AI PRIMER - An Explanation of Training Data in AI Systems

By Thomas Hamilton

Introduction

As a former attorney and now the VP of Strategy & Operations at a technology company doing ground breaking research in artificial intelligence (AI), I've had an advance view of both the benefits, and the pitfalls, of the current wave of AI technology which is now beginning to transform the practice of law. Because of this privileged vantage point I've been asked to share some of the insights I've learned over the past 4 years in this volume. Specifically, I've been asked to speak to the importance of data in the creation of AI systems – a concept that becomes more important every day as the scope and power of AI software increases exponentially.

I felt the best way to explore the importance of data sets would be to examine them in the same way that I initially came to learn of their importance – by starting with the basics. We'll first define AI broadly before examining the four pillars which comprise modern AI. From there we'll discuss how breakthroughs in deep learning, many of which were pioneered in my home province of Ontario, Canada, have in the last few years dramatically advanced what is possible with AI systems. From there, armed with a proper foundational understanding, we'll then turn to the role that data plays in both supervised and supervised learning systems, both at a general level and then specifically to law. Lastly we'll consider the risks and enormous possibilities that this data provides, now that we live in a world where the AI systems relying on it to make their decisions are becoming increasingly powerful.

PART 1: What is AI

In 2019 Artificial Intelligence is generally defined by AI researchers as software which learns to perform intelligent tasks which we previously believed only a human could perform. This is a useful definition in that it implicitly takes into account the fact that what society considers as AI is a constantly moving target. When Apple debuted their Siri voice recognition AI software in the iPhone 4s in 2011 it was seen as revolutionary technology. Now, less than a decade later, a smart phone coming equipped with voice recognition technology is simply a given and no longer considered by lay people as AI.

Broadly, when AI is being discussed in 2019, it is referring to 4 interrelated concepts: machine learning, natural language processing, vision recognition and speech recognition. Let's briefly examine each of these, before diving into the details

The first is machine learning, which underpins everything that is possible with modern AI systems. Machine learning describes the capacity for a software system to take data points, process them to improve performance of a task, and then create an improvement feedback loop wherein it can continue performing the task while continuously improving. The power of machine learning systems is that they now allow for software to learn to perform tasks they were never explicitly explained how to perform.

The second category is vision recognition, which is the capacity for software systems to interpret images, identify them and describe them. Through machine learning feedback loops, these vision recognition systems are now becoming highly sophisticated, but are not without error.

The third category is speech recognition, which is the capacity for a software system to speak and interpret oral language, allowing for back and forth interaction. Apple's Siri would be a great example.

Lastly is natural language processing, which is the capacity for a software system to understand human language. This means that the AI can interpret the actual meaning of human communication, allowing it to decipher intent and return highly relevant answers and search results to even very complex queries. It is recent advances in machine learning methods (described below) and natural language processing that have opened up enormous opportunities for AI technology in law.

While these 4 concepts have existed for some time, their real world applications have been severely limited due to insufficiency of computing power, data, and theoretical understanding of machine learning. While the purpose of this piece is to ultimately describe and discuss the role of training data in AI systems, this cannot be easily separated from the role of compute power and theoretical breakthroughs. Consequently, let's examine those in some detail, along with their interactions with Big Data, before then moving on to a substantial discussion of the role of training sets. Let's begin by examining the importance of recent breakthroughs in machine learning theory.

PART 2: What has made the AI revolution possible

Defining deep learning

Deep learning is a field of machine learning focused on designing algorithms that learn how to do things by looking at examples of how to do them (training data) rather than being instructed how to do them through explicit programming. As a subset of machine learning, deep learning focuses on computer algorithms which can both learn and improve on their own. These algorithms are called deep neural networks and are loosely inspired by the network of neurons in the human brain.

Defining neural nets

Traditionally, programmers enable computers to perform a task by explicitly writing the instructions of how to do it using a computer programming language. The inherent limitation in this process is that computer programmers can only program tasks which they know how to articulate logically, resulting in computer applications that solve only problems that their programmers already understand and know how to solve. In the past this was sufficient, but as the scope of our ambition with respect to what we expect software to be able to do has increased, this has proven a major limiting factor.

How do you tell a computer to recognize objects like tumors in CAT scans, for instance, and provide solutions to problems the programmer has never seen before and has little understanding of? In the past this sort of programming would have been impossible, but it is exactly these types of challenges which neural networks were built to tackle. On a high-level, neural networks function as a black box. Data is input on one end and the neural network then renders a response on the other end. Inside of this black box is a network of artificial neurons. When data is input, pathways in the network fire, producing a response.

At first, these responses are random like those in the brain of a newborn baby, but with time programmers are able to teach or "train" a neural network to intelligently respond. Returning to the CAT scan example, with sufficient training a neural network which is fed a CAT scan with a tumor present will return "positive". During training, machine intelligence engineers tune and refine how a neural network's pathways fire by comparing its responses to our desired responses in its training data (human-generated examples of correct responses). With the arrival of sufficient compute power, it is important to note that this tuning is not done by hand: It is done automatically by a training algorithm that analyzes millions or even billions of training examples. Once it finishes training, the network can give “intelligent” responses to similar inputs it has never seen before.

The concept of deep neural networks, then, is a marriage of the above concepts. In a similar way to the nerve cells (i.e. neurons) which make up the human brain, neural networks comprise layers (neurons) which are connected in adjacent layers to one another. The greater the number of layers, the “deeper” the neural network is.

Supervised and unsupervised learning

Neural networks learn through two separate and distinct methods (although in reality, often a hybrid approach is taken). Looking in a bit more detail about these neural networks learn will inform our later conversation on training sets, so let’s dive a bit deeper by first looking at what is known as supervised learning.

Supervised learning is the method of instructing a neural network through specifically labelled training data. To illustrate, let’s imagine that we want to use supervised learning to train our neural network to recognise photos which have at least one bird. The problem, of course, is that there are so many different types of birds, and very few of them look alike. Additionally, different photos of the same type of bird still might not show those birds at the same angle, resolution, or even in the same light. In order to get around this, we’ll create an enormous training set of thousands of images, some of which include birds and some of which do not. Each of those which include birds will be labelled “bird”, and those which do not include birds will be labelled “not bird.”

These images are fed into the neural network, which then converts each image into data, as neurons within the network assign different weights to different elements. Ultimately, the final output layer assembles and aggregates these elements and states either “bird” or “not bird.” If it gives the wrong answer, then the neural network will make note of its error and go back and adjust the weightings that its neurons have provided. This process, repeated at scale ad infinitum, will begin to train the neural network on identifying birds all without having ever been explicitly instructed how to do so.

Let’s now take a look at unsupervised learning. Unlike with supervised learning which involves intensive labelling of data, unsupervised learning uses completely unlabeled data. Because it does not involve training sets, the goal of unsupervised learning is to discover hidden trends and patterns in the data or to extract desired features, which is why it has such enormous potential in the face of massive data sets. In situations where it is either impossible or impractical for a human to propose trends in the data, unsupervised learning can provide initial insights that can then be used to test individual hypotheses.

At a high level, this is generally done using methods drawn from statistics, such as clustering, anomaly detecting and probability. Interestingly, as these systems have increased in sophistication and following high profile breakthroughs by groups such as Google’s Deep Mind team, knowledge from biological neuroscience is now being successfully used to push the boundaries of what is possible in computational neuroscience.

Because of the pros and cons of both approaches, many complex solutions require a solution that falls somewhere in between the two methods. This semi-supervised learning solution is able to access reference data where it exists, while leveraging unsupervised learning techniques to make best guesses in the short term while also unearthing unexpected insights.

Recently, the above theoretical work gathered significant momentum and practical application through the creation and refinement of convolutional neural networks, as well as the continued pioneering work by a number of researchers in the field.

The big data revolution

Big Information and Big Data are pretty much synonymous. They refer to the vast volumes of data that our computers have collected and produced like financial transactions, videos, emails, texts, call records, medical records, etc. Analytics refers to the set of techniques that we have to analyze and model this data. Deep learning is just one of these analytical methods.

We'll examine the role of data in more detail below, but for now the key takeaway should be that prior to the arrival of computer systems collecting and sharing enormous quantities of information, AI systems rarely had sufficient data to perform complex tasks even if the theoretical breakthroughs in deep learning, and sufficient compute power, had both been present. Additionally of note has been the proliferation of large, standardized data sets such as those created through Image Net.

The continued computing power revolution

The final concept which has led to the current surge of AI technology is the arrival of sufficient compute power at affordable rates. The famous Moore's Law states that the number of transistors on a microchip have historically doubled every two years while at the same time the cost of computers is halved. At present, the doubling of transistors occurs roughly every 18 months. This means that the hardware powering the AI algorithms discussed above continues to improve at such a speed that even with no additional theoretical breakthroughs we would continue to see the power of AI systems increase.

PART 3: What is the role of data in AI?

Raw data is the input of a ML system, and is the fuel which makes AI systems runs. Without data there is no AI. As discussed above, it wasn't until the arrival of Big Data that many of the modern breakthroughs in AI application became possible.

Big Data refers to the vast volumes of information that our computers collect and produce. Since the internet revolution, Big Data has grown exponentially in size and scope and includes but is not limited to records of financial transactions, videos, emails, text messages, call records, medical records, publicly available government records, vast troves of information on online search and click patterns, and many other varied sources of data.

Because of the exponential growth in both Big Data as well as compute power, the potential for deep learning methods continues to grow at a blistering speed, as do the size and scope of the risks created by these systems as they scale enormously in their capabilities.

Risks with data

Risks with bias in training data for supervised learning systems

Broadly, there exists two risks with the data used with your AI system. Let's begin with the simpler of the two - issues with training data used in the supervised learning of an ML system.

Training data serves as the textbook which teaches a supervised learning system how to perform a specific task. Training data can be used in a number of different ways, all with the ultimate goal of increasing the accuracy of an AI system's predictions. It accomplishes this goal through the variables outlined in the data, and in identifying and categorizing these variables and evaluating their impact on an AI algorithm, data scientists are able to strengthen a supervised learning system through many rounds of subsequent adjustments. Consequently, the best data will be extremely rich in detail, which will allow it to continue improving your AI system even after hundreds of rounds of training cycles.

There are generally three risks associated with the use of training data. The first is poorly labelled / messy data.

You'll remember that the majority of training data will contain pairs of input information and corresponding labeled answers (i.e. in our example earlier, this would be "bird" and "no bird"). . In some fields, it will also have highly relevant tags, which will help your AI to make more accurate predictions.

The first risk is that your data set itself was poorly labelled due to human error and forgetfulness. For instance, perhaps you were using unpaid summer interns to tag your photos with "bird" and "bird" and some of the labelling was done sloppily and includes false positives. More importantly, imagine a substantially more complex set of training data, and how much attention to detail would be required. Perhaps the underlying information wasn't properly compiled as well, meaning that some of the students never received the photos they were expected to be labelling. There are a myriad of ways in which human error or organizational issues can unintentionally skew data sets.

A common refrain, which will apply to a number of the examples we will be discussing, is the concept of "garbage in, garbage out." Remember that if data is the fuel of an AI system, if you put in messy, incomplete or outright wrong data, the accuracy of your AI system's prediction models will suffer accordingly.

If issues with messy data are our first step into the world of data risk, the next would be a complete training data set, but which is biased. To illustrate, let's once again begin with a simplistic example - in this case text recognition.

Neural networks are now being created to suggest the topic of a sentence. Let's imagine two sentences:

"Down the first 11 rounds, heavy weight champ rallies to deliver a crushing KO in the 12th"

"New legislation means that online gambling is now sometimes legal in Kansas"

Most readers would agree that these two sentences fall fairly cut and dry into obvious high level buckets. The first would be categorized as "sports" and the second as "legal." But let's now imagine that these examples become a bit more complex, and are being tagged by someone who is required by their job to tag hundreds of these sentences per hour. Imagine the sentences now say:

"Down the first 11 rounds, heavy weight champ rallies to deliver a crushing KO in the 12th to an opponent who was no longer defending themselves and is still in intensive care 48 hours later - police investigation into foul play now underway"

"New legislation means that online gambling on college sports will be legal in Kansas with tax proceeds to provide scholarships for elite athletes to attend Kansas division 1 schools"

Here it becomes more difficult to agree on how you might tag these sentences as one category. Certainly the first still is about a sporting event, but it appears to be veering into a criminal investigation so could conceivably be tagged as "legal." The second sentence still involves the legality of online betting, but that discussion now could be viewed as secondary to the impact that legislation will have on college sports in Kansas.

These simple examples show the issues inherent with subjectivity in creation of training sets, and the difficulty in controlling for this bias.

Lastly, insufficient amounts of training data can also cause problems as a supervised learning system will not have sufficient data to make intelligent decisions. While this risk has decreased over time as AI systems become more sophisticated and consequently require less training data, it is still an important consideration.

Risks with data for Unsupervised Learning Systems
Just as the potential for unsupervised learning systems is enormous in the law, the risks are equally large. Let's begin with a simple example before looking at broader implications and some real world examples.

The law, especially in common law jurisdictions where so much of the legal logic supporting a decision is written down and available to a researcher, is an extraordinarily rich data set for machine learning systems, especially those with a strong basis in Natural Language Processing. By simply uploading all of published and unpublished case law from a given state in the last 100 years, our AI systems could give us correlations and probabilities for different sentencing verdicts that could potentially save overworked judges, clerks, attorneys and paralegals thousands of hours per year. This could have the benefit of both reducing the workload of the overburdened judicial system, while also reducing the burden shouldered by tax payers while in fact increasing the accuracy and thoroughness of judicial decision making.

Unfortunately, the above would only be true if the data (in this case, the sum total of all case law over the past 100 years) was free of any bias. As we saw above, garbage in garbage out. So just as a supervised learning system will run into issues where patterns of sloppy tagging or unintentional bias creep into the creation of the training data, so too will unsupervised learning systems fail to provide objectively accurate and fair predictions when the underlying data that is being input is rife with bias. There are numerous, well documented examples bias in judicial decision making.

While the legal profession has rightly steered away from fully automating decisions based on past case law, one need look no farther than the recent disasters in automated loan approval systems or AI hiring algorithms to understand the speed with which pernicious biases built upon decades of implicit sexism, racism, homophobia and any number of other biases hidden in past codified decisions will wildly skew the decisions of an AI system basing its decisions on that biased data.

The scope of this risk increases exponentially as we move away from the current era of narrow applications of artificial intelligence (AI software that can outperform a human at a very narrowly defined task such as winning a game of chess, flagging problematic provisions in contract review, tagging photos that include a car, etc.) into what is known as general artificial intelligence (AI software that can outperform a human at complex, multi-faceted tasks that also involve some degree of "intuition" or "common sense"). While the claims of the impending AI apocalypse are sensationalized and in many instances irresponsibly spread by the vendors of out of date legal technology, they do include a kernel of truth and should not be taken lightly.

On the other hand, law as a profession should not stand idly by as AI transforms other industries, professions and cultural forces for the better. Chat bot technology being used to increase the speed and quality of service for major airlines should adopted where possible to do the same for legal aid clinics. Sentiment analysis technology used to identify rogue actors inside of a large corporation should also be used by lawyers and researchers to unearth previously hidden trends of judicial bias. Lastly, natural language processing technology breakthroughs that are changing journalism and web search should be also available to attorneys no longer interested in slogging through hours or unproductive and inaccurate research.

Conclusion

The field of AI research, while many decades old, is undergoing a kind of renaissance through the confluence of several factors and appears to be only beginning to reach its full potential.

While we are likely many years away from even primitive forms of general AI, the current era of strong narrow AI systems is already dramatically streamlining and modernizing the practice of law in ways in which even a few years ago lawyers across the world told me were impossible. Within a few more years, these AI systems will have not only continued to improve by virtue of being machine learning systems, but will also have moved beyond the "early adopter" phase into mainstream usage.

I see the publication of this short essay as a wonderful sign that we are well on our way towards this very near future where AI provides a set of tools that are both understood by the average lawyer but also employed by them to provide better, faster and more accurate client service. The law is a wonderfully abundant source of data that if harnessed correctly and ethically can bring about almost unimaginably positive change for the average citizen's access to both legal information as well as affordable and high quality legal services. I hope you've enjoyed reading this short piece even half as much as I've enjoyed writing it, and will carry the information I've shared with you in the months and years to come when assessing and implementing these AI systems in your work and your home.

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Measuring the safety impact of road infrastructure systems on driver behavior: Vehicle instrumentation and real world driving experiment

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ABSTRACT
Featured in this pilot experimental study is the construction and design of an instrumented vehicle that is able to capture vehicle trajectory data with an extremely high level of accuracy and time resolution. Once constructed and properly instrumented, the various data collection systems were integrated with one another and a driving experiment was conducted on northern Virginia roadways with 18 participants taking part in the study. Trajectory data were collected for each of the drivers as they traversed a predefined loop of four roadway segments with varying numbers of lanes and varying shoulder widths. Data collected from the experiment were then used to calibrate the parameters of the prospect theory car-following model through a genetic algorithm calibration procedure. Once all model parameters were successfully calibrated, significance testing was carried out to determine the impacts that the varying roadway infrastructure had on driving behavior. Results indicated that there were significant changes in behavior when comparing one lane roadways to their two lane counterparts—specifically in cases where the roadway featured a wide shoulder. Additional testing was conducted to ensure that there was no variation based on gender, as nine study participants were female and nine were male. The successfulness of this first study conducted with the newly constructed instrumented vehicle creates the opportunity for a variety of additional studies to be conducted in the future.

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Introduction

Roadway infrastructure impacts driving behavior, which, in turn, has significant implications when analyzing vehicle-to-vehicle interactions and assessing macroscopic transportation network performance. The main question of interest is: How does the road surrounding environment impact the aggressive (risk attitudes) driving behavior from a traffic flow theory perspective? In order to address this question, the objective of this research is to conduct a real-world driving experiment featuring a vehicle instrumented to collect trajectory, location, and vehicle diagnostic data. Data from this experiment are then utilized to explicitly formulate the structure of the relationship between various car-following model parameters and one of the geometric features (shoulder width/number of lanes) shown to be significant in previous studies (Hamdar & Schorr, 2013).

Motivation and contribution

If total collisions are considered a surrogate measure for safety, the motivation for the examination of the different factors leading to unsafe driving conditions is highlighted by the 5,615,000 collisions that occurred on United States roadways in 2012 (an increase from the previous 3 years) (NHTSA, 2014). Additionally, these collisions resulted in 33,561 fatalities (an increase from the previous 2 years), and when considering vehicles miles traveled (VMT) as a measure of congestion—the problem is exacerbated as the total VMT in 2012 was 2,969 billion, producing a fatality rate of 1.13 fatalities per 100 million vehicle miles traveled (both the total VMT and the fatality rate have increased over the previous 2 years) (NHTSA, 2014). What becomes clear is that roadways are trending in a direction that is both less safe and increasingly congested. Various methods of vehicle instrumentation have been utilized over the past 40 years in an effort to gain additional insights into the factors that contribute to decreased safety on roadways (Lenne, 2013). New technologies allow for faster and more accurate data collection methods, which allow for a more detailed examination of driver behavior. It is up to research practitioners to demonstrate the capabilities of new data collection methods and to identify the

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potential applications in terms of safety, congestion, and driver behavior (among others).

Objectives

The main objective of this study is to demonstrate how data collected by a highly accurate instrumented vehicle can be used to enrich our understanding of the impact that changes in roadway geometry have on driving behavior. To realize this main goal, the specific objectives of this study are as follows:

- Construct an instrumented vehicle such that trajectory and headway data can be collected at a high time resolution and subsequently synced together.
- Design a real-world driving experiment utilizing the instrumented vehicle on roadway segments with varying geometric characteristics.
- Calibrate the parameters of the prospect theory model using the data gathered from the driving experiment.
- Determine the impacts that specific roadway geometric characteristics have on driving behavior through statistical analysis of calibrated model parameters.

Background

While data-driven approaches (predominately focused around the modeling and evaluation of collision data) are commonplace in the transportation research community, new and affordable technologies have led to advancements in the collection of real-time driving data. The quantification of driving behavior in real time is an important advancement in the assessment of roadway safety—allowing for new insights through a variety of different methodologies and their subsequent applications. Three main approaches are used for the collection of real-time data: driver simulators, naturalistic studies, and instrumented vehicles, all of which have an associated set of pros and cons.

Driver simulators have been used extensively in a wide range of applications including (but not limited to) assessment of driver distraction (Young et. al, 2013), the performance of active safety and information systems (Liu & Wen, 2004; Ma, Smith, & Fontaine, 2015), and the evaluation of impaired drivers (Akerstedt, Peters, Anund, & Kecklund, 2005), as well as those with certain medical conditions (Frittelli et al., 2009). Driver simulators are particularly useful as they allow for simulated driving experiences to be conducted in a safe and controlled environment where various scenarios (including complicated and high-risk environments) can be created and held constant for all participants in a given study (Bifulco, Pariota, Galante, & Fiorentino, 2012). However, the obvious drawback to these studies is that they do not take place on actual roadways and are unable to capture the natural interactions that occur between drivers in the real-world environment (Carston, Kircher, & Jamson, 2013). As such, on-road data collection methods such as naturalistic studies and instrumented vehicles are becoming increasingly popular in order to better understand road safety crash risks and risk factors (Lenne, 2013).

Naturalistic approaches utilize unobtrusive methods (typically in participants' own vehicles) to collect data in real traffic conditions (Lenne, 2013). Again, the applications of naturalistic studies are vast, including (but not limited to) the examination of risks to heavy vehicle operators through the use of data acquisition systems, internal and external cameras, and daily activity registers (Soccolich et al., 2013); assessment of heavy vehicle operator response to a forward collision warning system through the use of gaze monitoring and brake pedal position (Wege, Will, & Victor, 2013); examination of older driver engagement in secondary activities at intersections through the use of a video camera system as well as a vehicle diagnostic logging system (Charlton, Catchlove, Scully, Koppel, & Newstead, 2013); analysis of rapid deceleration events for older drivers through the use of a custom driver monitor system that featured a two-axis accelerometer (Keay et al., 2013); and impacts of a forward distance warning system on car driving performance through the Australian Transport Accident Commission's SafeCar project (Young et al., 2007). Naturalistic studies allow for the collection of large amounts of data (in terms of both the number of participants and the number of trips made) over an extended period of time. Furthermore, the instruments used to collect data are unobtrusive (Heuer et al., 2010), and these types of studies do not require a researcher to be present in the vehicle during data collection (the collection of these "baseline" data is intended to reflect "normal driving"; Carsten et al., 2013). However, practical and analytical challenges can impact naturalistic studies, as data sets are large and complicated, often requiring the processing of hundreds or even thousands of hours of vehicle-based and video data (Lenne, 2013). Additionally, since no variables are controlled by the researcher, causal conclusions cannot be drawn from naturalistic driving studies (Carsten et al., 2013).

Similar to naturalistic studies, field operational tests (FOT) are long-range studies and again involve some sort of instrumentation. In these studies objective data on situation and behavior are collected through an automated process and subjective data are usually collected manually or electronically (Carsten et al., 2013). These studies have been used to make a variety of observations on driving behavior, including the evaluation of the safety impacts associated with adaptive cruise control (Rakha, Hankey, Patterson, & Van Aerde, 2001). In addition to the studies mentioned to this point, controlled on-road studies involving instrumented vehicles offer opportunities for unique data collection through the use of multiple methods (Lenne, 2013). These controlled on-road studies are defined by their reliance on a predetermined route in order to identify differences in performance and behavior under varying driving conditions (Carsten et al., 2013). Furthermore, from a behavior perspective, field studies utilizing instrumented vehicles are frequently regarded as the ultimate validation stage for assessing behavioral models, safety measures, and improved road infrastructure design (Santos, Merat, Mouta, Brookhuis, & De Waard, 2005), as well as addressing their adoption. Still, the potential drawbacks of these controlled on-road studies must be mentioned, as the studies do not collect data over a long time period (Lenne, 2013) and many require a researcher to be present in the vehicle (potentially impacting the driver's behavior) (Lenne, 2013; Carsten et al., 2013). With that being said, these types of studies are well suited to address research questions that are independent of exposure and that utilize independent factors that are stable over shorter periods of time (such as age and personality), and are excellent tools in the early stages of system development and FOT design (one example of this being a situation where drivers' headway is impacted, and thus the need for additional sensors [such as LIDAR sensors] is required; Carsten et al., 2013). Examples of studies utilizing this type of instrumented vehicle data collection include examination of the number and nature of errors committed by drivers in distracted and undistracted states (Young, Salmon, & Cornelissen, 2013), analysis of the situational awareness of both novice and experienced drivers at rail crossings (Salmon, Lenné, Young, & Walker, 2013), and evaluation of an intersection violation warning system (Neale, Perez, Lee, & Doerzaph, 2007; Brewer, Koopmann, & Najm, 2011). In addition, instrumented vehicles have been used in driver training through the benchmarking of experienced drivers (Underwood, 2013).

In addition to the behavioral applications mentioned already, driver simulators, field studies, and instrumented vehicles can allow for collection of trajectory data in order to assess and calibrate car-following models. Car-following models describe the behavior of the following vehicle as a function of the lead vehicle's trajectory, allowing for estimation or prediction of the following vehicle's trajectory in response to the actions of the lead vehicle (Soria, Elefteriadou, & Kondyli, 2014). Driver simulator experiments have been conducted to evaluate car-following behavior under both normal and evacuation scenarios (Xu, Kuan Yang, Hua Zhao, & Jie Li, 2012), and field tests have been conducted using loop detector data to determine distance gaps under different congestion regimes (Dijker, Bovy, & Vermijs, 1998). While these types of studies are most certainly useful in understanding car-following behavior, instrumented vehicles allow for more detailed data collection and thus have been used frequently in both data collection and calibration efforts (Soria et al., 2014).

Examples of instrumented vehicles being used for data collection and the assessment of driver behavior variability in car-following include two studies by Brackstone, Sultan, and McDonald (2002, 2009), where headways for drivers following the instrumented vehicle were recorded in the first study, and then the research was extended (in the second study) to study the factors that influence the decision-making process of car following. While the drivers in Brackstone's studies knew they were part of an experiment, Kim et al. (2007) used an instrumented vehicle equipped with an infrared sensor, a differential global positioning system (DGPS) inertial distance measuring instrument, a vehicle computer, and a digital video camera to measure the position, speed, and acceleration (as well as demographic information collected from the video recordings) of the following vehicles, whose drivers were unaware that they were being monitored as part of the study. In an effort to quantify driver reaction times, Ma and Andreasson (2006) equipped a vehicle developed by Volvo Technologies with a GPS system, an on-board computer, two LIDAR sensors (facing front and rear), and cameras corresponding to the sensors. The study was conducted on Stockholm, Sweden, roadways, and the "follow-the-leader" behaviors of random vehicles behind the instrumented vehicle were observed.

Once data from instrumented vehicles are collected, the next step in evaluating car-following models is the calibration stage. One such study was conducted by Panwai and Dia (2005), who evaluated AIMSUN, PARAMICS, and VISSIM models using instrumented vehicle data collected in Stuttgart, Germany. In this case, the instrumented vehicle was equipped with radars to record the differences in speed and headway between the instrumented vehicle and the vehicle immediately in front of it (Manstetten, Krautter, & Schwab, 1997). Similarly, Punzo and Simonelli (2005) examined Newell's model, the Gipps model, an intelligent driver model, and the MITSIM model though the use of trajectory data recorded from four instrumented vehicles. Here, the four vehicles were all instrumented with GPS devices and Global Navigation Satellite System receivers (GLONASS) to record vehicle spacing data and drove in a platoon on both urban and "Sextraurban" roadways in Naples, Italy (Punzo, Formisano, & Torrieri, 2005). One final example of a study focused around car-following model calibration



Figure 1. Vehicle instrumentation.

using data from instrumented vehicles was conducted by Soria et al. (2014). Here, a Honda Pilot sports utility vehicle (SUV) was equipped with four wide-coverage digital cameras, a Honeywell mobile digital recorder, a GPS system, and a laptop to record geographical position, speed, spacing, left–right turn signal activation, video clips, and audio recordings. The instrumented vehicle was positioned as the follower and only the front camera was used to determine the spacing between the leader and the follower (Soria et al., 2014). The authors then used the data obtained from the instrumented vehicle to calibrate the Gipps model, the Pitt model, the MITSIM model, and the modified Pitt model.

Research methodology

Vehicle instrumentation

The instrumented vehicle used for data collection in this experiment is comprised of three systems working in unison: a LIDAR system, a DGPS system, and an on-board diagnostics (OBD) monitoring system. Data from all three systems are received by an in-vehicle laptop, which generates a local time stamp for synchronization purposes. A schematic for the vehicle instrumentation (overlaid on a laser scan of the actual vehicle) is provided in Figure 1; Table 1 then lists the various components.

Table 1. Vehicle instrumentation key.

Instruments		
Number	Instrument name	Data collected
1	Lidar sensors (2)	Trajectory data
2	DGPS antenna	Vehicle position data
3	External computing unit	
4	Sync box	
5	Ethernet switch	
6	DGPS receiver	Vehicle position data
7	Power box	
8	Laptop	
9	On-board diagnostics logger	Vehicle diagnostic data

Experimental setup

The driving experiment in this study allows for observation of moment-by-moment local interactions among drivers, and measures drivers' preferred traffic measures with known attributes (gender, age, and attitude). Furthermore, experimental set-up involves testing one of the exogenous geometric factors shown to impact safety. For this pilot study, the authors have selected shoulder width and the number of lanes as the test variables, and a driving experiment was conducted in an interrupted flow scenario. In order to combat the potential impact that other geometric factors may have on experimental results, the selected roadway segments were all at least 1 mile in length and featured changes in both vertical and horizontal alignment. Figure 2 displays a GoogleEarth image of the northern Virginia roadway segments selected for this experiment generated by the differential GPS data recorded during experimentation. The black line in the figure is the actual DGPS path traveled by a study participant, and the base stations zdc11910 and lwx11910 (used to increase the accuracy of the DGPS recordings) are seen in the top left and bottom center of the figure. Additionally, each of the four segments is highlighted in the figure where the red lines mark the start and/or end point of a segment. Segment 1 is a two-lane roadway with a wide shoulder, segment 2 is a one-lane roadway with a wide shoulder, segment 3 is a two lane roadway with a narrow shoulder, and segment 4 is a one-lane roadway with a narrow shoulder.

For the experiment, 18 drivers (nine males and nine females between the ages of 20 and 33 years) drove the instrumented vehicle through all four roadway segments. Drivers were instructed to behave as they would normally, with the exception that they were not permitted to pass the lead vehicle at any point during the test run. While it would be impossible to conduct all test runs in identical traffic conditions, a no-passing restriction was imposed by instructing drivers to imagine that, when on the two lane segments, there was a stream of vehicles next to them such that they could not pass the lead vehicle. This restriction was imposed as to try to create a similar traffic flow scenario for all study participants and to eliminate data collection problems associated with free-flowing vehicles (no leader). The lead vehicle was operated by an author of this study and speed was varied (±7 mph from the posted speed limit) on as consistent a basis as possible (given the surrounding traffic conditions), at approximately the same locations throughout each of the four segments.



Figure 2. Roadway segments used in this pilot study. Roadway segment image is courtesy of GoogleEarth, retrieved July 23, 2014.

Modeling and calibration

Drivers evaluate their acceleration choice options based on the resulting potential gains and losses. Prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) has been used to model this decision-making process (Hamdar, Treiber, Mahmassani, & Kesting, 2008). Here, drivers frame the stimulus where different utilities are assigned to different acceleration choices considering different weights for gains and losses, and then "edit" the choices based on a prospect index calculated in the same way as expected utility are calculated. The prospect theory value function is formulated as:

$$U_{PT}\left(a_n\right) = \frac{\left[w_m + (1 - w_m)\left(\tanh\left(\frac{a_n}{a_0}\right) + 1\right)\right]}{2} \times \left[\frac{\left(\frac{a_n}{a_0}\right)}{1 + \left(\frac{a_n}{a_0}\right)^2}\right]^{\gamma} \quad (1)$$

where U_{PT} is the acceleration value function, a_0 is the normalization parameter, $\gamma > 0$ is a sensitivity exponent indicating how sensitive a driver is towards gains or losses in travel times (i.e., speeds), and w_m is the relative weight of losses compared to the gains. Here, a driver choosing a_n as his or her desired acceleration will gain U_{PT} unless he or she is involved in a rear-end collision. The value of a_0 is set as a constant equal to 1 m/s^2. This non-varied model parameter indicates the subjective scale of the acceleration: accelerations $|\dot{v}_{\text{int}}| < a_0$ are considered to be "near the reference point," leading to increased sensitivity. In other words, this parameter may be considered as the scaling unit of the acceleration to be used inside exponentials or noninteger powers requiring dimensionless arguments (i.e., Eq. (1)). Furthermore, a crash seriousness term $k(v, \Delta v)$ is used to calculate the disutility resulting from a crash as follows:

$$U\left(a_n\right) = \left(1 - p_{n,i}\right) U_{PT}\left(a_n\right) - \mathrm{p}_{\mathrm{n,i}} w_c \mathrm{k}\left(v, \Delta v\right) \quad (2)$$

where $p_{n,i}$ is the subjective probability of driver i in vehicle n being involved in a crash at the end of a car-following duration; $p_{n,i}$ is approximated by a normal distribution given that drivers are assumed to estimate the future speed $v_{n-1}(t + \Delta t)$ of vehicle $n - 1$ to be normally distributed with a mean equal to the current speed $v_{n-1}(t)$ and a standard deviation of $\alpha * v_{n-1}(t)$ (α is a velocity uncertainty parameter); $U_{PT}(a_n)$ is derived from Eq. 1; and w_c is a crash weighting function which is lower for drivers willing to take a higher risk. The value of $k(v,\Delta v)$ is set equal to 1 for simplicity since the model estimations are only based on velocity. Regarding w_c, a higher w_c corresponds to conservative individuals while a lower value corresponds to drivers willing to take a higher risk; this parameter is the subjective weighing factor associated with a collision-related loss (i.e., collision weight). A more elaborate explanation of the model parameters may be found in Hamdar, Mahmassani, and Treiber (2015).

Additionally, a logistic functional form given here is employed to reveal the stochastic nature of acceleration choice:

$$f(a_n) = \left\{ \frac{e^{(\beta_{PT} \times U(a_n))}}{\int_{a_{min}}^{a_{max}} e^{(\beta_{PT} \times U(a'))} da'} ,\ a_{min} \le a_n \le a_{max} \right. \quad (3)$$

where β_{PT} is the sensitivity of choice to the total utility and $f(a_n)$ is the probability density function. The physical meanings of the estimated parameters given in the fourth section are listed Table 2.

These safety parameters are all estimated from the experimental data using 1–3 presented in the preceding and the calibration method defined next using Eq. 4.

Trajectory data recorded by the instrumented vehicle (velocity, acceleration and space headway) at a resolution of 0.1 s is used to calibrate the model just presented.

Table 2. Physical meanings of estimated parameters.

Parameter	Description
Γ	Driver sensitivity of gains or losses (in travel times)
w_m	Driver's relative weight of losses compared to gains (risk aversion)
w_c	Crash weighting function
B	Driver sensitivity to surrounding environment (impatience)
α	Driver uncertainty of leading vehicle's velocity

Since headway data were not always recorded at the same time resolution as the vehicle motion data, values were interpolated based on the change in vehicle velocity between recorded headway values. Calibration was then performed on a segment-by-segment basis for each driver using a genetic algorithm procedure. Genetic algorithm calibration falls under the umbrella of artificial intelligence systems—an evolving field of research that has definite applications in the transportation research community, including the calibration of car-following models (Colombaroni & Fusco, 2013). Defining the architecture of the genetic algorithm calibration procedure (Hamdar, 2009), the fitness function takes the following form:

$$F_{mix}\left[v^{sim}\right] = \sqrt{\frac{1}{\left|v^{data}\right|} \frac{\left(v^{sim} - v^{data}\right)^2}{\left|v^{data}\right|}} \quad (4)$$

where v^{sim} is the experimental data (time series), v^{data} is the empirical data (time series), and $\langle . \rangle$ is the temporal average of a time series of duration ΔT. The fitness function has a mixed form, as it considers both the relative error (sensitive to differences at individual time steps) and the absolute error (sensitive to differences in the time series as a whole). Furthermore, chromosomes represent sets of the target calibration parameters, and at each chromosome generation, fitness is determined by the mixed error function just shown (greedy selection is used to select the parameters with the 10 best fitness scores). Chromosomes are then generated from these parents and then recombined to generate children, with a crossover point chosen through random selection, and (excluding the chromosome with the single best fitness score) genes are mutated (random selection) with a probability and rate of 10%. Initially, a fixed number of generations are evaluated, and the process is terminated when the fitness score drops below 10% or there is no improvement for 20 consecutive chromosome generations.

Results and discussion

Calibration results and significance testing

Table 3 displays the descriptive statistics for the calibration results. This includes the average and standard deviation values for the calibration parameter, velocity, and

Table 3. Descriptive statistics for all segments.

Segment	Stat	Vel (m/s)	Space (m)	Head (s)	ψ	γ	Wm	Wc	Tmax	α	β	Tcorr	RT (s)	Vel error
1	Avg	15.18	33.03	2.21	5.97	0.73	3.66	89833	5.26	0.21	6.33	17.83	0.63	0.173
	Dev	1.60	7.94	0.66	3.73	0.62	2.18	23796	1.57	0.09	3.39	5.23	0.73	0.074
2	Avg	13.99	33.09	2.41	5.40	1.09	2.83	97944	4.83	0.11	7.08	20.39	0.36	0.100
	Dev	1.07	13.12	1.14	4.90	0.72	1.98	16913	2.07	0.06	2.81	4.02	0.36	0.056
3	Avg	14.71	30.52	2.10	5.64	0.63	4.11	95000	5.16	0.19	5.60	20.83	0.72	0.169
	Dev	1.14	6.99	0.55	4.50	0.46	2.24	25752	0.91	0.06	2.90	4.59	0.53	0.072
4	Avg	15.70	29.69	1.90	4.27	0.71	3.94	100778	5.67	0.13	6.63	20.22	0.62	0.137
	Dev	1.50	7.46	0.48	3.91	0.58	2.46	19283	1.72	0.06	3.03	3.81	0.47	0.059

Table 4. Descriptive statistics for number of lanes.

Lanes	Stat	Vel (m/s)	Space (m)	Head (s)	ψ	γ	Wm	Wc	Tmax	α	β	Tcorr	RT (s)	Vel error
1	Avg	14.84	31.39	2.16	4.83	0.90	3.39	99361	5.25	0.12	6.86	20.31	0.49	0.119
2	Avg	14.95	31.77	2.15	5.81	0.68	3.88	92417	5.21	0.20	5.96	19.33	0.68	0.171

Table 5. Descriptive statistics for shoulder widths.

Shoulder	Stat	Vel (m/s)	Space (m)	Head (s)	ψ	γ	Wm	Wc	Tmax	α	β	Tcorr	RT (s)	Vel error
Wide	Avg	14.58	33.06	2.31	5.68	0.91	3.25	93889	5.05	0.16	6.71	19.11	0.49	0.137
Narrow	Avg	15.21	30.10	2.00	4.96	0.67	4.02	97889	5.42	0.16	6.11	20.53	0.67	0.153

Table 6. Descriptive statistics for males and females.

Gender	Stat	Vel (m/s)	Space (m)	Head (s)	ψ	γ	Wm	Wc	Tmax	α	β	Tcorr	RT(s)	Vel error
Female	Avg	15.01	27.00	1.82	5.48	0.62	3.49	94861	5.25	0.14	6.68	20.06	0.653	0.143
Male	Avg	14.78	36.16	2.49	5.16	0.96	3.78	96917	5.21	0.18	6.14	19.58	0.514	0.147

space and time headways for each segment. Additionally, these descriptive statistics are provided for geometric characteristics (number of lanes and shoulder width) and gender in Tables 4, 5, and 6, respectively.

The parameters listed in the tables that are not previously defined are the reaction time (RT), driver's anticipation/maximum anticipation time horizon T_{max}, and correlation time of intra-driver variability T_{corr}. Parameter T_{corr} is calibrated once the acceleration distribution is known by using the Wiener Process (Mehdi, 1994).

In order to interpret the statistical significance of the change in calibration parameters based on number of lanes, shoulder width and gender, multiple multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) tests were conducted (using the SAS software). Results of the MANOVA test indicate whether or not you can reject the null hypothesis—the null hypothesis being that a certain exogenous characteristic has no statistically significant impact on the change in calibration parameters. For statistical significance and the rejection of the null hypothesis, the *p* value must be less than .05. Table 7 displays the MANOVA results for the impacts of number of lanes, shoulder width, and gender on the calibration parameters. In addition, the impact of changing segments is included at the top of this table to demonstrate that the null hypothesis can be rejected for the change in segments. If the null hypothesis could not be rejected for the changing segments as a whole, then there would be no statistical significance of the calibration results for this study.

From the table, it is clear that a change in the number of lanes has the most statistically significant impact

Table 7. General MANOVA testing.

	Segment		
Statistic	Value	*F* Value	*p* Value
Wilks' lambda	0.484	1.84	0.0106
Pillai's trace	0.615	1.78	0.0146
Hotelling–Lawley trace	0.872	1.90	0.0094
Roy's greatest root	0.571	3.93	0.0005
Shoulder width statistic			
Wilks' lambda	0.784	1.90	0.0684
Pillai's trace	0.216	1.90	0.0684
Hotelling–Lawley trace	0.276	1.90	0.0684
Roy's greatest root	0.276	1.90	0.0684
Lanes statistic			
Wilks' lambda	0.688	3.13	0.0036
Pillai's trace	0.312	3.13	0.0036
Hotelling–Lawley trace	0.454	3.13	0.0036
Roy's greatest root	0.454	3.13	0.0036
Gender statistic			
Wilks' lambda	0.787	1.86	0.0745
Pillai's trace	0.213	1.86	0.0745
Hotelling–Lawley trace	0.271	1.86	0.0745
Roy's greatest root	0.271	1.86	0.0745

Table 8. MANOVA testing for changing number of lanes based on shoulder width.

No shoulder—Changing lanes			
Statistic	Value	*F* Value	*p* Value
Wilks' lambda	0.717	1.14	0.3704
Pillai's trace	0.283	1.14	0.3704
Hotelling–Lawley trace	0.395	1.14	0.3704
Roy's greatest root	0.395	1.14	0.3704
Wide shoulder—Changing lanes			
Statistic	Value	*F* Value	*p* Value
Wilks' lambda	0.555	2.31	0.0458
Pillai's trace	0.445	2.31	0.0458
Hotelling–Lawley trace	0.801	2.31	0.0458
Roy's greatest root	0.801	2.31	0.0458

on the change in the calibration parameters. With this in mind, the data set was separated based on shoulder width and a MANOVA test was again conducted for the number of lanes. These results are displayed in Table 8.

Here, it is clear that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected when considering a change in the number of lanes on roadways with narrow shoulders, but it can be rejected for a change in the number of lanes on roadways with wide shoulders.

Finally, to ensure that there was no statistically significant difference based on gender, a final MANOVA test was carried out for each segment using gender as the dependent variable. These results (Table 9) demonstrate that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected based on gender for any of the segments.

Table 9. MANOVA testing based on gender by segment.

Segment 1—Gender			
Statistic	Value	*F* Value	*p* Value
Wilks' lambda	0.364	1.56	0.2725
Pillai's trace	0.636	1.56	0.2725
Hotelling–Lawley trace	1.749	1.56	0.2725
Roy's greatest root	1.749	1.56	0.2725
Segment 2—Gender			
Statistic	Value	*F* Value	*p* Value
Wilks' lambda	0.235	2.90	0.0745
Pillai's trace	0.765	2.90	0.0745
Hotelling–Lawley trace	3.258	2.90	0.0745
Roy's greatest root	3.258	2.90	0.0745
Segment 3—Gender			
Statistic	Value	*F* Value	*p* Value
Wilks' lambda	0.372	1.50	0.2895
Pillai's trace	0.628	1.50	0.2895
Hotelling–Lawley trace	1.687	1.50	0.2895
Roy's greatest root	1.687	1.50	0.2895
Segment 4—Gender			
Statistic	Value	*F* Value	*p* Value
Wilks' lambda	0.466	1.02	0.4940
Pillai's trace	0.534	1.02	0.4940
Hotelling–Lawley trace	1.148	1.02	0.4940
Roy's greatest root	1.148	1.02	0.4940

Discussion of results and parameter explanation

Based on the significance testing conducted in the preceding, results from this pilot experimental study indicate that drivers change their behavior significantly on roadways with wide shoulders when there are a varying number of lanes. With this in mind it is important to interpret the parameter values from segments 1 and 2 (displayed earlier, in Table 3). Interpretation of the changes in the calibration parameters between these two segments requires an explanation of the "physical meaning" for each of the parameters individually. Beginning with the gamma parameter (γ), this can be thought of as a driver's sensitivity to perceived gains and losses. That is, if the value function of the Prospect Theory model generally has the form seen in Figure 3, increasing gamma would be indicative of an increase in the amplitude of the curve derived from Eq. 1.

Furthermore, the parameter w_m represents the relative weight a driver puts on losses as compared to gains. Increases in this parameter are therefore indicative of a driver who is "valuing" potential risks more than that of potential gains, that is, becoming more risk averse. Increasing the alpha parameter is indicative of a driver being more uncertain of the leader vehicle's velocity, and the beta parameter can be thought of as the drivers' sensitivity to the surrounding environment. Increasing the beta parameter could be indicative of a number of things, including a more experienced driver or one who has become impatient. The T_{max} parameter can be thought of as the anticipation of the driver, as increasing values indicate a driver that is thinking multiple steps ahead and decreasing values indicate a driver who has a myopic view and is thinking about what is occurring "in the moment."

Looking at the changes in average calibrated values for these parameters between segments 1 and 2 we see that the one-lane segment (segment 2) features higher values for beta and gamma and lower values for alpha, T_{max}. and w_m. The combined impacts of increased gamma and decreased w_m demonstrate that not only is the driver putting less weight on perceived losses, but the driver is



Figure 3. Prospect theory value function (Hamdar, 2009).

also increasing his or her sensitivity to perceived gains and losses. This result is further explained by an increase in the beta parameter, which, in combination with the impacts discussed earlier, seems to indicate that drivers became increasingly impatient during this segment of the experiment. Reaffirming this notion is the decrease in the value for T_{max}, which demonstrates that drivers are thinking more in the moment, rather than anticipating what maneuvers they may make in the future (which seems to indicate a growing level of frustration). Finally, the largest percentage decrease in any parameter value is seen in that of alpha, indicating that the driver is very certain of what the vehicle in front of him or her is doing, once again reaffirming the notion that drivers became increasingly impatient and frustrated while traversing this segment of the experiment.

In addition to the driving environment discussed in the preceding, significance testing indicated that drivers change their behavior when moving between one and two lane roadways in general. The most significant changes in terms of the individual calibration parameters are seen in alpha, beta, and gamma. Here we once again observe that drivers on one-lane roadways are much more certain of the lead vehicle's velocity (decreased alpha), become increasingly sensitive to their environment (or potentially increasingly impatient—increased beta), and become increasingly sensitive to perceived gains and losses (increased gamma—with a slight decrease in the risk aversion parameter w_m).

While the changes in calibration parameters were not statistically significant for shoulder width or gender, it is interesting to observe that drivers had a higher average velocity, lower space headway, and thus much lower time headway on roadways with narrow shoulders. That is, when shoulder width narrowed, drivers followed the lead vehicle much more closely. The same was true when comparing female drivers to male drivers, as female drivers had an average time headway that was nearly 0.7 s less than their male counterparts. These changes in average values were not observed when comparing one-lane to two-lane roadways, as the average velocity, spacing, and time headway were almost identical in this case.

Conclusions and future work

This pilot real-world study featured the construction of an instrumented vehicle that was able to successfully capture high-time-resolution trajectory data through the use of multiple instruments working in unison. Furthermore, a driving experiment was successfully conducted with 18 participants driving a predefined "loop" that featured four segments with varying number of lanes and shoulder widths. Data collected from the driving experiment were then effectively calibrated using a genetic algorithm calibration procedure. Finally, significance testing was conducted on the calibrated parameters for the prospect theory value function and results indicated that there were significant changes in driver behavior for varying number of lanes—specifically when the roadway featured a wide shoulder as opposed to a narrow one.

Research conducted in this study differentiated itself from that of previous studies not only with the combination of instruments that were used, but also in the accuracy and time resolution of the data that were collected. Further differentiating this study from previous works, the driving experiment that was conducted tested the differences in behavior based on changing roadway geometry and then used the collected trajectory data to successfully calibrate the parameters of the prospect theory car-following model.

Given that this was the first study for this instrumented vehicle, construction and data synchronization posed significant challenges that needed to be overcome before the actual driving experiment could take place. With these major obstacles out of the way, opportunity abounds for additional driving experiments to be conducted with a seemingly limitless potential for different types of experimental setups. Furthermore, the vehicle used in this study was constructed in such a manner that additional instruments can easily be integrated in the vehicle and instrumentation design, once again opening the door for a wide variety of future applications and testing.

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IB

Union Calendar No. 212

115TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. R. 3388

[Report No. 115–294]

To provide for information on highly automated driving systems to be made available to prospective buyers.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JULY 25, 2017

Mr. LATTA (for himself and Ms. SCHAKOWSKY) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Energy and Commerce

SEPTEMBER 5, 2017

Additional sponsors: Mr. HARPER, Mr. UPTON, Mr. WALDEN, Mr. LANCE, Mr. GUTHRIE, Mr. KINZINGER, Mrs. MIMI WALTERS of California, Mr. CRAMER, Mr. BARTON, Mr. BUCSHON, Mr. COSTELLO of Pennsylvania, Mr. FLORES, Mr. MULLIN, Mr. BILIRAKIS, Mr. CARTER of Georgia, Mr. WALBERG, Mr. COLLINS of New York, Mr. BURGESS, Mr. RUSH, Mr. JOHNSON of Ohio, Mrs. BROOKS of Indiana, Mr. PALLONE, Mrs. DINGELL, Ms. MATSUI, Ms. ESHOO, Mr. MCNERNEY, Mr. WELCH, Mr. GENE GREEN of Texas, Ms. CLARKE of New York, and Mr. CÁRDENAS

SEPTEMBER 5, 2017

Reported with amendments, committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, and ordered to be printed

[Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert the part printed in italic]

[For text of introduced bill, see copy of bill as introduced on July 25, 2017]

A BILL

To provide for information on highly automated driving systems to be made available to prospective buyers.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

(a) SHORT TITLE.—This Act may be cited as the ''Safely Ensuring Lives Future Deployment and Research In Vehicle Evolution Act'' or the ''SELF DRIVE Act''.

(b) TABLE OF CONTENTS.—The table of contents for this Act is as follows:

SEC. 2. PURPOSE.

The purpose of this Act is to memorialize the Federal role in ensuring the safety of highly automated vehicles as it relates to design, construction, and performance, by encouraging the testing and deployment of such vehicles.

SEC. 3. NHTSA AUTHORITY AND STATE PREEMPTION FOR AUTONOMOUS MOTOR VEHICLES.

Section 30103 of title 49, United States Code, is amended—

(1) by amending subsection (b) to read as follows:

"(b) PREEMPTION.—

"(1) HIGHLY AUTOMATED VEHICLES.—No State or political subdivision of a State may maintain, enforce, prescribe, or continue in effect any law or regulation regarding the design, construction, or performance of highly automated vehicles, automated driving systems, or components of automated driving systems unless such law or regulation is identical to a standard prescribed under this chapter.

"(2) MOTOR VEHICLE STANDARD.—When a motor vehicle safety standard is in effect under this chapter, a State or political subdivision of a State may prescribe or continue in effect a standard applicable to the same aspect of performance of a motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment only if the standard is identical to the standard prescribed under this chapter.

"(3) RULES OF CONSTRUCTION.—

"(A) IN GENERAL.—Nothing in this subsection may be construed to prohibit a State or a political subdivision of a State from maintaining, enforcing, prescribing, or continuing in effect any law or regulation regarding registration, licensing, driving education and training, insurance, law enforcement, crash investigations, safety and emissions inspections, congestion management of vehicles on the street within a State or political subdivision of a State, or traffic unless the law or regulation is an unreasonable restriction on the design, construction, or performance of highly automated vehicles, automated driving systems, or components of automated driving systems.

''(B) MOTOR VEHICLE DEALERS.—Nothing in this subsection may be construed to prohibit a State or political subdivision of a State from maintaining, enforcing, prescribing, or continuing in effect any law or regulation regarding the sale, distribution, repair, or service of highly automated vehicles, automated driving systems, or components of automated driving systems by a dealer, manufacturer, or distributor.

''(C) CONFORMITY WITH FEDERAL LAW.—Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to preempt, restrict, or limit a State or political subdivision of a State from acting in accordance with any other Federal law.

"(4) HIGHER PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENT.—However, the United States Government, a State, or a political subdivision of a State may prescribe a standard for a motor vehicle, motor vehicle equipment, highly automated vehicle, or automated driving system obtained for its own use that imposes a higher performance requirement than that required by the otherwise applicable standard under this chapter.

"(5) STATE ENFORCEMENT.—A State may enforce a standard that is identical to a standard prescribed under this chapter."; and

(2) by amending subsection (e) to read as follows:

"(e) COMMON LAW LIABILITY.—

"(1) IN GENERAL.—Compliance with a motor vehicle safety standard prescribed under this chapter does not exempt a person from liability at common law.

"(2) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this section shall be construed to preempt common law claims.".

SEC. 4. UPDATED OR NEW MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARDS FOR HIGHLY AUTOMATED VEHICLES.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Chapter 301 of subtitle VI of title 49, United States Code, is amended by inserting after section 30128 the following new section:

"§ 30129. Updated or new motor vehicle safety standards for highly automated vehicles

"(a) SAFETY ASSESSMENT CERTIFICATION.—

"(1) FINAL RULE.—Not later than 24 months after the date of the enactment of this section, the Secretary of Transportation shall issue a final rule requiring the submission of safety assessment certifications regarding how safety is being addressed by each entity developing a highly automated vehicle or an automated driving system. Such rule shall include—

"(A) a specification of which entities are required to submit such certifications;

"(B) a clear description of the relevant test results, data, and other contents required to be submitted by such entity, in order to demonstrate that such entity's vehicles are likely to maintain safety, and function as intended and contain fail safe features, to be included in such certifications; and

"(C) a specification of the circumstances under which such certifications are required to be updated or resubmitted.

"(2) INTERIM REQUIREMENT.—Until the final rule issued under paragraph (1) takes effect, safety assessment letters shall be submitted to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration as contemplated by the Federal Automated Vehicles Policy issued in September 2016, or any successor guidance issued on highly automated vehicles requiring a safety assessment letter.

"(3) PERIODIC REVIEW AND UPDATING.—Not later than 5 years after the date on which the final rule is issued under paragraph (1), and not less frequently than every 5 years thereafter, the Secretary shall—

"(A) review such rule; and

"(B) update such rule if the Secretary considers it necessary.

"(4) RULES OF CONSTRUCTION.—

"(A) NO CONDITIONS ON DEPLOYMENT.—Nothing in this subsection may be construed to limit or affect the Secretary's authority under any other provision of law. The Secretary may not condition deployment or testing of highly

automated vehicles on review of safety assessment certifications.

''(B) NO NEW AUTHORITIES.—No new authorities are granted to the Secretary under this section other than the promulgation of the rule pursuant to paragraph (1).

''(5) REVIEW AND RESEARCH.—To accommodate the development and deployment of highly automated vehicles and to ensure the safety and security of highly automated vehicles and motor vehicles and others that will share the roads with highly automated vehicles, not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this section, the Secretary shall—

''(A) initiate or continue a review of the Federal motor vehicle safety standards in effect on such date of enactment; and

''(B) initiate or continue research regarding new Federal motor vehicle safety standards.

''(b) RULEMAKING AND SAFETY PRIORITY PLAN.—

''(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of this section, the Secretary shall make available to the public and submit to the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate a rule-

making and safety priority plan, as necessary to accommodate the development and deployment of highly automated vehicles and to ensure the safety and security of highly automated vehicles and motor vehicles and others that will share the roads with highly automated vehicles, to—

''(A) update the motor vehicle safety standards in effect on such date of enactment;

''(B) issue new motor vehicle safety standards; and

''(C) consider how objective ranges in performance standards could be used to test motor vehicle safety standards, which safety standards would be appropriate for such testing, and whether additional authority would facilitate such testing.

''(2) INCLUSION OF PRIORITIES.—

''(A) PRIORITIES.—The plan required by paragraph (1) shall detail the overall priorities of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration for the 5 years following the issuance of the plan, including both priorities with respect to highly automated vehicles and priorities with respect to other safety initiatives of the Adminis-

tration, in order to meet the Nation's motor vehicle safety challenges.

''(B) IDENTIFICATION OF ELEMENTS THAT MAY REQUIRE STANDARDS.—For highly automated vehicles, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration should identify elements that may require performance standards including human machine interface, sensors, and actuators, and consider process and procedure standards for software and cybersecurity as necessary.

''(3) PERIODIC UPDATING.—The plan required by paragraph (1) shall be updated every 2 years, or more frequently if the Secretary considers it necessary.

''(4) RULEMAKING PROCEEDINGS ON UPDATED OR NEW MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY STANDARDS.—

''(A) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 18 months after the date of enactment of this section, the Secretary shall initiate the first rulemaking proceeding in accordance with the rulemaking and safety priority plan required by paragraph (1).

''(B) PRIORITIZATION OF SUBSEQUENT PROCEEDINGS.—The Secretary shall continue initiating rulemaking proceedings in accordance with

such plan. The Secretary may change at any time those priorities to address matters the Secretary considers of greater priority. If the Secretary makes such a change, the Secretary shall complete an interim update of the priority plan, make such update available to the public, and submit such update to the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate.''.

(b) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The analysis for chapter 301 of subtitle VI of title 49, United States Code, is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 30128 the following new item:

''30129. Updated or new motor vehicle safety standards for highly automated vehicles.''.

SEC. 5. CYBERSECURITY OF AUTOMATED DRIVING SYSTEMS.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Chapter 301 of subtitle VI of title 49, United States Code, is amended by inserting after section 30129 (as added by section 4) the following new section:

''§ 30130. Cybersecurity of automated driving systems

''(a) CYBERSECURITY PLAN.—A manufacturer may not sell, offer for sale, introduce or deliver for introduction into commerce, or import into the United States, any highly

automated vehicle, vehicle that performs partial driving automation, or automated driving system unless such manufacturer has developed a cybersecurity plan that includes the following:

‘‘(1) A written cybersecurity policy with respect to the practices of the manufacturer for detecting and responding to cyber attacks, unauthorized intrusions, and false and spurious messages or vehicle control commands. This policy shall include—

‘‘(A) a process for identifying, assessing, and mitigating reasonably foreseeable vulnerabilities from cyber attacks or unauthorized intrusions, including false and spurious messages and malicious vehicle control commands; and

‘‘(B) a process for taking preventive and corrective action to mitigate against vulnerabilities in a highly automated vehicle or a vehicle that performs partial driving automation, including incident response plans, intrusion detection and prevention systems that safeguard key controls, systems, and procedures through testing or monitoring, and updates to such process based on changed circumstances.

''(2) The identification of an officer or other individual of the manufacturer as the point of contact with responsibility for the management of cybersecurity.

''(3) A process for limiting access to automated driving systems.

''(4) A process for employee training and supervision for implementation and maintenance of the policies and procedures required by this section, including controls on employee access to automated driving systems.

''(b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—This section shall take effect 180 days after the date of enactment of this section.''.

(b) ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITY.—Section 30165(a)(1) of title 49, United States Code, is amended by inserting ''30130,'' after ''30127,''.

(c) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The analysis for chapter 301 of subtitle VI of title 49, United States Code, is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 30129 (as added by section 4) the following new item:

''30130. Cybersecurity of automated driving systems.''.

SEC. 6. GENERAL EXEMPTIONS.

Section 30113 of title 49, United States Code, is amended—

(1) in subsection (b)(3)(B)—

(A) in clause (iii), by striking ‘‘; or’’ and inserting a semicolon;

(B) in clause (iv), by striking the period at the end and inserting ‘‘; or’’; and

(C) by adding at the end the following:

‘‘(v) the exemption would make easier the development or field evaluation of—

‘‘(I) a feature of a highly automated vehicle providing a safety level at least equal to the safety level of the standard for which exemption is sought; or

‘‘(II) a highly automated vehicle providing an overall safety level at least equal to the overall safety level of nonexempt vehicles.’’;

(2) in subsection (c), by adding at the end the following:

‘‘(5) if the application is made under subsection (b)(3)(B)(v) of this section—

‘‘(A) such development, testing, and other data necessary to demonstrate that the motor vehicle is a highly automated vehicle; and

‘‘(B) a detailed analysis that includes supporting test data, including both on-road and validation and testing data showing (as applicable) that—

''(i) the safety level of the feature at least equals the safety level of the standard for which exemption is sought; or

''(ii) the vehicle provides an overall safety level at least equal to the overall safety level of nonexempt vehicles.'';

(3) in subsection (d), by striking ''A manufacturer is eligible'' and all that follows and inserting the following:

''(1) ELIGIBILITY UNDER SUBSECTION (b)(3)(B)(i).—A manufacturer is eligible for an exemption under subsection (b)(3)(B)(i) of this section (including an exemption under subsection (b)(3)(B)(i) relating to a bumper standard referred to in subsection (b)(1)) only if the Secretary determines that the manufacturer's total motor vehicle production in the most recent year of production is not more than 10,000.

''(2) ELIGIBILITY UNDER SUBSECTION (b)(3)(B)(iii).—A manufacturer is eligible for an exemption under subsection (b)(3)(B)(iii) of this section only if the Secretary determines the exemption is for not more than 2,500 vehicles to be sold in the United States in any 12-month period.

''(3) ELIGIBILITY UNDER SUBSECTION (b)(3)(B)(ii), (iv), or (v).—A manufacturer is eligible for an exemption under subsection (b)(3)(B)(ii), (iv), or (v) of this section only if the Secretary determines the exemption is for not more than 100,000 vehicles per manufacturer to be sold, leased, or otherwise introduced into commerce in the United States in any 12-month period.

''(4) LIMITATION ON NUMBER OF VEHICLES EXEMPTED.—All exemptions granted to a manufacturer under subsections (b)(3)(B)(i) through (v) shall not exceed a total of (i) 25,000 vehicles manufactured within the first 12-month period, (ii) 50,000 vehicles manufactured within the second 12-month period, (iii) 100,000 vehicles manufactured within the third 12-month period, and, (iv) 100,000 vehicles manufactured within the fourth 12-month period. Any renewals under subsections (b)(3)(B)(i) through (v) shall not exceed a total of 100,000 vehicles manufactured within a 12-month period.'';

(4) in subsection (e), by striking ''An exemption or renewal'' and all that follows and inserting the following:

''(1) EXEMPTION UNDER SUBSECTION (b)(3)(B)(i).—An exemption or renewal under sub-

section (b)(3)(B)(i) of this section may be granted for not more than 3 years.

“(2) EXEMPTION UNDER SUBSECTION (b)(3)(B)(iii).—An exemption or renewal under subsection (b)(3)(B)(iii) this section may be granted for not more than 2 years.

“(3) EXEMPTION UNDER SUBSECTION (b)(3)(B)(ii), (iv), or (v).—An exemption or renewal under subsection (b)(3)(B)(ii), (iv), or (v) of this section may be granted for not more than 4 years.”; and

(5) by adding at the end the following:

“(i) LIMITATION ON CERTAIN EXEMPTIONS.—No exemption from crashworthiness standards of motor vehicle safety standards shall be granted under subsection (b)(3)(B)(v) until the Secretary issues the safety assessment certification rule pursuant to section 30129(a) and the rulemaking and safety priority plan pursuant to section 30129(b) and one year has passed from the date by which the Secretary has issued both such rule and such plan. This subsection shall not apply to exemptions from occupant protection standards if the exemption is for a vehicle that will not carry its operator or passengers. This subsection shall not apply to exemptions from crashworthiness standards if the exemption sought is for a standard addressing the steering control system and it is for a vehicle that—

‘‘(1) will not have a steering control system;

‘‘(2) provides impact protection to an occupant in the front left seat at a level at least equal to the level provided in nonexempt vehicles; and

‘‘(3) provides a safety level at least equal to the safety level of the standard for which the exemption is sought.

‘‘(j) REPORTING REQUIREMENT.—A manufacturer granted an exemption under subsection (b)(3)(B)(ii), (iv), or (v), shall provide information about all crashes of which it has actual knowledge involving such exempted vehicles, regardless of whether a claim is submitted to the manufacturer, in accordance with part 579 of title 49, Code of Federal Regulations.

‘‘(k) PROCESS AND ANALYSIS.—

‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this subsection, the Secretary of Transportation shall publish in the Federal Register a notice that details the process and analysis used for the consideration of exemption or renewal applications under subsection (b)(3)(B)(v).

‘‘(2) PERIODIC REVIEW AND UPDATING.—The notice required by paragraph (1) shall be reviewed every 5 years and updated if the Secretary considers it necessary.

"(l) EXEMPTION DATABASE.—

"(1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary shall establish a publicly available and searchable electronic database of each motor vehicle for which an exemption from motor vehicle safety standards prescribed under this chapter or a bumper standard prescribed under chapter 325 has been granted.

"(2) VEHICLE IDENTIFICATION NUMBER.—The database established under paragraph (1) shall be searchable by Vehicle Identification Number and shall include no information identifying the vehicle owner.".

SEC. 7. MOTOR VEHICLE TESTING OR EVALUATION.

Section 30112(b)(10) of title 49, United States Code, is amended—

(1) by striking "that prior to the date of enactment of this paragraph";

(2) in subparagraph (A), by striking "motor vehicles into the United States that are certified" and inserting "into the United States motor vehicles that are certified, or motor vehicle equipment utilized in a motor vehicle that is certified,";

(3) in subparagraph (C), by striking the period at the end and inserting "; or";

(4) by redesignating subparagraphs (A) through (C) as clauses (i) through (iii), respectively, and moving their margins 2 ems to the right;

(5) by striking ''evaluation by a manufacturer that agrees not to sell or offer for sale'' and inserting the following: ''evaluation by—

''(A) a manufacturer that agrees not to sell or lease or offer for sale or lease''; and

(6) by adding at the end the following:

''(B) a manufacturer of highly automated vehicles, automated driving systems, or components of automated driving systems that agrees not to sell or lease or offer for sale or lease the highly automated vehicles, automated driving systems, or components of automated driving systems at the conclusion of the testing or evaluation and—

''(i) has submitted to the Secretary—

''(I) the name of the individual, partnership, corporation, or institution of higher education and a point of contact;

''(II) the residence address of the individual, partnership, corporation, *or institution of higher education and State of incorporation if applicable;*

''(III) a description of each type of motor vehicle used during development of highly automated vehicles, automated driving systems, or components of automated driving systems manufactured by the individual, partnership, corporation, or institution of higher education; and

''(IV) proof of insurance for any State in which the individual, partnership, corporation, or institution of higher education intends to test or evaluate highly automated vehicles; and

''(ii) if applicable, has identified an agent for service of process in accordance with part 551 of title 49, Code of Federal Regulations.''.

SEC. 8. INFORMATION ON HIGHLY AUTOMATED DRIVING SYSTEMS MADE AVAILABLE TO PROSPECTIVE BUYERS.

(a) RESEARCH.—Not later than 3 years after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Transportation

shall complete research to determine the most effective method and terminology for informing consumers for each highly automated vehicle or a vehicle that performs partial driving automation about the capabilities and limitations of that vehicle. The Secretary shall determine whether such information is based upon or includes the terminology as defined by SAE International in Recommended Practice Report J3016 (published September 2016) or whether such description should include alternative terminology.

(b) RULEMAKING.—After the completion of the study required under subsection (a), the Secretary shall initiate a rulemaking proceeding to require manufacturers to inform consumers of the capabilities and limitations of a vehicle's driving automation system or feature for any highly automated vehicle or any vehicle that performs partial driving automation.

SEC. 9. HIGHLY AUTOMATED VEHICLE ADVISORY COUNCIL.

(a) ESTABLISHMENT.—Subject to the availability of appropriations, not later than 6 months after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Transportation shall establish in the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration a Highly Automated Vehicle Advisory Council (hereinafter referred to as the ''Council'').

(b) MEMBERSHIP.—Members of the Council shall include a diverse group representative of business, academia

and independent researchers, State and local authorities, safety and consumer advocates, engineers, labor organizations, environmental experts, a representative of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, and other members determined to be appropriate by the Secretary. Any subcommittee of the Council shall be composed of not less than 15 and not more than 30 members appointed by the Secretary.

(c) TERMS.—Members of the Council shall be appointed by the Secretary of Transportation and shall serve for a term of three years.

(d) VACANCIES.—Any vacancy occurring in the membership of the Council shall be filled in the same manner as the original appointment for the position being vacated. The vacancy shall not affect the power of the remaining members to execute the duties of the Council.

(e) DUTIES AND SUBCOMMITTEES.—The Council may form subcommittees as needed to undertake information gathering activities, develop technical advice, and present best practices or recommendations to the Secretary regarding—

(1) advancing mobility access for the disabled community with respect to the deployment of automated driving systems to identify impediments to their use and ensure an awareness of the needs of the

disabled community as these vehicles are being designed for distribution in commerce;

(2) mobility access for senior citizens and populations underserved by traditional public transportation services and educational outreach efforts with respect to the testing and distribution of highly automated vehicles in commerce;

(3) cybersecurity for the testing, deployment, and updating of automated driving systems with respect to supply chain risk management, interactions with Information Sharing and Analysis Centers and Information Sharing and Analysis Organizations, and a framework for identifying and implementing recalls of motor vehicles or motor vehicle equipment;

(4) the development of a framework that allows manufacturers of highly automated vehicles to share with each other and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration relevant, situational information related to any testing or deployment event on public streets resulting or that reasonably could have resulted in damage to the vehicle or any occupant thereof and validation of such vehicles in a manner that does not risk public disclosure of such information or disclosure of confidential business information;

(5) labor and employment issues that may be affected by the deployment of highly automated vehicles;

(6) the environmental impacts of the deployment of highly automated vehicles, and the development and deployment of alternative fuel infrastructure alongside the development and deployment of highly automated vehicles;

(7) protection of consumer privacy and security of information collected by highly automated vehicles;

(8) cabin safety for highly automated vehicle passengers, and how automated driving systems may impact collision vectors, overall crashworthiness, and the use and placement of airbags, seatbelts, anchor belts, head restraints, and other protective features in the cabin;

(9) the testing and deployment of highly automated vehicles and automated driving systems in areas that are rural, remote, mountainous, insular, or unmapped to evaluate operational limitations caused by natural geographical or man-made features, or adverse weather conditions, and to enhance the safety and reliability of highly automated vehicles and automated driving systems used in such areas with such features or conditions; and

(10) independent verification and validation procedures for highly automated vehicles that may be useful to safeguard motor vehicle safety.

(f) REPORT TO CONGRESS.—The recommendations of the Council shall also be reported to the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate.

(g) FEDERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ACT.—The establishment and operation of the Council and any subcommittees of the Council shall conform to the requirements of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.).

(h) TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE.—On request of the Council, the Secretary shall provide such technical assistance to the Council as the Secretary determines to be necessary to carry out the Council's duties.

(i) DETAIL OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEES.—On the request of the Council, the Secretary may detail, with or without reimbursement, any of the personnel of the Department of Transportation to the Council to assist the Council in carrying out its duties. Any detail shall not interrupt or otherwise affect the civil service status or privileges of the Federal employee.

(j) PAYMENT AND EXPENSES.—Members of the Council shall serve without pay, except travel and per diem will be paid each member for meetings called by the Secretary.

(k) TERMINATION.—The Council and any subcommittees of the Council shall terminate 6 years after the date of enactment of this Act.

SEC. 10. REAR SEAT OCCUPANT ALERT SYSTEM.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Chapter 301 of subtitle VI of title 49, United States Code, is amended by inserting after section 30130 (as added by section 5) the following new section:

"§ 30131. Rear seat occupant alert system

''(a) RULEMAKING REQUIRED.—Not later than 2 years after the date of enactment of this section, the Secretary shall issue a final rule requiring all new passenger motor vehicles weighing less than 10,000 pounds gross vehicle weight to be equipped with an alarm system to alert the operator to check rear designated seating positions after the vehicle motor or engine is deactivated by the operator.

''(b) PHASE-IN.—The rule issued pursuant to subsection (a) shall require full compliance with the rule beginning on September 1st of the calendar year that begins 2 years after the date on which the final rule is issued.

''(c) DEFINITIONS.—For purposes of this section—

''(1) the term 'passenger motor vehicle' has the meaning given that term in section 32101; and

''(2) the term 'rear designated seating position' means any designated seating position that is rearward of the front seat.''.

(b) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.—The analysis for chapter 301 of subtitle VI of title 49, United States Code, is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 30130 (as added by section 5) the following new item:

''30131. Rear seat occupant alert system.''.

SEC. 11. HEADLAMPS.

(a) SAFETY RESEARCH INITIATIVE.—Not later than 2 years after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Transportation shall complete research into the development of updated motor vehicle safety standards or performance requirements for motor vehicle headlamps that would improve the performance of headlamps and improve overall safety.

(b) RULEMAKING OR REPORT.—

(1) RULEMAKING.—After the completion of the research required by subsection (a), the Secretary shall initiate a rulemaking proceeding to revise the motor vehicle safety standards regarding headlamps if the Secretary determines that a revision of the standards meets the requirements and considerations set

forth in subsections (a) and (b) of section 30111 of title 49, United States Code.

(2) REPORT.—If the Secretary determines that a revision to the standard described in paragraph (1) does not meet the requirements and considerations set forth in such subsections, the Secretary shall submit a report describing the reasons for not revising the standard to the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate.

SEC. 12. PRIVACY PLAN REQUIRED FOR HIGHLY AUTOMATED VEHICLES.

(a) PRIVACY PLAN.—A manufacturer may not sell, offer for sale, introduce or deliver for introduction in interstate commerce, or import into the United States, any highly automated vehicle, vehicle that performs partial driving automation, or automated driving system unless the manufacturer has developed a privacy plan that includes the following:

(1) A written privacy plan with respect to the collection, use, sharing, and storage of information about vehicle owners or occupants collected by a highly automated vehicle, vehicle that performs partial driving automation, or automated driving system. Such policy shall include the following:

(A) The practices of the manufacturer with respect to the way that information about vehicle owners or occupants is collected, used, shared, or stored.

(B) The practices of the manufacturer with respect to the choices offered to vehicle owners or occupants regarding the collection, use, sharing, and storage of such information.

(C) The practices of the manufacturer with respect to the data minimization, de-identification, and retention of information about vehicle owners or occupants.

(D) The practices of the manufacturer with respect to extending its privacy plan to the entities it shares such information with.

(2) A method for providing notice to vehicle owners or occupants about the privacy policy.

(3) If information about vehicle owners or occupants is altered or combined so that the information can no longer reasonably be linked to the highly automated vehicle, vehicle that performs partial driving automation, or automated driving system from which the information is retrieved, the vehicle owner, or occupants, the manufacturer is not required to include

the process or practices regarding that information in the privacy policy.

(4) If information about an occupant is anonymized or encrypted the manufacturer is not required to include the process or practices regarding that information in the privacy policy.

(b) STUDY.—The Federal Trade Commission shall conduct a study and submit a report to the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate on the highly automated vehicle marketplace, including an examination of the following issues:

(1) Which entities in the ecosystem have access to vehicle owner or occupant data.

(2) Which entities in the highly automated vehicle marketplace have privacy plans.

(3) What are the terms and disclosures made in such privacy plans, including regarding the collection, use, sharing, and storage of vehicle owner or occupant data.

(4) What disclosures are made to consumers about such privacy plans.

(5) What methods are available to enable deletion of information about vehicle owners or occupants from any data storage system within the vehicle

(other than a system that is critical to the safety or operation of the vehicle) before the vehicle is sold, leased, or rented, or otherwise occupied by a new owner or occupant.

(c) FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ENFORCEMENT.—A violation of subsection (a) shall be treated as a an unfair or deceptive act or practice within the meaning of section 5(a)(1) of the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. 45(a)(1)). The Federal Trade Commission shall enforce this section in the same manner, by the same means, and with the same jurisdiction, powers, and duties as though all applicable terms and provisions of the Federal Trade Commission Act were incorporated into and made a part of this Act.

(d) EFFECTIVE DATE.—This section shall take effect 180 days after the date of enactment of this section and shall only apply to highly automated vehicles, vehicles that perform partial driving automation, or automated driving systems first introduced after the effective date of this section.

SEC. 13. DEFINITIONS.

(a) AMENDMENTS TO TITLE 49, UNITED STATES CODE.—Section 30102 of title 49, United States Code, is amended—

(1) in subsection (a)—

(A) by redesignating paragraphs (1) through (13) as paragraphs (2), (3), (4), (5), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (13), (15), (16), and (17), respectively;

(B) by inserting before paragraph (2) (as so redesignated) the following:

‘‘(1) ‘automated driving system’ means the hardware and software that are collectively capable of performing the entire dynamic driving task on a sustained basis, regardless of whether such system is limited to a specific operational design domain.’’;

(C) by inserting after paragraph (5) (as so redesignated) the following:

‘‘(6) ‘dynamic driving task’ means all of the real time operational and tactical functions required to operate a vehicle in on-road traffic, excluding the strategic functions such as trip scheduling and selection of destinations and waypoints, and including—

‘‘(A) lateral vehicle motion control via steering;

‘‘(B) longitudinal vehicle motion control via acceleration and deceleration;

‘‘(C) monitoring the driving environment via object and event detection, recognition, classification, and response preparation;

''(D) object and event response execution;

''(E) maneuver planning; and

''(F) enhancing conspicuity via lighting, signaling, and gesturing.

''(7) 'highly automated vehicle'—

''(A) means a motor vehicle equipped with an automated driving system; and

''(B) does not include a commercial motor vehicle (as defined in section 31101).'';

(D) by inserting after paragraph (13) (as so redesignated) the following:

''(14) 'operational design domain' means the specific conditions under which a given driving automation system or feature thereof is designed to function.''; and

(E) by adding at the end the following:

''(18) 'vehicle that performs partial driving automation' does not include a commercial motor vehicle (as defined in section 31101).''; and

(2) by adding at the end the following:

''(c) REVISIONS TO CERTAIN DEFINITIONS.—

''(1) If SAE International (or its successor organization) revises the definition of any of the terms defined in paragraph (1), (6), or (14) of subsection (a) in Recommended Practice Report J3016, it shall no-

tify the Secretary of the revision. The Secretary shall publish a notice in the Federal Register to inform the public of the new definition unless, within 90 days after receiving notice of the new definition and after opening a period for public comment on the new definition, the Secretary notifies SAE International (or its successor organization) that the Secretary has determined that the new definition does not meet the need for motor vehicle safety, or is otherwise inconsistent with the purposes of this chapter. If the Secretary so notifies SAE International (or its successor organization), the existing definition in subsection (a) shall remain in effect.

''(2) If the Secretary does not reject a definition revised by SAE International (or its successor organization) as described in paragraph (1), the Secretary shall promptly make any conforming amendments to the regulations and standards of the Secretary that are necessary. The revised definition shall apply for purposes of this chapter. The requirements of section 553 of title 5 shall not apply to the making of any such conforming amendments.

''(3) Pursuant to section 553 of title 5, the Secretary may update any of the definitions in paragraph (1), (6), or (14) of subsection (a) if the Sec-

retary determines that materially changed circumstances regarding highly automated vehicles have impacted motor vehicle safety such that the definitions need to be updated to reflect such circumstances.''.

(b) DEFINITIONS IN THIS ACT.—As used in this Act—

(1) the term ''automated driving system'' has the meaning given such term in subsection (a) of section 30102 of title 49, United States Code, subject to any revisions made to the definition of such term pursuant to subsection (c) of such section;

(2) the term ''highly automated vehicle'' has the meaning given such term in subsection (a) of section 30102 of title 49, United States Code, not subject to any revision under subsection (c) of such section; and

(3) the term ''vehicle that performs partial driving automation'' has the meaning given such term in subsection (a) of section 30102 of title 49, United States Code, not subject to any revision under subsection (c) of such section.

Amend the title so as to read: "A bill to amend title 49, United States Code, regarding the authority of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration over highly automated vehicles, to provide safety measures for such vehicles, and for other purposes.".

Union Calendar No. 212

115TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. R. 3388

[Report No. 115–294]

A BILL

To provide for information on highly automated driving systems to be made available to prospective buyers.

SEPTEMBER 5, 2017

Reported with amendments, committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, and ordered to be printed

The Washington Post

National

The ATM at 50: How it's changed consumer behavior

By Ken Sweet | AP September 21

NEW YORK — An automated teller machine. The cash machine. In Britain, a cashpoint. ATMs, known for spitting out $20 bills (and imposing fees if you pick the wrong one), turn 50 years old this year. They're ubiquitous — and possibly still a necessity, despite the big changes in how people pay for things.

It was a radical move when Barclays installed cash machines in a London suburb in 1967. The utilitarian machine gave fixed amounts of money, using special vouchers — the magnetic-striped ATM card hadn't been invented yet. There was no way for a customer to transfer money between accounts, and bank employees tabulated the transactions manually at the end of each day.

As the ATMs became familiar, though, they changed not only the banking industry but made people comfortable interacting with kiosks in exchange for goods. Now that means getting movie tickets and boarding passes, self-checkout at grocery stores, and online shopping that brings products to your door with a few clicks. All are based on the idea that people can handle routine transactions by themselves without a teller or cashier.

"The ATM tapped into that innate force in people that gives gratification for doing a task on their own and it grew from there," said Charles Kane, a professor at the MIT Sloan School of Management.

It was a radical concept at the time. The ATM wasn't the first self-service device — vending machines and the automat had been popular before. But those dispensed items people could hold in their hand.

Bernardo Batiz-Lazo, a business professor and ATM historian (yes, they exist!) at Bangor University in Britain, said early users of automated tellers were often checking their balances twice: once to see how much was in their account, then again after withdrawing money to see if it registered.

"They were popular, but it took a long time to slowly convince customers to learn about ATMs and use them regularly," Batiz-Lazo said.

For the banking industry, ATMs meant banks could be in thousands of places at once, not just in branches, and earn billions of dollars in fees from non-customers. Banks used to staff dozens of tellers at each branch to handle routine transactions, now many staffers work on other tasks, like sales or account maintenance.

Around the U.S. today are roughly 3 million cash machines, according to the ATM Industry Association. Most are actually not owned by banks, but by private companies that install them at convenience stores, restaurants and bars in hopes of grabbing customers who don't want to find a bank branch.

The wide acceptance of the ATMs changed the types of cash Americans typically carry in the pocketbooks. Since ATMs became more widely available in the early 1980s, the twenty-dollar bill has regularly been the second-most printed bank note each year by the Bureau of Engraving and Printing. The first place spot is held by the $1 bill.

Even as people use cash less, and credit cards or mobile payments more often, the ATM isn't going anywhere for a while. At least, that's what historians and — unsurprisingly — the ATM industry says. Devon Watson, vice president at Diebold Nixdorf, the world's largest manufacturer of ATMs, says 85 percent of all transactions worldwide are still in cash.

Newer ATMs have more functions than ever. They accept check deposits, can transfer money between accounts, show an account balance, pay a credit card or mortgage payment, or even sell you stamps. NCR, another major manufacturer of ATMs, say the latest models are also designed to act more like smart devices. Kevin King of NCR says that includes "swipe, gesture, multi-touch."

And future ATMs will likely start selling products as well. Have a checking account? The ATM will ask you whether you want to open a brokerage account. Much like tellers did.

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Associated Press video reporter Marina Hutchinson in Atlanta contributed to this report.

BUSINESS INSIDER

A mysterious hedge fund just scooped up the foreclosed medallions from New York City's 'Taxi King'

RAUL HERNANDEZ
SEP. 19, 2017, 4:32 PM



Prayitno/Flickr

A fleet of Evgeny "Gene" Freidman's foreclosed taxi medallions sold on Monday in a closed-door auction taking place in a Queens, New York hotel.

All 46 medallions — the metal plates on yellow cab hoods allowing them to legally pick up street-hails — were won by a group identified in bankruptcy court documents as MGPE Inc. for a total of $8.56 million, or $186,000 per medallion, according to Crain's New York. Business Insider was able to verify those numbers with an industry source as well.

The individual bidders behind MGPE Inc. are not identified in court filings but are part of a hedge fund and are expected to lease the medallions out to fleet operators, according to Crain's and verified with an industry source.

The New York City taxi medallion industry is new territory for hedge funds, who may be seeing the recent drop in medallion prices as a buying opportunity. Taxi medallions peaked in value in 2013 at more than $1 million but are now often auctioned off for less than half that amount.

Matthew Daus served as head of the Taxi & Limousine Commission for more than eight years and currently works for the law firm Windels Marx which has taxi industry clients. He says hedge funds are a rare sight in the taxi industry.

"When I was head of the TLC we targeted groups like hedge funds," says Daus. "We tried to get them involved, but they wouldn't touch medallions with a 10-foot pole back then."

In the week leading up to the auction, MGPE Inc. put in an opening "stalking-horse" bid for $7.7 million, or $167,500 per medallion. On the day of the auction, one group bid up the price, entering a bid of $175,000 per medallion for all 46 medallions before MGPE Inc. countered with the winning $186,000 per medallion bid.

There were also bidders willing to go higher than $186,000, but only for individual medallions. The auctioneer chose to go with MGPE Inc.'s bulk offer, according to Crain's and verified by an industry source.

The $186,000 medallion price is not expected to become the new normal for future medallion auctions, according to Daus.

"These medallions were foreclosed upon as a part of Freidman's bankruptcy," says Daus. "These bulk bargain bids are not indicative of a medallion's true market value."

×

James O'Connor

From: Matthew W. Daus <mdaus=windelsmarx.com@mail99.sea21.rsgsv.net> on behalf of Matthew W. Daus <mdaus@windelsmarx.com>
Sent: Thursday, September 21, 2017 10:34 AM
To: James O'Connor
Subject: Hedge Funds & Medallion Auctions – Matt Daus Quoted in Business Insider

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

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BUSINESS INSIDER

Matthew Daus was recently quoted in an article published by Business Insider titled "A mysterious hedge fund just scooped up the foreclosed medallions from New York City's 'Taxi King'". Earlier this week, auctions were held for 46 foreclosed taxi medallions in a closed-door Queens, New York hotel. All of the medallions were sold to a group of bidders for a total of $8.56 million, or $186,000 per medallion. Though MGPE Inc., the hedge fund that won the auction, submitted a bulk offer for $186,000 per medallion, Matt believes that price will not become the new normal for future medallion auctions. "These medallions were foreclosed upon as a part of Freidman's bankruptcy," says Daus. "These bulk bargain bids are not indicative of a medallion's true market value." Read the full article.

Matt was also quoted in a second article published by Business Insider titled "A Greenwich hedge fund is behind the mysterious buyer of the NYC 'Taxi King's'. The article revels details about the mysterious hedge fund that purchased a bulk of medallions during a closed-door auction this past Monday. Marblegate Asset Management, the Connecticut-based hedge fund which focuses on distressed credit, describes its investment strategy as seeking "to purchase high yield and leveraged corporate credits and claims at a discount to intrinsic value and to realize the value of investments through a combination of restructuring, recovery and refinancing." It is quite a new trend for hedge funds to express interest in the taxi industry. Matt notes that during his stint with the Taxi & Limousine Commission, hedge funds were a rare sight in the industry. "When I was head of the TLC we targeted groups like hedge funds," says Daus. "We tried to get them involved, but they wouldn't touch medallions with a 10-foot pole back then." Read the full article.

The New York Times https://nyti.ms/2xUHqyT

N.Y. / REGION

Taxi Medallions, Once a Safe Investment, Now Drag Owners Into Debt

By WINNIE HU SEPT. 10, 2017

Owning a yellow cab has left Issa Isac in deep debt and facing a precarious future.

It was not supposed to turn out this way when Mr. Isac slid behind the wheel in 2005. Soon he was earning $200 a night driving. Three years later, he borrowed $335,000 to buy a New York City taxi medallion, which gave him the right to operate his own cab.

But now Mr. Isac earns half of what he did when he started, as riders have defected to Uber and other competitors. He stopped making the $2,700-a-month loan payment on his medallion in February because he was broke. Last month, it was sold to help pay his debts.

"I see my future crashing down," said Mr. Isac, 46, an immigrant from Burkina Faso. "I worry every day. Sometimes, I can't sleep thinking about it. Everything changed overnight."

Taxi ownership once seemed a guaranteed route to financial security, something that was more tangible and reliable than the stock market since people hailed cabs in good times and bad. Generations of new immigrants toiled away for years to earn enough to buy a coveted medallion. Those who had them took pride in them, and viewed them as their retirement fund.

Uber and other ride-hail apps have upended all that.

Just as homeowners faced ruin when housing markets sank, struggling cab owners in Chicago, Boston, San Francisco and other cities are now facing foreclosure and bankruptcy. Many took out loans to pay for taxi medallions, counting on business that has instead nose-dived amid fierce competition. They are falling behind on loan payments, being turned away by lenders and stand to lose not only the medallions that are their livelihoods but also their homes and savings.

Nowhere is the crisis more dire than in New York, which has the largest taxi fleet in the country. Medallions now sell for a fraction of the record $1.3 million price in 2014, and in many cases, are worth far less than what their owners borrowed to buy them. Even if these owners sell their medallions, they still owe hundreds of thousands of dollars — far more than in many other cities where medallion prices were lower to begin with.

In an unprecedented fire sale of medallions, up to 46 of them are expected to go on the auction block later this month as part of bankruptcy proceedings against taxi companies affiliated with an embattled taxi mogul. While the city has previously held auctions to sell a limited number of new medallions — about 1,800 since 1996 — this is believed to be the first auction to dispose of foreclosed medallions, according to city officials.

While the auction has drawn attention to the precipitous fall of the once-mighty taxi industry, it does not reflect the hardship — and heartbreak — of individual owners like Mr. Isac. It is their stories that often get lost in the larger debate over new technology and commutes, and tell of the human cost of the city's rapidly evolving transportation landscape.

Since 2015, a total of 85 medallions have been sold as part of foreclosure proceedings, according to city records. In August alone, 12 of the 21 medallion sales were part of foreclosures; the prices of all the sales ranged from $150,000 to $450,000 per medallion.

Many more taxi owners say they do not know how much longer they can hold on. Didar Singh, 65, who took out a loan to buy two medallions for a total of $2.6 million in 2013, said he can only afford to pay the interest — $4,816 a month — on the loan. As it is, his taxis do not bring in enough to cover his expenses, forcing him to rely on savings and help from his children.

Sohan Gill once saw his medallion as such a good investment — "better than a house" — that his wife bought two more in 2001. Now they cannot find enough drivers for the cabs because business is so bad. And Mr. Gill, 63, who had retired from driving, had to go back on the road. "How many more years am I going to drive to take care of these medallions?" he asked.

Gone are the years when taxi medallions steadily rose in value, largely because there was a limited supply of them. The city controls the number of medallions — currently capped at 13,587 — to prevent an oversupply of cabs like what occurred in the 1930s when concerns over congestion, reckless driving and cut-rate fares prompted the city to step in. The last time there was an auction for medallions was when the city sold 350 new medallions in 2014 at the height of the market, generating $359 million in revenue.

But today, yellow cabs are dwarfed by cars working for ride-hail apps, which face far fewer regulations. Taxi owners and their supporters complain that their competitors do not have a similar cap on their cars, and are not subject to strict rules on taxis that cover fares, vehicle equipment and access for disabled people, among other things.

There are more than 63,000 black cars providing rides in the city through five major app services: Uber, Lyft, Via, Gett and Juno. Of those, about 61,000 cars are connected with Uber, though they may also work for the other app services, too.

"We are not against competition, we are not against technology, but we want to compete fair and square," said Nino Hervias, 58, a taxi owner and spokesman for the Taxi Medallion Owner Driver Association, which represents about 1,500 individual taxi owners, most of whom are immigrants.

Taxi owners have sought to sue the city over what they see as an unfair playing field, with little success. Earlier this year, a lawsuit filed against the city and taxi commission by taxi owners, trade groups and credit unions was dismissed by a federal judge who found that they had failed to show they were denied due process or equal protection.

Mr. Hervias and another driver have also taken legal action, known as an Article 78 proceeding, to compel the city and its regulators to establish and enforce standards that will make sure that all licensed cars — including yellow cabs — "are and remain financially stable." The case is pending in State Supreme Court in Manhattan, with a court appearance scheduled in October.

Yellow taxis made an average of 277,042 daily trips and collected $4 million in fares per day in July, down from 332,231 daily trips and $4.9 million in fares the year before, according to city data.

Allan J. Fromberg, a spokesman for the taxi commission, said it had taken a number of steps to help struggling taxi owners, such as lifting a requirement for individual owners to personally drive their taxis at least 150 shifts a year, which was not only a burden for older people but also limited the pool of potential buyers for medallions. It has also supported laws that have eased restrictions on who could buy the medallions and significantly lowered the transfer tax on medallion sales.

The commission has also provided financial incentives to defray the cost and maintenance of handicap-accessible cars, Mr. Fromberg said. And it has created a pilot program that is intended to help fleet owners attract more drivers; the program allows drivers to pay a percentage of their earnings during a shift to lease the cab, in lieu of a flat fee up front that puts drivers under pressure and leaves them in the hole if they do not earn enough back.

But for many taxi owners, such measures have not been enough.

Mr. Isac is again leasing yellow cabs since he no longer has his own medallion. At times, he picks up only one passenger an hour. Even so, he is not ready to give up on yellow cabs yet.

"I'm still driving a yellow taxi because I want them to come back," he said. "I don't want to see yellow cars disappear from the streets."

Uppkar Thind, 46, an immigrant from India, said he now has to drive 11 to 13 hours a day and can no longer take time off if he wants to break even. He is paying off a medallion that he bought for $357,000 in 2006 with money borrowed from his relatives and a credit union.

"I worked hard," he said. "I achieved my American dream and it turned into a nightmare."

A version of this article appears in print on September 11, 2017, on Page A1 of the New York edition with the headline: As Uber Ascends, Debt Demolishes Taxi Drivers.

BREAKING NEWS **Teen stabbed to death in NYC high school**

METRO

City Council weighs yellow cab bailouts, restrictions on Uber and Lyft

By Danielle Furfaro September 25, 2017 | 11:10pm | Updated

Christopher Sadowski

The City Council is weighing a major bailout of the yellow-cab industry, with possible restrictions and surcharges on rivals such as Uber and Lyft.

Several dozen beleaguered taxi-medallion owners flocked to a council Transportation Committee hearing Monday to complain that the ride-share apps have caused a 90 percent drop in the value of their medallions.

They say that the city should never have allowed Uber, Lyft and others to operate without the same fees and regulations to which taxis are subject and that the presence of nearly 70,000 ride-share vehicles is killing their ability to earn a living.

[redacted]

"Uber shouldn't be above the law," said medallion owner Gloria Guerra.

She and her husband, William, purchased their taxi medallion for $86,000 in 1984. They planned to sell it to fund their retirement. But the medallions, which were selling for about $1.3 million in 2011, are now virtually unsalable.

"The number of taxis are limited, but Ubers aren't. Taxis can't raise their fares, but Uber can. Taxis are more tightly regulated by the city. It's two completely different sets of rules, and it's killing us," Gloria said.

The committee said it would consider launching a task force and a six-month study on the ride-share programs' impact on the industry.

One measure the panel will consider is capping the total number of cars operated by Uber and other ride-share apps.

The committee is also considering helping medallion owners with a cash bailout funded partly by surcharges on any livery car — along with letting each medallion cover two taxis instead of the current one and easing up on disabled-access requirements.

Whatever the city does, it has to do it fast, said Richard Lipsky, spokesman for the Taxi Medallion Owners and Drivers Association, who added that he was shocked that the council waited for four years after Uber arrived to hold a hearing on how to help taxis.

"It's about time, and let's hope it isn't too late," said Lipsky. "As we speak, thousands of medallion owners are either in foreclosure or facing financial ruin."

FILED UNDER BAILOUTS, CITY COUNCIL, LYFT, TAXIS, UBER

The New York Times | https://nyti.ms/2xY3gBi

BUSINESS DAY

Tesla Self-Driving System Faulted by Safety Agency in Crash

By NEAL E. BOUDETTE and BILL VLASIC SEPT. 12, 2017

Even as the government moved Tuesday to open a clearer path for automakers to develop driverless cars, its leading safety agency waved a new warning flag.

After a yearlong investigation, the National Transportation Safety Board concluded that a Tesla system capable of automatically steering and controlling a car had "played a major role" in a fatal crash in Florida.

The agency said the system, known as Autopilot, had performed as intended, but lacked safeguards to prevent drivers from using it improperly.

In the Florida case, the driver was able to use the system on a road for which it was not designed, and to turn his attention away from the road for an extended period just before the crash, the N.T.S.B. said.

"The combined effects of human error and the lack of sufficient system controls resulted in a fatal collision that should not have happened," Robert L. Sumwalt, the chairman of the N.T.S.B., said at a meeting during which the board's report was approved.

In January, in what was interpreted as a victory for Tesla, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration's report on the accident said that the company's

Autopilot-enabled vehicles did not need to be recalled. That inquiry, however, focused only on the question of whether any flaws in the system had led to the crash; it found no such flaws.

The renewed attention to the Tesla system came as automakers are jockeying to push driverless technologies forward, while lawmakers and regulators scramble to keep pace, with the Trump administration putting forward its approach on Tuesday.

The Transportation Department unveiled voluntary guidelines for testing autonomous vehicles on Tuesday as part of a broader government effort to encourage automakers' development of self-driving technology.

The department announced the initiative as Transportation Secretary Elaine L. Chao visited a testing center for self-driving vehicles in Ann Arbor, Mich.

The proposal establishes a voluntary framework of safety guidelines for companies to test autonomous vehicles on public roads. The approach also aims to clarify the role that state governments play in regulating the technology, including the enforcement of traffic laws and vehicle insurance requirements.

The guidelines replace policies set down by the Obama administration last year that called for automakers to submit safety assessments of their self-driving models before testing them on public roads.

Under the new guidelines, it will be left to automakers and other companies to decide whether to submit safety reviews to federal regulators. While the Trump administration will encourage public disclosures of such assessments, the documents will not be subject to federal approval.

"This is not an enforcement document," Ms. Chao said. "This is a guidance document."

There will be no waiting period for a company to begin testing autonomous models, although the vehicles remain subject to broader safety rules and standards for equipment and parts.

Industry officials lauded the less restrictive guidelines, which are intended to be a model for state policies. "The guidance provides the right balance, allowing emerging innovations to thrive while government still keeps a watchful eye over new developments," said the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers, a trade group.

Separately, the House approved a bill last week allowing automakers to deploy hundreds of thousands of autonomous vehicles on American roads over the next few years. A similar bill is being drafted in the Senate.

In addition to Tesla's efforts, the competition to develop self-driving cars has become fierce among auto industry giants such as General Motors and Ford Motor, as well as technology companies including Google and Apple.

The companies have been accelerating their testing and have backed legislation exempting autonomous vehicles from current motor vehicle laws.

Some safety campaigners and consumer groups have been critical of the move toward voluntary rules covering self-driving technology, including the guidelines introduced by Ms. Chao, saying they reduce federal oversight that was already too limited.

"The voluntary policy announced today is a retreat from the already flawed guidance provided in 2016," said Jason K. Levine, the executive director of the Center for Auto Safety in Washington. He said the lack of required safety assessments cedes power to automakers "who have frequently proven they cannot be trusted to protect the public interest in their race for profits."

Automakers and government officials contend that self-driving technology could reduce vehicle accidents and traffic fatalities, which rose by nearly 8 percent in 2015 to more than 35,000 deaths. Tesla reiterated that safety potential Tuesday after the transportation safety board issued its report on the Florida crash.

The accident killed Joshua Brown, 40, of Canton, Ohio. His 2015 Tesla Model S was operating under its Autopilot system on May 7, 2016, on state highway in Williston, Fla., when it crashed into a tractor-trailer that was crossing the road in front of him.

The system's forward-looking camera failed to recognize the white truck against a bright sky, and neither Mr. Brown nor the Autopilot system activated the brakes. Data from the car showed it had been traveling at 74 miles per hour at the time of the crash and that Mr. Brown had ignored several warnings to keep his hands on the steering wheel. A preliminary N.T.S.B. report found that he had at least seven seconds to notice the truck before impact.

Like the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, the N.T.S.B. found that the version of Autopilot in Mr. Brown's car had performed as it had been designed to.

But Mr. Sumwalt said that version of Autopilot "gave far too much leeway to the driver to divert his attention to something other than driving." He also said it was intended for use on limited-access highways rather than routes with cross traffic and intersections, such as the state highway Mr. Brown was traveling on.

In a statement, Tesla said it "appreciates" the N.T.S.B.'s analysis and will evaluate the agency's recommendations. "We will also continue to be extremely clear with current and potential customers that Autopilot is not a fully self-driving technology and drivers need to remain attentive at all times," the company said.

Since the accident, Tesla has modified Autopilot to warn drivers more frequently to keep their hands on the steering wheel. After three warnings, the system cannot be engaged without stopping and restarting the car.

Tesla has also modified how Autopilot's radar and camera sensors interact to improve its ability to recognize obstacles. The Autopilot upgrade was rolled out a year ago.

Tesla introduced Autopilot in October 2015, to great fanfare. And for a time it seemed that Tesla was far ahead of the big, established automakers as the notion of self-driving cars caught the imagination of both the media and technology enthusiasts.

But before long, some drivers, including Mr. Brown, began to post videos on YouTube showing that it was possible to go several minutes without looking at the road or holding the wheel. Some videos show drivers reading while at the wheel; in one, a driver climbs into his car's back seat.

Even before the fatal crash, Tesla had come under criticism for releasing Autopilot without greater safeguards to prevent improper use. And early on, the company referred to it as a beta system — a technical term for an experimental version, suggesting it was a work in progress.

A version of this article appears in print on September 13, 2017, on Page B1 of the New York edition with the headline: Tesla Autopilot Found at Fault In Fatal Crash.

the **two-way**

AMERICA

Department Of Transportation Rolls Out New Guidelines For Self-Driving Cars

September 12, 2017 · 9:19 PM ET

COLIN DWYER



A Ford Fusion development vehicle equipped with autonomous controls, seen at a test facility Tuesday in Ann Arbor, Mich.
Jeff Kowalsky/AFP/Getty Images

The Department of Transportation released its revised guidelines on automated driving systems Tuesday, outlining its recommended — but not mandatory — best practices for companies developing self-driving cars. The first such guidelines released under the Trump administration, the Vision for Safety 2.0 scales back some of the recommendations outlined last year under President Obama.

In a statement released Tuesday, Transportation Secretary Elaine Chao lauded the possibilities of automated driving systems, saying "we can look forward to a future with fewer traffic fatalities and increased mobility for all Americans."

"In addition to safety," Chao said, "ADS technology offers important social benefits by improving access to transportation, independence and quality of life for those who cannot drive because of illness, advanced age or disability."

THE TWO-WAY

Government Says Self-Driving Vehicles Will Save Money, Time, Lives

ALL TECH CONSIDERED

Regulating Self-Driving Cars For Safety Even Before They're Built

As Forbes reports, the prevailing difference between last year's version and the one released Tuesday is one of slimmed scale and extent. For instance, the new guidelines trim a 15-point safety assessment proposed last year, which would be conducted by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration if manufacturers submit to one. The proposed evaluation is down to 12 points.

Though, as a voluntary exercise, the number of points on the assessment is likely less important than whether manufacturers submit to one at all — and Deborah A.P. Hersman, president and CEO of National Safety Council, points out that "DOT has yet to receive any Safety Assessments, even though vehicles are being tested in many states."

The new guidelines make clear again that manufacturers are not required to submit to voluntary assessments — though they are "encouraged" — and that those assessments are "not subject to Federal approval."

"Voluntary guidelines will serve the developers of new technologies to ensure they can move quickly, but they serve public safety best if all the players agree to comply with them," Hersman said in a statement Tuesday.

"Mandating additional safety measures such as a clear disclosure, robust validation processes prior to deployment and data sharing requirements will now fall to the Congress as both the House and Senate move their bills," she said.

POLITICS

Congress Struggles To Keep Up With Regulations For Self-Driving Cars

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The new guidelines also no longer apply to Level 2 vehicles — or vehicles with partial automation, in facets such as acceleration and steering, that still require drivers to "remain engaged with the driving task."

David Friedman, former interim head of NHTSA, says the timing of Chao's announcement should raise some eyebrows. On the same day the new plan relaxed guidance on Level 2 vehicles, the National Transportation Safety Board faulted a Tesla automated driving system for playing a "major role" in a collision that killed its test driver last year.

According to the NTSB assessment, the cause of the crash was a combination of the "driver's inattention" and the Tesla automation system that "permitted the car driver's overreliance on the automation."

THE TWO-WAY

Tesla Remotely Expanded Car Batteries Near Irma's Path, And Questions Linger

"System safeguards, that should have prevented the Tesla's driver from using the car's automation system on certain roadways, were lacking and the combined effects of human error and the lack of sufficient system safeguards resulted in a fatal collision that should not have happened," NTSB Chairman Robert L. Sumwalt III said in a statement.

Friedman says the new guidelines will do little to rectify the kinds of problems that led to the crash — in fact, he says, just the opposite: "Now it's back to the wild, wild west for those systems."

"Just as the NTSB says the government and industry should be stepping up its efforts to ensure the safety of Level 2 automated vehicles," he added, "the Department of Transportation and Secretary Chao are rolling back their responsibility in that space."

Nevertheless, the Department of Transportation says the development of this technology will do much to reduce the number of serious automobile crashes, 94 percent of which it says are due to human error.

And the agency says these new guidelines are just part of an evolving approach to automated driving systems. "In fact," it says, "DOT and NHTSA are already planning for 3.0."

The New York Times | https://nyti.ms/2xaPEGq

TECHNOLOGY

Self-Driving Cars' Prospects Rise With Vote by House

By CECILIA KANG SEPT. 6, 2017

WASHINGTON — Lawmakers in the House took a major step on Wednesday toward advancing the development of driverless cars, approving legislation that would put the vehicles onto public roads more quickly and curb states from slowing their spread.

Under the bill, which was approved by a unanimous voice vote, carmakers can add hundreds of thousands of self-driving cars to America's road in the next few years. States, which now have a patchwork of rules regulating the vehicles, would have to follow the new federal law.

The House vote sets the stage for a battle between safety advocates and companies that make the largely unproven technology. Automakers say the vehicles could greatly reduce roadway fatalities and help their businesses, but many safety advocates say they are not ready for wide deployment. The next steps will come in the Senate, which is expected to consider a similar bill soon.

Lawmakers who support the legislation said the country's confusing regulatory environment was hampering the driverless-car industry's prospects.

"Self-driving cars have the potential to save lives especially when the majority of fatalities are caused by human error," said Representative Debbie Dingell, Democrat of Michigan. "The question is whether we are in the driver's seat and not to cede it to China or India."

Auto and technology giants, including Ford Motor, General Motors and Waymo, Alphabet's driverless division, have pushed hard for the new law. They have also pressed regulators at the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration to clarify safety guidelines covering self-driving technology. Elaine L. Chao, the transportation secretary, is expected to announce revised guidelines for the vehicles next week in Michigan.

In recent years, dozens of states have passed laws related to self-driving safety, some of which carmakers view as too heavy-handed. The companies have, for example, fought proposals in California, Michigan and New York that would require driverless cars to be electric-powered and to contain steering wheels and brake pedals.

"The reason why Congress is doing this is that there was a growing concern of a vacuum created because N.H.T.S.A. hadn't acted and the states were acting in N.H.T.S.A.'s place," said Marc Scribner, a senior fellow at the Competitive Enterprise Institute, a conservative-leaning research group in Washington.

The House bill allows manufacturers of driverless cars to obtain some exemptions from vehicle safety regulations for 25,000 vehicles in the first year after the legislation takes effect and up to 100,000 vehicles within four years. The carmakers would still have to meet certain safety standards being developed by N.H.T.S.A.

Safety and labor advocates have criticized the exemptions are too broad. As written, some safety experts say, driverless cars could have weaker standards for steering systems, brakes and airbags.

"This bill threatens the safety of the American public because it will give automakers a huge number of exemptions for safety standards for no reason at all but because they want their autonomous vehicles to be first on the lot," said Joan

Claybrook, a chairwoman of Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety. "This is totally reckless."

Labor unions urged lawmakers to look more critically at driverless trucks and cars that could eventually put millions of drivers out of work. And Consumers Union sent a letter to House members saying the bill was passed too quickly.

"The overall number of vehicles that can receive safety exemptions should be significantly reduced, and neither the number of exempted vehicles nor the duration of exemptions should be increased without specific safety-related justifications," Consumers Union said in the letter.

Although the bill prevents states from creating laws related to the design and operations of driverless cars, the states would maintain authority over licensing, insurance and public safety transportation laws.

State officials have countered by saying those delineations would be meaningless. If no one is technically driving a car, they say, how could a state hold drivers accountable for a crash?

Companies have argued that traditional vehicle safety laws are outdated and do not make sense for vehicles engineered without a driver in mind. Business lobbyists said that Congress needed to step in to stop the rise of state and city regulations created in recent years. The bill requires that N.H.T.S.A. create final rules for self-driving vehicle safety standards within two years.

"We applaud the committee's work to strengthen provisions to limit the possibility of excessive litigation that could ultimately delay, hinder, or halt development," said Tim Day, a senior vice president at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce.

Follow Cecilia Kang on Twitter @ceciliakang

A version of this article appears in print on September 7, 2017, on Page B4 of the New York edition with the headline: Self-Driving Cars' Future Buoyed With House Bill.

James O'Connor

From: James O'Connor
Sent: Wednesday, September 27, 2017 2:55 PM
To: James O'Connor
Subject: THE FUTURE

The FUTURE is approaching faster than one can handle...!

1. In 1998, Kodak had 170,000 employees and sold 85% of all photo paper worldwide.

Within just a few years, their business model disappeared and they went bankrupt.

What happened to Kodak will happen in a lot of industries in the next 5-10 years and, most people won't see it coming. Did you think in 1998 that 3 years later you would never take pictures on film again?

**Yet digital cameras were invented in 1975. The first ones only had 10,000 pixels but followed Moore's law. So as with all exponential technologies, it was a disappointment for a time, before it became way superior and became mainstream in only a few short years. It will now happen again (but much faster) with Artificial Intelligence, health,
autonomous and electric cars, education, 3D printing, agriculture, and jobs.**

Welcome to the 4th Industrial Revolution. Welcome to the Exponential Age

2. The software will disrupt most traditional industries in the next 5-10 years.

3. Uber is just a software tool, they don't own any cars, and are now the biggest taxi company in the world.

4. Airbnb is now the biggest hotel company in the world, although they don't own any properties.

5. Artificial Intelligence: Computers become exponentially better in understanding the world This year, a computer beat the best Go player in the world, 10 years earlier than expected.

6. In the US, young lawyers already don't get jobs. Because of IBM's Watson, you can get legal advice (so far for more or less basic stuff) within seconds, with 90% accuracy compared with 70% accuracy when done by humans.

So if you study law, stop immediately. There will be 90% less lawyers in the future, only omniscient specialists will remain.

6A. Watson already helps nurses diagnosing cancer, its 4 times more accurate than human nurses.

7. Facebook now has a pattern recognition software that can recognize faces better than humans. In 2030, computers will become more intelligent than humans.

8. Autonomous cars : In 2018 the first self-driving cars will appear for the public. Around 2020, the complete industry will start to be disrupted. You don't want to own a car anymore. You will call a car with your phone, it will show up at your location and drive you to your destination. You will not need to park it, you only pay for the driven distance and can be productive while driving.

The very young children of today will never get a driver's license and will never own a car.

8A. It will change the cities, because we will need 90-95% less cars for that. We can transform former parking spaces into parks.

**1.2 million people die each year in car accidents worldwide. We now have one accident every 60,000 miles (100,000 km), with autonomous driving that will drop to 1 accident in 6 million miles (10 million km).
That will save a million lives world wide each year.**

8B. Most car companies will doubtless become bankrupt. Traditional car companies try the evolutionary approach and just build a better car, while tech companies (Tesla, Apple, Google) will do the revolutionary approach and build a computer on wheels.

8C. Many engineers from Volkswagen and Audi; are completely terrified of Tesla.

9. Insurance companies will have massive trouble because, without accidents, the insurance will become 100x cheaper. Their car insurance business model will disappear.

10. Real estate will change. Because if you can work while you commute, people will move further away to live in a more beautiful neighborhood.

11. Electric cars will become mainstream about 2020. Cities will be less noisy because all new cars will run on electricity.

12. Electricity will become incredibly cheap and clean: Solar production has been on an exponential curve for 30 years, but you can now see the burgeoning impact.

13. Last year, more solar energy was installed worldwide than fossil. Energy companies are desperately trying to limit access to the grid to prevent

competition from home solar installations, but that simply cannot continue - technology will take care of that strategy.

14. With cheap electricity comes cheap and abundant water. Desalination of salt water now only needs 2kWh per cubic meter (@ 0.25 cents). We don't have scarce water in most places, we only have scarce drinking water. Imagine what will be possible if anyone can have as much clean water as he wants, for nearly no cost.

15. Health: The Tricorder X price will be announced this year. There are companies who will build a medical device (called the "Tricorder" from Star Trek) that works with your phone, which takes your retina scan, your blood sample and you breath into it.

16. It then analyses 54 bio-markers that will identify nearly any disease. It will be cheap, so in a few years everyone on this planet will have access to world class medical analysis, nearly for free. Goodbye, self-serving medical practitioners and establishments.

17. 3D printing: The price of the cheapest 3D printer came down from $18,000 to $400 within 10 years. In the same time, it became 100 times faster. All major shoe companies have already started 3D printing shoes.

18. Some spare airplane parts are already 3D printed in remote airports. The space station now has a printer that eliminates the need for the large amount of spare parts they used to have in the past.

19. At the end of this year, new smart phones will have 3D scanning possibilities. You can then 3D scan your feet and print your perfect shoe at home.

19A. In China, they already 3D printed and built a complete 6-storey office building. By 2027, 10% of everything that's being produced will be 3D printed.

20.Business opportunities: If you think of a niche you want to go in, first ask yourself: "In the future, do I think we will have that?" and if the answer is yes, how can you make that happen sooner?

20A. If it doesn't work with your phone, forget the idea. Any idea designed for success in the 20th century is doomed to failure in the 21st century.

20B. Work : 70-80% of jobs will disappear in the next 20 years. There will be a lot of new jobs, but it is not clear if there will be enough new jobs in such a short time. This will require a rethink on wealth distribution.

21. Agriculture : There will be a $100 agricultural robot in the future. Farmers in 3rd world countries can then become managers of their field instead of working all day on their fields.

22. Aeroponics will need much less water. The first Petri dish produced veal, is now available and will be cheaper than cow produced veal in 2018. Right now, 30% of all agricultural surfaces is used for cows. Imagine if we don't need that space anymore.

23. There are several startups who will bring insect protein to the market shortly. It contains more protein than meat. It will be labeled as "alternative protein source" (because most people still reject the idea of eating insects).

24. There is an app called "moodies" which can already tell in which mood you're in. By 2020 there will be apps that can tell by your facial expressions if you are lying. Imagine a political debate where it's being displayed when they're telling the truth and when they're not - it will ultimately compel all politicians to be truthful (a
truly unique & novel occurrence).

25. BY 2020 (or sooner - some might suggest this is happening now) WHAT A UNIVERSITY STUDENT LEARNS IN THE FIRST YEAR OF A THREE YEAR DEGREE - WILL BE IRRELEVANT AND REDUNDANT BY THE TIME THE THIRD YEAR IS COMPLETE

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Autonomous Vehicles: Considerations for Personal and Commercial Lines Insurers

By Maureen Brown, CPCU, RPLU+, ARe, ARM-P, ASLI



Editor's Note

This article originally appeared in the spring 2016 issue of Wholesale Insurance News*, a magazine of the American Association of Managing General Agents. It has been updated and reprinted with permission.*

Since the early 1960s, the insurance industry has been a major force behind the most significant advances in highway and vehicle safety, including electronic stability control requirements, seat-belt use, and automobile crash worthiness. Now, accident avoidance and autonomous vehicle (AV) technologies offer an opportunity for us to advance another milestone in vehicle safety, going beyond keeping people safe in a crash to avoiding the crash altogether—saving lives, reducing injuries, and having a significant positive impact on the human and economic toll of accidents. Data from tests conducted by the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (IIHS) shows that vehicle safety systems that are considered the building blocks of fully autonomous vehicles have been successful at reducing accidents.[1]

At the same time, AV technology could give rise to new and potentially costly liability exposures with characteristics that emerge along with the technology's evolution from partially to fully autonomous. Will the tools and methods underwriters use to evaluate risk also evolve? What new products will be needed, both for traditional auto manufacturers and suppliers faced with new risks and for new entrants into the AV supply chain? When will these changes occur and how will auto insurers adapt?

What Are Autonomous Vehicles?

Autonomous vehicles typically use a combination of sensors, cameras, global positioning systems (GPS), radar, and light detection and ranging (LIDAR) technology to gather data that enables the vehicles to know where they are located and their proximity to everything around them. The data is processed by onboard computers that drive the vehicles.

The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) has adopted the Society of Automotive Engineers' (SAE) descriptions of levels of autonomy from no automation at Level 0, to full self-driving capabilities at levels 4 and 5 (see chart below). While Level 4 technology is in various stages of testing, most vehicles on the road today fall into levels 2 and 3. Some luxury cars offer automated Level 2-type functions, such as automatic lane-keeping and forward collision avoidance systems, in production models today.

Significant Safety and Economic Benefits

The NHTSA reports that in 2015, more than 35,000 fatalities occurred in the United States as a result of vehicle crashes, with human error as a primary cause.[2] Analysts agree that AVs have the potential to dramatically reduce human error and, therefore, the frequency of vehicle crashes.

In addition to decreasing accident-related costs, AVs may have other significant benefits, including fewer cars on the road because of reduced ownership of cars and increased ridesharing,[3] more efficient driving, and increased productivity because people will gain time as AVs do the driving.[4] While savings estimates vary widely, Morgan Stanley values savings at $1.3 trillion, which includes nearly $500 billion of accident-related costs, $169 billion in fuel-related savings, and $645 billion in productivity gains.[5]

Commercial AVs could also significantly reduce the 4,000 traffic fatalities involving large trucks annually in the United States.[6] Independent testing agencies have confirmed that autonomously driven tractor-trailer combinations can reduce congestion, emission, driver fatigue, vehicle downtime, and maintenance costs. Also, an estimated 4 percent to 7 percent reduction in fuel costs could add up to significant savings, considering fleets travel an average of 80,000 to 100,000 miles per year.[7]

Insurance Implications

Today, even with collision avoidance systems in place, there is still a need for personal and commercial automobile insurance in its current form. However, as the concept of AVs on our roads becomes a reality, personal and commercial automobile insurers will be forced to adapt to this significant mobility transformation by changing their distribution channels and developing new products to address the potential shift in liability from the driver to the vehicle or technology manufacturer.

Insurance industry analysts predict that AVs will have a significant impact on personal and commercial lines insurers. KPMG predicts that the personal auto industry could shrink by 60 percent within 25 years.8 KPMG further indicates that as the size of the automobile insurance industry shrinks, a noticeable shift in the percentage of losses in personal and commercial lines will occur. This shift will be attributed to vehicles making more decisions, thereby increasing the potential liability for software developers and manufacturers. As the auto marketplace moves toward car sharing and mobility on demand, liability will shift to fleet owners also covered by commercial products.

Liability May Shift

As AVs move out of research and testing environments and into the consumer marketplace, these types of liability coverages may be impacted:

- General liability—Liability for losses caused by AVs may shift from the operators of AVs to the manufacturers of the AV technology. Assigning liability, in turn, will likely hinge on whether the driver or the component part/technology caused the accident, or some combination of the two (autonomy levels 1 through 3). As of December 2015, car manufacturers Volvo and Mercedes along with tech-giant Google have stated they would take “full liability” if a loss occurs when one of their vehicles is in fully autonomous mode (levels 4 through 5).9
- Cyber liability exposures—The potential for hacking a vehicle’s computer system to gain information or to cause injury or disruption presents significant data security exposures. While those exposures exist today, the auto industry has acknowledged the growing potential for cyber security threats as vehicles become more connected to each other and to the internet or other networks.
- Liability exposures could arise, for example, from the collection and storage by the AV systems of data and personal information that is protected under state or federal laws. The potential, while less likely, also exists for widespread harm from hacking or cyber attacks.
- Reputational risk—Given the amount of media attention focused on AV technology, any serious loss involving an AV will likely be carefully scrutinized and widely reported, which presents a potential reputational risk to the technology manufacturer.

Timing Is Uncertain

Most vehicle manufacturers are in various stages of developing and testing AVs. But a host of factors, primarily regulatory, will influence if and when they become commonplace on public roads. Although Morgan Stanley and KPMG predict that we will see AVs on our roads before the end of the decade, even with the guidance provided by the 2016 NHTSA Federal Automated Vehicles Policy,10 IIHS/Highway Loss Data Institute predicts that vehicles equipped with crash-avoidance and lane-keeping systems would not reach 95 percent of fleet penetration until 2039.**11**

Daimler showcased the industry’s first autonomous long-haul truck in Nevada in May 2015 and expects this truck to be introduced into the market by 2025. Similarly, Otto, an Uber subsidiary, made the first autonomous commercial delivery in Colorado in October 2016 under controlled conditions.[12]

Key Factors Temper Progress

These are factors that have slowed the progression of moving AVs into the consumer marketplace:

- Social acceptance—Surveys show that many people would not purchase AVs if they were available today, yet they would be willing to spend a little more money to equip their next vehicles with features like crash avoidance and lane-keeping systems, which are the building blocks of tomorrow’s fully

autonomous vehicles.[13, 14] It seems the general population is not ready to give up control of their vehicles or trust that a computer might make better decisions at the wheel.
- Regulatory factors—Laws and regulations regarding AVs lag behind the development of AV technology. Most enacted legislation has focused on testing AVs on public roads rather than envisioning AVs in the consumer marketplace.

As of January 2017, twelve states allow testing of AVs on public roads. Generally, test vehicles are dual control (that is, fully automatic and manual), and a licensed operator is required to be in the car and ready to take control at any moment. In 2016, Michigan became the first state to pass legislation that allowed for the operation of vehicles without a driver present.

In its September 2016 Federal Automated Vehicles Policy, the NHTSA outlines a procedure that requires AV manufacturers to submit a fifteen-point checklist to ensure due process around safety.[15] The document, created in consultation with industry stakeholders and safety experts, is meant to be revised regularly to adapt to the changing industry.

While insurance implications are mentioned in the policy, the NHTSA has indicated that liability is regulated by the states. The NHTSA stated that liability issues should be proactively addressed and that tort implications should be managed before AVs are released. Although the policy has been well received, many manufacturers question its binding authority without the rulemaking process and see many of the procedures as guidelines.

As AVs get closer to widespread implementation, lawmakers will likely pay more attention and introduce legislation designed to protect the public across a wide range of AV impacts, including licensing and certification of vehicles, infrastructure, cyber security, and, of course, safety standards. Insurance regulators may seek to prevent adverse selection and moral hazards, and to protect privacy and personal information. As laws and regulations evolve with AV technology, insurance coverages will likely change to meet the needs of this new transportation model. Insurers that stay up to date on AV issues will be better positioned to manage that impact successfully.

Many thanks to the Excess/Surplus/Specialty Lines Interest Group for its contributions to this article.

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INSURING AUTONOMOUS VEHICLES

AN $81 BILLION

OPPORTUNITY BETWEEN NOW AND 2025

INNOVATION BRINGS DISRUPTION FOR AUTO INSURERS AND ABUNDANT OPPORTUNITY

The rapid emergence of autonomous vehicles – with Stevens Institute of Technology predicting that as many as 23 million fully autonomous vehicles will be traveling US highways by 2035 – presents the automobile insurance industry with major challenges, but also with a significant near-term opportunity. In fact, we estimate that the switch to autonomous vehicles will generate at least $81 billion in new insurance revenues in the US between 2020 and 2025. Converting this opportunity will not be easy, but insurers taking action now will, we believe, have an important first mover advantage, not only over other insurers, but against new disruptors such as automotive manufacturers and over-the top (OTT) players providing Internet content and services.

Widespread adoption of autonomous vehicles may seem to insurers like something that takes place in the far distant future, but autonomous vehicles are making inroads, and quickly.

The shift to autonomous vehicles will cause dramatic changes in how insurance premiums are generated. With most autonomous vehicles likely to be owned by original equipment manufacturers (OEMs), OTT players, and other service providers such as ride-sharing companies, the number of individual policies will decline, along with revenues from premiums generated by these policies. And, since autonomous vehicles will be considerably safer than vehicles driven by humans, there will be fewer road accidents, leading to reduced pricing for insurance policies. Estimates are that claim frequency could drop significantly when compared to claims for vehicles driven by humans. While insurers of autonomous vehicles will make fewer payouts for claims, this will not compensate them for lost policy revenues.

BEHIND THE NUMBERS

Stevens Institute of Technology developed proprietary models for forecasting the adoption of autonomous vehicle technology, the size of the insurance markets, and the potential new insurance market penetration of the following three new sub-categories: Cyber Risk, Software and Hardware, and Infrastructure. The Stevens team conducted a dynamic forecasting computer-based simulation which considered the consumer purchasing behavior, insurance revenue calculation, automobile market sales, and the new insurance sub-categories. Sensitivity analysis was then applied to the model to account for overall risk and uncertainty. Lastly, using expert opinion price ranges of the three new insurance sub-categories, the future insurance market impact of autonomous vehicles was further investigated.

The estimates of autonomous vehicle market growth from 2020 to 2050 were generated from Stevens' own modeling and analysis and adjusted based on external forecasts. For instance, the estimate of annual sales of 3 million fully autonomous vehicles by 2050 is based on their analysis of NHTSA and other independent forecasts.

AUTO INSURANCE PREMIUMS COULD DROP BY AS MUCH AS $25 BILLION BY 2035

We agree that the revolution in autonomous vehicles poses serious and fundamental risks to the traditional insurance business model. Our conservative estimates are that, by 2026, insurers will begin to see auto insurance premiums drop due to the rollout of autonomous vehicles; by 2035, the reduction could be as much as $25 billion, or 12.5 percent of the total market. However, models designed by Accenture in collaboration with Stevens Institute – illustrated in Figure 1 below – indicate that these decreases will be offset by new insurance product lines centered upon autonomous vehicles. These new revenues could be in the range of $15 billion annually by the year 2025 and as much as $23 billion in 2035, although by 2033 lost premium revenues will begin to outweigh the gains from new insurance product lines.

Figure 1. Estimated gains and losses in insurance premium revenues caused by autonomous vehicles (AVs)



As seen in figure 2 below, the cumulative value of potential new revenues is enormous. It totals as much as $81 billion by 2025 and, because of the gains that can be realized in the years up until 2025, the accumulated premium loss will not surpass the forecast gains until 2050. For insurers, the great opportunity is within the next decade, but this potential can only be realized through rapid action.

These potential revenues cannot be characterized as easy pickings or low-hanging fruit. To seize this opportunity, insurers will need to change and adapt their business models, and to do so quickly. Those insurers that come to terms with marketplace realities and pivot in the right direction have a much better chance of enjoying long-term success than those that adopt a "wait and see" posture, hoping that the pace of change will be slower than anticipated.

Figure 2. Aggregated revenues from new premiums



CHAOS CREATES OPPORTUNITY

The revolution in autonomous vehicles presents opportunities for insurers in three key areas:

1. Cyber security
2. Product liability insurance for sensors and/or algorithms
3. Insuring against infrastructure problems

As seen in Figure 3 below, the largest opportunities by 2025 will be in cyber security ($12 billion) and product liability ($2.5 billion). Infrastructure insurance is a smaller and more specialized opportunity representing approximately $0.5 billion in potential premiums.

Figure 3. Opportunity map



CYBER SECURITY

The opportunities here include protecting against vehicle theft, unauthorized vehicle entry, and the use of "ransomware" to hold vehicles hostage until payments are made to unlock software controls. Insurers will also be writing policies to protect against criminal or terrorist hijacking of vehicle controls through hacking. And, with many cars serving as connected devices, insurers will offer protection against identity theft, privacy invasion, and the theft or misuse of personal information. The cyber security model was based on benchmarks of cyber security spending in the US information technology sector.

PRODUCT LIABILITY

Insurers will write policies to cover manufacturers' liability for communication or Internet connection failure as well as for the potential failure of software – including software bugs, memory overflow, and algorithm defects – and hardware failures such as sensory circuit failure, camera vision loss, and radar and lidar (light detection and ranging) failures. Liability coverage will be needed not only by OEMs but by their tier 1 and tier 2 suppliers as well. The product liability model was based on historical automotive software and hardware failure rates, using National Highway and Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) data.

INFRASTRUCTURE

Autonomous vehicle manufacturers and/ or service providers will need to shoulder responsibility for the infrastructure put in place to control vehicle movements and traffic flow. This will include cloud server systems (which can malfunction, become overloaded or suffer interruptions from outside factors); failure of external sensors and signals; and communication problems originating at the system level. The infrastructure model is based on the number of traffic lights in urban and rural areas of the US.

As autonomous vehicles shift the industry focus from personal ownership and liability to commercial and product liability, the biggest payers of new premiums will become OEMs, technology giants and governments. In addition, there may be other revenue opportunities related to managing risk connected with new products and services indirectly related to autonomous vehicles.

As seen in Figure 4 on the next page, personal vehicle ownership will continue to represent the majority of vehicle ownership, although (taking account of population growth) per-capita ownership levels will decline. Services for ride sharing or car sharing such as Uber and Zipcar will continue to grow. In the chart in Figure 4, the "Personal Traditional Vehicle" is owned and operated by an individual, while the "Personal Semi-Autonomous Vehicle" is a transitional vehicle which, while incorporating some autonomous driving features, is still owned and operated by an individual. The "Personal Fully Autonomous Vehicle" is a self-driving vehicle owned and used by one person, while the "Car Service Traditional Vehicle" is either 1) owned by a fleet company and operated by many people (as with Zipcar) or owned by one person and used by many people (as with taxi companies and Uber-type services). The final category, "Car Service Fully Autonomous Vehicle" is a self-driving vehicle owned by a fleet company and used by many people.

Figure 4. Autonomous vehicle adoption forecast



THE AUTONOMOUS VEHICLE TIPPING POINT

Autonomous vehicles are evolving rapidly and are currently between **Level 0** (in which the human driver controls everything, including steering, brakes, throttle and power) and **Level 1** (in which most functions are still controlled by the driver, but some, such as braking or parallel parking, can be done automatically by the car). The next phase is **Level 2** or "Modern Plus" in which at least two vehicle functions – such as cruise control or lane-centering – are automated, but the driver must be ready to take control of the vehicle.

FUTURE STAGES WILL INCLUDE

Level 3: Partial Autonomy – Drivers are still necessary, but are not required to continuously monitor the vehicle as in previous levels.

Level 4: Full Autonomy + Human – The vehicle performs all safety-critical driving functions and monitors roadway conditions for an entire trip, with the option for the human to take over driving at any time.

Level 5: Full Autonomy (No Human) – There is no option for human driving (that is,there is no steering wheel or other controls).

EARLY MOVERS HAVE THE MOST TO GAIN

In our view, insurers who act now to explore the opportunities presented by the autonomous vehicle revolution will be best positioned to capture new revenues. Early mover advantage is particularly important in light of the blurring of industry boundaries. Automakers are experimenting with packages that offer insurance as well as maintenance services to prospective buyers, potentially taking market share from traditional industry players. It is worth noting, however, that, while the OEMs are acting as an insurance distribution channel, the actual policies are written by insurance companies working in partnership with the OEMs.

Autonomous vehicles and related technologies such as vehicle telematics will generate vast quantities of proprietary driver data. As OEMs and technology companies explore the vehicle insurance market, they will also be looking for opportunities to control and monetize this data in the development of analytics and highly personalized offerings made directly to customers through built-in vehicle communications channels.

WHAT INSURERS SHOULD BE DOING NOW

The threat posed to traditional automobile insurers by the rapid evolution of autonomous vehicles is real, but so is the $81 billion opportunity represented by new forms of cyber, product liability and infrastructure insurance. Early mover advantage will go to insurers getting a jump on actuarial modeling, the development of new product offerings, the creation of new distribution channels and the formation of partnerships with new premium payers – all critical elements of success.

TO GET AHEAD OF COMPETITORS AND GAIN AN EARLY MOVER ADVANTAGE IN THIS SECTOR, INSURERS SHOULD CONSIDER THE FOLLOWING INITIATIVES

1

DEVELOP NEEDED EXPERTISE IN BIG DATA AND ANALYTICS

Although there will be a struggle for control of data generated by autonomous vehicles and the communications and software systems that support them, market participants with the ability to collect, organize and analyze this data will have inherent advantages over those with less developed capabilities.

2

BEGIN THE ACTUARIAL AND MODELING PROCESS

The introduction of partially autonomous safety features has already changed the safety profile of newer vehicles. For example, autonomous emergency braking systems that direct instantaneous deceleration and braking of a vehicle are directly responsible for a 15 percent reduction in frontal crashes. Insurers should adapt current actuarial and modeling techniques to be ready as vehicles add more and more autonomous features, including the "tipping point" at Level 3 when human drivers become largely optional.

3

EXPLORE THE PARTNER ECOSYSTEM

To participate effectively in the autonomous vehicle environment, insurers will need to collaborate with OEMs, providers of communication and software systems, governments at multiple levels, and many other entities. Insurers not doing so already should be actively identifying and mapping out potential ecosystem partners.

4

THINK ABOUT NEW BUSINESS MODELS

Depending upon the opportunities pursued, insurers whose revenues derive primarily from personal automobile policies (insuring thousands of small risks) may have to transform themselves into large commercial insurers writing policies on a small number of very large risks. Thousands of auto insurers will be replaced by a much smaller number of commercial carriers. For the remaining players, this will entail major changes in areas including product development, policy administration and distribution.

CONCLUSION

The rate of adoption for autonomous vehicles can be debated, but there is little doubt that such vehicles will eventually predominate the world's highways. Automobile insurers should embrace, rather than fear, the future. Our research and modeling conducted in conjunction with Stevens Institute indicates that there will be a significant opportunity for insurers in the near- to mid-term (over the next five to ten years) as the need for cyber insurance and product liability insurance on vehicles outpaces the decrease in individual premium revenues. Taking advantage of this shift will require a major cultural adjustment for auto insurers, as well as close interaction with regulators and other policymakers. However, insurers taking preemptive steps now to convert this opportunity will be in a much better position to succeed as the autonomous vehicle revolution continues and the world shifts, however gradually, to this new mode of transportation.

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Morgan Stanley

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MORGAN STANLEY BLUE PAPER

MORGAN STANLEY RESEARCH
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Autonomous Cars

Self-Driving the New Auto Industry Paradigm

Autonomous cars are no longer just the realm of science fiction. They are real and will be on roads sooner than you think. Cars with basic autonomous capability are in showrooms today, semi-autonomous cars are coming in 12-18 months, and completely autonomous cars are set to be available before the end of the decade.

This is not a toy—the social and economic implications are enormous: Beyond the practical benefits, we estimate autonomous cars can contribute $1.3 trillion in annual savings to the US economy alone, with global savings estimated at over $5.6 trillion. There will undoubtedly be bumps in the road as well, including the issues of liability, infrastructure, and consumer acceptance. However, none of these issues appears insurmountable.

The auto industry business model could be transformed—and the collateral impact to other sectors could be significant as well. Like the PC/smartphone industry today, we see the auto industry reorganized into dedicated "hardware" OEMs, "software / systems" OEMs/suppliers, and integrated "experience" creators. Selling content to the occupants of the car (who now have nothing else to do) could be a significant new revenue stream. We believe early leaders in the space have a critical head start including Audi, Mercedes-Benz, BMW and Nissan among auto OEMs, Delphi, Continental, Autoliv and TRW among suppliers and tech players like Google, IBM and Cisco. Non-auto industries with high stakes in this market include telecom services, software, media, freight transportation, semiconductors and insurance.

Morgan Stanley Blue Papers focus on critical investment themes that require coordinated perspectives across industry sectors, regions, or asset classes.

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We would like to acknowledge the contribution of our intern, Brian Yun, to this Blue Paper.

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See page 101 for recent Blue Paper reports.

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MORGAN STANLEY BLUE PAPER

Autonomous Vehicles

Autonomous Cars: The Basics

Executive Summary

A few decades from now, a child from today will hardly believe that people used to drive vehicles manually. The march toward autonomous vehicles or self-driving cars is well underway and though it may be a few years until we get there, the destination may be closer than most people think. It also means that, as a society, we need to start now to fathom the enormous implications of this transition, so that we are ready for it when it comes.

Over the course of several months, we held intense brain storming sessions and interviewed futurists and top executives within the auto industry and potential disruptors outside the industry, to develop a vision of what a future with autonomous cars will look like. The result is this Blue Paper, a collaborative effort across ten global research teams at Morgan Stanley Research.

This Blue Paper is *not* meant to be a comprehensive list of every advantage and disadvantage, use of, and obstacle to adoption of autonomous vehicles. That already has been well-covered in other places, and we may write on such topics in more detail in future follow-up reports.

Rather than focus on the topic of "what is an autonomous vehicle", we have instead focused on areas that have not been addressed so far. We have attempted to lay out a timeline for adoption, determine what the global implications might be, quantify the socio-economic benefits, and—most importantly—examine the investment implications of autonomous vehicles. We have attempted to make *a practical case* for the adoption of autonomous vehicles and present solutions to the most pressing concerns/obstacles, with the goal of sparking the debate about whether we need to be preparing for the future, starting now.

We prefer to use the term "autonomous car" rather than "self-driving car" or "driverless car" in this report, because we believe the term "autonomous" best conveys the amount of technology and engineering that goes into making this system work. It also avoids the negative images of rogue, self-aware vehicles that the term "self-driving" or "driverless" can imply.

Autonomous cars are real and will be ready for prime time sooner than you think

In any discussion of cars, mention the terms "autonomous" or "self-driving" and most people conjure up images of science fiction movies or television shows, like *Knight Rider* and *Batman*. The idea of a driverless car is still so fantastical that this topic struggles to get respect even today. Broaching the concept as something real is still met with eye-rolling and deep skepticism, even among people within the auto industry who are actively working on autonomous car technology. It is true that there has been a significant amount of print media devoted to the topic recently, but we believe there has been little serious dialogue. Even starting work on this Blue Paper drew a lot of debate within our own teams as to whether this was a topic of relevance, in terms of size of the impact, the timing of potential realization, and the ability to generate actionable investment implications.

However, it is now clear to us that not only are autonomous cars real but they are likely to come around sooner than most people think. With US drivers driving 75 billion hours a year, autonomous cars are also poised to have a much greater impact on society as a whole than most people give them credit for.

Getting the cars to drive themselves may be the easiest part

Why are we so convinced when even people closest to the technology within the auto industry sound so deeply skeptical? Simply because the uncertainty around timelines of adoption for most new technologies in the auto industry is largely due to having to solve complex technological problems. That is not the case for autonomous vehicles—the technology to make a self-driving car happen is largely available today and only incremental R&D is required, mostly in the area of testing, durability, reliability, and cost reduction, all of which have largely visible paths. This is one of the few areas where there is agreement across the auto industry, the futurists, and adjacent market players.

Basic autonomous capability is available in cars today, with semi-autonomous capability coming in 12-18 months and full autonomous capability (which exists in prototype form today) on the path to commercialization by the end of the decade. The technology to make it happen is not a stretch and neither is the cost premium. We estimate full autonomous capability will add only about $10,000 to the cost of a car, at today's prices (which we expect will fall significantly by the time the technology is ready to be commercialized). In fact, we believe autonomous vehicle technology is a smaller leap than full electric vehicles—which still need unknown battery breakthroughs in a lab or significant macro disruption to make them viable beyond being niche vehicles.

"It won't happen because it's too hard"

Rather than the technology itself, we believe most of the concerns or obstacles to mass adoption of autonomous vehicles are largely practical or procedural in nature. What's more, these issues appear relatively easy to solve and we have suggested our own likely solutions to a number of the most pressing issues.

The main barrier to autonomous vehicle growth is the question of liability—"who is responsible in the event of an autonomous vehicle crash, the occupants, the OEM, the supplier, or someone else?" We do not see this as an insurmountable issue—in fact, we believe the solutions are relatively straightforward. We talk about all states in the US going to "no fault" to eliminate the need to answer the above question in the first place and believe the economics of insurance can support the liability in the event of a crash. We note that the liability issue has often been presented as a deal breaker ahead of most of the biggest technological leaps taken by mankind, but that has not stopped us from flying on airplanes or building an electric grid or, indeed, inventing the automobile in the first place. Other potential obstacles often mentioned include gaining customer acceptance, building sufficient infrastructure, government regulation, and ethical issues.

We believe the potential socio-economic benefits of autonomous cars are so great that most of the practical issues will be quickly solved to clear the path to their implementation. There will be offsetting unfavorable impacts as well—for example, whether we will need as many EMTs, paramedics, and law enforcement officers, if there are no accidents? However, as with other innovations in the history of mankind, we believe society must and will adapt.

Global or bust

One of the potential obstacles to the success of autonomous vehicles that does not come up often enough, in our opinion, is whether it can succeed in emerging markets or be limited to developed markets only. Almost every stakeholder we have spoken to seems to believe that if autonomous vehicles were to achieve significant penetration at all, it will only be in developed markets, given the additional challenges facing the technology in emerging markets, on top of the challenges faced in developed markets.

We strongly believe that autonomous vehicles cannot be limited to developed markets alone if they are to become the fundamental business model shift we envision. The OEMs' recent move to common platforms and the need to sell similar cars across all markets will ultimately mean that cars will either be autonomous everywhere or nowhere, especially given the vast changes in the design and engineering of a vehicle that are required to give it autonomous capability. In this Blue Paper, we discuss many of the obstacles that autonomous vehicles in emerging markets face, and explain why we believe not only that none of them are deal-breakers but also that there are many EM-specific reasons why autonomous vehicles will actually work better in those markets.

Your time starts now

We see five phases in the autonomous vehicle adoption curve, starting with basic active safety capability today and ending at a utopian world in which every car on the road will be autonomous. While this utopia looks to be a couple of decades out, we envision a scenario in which mass adoption and full penetration could come much more quickly, if the need to achieve the socio-economic benefits of autonomous cars compels the industry and governments to force the adoption of the technology. And the socio-economic benefits are indeed significant.

Not just about making the world a better place

Autonomous cars bring obvious social benefits—fewer (if any) road accidents, reduced traffic congestion, higher occupant productivity, fuel savings, and many, many more. However, while the social benefits may be nice, autonomous vehicles need to generate a real economic return for both the consumers paying for the technology as well as the industry/governments that will invest billions of dollars in developing it. Happily, though, the economic benefits of these social gains promise to be great. We have made a high-level attempt to quantify these gains—we believe the US economy can save $1.3 trillion per year, once autonomous cars become fully penetrated. To put that number in context, it represents 8% of US GDP. Extrapolating these savings to a global level by applying the ratio of US savings / US GDP to global GDP, we estimate global savings from autonomous vehicles to be in the region of $5.6 trillion per year. We believe the promise of achieving this level of savings will compel the penetration of autonomous capability in vehicles, at a pace quicker than natural demand pull.

Exhibit 1
Adoption Timeline



Source: Company Data, Morgan Stanley Research

Exhibit 2
Potential US Cost Savings



Source: Company Data, Morgan Stanley Research

The investment implications are also great

Autonomous capability is not just a cool new feature to add to car's brochure. We believe this technology can drive one of the most significant transformations of the automobile in its history. A change of this magnitude is likely to drive a paradigm shift in the auto industry as well. We highlight two fundamental changes that we see coming to the auto industry

(a) The growth of software as a value-added part of the car is likely to divide the industry into dedicated "hardware" makers (similar to OEMs today), dedicated "software" makers (includes OEMs, suppliers and external entities new to the auto industry), and vertically integrated "experience" makers, who control every aspect of the automobile. This industry structure is analogous to the smartphone or PC industry structure of today.

(b) The consumption of content in the car by occupants (who now are free to do what they want) opens up a new revenue stream for whoever it is that wants to control it. This could be the OEM itself, the autonomous system supplier, or a third party.

We believe the move to autonomous vehicles could present an existential threat to OEMs who are lagging behind with the technology or do not have the balance sheets to keep up. These OEMs could either go away entirely or become low-cost assemblers of cars.

Traditional vs. non-traditional players: The importance of thinking big

The main advantages for the traditional players here are their familiarity with the automobile, their control over the industry, and their very high standards for testing and reliability that make them unlikely to go to market with a half-baked product. The main challenge that the traditional players face, in our view, is sustaining an ability to think outside the box and beyond a rigid structure of innovation and adoption. In our conversations, we found many traditional players unable or unwilling to think (or at least share their thoughts) about a future with autonomous vehicles in it, and how those vehicles might be game changing, beyond a general expectation that they are relatively inevitable. The traditional industry appears to be thinking of the autonomous car as “just another feature.” Strapped to an adoption curve, they appear to be unwilling to think beyond it and, in our view, therefore risk being left behind.

It is the exact opposite for the new entrants—companies like Google, IBM, Cisco Systems, and start-ups. These companies (while playing their cards equally close to their vests) seem to be aiming for the same utopia of universal adoption of autonomous vehicle technology that we envision, with merely achieving a high degree of penetration being the downside proposition. Unencumbered by the adoption curve planning of the traditional auto industry, these players seem to want to embrace risk and push the boundaries of disruption, and seem to have little fear of failure. In our view, this may free them to leapfrog the traditional auto industry players as creators of value. This approach mirrors Tesla’s attitude to building cars, which so far has achieved remarkable success in a very short period of time. However, this approach carries risk—these non-traditional players need to learn the automobile and how its occupants like to interact with it, build their products and systems to be automotive-grade, and embrace the cyclicality of the industry.

Autonomous cars can have significant implications for a number of adjacent sectors. The Morgan Stanley Freight Transportation team believes that autonomous and semi-autonomous driving technology will be adopted far faster in the cargo markets than in passenger markets. Long-haul freight delivery is one of the most obvious and compelling areas for the application of autonomous and semi-autonomous driving technology The Telecom Services team believes the industry could see a ~$100 bn revenue opportunity, while the Semiconductor team expects a significant increase in semi usage. The MS Media team sees an incremental $5 bn of potential revenue for the media companies, and the Software team sees opportunity for complex software use and Big Data. The insurance and car rental sectors may see binary outcomes from autonomous cars.

Exhibit 3

Bull-Base-Bear Cases for Potential Savings in the US

	Bull Case	Base Case	Bear Case
Autonomous Cars Total Savings	**$2.2tn**	**$1.3tn**	**$0.7tn**

Key Assumptions		Bull Case	Base Case	Bear Case
	Fuel Price Per Gallon:	$6.00	$4.00	$3.00
	Improvement in Fuel Efficiency:	50%	30%	15%
	Cost of Life:	$9mm	$8mm	$6mm
	Median Income per	$32.5	$25.0	$19.0
	Work as % of Total Time Spent in a Car:	50%	30%	10%

Source: Company Data, Morgan Stanley Research

SUMMARY OF KEY TAKEAWAYS BY INDUSTRY

Auto OEMs & Suppliers	**Autonomous driving capability could change the auto industry in fundamental ways:** • Shifting the "value" of the car away from predominantly hardware to a software component as well, thereby allowing new players to enter and forcing existing players to reinvent themselves or cede share. This could allow OEMs to shift away from a vertically integrated, asset heavy business model, thereby changing the profitability structure of the industry. • Introducing a new revenue model that monetizes the new "drive time" content opportunity within the car. **Ultimately, we see the industry structure going the way of the PC/smartphone industry.**
Freight Transportation	**Autonomous and semi-autonomous driving technology will be adopted far faster in the cargo markets than in passenger markets**: • We conservatively estimate the potential savings to the freight transportation industry at $168 bn annually • Collateral implications include competitive advantage to large, well capitalized fleets
Media: TV	**Autonomous vehicles have the potential to materially increase total media consumption. generating over $5 bn of net new media revenue. Video should take disproportionate share of liberated drive-time, while radio and recorded music may lose a key captive audience:** • We expect TV to be the largest beneficiary on a total dollar basis and Home Video to benefit the most on a % basis. As likely relative time share losers, roughly 10-15% of radio and recorded music revenues could be at risk. • Unclear impact to outdoor advertising: While the newly liberated driver may have more capacity to view outdoor advertising, outdoor ads will need to compete with more immersive media (e.g. TV) for the driver's attention.
Telecom Equipment	**Today, connected cars are a modest near-term revenue opportunity. This could potentially reach ~$100 bn with the rise of autonomous driving. Positive for towers, while carriers face opportunities and risks:** • Towers should benefit from the carrier capex requirements of a higher-capacity, broader coverage network, further adding to the potential duration of revenue growth. • This could be a significant opportunity for carriers. These customers could have low churn (average life of car) and strong ARPU, though the network investments may be quite costly.
Semiconductors	**The increasing importance of semiconductors in car manufacture and operation has two key implications:** • Chip providers in the compute, networking and communications, and data storage segments should benefit. • New wireless inter-vehicle communication standards could provide significant opportunities.
Software	**We see three principal areas of opportunity for software vendors.** *Near-term:* • A demand for increasingly complex software in auto design and manufacturing. *Longer-term:* • Standardization of custom-built software on packaged platforms or application sets. • Managing "big data" resulting from increasing sensor counts in vehicles.
Insurance	**The autonomous car is unlikely to be the death knell for auto insurance, but the assignment of Insurance liability is a key unknown. Two key implications:** • Insurance prices are likely to decline due to lower accident frequency. • However, accident severity costs may continue to rise as car complexity rises.
Medical	**Autonomous vehicles should have limited impact on hospital volumes and revenues, with only 8% of car accidents resulting in an in-patient admission:** Motor Vehicle Accidents (MVA) account for $23 bn in hospital spending, which translates to ~1.5% of all total hospital care and physician services costs.
Car Rental	**Two highly polarizing scenarios seem plausible:** • Transforming cars into workplaces or leisure venues could Increase the benefits of private ownership, to the detriment of rental companies. • The fleet management/customer service opportunities in the world of the roving autonomous car parc could be significant.

Potential Net Beneficiaries, or 'The Autonomous 40'

The below names were chosen for being either early leaders in autonomous vehicles or dominant players within industries positioned to be net beneficiaries of autonomous vehicles, or both. This list is not, and should not be considered, a portfolio.

Company	Early Adopter	Dominant in Vertical
Auto OEMs		
BMW	●	●
Daimler	●	●
General Motors	●	●
Nissan	●	●
Toyota	●	●
Volkswagen/Audi	●	●
Auto Suppliers		
Autoliv	●	●
Continental	●	●
Delphi	●	●
Denso	●	●
TRW Automotive	●	●
Tech Hardware / networking		
Cisco Systems*	●	●
IBM	●	●
Software		
Dassault Systèmes		●
Google	●	●
PTC*		
Big Data		
EMC		
HP		
Oracle		●
SAP		●
Teradata		

Company	Early Adopter	Dominant in Vertical
Semiconductors		
Ambarella	●	
Intel	●	●
Linear Technology	●	●
NVIDIA	●	
NXP Semiconductors	●	●
Telecom Services		
American Tower Corp.		●
AT&T		●
Crown Castle International		●
SBA Communications		●
Sprint		
T-Mobile		
Verizon		●
Freight Transportation**		
Con-way		●
FedEx		●
Heartland Express		●
Knight Transportation		●
Old Dominion Freight Lines		●
Saia		●
Swift Transportation		●
United Parcel Service		●
Werner Enterprises		●
Media		
In our view, the entire vertical could benefit		

* Not covered by Morgan Stanley Research
**Important freight carriers with large trucking fleets
Source: Morgan Stanley Research

Exhibit 4

History of Autonomous Cars

1977	First truly autonomous car unveiled by S. Tsugawa at Japan's Tsukuba Mechanical Engineering Laboratory
1980s	Ernst Dickmanns' vision-guided Mercedes-Benz van achieves 39 mph on streets without traffic
	The US Department of Defense funds the DARPA Autonomous Land Vehicles (ALV) project
1987 (to 1995)	The European Commission funds the €800 million EUREKA Prometheus Project on autonomous vehicles
1994	Dickmanns / Daimler-Benz vehicles, VaMP and Vita-2, drive more than 620 miles in Paris
1995	Carnegie Mellon University Navlab project ("No Hands Across America") achieves 98.2% semi-autonomous driving over 3,100 miles
1996	Alberto Broggi's ARGO Project achieves 94% fully autonomous driving on a 1,200 mile journey across Northern Italy
2004 to 2005	DARPA starts long distance competitions; In 2005 $2 million prize awarded to Stanford University
2007	DARPA Urban Challenge focuses on 60-mile urban environment, Carnegie Mellon's team takes first place
2010	Google starts their Driverless Car program using a mix of Google Maps data, radars and LIDAR

Source: Company Data, Morgan Stanley Research

Part 1: Autonomous Vehicles ─ Basics

An autonomous vehicle can drive itself with no input from the driver. While the technology needed to achieve real autonomous driving has only emerged in recent years, test prototypes of autonomous cars date back to the 1940s and 1950s.

Autonomous cars can have many advantages. Chief among them are lives saved, fuel savings, reduced traffic congestion, improved user productivity, economic stimulus, and military applications.

Autonomous cars also face challenges. They include consumer acceptance, high cost, liability concerns, legislative uncertainty, the need to convert a large car parc of non-autonomous vehicles, as well as security and ethical issues.

None of these challenges appear insurmountable. We believe autonomous cars can change the world as we know it by increasing miles driven, car usage, and suburbanization, as well as promoting emerging market/rural area connectivity.

What is an Autonomous Vehicle?

An autonomous vehicle can drive itself from Point A to Point B with no manual input from the driver. The vehicle uses a combination of cameras, radar systems, sensors, and global positioning system (GPS) receivers to determine its surroundings and uses artificial intelligence to determine the quickest and safest path to its destination. Mechatronic units and actuators allow the "brain" of the car to accelerate, brake, and steer as necessary.

History of the autonomous car

Much like electric vehicles, autonomous cars may seem like a very recent initiative but were first developed decades ago. These included both OEM driven initiatives like the GM Futurama exhibit at the 1940 World's Fair and running autonomous prototypes from GM and Ford in the 1950s. There have also been several independent attempts to build autonomous cars over the years in the US, Japan, and Europe, in the 1960s through the 1980s. Most of the early attempts at autonomous driving needed significant help from infrastructure (like special roads with metal guide strips and radio sensors to point out the right of way to the cars), but some also used early cameras, remote sensors, and actuators to allow the cars to control themselves—in much the same way as semi-autonomous cars can today. The early "self-driving" cars were able to complete test routes but were largely untested in real world traffic conditions.

The big breakthrough that brought autonomous driving out of the fringes of "skunkworks" programs and the odd science class project was the DARPA Grand Challenge. Organized by the US Defense Department's Defense Advanced Research Project Agency (DARPA), this competition brought a number of schools, OEMs, and innovators together to create the autonomous vehicle of the future—initially aimed for potential military use, but eventually with crossover to civilian applications.

The DARPA Grand Challenges were held in 2004 (open desert), 2005 (desert course), and 2007 (urban course). While the participants had varying degrees of success (the first Grand Challenge saw no participant complete the course and had no winner), the reliability and capability of the machines improved dramatically with each iteration. The first Grand Challenge winner was Stanford's Stanley vehicle in 2007—a modified Volkswagen Touareg that earned the team the $2 million winning purse. The Grand Challenges got many of the OEMs and other participants in the autonomous vehicle field today, including Google and Cisco Systems, seriously thinking about the technology. Many members of participating teams are spearheading autonomous vehicle development at the auto OEMs and other companies today.

Exhibit 5
2005 DARPA Grand Challenge Winner

Source: Carnegie Mellon Tartan Racing

Advantages of autonomous vehicles

The main advantages come from the assumption that once artificially intelligent robots take over a formulaic and mundane task like driving, they will make fewer mistakes than human drivers. This should result in several socio-economic benefits.

1. **Lives saved**. Each year 30,000 to 40,000 people are killed on the roads in the US alone. Despite a recent decline, there were 11 mm road accidents in the US in 2009 (latest data from the US Census). Most of these

accidents are caused by driver error or mechanical failure. Driver errors are, in turn, caused by lack of knowledge, failure to follow traffic rules, driver distraction, or driver incapacity (DUI or fatigue). Arguably, an autonomous car should be more capable and consistent with its computer-driven ability to determine and interpret its surrounding environment and apply traffic laws. This should result in significantly fewer accidents, especially if a high percentage of cars on the road are autonomous. This could be even more beneficial in emerging markets where limited driver experience, weakly enforced traffic laws, and poor road conditions result in a significantly higher ratio of traffic deaths to car population than in the developed world.

Exhibit 6

World Traffic Deaths by Region (2010)

(000s)



Source: Euromonitor Data, Morgan Stanley Research

Exhibit 7

US Traffic Deaths per Year

(000s)



Source: National Highway Traffic and Safety Administration Data, Morgan Stanley Research

2. **Gasoline saved—**In the US alone, automobiles consume 143 bn gallons of oil per year use at a cost of over $500 bn. Cars that drive themselves based on predictive capability and the ability to alter the state of the car based on anticipated load conditions should be significantly more efficient than manually operated vehicles. Just using cruise control in a car of today can easily result in a 15-30% fuel economy improvement vs. manually operating the throttle. This is because the car knows what kind of load will be placed on the engine and adapts accordingly.

   In the future, autonomous cars with vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) and vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2X) communication ability will have a far greater understanding of road and traffic conditions and should be able to predict even anticipated loads on the engine allowing them to operate in "cruise" mode all the time. This could result in a similar level of fuel economy savings as using cruise control all the time. Combined with a push for more fuel-efficient internal combustion engines and light electrification, corporate average fuel economy could run up to 75 mpg and above. In a utopian world where all cars are self-driving, cars can theoretically be made significantly lighter (why reinforce a car that is not going to crash?), potentially driving fuel economy north of 100 mpg.

Exhibit 8

US Gas Usage – Gallons per Year

(bn)



Source: EIA, Morgan Stanley Research

3. **Traffic patterns**—V2V and V2X capability should enable autonomous cars to know the position of surrounding traffic and create significantly more efficient traffic flow. Every year, the existing US car parc burns 3 billion gallons of gas sitting in traffic jams. Autonomous cars should be able to not only dynamically re-route themselves based on anticipated traffic conditions (similar to advanced GPS systems today), but also to avoid creating traffic jams in the first place. Car

positioning based on V2V/V2X communications should allow traffic to negotiate intersections without stopping, and cars should be able to travel at higher speeds and in closer proximity to each other (the aerodynamic efficiency of this should further boost fuel economy).

Exhibit 9

Historic Average Commute Time vs. Average Travel Length



Source: US Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration, Morgan Stanley Research

4. **Consumer productivity.** One benefit of smoother traffic flow, we believe, is less time spent on the road getting from Point A to Point B, which should significantly boost commuter productivity. The bigger gains could come from not having to manually drive the car, freeing up the occupants' time spent *in* the car for other pursuits. US drivers spend an average of 75 billion hours each year on the road, which can now be put to good use. Whether people choose to spend this time eating, sleeping, watching TV, reading the newspaper, working, or simply conversing, it should result in significantly de-stressing the average commute and life in general.

Exhibit 10

Average Yearly Hours Commuting vs. Miles Driven



Source: Euromonitor and Department of Transportation, Morgan Stanley Research

5. **Boost to the economy**. If, as we expect, autonomous cars do end up converting commuters into consumers, the resulting enhanced consumer productivity could drive economic value creation, which could conceivably help boost the economy. More importantly, more time to consume…anything—movies, TV, books, news, food, YouTube videos… in the car, means more opportunity to buy stuff. Expect to see a massive increase in the number of billboards by the side of the road, location-based advertising (such as an in-car tweet notifying you in real time that you are now driving past the highest-rated steakhouse in all of Dallas!).

6. **Military applications.** Aerial defense has already gone unmanned with the use of drones and spy planes. We believe ground warfare could do the same with autonomous vehicles. The connection between autonomous vehicle capability and defense applications is strong—the DARPA challenge was one of the first modern attempts at developing self-driving capability. Autonomous military vehicles can keep troops out of harm's way by scoping for IEDs, conducting reconnaissance, or even engaging in basic combat operations in dangerous situations.

Exhibit 11
US Army's Unmanned Stryker Combat Armored Vehicle

Source: Digital Journal

Between the lives and dollars saved and general improvement in the quality of life through fewer traffic jams, stress-free travel, and higher productivity, autonomous cars have the potential to effect the biggest transformation in society since the internet.

Obstacles to adoption

Consumer acceptance—At first, many consumers may be reluctant to put their lives in the hands of a robot. Recent studies and surveys have shown a split in opinion on whether people would like autonomous capability to be available in their vehicles or not. Therefore, mass acceptance of this technology could take a long time. This could be the case particularly if there are accidents involving even semi-autonomous vehicles early in the adoption phase, whether it was the fault of the autonomous system or not.

Just in the course of researching this Blue Paper, we have had discussions with people about autonomous vehicles that usually elicits two reactions: "that's awesome" quickly followed by "that's scary. What if I don't want to share the road with an autonomous car?" Over time, we believe the autonomous capability in cars will get more capable and reliable (see our adoption curve in Part 4), increasing the public's faith in and acceptance of the system.

Logically, as autonomous vehicles continue to penetrate, we would soon approach a point where to ensure complete reliability of phase 4 vehicles, all vehicles on the road would need to be at least partly autonomous. This could mean that autonomous vehicles could be mandated by law and manual driving disallowed in order to reduce the number of variables on the road. Suddenly, the question of "what if I don't want to share the road with an autonomous car" could become "what if I don't want to share the road with someone driving his own car?" There could be significant issues with telling people that they cannot drive their own cars. There could be significant privacy concerns as well if V2V/V2X systems can "track" every car on the road and store vehicle/road/traffic conditions in central databases for long-term access. We see a few potential solutions to this problem, which we discuss in Part 6.

Cost—In our view, the above is a reasonably high quality problem to have because it would mean the other obstacles on this list mostly would have been resolved, penetration of autonomous vehicles among the early adopters/tech fans/wealthy consumers would be full, and the technology would be knocking on the door of the mass market. To first get the early adopters on board, however, the costs of the system need to come down. At each point in our adoption curve (Part 5), the ongoing phase should add no more than $1,000-2,000 to the cost of the car, with the next phase adding not more than $3,000-5,000. Even with such limited cost premiums, penetration could be low and restricted to high-end trim levels of mass market vehicles rather than across the board.

According to a recent JD Power survey, 37% of respondents at first said they were interested in purchasing an autonomous vehicle, but that percentage dropped to 20% once they were told it would cost an additional $3,000. OEMs are already concerned that consumers may balk at paying a similar premium for new fuel efficiency technologies, despite the lower running costs that would result in a net payoff over time. In addition, newly mandated safety and consumer-demanded infotainment systems, together with the aforementioned fuel efficiency technologies, could already add $5,000 to $6,000 to the cost of the car, before the cost of autonomous systems, which may be seen as a convenient indulgence and not as "necessary" as the other features.

Technology—The practical hurdles to widespread adoption of autonomous vehicles may be great but to even get to that point, we must solve several technological challenges first. Almost every constituent we have spoken with believes that the path to fully autonomous vehicles contains many technological challenges—but none are insurmountable. In fact, some believe that a cost-is-no-object, fully autonomous vehicle can be put on the road today.

Some of the key technological challenges to be resolved are

(1) What to do in the snow/fog/rain when radar/sensor capabilities today are rendered ineffective

(2) How to manage LIDAR systems for real-time changes in roadside "profiles" (see Part 2: Technology for details on LIDAR and "profiles")

(3) How to integrate the army of sensors and radars in cars today without dramatically changing the styling and practicality of vehicles

(4) How to handle the human-machine interface (how does the car get the driver to take over in emergency situations)

(5) The chicken-and-egg quandary of having enough autonomous cars o the road to make V2V/V2X possible and relevant, but getting those early adopters on the road in the first place.

Again, these issues are not insurmountable, in our view. In fact, many in the industry believe that the leap to make fully autonomous vehicles commercially viable today would be *smaller* than the leap to commercialize fully electric vehicles. Many industry observers, OEMs, and suppliers also think that the greatest technological challenge is to bring those solutions down the cost curve for widespread adoption. In the end, we believe that the success or failure of autonomous vehicles and the timeframe for adoption will be determined not by the ability to clear the technology hurdle but by overcoming the other obstacles listed here.

Liability——We have noted earlier that we believe customer acceptance is likely to be the biggest obstacle to autonomous vehicle penetration, but industry constituents that we have spoken with list the liability factor as the number one concern. Put simply, if there is an accident involving an autonomous vehicle, who is liable for the consequences? Legally, the OEMs can cover their liability in partially autonomous vehicles (stages One through Four, as listed in Part 5: Timeline for Adoption) because the driver is still behind the wheel and therefore ultimately liable for the safety of the vehicle. But even this point may be intensely debatable, if a "feature" of a car cannot be relied upon at all times. The insurance industry needs to get fully on board with autonomous vehicles and lay down strict rules of "at fault" before we can commercialize fully autonomous vehicles. We have explored this topic in more detail in Part 6: What Happens Next.

Legislation—National and state governments will need to develop laws that allow cars to drive themselves on the streets. Among the potential implications of this, people who otherwise are not able/allowed to drive could "get behind the wheel" of autonomous cars, and cars could technically drive from one place to another with no occupants. There are concerns over privacy and how to manage the enormous mount of private data that will be generated. The initial steps appear relatively promising. In the US, California and Nevada have granted "licenses" to self-driving autonomous vehicles and the US Department of Transportation has issued guidelines for the implementation of autonomous vehicles.

Existing car parc—Autonomous cars will be most effective when all cars on the road have the capability, which will then act as a universal, crowd-sourced traffic management system and drive predictable reactions to different driving scenarios. However, with 250 million cars on the road in the US alone (and 1 billion worldwide), full penetration of autonomous vehicles could take decades. At a rate of 13-14 mm cars scrapped in the US per year, turning over the US car parc alone would take almost 20 years. Having manually driven cars along with autonomous cars could dramatically increase the number of unpredictable outcomes and reduce the reliability, effectiveness, and safety of autonomous cars in the initial years—which could set off a vicious circle of limited acceptance. There could be a solution, however. Once there is a large enough penetration of autonomous cars (more than 25%, approaching 50% of cars on the road), we believe the obvious and quantifiable social and economic benefits of full penetration could accelerate the scrappage or retrofitting of existing cars with autonomous systems, via government or industry aided funding and/or mandates. This could cut the time needed to achieve full penetration by half. *See Part 4 for more detail.*

Exhibit 12

Car Parc Turnover (Parc/2013 Sales) for Major Countries



Source: IHS AutoInsight, Eurodata, Morgan Stanley Research

Infrastructure/EM—While autonomous cars' dependence on dedicated infrastructure is much lower than it was in the early prototype stages several years ago, we still need some basic level of infrastructure including road markings and signage, GPS mapping, strong telecom networks and ideally some level of vehicle-to-grid (V2X) communication. Lack of infrastructure in EM and even some DM markets could be a challenge to accelerating penetration of autonomous vehicles. *Please see Part 3 for more detail.*

Security—The prospect of cars that can drive themselves inevitably raises security concerns. What if an autonomous car can be hacked into and taken over? While a real issue, we believe autonomous cars are probably not as vulnerable as some people think. Recent reports of individuals "hacking into" cars have raised concerns about future connected cars. However, we note that every instance of a "car hack" so far has been physical—wires connected from the hackers' computer to the cars OBD system with the "hacker" physically inside the car. The "risk" in this situation is the same as the risk that a burglar is sitting in the back seat with a gun to your head. Hacking a car wirelessly is much more difficult. That does not mean it is impossible, however, and future technological development theoretically could allow someone to wirelessly enter a car through its connectivity systems. The auto industry recognizes this and is moving to address it. The current AUTOSAR automotive software development standards are being fortified to prevent break-ins and the industry is moving toward protecting each ECU in the car from being hacked.

The ethical issue—Autonomous cars raise two kinds of ethical issues

(a) Can we program an autonomous car to respond to *every single conceivable scenario* on the road, including instances when it may be necessary to break or circumvent existing laws or rules to achieve a favorable outcome (breaking the speed limit on the way to the ER, for example, or driving recklessly to get out of a dangerous situation)?

(b) While autonomous cars are likely to deliver significant socio-economic benefits, there is also a flipside in terms of a number of jobs being rendered obsolete.

Regarding (a) we note that those same ethical issues exist today—what happens if the police stop the aforementioned driver speeding to the ER? Does he get a ticket? Also, there could be workarounds—the occupant could call 911 to get a special dispensation, and that car could then be "permitted' via special instructions to drive under a different set of protocols.

Regarding (b), this is an unfortunate potential outcome of the adoption of the driverless car, but we note that this has been an issue since the Industrial Revolution, and every single technological breakthrough ever since. In addition, the enormous savings generated by autonomous cars should help pay for compensation and/or training for those negatively affected by it.

How autonomous cars can change the world

Miles driven should increase—US drivers drive approximately 3 trillion miles a year. This number had increased in almost a straight line over the past 30 years but peaked in 2008, then declined sharply in the economic downturn, before stabilizing more recently. However, during the period of growth, the number of cars on the road rose at an even faster pace and miles driven per car peaked in 2004. Simply put, Americans today are driving less, on both an absolute and relative basis, than they were before 2008.

There could be a number of reasons for this. The relative decline could be a result of too many cars on the road, while the absolute decline could reflect macro weakness/high unemployment, high gas prices, environmental awareness, the rise of internet services (Facebook, Seamless, Netflix etc., which give people fewer reasons to venture outside) and declining youth interest in the car. The consensus view appears to be that miles driven will continue to remain stable or decline because most of the above factors (except macro) are structural and not cyclical.

Exhibit 13
US Miles Driven – Trailing 12 Months



Source: Federal Highway Administration, Morgan Stanley Research

We believe autonomous cars can change this trend and boost miles driven significantly. If driving—whether as a work commute or an interstate vacation—is a comfortable, stress-free experience that gives consumers their own private space and flexibility of schedule, with little actual involvement in the driving activity, we believe consumers may be willing to switch away from the inconveniences of public transportation to "driving" their own autonomous vehicles.

Usage increase—Another factor resulting in higher miles driven will be the use of autonomous vehicles in driverless situations. Autonomous capability is perfectly suited for fixed route applications including public transportation (buses, taxis), delivery (mail, package, commercial) or even long-haul. Over time, autonomous vehicles in these applications could dramatically increase usage and lower cost vs. having human drivers. Autonomous cars also lend flexibility to occupants who are too young or too old (or too incapacitated) to drive but need to travel anyway and now will not have to depend on someone to drive them around.

Exhibit 14

Commuters in the US



Source: US Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration, Morgan Stanley Research

More suburbanization—If drivers are more comfortable traveling long distances in a car because of higher productivity and the new ability to put that time to better use, we may see a trend toward moving away from dense, expensive urban areas to increasingly remote suburbs. Local governments may encourage this move (through tax incentives and other) because it may reduce the need to build expensive public transportation systems, reduce the resource load on urban centers, and increase tax revenues from gentrification of remote suburbs.

Car ownership—There are polar opposite views on what autonomous vehicles will do to car ownership. One school of thought is that the higher optionality now provided by an autonomous car could dramatically increase car ownership. People who previously relied on public transit for time management, cost, safety, or other reasons could now choose to own their own cars instead. The other school of thought says that car ownership could collapse if driverless cars could serve multiple purposes (why own two cars in a household when one car can drop a spouse at work and then return on its own to pick up the other spouse). In an extreme scenario, car ownership could fall to virtually zero to be replaced by roving fleets of driverless droids to take you to your destination.

Our view is that the final outcome is likely to be something in between. We do not see the extreme scenario of almost no car ownership playing out simply because we have not seen car ownership today replaced by massive fleets of "driver-ed" taxis or car-sharing services. The desire to own your own personal, clean, reliable method of transportation is too great, in our opinion. We believe the tendencies to either downsize the household car fleet or expand it—because of the higher flexibility of autonomous cars—will largely offset each other. We expect car ownership to remain largely stable, with more households having cars but with fewer cars per household.

Cars will look different—An autonomous car needs to look nothing like the cars of today, in our view. A car of today is built around the driver and maximizes that person's physical ability to drive the car. An autonomous car needs to be built around the comfort and entertainment of the occupants, with the car doing its own driving. What will cars of the future look like? Look up. We see airplanes as a good benchmark. Cars will have highly aerodynamic bodies with built-in sensors and cameras around the edges. We will no longer need large and potentially dangerous windows apart from small portholes for occasional sightseeing. The interior will mimic first class airline cabins with large, comfortable, reclining seats for all occupants and several displays (including on what used to be the windscreen?), since we will not need a traditional steering wheel, pedals or instrument panels. Cars will be lighter through use of advanced materials and less need for crash reinforcement/passive safety and mechanical controls. Why do cars need to have lights, apart from airplane-like strobes, since there will be no need to signal and the cars will have infrared cameras with which to see?

Exhibit 15

The car of the future? Maybe…

Source: Morgan Stanley Research

New revenue model for the auto industry—From an investment perspective, it is understandable that the auto industry will see the biggest impacts, both positive and negative. We see two fundamental changes. First, while the traditional OEM/supplier relationship will continue for some time, we see the industry eventually coalescing around three main components: 1) companies that specialize in making the car (traditional OEMs/suppliers or "hardware" makers); 2) companies that specialize in making software that will be the brains of these cars, including autonomous driving capability (hi-tech suppliers, in-house OEMs or third parties called "software" suppliers); and 3) companies that try to be vertically integrated and control every aspect of the automotive "experience," including the content consumed by the occupants of the autonomous cars. This potential industry structure closely parallels the PC/smartphone industries. See our detailed analysis of this business model in Part 7.

This new industry structure—with the growing importance of software and content that the traditional players have little knowledge of—could effect the second fundamental change we foresee. It could render obsolete traditional players who cannot evolve, replacing them with new players from outside the industry (such as, hypothetically, Google, IBM, Cisco Systems, smartphone makers, and startups).

EM/remote connectivity—While most of the above changes seem to relate mostly to developed markets, they are equally applicable to EM, in our view. However, where the EM markets could see the most game-changing impact from autonomous cars could be in remote and poor regions. Autonomous vehicles can be used as regular convoys to supply food, water, and resources to remote but populated areas, serve as an alternative to non-existent and/or difficult mass transportation. Even in urban areas, we believe autonomous cars can bring driving discipline, ease traffic management and reduce accident rates. Please see Part 3 for more detail.

Is this the end of the auto enthusiast?

Not necessarily, in our opinion, and things may possibly get even better. One of the issues frequently presented to us as an obstacle to the penetration of autonomous cars is that people love driving too much to give up the wheel, especially in Europe. We disagree. In our opinion, the vast majority of people driving today are trying to get from Point A to Point B as quickly, safely, and comfortably as they can, and are not attempting to carve up canyon roads. For those that do enjoy such things, the move to autonomous vehicles is only another step on a path that began with the slow death of the manual transmission. The new generation of automatic transmissions are so objectively superior to manual transmissions in every way, that only a small group of hard-core enthusiasts still lament the imminent extinction of manual. Furthermore, we believe that in an autonomous car world, enthusiasts can still enjoy track days where they can drive select cars manually or take “classic cars” for a spirited drive. The takeaway is that, as car enthusiasts, we may be living in a golden age *today.* Go buy a top-of-the-line luxury/performance model today and store it in a garage for the next 20 years.

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Autonomous Vehicles

Which Technology Wins?

Technology

The technology to enable fully autonomous car capability already exists. Active safety systems that are commercially available today represent a basic level of autonomous driving. Fully autonomous functionality does not need much more incremental hardware.

Software and testing is where most of the work needs to be done. Autonomous cars use sophisticated algorithms to decipher the input received from sensory hardware to determine the course of action to be taken and how to execute that action. This will also need extensive testing to ensure every possible scenario has been accounted for.

The cost premium is not that high. We estimate that a fully autonomous systems will add about $10,000 to the cost of the car, with the cost expected to be cut in half by the time the technology is ready to be commercialized by the end of the decade.

The first step toward getting autonomous cars on the road is to get them to work. This may not be as large a challenge as some think because much of the technology already exists. In our discussions with the players involved, a few things have become quite clear

1. **The hardware is not the hurdle.** Most of the technology needed to get fully autonomous cars to work in the real world already exists today and many fully functional prototypes have already been built and are being tested. Active safety systems, which offer a very basic level of autonomous functionality, have been on sale for a few years and are just starting to enter the mass market. Full autonomous capability only needs automakers to walk further down that path. We look at many of the hardware components that make up the autonomous driving system in this section.

2. **Software will be the "secret sauce" here**. While the hardware situation appears relatively settled, much of the development work taking place today appears to revolve around software. Autonomous vehicles use incredibly sophisticated algorithms to interpret the sensory input coming in from the hardware to (a) interpret the car's surroundings (b) anticipate upcoming events and predict the necessary reactions (c) instruct the various hardware components of the car to perform the necessary actions. This exponential increase in the amount and sophistication of software needed to achieve autonomous capability is probably the biggest change in the functionality of the automobile.

3. **Practical considerations are the main impediment.** While the engineers put the final tweaks on the hardware and software needed to deliver full autonomous capability in labs, the long lead time to commercial implementation is likely to be the result of practical considerations. There are two levels of practical considerations (a) solving non-technical issues like liability and regulation, as discussed elsewhere in this report, and (b) making sure that the hardware and software have accounted for virtually every possible real-life driving scenario. The only solution for (b) is extensive testing in the real world and in simulations, which takes a lot of time and resources and needs some level of (a) to be solved.

The industry's poker face

The section on Technology was both the easiest and the toughest part of this Blue Paper for us to write, and came together at the very end. The easy part was that most of the content for this section physically exists, is already commercialized, and is easy to write about, with little need for the projection we employ in many other parts of this report. The hard part was trying to penetrate the wall of secrecy surrounding industry activities on the technology side. We spoke with many companies currently operating autonomous vehicle prototypes and while most were eager to discuss their broad vision of a future with autonomous cars, there was little visibility into specific technological approaches, even at a 10,000-foot level. Some of this, understandably, could be a result of competitive concerns. But we believe the secrecy may also indicate a lack of clarity on the precise path ahead. We found many of the suppliers, including Autoliv, Delphi, Denso, and TRW, to be much more forthcoming about their technological solutions.

There appear to be two broad approaches to getting the car to be able to drive itself

The old adage "Give a man a fish and feed him for a day or teach a man to fish and feed him for a lifetime" is a good way to describe it.

The first approach is the "give a man a fish approach" where the car is told where to go. Imagine being blind-folded and having to walk through an obstacle course with an external observer passing on instructions like "turn left, walk 10 steps, stop, turn right," etc.—that is approximately what this approach is like. The input comes from infrastructure (along the road sensors, intersection management systems, and other V2X communication) and from comparing a LIDAR-obtained profile of the 360° surroundings of the car, comparing that image to a map database, and identifying any differences between the two images as "obstacles" that need to be navigated around.

The advantages to this approach are that it can be made quite reliable over time, covers relatively large distances and is relatively low cost (from the car's perspective). The disadvantages are high initial cost (because of the need to build out infrastructure and a detailed street-view map database) and potentially, the car's ability to react to sudden changes.

The second approach is the "teach a man to fish approach," which is similar to tackling the obstacle course by feeling your way around the course while blind-folded, without external navigation instructions. This is achieved by stuffing the car with a battery of cameras, radar, and sensors that give the car a 360° knowledge of the surrounding environment and allowing it to react proactively to obstacles.

This approach allows the vehicle to react quickly to situations and focus only on what is important, while ignoring everything else—which is one of the most important and fundamental rules of autonomous driving. The downside is relatively high car cost (at least in the near term) and sensitivity to weather and other sources of electronic signal blockage.

Exhibit 16

Building a sensory buffer around the car



Source: Autoliv, Morgan Stanley Research

Neither approach is the "right" or "wrong" one. In reality, the final approach is likely to be a combination of the two—or an "all-of-the-above" approach to achieve maximum reliability and redundancy for the system.

Hardware components of an autonomous driving system

1. **Cameras:** Cameras need to be at least monovision cameras, which means they have one source of vision. Monovision cameras are very simple devices and the video feed is usually used for understanding basic surroundings—typically fixed infrastructure like lane markings, speed limit signs, etc. The hardware itself is pretty simple and cheap. Automotive monovision cameras are less sophisticated and have lower pixel density than cameras on smartphones. However, the challenge is on the software side, which involves fast image processing to recognize common roadside infrastructure from a simple black and white relatively low-resolution image. The next stage up is stereovision cameras, which use two video sources, similar to human eyesight. This incorporates depth perception and can help the car better understand the relative position of moving traffic and potential obstacles.

Exhibit 17

Stereovision cameras use depth perception to differentiate between moving and still objects and empty spaces



Source: Autoliv, Morgan Stanley Research

Apart from object detection, the cameras can be used for various other applications, including reading speed limit signs, headlight high beam de-activation in case of an approaching vehicle, light sensing, etc.

Exhibit 18
Monovision camera

Source: Autoliv, Morgan Stanley Research

2. Radar: in addition to visual confirmation of its surroundings, the car also collects sensory images using radar systems. There are two typical types of radar systems— short-range and long-range, which are usually mutually exclusive. Short-range radar, as the name indicates, "feels" around the car's immediate surroundings, especially at low speeds, while long-range radar is used at high speeds and over relatively long distances. It is the combination of long distance radar plus algorithm-based processing of images from stereovision cameras that gives the autonomous car the capability of knowing, with a reasonably high degree of accuracy, exactly what is in front of it and how the positions and profiles of external objects are changing at all times.

An autonomous car is also likely to have short-range side radar (already used in blind spot detection systems) and short- and long-range rear radar (already used in advanced active safety systems for pre-crash warning and avoidance) to create a 360° view of what is around the car. Ultra wideband radar is probably best suited for autonomous applications but the challenge with the technology today is that standards are not harmonized and it is difficult to secure permission to use the spectrum needed for its operation. However, we expect this to change over time as the technology matures and there is more pressure on governments to approve, monitor, and secure communications bandwidth for autonomous cars.

Exhibit 19
Automotive radar systems

Source: Autoliv, Morgan Stanley Research

The weather issue: One of the concerns surrounding an autonomous car's ability to be effective in a broad range of circumstances is the whether it can be reliable in bad weather. It is true that in conditions of heavy rain, fog or snow, the autonomous car's cameras would struggle to pick up familiar patterns or objects while radar systems could become confused. In such cases, an autonomous car may not be able to function.

However, there are a few things to keep in mind:

1. This only happens in cases of really extreme weather, where visibility drops to very low distances similar to whiteout conditions. It can be argued that the human driver's ability to see may be no better than the car's in such circumstances and the best course of action may indeed be to pull over and not drive at all

2. Vehicle to vehicle communication makes driving in poor weather conditions safer than with manual driving. Cars know exactly where they and other cars are on the road and differing speeds and driving styles will not be an issue. Autonomous cars will also be unlikely to drive in a manner unsuitable to the conditions, causing fewer bad weather accidents.

   In the end, driving probably becomes like other modes of transportation, including air and train travel—if the weather conditions are so bad that even a car with advanced stereo and infrared cameras and long distance radar cannot see, it is probably too dangerous to drive in the first place.

3. **LIDAR:** LIDAR uses a combination of reflected laser/light (LI) and radar (DAR) to create a 3D profile of the surroundings of the car. LIDAR is extensively used today in marine, archeological, and mapping applications.

LIDAR does not technically detect a moving object but rather creates a rapid series of 360° profiles and compares them to each other and to a stored database to detect changes (i.e., movement). One of the issues faced by this system in real life is that temporary changes (like snow or new traffic patterns) could disrupt the surrounding profile. Also, given the nature of the output, this system may not work for some aspects of autonomous driving like lane and sign tracking, which will need camera / vision systems.

Exhibit 20
LIDAR image creates a 3D profile of the car's surroundings



Source: BBC

4. **Sensors:** While the cameras, radar, and LIDAR are used for obstacle and environment monitoring, sensors are used extensively to understand what is happening with the car itself. In addition to navigating the roads, the autonomous car also needs to monitor itself to know that it is not traveling over the speed limit or if something is wrong with the car and it has to pull over. Sensors of all kinds are already extensively used in cars, including acceleration sensors, pressure sensors, light sensors, etc. We expect a meaningful step up in sensor content in the car, especially in the active safety and human-machine interface (HMI) areas.

5. **GPS receiver/communications:** Autonomous cars will need reliable, high-speed two-way data communications equipment for navigation, V2V/V2X communication, and content reception. This will include antennas, 4G receivers, and GPS receivers. Autonomous cars will also likely need to have sophisticated event data recorders or black boxes, similar to planes, given the high level of automation, in the event of an accident or failure.

6. **Human-machine interface (HMI):** The HMI could be one of the most sophisticated and complex systems within an autonomous car. The HMI refers to the combination of systems in the interior of the vehicle, including the infotainment/entertainment system, instrument panel, and controls that act as an interface between the car and the occupants. The HMI in an autonomous vehicle will be very different from that of a vehicle today. The priority for the HMI will move away from driver information and control and toward infotainment/entertainment. However, the HMI also needs to be aware of the internal environment of the car, in case of emergency situations. In exceptional cases, the car may need to alert the occupants that it needs to be manually controlled or that it is pulling over. The HMI is likely to be comprised of an array of in-cabin sensors, screens, and controls.

Exhibit 21
Acceleration sensor

Source: Autoliv, Morgan Stanley Research

7. **Domain controller:** The domain controller functions as the hardware "brain" of the autonomous driving system. It acts as the crossover between the input and output systems of the car by receiving signals from the various cameras, radar, and sensors, determining what action is to be taken and then communicating with the car's drivetrain to execute the necessary actions. The domain controller is also likely to be where the software brain / operating system of the car resides (see Part 7 for more detail on the car's operating system). The battle over who controls the domain controller—the OEM, the safety supplier, the chassis supplier, the autonomous system supplier—will determine who controls the value of the car.

Exhibit 22

The Domain controller performs a critical central control function in the car



Source: Autoliv, Morgan Stanley Research

8. **Motion control systems/actuators/mechatronic units**. Once the domain controller has decided what action is to be executed based on inputs received by the sensing units, it passes instructions to mechatronic units/actuators, which physically control the drivetrain components, such as the steering wheel, throttle, brakes, suspension, etc. Actuators are already present in cars with active safety systems today, as these are the components that make the steering wheel turn and the car accelerate or brake without human input.

Exhibit 23

Actuators control the steering and other mechanical components in the drivetrain

Source: TRW, Morgan Stanley Research

We believe that the auto industry will collectively come together to establish standards for V2V/V2X communication, autonomous system hardware, and software to ensure commonality, consistency, and safety of systems across OEMs, geographies, and vehicle types. This process may already be underway.

There needs to be a high level of redundancy

The price of system failure in an autonomous car is unacceptably high, similar to the aviation industry. One way to minimize the impact of mechanical failure is to have redundant systems, again, similar to the aviation industry. Failure of one system could then be made up by backup systems, at least in a fail-safe mode. Autonomous cars will approach redundancy in two ways.

(1) For sensory inputs, to determine the environment around them, autonomous cars use multiple overlapping data sources to ensure that the quality of the sensory input is as accurate as possible. The multiple cameras, radar, LIDAR, and GPS systems are all used to look around the vehicle—each in slightly different ways—to ensure that all possible variables in the surrounding environment are captured.

(2) The mechanical systems in an autonomous car, however, will likely need multiple hardware systems to ensure that failure of one does not compromise the safety of the vehicle. If the actuator that controls the steering fails, for example, there needs to be an electronic or mechanical backup, at least until the car has been brought safely under control. We note that the odds of failure for an autonomous car are just as high as for a car today (which does not have redundant systems) or even lower, given the high level of system monitoring and V2V communication that can notify following cars of even an impending failure and make sure they avoid a collision. However, in the event that a failure does result in a collision the consequences could be catastrophic (given the likely speeds and traffic density at the time), making the need for redundant systems a vital one. Redundant systems also add significant cost and weight to the vehicle, which might be the ultimate determinant of the level of redundancy built in.

The cost is not that high, in a broader context

It doesn't matter what this technology is capable of, if no one is able to afford it. We were surprised to find out that autonomous systems are likely to cost significantly less than we initially thought. At today's prices, we estimate that the various hardware components needed to achieve *full* autonomous capability cost less than $5,000 per car, which means that, together with R&D and other costs, the customer would pay a premium less than $10,000. We believe this is a reasonable premium to pay over a regular car given the benefits to the customer of a car that can drive itself. By the time fully autonomous cars are ready to be commercialized in 5-7 years, we expect the cost to be cut at least in half, with higher volumes and more mature technology. Pressure from tougher safety standards that compel the OEMs to put these technologies into their cars (even if not mandated by the government) could see the OEMs squeeze profit margins on the incremental content and bring cost down even further.

MORGAN STANLEY BLUE PAPER

Autonomous Vehicles

Regional Differences

Regional Differences in Autonomous Car Development

Many industry observers believe that even if autonomous cars were to be successful, they are likely to remain a developed market (DM) phenomenon only.

We disagree. We think emerging market (EM) penetration of autonomous cars is essential because the volume boost would bring down the cost of the technology and would support the strong push by every OEM to achieve platform consolidation.

We see several catalysts that can aid the adoption of autonomous vehicles in emerging markets.

Basic infrastructure is a necessity to make autonomous cars work. The latest technology aims to make autonomous vehicles independent of fixed dedicated infrastructure. Several decades ago, the early prototypes and experimental models relied upon roadside and connectivity infrastructure (such as under-road metal strips and radio transmitters along roadways) to make the car aware of its surroundings and path of travel. Autonomous vehicles today seek to use a battery of on-board cameras, radar, and GPS to get an independent sense of the surrounding environment. This, in theory, reduces the autonomous vehicle's dependence on infrastructure, giving it relative flexibility of use.

However, while the autonomous car of today can see by itself, there still needs to be something to be seen and this necessitates a basic level of infrastructure development. Even fully autonomous cars will depend on road and lane markings, and global positioning systems loaded with pre-mapped roads. They will also require a sufficient field of vision and connectivity for V2V and V2X communication.

It appears autonomous vehicles are therefore best-suited for developed markets—at least in the near term. DM are more likely to have fully developed and mature road and communications infrastructure. Furthermore, given higher average transaction prices and traditional familiarity with a technology penetration curve in developed markets, acceptance of and willingness/ability to pay for autonomous vehicles could also be higher than in emerging markets. Almost everyone in the industry that we have spoken with seems to believe that if and when autonomous cars start to penetrate the car parc, their growth will likely remain restricted to developed markets only.

This is certainly the way the early days of autonomous cars are panning out. The US appears to be the most willing to embrace the concept of autonomous vehicles, with two states (California and Nevada) granting licenses to OEMs and suppliers to test-run autonomous vehicles on public roads (Florida and Michigan have also been supportive). Various US government bodies like the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), the Department of Transportation (DOT), and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) are thinking about future legislation already, and several other corporate constituents appear open to the concept.

Europe appears to be proceeding more slowly on this path, which is unusual given that Europe traditionally has been the incubator or birthplace of cutting-edge automotive technologies, including active safety, the predecessor of autonomous driving. Indeed, many European OEMs, including Audi, BMW, Mercedes-Benz, and Volvo, are among the pioneers in the field of autonomous driving. But while much of the R&D may be in Europe, the US is also becoming an R&D center, and increasingly the predominant test-bed for the OEMs, although these are signs that Europe may be starting to catch up as well. In July 2013, the Department of Transportation of the United Kingdom issued a report approving the testing of autonomous cars as part of a GBP28 billion plan to ease traffic congestion. Japan also recently issued its first autonomous driving license to Nissan.

Exhibit 24

Global road density—Developed markets have a more developed road network, giving them a better platform for autonomous cars

Kilometers of Road per km^2 of Land



Note: KM of roads per KM2 of land area 2012
Source: Euromonitor Data, Morgan Stanley Research.

Why is the regional development relevant?

Does it matter whether autonomous vehicles remain a DM phenomenon only and cannot make inroads into the EM markets? Indeed, there is no technical reason why we cannot have a vast network of autonomous cars in DM with regular cars in EM. **However, we think it is critical that autonomous cars gain acceptance in emerging markets as well.** In fact, we believe autonomous cars may struggle to fully penetrate even DM, if EM volumes do not catch up.

For starters, if autonomous cars can achieve penetration in EM markets, the volume boost should help defray the development costs. However, that is merely a collateral benefit. The primary reason why we believe EM penetration is critical is the structural push toward platform consolidation—the top strategic priority of most global OEMs today. OEMs are looking to reduce the number of architectures and engine platforms on which they build cars globally to minimize engineering costs and gain economies of scale over the largest volume possible. We expect this to be the top driver of structural cost savings for the OEMs over the next decade. What this also means is that OEMs will be looking to sell virtually the same model of car with a similar engine lineup in all regions of the world.

A purpose designed and built autonomous car may have many characteristics that differentiate it from a non-autonomous car. As discussed in Part 1, an autonomous car can be lighter, look different inside and out, and have different design and engineering priorities than a regular car. The differences can be even greater under the skin, with a network of radars/sensors and different electrical architecture and hardware/software relationships. This could make common platforms extremely difficult to achieve between autonomous and non-autonomous cars. Making a non-autonomous car on an autonomous architecture could result in massive redundancies and cost inflation for no benefit at all.

If OEMs now need to develop separate platforms for EM and DM markets, it could completely negate any cost savings that the OEMs seek to generate from platform consolidation. It is critical that the OEM can sell the same car in all markets—so either autonomous cars penetrate EM as well or the whole exercise could be a non-starter in DM as well. Fortunately, we do not see this being a significant problem.

We think autonomous cars can thrive in Emerging Markets

Despite the early start and inherent bias toward autonomous vehicles remaining largely a developed market phenomenon, we believe emerging markets will eventually become the primary markets for autonomous vehicles. Developed markets may well take the lead and see high penetration in the initial years, but over time, we see a number of reasons why developing markets should quickly catch up.

1. More people = more traffic deaths. While the existing car parc in most EM countries is still small compared to DM countries, the number of traffic deaths as a percentage of cars on the road is significantly higher. According to the latest data from Euromonitor, over 1,000 people are killed per 100,000 cars in India and 370 in China vs. 10-15 in most developed markets. By the end of this decade, the number of cars on the road in China will approach today's levels in the US. Assuming a similar ratio of traffic deaths to car parc (where the fatalities per 100,000 cars in China is 30x the rate in the US), almost one million people will be killed on the roads in China every year.

Exhibit 25

Total number of road deaths per 100K vehicles

World Traffic Deaths by Country (2010)



Source: World Health Organization, Morgan Stanley Research. Note: * Death rates calculated using light vehicle car parc excluding two wheeler. Emerging markets of India, Brazil, China, Mexico and Argentina have higher two wheeler mix in death rates.

Exhibit 26

Projected Car Parc Growth in China through 2020

(mm)



Source: IHS AutoInsight, Eurodata, Morgan Stanley Research

Exhibit 27

Projected Road Fatalities Growth in EM through 2020

(000s)



Source: GBI Research Data, Morgan Stanley Research

2. Less stringent driving tests/standards and higher congestion: Standards for driving in EM markets tend to be lower than DM markets. This may be the result of driving licenses that are easier to obtain, greater congestion, less strict enforcement of driving laws, problematic traffic planning, and insufficient driving infrastructure.

This is initially going to be a challenge to penetration of autonomous vehicles, which need a certain degree of uniformity/predictability of traffic flows. However, over time, deeper penetration of autonomous vehicles should, by itself, improve driving standards if the cars are controlling the flow of traffic.

To facilitate the changeover, we may need designated "autonomous car-friendly zones" in some countries. Autonomous vehicles seem very well-suited to urban areas in emerging markets but face enormous challenges in less developed rural areas. It is possible to envision a scenario where cars may be required to switch to autonomous mode to enter parts of the cities that are prone to congestion and grid lock, similar to low pollution “congestion zones” in some cities today.

3. Higher penetration of chauffeur driven cars...which is getting more expensive. The high congestion and poor driving standards together with low car penetration (a family may only have one car but needs to run multiple trips during the day) and hitherto cheap labor has driven a significantly higher proportion of chauffeur-driven cars in EM than in DM. It is not uncommon to see even ultra-compact cars being chauffeur driven in EM. However, rising labor/wage rates and a tight labor pool are making it increasingly difficult and expensive to retain chauffeurs in growing emerging markets. Autonomous cars can cost effectively solve this problem (at least partly, at first).

4. Quicker to adapt to new technology: EM countries have been very receptive to new technologies and conveniences. For example; smartphone penetration in China, India, and other EM countries has outpaced Western Europe and other developed countries in recent years. While the EM markets are typically a generation or two behind the DM markets with adoption of safety and emissions standards, technological content is quickly catching up. We believe EM markets could embrace autonomous driving if it can cost effectively solve a number of practical issues facing driving in EM countries.

Exhibit 28

Smartphone Wireless Penetration Globally

India and China have amongst the fastest growth rates



Source: Morgan Stanley Research

5. Fewer legal/government constraints. Given the severe and immediate concerns facing the economies and societies of many emerging markets—from overdependence on oil to higher rates of traffic fatalities, congestion and pollution—we believe that the many social and economic benefits of autonomous vehicles may be more readily embraced by the governments of EM countries than by their DM counterparts, who may not face such large and near-term threats or as severe a threat of litigation/liability.

6. Newer infrastructure in many urban areas. While one of the constraints to quick adoption of autonomous cars in EM could be the lack of road and infrastructure networks, in many urban areas, EM countries actually have newer and better roads and telecom networks than many developed markets. In addition, the sharp growth of new infrastructure projects in the coming years could result in support for autonomous vehicles being built in from the start.

Exhibit 29

Miles of Roadway: Emerging vs. Developed Countries

(total miles of road, mm)



Source: Euromonitor Data, Morgan Stanley Research

7. Limited driving range/standard driving patterns. Autonomous vehicles excel in conditions that are either stop-and-go urban traffic or very long distance highway cruises with few variables. *It is the intermediate suburban-highway-urban cycle that presents challenging conditions*. Drivers in EM countries tend to use cars mainly for intra-urban commuting, for which autonomous cars are well suited. There isn't really a "driving culture" in most emerging markets, unlike the US or even Europe, which is likely a function of legacy low car penetration/ownership, smaller/less powerful vehicles, a poor road network, excellent public transport alternatives and high gas prices. Autonomous vehicles could be good commuter cars.

8. EM is where the growth is. Car ownership is mostly fully penetrated in DM, but has significant room to grow in EM markets. Almost all the growth in global car sales in the next decade is expected to come from EM.

Exhibit 30

Auto Sales Growth by Region through 2020

(mm)



Source: IHS Data, Morgan Stanley Research

Achieving EM penetration is not going to be easy. We do not gloss over the fact that many of these opportunities can themselves initially present significant challenges to penetration of autonomous cars in emerging markets. This includes the aforementioned poor infrastructure outside of select urban areas, poor driver training/driving discipline of the existing car parc, cost considerations, and other priorities that compete for incremental auto content per vehicle before the car needs to drive itself. However, we feel confident that strong demand for the latest technology in EM markets, coupled with the push for platform commonality by the global OEMs and innovation at EM OEMs / suppliers, will create a significant market for autonomous vehicles a few years in.

China's self-driving car test

China is one of the first emerging market countries to show acceptance of autonomous cars. In 2011, the National University of Defense Technology in China, in partnership with First Auto Works, created an autonomous vehicle using a Hongqi HQ3 sedan. The autonomous vehicle completed a 154-mile journey on a busy freeway from the Hunan province's capital of Changsha to Wuhan, the capital of the Hubei province, in 3 hours and 20 minutes.

Researchers reportedly set the top speed of the vehicle at 68 mph, which was fast enough to permit the car to overtake 67 other vehicles on the expressway, and let the car loose to figure out how to get to its destination. Along the way, the HQ3 navigated through fog, thundershowers, and unclear lane markings without incident. FAW says that it has been working on autonomous car technology since 2001.

Exhibit 31
Autonomous Hongqi HQ3 sedan

Source: FAW

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Autonomous Vehicles

Timeline for Adoption

Morgan Stanley

Exhibit 32
Timeline for Adoption



Source: Company data, Morgan Stanley Research

Exhibit 33

The Four Phases of Autonomous Vehicle Adoption

Phase 1 – Passive Autonomous Driving (0-3 years)	Phase 2 – Limited Driver Substitution (3-5 years)	Phase 3 – Complete Autonomous Capability (5-10 years)	Phase 4 – 100% Penetration, Utopian Society (Two decades)
Capability: Autonomous capability is not meant to control the car but only acts as a second line of defense in the event that a mistake by the driver is about to cause an accident.	**Capability**: The driver is still the primary operator of the vehicle under all conditions though he can give up some duties to the vehicle. This also includes limited external self park capability.	**Capability**: The car can accelerate, brake and steer by itself in mixed and transitional driving conditions but the driver should remain in the driver's seat ready to take over in the event of an emergency or system failure.	**Capability**: This is an "ideal" world in which all cars on the road have at least a Phase 3 level of autonomous capability and full V2V/V2X capability, and the cars are capable of driving themselves with zero human intervention.
Functions: adaptive cruise control, crash sensing, blind spot detection, lane departure warning, night vision with automatic pedestrian highlighting	**Functions**: All Phase 1 features plus automated braking/throttle/steering with GPS driven forward vision.	**Functions**: All Phase 2 features plus capability to manage transitions, lane changes, navigate intersections, etc.	**Functions**: All Phase 3 features plus focus on lifestyle/entertainment of occupants with car control as a backup/supporting function, cars can also travel with no occupants. Remote control/disable feature necessary
Tech needed: radar, front camera, infrared camera, AV display, mechatronic controls	**Tech needed**: All Phase 1 tech plus more advanced forward radar (with multi-level forward sensing), GPS connectivity to map database.	**Tech needed**: All Phase 2 tech plus redundant capabilities, advanced sensors to interpret surroundings, basic V2V/V2X system, access to a vast database of roads and other infrastructure	**Tech needed**: All Phase 3 functions with advanced human machine interface, artificial intelligence, fully networked road and vehicle infrastructure
Cost: CPV ~ $100-200 each; total cost to customer of about $1000-1,500.	**Cost**: Cost to customer ~ $2,000-5,000 (at today's prices).	**Cost**: Cost to customer ~ $5,000-7,000. (at today's prices)	**Cost**: Cost to customer ~ $10,000. (at today's prices).
Our View: These systems are already available as optional extras on high end luxury vehicles and even some mid-line cars today. As the cost of these systems comes down, early adopters spread positive feedback and safety agencies like Euro NCAP mandate adoption of active safety systems, we could see mass penetration of these technologies ramp in 3 years.	**Our View**: This type of limited autonomous vehicle should hit the road first in the 2014 Mercedes Benz S-Class, which allows autonomous driving in traffic and high-speed (but limited) highway conditions. Next gen self park systems will allow the driver to exit the vehicle while it parks. However, the driver may still have to drive up to a vacant spot.	**Our View**: Prototypes of such vehicles exist today though mass introduction with an automotive grade of reliability will need a certain level of infrastructure development(for V2X), certain minimum penetration level of Phase 1/Phase 2 systems (for V2V) and widespread acceptance of the concept of autonomous driving	**Our View**: Despite the relatively small technological leap vs. Phase 4, we believe this will take much longer due to required high penetration of the existing car parc and some infrastructure development. However, this phase could be realized sooner than we think.

Source: Company data, Morgan Stanley Research

Timeline for Adoption

We expect fully autonomous vehicles on the road by the end of the decade. This view is more bullish than the traditional auto industry but slightly more conservative than some of the external players.

We see four phases of adoption of autonomous vehicles. Phase 1 is already underway, Phase 3 will see introduction of fully autonomous vehicles in 5-10 years, Phase 4 may take a couple of decades until full penetration is achieved.

However, Phase 4 could come sooner than we think. If the government, the auto industry and other entities choose to accelerate adoption to access the full socioeconomic benefits of autonomous cars.

There appears to be broad consensus that we are not heading toward a "Minority Report" world of self-driving modules zipping around autonomously in a highly coordinated pattern ferrying blissfully ignorant occupants to their destinations, any time soon. While that may be the ultimate utopian goal, the first target is to get fully autonomous vehicles on the road. Here is where we see more diversion of opinion. The most aggressive bulls on autonomous vehicles see the first fully autonomous vehicles on sale in 4-5 years with a steady penetration through the car parc from that point on. It is probably not a coincidence that most of these bulls are outside the traditional auto industry. Most auto OEMs and suppliers, on the other hand, are in agreement that the first fully autonomous cars are at least 10 years away.

Exhibit 34
Robohighway of the Future?
Sorry…this is not happening any time soon

Source: Engadget.com

So why bother reading this report? For two reasons:

1. Our own view on timing is somewhere in between the bulls and bears—we believe a confluence of supply push and demand pull will see fully autonomous vehicles on the road by the end of the decade
2. Penetration of autonomous functionality in the vehicle is not binary but rather a curve that started *a few years ago*

These factors make autonomous vehicles a relevant investible topic *today.*

The autonomous vehicle adoption curve

The path to fully autonomous cars is unlikely to be a straight one. In a way, we already have a certain level of autonomous driving capability available in cars today, in the form of sophisticated and usually optional active safety systems. The traditional auto industry is likely to implement a path to full autonomous capability by incrementally increasing the capabilities and independence of currently available systems.

We see the following phases in the adoption curve of autonomous vehicles. Our phases mostly coincide with the US Department of Transportation's recently issued "levels" of autonomous vehicles.

Phase 1: 0-3 years: Autonomous driving as a safety feature

Autonomous capability: The main purpose of autonomous driving in this scenario is to act as a back-up for the driver in order to avoid an accident. The autonomous capability is *not* meant to control the car but acts only as a second line of defense in the event that a mistake by the driver is imminently going to cause an accident. Despite being "active" safety, the autonomous driving capability is "passive" in nature.

Scenario 1: A driver is cruising on the highway at 70 mph when he comes upon traffic that is backed up at a construction zone. The driver is distracted and does not notice that traffic is moving at a considerably slower speed ahead of him. The car detects this and warns the driver and if he or she does not apply the brakes, the car automatically initiates emergency braking.

Scenario 2: A driver is driving home from a long day at work and is exhausted. On a long stretch of road, the driver loses focus and the car begins to drift off the road. The car warns the driver via an audible/visual alert that he is leaving the lane, and then nudges the car back into the lane.

Functions: Adaptive cruise control (cruise control that adjusts vehicle speed based on traffic conditions, and that can bring the car to a full stop and start moving again), front crash sensing, rear crash sensing, blind spot detection, lane departure warning, night vision/infrared systems with automatic pedestrian highlighting.

Technology needed: Forward radar, rear radar, side radar, front camera, infrared camera, AV display, mechatronic controls/actuators.

Cost: We estimate that *each* of the above functionalities will include content per vehicle of approximately $100-200 with a cost to customer of approx. $1,000-1,500.

Why this will take 0-3 years. These systems are already available as optional extras on high-end luxury vehicles and even some mid-line cars today. As the cost of these systems comes down, early adopters spread positive feedback and safety agencies like Euro NCAP mandate adoption of active safety systems, we could see mass penetration of these technologies ramp in three years.

Exhibit 35
Adaptive cruise control



Source: Audi

Phase 2: 3-5 years: autonomous driving in limited/controlled conditions

Autonomous capability: The main purpose of autonomous driving in this scenario is to move beyond basic active safety and assist/substitute for the driver under limited, controlled driving conditions, reducing stress for the driver. In this scenario, the driver is still the primary operator of the vehicle under all conditions though he can give up some duties to the vehicle. This also includes limited external self parking capability.

Scenario: If a car is stuck in stop-and-go traffic, the driver can allow the car to creep ahead and stop as necessary and relax for a while until traffic conditions improve.

Scenario 2: If a driver is driving on the highway at speed over long distances with little traffic, he can allow the car to control the throttle and steering and any emergency actions.

Scenario 3: A driver pulls up to a parking spot, puts the car in autonomous park mode and exits the vehicle. The car automatically parks itself in the chosen spot and shuts off.

Functions: all Phase 1 features plus automated braking/throttle/steering with GPS driven forward vision.

Technology needed: All Phase 1 technologies, plus more advanced forward radar (with multi-level forward sensing), GPS connectivity to map databases that provide upcoming road directions and conditions, speed limits, and other basic pre-determined information.

Cost: This is an incremental step over Phase 1. We estimate the cumulative costs of these technologies to be in the $2,000-5,000 range, *at today's prices.* We expect the prices to decline sharply over time.

Why this will take 3-5 years: Such a type of limited autonomous vehicle should hit the road first in the 2014 Mercedes Benz S-Class, which allows autonomous driving in traffic and high speed (but limited) highway conditions. Cadillac's Super Cruise feature set to become available on the XTS and CTS in a couple of years performs similar functions on the highway. Next-gen competitors to the S-Class (Audi A8, BMW 7Series and others) are likely to offer these features when launched within the next 3-5 years. While "self-parking" is already available in some vehicles, only steering is autonomous while the driver still controls the throttle and needs to be in the vehicle. Next generation self-park systems will allow the driver to exit the vehicle while it parks. However, the driver may still have to drive up to a vacant spot. For truly automated parking, where the car finds its own spot, we may have to wait 5-10 years.

Exhibit 36
2014 Mercedes Benz S-Class – autonomous driving capability

Source: Company data

Phase 3: 5-10: years autonomous driving in mixed conditions / fully autonomous driving

Autonomous capability: This scenario envisions true autonomous driving. The car can accelerate, brake and steer by itself in mixed and transitional driving conditions. However, the driver should remain in the driver's seat at least semi-attentive, ready to take the wheel in the event of an emergency or system failure.

Scenario: Driver gets into the car in his suburban driveway, sets the destination as his workplace in the nearby downtown area, and proceeds to read the newspaper (on his personal smart device, of course), while the car drives him to work. Once he is there, he alights at the front door to the building, while the car drives around to the parking garage, finds an empty spot, and parks itself, until summoned to the front door again, at the end of the day.

Functions: All Phase 2 features, plus fully autonomous driving capability with ability to manage transitions including dense traffic to highway, lane changes, navigate intersections, urban-highway cycle etc. True remote self parking capability.

Technology needed: All Phase 2 features at a highly advanced level with redundant capabilities, highly advanced radar/laser sensors to capture surroundings, basic human machine interface to monitor occupants and make sure the driver is at least semi-attentive, basic V2V/V2X capabilities to be fully aware of the surroundings, big data capability with access to a vast database of roads and other infrastructure.

Cost: We estimate the cost of a fully autonomous system without V2V/V2X communication to be around $5,000-7,000, at today's prices. We expect the cost to come down significantly by the time we get to this phase.

Why this will take 5-10 years: Prototypes of vehicles with such capabilities exist today, although commercial introduction with an automotive grade of reliability will need a certain level of infrastructure development (for V2X), a minimum penetration level of Phase 1/Phase 2 systems (for V2V), and widespread acceptance of the concept of autonomous driving (to solve liability, regulatory and other concerns raised elsewhere in this report).

Exhibit 37
Audi self parking A7



Source: Audi.com

Phase 4: 20+ years: 'Autopia'

Autonomous capability: This is an "ideal" world akin to common science fiction in which all cars on the road have at least a Phase 3 level of autonomous capability (including retrofitting older cars), full V2V/V2X capability and the ability to drive from Point A to Point B with zero human intervention.

Scenario: A family of four wants to travel from New York to Chicago. They have dinner at home, climb into the vehicle at 9 pm, watch a movie projected on the windscreen, and then go to sleep in their fold-flat seats, waking up at their destination the next morning.

Functions: Fully autonomous driving with no human intervention, with the focus likely to be on lifestyle/entertainment of occupants and manual car control as a back-up/supporting function (or disallowed). Cars will look very different from cars of today. Cars can also travel with no occupants. Remote control/disable functionality necessary.

Technology needed: All Phase 3 functions with advanced human machine interface, artificial intelligence, fully networked road and vehicle infrastructure.

Cost: With additional infotainment content and full V2V/V2X communication, we estimate a completely autonomous car in a utopian world will carry a $10,000 cost premium at today's prices. We expect cost to fall by half by the time this Phase comes to fruition.

Why this will take 20+ years: The large time gap between Phase 3 and Phase 4 is because we will need a critical mass of autonomous cars on the roads before this scenario can play out. In fact, we believe a significant majority of, if not all, cars on the road need to have basic autonomous and V2V/V2X capability before we can think of the "utopian" environment. They will also require a significant infrastructure build-out that will take a lot of time and money to complete. This infrastructure will include "side lanes" on highways where autonomous vehicles can pull out in case of technical issues, fully networked intersections and traffic monitoring capability, fully mapped roads with real-time updates, and massive network capability to handle the data needs of several hundred million autonomous vehicles on the roads, etc. However, as we mentioned earlier in this report, we believe the significant socioeconomic benefits of autonomous cars could accelerate their adoption, and this Phase could be realized sooner than we expect.

The adoption curve

We see these four Phases of autonomous vehicles being implemented across an adoption curve. The first three phases will be incremental increases in the content and capability, with a steep increase to get to the Utopian world in Phase 4. The sharp slope of the curve reflects the challenge that we expect the industry to face as it attempts to achieve full penetration of autonomous vehicles.

The risk of settling for incremental active safety vs. going for step-function change

The steep curve in the last phase of autonomous vehicle adoption also represents a grey area at the inflection point between Phase 3 and Phase 4. This is the point of crossover, where the "training wheels" and "adult supervision" are removed from the autonomous vehicle and it is allowed to drive on its own. The cars do not really become "self-aware" at this point—it's just that they do not need human intervention and can decide their own course of action even in the case of emergencies or one-in-a-million chance circumstances. This is a critical step that distinguishes between a true autonomous vehicle and a car that can drive itself on auto-pilot. **Achieving this final step is also an *extremely* important juncture in the new business model, where the winners can be sorted from the losers in the race for autonomous cars.**

The traditional industry approach. It appears that most of the auto OEMs and suppliers working on the autonomous car are aiming at late Phase 3 technology—cars that can drive themselves in a variety of circumstances, without regard to whether they are fully (Phase 4) autonomous or not. These entities view the combined hurdles of customer acceptance, liability, infrastructure, and mass penetration as too great to overcome in the foreseeable future. While they acknowledge that there is a chance we may ultimately get to such a utopian world, they believe it is equally likely that we do not, which makes it not something they need to worry about at this point in time. What this means is that they can adapt existing cars/architectures for self-driving capability without having to design an autonomous car from the ground up. This is the incremental approach, where active safety gets better and better until the customers decide at which point they want the cars to take over.

The outsiders' approach. Unlike the traditional auto industry, the "outsiders," like Google and some start-ups, are *directly aiming to get to Phase 4 as fast as possible.* They acknowledge that there might be an adoption curve initially, but want to skip over Phases 2 and 3.

There could be three reasons for this.

1. Giving customers the full benefit of autonomous capability will drive maximum penetration: Once people have experienced the full benefits of a fully autonomous vehicle and what they can (and what they don't have to) do behind the wheel, this will automatically create a positive feedback loop that can drive mass penetration. Incremental steps in active safety may not accomplish this.

2. New entrants cannot really capitalize in the intermediate Phases: Being external to the auto industry, the Googles and start-ups of the world cannot really participate in the trickle up penetration of active safety in the same way that traditional auto suppliers can. This drives them to reinvent the automobile on their own terms. It helps that the approach toward the utopian vision needs extensive use of mapping and big data capabilities—something they are very good at and the OEMs/suppliers are not.

3. You need full autonomy in order to monetize it: We extensively delve into the monetization opportunity and the new business model for autos in Part 7, but, in short, we expect a new revenue stream to the generated from fully autonomous cars in terms of the content that can be sold to the occupants when they are in the car and on the road. To truly be able to achieve this, the occupants need to be able to concentrate on *the content* and not *on the road*.

We believe the traditional OEMs/suppliers may miss the opportunity to monetize the content angle, if they "settle" for getting the autonomous car to Phase 3 and do not push for Phase 4.

THE SARTRE PROJECT – How autonomous and manually driven cars can co-exist

The SARTRE (SAfe Road TRains for the Environment) Project is an initiative funded by the European Union that studies the feasibility of implementing a road-train system on highways. A road-train would comprise of a number of cars in formation, closely following each other as a "platoon" until cars need to peel out of the pack to different destinations. The cars will be in semi-autonomous mode when in the platoon. In its current form, each platoon would be led by a bus or truck. The cars can merge into / out of the platoon with relatively small gaps (10 meters, expected to come down) through V2V communication and coordination.

The advantages of this concept are that cars can drive autonomously in safety, achieve significant fuel economy improvements as a result of the "drafting effect" of the platoon and reduce congestion.

We think the SARTRE project is a good example of how autonomous and non-autonomous cars can coexist on roads for a few years until autonomous cars achieve full penetration. Dedicated lanes for autonomous vehicles or periodic "platoon lead" vehicles could be used to shepherd autonomous cars around manually driven ones.

Department of Transportation's "Levels" of an autonomous car

Another way of looking at the expected evolution of autonomous vehicles is to divide it into different levels based on capability. This is what the US Department of Transportation has done in its initial guideline note on autonomous vehicles. This note is meant to be a guide for the states and government agencies when they have to deal with the issue, in any context.

NHTSA defines vehicle automation as having five levels:

No Automation (Level 0): The driver is in complete and sole control of the primary vehicle controls—brake, steering, throttle, and motive power—at all times.

Function-specific Automation (Level 1): Automation at this level involves one or more specific control functions. Examples include electronic stability control or pre-charged brakes, where the vehicle automatically assists with braking to enable the driver to regain control of the vehicle or stop faster than possible by acting alone.

Combined Function Automation (Level 2): This level involves automation of at least two primary control functions designed to work in unison to relieve the driver of control of those functions. An example of combined functions enabling a Level 2 system is adaptive cruise control in combination with lane centering.

Limited Self-Driving Automation (Level 3): Vehicles at this level of automation enable the driver to cede full control of all safety-critical functions under certain traffic or environmental conditions and in those conditions to rely heavily on the vehicle to monitor for changes in those conditions requiring transition back to driver control. The driver is expected to be available for occasional control, but with sufficiently comfortable transition time. The Google car is an example of limited self-driving automation.

Full Self-Driving Automation (Level 4): The vehicle is designed to perform all safety-critical driving functions and monitor roadway conditions for an entire trip. Such a design anticipates that the driver will provide destination or navigation input, but is not expected to be available for control at any time during the trip. This includes both occupied and unoccupied vehicles.

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Autonomous Vehicles

Quantifying the Economic Benefits

Exhibit 9

Medical, Fuel Costs and Productivity Gains Drive Significant Savings



Source: US Department of Transportation, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Federal Highway Administration, EPA, FDA, AAA, Census, Texas Traffic Institute, usgovernmentspending.com, Thomson Reuters, Morgan Stanley Research

Exhibit 38

Bull-Base-Bear Cases for Potential Savings in the US

	Bull Case	Base Case	Bear Case
Autonomous Cars Total Savings	$2.2tn	$1.3tn	$0.7tn

Key Assumptions			
Fuel Price Per Gallon:	$6.00	$4.00	$3.00
Improvement in Fuel Efficiency:	50%	30%	15%
Cost of Life:	$9mm	$8mm	$6mm
Median Income per	$32.5	$25.0	$19.0
Work as % of Total Time Spent in a Car:	50%	30%	10%

Source: Company Data, Morgan Stanley Research

Quantifying the Economic Benefits of Autonomous Vehicles

We estimate that autonomous vehicles can save the US economy $1.3 trillion per year. We believe the large potential savings can help accelerate the adoption of autonomous vehicles.

We see five drivers of the cost savings: Fuel cost savings ($158 bn), accident costs ($488 bn), productivity gain ($507 bn), fuel loss from congestion ($11 bn), productivity savings from congestion ($138 bn).

This is our base case estimate. Our bull case estimate of savings is $2.2 tn/year and a bear case is $0.7 tn/year

- This is a rough estimate. It does not account for the cost of implementing autonomous vehicles (one-time), offsetting losses, and investment implications. It also assumes 100% penetration of autonomous vehicles to achieve the full run-rate of potential savings.

The key selling point of autonomous cars is their potential to reduce the adverse social and economic impacts of transportation infrastructure. Here we have attempted to calculate the total potential economic cost savings that autonomous cars represent. In our view, putting a dollar figure on the potential savings impact can help crystallize the benefits of a technology that is viewed by some, even industry insiders, as pie-in-the-sky science fiction.

Autonomous vehicles can save the US economy *$1.3 trillion per year*

These cost savings would come from the improvement in fuel economy of the car parc, improved productivity for autonomous cars occupants, and the near elimination of accidents and the resultant injuries and loss of life. If autonomous cars can penetrate globally, the global economic savings could be many multiples higher. Applying the ratio of US savings / US GDP to global GDP of about $70 trillion, nets a global savings estimate of about $5.6 tn per year from autonomous vehicles.

But here comes the fine print

There are a number of disclaimers that we must make very clear, however.

1. **This is a very rough estimate.** The $1.3 tn savings figure makes a number of assumptions based on data from a variety of government and non-government agencies and studies. Furthermore, some of the sources date back to 2010, as the most recently available information. This estimate is also by no means comprehensive and only represents an attempt to quantify the biggest areas of savings.

2. **We do not include the cost of autonomous vehicles.** This analysis is obviously one-sided and only looks at the benefits of autonomous cars and not the costs. This was done for two reasons: (a) for the sake of simplicity, the benefits being a little more obvious than the infrastructure, legal, and other costs needed to get the cars on the road; and (b) we view most of the costs related to autonomous cars as up-front or one-time in nature, while the savings should be ongoing, making this more relevant.

3. **We do not consider the offsetting losses.** There are two sides to every story and as has been the case since the Industrial Revolution, every automated/mechanized activity potentially eliminates existing jobs. Our analysis does not account for such offsetting losses. For example; if there are virtually no motor vehicle accidents there could be fewer emergency rooms at hospitals, which could result in less employment for EMTs/doctors/nurses. In another instance, self-parking cars could eliminate the need for valets.

4. **We do not include the investment implications of autonomous vehicles.** The $1.3 tn number only includes the dollar cost of the social savings and does not consider the value accrued to the auto OEMs, suppliers, and external corporate entities directly or indirectly involved with autonomous vehicles. *We have attempted a separate assessment of investment implications in Part 7 of this report.*

5. **This will only happen in a Phase 4 utopian world.** The most important thing to keep in mind about our $1.3 tn savings estimate is that it can be achieved only in a Phase 4 utopian scenario, as laid out in Part 4 of this Blue Paper. This means that the $1.3 tn figure could be purely theoretical until we get to a point where 100% of cars on the road are autonomous and manual driving is virtually banned from the roads. However, we could see incremental savings along the adoption curve.

Fuel savings: $158 billion per year

There are currently 251 mm vehicles on the road in the US, which travel a total of approximately 3 trillion miles per year, for an average of about 11,700 miles per vehicle per year. In 2012, the US alone consumed 134 billion gallons of gasoline for transportation use, according to the US Energy Information Administration (EIA), at a cost of $535 billion at $4/gallon. Divided over 251 mm vehicles, that works out to 532 gallons of gasoline per year for an effective fuel economy of 22 mpg. *We can do better.* The corporate average fuel economy for the vehicle fleet in 2011 is almost 30 mpg or 36% above the car parc average number. As per the new fuel economy standards, set forth by the NHTSA and the EPA, the CAFE standard needs to go to 54.5 mpg by 2025. Clearly, cars are set to become massively more fuel efficient in the coming years and the country's gasoline bill is set to drop significantly.

None of this has anything to do with autonomous cars…yet. We think autonomous cars can add a further leg up to fuel efficiency. In today's cars, even using cruise control / driving smoothly can easily deliver a 20-30% improvement in fuel economy vs. a manually controlled "surging" brake / throttle. Autonomous cars will run on cruise control 100% of the time. Add to this aerodynamic styling and light weight, plus active traffic management, and **we can potentially get up to a 50% improvement in fuel economy from autonomous cars *on top of* the fuel economy improvement from new engine and transmission technologies that are going to be incorporated in cars anyway.** In order to be conservative, we assume an autonomous car can be 30% more efficient than an equivalent non-autonomous car. Empirical tests have demonstrated that level of fuel savings from cruise control use / smooth driving styles alone. If we were to reduce the nation's $535 gasoline bill by 30%, that would save us $158 bn.

There is a catch here…Because these savings would be realized over a span of several years, the parallel increase in fuel efficiency of the cars will already reduce that fuel bill and potentially reduce the apparent benefit of autonomous vehicles. For example; if the average miles per gallon in the US goes to 30 by the end of the decade, from 22 today, the total gasoline bill would go from $535 bn to $392 bn. Thirty percent autonomous car savings on this figure is only $118 bn—still significant but less than the $158 bn we have considered. However, we believe the $158 bn number is relevant because it is based on today's $4/gallon cost of gasoline, a cost we believe is likely to increase in the coming years. We also assume that the convenience of autonomous cars will result in more miles driven and therefore higher gasoline consumption by the car parc. *Note that the $158 bn estimate is adjusted for congestion improvement, which we include as a separate category to avoid double counting.*

Exhibit 39

Total Dollar Spent on Fuel (2012)

US data



Source: US Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration, Morgan Stanley Research

Accident savings (including injuries and fatalities) $488 billion per year

The largest vehicle costs to society are the billions that are lost to injuries and fatalities. In 2010, the World Health Organization (WHO) estimated 1.2 million deaths globally due to vehicle accidents. A report by the WHO confirmed that nearly a million children are killed worldwide as a result of unintentional injuries, and the biggest killers are traffic accidents. According to the US Census, there were 10.8 million motor vehicle accidents in the US in 2009 (the last year for which data is available). According to the US DOT, these accidents resulted in over 2 million injuries and 32,000 deaths. Over 90% of these accidents have been determined to be caused by human error, according to the International Organization for Road Accident Prevention.

Accidents are very expensive. The Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) calculates the cost per vehicle crash injury, adjusted for inflation, to be around $126,000, and the cost per fatality at almost $6 million. The FHWA places dollar values on 11 components and excludes property damage-only crashes. The comprehensive costs include property damage; lost earnings; lost household production (non-market activities occurring in the home); medical costs; emergency services; travel delay; vocational rehabilitation; workplace costs; administrative costs; legal costs; and pain and reduced quality of life. The EPA and FDA also have calculations for the statistical value of life, $9.1 mm and $8 mm, respectively (we use the “midpoint” FDA number as the basis for our base case calculations). Costs from injuries represent $282 billion, and costs from fatalities represent $260 billion per year. There is a total cost of $542 billion per year in the US due to motor vehicle-related accidents.

If 90% of accidents are caused by driver error, taking the driver out of the equation could theoretically reduce the cost of accidents by 90%. This could save $488 bn (90% of $542 bn) per year. While autonomous vehicles could still be involved in accidents due to mechanical failure, we believe V2V/V2X communication and instant reaction times would greatly reduce the collateral damage in that instance.

Again, there is a catch… We are not going to achieve these savings until we have completely eliminated the human factor behind the wheel. This means that almost 100% of the cars on the road need to be autonomous at all times to prevent the one guy who is still driving his car himself from causing an accident. As mentioned earlier, this will only happen in the utopian scenario.

Exhibit 40

Cost of Motor Vehicles-related Fatal and Non-fatal Injuries

US data



Source: US Department of Transportation, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Federal Highway Administration, EPA, FDA, AAA, Morgan Stanley Research

Productivity gains: $507 bn per year

One of the main advantages of autonomous cars is that occupants are freed from the chore of driving to do whatever else they want. For instance, people can work in their cars while commuting to work or at any other time. We have tried to estimate the value generated from people now being able to work during a time they could not earlier.

US drivers drive approximately 3 trillion miles a year. According to the DOT/FHWA, in 2009, the average speed of a commute in the US was 27.5 mph. For the purposes of our calculation, we are assuming 40 mph (for simplicity’s sake, a blend of average urban speed limit of 30 mph and highway speed limit of 55 mph). Three trillion miles driven at 40 mph equals 75 billion hours spent in a car (again, conservatively assuming only one occupant in a car at all times). If we assume that people work 30% of the time that they are in a car, that equals 18.75 bn hours. We assume the “cost of time” is $25 per hour (based on US median income of $50k/year) and that people are 90% as productive in the car as behind a work desk. This means the value of the productivity generated from being able to work in the car is $507 bn (22.5 bn x $25 x 90%).

Exhibit 41

Productivity Gain from Autonomous Cars

US data



Source: Census, Federal Highway Administration, Morgan Stanley Research

Congestion savings: $149 bn per year

Productivity loss from congestion is something every driver can feel in real time. There is no escaping the dreaded morning commute, or the rush to beat after-work traffic. The

European Commission for Mobility and Transport estimates that congestion costs Europe about 1% of GDP each year. According to the Texas Traffic Institute's Urban Mobility Report, supported by the US DOT, in 2011 the average US driver lost 38 hours to congestion, way up from 16 hours in 1982. This was calculated as the difference between traveling at congested speeds rather than free-flowing speeds. That is the equivalent to almost five vacation days. In areas with over three million people, commuters experienced higher congestion delays and lost an average of 52 hours in 2011. The report analyzed over 600 million speeds on 875,000 roads across the US. The speed data was collected every 15 minutes, 24 hours a day, at hundreds of points along almost every mile of major road in North America.

The report also estimates that there are about 145 mm commuters in the US, which means they are collectively losing to congestion around 5.5 billion hours a year (38 hours x 145 million commuters).

Autonomous cars should be able to largely eliminate congestion due to smoother driving styles and actively managed intersections and traffic patterns. Autonomous cars (and especially driverless cars) should also strongly encourage traffic pooling. Again, assuming the cost of time is $25 per hour, 5.5 bn hours saved in congestion is worth $138 bn of potential productivity generated.

Exhibit 42

Productivity Gain from Vehicle Traffic Congestion Avoidance

US data



Source: Census, Texas Traffic Institute, Morgan Stanley Research

We assert that this is *not* double-counting against the productivity gains bucket. The productivity gains math uses only the time spent *moving* on the road, whereas the above congestion math uses only time spent stuck in congestion when not moving.

There is another aspect to congestion saving—the fuel wasted by being stuck in traffic will no longer be needed. This was also calculated by the Texas Traffic Institute's report, which quantified congestion by taking the free-flow results and subtracting them from congested results. First, TTI calculated the emissions and fuel consumption during congested conditions by combining speed, volume, and emission rates. Then it estimated the amount of gas needed to produce those $C0_2$ emissions. The average fuel wasted was 19 gallons per commuter and a total of 2.7 bn gallons for the entire US in 2011. $10.8 billion dollars were wasted by just sitting in traffic. This waste could also be eliminated by moving to a congestion-free autonomous car world.

Exhibit 43

Fuel Savings from Vehicle Traffic Congestion Avoidance

US data



Source: Texas Traffic Institute, Morgan Stanley Research

In conclusion, we believe that full penetration of autonomous cars could result in social benefits such as saving lives, reducing frustration from traffic jams, and giving people more flexibility with commuting or leisure driving. These social benefits also have significant potential economic implications. And the implications are truly significant—the $1.3 tn of value potentially generated by autonomous cars amounts to over 8% of the entire US GDP, as well as 152% of the US Defense budget and 144% of all student loans outstanding. In a different context, it is about 150% of the global auto OEM market cap and 100% of the global auto industry market cap.

The best part is that while we may have to wait for the Utopian scenario to get the entire savings, we can still get partial savings in the same ratio as the adoption curve with incremental penetration of autonomous capability until we get to 100% penetration. This by itself, makes the pursuit of autonomous vehicles entirely worth it, in our opinion.

What If We Are Wrong?

What happens if our views here do not come to pass and autonomous cars remain a niche vehicle feature at best? This is certainly possible given the number of headwinds facing autonomous vehicle penetration discussed elsewhere in this Blue Paper.

If autonomous vehicles fail to gain traction, then little will change vs. the industry of today. The push toward widespread in-car connectivity is well underway and should continue until all cars are connected devices, but with drivers still at the wheel, the incremental benefits from moving from Phase 3 to Phase 4 would not be realized. This means there would still be modest gains in safety as active safety systems achieve full penetration, but fuel economy, productivity, and economic gains would likely be relatively limited.

MORGAN STANLEY BLUE PAPER

Autonomous Vehicles

Next Steps

- Government
- Auto Insurance
- Telecom Services

Next Steps — The Path to Get There

So what are the next steps to get there? Before we see full penetration of autonomous cars, we need to resolve a few issues outside of the technology needed to get there. Some of these issues are relevant in the near term, some are longer-term issues, but all of them probably need to kick off now to be resolved in time for the autonomous car ramp-up.

We highlight four next steps:

Building consumer awareness

Getting regulatory support

Resolving the liability issue

Building out the network infrastructure

While the industry works to perfect autonomous vehicle technology, there are steps that need to be taken outside the industry to ensure that the rollout will be smooth and successful. While these actions do not necessarily have to be completed before the first autonomous car hits the road, they will be a necessity to achieve full penetration of autonomous vehicles.

Step 1: Building consumer awareness

It is going to take a lot of coaxing to get people to give up control of the steering wheel. Even the use of cruise control is viewed with skepticism by many drivers today so getting them to give up complete control is not going to be easy. That said, we probably do have an epidemic of too many people driving while impaired, whether it is texting or some other distraction. It may be easier to get people to embrace autonomous cars than to give up their smartphone in the car.

We believe the OEMs need to begin 1) familiarizing consumers with autonomous car technology and 2) retraining their car-related behaviors. In our view, the best way to do this is by conducting road shows at which people are driven around small tracks in autonomous cars at low speeds, to get them used to the feeling. OEMs can also set up simulators at dealers so that customers can try out the autonomous experience in a safe environment.

Step 2: Getting regulatory support

The US government is going to have to get on board with autonomous cars at some point during the ramp up phase. We believe the government can have a large role in the process, including accommodating autonomous cars in legislation, issuing special licenses to autonomous vehicles in the early stage, helping resolve the liability issue, building out V2X infrastructure, and ultimately speeding up adoption through a mandate, if necessary.

Step 3: Resolving the liability issue

This is the most frequently cited impediment to autonomous vehicle penetration. We believe the liability issue needs to be comprehensively addressed soon. This is actually a critical issue for even early adoption of autonomous vehicles.

Step 4: Building out the network infrastructure

While a vast V2V/V2X is only needed for part of Phase 3 and Phase 4 of the adoption curve, the long lead times necessary for build-out and spectrum approval means we have to get started pretty soon.

Government's Role: The Silent Referee

The two hurdles to the adoption of autonomous vehicles that we come across most often are 1) determining liability and 2) government acceptance of the technology. While the first is very real and will need to be comprehensively addressed, we believe the second is less of an obstacle than many people think.

Stage 1: We do not think the US government will be an impediment to autonomous vehicle adoption/penetration

The US government rarely tends to be ahead of the curve when it comes to adoption or penetration of new technologies. Sometimes it is an impediment, such as in the case of Audi's active-matrix LED headlamps. These are illegal in the US because of a 1968 law requiring that the driver must be in control of switching headlights between high and low beams. Another example is the lag time in the EPA’s ability to adapt its fuel economy testing methods to keep pace with new fuel-efficient technologies.

In the case of autonomous vehicles, however, it may not be a bad thing. This is because we believe very little intervention is needed from the government for early adoption of autonomous systems. While we are still very early in the process and there are several areas of uncertainty, there appear to be few laws or regulations that prevent or inhibit the use of autonomous systems in cars.

The "driver's" license issue. The biggest sticking point is likely to be how to handle licensing for cars without drivers. So far, Nevada, California, Florida, Michigan, and the District of Columbia have explicitly permitted and/or licensed fully autonomous cars for use on their roads (with a few other states considering similar approvals). However, for the other states, it is unclear whether driverless cars are legal, and not having an explicit approval does not necessarily mean it cannot be done. Simply put, if there are no laws that specifically forbid the use of autonomous cars, there may be no legal impediment to their adoption and the government might not need to officially approve the technology ahead of time for it to proceed and develop.

Legal issues aside, however, there are practical considerations that governments may need to address over time.

Stage 2: We believe the US government will eventually help facilitate rapid adoption of autonomous vehicles

While we need little government intervention to initially get autonomous cars on the road, the government may well have an important role to play over time (between phases 3 and 5 as stated in Part 4).

Where autonomous cars will need US government support:

1. Stepping in with intervention if necessary. The US government is unlikely to ignore autonomous vehicles, in our view. The DOT has already issued guidelines for autonomous vehicles and the NHTSA and the federal government are working with individual states on rules and regulations. We believe the government's approach to autonomous driving will be similar to its approach to distracted driving/connected cars, that is staying at arm’s length and letting the technology evolve at its own pace unless there are real-world concerns or adverse implications of the technology that need policing or regulation. In the case of autonomous vehicles, if early self-driving cars are involved in an unacceptably high rate of accidents caused by system unreliability and the general public becomes fearful of sharing the road with autonomous vehicles, then the government could step in to regulate the technology.

But if the technology works as hoped for and demand is high, the government could help accelerate adoption.

2. New automotive technologies typically penetrate fastest when they are mandated. The government usually mandates technology when the benefits are clearly demonstrated and undeniable and the overall cost/benefit of a mandate is positive. If the actual socio-economic benefits of autonomous vehicle technology is even remotely in the ballpark of our estimate in Part 5, we believe the cost/benefit analysis will be quite clear. This could be a few years after fully autonomous vehicles first become available. As we mentioned in Part 5, to get the full benefit, we need 100% penetration of the car parc, which could take two decades or more at a natural run rate. A government mandate (in the form of an accelerated scrappage program, an electric vehicle-like cost rebate, or a ratings/cost penalty on cars without the technology) could significantly accelerate full penetration and, consequently, the realization of full economic savings.

3. Helping resolve the liability issue. "Who is at fault in the event of an autonomous car crash?" appears to be the number one issue facing autonomous vehicles. While part of this needs to be resolved by the insurance companies (please see insurance implications elsewhere in this Blue Paper), the government could also help resolve this in a number of ways. (We note that we are not attorneys and that the following discussion is purely hypothetical.)

From a tort perspective and to help lay the groundwork for the insurance companies, we might see all states adopting "no fault" insurance regimens. Currently 12 states are "no fault," meaning the blame for an accident and the insurance implications are equally shared by the parties involved, irrespective of who caused the accident. Applying such a regimen to autonomous cars may remove the very need to answer the question of "who is responsible..."—at least from an insurance/tort perspective.

From a criminal liability perspective, because autonomous cars will carry an array of cameras, sensors, radar, GPS, and data tracking technologies, reconstruction of accident scenes likely will be easier to achieve. This should help make it easier to apportion blame in the event of an accident. We also believe the OEMs and suppliers will carry ample liability reserves in the early years of autonomous vehicles, to defray litigation risk. This could help determine which companies succeed in the world of autonomous vehicles—if your system is good enough, you will not need to worry about your liability reserve. In addition, as we discuss in the insurance, keeping individual auto insurance premiums at current levels, despite the large reduction in the frequency of accidents, could help create a large liability pool with which to settle accident claims when they do occur.

Comments from Morgan Stanley Property & Casualty Insurance analyst Greg Locraft: While this is speculation at this time—moving to a "no fault" regime might be an answer especially because it eliminates the complexity from the at-fault equation. It is also possible that when a concentrated group is trying to insure a risk, a lot of times they will "pool" their premiums/dollars and create their own insurance company (including off-shore) and self-insure for smaller losses and use reinsurance to manage tail risk exposure. The insurance industry has had a long history of innovating product to solve for issues of companies/ consumers, especially on s mass scale. Insurance is a product that "follows" the growth curve of other industries as a necessary evil. It is a utility in the business world. Autonomous car insurance may be costly for those that bear the risk, especially in the early years...but a solution is likely to be found.

4. Regulating the V2V/V2X frequency spectrum. Autonomous cars will need to communicate both among themselves and with nearby infrastructure to be most efficient in their operation. To help facilitate this, the government may need to open up and safeguard enough telecommunications frequency. This need not wait until critical mass is achieved, and could be one of the earliest actions the government can take to enable adoption. The government would also need to lay down guidelines to ensure the security and privacy of the collected data.

5. Infrastructure/city planning. In the long run, the government could enhance the safety and success of autonomous vehicles by adequately developing infrastructure suited to them. This includes improving road marking and signage, installing V2I communication infrastructure along roads and intersections, dedicating lanes for autonomous cars to pull into when experiencing mechanical failure, creating "no human driving" zones that reduce the likelihood of "black swan" events, rewriting building codes to mandate the support of autonomous capability in parking garages, and, of course, buying large fleets of autonomous vehicles for government use.

Auto Insurance: Fewer Accidents but Who Is Liable?

Gregory W. Locraft

Assignment of Insurance liability a key unknown. In a driver-less autonomous car world, the blame may potentially be placed on the auto manufacturer or perhaps the software provider; however, it is unlikely the owner of the autonomous vehicle would escape liability in an accident.

Insurance prices likely to decline due to lower accident frequency. P&C industry loss frequency has declined 22% over the past 30 years as cars have become safer. The autonomous car would be expected to utilize advanced technology to avoid crashes, thus saving on auto insurance claim payouts.

However, accident severity costs may continue to rise as car complexity rises. P&C accident loss severity (i.e., cost per accident) has risen 56% the last 30 years. The technological complexity of the autonomous car means that when accidents happen they could be much more costly to repair, driving insurance costs higher.

The autonomous car is unlikely to be the death knell for auto insurance. Auto insurance has evolved through significant new technology adoptions that were once thought to point to a world of lower insurance premiums, including seat belts, anti-lock braking, and air bags. While insurance will not deter autonomous car evolution, the multi-decade adoption for each of these innovations points to any material impact from the autonomous car on auto insurance being 20+ years away.

The $200 bn US auto insurance market is competitive and highly regulated. Auto insurance is the second biggest line of business (workers compensation is the first) and accounts for 38% of US premiums. The product is mandatory. If one wants to drive a car, one must be insured. Auto insurers are highly regulated at the state level in order to protect the interests of policyholders (i.e., drivers). Regulators review pricing and profitability, and have the power to seize control of companies that fail to meet minimum capital hurdles. The industry is fragmented, with many competitors, but the Top 5 garner 53% market share and include, in order, State Farm, Geico, Allstate, Progressive, and Farmers.

Assigning blame is a key unknown insurance consideration in a driver-less world. Core to an insurance claim is the designation of "fault" or blame for the damage. In a driver-less autonomous car world, blame may potentially be placed on the auto manufacturer or perhaps the software provider; however, it is unlikely the owner of the autonomous vehicle would escape liability in an accident.

The battle for assigning blame in autonomous cars accidents is likely to be waged in the courts. Our industry sources agree it is too early to assess auto insurance in a driver-less world. Robert Hartwig, president of the Insurance Information Institute, said at a recent Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) panel, "It's a legal morass right now, and unfortunately it will take court decisions to work this out."[1] At its May 16 investor day, Progressive executives discussed the adoption of future driver-assisted technologies such as automatic braking and lane assistance. They even discussed the eventual uptake of V2V and/or V2X systems. However, they refrained from discussing who would be responsible for the insured costs in the event of an autonomous car crash.

Insurance costs benefitting from a structural decline in auto accident frequency that should continue with the autonomous car: P&C industry loss frequency (i.e., number of accidents) has declined 22% over the past 30 years as cars have become safer (air bags, etc.). The autonomous car would be expected to use advanced technology to avoid crashes and eliminate some of the more common accident-inducing behaviors, such as tailgating, dozing off at the wheel, texting while driving, etc. In a perfect world, we would see a step-function improvement in the number of auto accidents as human drivers are removed from the equation.

Exhibit 44
Auto Frequency Down 22% over the Last 30 Years



Source: Progressive Investor Day presentation

Accident severity costs, however, should continue to rise as car complexity and medical costs rise: P&C accident loss severity (i.e., cost per accident) has risen 56% over the last 30 years. Key drivers of rising severity are medical inflation and higher-cost car repairs due to more valuable

[1] http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-02-06/self-driving-cars-more-jetsons-than-reality-for-google-designers.html

content within autos. The complexity of the autonomous car means that when accidents happen they will be more costly to repair, driving insurance costs higher.

Exhibit 45

Auto Severity +56% over the Last 30 Years



Source: Progressive Investor Day presentation, Best's Aggregates and Averages, Bureau of Labor Statistics, USDOT Federal Highway Administration, P&C Insurers Association of America

The autonomous car is unlikely to be the death knell for auto insurance. Auto insurance has evolved through decades of new technology adoptions that were once thought to point to a world of lower insurance premiums. Although accident frequency declined, the auto insurance industry adapted and grew as the desire for protection by owners amidst rising severity costs held firm. Advances in safety and their impact on auto insurance rates include:

1. **The seat belt:** The 20-year introduction of the seat belt saw insured rates increase by 20%.
2. **Anti-lock Braking Systems (ABS):** During the 30-year implementation of ABS (which are now standard in many automobiles), pricing actually increased by 38%.
3. **The air bag:** The 15-year adoption of the air bag corresponded to rate increases of 24%

Note: All rate increases are given on an inflation-adjusted basis.

Exhibit 46

Insurance Pricing Has Risen During Major Auto Safety Adoption Curves



Source: DOT, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Morgan Stanley Research

Insurance will not deter autonomous car adoption as early policies emerge in specialty markets in the next 10 years. As with other emerging technologies, specialty writers tend to initially dissect and price risk that is less homogenous and more unknown, as would be the case with the autonomous car (i.e., Lloyds of London). These carriers typically charge higher rates. In time, as loss experience emerges, competition enters the higher-priced/higher-return insurance segments and drives prices lower for end users. We have little doubt carriers will embrace the provision of insurance for autonomous cars and will be ready to adapt to whatever timeline the autonomous car industry follows.

A material impact from the autonomous car on auto insurance is 20+ years away. We believe the complexity of each of the previous innovations we mention pales in comparison to that of widespread autonomous car adoption, so any material impact in auto insurance is likely 20+ years away, at a minimum. Indeed, Progressive estimates a long timeline for adoption. They note that with other new auto technologies, such as ABS, airbags, or electronic stability control systems, full-scale adoption took up to 30 years, with 50%+ penetration achieved in 15-20 years.

Telecom Services: Ubiquitous LTE Coverage Is Essential

Simon Flannery
John Mark Warren, CFA

Today, carriers are working with manufacturers to enable connected cars. Though connected cars are a modest near-term revenue opportunity, in the long term they could represent ~$100 bn.

Autonomous driving would dramatically increase the role and importance of wireless networks.

- The drivers' network usage will rise. US drivers spend 75 billion hours in the car per year, and moving to autonomous driving would mean much of this time may be used to consume content.
- The cars themselves will continuously use the network. The interactions between autonomous cars and wireless networks will be near constant as the vehicles navigate the driving environment.

Traffic patterns will change the geography and timing of data consumption.

- Today, data consumption is concentrated in urban markets. Autonomous driving could expand the high data usage areas from urban to suburban and rural markets, following traffic patterns.
- Today, network usage rises through the day, peaking in the evening. Network utilization should rise in an autonomous driving environment, as usage during the morning and evening commutes grows significantly and adds to peak loading periods. Even the low-usage night-time hours provide an opportunity for OTA updates.

The volume and criticality of network usage will require additional investment.

- Coverage needs will grow in suburban and rural markets as cars demand uninterrupted network contact to navigate safely. Low-band spectrum is ideal, given its breadth of coverage per cell site.
- Capacity needs will grow in urban markets as the driver consumes more data. High-band spectrum is ideal, given its higher capacity.

Industry Implications: Another positive for towers, while carriers face opportunities and risks.

- Towers should benefit from the carrier capex requirements of a higher-capacity, broader coverage network, further adding to the potential duration of revenue growth for AMT, CCI, and SBAC.
- This could be a significant opportunity for carriers. These customers could have low churn (average life of car) and strong ARPU, though the network investments may be quite costly. T and VZ are advantaged, with network leadership and the best low-band spectrum. The broadcast auction is an opportunity for TMUS and S.

Autonomous Driving Will Dramatically Increase the Role and Importance of Wireless Networks

A strong and reliable wireless signal is increasingly becoming essential, as our daily lives grow more connected and the content we generate and consume becomes richer.

This could significantly change in an autonomous driving environment. The hours spent in a car go from largely unconnected to doubly connected, with both the driver and the car using the network.

Exhibit 47

Today's Vehicles Are Increasingly Connected

Source: Morgan Stanley Research

Drivers will have one hour of additional free time to surf each day. Today, the average American spends about an hour in a vehicle every day. The average vehicle carries 1.6 people and the non-driving passengers are likely already using mobile devices in the vehicle. However, an autonomous car will free up the driver's time, increasing potential in-car mobile usage by 167% as the driver will no longer need to be engaged in navigating the vehicle.

Cisco forecasts that mobile internet traffic will rise at a 68% CAGR through 2017, while internet video use will rise at a 29% rate over the same time period. Growth in data demand from autonomous vehicle usage may become a key contributor to continued mobile and internet video growth beyond 2017.

Exhibit 48

Mobile Data Driven by Video, Social, and Web



Source: Cisco Visual Network Index Forecast – 2013, Morgan Stanley Research

The car will continuously use the network. In order to safely navigate from point A to point B, the autonomous car will simultaneously communicate with all nearby other vehicles, traffic signals, overhead signs, and toll booths, get real-time updates on road conditions and traffic patterns, and constantly evaluate its surroundings to adapt to any unpredictable activity. This suggests the car will likely be in constant contact with the wireless network. Therefore, the network must have full coverage of all highways and roads, and high latency will be unacceptable.

Exhibit 49

Cars Will Communicate with Each Other and the Roads Infrastructure



Source: *V2X Cooperative Systems: What Is It All About?* by Steve Sprouffske, Manager, ITS Solutions and Presale Group

The FCC has allocated 75 Mhz of spectrum in the 5.9 GHz band for use by the transportation industry. This spectrum would be used for dedicated short-range communications (DSRC). The idea would be to have cars, traffic lights, road signs, and other elements communicating with each other. This would enable collision avoidance systems, cooperative cruise control, real time traffic management, and many other applications. Given the short range of 5.9 GHz spectrum, we could see backhaul via LTE networks.

Traffic Patterns Will Change the Geography and Timing of Data Consumption

The adoption of a connected and autonomous car will have implications for when and where data is consumed. From a geographic perspective, we would expect data usage to broaden from the urban environment toward suburban and rural markets. From a timing perspective, we would expect network utilization to rise as high usage broadens from the mid to late evening hours to the peak commuting hours.

Data consumption will broaden from urban markets. Today, usage is concentrated in urban markets, largely driven by population density. In an autonomous driving environment in which data is consumed on roads and highways by both the driver and vehicle, traffic patterns dictate that data usage will broaden from urban centers to suburban markets and rural areas.

Exhibit 50

High Data Usage Will Expand Beyond "NFL Cities"



Source: Morgan Stanley Research, fhwa.dot.gov

Network utilization should improve. Today, network usage is lower in the morning and grows steadily throughout the day, peaking in the late evening. Networks are largely built to accommodate peak usage, meaning there are significant periods of under-utilization, though some self-optimizing network capabilities are improving carriers' abilities to better balance peak and off-peak demands.

Exhibit 4

Today, Mobile Usage Peaks in the Late Evening



Source: Chart from blog.flurry.com, Morgan Stanley Research

An autonomous driving environment will likely change this usage pattern. Network usage will grow during high-commute times, such as rush hour in the mid-morning and early evening. This should lead to higher network optimization for carriers.

Even the early morning hours (midnight to 5am), when network usage is largely dormant, may be better utilized by the network as carriers can take advantage of these times to roll out over-the-air (OTA) software updates to the vehicle. We already see this occurring in the Tesla Model S.

Exhibit 51

It's "Back to the Future" for Mobile



Source: Morgan Stanley Research

The Volume and Criticality of Network Usage Will Require Additional Investment

To take advantage of the opportunities that autonomous vehicles may offer, carriers will need to significantly bolster their networks. Coverage needs will grow, as every highway and road will need to have uninterrupted, low-latency network coverage for vehicles to safely navigate. Capacity needs will grow, particularly in urban markets, where connected vehicles will drive data growth in already high-usage areas as both drivers and cars access the networks.

Exhibit 52

Carrier Partnerships Are Largely Focused on Telematics and Infotainment Today

Carrier	OEM	Capabilities	Timing
AT&T	GM	Diagnostics, infotainment, connectivity, security, navigation, etc.	Late 2014
	Tesla	Diagnostics, infotainment, connectivity, security, navigation, OTA updates, etc.	Current
	Nissan / Sirius XM	Diagnostics, infotainment, roadside support, etc.	Announced July '13
	Ford Focus Electric	Mobile network services, smartphone integration, etc.	Current
	Nissan Leaf	Mobile network services, smartphone integration, etc	Current
Sprint	Chrysler (certain models)	"Sprint Velocity" platform - Diagnostics, connectivity, infotainment, etc.	Current
T-Mobile	Audi	WiFi connectivity & navigation, etc.	Current
verizon	Mercedes (Hughes)	Concierge, navigation, security, etc.	Current
	VW (Hughes)	Concierge, security, diagnostics, etc.	Current
	On-Star	Concierge, etc.	Through Model Yr 2013

Source: Company Data
Listed capabilities may not be inclusive of all services provided.
Listed partnerships may not be inclusive all arrangements

Coverage needs will grow in suburban and rural markets. To enable autonomous driving, wireless networks will need to seamlessly cover every road and highway, significantly broadening the geography over which wireless networks must have uninterrupted coverage. This should increase the value of low-band spectrum, given the significantly lower cell site density required to achieve full coverage.

Data can travel significantly farther between cell sites when transmitted over low band spectrum (<850MHz) than over high-band spectrum (>2.3GHz), meaning that required cell site density is much lower.

Cell site density can be as much as 2x higher for high-band spectrum than for low-band spectrum. This, along with superior propagation characteristics of low-band spectrum, is why AT&T and Verizon have rolled out their initial LTE networks in low-band spectrum. In an autonomous driving environment, this attribute may become even more valuable as the economics of offering flawless coverage in low-density and rural areas could be difficult with high-band spectrum, given the capex needed.

Exhibit 53
Low Band Spectrum Requires Less Capex



Source: Company Data, Morgan Stanley Research

Bells' Have Low-Band Advantage, but Auction Offers a Reset. AT&T and Verizon hold the most low-band spectrum today, with 55MHz and 57MHz, respectively. However, the FCC plans to auction up to 120MHz of additional low-band spectrum currently occupied by television broadcasters in 2014. This offers an opportunity for all of the national carriers to potentially bolster their low-band spectrum position.

Exhibit 54
Low-Band Spectrum Up for Auction in 2014/2015



Source: Company Data, Morgan Stanley Research

Capacity needs will grow in urban markets. As network usage grows in urban markets from the addition of connected cars and drivers, carriers will need to ensure that they have sufficient network depth to accommodate even higher usage than today.

High-band spectrum that complements a low-band network will be ideally suited to handle this increased traffic, particularly if autonomous vehicles induce higher mobile video usage, which we would expect.

Today, most mobile video is consumed in static locations with WiFi. If drivers begin to consume mobile video in transit, carriers may want high-band spectrum to accommodate this usage and to complement the base layer of the network built in the low-band.

Exhibit 55
Big 4 Spectrum Holdings



Source: Company Data, Morgan Stanley Research estimates, not adjusted for AT&T's proposed purchase of LEAP or AT&T's 3Q13 purchase of 700MHz B-Block spectrum from VZ.

Industry Implications:

Towers—Positive. Current LTE network build plans at the Big 4 carriers will not be completed for several years, giving the towers good visibility into near-to-mid-term growth. An autonomous driving environment could provide a platform for further growth beyond current plans, as the increased network breadth required would lead to further investment by the carriers.

Carriers –Opportunities and Risks: In an autonomous driving environment, wireless networks would be even more important and valuable than they are today. We estimate the rise of autonomous vehicles could be a ~$100 bn opportunity for the carriers. Autonomous cars would represent very low churn, potentially high-ARPU connections, while existing customers would continue to increase their data usage.

Exhibit 56

Autonomous Vehicles May Be a $100B Opportunity

Total Addressable Market			
Estimated Vehicles			300 million
	x	Incremental usage (Driver + Car)	5 GB/Mo
	x	Revenue per GB	$5-$7
Annual Revenue Opportunity			$90B - $125B

Source: Morgan Stanley Research estimate

The revenue model is still uncertain. Given the limited number of fully connected cars with diagnostics, infotainment, security, navigation, etc. today, we do not yet know what structure carriers will ultimately use to monetize the car and driver's network usage. One example we have today is the Audi connect product, in which consumers purchase data based on a monthly service agreement.

We understand that the average usage runs about 1-2 GB per month, even on an HSPA network, with some users consuming 30 GB per month. A mobile hotspot can enable kids to use WiFi tablets on the go; one can see how backseat DVD systems may become a thing of the past.

Exhibit 57

Audi Owners Pay for Monthly Data Plans

Audi connect® Data Plans Update

Service Term	Retail Price	Monthly Equivalent	Savings
1 month	$30	$30	-
12 months	$324	$27	10%
24 months	$600	$25	17%
30 months	$450	$15	50%

Source: Company Data, Morgan Stanley Research

Alternatively, the Tesla Model S does not have a monthly fee for the car owner, though buyers must pay $3,500 for the tech package, which includes GPS navigation and other features. Ultimately, there may be two revenue streams for carriers. One may be a wholesale arrangement with the automobile manufacturer for the vehicle's navigation and diagnostic services and ultimately its autonomous driving usage, while the carrier may deal directly with the consumer for infotainment services.

AT&T and Verizon have an early advantage given their data-centric pricing, leading national networks and strong spectrum holdings, particularly low-band, which is in short supply. That said, T-Mobile and Sprint are aggressively building out their networks and may be able to improve their low-band spectrum position via the broadcaster incentive auction expected next year.

This opportunity brings significant risk, as the increased investment in capex and spectrum required to make this technology viable may pressure cash flows, and it is not clear how many carriers will be able to participate in the opportunity at scale.

MORGAN STANLEY BLUE PAPER

Autonomous Vehicles

The New Auto Industry Revenue Model

- **Lessons from the Technology Hardware Industry**
- **Global Auto Company Implications**

Exhibit 58

The Future Structure of the Automotive Industry?



Source: Company Data, Morgan Stanley Research

The New Auto Industry Revenue Model

We believe autonomous cars will drive a paradigm shift in the traditional auto industry. We see the emergence of software as a key part of the "value" of the car, dividing the auto industry into "hardware" specialists, "software" specialists, and integrated "experience" providers. This is analogous to the PC hardware or smartphone industries.

This could be a binary event for many players. Some could see an existential threat from autonomous cars, some could reinvent themselves as leaders, and others could enter the industry for the first time.

There are implications for OEMs and suppliers. The traditional OEMs need to lead in the space or reinvent themselves as manufacturing specialists. The secular suppliers who provide autonomous vehicle systems and other growing parts of the car will get stronger, while suppliers who are exposed to static or no longer essential parts of the car will be challenged.

The content opportunity opens up a new potential revenue stream. The battle to control the content will be waged by the OEMs, the ,suppliers and the external content providers.

There are significant collateral implications for other sectors. We examine the read-across to the auto space from the PC hardware industry, Google's ambitions and the implications for media, software, car rental, healthcare, transportation, and the semiconductor spaces.

The move to autonomous vehicles is likely to bring significant social and economic consequences for the broad economy and even society in general. The investment implications are likely to be even greater. The advent of the autonomous car is likely to have investment implications for telecom, infrastructure, insurance, IT services, technology hardware, software, and, of course, autos.

A New Revenue Model for the Auto Industry

It may be easy to conclude that the reinvention of the automobile as autonomous will be a watershed event for the auto industry and that the automobile—which at one point in the last decade seemed destined to become insignificant—will play a new, important role in society. This should be significantly positive for the automotive OEMs and suppliers.

Not quite.

We see the emergence of autonomous cars as a binary event for the auto industry. Some players will face an existential threat from autonomous cars, some will reinvent themselves as leaders, and others will enter the industry for the first time.

The Battle for Content

Most of the attention surrounding autonomous cars so far has focused on the potential social and macroeconomic gains they represent. Autonomous cars seem to be all about making the world a better place. However, we do not believe that the social/practical gains necessarily will be the primary driver of the pursuit of autonomous vehicle penetration.

Social gains may be a good way to get some parties (like the government, insurance companies, and the general public) on board, but rarely pay the bills. The government might be able to use the social economic savings (Part 6) to justify spending significant resources building some level of infrastructure support and writing legislation that supports implementation. However, autonomous vehicles will need to deliver real economic returns to the companies and entities involved to be able to gain real traction.

On the business side of things, the various players within and outside the auto industry are expected to spend several billions of dollars on autonomous vehicle development over the next decade, without any guarantee that the customer is able and willing to pay for it. We have seen this with other penetration stories in the group—the OEMs typically tend to push back against fuel efficiency or safety or emissions legislation, until it is clear how they can monetize it.

We see are two primary reasons why the OEMs may be championing a push toward autonomous cars:

1. **Keeping up with the cutting edge of innovation**. In addition to the social benefits, this is the main reason we hear from the OEMs and suppliers for pursuing this opportunity. With even basic active safety systems and advanced infotainment systems—two areas where the luxury OEMs used to distinguish themselves—spreading to the mass market OEMs, the luxury OEMs need to move on to the next frontier, which they believe is cars the drive themselves.
   The existing auto players also, quite rightly, view this as one of the biggest steps up in the functionality of the automobile, significantly greater than higher fuel efficiency or infotainment. Once customers have experienced autonomous cars and have heard the positive word-of-mouth, the OEMs believe the demand-

pull for the feature is going to be very strong. And self-driving capability is not an LED daytime running light that can be slapped on the car in a hurry. Given the nature of the product—high levels of experience / knowledge required with extremely long lead times and very high level of R&D involved—if an OEM reacts and tries to get on the bandwagon *after* demand spikes, it may be too late.

2. **More importantly, we believe the real value here comes from selling content to the occupants of the car.** The emergence of the autonomous vehicle opens up a new avenue of revenue generation for all entities involved. As mentioned in Parts 1 and 4, we collectively spend over 75 bn hours per year in our cars. With the ability of the car to drive itself, that time can now be redirected to other pursuits, potentially creating a new revenue stream if the content can be monetized. In a way, this is a content provider's dream. Short of air travel, there are few other opportunities to have a captive audience for several hours at a time**.**

   However, to make this happen it is critical that the car be fully autonomous. It is not practical to have to keep pausing a movie every couple of minutes to manually take over the car and make a lane change. We believe this may be why some players are attempting to go straight for the ultimate goal of completely autonomous cars, bypassing the incremental stages.

The New Auto Industry Paradigm

Autonomous driving capability is not just a cool new feature in the car, but rather a powerful force that can fundamentally change the auto industry.

We see two paradigm shifts in the industry.

1. Shifting the "value" of the car away from predominantly hardware to a software component as well, thereby allowing new players to enter and forcing existing players to reinvent themselves or cede share. This could potentially allow OEMs to shift away from a vertically integrated, asset heavy business model, thereby changing the profitability structure of the industry

2. Introducing a new revenue model by being able to monetize the content opportunity within the car.

In short , we see the industry structure going the way of the PC/smartphone industry.

The value in the auto industry today is about the car as a holistic product. The OEM is the most important link in the supply chain as the biggest single contributor of content, which is why the OEMs have the most visible brands in the industry as well. The other parts of the value chain tend to be incidental to the automotive experience and do not usually have branding power.

In a world of autonomous vehicles, we see the value in the auto industry coming from three different sources.

- **Hardware**: We define hardware as the car as we know it today, i.e. the powertrain, unibody, exterior panels, interior, lighting, seats, etc. Today, we estimate about 90% of the value of the car to the customer comes from the hardware. We see that falling to about 40% in an autonomous car environment.

- **Software**: We believe autonomous cars will need use an all-encompassing software operating system unlike cars of today. These operating systems will control and monitor every function of the car from the powertrain to the infotainment system, human machine interface and of course autonomous functionality—effectively replacing the human driver in the car. Today, we estimate that about 10% of the value of the car comes from the software. We see that rising to about 40% in an autonomous car environment.

- **Content**: We see the emergence of in-house OEM and third party-created content for use in autonomous vehicles, including for entertainment, productivity, and functionality. This content could come in the form of audio, video, or apps, or in other forms. Today, very little value of the car to the customer comes from the media content—we see that increasing to about 20% in an autonomous car environment.

Exhibit 59

Value of the Car – Today vs. Tomorrow



Source: Morgan Stanley Research

The traditional OEM-supplier auto industry business model is also likely to change, with some companies trying to specialize in each of the three functions we describe, and with others trying to vertically integrate across the spectrum. This is likely to mirror the PC/smartphone industry, with hardware specialists, software specialists, and integrated experience creators.

The “hardware” business model

We believe the current auto industry structure can remain largely in place with OEMs and suppliers making great cars. Even if cars were to drive themselves–or perhaps even more so because of it–cars will have to remain safe, comfortable, quick, connected, quiet, and stylish. The OEMs will continue to be the most influential players in the industry through their design, assembly, distribution, marketing and service capabilities. The suppliers can continue to add value and build sustainable business models by focusing on the growth areas of fuel efficiency, safety, emissions, and interior content. However, the gap between the secular and cyclical suppliers could widen. With the value of the automotive hardware declining as part of the overall value provided by the autonomous car, only the most critical hardware components within the car can continue to command pricing power. The “metal-benders” and “widget makers,” who are already facing significant challenges within the industry, will particularly suffer if the value of the hardware as a whole declines.

The stability of the hardware business model, however, does not mean that there will not be major changes. As cars evolve from what they are today to fully autonomous vehicles in our utopian scenario, we envision several changes in the form and function of the various parts of the car, as we highlight in Part 1. Suppliers who make components that serve little to no function in an autonomous car will be particularly at risk.

The “software” business model

The average car today contains a reasonable amount of software—about 5-10 million lines of code. The software in a car today typically regulates independent functions of a car, including drive-by-wire, traction management, active safety and infotainment. However, these systems act largely as independent silos today, with only a few “handshakes” or exchanges between components. The autonomous car of the future cannot work like this. All the systems in an autonomous car will need to be brought together within a central managing “brain” that can supervise and control almost every function of the car at all times. The level of system monitoring in an autonomous car is *significantly* higher than that of a regular car, given the fact that the main controlling factor of a regular car—the driver—is absent in an autonomous vehicle. The autonomous vehicle also cannot risk different sets of code written by different suppliers of each component.

In effect, the central controller/operating system will be replacing the human driver as the primary operator of the vehicle. In an autonomous car, the car needs to know what every function and feature within the vehicle is doing at all times because the car is in charge and has to make decisions based on operating conditions. This means virtually very function of the car will now have a software component to it. In addition, every function within the car will now need to be supervised and controlled by the central computer, which runs an “operating system” similar to a personal computer, within with each of the different functions of the car reside. Unlike cars of today, with independent functions, the central controller/operating system (analogous to the domain controller that we described in part 2) will control all the other functions of the car. We envision the autonomous driving “brain” as being the most important part of this central controller/operating system.

We expect players within the auto industry to specialize in this newly important software component—i.e., to build operating systems for cars. These could be existing auto OEMs, auto suppliers or quite possibly players from outside the industry, such as Google, Apple, Microsoft, or other companies with computer operating system expertise. We see the automotive software/operating industry as being parallel to the hardware industry, where suppliers sell and install their operating systems into cars made by different automakers, in much the same manner as PCs today ship with options of different operating systems. These operating systems will then interact with the hardware components installed in the vehicle using industry standard communication protocols (similar to how a certain make of computer can work with a printer or keyboard of another make).

Exhibit 60

Current System Architecture vs. Autonomous Vehicle System Architecture



Source: Morgan Stanley Research

The "Experience" creator. In addition to the software business model that revolves around the operating system for the car, we also an emerging content opportunity. One of the key objectives of getting cars to drive themselves is so that the occupants of the car, including the driver, can be freed up to sell them content. This allows several content creators who have only had limited access to the car until now, through infotainment systems such as internet radio, to make full inroads into the car. Most content is not car-specific (YouTube, Netflix, blogs, news, TV, social media, etc.) that is developed for smartphones can be piped into the car as well, with little incremental change. This does not mean that YouTube and Netflix will now have an automotive division and will become players in the auto industry. This does mean that these companies will be able to gain access to a new revenue stream, in addition to smartphones and computers.

We do not believe that the traditional auto industry players will be locked out of the content opportunity or that the hardware and the software business models are mutually exclusive, however. We see some existing industry players trying to offer a comprehensive solution, including hardware, software and content, to give customers the most cohesive, integrated experience possible. For example; an auto OEM will make its own car, powered by its own proprietary operating system developed in-house or in close relation with a supplier. It will also control the content available within its cars. This is closest to the Apple model for smartphones and desktop computers. We see this as being limited to the most advanced and successful OEMs, the ones with powerful brands, large balance sheets, and extensive R&D resources that will allow them to venture into areas they will have little expertise in, especially on the software/content side.

But why do this? Why not let the software/content be handled by those outside of the traditional auto industry who know it best? We do think outsourcing the software will still be the most common business model, but the few OEMs who want the best experience for the customers will at least attempt to vertically integrate, for two reasons;

1. ***The value/importance of the software/content component:*** the OEMs so far have stayed out of software largely because it has been a relatively small part of the value of the car and has been restricted to components typically purchased from suppliers. This will no longer be the case with autonomous cars, with the software+content angle accounting for 60% of the value of the car, in our view. In addition, selling the software/autonomous capability to other, less vertically integrated automakers as well as monetizing the content opportunity within the car are two new revenue streams that the OEM may be unwilling to ignore.

2. ***The temptation of replicating Apple' success with smartphones.*** Apple's success as a design-focused company that controls every part of the hardware, software, and content in its products, and its ability to translate that into better products, quality, and pricing should be the goal of every automaker, in an industry where pricing and uniqueness have been hard to come by, despite high transaction prices.

This may not be as farfetched as it sounds. With many OEMs already developing in-house autonomous vehicle capability, as well as infotainment system development, their software capabilities may already be much farther along than most people give them credit for. For example; GM recently decided to stop outsourcing all its IT development and is hiring 10,000 computer professionals in the next three to five years, to bring ~90% of all its capability in house.

The OEMs are also not strangers to the content business, either. Recall that many OEMs already have smartphone apps available that allow basic car functions to be controlled via smartphone. In the past few years, both BMW and Audi have commissioned independent filmmakers to direct indie/art movies that feature their cars as part of marketing campaign, and both OEMs have internal TV channels as part of their corporate/dealer network.

While we do not expect an OEM to emulate Netflix and commission a top Hollywood director to develop a TV series for their vehicles only, we point out that this is not impossible. We think it is more likely that certain OEMs team up with media partners to allow exclusive availability of content on their vehicles (especially in the case of multi-brand conglomerates like VW or GM), and generally act as gatekeepers for what goes into their vehicles.

What does this mean for:

OEMs. The OEMs will have a range of choices as to how vertically integrated they want their cars to be. They can make fully integrated vehicles by designing, developing, and assembling the body and the operating system (including the autonomous capability), and controlling the content available in the car. The other extreme would be an extremely asset-light, completely outsourced model, in which the OEM sells a car under its brand and distribution network but, apart from designing the vehicle in its studios, every other component is outsourced. This would include sourcing the engine, transmission, battery, and other interior/exterior components from other OEMs or suppliers; using software and autonomous capability developed by other OEMs, suppliers, or third parties, and outsourcing assembly (such as Magna Steyr) and maybe even distribution (such as a third-party distribution arrangement like Penske-Smart).

While the OEMs could certainly adopt a business model that looks like something in between these two extremes, over time we see the industry coalescing at one or the other end of the vertical integration spectrum. In the early years, we expect the OEMs that to date have not been early leaders in the development of autonomous vehicle systems to be "hardware specialists" and design, develop, and build the cars themselves, but purchase the software from outside suppliers. Those OEMs who have been autonomous vehicle leaders from the start are likely to pursue full vertically integration as soon as possible, in our view.

The three OEM business models:

The business models will be quite different at either end, of course. The fully integrated OEMs will have massive upfront fixed costs for R&D but will also likely have the strongest brands, margins, and ROIC, given the value of the automobile that they control. The "hardware specialist" business model will likely come down to a cost model determined by how cheaply a car can be designed and built, while keeping capacity utilization at the highest possible levels in order to generate adequate returns after outsourcing 60% of the value of the car from external entities. This is a likely business model for brands that are not strong or operate mostly in emerging markets. The fully outsourced business model would be basically a brand-licensing model, where an OEM with a strong brand and design capabilities would choose an extremely asset -light model which can be relatively easily monetized even with outsourcing everything.

Suppliers. When we first started thinking about autonomous vehicles, we had expected that the OEMs and companies outside the traditional auto industry (like Google) would be most successful and the existing auto suppliers would be the most severely challenged. This was driven by our view of a shift in the value generated by the different components of the car vs. today, and the relative exposure of the suppliers today.

While we remain convinced the shift in value will occur, our conclusion about winners and losers could not be more different than our initial view. We see autonomous vehicles as being highly beneficial to auto suppliers and believe certain suppliers will see tremendous value creation from being early leaders in the space. These suppliers are likely to enjoy an extremely close relationship with the OEMs and will be involved in the design and development of a vehicle at an even earlier stage than they are today. This will be especially true if the supplier is a conglomerate that is also a leader in other parts of the car that will see rapid content growth, such as fuel economy/electrification, active safety, and comfort/convenience (the latter two being closely tied to autonomous vehicle capability).

The less vertically integrated the OEM chooses to be, the greater will be the value accrued to the suppliers—and we expect to see a significantly higher level of outsourcing over time. We could also see the emergence of a new breed of suppliers that specializes in low-cost manufacturing (like a Foxconn for smartphones). Finally, we expect to see value erode at existing suppliers of components that will be less important or relevant in the car (exhausts, drivetrains, tires, or any component that is not highly engineered).

External entities. External entities could come into the auto industry in three ways: 1) Software—through development of proprietary autonomous vehicle systems (Google, Mobileye, start-ups, etc.), 2) Software—through supplying content for in-car consumption (YouTube, Netflix, social media); and 3) Hardware—suppliers of new components related to autonomous capability or low-cost assemblers taking advantage of the new outsourcing business model.

Entering the automobile will be seen as a game-changing event for the companies that are from outside the industry—in both good and bad ways. The positive perspective is that the automobile is the most expensive item purchased by an individual after his home, and the place where he spends the most free time, after his home. The automobile is also the last place that neither traditional nor new media have significantly penetrated. We still hear protests from some people about the death of the car radio as internet radio takes hold in infotainment systems. This could accrue tremendous value to entities that can sell content to the consumers within the automobile.

The downside is that the global auto industry is one of the most cyclical, price-sensitive industries in the world, with significant overcapacity and inefficiencies, and a powerful supply/value-chain. Exposing the likes of Google and Silicon Valley start-ups to annual contractual price-downs and supplier support payments likely will be seen in a dim light by shareholders of those companies. The learning curve will be steep, however; given the tremendous value that these entities are likely to generate and the software-centric nature of their products, they should be relatively insulated from the worst tendencies of the industry.

Lessons from the Technology Hardware Industry

Katy Huberty
Scott Schmitz

We see three primary lessons from prior technology cycles that apply to potential changes in the auto industry during the development of autonomous vehicles:

1) Value-added services that cause most of the disruption are preceded by periods of infrastructure investment.

2) Closed systems are often more successful in early product development, but open systems eventually lower costs and gain more market share, albeit at lower profitability levels.

3) Controlling the platform is the key to long-term success. Operating system software and key semiconductor components are among the few areas of competitive edge, while OEM competition and lack of differentiation pressures margins.

Starting with mainframes in the 1960s, technology cycles last roughly 10 years and start with an infrastructure build-out followed by value-added services that lead to major changes in user behavior. Each cycle brings new winners, improved functionality/interfaces, lower prices, and expanded services, leading to a ten-fold increase in the number of devices.

We are in the early days of the next computing cycle—the "Internet of Things"—in which sensors embedded in everything from mobile devices to stores and automobiles will change the way consumers interact with their environment. We view the autonomous car as an extension of this trend, contributing to a ten-fold increase in the number of devices (in this case cars) that communicate with one another through sensor technology, including Bluetooth, GPS, and WiFi. The first step in this process is the connected car—where 3G/4G connectivity powers infotainment systems, leading all the way up to autonomous cars.

Key lessons from prior technology cycles

Infrastructure comes first, followed by value-added services that change user behavior

Technology cycles follow a logical growth pattern that begins with infrastructure development, evolves with software and services, and ultimately causes the major disruption. For example, the Mobile Internet cycle required ubiquitous wireless connectivity, which was followed by the rapid growth of mobile phones, use of applications, and broad changes in computing behavior.

Exhibit 61

Technology Cycles over the Past 50 Years



Source: Morgan Stanley Research

Exhibit 62

Autonomous Vehicles Require Significant Infrastructure Investments before Disruption from Valued-added Services Change User Behavior



Source: Thomson Reuters, Morgan Stanley Research

The advancement of wireless speeds, improved smartphone functionality, and value-added services led to an explosion in the number of devices. Consistent with prior technology cycles, the mobile internet cycle is driving a 10x increase in the number of computing devices compared to the desktop internet era. Since the introduction of the first iPhone in 2007, smartphones grew at a 42% CAGR, reaching 723M units in 2012.

Exhibit 63

Each Successive Computing Cycle Has Yielded 10x More Cumulative Devices



Source: ITU, Morgan Stanley Research

Closed systems launch new industries, but open systems eventually lower costs and gain more market share, albeit at lower profitability levels

Some of the most successful technology innovation cycles occur when a single person or company has full control of all aspects of product development (hardware and software) in order to best complete the vision. We refer to this as the closed approach, which is common in the early stages of new product cycles. Apple and AOL are some of the most well-known examples of a closed approach during the early stages of the personal computer, desktop Internet, and mobile Internet cycles. However, as the initial vision materializes, standards are set that typically lead to lower cost and broader adoption. Microsoft proved this with Windows, and Google is beginning to prove it with Android in smartphones and tablets. However, closed system participants do not necessarily lose value in later stages, they simply grow at slower rates because they demand higher prices.

The closed approach is often required in the early stages of a new product category, given the lack of standards and uncertain market adoption that may require constant changes to the product. The closed approach limits market share, but allows for premium pricing and higher profitability (Apple). The closed approach typically yields a better user experience but reduced economies of scale as building each component internally raises costs.

Exhibit 64

Apple's Closed System Led to the Early Success of the Personal Computer, but as Standards Evolved Open Systems Dominated the Market



Source: Reuters, Morgan Stanley Research

Auto industry—closed vs. open approach

The traditional auto industry is fiercely protective of its technologies, patents, engineering, and production techniques. While cooperation between OEMs currently exists, it is relatively limited, rarely successful, and comes either in the form of one OEM buying a complete powertrain or vehicle platform from another or joint technology development from scratch (GM and Ford on six- and nine-speed transmissions, for example). Neither sort of cooperation applies in the case of true open source. There are rare cases of open source in today's auto industry from independent design studios—a good example is legendary designer Gordon Murray's T-27 and T-25 city cars.

With the emergence of autonomous vehicles, however, the auto industry may have to start embracing an open source world. This would be particularly true if certain suppliers adopt a business model of offering up their autonomous vehicle systems for free, in exchange for supplying the hardware or controlling in-car content. Eventually, if the hardware of a car becomes so commoditized that most of the car's value comes from the software, even the hardware could become open source, especially in emerging markets. At the end of the day, however, there is a relatively low limit to how open source a vehicle can be given the unacceptably high risk of failure and security concerns.

Exhibit 65

Apple's Innovation Also Changed the Smartphone Industry, but Fast Followers and Open Solutions Drove Down Costs and Gained Market Share



Source: IDC, Morgan Stanley Research

Exhibit 66

Open Systems Account for 80% of the Market, but Apple Still Leads Profitability and Valuation



Source Thomson Reuters, Morgan Stanley Research

Apple's market share peaked at 19% in 2012, before falling slightly in 2013 as low-cost Android-based units quickly flooded the market with wide OEM distribution. However, Apple still commands a premium for its more fluid user experience, helped by its tight control of the hardware and software functionality. Additionally, Apple's installed based, with over 575 million credit card-linked accounts and portfolio of music, photos, and videos that easily tether to Apple devices, makes Apple's platform very sticky. Apple's premium solutions continue to yield margins significantly above the industry average. Despite accounting for only 19% of the smartphone units in 2012, Apple generated more than twice the operating profit of the next five largest players who control 48% of the market.

Exhibit 67

Apple Has Less than Half the Revenue and Market Share of the Smartphone Market, but Earns >2x the Profit and Is Twice as Valuable

2012	Apple	Next 5 Largest Players	Apple Delta
Revenue ($bn)	85	165	-0.5x
Unit Market Share	19%	48%	-0.6x
OP ($bn)	37	16	1.3x
OPM (%)	43%	10%	3.4x
Market Cap ($bn)	456	219	1.1x

Source: Reuters, Company data, Morgan Stanley Research

A similar trend is playing out in tablets, with Apple accounting for half the industry revenue but only 33% market share vs. nearly 100% in early 2010.

Operating System Software and Key Semiconductor Components Among the Few Areas of Differentiation in the PC Food Chain

High market share and control of the primary functionality of a PC have helped Microsoft and Intel consistently draw value from the PC supply chain. The fragmented market for most other components as well as a large variety of PC brands pressures pricing and profitability. Most PCs contain the same components (WinTel architecture), leading to a lack of differentiation, commoditized pricing and elongating life spans.

Exhibit 68

CPU and OS Account for Nearly Half of the PC Bill of Materials with the Highest Profitability Levels

Notebook	US$	% of BOM	Approx. GM%
CPU & Chipset	150	31%	60%
OS	60	13%	75%
Assembly (MVA)	45	9%	10%
Panel/Display	41	9%	-2%
HDD	40	8%	28%
Connectors, IC, and others	38	8%	40%
Battery	28	6%	10%
Casing	20	4%	10%
Power adaptor	12	3%	20%
PCB	12	3%	10%
Memory	8	2%	15%
WiFi/Bluetooth	7	1%	50%
Keyboard, Camera, Speaker, Oth	19	4%	15%
Total	**480**	**100%**	

Source: Source: Gartner, IDC, Morgan Stanley Research

Most of the profit sits with the software providers. Software providers not only benefit from high margins, but also have lower capital intensity, yielding ROICs well above most other suppliers.

Exhibit 69

OEMs Extract Little Value from PCs Compared to Key Suppliers



Source: Company data, Morgan Stanley Research

New computing devices in the form of tablets and smartphones are further pressuring the PC industry. As the user experience matures and product differentiation narrows, less emphasis is placed on the individual components and more on the price. By removing the driver control, a vehicle's performance becomes slightly less relevant, which could pressure the hardware OEMs' ability to differentiate. Users generally do not care who makes the processor in their PC, tablet, or smartphone, and similarly "passengers" may not care who makes the "processor" in their car.

Exhibit 70

PC Margins Pressured as Lack of Product Differentiation and Alternative Computing Platforms Forces Aggressive Price Competition



Note: for HP, only PC segment is included
Source: Company data, Morgan Stanley Research

Global Auto Company Implications

Auto OEMs

The biggest impact within the auto industry from the move to autonomous cars is arguably going to be on the OEMs. The OEMs that have the most reliable and feature-rich autonomous capabilities in their cars are likely to be the ones that succeed, while the ones that do not will either be forced out of business or will have to reinvent their business models to be "hardware only" / assemblers while buying the autonomous systems from other OEMs/suppliers/third party players. We believe this could really be existential for the OEMs—at least, once we get to a world where autonomous capability is so widespread that non-autonomous cars are no longer allowed on roads.

Getting a head start is critical. As we have outlined earlier in this Blue Paper, the technology to enable full autonomous driving capability is not really a hurdle apart from bringing it somewhat down the cost curve. However, there is a significant amount of development work still needed, particularly in the areas of reliability and scenario testing. This is something that can only be gained with experience—namely racking up millions of test miles on prototypes in controlled test and real world scenarios. This could take several years to complete and there is no short cut to this.

In this setup, getting a head start on the testing and development is critical. While it may tempting to wait until the path forward is a little clearer in a few years, we believe that a late entrant into the space will find playing catch-up either very expensive or nearly impossible, if they are caught 5-7 development years behind some competitors. It is true that the OEMs may be reluctant to repeat their recent experience of the electric vehicle arms race, when gas prices were rising sharply before the economic downturn, only to reward the OEMs with weak demand, little technological progress, and underutilized battery capacity in recent years. However, we believe autonomous vehicles arguably have a clearer path ahead than EVs, making them a smaller leap of faith.

The early movers will likely be the most successful. Fortunately, the race to be the early leader in the OEM race is intense. Almost every major OEM has at least expressed interest in the field of autonomous vehicles, if not committed significant R&D resources behind the project.

The German luxury OEMs are typically amongst the leaders in innovation when it comes to most major technologies that have debuted in the auto industry, at least in the past 50 years. Autonomous vehicles are no different. Audi, Mercedes Benz, and BMW each have running prototypes of autonomous vehicles on the road, with firm plans/targets of commercial roll-out. All three have been leaders in implementation of active safety—the precursor to autonomous driving—over the past several years, and the rest of the industry is in the process of catching up. In the meantime, the German OEMs have their sights set on full autonomous capability.

Audi was one of the first OEMs to obtain a license for an autonomous vehicle for its driverless A7 prototype in the state of Nevada. Its TT Pikes Peak prototype tackled the grueling and incredibly treacherous Pikes Peak Hill Climb challenge in 2010, without a driver at the wheel. Audi parent Volkswagen's recent autonomous vehicle initiatives go back even further. The winner of the 2007 DARPA challenge was Stanley, a VW Touareg retrofitted with driverless capability in collaboration with Stanford University.

Mercedes-Benz, however, will become the first OEM to commercialize semi-autonomous driving. Its 2015 S-Class will be able to autonomously navigate slow speed traffic jam situations as well as high-speed highway cruising (up to 124 mph). Mercedes-Benz also recently demonstrated its completely autonomous S500 Intelligent Drive vehicle, which covered the 60-mile journey between Mannheim and Pforzheim in Germany—replicating the route driven by the first automobile made by Karl Benz 125 years ago. We note that almost all the hardware used by the S500 Intelligent Drive is already production-based.

BMW demonstrated its ConnectedDrive Connect (CDC) system on a 5-Series in 2012 and engineers have racked up several thousand test miles on autonomous cars already. While BMW says that the technology is about 10-15 years away from commercial production, it continues to work with suppliers like Continental to further develop the system.

Volvo is trying to make sure that the early lead in the autonomous car field is not exclusively German. The upcoming 2015 XC90 is expected to come equipped with a traffic jam and highway cruise assistant. Volvo has also demonstrated a self-parking car and is a participant in the SARTRE autonomous road train project in Europe.

General Motors' autonomous car history goes back several decades, with some of the earliest self-driving prototypes developed in the 1940-60s. GM has not fallen behind the Germans since then, either. Cadillac will debut its Super Cruise feature around 2016, which can drive at highway speeds and take corners. This ability would make it one of the most advanced early autonomous systems on the road.

Ford was the first mass OEM to offer hands-free parking in its cars, as early as five years ago. Since then, it has taken somewhat of a back seat, so to speak, in the development of fully autonomous cars compared to some peers, at least in the public domain. However, in early October 2013 Ford demonstrated self-parking and obstacle avoidance technologies in new prototypes. Earlier this year, Ford Chairman Bill Ford, Jr., stated at a conference that self-driving cars will soon become reality.

Toyota was the first OEM to commercialize hands-free parking back in 2007 with the Lexus LS and continues down that path with a small fleet of autonomous prototypes, including a Lexus LS and RX450h. In October 2013, Toyota announced it had developed an advanced, next-gen driving support system for highway (including car-only highway) driving that uses automated driving technologies. The system is called Automated Highway Driving Assist, or AHDA. AHDA goes beyond technology currently on the market, such as adaptive cruise control based on, e.g., cameras and millimeter-radar, to provide an advanced technology package that supports drivers by, for instance, wirelessly communicating with vehicles traveling ahead. It plans to commercialize AHDA by around the mid-2010s.

Nissan, much like it did with its EV strategy, appears to have the most concrete and aggressive autonomous vehicle rollout plan. Despite being off to a relatively slow start, Nissan not only has a prototype of an autonomous Nissan Leaf on the road but has also announced a target to deliver the first "commercially viable self-driving system" by 2020, across several models in its lineup—and at a "realistic price". While the details on what exactly this means are unclear, Nissan is one of the only OEMs to set a clear timetable for commercial introduction of autonomous vehicles.

Honda also unveiled a self-driving car based on the Accord Hybrid at the ITS World Congress in October. The car utilizes Honda's unique technology developed in its humanoid robot, ASIMO, a well-known "face" in Japan. ASIMO analyzes the movements of people in its vicinity, and this technology has been adapted to vehicles. It tracks the movements of pedestrians (e.g., judges whether they are attempting to cross the road or not) and provides feedback to the driver, and also uses the information to control the vehicle and avoid collisions. While it apparently does not currently have a fully independent driverless car such as that pursued by Google, it is engaged in advanced research.

Beyond the J3, we also focus on **Fuji Heavy Industries** (Subaru), for its highly developed technology in adaptive cruise control, a fundamental technology in self-driving systems. Over the last 24 years, FHI has developed driving-assist systems that use stereo cameras. Its adaptive cruise control system, known as EyeSight, is very popular in Japan, and models featuring EyeSight now make up around 80% of FHI's domestic sales. When the US-based IIHS (Insurance Institute for Highway Safety) recently tested front-crash prevention systems for the first time, the EyeSight-equipped Legacy/Outback received the highest ratings among the 74 models tested. At the recent ITS World Congress, FHI exhibited an EyeSight vehicle also fitted with its cooperative driving assistance system, which features inter-vehicle and pedestrian-to-vehicle communications systems.

While these OEMs appear to be the early movers in the autonomous vehicle space, several others, including Fiat, PSA, the small Japanese OEMs and other emerging market OEMs continue to either adopt a wait-and-watch attitude or do not have this on their radars for the time being. There currently are about 25 major global OEMs ex-China and about another 100 or so in China. With the leap to autonomous technology looming over the next decade, we are not sure everyone can (and should) make it.

In the end, it comes down to balance sheets and priorities. OEMs that are dealing with severe macro declines in their home markets and are barely able to keep their regular product line-up profitable appear unlikely to be able to invest significant resources on what is still regarded in many circles as a fantasy, especially when there are many other calls on their cash, including investing in fuel efficiency, safety and infotainment technology, developing common platforms, and EM growth. As we concluded in a prior Blue Paper on global auto scenarios in 2022, the OEMs with the biggest balance sheets are likely to be the long-term success stories, while the smallest ones are likely to face existential threats over time.

In our view the "haves and have-nots" will evolve such that the early start and the heavy investment made by the "haves" will lead them eventually to become "experience" makers and licensees of their autonomous technologies.

The have-nots, on the other hand, could either go away or become "hardware specialists/assemblers" who license the autonomous system from other OEMs/suppliers.

Auto Suppliers

We see suppliers fulfilling two roles within the autonomous vehicle space.

1. Being a Tier-1 supplier working with the OEMs on their autonomous systems by providing technology, software and expertise

2. Independently developing their own autonomous vehicle systems to license to OEMs who are lagging behind the leaders and need to bring the technology to market quickly.

Irrespective of the role, the diversified electronics and active safety suppliers have the best chance of being the long-term winners here. Companies that are already well down the path to developing fully autonomous driver assistance systems in conjunction with the OEMs include Delphi, Continental, TRW, Denso and Autoliv. These companies are active safety suppliers who already make the cameras, radar, sensors, and mechatronic units which will enable the autonomous car to "see" and drive itself. The suppliers who also do infotainment/telematics/connectivity in addition to active safety (Delphi, Continental, Denso) have an additional leg up with being able to develop the HMI and content delivery systems.

Continental has perhaps been the most vocal supplier when it comes to autonomous cars. The company's booth at the 2013 Frankfurt auto show was centered around the concept and Continental announced partnerships with Google and IBM for further development. This is not a new venture for Continental—it also has a partnership with BMW to get autonomous vehicles on the road by 2025. Continental has also put interim stakes in the ground with a goal of having "partially automated" cars on the road by 2016 and "highly automated" cars by 2020. Continental also has a license to operate its autonomous vehicle in the state of Nevada.

Delphi Automotive PLC has also devoted considerable resources (relatively speaking) to the autonomous car project. It has been working with Google on its fleet of self-driving Priuses. We believe Delphi can benefit from its strong presence in both the active safety and infotainment spaces together with its software expertise.

Autoliv is a leader in the passive and active safety space today (along with TRW) so a progressive move into autonomous capability is a logical step for them. While ALV is still approaching the technology from a safety perspective (increase the capability of active safety enough to remove the driver from the equation potentially) and its main focus is to be the owner of the domain controller within the car, it remains to be seen whether ALV will move out of the safety domain into adjacent areas like infotainment and HMI, which it needs to become an end-to-end autonomous vehicle system supplier (that can license a system in a box to an OEM).

TRW is another safety leader that is keenly interested in autonomous vehicles and driver assistance systems (DAS). TRW is working with Mobileye, a private company that specializes in vision-assisted DAS.

Sensata Technologies Holding is a leader in automotive sensors though it is unclear what role they will play in an autonomous world. While there is likely to be a meaningful increase in the number of sensors in an autonomous car, most of the incremental sensors are likely to be for active safety or HMI applications, which Sensata does not participate in. Sensata's specialty is in the engine/transmission/powertrain area, which could see modest incremental content increase but is unlikely to see a big lift from the move to autonomous vehicles.

Non-traditional supplies: The autonomous vehicle opportunity also allows players who have not traditionally been part of the autos space to have a look in. While Google is probably the most well-known "external" player here, others potentially include Cisco Systems, IBM, Intel and others from the IT world as well as—for probably the first time in several decades within the auto industry—start-ups. These companies are effectively on the path to becoming Tier-1 automotive suppliers with a focus on electronic systems and software that will drive autonomous capability.

These external entities are not going to have it easy. The traditional auto industry historically has been tightly knit and highly skeptical of outsiders, believing that "automotive grade" is very difficult standard to achieve. Indeed, in our discussions with various members of the traditional auto industry about the role external entities play have in the future, we encountered an enormous degree of skepticism, dismissal and even hostility directed toward their ambitions. However, we do not believe "automotive grade" is an insurmountable moat around the industry.

It is likely true that the external entities cannot go it alone—they will most likely have to work with the traditional OEMs and suppliers to find their way around the automobile.

However, the expertise they can bring on the software side of the business—which has hardly been a forte of the traditional industry can be critical to the success or failure of this endeavor.

Impact on Japanese Auto Suppliers

Shinji Kakiuchi

Of the Japanese auto parts makers, we expect **Denso** to benefit from wider adoption of self-driving systems. Among global suppliers, we think Denso and German companies Robert Bosch and Continental are able to deliver high value-added in this field.

In terms of anti-collision system hardware, per-vehicle use of sensors, sonar, radar and cameras can be expected to rise. Suppliers of these parts are likely to benefit from the increased volume. However, standardization of the systems by automakers and legally mandated installation (e.g., as occurred with airbags and ABS) could lead to commoditization and lower prices.

We see scope, meanwhile, for companies to maintain and enhance value-added via development capabilities and technology. The key to advanced driving technology is in analyzing driving data from sensors and the like and determining how to control the actual vehicle. Automakers essentially have the knowhow here. Many suppliers supply ECUs that control individual systems, such as brakes, airbags or steering, but only the major Tier 1 suppliers offer ECUs that integrate control of multiple systems that enable, for instance, safe driving. And even within this group, companies need software development capabilities to build the architecture that links the systems together.

Denso has the development and technological capabilities, including software circuit design capabilities, to build integrated ECUs that link navigation, engine control, brake control, transmission, steering and other systems.

On September 26, Denso revealed that it aims to carve out a global share of around 20% in the safety/anti-hazard sensor business by 2020—it had around 10% in 2012. Denso expects the market for anti-collision systems to grow eight-fold in the next eight years as use becomes widespread and regulations tighten. It aims to expand orders by enhancing its individual sensors and also offering sensor packages tailored to specific functions.

Denso roughly estimates the size of the global market for such sensors at ¥100-150bn per year. It expects this to balloon to ¥800-1,200bn by 2020. Denso aims to grow sales from the ¥10-20bn it had in F3/13 to around ¥200bn in F3/21.

Denso has packaged its sensor systems into three types, standard (for mass-produced autos: image sensors + millimeter-wave radar (long-range)), basic (for small cars: image sensors + LIDAR), and advanced (for high-end autos: stereo image sensors + millimeter-wave radar). With this base lineup, it is pursuing orders for safety/anti-hazard systems to aid in, for example, avoiding collisions, keeping the vehicle within lane boundaries, ensuring nighttime visibility, and regulating speed.

Denso announced on September 26 its decision to invest in Adasens Automotive, which develops image recognition technology for safety/anti-hazard systems. Adasens is part of the Spain-based Ficosa International group. Denso is slated to acquire 50% of Adasens shares from Ficosa.

Within the Toyota group, **Aisin Seiki** is also set to enhance its self-driving technology, its plan being to build on the concept of its IPA (Intelligent Parking Assist) system, a world-first system jointly developed with Toyota in 2003.

Potentially challenged: The growth of autonomous vehicles could bring the involved suppliers greater power and relevance within the industry, resulting in faster growth, stronger CPV/margins and eventually higher stock multiples. On the other hand, with the hardware components of the car decreasing in relevance, the non-secular suppliers who do not serve the growth areas of efficiency, safety and comfort/convenience could go the other direction and see their decline in relevance accelerate, especially if autonomous capability renders their parts virtually obsolete. Some of these areas could be body panels/frames, drivetrain (axles), exhaust, lighting, some interior components, glass, tires etc.

We also note that the barriers to entry in the supplier space are high—map databases, tech hardware, and software expertise will take years of experience and several billion dollars of investment to replicate from scratch. New/late entrants will also have to convince the OEMs—who may already have a long history of working together with the early suppliers and deeply integrating their systems into the car—to start over, take a risk and give them a chance. But this is not a technology where the OEM can take a chance as the risk of failure is unacceptably high.

MORGAN STANLEY BLUE PAPER

Autonomous Vehicles

Read-Across to Other Industries

- Google
- How Autos View Google
- Freight Transport
- Media
- Semiconductors
- Software
- Car Rental
- Healthcare

Google: An Early Leader in Autonomous Vehicle Research

Scott Devitt
Jordan Monahan

Google's autonomous vehicle program may be the earliest, highest-profile program in the US today. Google's autonomous vehicle team has been developing self-driving cars since at least 2005, and Google has been actively promotional about the program over the past 1-2 years. While Google's business case for autonomous vehicles is currently open to speculation, these vehicles fit into the GoogleX R&D laboratory mandate. Google X attempts to make a few targeted bets on technologies that have a low initial probability of success, but a high expected payoff upon achieving success. Google has vocally championed these "10X" products and the company's "10X" thinking since co-founder Larry Page took over as CEO in 2011.

A dozen autonomous cars in three states today

Google's self-driving car program consists of around a dozen vehicles, primarily Toyota hybrid vehicles, each supervised by a driver and an engineer in the front two seats. Google has successfully sponsored legislation legalizing self-driving cars (with human caretakers) in three US states: California, Florida, and Nevada. As of August 2012, Google's autonomous vehicles had driven more than 500,000 accident-free kilometers.

According to various media sources, each of Google's vehicles contain around $150,000 of computer and sensor equipment, including a $70,000 LIDAR system that measures objects and distances via a combination of laser imaging and reflected light. While initial costs seem prohibitive for mainstream vehicles, a former Google engineer has commented to *USA Today* that "reasonably-priced LIDAR systems are coming relatively soon." Indeed, the sales director of Ibeo, a German automotive supplier, announced the firm's plans to sell a lower-powered LIDAR system for around $250 starting in 2014.

Commercial possibilities may include the following:

- ***Google using self-driving vehicles continuously to improve its market-leading maps and local directory products:*** Robotic vehicles may be able inexpensively to traverse a variety of roads to collect precision location data, Street View data, and business data. Google would then be able to provide the most up-to-date data to consumers of its web-based informational and advertising products.

- ***Google perfecting and then licensing its proprietary vehicle operation software to vehicle OEMs:*** Google may decide to license or sell software and/or a package of hardware/software to traditional vehicle manufacturers, similar to its Android and Chrome OS programs that provide software to electronic equipment OEMs. Advantages include Google gathering a large amount of mapping and other data, along with the ability to "close the loop" between online ads and offline purchase behavior. For example, Google may benefit from being able to show an advertising agency that a consumer who viewed an online ad for Nordstrom, for instance, later that day drove to a Nordstrom retail location.

- ***Google producing vehicles to sell to consumers:*** Various Google executives have expressed a desire to solve traffic congestion, fatality, and natural resource problems by reducing driver error and increasing vehicle efficiency. By replacing fallible human operators with computers and sensors, Google may believe that it can reduce or eliminate collisions, injuries, and deaths associated with human driver error. Also, Google may believe that computerized drivers are more likely to choose efficient routes and minimize fuel consumption. Google may see these as public goods, but ones that it can most effectively deliver by producing a fully integrated hardware/software vehicle.

- ***Google producing a fleet of for-hire vehicles:*** Google has also discussed the potential to replace inefficient taxis (which spend time and waste fuel looking for customers) with fleets of self-driving taxis that operate on demand. According to media reports, Google has been in discussions with automotive suppliers Continental and Magna International about assembling a "Model G" self-driving car or taxi.

While each of these commercial options (or others) may become potentially interesting businesses over time, Google may also find other projects that it is even more interested in pursuing and discontinue autonomous vehicle research at any time. We therefore remain excited about the potential for Google to reinvent transportation, but hesitate to quantify the opportunity at such an early stage.

How Does the Auto Industry View Google?

Ravi Shanker

The traditional auto industry views Google's efforts with a mix of suspicion and enthusiasm. On the one hand, having a company like Google and its track record of innovation enter the auto world could be a shot in the arm for one of the most mature and cyclical industries in the world. OEMs might also be eager to partner with Google and potentially use its experience with the autonomous car systems. On the other hand, if Google chooses to make its own way in the industry or partner with an "outsider" like Tesla, the entrenched OEMs could be facing a formidable new competitor.

The traditional auto industry is watching Google very closely. The high level of interest is driven by a number of factors: 1) Google's early lead with its autonomous vehicle initiative, which probably forced a number of automakers to follow suit; 2) interest in what exactly Google's plans are, and whether Google can disrupt the automobile OEM space, much as Tesla has done with electric vehicles; and 3) the hope of partnering with Google to use its expertise, experience, and especially its map database, Street View.

Make no mistake. The traditional auto industry is by no means dismissing Google's autonomous vehicle efforts as misguided or doomed and is instead tracking them as a real competitor, even if there is some skepticism as to whether Google will ever actually become an OEM.

Can Google ever make its own car? It may not be as crazy as it sounds. Google is pursuing the development of its autonomous driving system with enthusiasm and determination. While the perceived social benefits may be helping the project down its path, we believe the auto industry firmly believes that "the greater good" is not Google's only end-game here. One of the possible outcomes of this endeavor could be Google entering the auto business by making its own cars. As surprising as that might sound, we have spoken with top executives at auto OEMs who do not dismiss the idea out of hand.

While we have seen no evidence that Google intends to become an automobile OEM, there are a few factors that may make it easier for it to do so:

1. The growing importance of software that we discussed earlier would mean that if Google were to use its own proprietary autonomous driving and operating system for the car, it would control a significantly larger part of the value of the car in the future than just a software-based approach today.
2. As we discussed earlier, the actual hardware of the car could become more of a cost-driven assembly business that can be outsourced. Google need not build a single car plant but instead could have its cars built by third-party assemblers (similar to the Model G taxi mentioned on the previous page), or it could enter into partnerships with certain OEMs with excess capacity and design abilities (of which there are at least a few Europe today).
3. The Tesla factor. Google and Tesla appear to have a very close working relationship, given their common Silicon Valley roots, and already have a connection on the mapping/infotainment side. Tesla CEO Elon Musk has spoken of his intention to have "autopilot" functionality on future Teslas and has engaged in discussions with Google over the idea. It may not be farfetched to expect Google and Tesla to team up on car design and manufacturing.

Still, even though it is easier and more logical than ever for a company like Google to enter the car-making business, we do not think this is likely to be a near/medium term project.

It's like Android…for cars. We believe the auto industry may be more accepting of a near-term solution that sees Google license its autonomous driving system for other carmakers to use. Similar to Android for smartphones, we envision Google issuing guidance for the autonomous-capable hardware and design necessary for the OEMs to incorporate into their cars before the Google driving system is plug-and-played in. Similar to Android, this system could potentially be free for automakers to use, though it is unlikely to be open source given the security concerns.

In return for its system, the OEM may give Google exclusive access to the data into and from its cars. This is a sensitive area today and most OEMs control the data that is generated by the cars they manufacture, even if it is a supplier's component that generates it. However, in return for not having to spend billions of dollars and many years on autonomous vehicle development (especially if an OEM is already behind its peers in this area), the OEM could potentially give Google data exclusivity with the car. As we have discussed earlier, this is likely to move in two directions: 1) into the car, where Google may control / supply the content that is consumed by the occupants during travel, or 2) out of the car, where Google is anonymously given data about driving patterns and characteristics for its own use. This dual stream of data could open a third revenue front for Google, in addition to PCs and smartphones.

This is still entirely theoretical, of course. The last thing that a company of the size, caliber, and profitability of Google may want to do is to enter the traditional auto industry—an industry still challenged by extreme cyclicality, global overcapacity, fragmentation, and questionable pricing power. But that does not mean that Google cannot bring in an entirely new approach, especially as the automobile undergoes one of its most fundamental transformations in its history. As long as Google's fleet of self-driving Priuses keeps plying the highways of California, the traditional auto industry is going to be on its toes waiting to either welcome Google as a partner or face it as a competitor.

Not All Maps Lead to Google: Alternative Mapping Providers

Andrew Humphrey

Besides Google, there are just two other global companies that have proprietary mapping database: Tom Tom/Tele Atlas and Nokia/Navteq. These companies could be Tier 2 suppliers of their mapping databases to the Tier 1 suppliers of automotive in-vehicle software. TomTom, for example, has said it believes it will be a question of when, not if, autonomous cars will be commercialized. Management says that its focus is likely to be on software, content, and services rather than hardware because supplying hardware to the automotive industry is not a part of its strategy going forward.

Autonomous cars will need a very high level of accuracy in their mapping and positioning systems—far more than exists with GPS today. This also includes crowdsourcing of traffic and real-time data for route management as well as an extensive point-of-interest database. In addition to mapping, navigation, we observe that accurate positioning and handling real-time data are also part of TomTom's core competencies. TomTom has said it believes that it can extend into integration with the car's sensors to achieve an even greater level of position accuracy, though it does not intend to reach up into the Tier-1 level of full integration with the vehicle mechanics.

Autonomous Freight Vehicles: They're Heeeeere!

William Greene

The Morgan Stanley Freight team believes that autonomous and semi-autonomous driving technology will be adopted far faster in the cargo markets than in passenger markets. Long-haul freight delivery is one of the most obvious and compelling areas for the application of autonomous and semi-autonomous driving technology.

We conservatively estimate the potential savings to the freight transportation industry at $168 bn annually. The savings are expected to come from labor ($70 bn), fuel efficiency ($35 bn), productivity ($27 bn) and accident savings ($36 bn), before including any estimates from non-truck freight modes like air and rail.

Collateral implications include competitive advantage to large, well capitalized fleets and improved customer service.

While the focus of this Blue Paper is primarily on passenger vehicles, the Morgan Stanley Freight team believes that autonomous and semi-autonomous driving technology will be adopted far faster in the cargo markets than in passenger markets. Humans are far more comfortable with autonomous technology operating vehicles in circumstances when human life is not at risk. When a risk to human life is introduced into the equation, the bar on safety rises exponentially, while freight losses are rightfully viewed as costly, but acceptable, if within reason. This helps explain why autonomous driving technology has already been applied and is in operation in select non-passenger environments, such as dump trucks in Australia mines, military truck convoys in war zones, drone military aircraft, and automated warehousing operations.

We understand the excitement about the idea that everyone will have their own autonomous chauffeur some day, but we believe that freight companies are far more likely to embrace, refine, and apply autonomous technology in ways that will lead the passenger market. Where freight and passenger traffic interact, safety hurdles will remain high. This could limit the speed with which autonomous driving technology can be applied to Class 8 trucks on US interstate highways, for example. We would argue that broad and complete adoption of self-driving freight trucks cannot occur if passenger vehicles remain manually driven. But, there is scope for semi-autonomous technology and, outside the mixed use environment, we would expect cargo companies to move as fast as regulators allow the technology to be adopted.

Long-haul freight delivery is one of the most obvious and compelling areas for the application of autonomous and semi-autonomous driving technology. As our colleagues discuss elsewhere in this report, local and urban driving environments are particularly challenging for software engineers due to the difficulties of predicting the unpredictable behavior of human drivers (who occasionally choose to violate basic traffic rules like running a red light on the way to the emergency room). The US interstate highway system, on the other hand, generally has fewer unpredictable outcomes.

We believe that in such an environment we could see the introduction of semi-autonomous rigs and, potentially, broad adoption of the technology within 15 years. By using technology that exists today, truck operators could "tether" rigs together and move in convoy fashion over long distances. Initially, these convoys would involve a lead human driver (or driving team) followed in close formation by any number of trailing rigs, which are self-driven to follow the lead truck and are tethered through the technology (we call this semi-autonomous as it still requires a human lead manual driver team). The convoy works well in the monotonous environment of long-haul US interstate driving and eliminates much of the infrastructure needs addressed earlier in this report as the convoy's self-driving communication would be self-contained. Upon exiting the highway or entry into a congested urban interstate area, human drivers would likely need to be reintroduced, but the savings in labor, fuel, and safety costs from this semi-autonomous technology would be significant for truck operators.

Assessing the potential savings (conservatively, $168 billion annually)

The discussion below is intended to be mainly a thought exercise, rather than a definitive analysis of all the savings and investments required to implement autonomous driving technology to the freight markets. The savings we estimate are likely incomplete and reflect the utopian scenario in which autonomous driving technology is fully embraced and implemented in the trucking environment, and does not consider savings if the technology were applied to air or rail. Interim steps that involve semi-autonomous driving can also have significant, albeit smaller, savings than the utopian scenario.

Exhibit 71

Potential Savings to the US Freight Transportation Industry from Autonomous Freight Vehicles



Source: Morgan Stanley Research

Labor savings ($70 billion)—not as simple as eliminating the driver. Passenger vehicles transport the driver as passenger to his destination. Freight vehicles, however, require a driver to move the freight, but carriers view the driver as a cost, one that must eventually be returned to home base. As a result, most investors may believe that the concept of autonomous freight vehicles is a certain way to reduce or eliminate labor costs, which are the largest cost bucket for any freight carrier. However, based on our discussions with industry veterans and technology experts, we don't believe that the labor component is fully eliminated. While the number of drivers required in an autonomous driving environment would be drastically reduced, labor will not be entirely eliminated from carrier operations. There will still be a need for programmers, route planners, maintenance experts, fleet managers and, in most cases, some human oversight of the freight shipments. In the early years of the technology, these additional labor costs may run high. Moreover, the cost to introduce autonomous or semi-autonomous driving technology will be exceedingly high (some estimates put the cost at $200,000 per truck above the initial purchase price).

The real savings for carriers will come from fleet productivity. The savings generated by shifting to 24 hours per day, 7 days per week schedule for costly freight assets is compelling. Gone are the concerns about new hours of service rules (which mandate rest periods for drivers). Carriers will no longer need to plan routes that eventually return a truck (and the driver) home. Given that the US long-haul trucking industry faces driver turn-over rates that often exceed 100% annually, there are also significant savings to be found from reducing recruitment costs.

Given all of the above, labor savings are tricky to estimate. Moreover, it is unclear whether labor unions would have enough political clout to block or delay the introduction of autonomous truck technology in some jurisdictions. Over time, we do not believe unions will be able to prevent adoption of this technology, but it is certainly possible that they could delay it. For our purposes, we assume labor and regulatory issues are not impediments to adoption of the technology. According to the American Trucking Association (ATA), the US has approximately 3.5 million professional truck drivers. We estimate that the average truck driver earns roughly $40,000 in annual compensation and benefits, implying a total industry driver labor cost of ~$140 billion.

Unlike our colleagues' estimates for the utopian vision where no one drives, we do expect that some "driver" role will still be required even if all vehicles were driverless. There are many reasons some monitoring role for a "driver" won't be fully eliminated. Consider just a few of the issues. First, what happens if the vehicle breaks down (flat tire, engine issue, etc.)? If the vehicle is 100 miles from the nearest maintenance facility, that's still a long way to bring a maintenance engineer. A solution is to have a "driver" monitor the road convoy and, if there are issues with any of the vehicles, he is there to address on the spot and call for support if needed.

Another issue to consider is security. Some trucks haul extremely valuable inventory (e.g., a trailer full of iPads). If entrepreneurial thieves determined which trailers contain valuable inventory, they could arrange to hijack the vehicle and abscond with the inventory before any security could arrive. For this reason, we believe that a residual driver pool will remain, which means scheduling and recruiting challenges will not be fully eliminated.

Mundane items like bathroom breaks, rest periods, meals and deadheading will all still be required even if vehicles are fully automated. Moreover, some form of slip-seating scheduling would need to be introduced. Slip-seating scheduling has drivers share trucks so that the truck asset can realize improved operating utilization. Most truck drivers today strongly prefer to use only one truck ("their" truck) for driving.

Exhibit 72

An Autonomous Truck

Source: New Energy and Industrial Development Organization of Japan

strongly prefer to use only one truck ("their" truck) for driving.
Under an automated driving regime, technician drivers would need to share the operating vehicle with other drivers (again, much like pilots share planes). In any case, our best guess is that a fully automated driving regime could result in a two-thirds reduction in the current driver pool. This would imply that the trucking industry could still save ~$93 billion in annual driver costs, but there are other offsets to consider.

For example, the "driver" may need to be proficient in the technology, which could require a higher education level as well as technical certifications (much like a pilot). These certifications would restrict entry into the profession and would certainly result in higher wages for the remaining pool of driving technicians. In addition, it is entirely possible that this higher level of training eventually lead to some form of unionization. The current long-haul driver pool is not thoroughly unionized, given the large number of owner-operators and the high turnover of drivers. Unionization of technician drivers could significantly increase the average cost per employee. In fact, the carriers may look at allowing unions to play some role in the new environment as an acceptable cost for unions' agreement not to use political and legal maneuvers to delay and fight the technology's implementation. Lastly, there may be other highly paid professional positions (programmers, route planners, etc), that are required to manage these new high-tech autonomous fleets.

Given all of the offsets, we simplistically assume that in a full-adoption scenario, average "driver" wages increase by 50% to $60,000, implying an annual labor cost of $70 billion, resulting in still impressive 50% reduction in total driver labor costs.

Fuel efficiency gains could be large ($35 billion).
According to the ATA, there are more than 26 million trucks of all classes in the US truck fleet. Of this, approximately 2.4 million are Class 8 or tractor trailer trucks. The ATA estimated that the US truck fleet drove ~400 billion miles in 2011 (15,380 miles per unit). Class 8 trucks are estimated to drive ~100 billion miles annually (41,666 miles per unit). The ATA estimates that the US trucking industry consumed 52.3 billion gallons of diesel fuel in 2011 and spent ~$143 billion on fuel that year. Although these trucks are a variety of sizes and perform various roles in the freight economy, the implied fuel economy of the US truck fleet is ~7 gallons per mile. We should note that ton-mile per gallon is actually a better way to measure freight fuel economy, due to the concept of trip avoidance when using larger vehicles, but to remain consistent with the passenger vehicle section, we used miles per gallon.

We believe that autonomous or semi-autonomous driving technology can vastly improve the fuel economy of the US truck fleet. Like passenger vehicles, autonomous freight vehicles would operate primarily on "cruise control" mode, which under current technology can improve vehicle efficiency significantly. Moreover, freight vehicles could move in "convoy" format. By running large vehicles in close formation (tailgating), a carrier could effectively create a "train" of rigs on the highway, which results in a slipstream of lower air resistance, thereby improving fuel efficiency. Recent tests of driverless trucks in convoy format in Japan saw fuel efficiency gains in the 15-20% range, which would imply $21-28 billion in annual fuel cost savings in today's dollars. The US Department of Energy estimates that "road-train" convoys, as are common in Australia, can improve ton-mile fuel efficiency by over 35%. For our purposes, we assume a 25% improvement in efficiency ($35B in annual savings), which is far lower than what our colleagues believe is possible in the passenger vehicle market, but we should note that our estimate fails to capture fuel savings from short-haul truck moves such as parcel delivery, local pick-up and delivery vehicles, and many other shorter moves. As such, the fuel savings in freight could me substantially larger.

Productivity gains come in many forms (savings difficult to estimate but should be $27 billion at a minimum). The productivity gains from the adoption of autonomous driving technology could be great, but are also difficult to estimate. According to a study by Texas A&M University, congestion cost the US trucking industry $27 billion in 2011. Presumably, this cost would be virtually eliminated by the broad adoption of autonomous vehicles.

But, there are other aspects to consider. Long-haul trucks could literally operate 24/7, though the nature of freight movements means that there will likely still be significant downtime for trucks. As noted above, the ATA estimates that the US Class 8 (long-haul) truck fleet logged ~100 billion miles in 2011, or 41,666 miles per truck. Assuming that the trucks operated ~250 days per year, this implies 166 miles per day per truck. This average clearly understates the productivity of dedicated long-haul trucks that can log well over 100,000 miles/year, though it may overstate the mileage driven by Class 8 trucks in local pick-up and delivery operations. The average also captures time when trucks are waiting to pick up or drop off freight, sitting on a congested highway, refueling, in a shop for maintenance, etc. Although autonomous technology may help alleviate some highway congestion once full adopted, refueling, time spent waiting on a customer and maintenance time are clearly unavoidable. For this reason, most industry experts on autonomous technology estimate that autonomous trucks would increase capacity by ~30%. If congestion is alleviated by the shift to autonomous vehicles, the capacity increase could be greater, but as a start, we agree with the estimate.

Even so, a 30% increase in truck productivity would be very significant. According to A.C.T., in 2012, US Class 8 truck sales were roughly 194,000 and the average price of a new rig ~$123,000. This implies that the industry spent ~$23 billion in capital on new trucks. In addition, the industry purchases ~237,000 trailers/year at ~$20,000 each, or $4.5 billion in total spend. A 30% increase in truck productivity implies that the industry would need far fewer trucks to haul the same freight, but this is too simplistic. Increasing trucking operations means each truck drives more miles each year, i.e., more wear and tear. Truck age is more a function of mileage than the passage of time and at ~500,000 miles most long-haul trucks are reaching maximum "age." So, autonomous driving technology would certainly improve asset turns, but it would mean that the useful life of a truck would fall when measured in years.

Additionally, the cost of the trucks will be materially higher. Some technology experts estimate that the cost of a installing the technology in a truck would add $200,000 to the cost (in addition to the ~$123,000 cost for a manually driven truck). While these estimates are surely to fall over time as the technology becomes more commercial, this is still a significant investment for any carrier. Even if the cost per autonomous truck drops by one-third as the technology is commercialized, the implied cost to replace 70% of the current fleet (i.e., assuming a 30% productivity gain) would still be ~$336 billion (70% of 2.4 million trucks at $223,000 per unit). Obviously, the transition to a wholly autonomous truck fleet would take ~7-10 years AFTER the technology is tested, approved and commercialized. But, given the labor, fuel and productivity savings, the pay back from such a significant investment would still be impressive.

And, that leads to an interesting ancillary conclusion worth mentioning. According to the ATA, there are over 500,000 trucking companies in the US, over 80% of which have fewer than 20 trucks. Clearly, for these small truckers, a capital expenditure three times as high as a new Class 8 truck (and many small carriers buy used trucks at substantial discounts) is just prohibitive. We believe that this would give the large, well-capitalized carriers are significant opportunity to create a major barrier to entry in their business (for the first time in the history of the industry). A large carrier that transitioned quickly to an autonomous fleet would generate significant labor, fuel, safety, and maintenance savings as well as huge gains in fleet productivity. This cost advantage would allow the carrier to enjoy outsized and sustained market share gains. Moreover, managing the technology and a very large fleet of trucks would take professional management and a commitment and investment in IT, which would likely play into the strengths of the larger, well-capitalized truckers, such as Knight Transportation, Swift Transportation and Werner Enterprises, just to name a few examples. In other words, automated driving technology could theoretically turn the current long-haul truckload business into more of a networked model, resulting in significant scale advantages and barriers to entry.

Large transport companies like UPS and FedEx have long eschewed the long-haul truckload market given the difficult industry competitive dynamics. Autonomous technology would be a significant savings for them as well, given their very large fleet of trucks and package delivery cars. This could lead to a new business line for them as well (long-haul trucking).

Lastly, it's worth considering whether autonomous driving technology would improve customer service. We believe that autonomous driving, if adopted en masse, would lead to far less road congestion relative to today. Thus, it follows that truck carriers would improve on-time pick-up and delivery performance, which could lead share shift back to truck from other modes.

Accident savings ($36 billion). In 2010, the US DOT reported that 3,675 people were killed in large truck crashes, capping a long period of improving truck safety statistics. In March, 2007 the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration published a study which estimated that the average cost of reported crashes involving large trucks (gross weight exceeding 10,000 pounds) at $91,112 (in 2005 dollars—the latest date we found) and a total cost of ~$40 billion. The cost per fatal truck crash was estimated at ~$3.6 million per incident. According to the authors, the costs indicated above represented "the present value, computed at a 4 percent discount rate, of all costs over the victims' expected life span that result from a crash. They include medically related costs, emergency services costs, property damage costs, lost productivity, and the monetized value of the pain, suffering, and quality of life that the family loses because of a death or injury. The cost estimates exclude mental health care costs for crash victims, roadside furniture repair costs, cargo delays, earnings lost by family and friends caring for the injured, and the value of schoolwork lost."

Similar to passenger vehicles, most truck crashes involve some element of human error. Using a similar estimate as our passenger vehicle colleagues, namely that 90% of accidents are due to human error, autonomous truck (and car) technology could save ~$36 billion annually (when we reach full adoption).

What about other modes? Autonomous technology has already been applied in rail and air environments. One example of a driverless train is New York City's JFK AirTrain, which are fully automated and operate without a conductor. In aviation, military drones have been widely publicized. Given the heavy regulatory overlay in rail and air, government regulators will play a major role as a gatekeeper to autonomous driving technology and the speed with which it can be adopted. If the other modes fail to adopt the technology, but trucking does, it seems certain that the other modes would, over time, cede market share back to truck. As such, we fully expect that some close loop networks can quickly adopt the technology if regulators allow. The potential opportunities and savings from driverless trains and pilot-less planes are similarly large to carriers in those industries, but estimating the savings goes beyond the scope of this Blue Paper.

Media: More TV Time Means More Revenue Potential

Benjamin Swinburne
Ryan Fiftal

Autonomous vehicles have the potential to materially increase total media consumption: By freeing up ~75 billion hours of drive-time or 6-7 hours per week per licensed driver, we estimate total media consumption could materially increase, generating over $5 bn of new media revenue.

We expect video to take disproportionate share of liberated drive-time, while radio and recorded music may lose a key captive audience: We expect TV to be the largest beneficiary on a total dollar basis and Home Video to benefit the most on a % basis. As likely relative time share losers, roughly 10-15% of radio and recorded music revenues could be at risk.

Unclear impact to outdoor advertising: While the newly liberated driver may have more capacity to view outdoor advertising, outdoor ads will need to compete with more immersive media (e.g. TV) for the driver's attention. This fragmentation is likely to pressure ad rates. Outdoor platforms will have opportunities to leverage location-based technology to better deliver advertising to passengers, but will be competing with more options than before.

With Robust Media Delivery Enabled by the Connected Car, the Autonomous Car Could Materially Increase Total Media Consumption

As stated earlier, we estimate that fully autonomous vehicles could free up ~75 billion hours of time currently spent by drivers each year, equating to roughly 6-7 hours per week per licensed driver. Putting this into context, Veronis Suhler Stevenson (VSS) estimates the average American consumes ~65 hours of total consumer media per week, indicating a substantial increase to total media consumption is possible. Based on our analysis, *we estimate autonomous vehicles could in total generate over $5 bn of new media industry revenue,* with TV the largest beneficiary in total dollars, Home Video the largest beneficiary by % of market growth and Radio / Recorded Music losing share.

TV and Home Video Most Likely Beneficiaries; Radio / Recorded Music Hours Most At Risk

Over the last few years, we have seen a general shift in media consumption (measured by time spent) away from pure audio services and toward video-based media (TV, Home Video, Video Games). We believe the proliferation of video-capable devices and increases in bandwidth delivered to the home, most notably to smartphones and tablets but increasingly connected TVs and game consoles, have caused the shift by significantly expanding the opportunity to consume video. Autonomous cars could further expand the video use-case, and *we expect video-based media to disproportionately win share of hours freed from driving.* Therefore, while television currently accounts for roughly 50% of total media hours consumed (according to VSS), we believe it could take a higher share of hours liberated by autonomous vehicles. Assuming (1) ~25% of former drive-time is spent on non-consumer-media activities (e.g. work) and (2) TV wins ~60% of the remaining hours, this could increase total TV consumption by 6-7%, potentially increasing TV ad revenue by ~$2B (assuming 6-7% more viewing drives 3-4% greater ad revenue at the industry level). Similarly, Home Video accounts for ~1.5% of total media time spent (VSS), though again we would expect disproportionate share. If 3% of drive time is redirected to movie consumption, we estimate the total number of home video units consumed could increase by 15-20%, potentially expanding the home video market by $1.5-2B depending on distribution platform.

Exhibit 73
Autonomous Vehicles Would Likely Continue the Shift of Media Consumption toward Video



Source: Veronis Suhler Stevenson. Video includes TV, Home Video, and Video Games. Pure Audio includes Radio and Recorded Music

However, some of this video consumption will come at the expense of audio-based media—most notably radio, secondarily recoded music—which will lose a "captive audience" of drivers. Assuming that roughly 75% of current drive-time is spent listening to audio today, we estimate that roughly 25% of total Radio and Recorded Music listening time could be at risk of transitioning to other media. In our Autonomous Vehicle scenario, we assume that while pure audio media accounts for 20-25% of total media consumption hours today (VSS), audio services would win only 15-20% of liberated drive-time, reducing total Radio and Recorded Music hours of consumption by ~20%, potentially reducing the radio advertising market by ~10% or $1-2B and recorded music sales by ~$1B.

Advertising Most Likely Form of Monetization, Though New Subscription Services Are Possible

Given that the Pay TV subscription bundle is already moving toward an any device, anywhere model (with no additional direct fees to the consumer), there is risk that increased TV consumption in the car will not directly increase subscription revenues (though increased TV consumption in theory should increase customer willingness to pay and support pricing power). Therefore, we expect increased advertising to be the primary method of monetizing increased media consumption, though other direct or transactional fees (e.g. pay per view movies, book and magazine sales) should also increase.

Unclear impact to Outdoor Advertising

The autonomous car's potential impact on Outdoor Advertising is somewhat less clear. On one hand, the newly liberated driver could have increased capacity to view outdoor advertising. However, similar to radio, Outdoor may lose a key captive audience—if the driver is immersed in video content, he or she is less likely to view outdoor advertising. There will be opportunities to innovate in the Outdoor industry, leveraging location-based technologies to deliver more targeted advertising to passengers. However, fragmentation of audience and attention will increase, which tends to put downward pressure on ad pricing.

Exhibit 74

We Expect Video-based Media to Win Disproportionate Share of Freed Drive Time, at the Expense of Radio and Recorded Music



Source: Morgan Stanley Research Estimates, based in part on Veronis Suhler Stevenson market size and consumer media consumption data

Exhibit 75

The autonomous car could create $10B in new media revenue and shift share from audio to video media



Source: Morgan Stanley Research Estimates, based in part on Veronis Suhler Stevenson market size and consumer media consumption data

Semiconductors: Driving Innovation in Automobiles

Joe Moore
Craig Hettenbach

Key Takeaways

- Automotive is currently the fastest growing market for semiconductors, with a CAGR of 17% over the last three years
- Emerging technologies such as telematics, vision enhancement, lane control, and advanced driver assist should drive further semiconductor content on the way to fully autonomous vehicles
- Compute, video processing, and analog/microcontrollers are key growth segments.
- Intel, Nvidia, Ambarella, NXP Semiconductor, and Linear Technology appear best-positioned

Many of the companies in our coverage stand to benefit from the increased semiconductor content that autonomous cars one day will require, but a few stand out as best-positioned, in our view. In the compute area, we highlight Intel and Nvidia; in video processing, Ambarella; and in the analog/ microcontroller space, NXP Semiconductor and Linear Technology.

Growing Market, both in Terms of Units…

Before we discuss semiconductor potential in autonomous vehicles, we feel it is important to understand the proliferation of semiconductors already happening in the automotive segment. Today, the automotive semiconductor market is driven by growth in both the number of vehicles, and semiconductor content per vehicle. As more and more vehicles are sold, particularly in emerging nations, the demand for semiconductors from these nations increases as well, albeit at a reduced pace compared to those in developed nations.

In fact, the automotive market is the fastest growing end market for semiconductors, with a CAGR of ~17% over the last three years (2009-12). More than 70% of that comes from the growth in semi content per vehicle (three-year CAGR of 12.3%).

Exhibit 76

Semiconductor Auto Revenues on the Rise, Driven by Units…



Source: SIA Data, IHS, Morgan Stanley Research

..as Well as Content per Unit

Given the intensity of technology adoption in new vehicles, semi content per vehicle has increased from under $300 in 2007 to close to $380 in 2012. We expect this secular trend to continue as consumers take advantage of new features enabled by advances in semiconductor devices (sensors, display, compute, connectivity, etc.).

Emerging applications such as telematics, vision enhancement, lane-control, advanced driver assist systems, etc. are likely drive the market, closing the gap with a fully functional autonomous vehicle down the road.

Exhibit 77

….and Semiconductor Content per Vehicle



Source: PwC, Morgan Stanley Research

Automotive Requirements Are Much More Stringent

Unlike the requirements for consumer and industrial markets, automotive requirements are much more stringent with much wider operating range- i.e., -40 to 160 deg. C and 0 to 100% humidity compared to -10 to 70 deg. C and ambient for industrial applications. Requirements for consumer are even less demanding. In addition, given the long life cycle of the products, products for the automotive sector require long operation times and failure rates close to 0%.

The Autonomous Vehicle Is Not Just a Concept Anymore

As the rest of this Blue Paper has shown, the self-driving car is no longer just a concept, and is rapidly moving closer to reality as the industry embraces more and more features into the vehicle related to safety, infotainment, and traffic management. Active safety systems include airbags, curtain restraint systems; braking, steering, and lane departure warning systems; electronic stability control; park assist; and tire pressure monitoring. The infotainment category includes audio, video, navigation, and other information from the myriad of sensors brought into the dashboard console, which are increasingly moving toward capacitive touch. In terms of traffic management, most connectivity and onboard telematics solutions are nascent and should evolve as the infrastructure develops. In addition, new technologies in the drive train, such as in hybrid and electric cars, are driving increased demand for semiconductors.

Exhibit 3 lists key feature enhancements in automobiles and the potential timeline for mainstream adoption. Note that the path to autonomous vehicles is transformational and will take more than five years to be realized.

Semiconductors Instrumental to Autonomous Evolution

Although a fully autonomous car could be years away, we expect to see the industry increasingly embrace functions that assist the driver. As autonomous vehicles evolve, we expect to see an increase in the amount and frequency of data collected, transmitted, processed, and stored. These activities directly or indirectly benefit companies in the compute, networking and communications, and data storage segments. Communicating data between vehicles (V2V) and the cloud (V2I) requires a combination of technologies including cellular baseband and WiFi, with standards continuing to evolve. We could see new wireless inter-vehicle communication standards, e.g., IEEE 802.11p, be widely adopted by automakers.

A cloud-based system with sensors in automobiles and a supporting roadside infrastructure would demand high bandwidth to collect and transmit data from the myriad of sensors present in the vehicle. In addition to the sensors within the vehicles (temperature, optical, navigation, proximity, etc.), we expect to see a rise in environmental sensors such as LIDAR, infrared cameras, and other video capturing device.

Semiconductor companies exposed to the network and communications infrastructure include Intel, Qualcomm, Broadcom, Cavium Networks, Inphi Corp, and LSI Corp. Those in our coverage in the compute infrastructure include Intel, Advanced Micro Devices, Nvidia, and Cavium. SanDisk and Micron Technology also could potentially benefit from the growing need for storage, particularly in solid-state drives (SSDs) where low latency is very important.

Exhibit 78

Features and Expected Timeline for Mainstream Adoption

Benefit	<2 years	2 to 5 years	5 to 10 years	>10 years
Transformational			- Autonomous Vehicles - Embedded Hypervisor - Natural-Language Q&A	
High	- CMOS Image Sensors - ESP/ESC - LED Lighting	- Gesture Control - High Brightness LED - Supercapacitors - Silicon Anode Batteries	- 802.11p - Automobile IP nodes - ISO 26262 - System Proptotyping	- Electric Vehicles - In-Vehicle Ethernet - Wireless EV Charging
Moderate	- Automotive Radar - Electric Power Steering - Video EDR	- Adaptive Cruise Control - Biometric Driver ID - Haptics - OLED Displays - Speech Recognition - Wireless Power	- Eye Tracking - Gaze Control - Head-Up Displays - ICE Start/Stop System - Lane Departure Warning - Night Vision Enhancement	- EV Charging Infrastructure - Smart Fabrics - Virtual Prototypes

Note: Lane departure warning is available in some premium models today. Source: Gartner, Morgan Stanley Research

Video processor maker Ambarella is a likely beneficiary as the demand for video capture, processing, and compression rises. At present, cameras powered by Ambarella's chips are installed in cars to record driving footage. Ambarella's latest processors are capable of delivering Super HD (and Full HD images at high frame rates (30 and 60fps, respectively). Insurance companies have promoted the use of these cameras as it helps them arbitrate cases in a transparent way, potentially bringing down the cost to them. In some cases, insurance companies offer incentives such as lower premiums to encourage customers to install the cameras. This practice is currently prevalent in markets with high accident rates, such as Russia and China, but not in the US.

As the automotive needs evolve, we expect AMBA's single chip solution to be compelling when it comes to processing multiple video streams from surround cameras, but also from other devices such as RADAR and LIDAR.

On the compute front, we also highlight Intel and Nvidia as potential beneficiaries of the increasing use of on-board analytics. Given the amount of redundant effort among automakers and the challenges associated with long product cycles, it makes sense, hypothetically, for a third party such as Intel or Nvidia to develop these solutions.

Intel currently is active in developing in-car technology for in-vehicle infotainment, targeting solutions that mimic user experience similar to what we see in smartphones and tablets. Its approach is to develop standard components/building blocks for elements such as CPUs, storage, displays, operating systems, and software to accelerate the development process and facilitate future upgrades. Intel is collaborating with automakers such as Nissan, Kia, Toyota, and a few others to develop the next generation infotainment systems. Nvidia's Tegra processor powers the infotainment system of the Tesla Model S sedan. The company has already garnered over $2bn in design wins (7 makers, 34 models) in the auto segment and expects to generate $450mm in revenues by FY16.

Programmable logic device (PLD) companies Xilinx and Altera also supply field programmable gate arrays (FPGAs) and PLDs for a variety of automotive applications. These include driver assistance systems (front, rear, and surround cameras), infotainment, real-time analytics (object detection, lane departure warning, etc.), and battery monitoring systems. Some of the key benefits of using PLDs over ASICs and ASSPs are that they can help lower overall development costs, bring down time to market, and leverage a single-chip solution. The rise in data gathering invariably demands storage, both local and cloud, a trend to which the memory companies Micron Technology and SanDisk are exposed.

Microcontrollers and Analog Exposure to Automotive

According to data from the Semiconductor Industry Association (SIA), the automotive exposure of microcontroller units (MCUs) is 44% of overall MCU sales, more than twice the 21% exposure of the analog industry. We expect MCUs to continue to be strong in autos because of increased demand and the rise in 32-bit MCUs.

Exhibit 79

Analog, MCU Revenues and End Market Exposures



Source: SIA End User Survey, Morgan Stanley Research

Exhibit 80

Autos Is the Largest Market for MCUs

% of MCU Revenue



Source: Gartner, Morgan Stanley Research

Freescale, NXP Semiconductor, ON Semiconductor, Analog Devices, Microchip Technology, and Linear Technology are some of the companies in our coverage with substantial exposure to the automotive market.

Of those, we highlight Linear Tech and NXP Semiconductor as particularly well-positioned to benefit from the increasing semi content in vehicles .

Exhibit 81

Automotive Market Exposure by Company



Source: Company Data, Morgan Stanley Research

Exhibit 82

LLTC and NXPI's leading products

Company	Leading Products
Linear Tech	Battery management systems Navigation and safety systems Hybrid/electric vehicle systems Electric Steering and braking
NXP	In vehicle networking Car Access Lighting & entertainment Transmission / throttle control

Source: Company Data, Morgan Stanley Research

Linear is seeing the strongest growth in autos among its peers, outgrowing production by a factor of 5x and analog industry auto revenues by 2x since 2007. The company has grown its automotive business at a five-year CAGR of 15% and eight-year CAGR of 20%, compared to automotive production of 3% and 4%, analog industry auto sales of 7% and 7%, and MCU industry auto sales of 3% and 5%.

Exhibit 83

LLTC: Substantially Higher Growth in Autos Relative to the Broader Analog Market

Indexed Autos Growth



Source: Company Data, Morgan Stanley Research

Over the last seven years, Linear intensified its efforts in autos. This has paid off handsomely to date, as the company was early to identify the increasing proliferation of electronics in autos and had the technology and technical sales personnel in place to meet the trend. Linear's strong portfolio of products, led by its battery management systems, has helped the company develop entrenched relationships with OEMs worldwide. Given the stringent qualifications set upon automotive component suppliers and Linear's growing position in this market, we are confident in the company's ability to maintain its lead.

NXP Semiconductors is a market leader in in-vehicle networking, passive keyless entry, and radio and audio amplifiers, and has an emerging business in telematics and solid-state lighting drivers. NXP's automotive revenue has grown at a CAGR of 15% over the last four years, nearly 2x the pace of analog auto revenue growth. NXP is benefitting from key auto trends such as increased energy efficiency (as mandated by government regulations), connectedness (entertainment and traffic management), and security (theft and hacking prevention).

We expect the company to continue to gain share in the analog auto space, as it increases penetration in its core market and as its emerging businesses, such as LED lighting and telematics, begin to ramp. Interestingly, the company recently gave a thumbs up to self-driven cars by making a strategic investment in autonomous car start-up Cohda, which specializes in inter-vehicle networking.

Software: From Design Today to Integrating Sensors Tomorrow

Adam Wood
Keith Weiss

The move toward autonomous cars present three opportunities for software vendors:

- OEM design
- Standardization of software content within autos
- Management and analysis of large data sets generated by increasing sensor count in cars

Software has emerged as a key competitive dynamic as hardware manufacturers seek to differentiate their offerings. We see evidence of this trend in many verticals including automotive today. The move towards autonomous cars would likely compound this effect.

We see three principal areas of opportunity for software vendors around the autonomous car trend: 1) near-term, automotive firms are dealing with the increasing complexity of adding software functionality to their design processes. Longer-term we see opportunities around firms 2) standardizing today's largely custom-built automotive software environment on packaged platforms or application sets, and 3) leveraging the large amounts of data likely to be generated by increasing sensor counts in vehicles.

Dealing with Software Complexity

Software today has already become very important to automobile manufacturers, even without considering the potential from autonomous vehicles. The increasing amounts of software embedded in products add huge complexity for manufacturers. Even before we discuss the challenges of the autonomous car, we see this increasing software mix providing a large opportunity for certain software companies. Indeed, at companies such as BMW and Jaguar Land Rover half the engineers are already dedicated to software and systems, and the rest to traditional mechanical design. The challenge for manufacturers today is that most of this software is custom-developed and manually installed. We see a significant opportunity for software companies to help automate and standardize the software development processes already in place at automakers. Clearly, this opportunity would likely expand significantly as the industry moves towards autonomous cars.

What is being done today? Traditional design software companies like Dassault Systèmes and PTC are already moving into the automotive software development market. Their design software has traditionally been used to design the mechanical parts of cars and the body-in-white. These vendors have also developed and acquired technologies to help OEM customers develop and test software and systems along with the mechanical design. Their products aid manufacturers with specifications, software and systems architecture, and the connections between the electronics software and control systems and the mechanical parts.

For example, Dassault Systèmes offers CATIA Systems, which covers system architecture and engineering. The technology is partly internally developed and partly a combination with the AUTOSAR embedded software tool developed by recently acquired Geensoft. AUTOSAR is already a standard in the German automotive industry. DS has seen its penetration of leading automotive OEMs increase +50% due to the CATIA Systems offering, which DS acknowledges probably covers only half of the functionality required by OEMs today. This leaves a significant market opportunity still to come for the company.

PTC also has a software and systems offering that, post its acquisition of MKS, includes the Integrity software development (ALM - application life cycle management) suite, now branded as PTC Integrity. PTC also highlights the already significant software complexity in many products and the risk of failure that software bugs can bring in what were purely mechanical products 15-20 years ago. The company also believes that compliance will be an increasingly significant driver in the space and should benefit from greater regulatory focus.

So what opportunity does the autonomous vehicle offer? As we consider the autonomous car we're looking at a moving set of goal posts as the software component in cars should increase materially from current levels.

How do they succeed? We believe that among the design software companies, DS and PTC stand to benefit most if is the OEMs and OE suppliers that try to develop the technology for autonomous cars and end up dominating the market. Of course, it is highly likely that the OEMs and their suppliers will try to build the systems needed for autonomous cars and so the technology providers like DS and PTC likely face a period during which these products grow quickly irrespective, of the end outcome of the battle for control of the autonomous car.

We also believe operating system integration will be a significant challenge. Technology providers such as DS, which already have experience in the much more automated aerospace industry, may have an advantage in helping auto OEMs design these systems.

Standardizing and Connecting a Custom Software World

The move from custom development toward the use of more packaged infrastructure and application components may represent an expanding opportunity for packaged software vendors.

This is a playbook we've seen in many markets before: As requirements and standards quickly evolve, firms requiring new software functionality remain largely focused on custom development in the short to mid-term (as you are seeing today within the car industry). As the market matures, 1) vendors are less able to drive differentiation from larger parts of their software functionality, 2) the costs of maintaining custom code rises, and 3) the need for interoperability with other functionalities and platforms drives software increasingly toward standards. For instance, today most vendors are developing their own in-dash infotainment systems Over time, we would not be surprised to see use of a standard platform underpinning these systems (analogous to mobile phone operating systems like Android).

Within our software coverage group, several vendors might benefit from this standardization trend. Microsoft and Oracle both offer platforms for embedding software functionality in non-general purpose compute devices—Windows CE Platform from Microsoft and the Java ME platform from Oracle. As we've seen with the Sync initiative, where Microsoft built out a broader infotainment platform now used in many Ford, Fiat, Nissan, and Kia models, vertical market functionality can be achieved. In addition, the open source Linux operating system underpins a large proportion of custom software work today.

In the medium term, we may see automotive firms look to a supported or security hardened Linux distribution like that offered by Red Hat. A recent collaboration between Red Hat and Meteorcomm shows what that type of standardization may look like, as the two vendors deployed a Interoperable Positive Train Control communication systems for the railroad industry based on Red Hat's Linux and messaging technologies.

These changes might be seen as a challenge to the providers of tools that support a more custom-developed approach. In response to that, we make two points: 1) It is very unlikely in our view that any one vendor will be able to dominate all the electronics, software, and systems in a car. So even if we move from totally custom to partly modular there will still be a need to integrate the different modules with each other and with the mechanical parts. 2) The software vendors that help support system architecture and engineering may choose between continuing to provide software to support modules or whether they could have a role providing the module itself—whether standalone or in partnership with others.

Big Data and the Autonomous Car

With a significant increase in on-board computing power and the number of sensors collecting data, cars will generate an even greater volume of data over time. This data is likely to be utilized in a more connected way than it is today—data collected and analyzed in real-time rather than at service intervals.

In the near term, product lifecycle management (PLM) software vendors like DS and PTC are already thinking about how this data could be used for more proactive servicing of vehicles. A part that has failed on a number of cars could be identified much earlier and then replaced. The idea of PLM is that the design teams could also learn from the experience of cars "in the wild" and incorporate live data on performance into the design of new vehicles. Analysis of the data sets could also be used to predict potential failures and order preventive maintenance.

We could also see this approach open up new business models for the manufacturers. Recently we have seen John Deere add sensors to its tractors and use analytics (SAP HANA) on the data these sensors collect in order to help predict when problems will occur and to add a services / maintenance business model to their existing manufacturing model. We could imagine a similar opportunity in automotive.

Longer-term, we see big data analysis used to lessen congestion of the roads, help drivers avoid hazardous conditions, and more effectively find roadside amenities, amongst other use cases. The beneficiaries within software would be companies involved in providing the technology to store, analyze, and use that data — particularly in real-time. In the case of store and analyze, we believe Splunk, Tibco, Oracle, SAP, Teradata, HP, EMC, PTC (not covered by Morgan Stanley), and Dassault Systèmes (Exalead) appear well-positioned. They have the capabilities to either ingest and analyze data in real time or work with massive quantities of data.

Car Rental: Potentially Polarizing Impact

Adam Jonas

- Autonomous cars could have significant, polarizing impact on rental car companies, but a highly connected car could be a sweet spot

The implications for autonomous driving on the car rental industry are likely very significant (if not transformational). That said, the direction of the outcome could potentially be very positive or negative. We can think of highly polarized scenarios ranging from a world in which self-driving vehicles increase the benefits of private ownership and usage, cannibalizing the need to rent vehicles, to one in which a roving parc of public transportation vehicles is controlled by firms with fleet management and customer service expertise.

A further outcome could be lowered barriers to entry for car rental firms as all vehicles become connected devices, representing constantly mobile capacity, potentially disrupting such traditional strengths as the location of their available fleet at key spots, such as airports. Peer-to-peer car rental models could conceivably become even easier to implement, impacting both the size and share division of the car rental pie.

While we are convinced autonomous driving provides a powerful encouragement for car usage and miles driven (by reducing many of the hazards and inconveniences of human-controlled driving), there is far greater uncertainty over its potential effect on private car ownership. *See Part 1 for more detail on the impact on car ownership.*

Car rental companies have a history of adapting the latest technology to improve the convenience of the rental experience. Currently, the industry is making the shift to connected cars and kiosks in various forms. Avis Budget's purchase of Zipcar offers new avenues for expanding the hourly rental experience in convenient locations. Hertz's 24-7 program is aimed ultimately at turning 100% of its car rental fleet into a vehicle that can be reserved on line and rented by the hour, with minimal or no human interface. Precisely how the car rental industry's efforts to adapt new technology dovetails with the broader powerful shift in the 250m vehicles on US roads and more than 1 billion globally is less clear.

Exhibit 84

Autonomous cars could result in extreme outcomes for rental car companies but also bring a sweet spot



Source: Morgan Stanley Research

The Healthcare Angle: Impact on Medical Costs

Andrew Schenker
Cornelia Miller

Key Takeaways

- We believe autonomous vehicles would have a limited impact on hospital volumes and revenues. However, the social costs related to injuries and accidents go beyond just the medical costs.
- Motor Vehicle Accidents (MVA) account for $23 bn in hospital spending, which translates to ~1.5% of all total hospital care and physician services costs.
- Only 8% of car accidents result in an in-patient admission.
- Private insurance covers 55% of motor vehicle accidents, while 25% of accident victims do not have insurance.
- Among all MVA-related visits, the most common procedures include sutures of the skin and subcutaneous tissue, splints and wound care, and CT head scans.
- Health insurance policies typically pay medical claims after auto policy medical payments have been exhausted.

The direct impact to hospitals and insurers is quite small but the social costs are much larger. Motor vehicle accidents remain a major cause of injury-related hospitalizations and emergency department visits. Specifically motor vehicle-related accidents represent ~3% of all ED visits and 12.5% of injury-related ED visits in the US. However, the related healthcare costs still represent a small portion of health care spend in this country. Therefore, the economic impact to the industry would be limited as a result of the increased safety related to autonomous vehicles. In addition, for the full safety benefits to be realized, all vehicles would need to be autonomous.

The expenses associated with MVA-related injuries is nearly $24 bn by our estimates. Our analysis excludes the lost productivity related to the accidents. This compares with over $2.5 trillion in national health expenditures and $1.5 tn in hospital and physician related spending per year. By our estimates, car accidents account for approximately 0.9% and 1.6% of all national health expenditures and total hospital and related services costs, respectively. In addition, the CDC estimates the cost of lost work and productivity at $114 bn per year.

Exhibit 85

Motor Vehicle Accidents Represent Less than 2% of Medical Spend

	Spend ($B)	Medical Costs % of Spend
Fatal injuries	$0.7	3.0%
Nonfatal hospitalized injuries	$17.4	73.3%
Nonfatal Ed-treated and released injuries	$5.6	23.8%
Total Medical Costs	$23.7	100.0%
Hospital Care	$814.0	2.9%
Professional Services	$688.6	3.4%
Total Hospitalizations & Services	$1,502.6	1.6%
National Health Expenditures	$2,593.6	0.9%

Source: CDC; CMS; Traffic Injury Prevention, 11:353–360, 2010; Morgan Stanley Research

Motor vehicle crashes lead to almost 2.3M annual injuries and fatalities resulting in medical care, with injuries accounting for the vast majority (~98%). Of those injured or killed in a motor vehicle accident approximately 4% were motorcyclists and another 6% were non-occupants, either pedestrians or cyclists. Not surprisingly, nearly 30% of fatalities include a motorcyclist or non-occupant. The data does not indicate who caused the accident.

Exhibit 86

Injuries Account for the Majority of All Motor Vehicle Related Injuries and Fatalities



Source: Federal Highway Administration, Census, US Department of Transportation

Only 8% of motor vehicle accidents result in an inpatient admission. Roughly 85% of individuals that are treated in an emergency room for an injury related to a motor vehicle accident are treated and released. Notably, only 8% are admitted to the hospital, which results in higher healthcare costs. Another 1.2% are transferred to another acute care hospital, and 5.8% go to another location for care such as a rehabilitation center.

Exhibit 87

Only 8% of MVA-Related Visits Result in In-patient

	MVA-Related ED Visits		
	# of Visits	%	Rate per 1,000
Discharge Status			
Treat-and-release	2,963,759	84.7%	9.9
Admitted for care	281,060	8.0%	0.9
Transferred to another acute care hospital	40,363	1.2%	0.1
Died in the ED	8,002	0.2%	0.0
Other	204,223	5.87%	0.7

Source: AHRQ, Center for Delivery, Organizations, and Markets, Healthcare and Utilization Project, Nationwide Emergency Department Sample (NEDS), 2006

Among those admitted to an emergency department as a result of a motor vehicle accident, the most common injuries include sprains, contusions, superficial injuries, open wounds, intracranial injuries, and neck and limb fractures. Approximately 20% MVA-related ED visits resulted in some kind of procedure. The most common procedures associated with these types of injuries are sutures of skin and subcutaneous tissues, splints and wound care, CT head scans, and routine X-rays.

Exhibit 88

Top Procedures Related to Auto Injuries

Top 10 Procedures in All MVA-related ED visits, 2006	# of visits with each procedure	% of All MVA-Related ED Visits
Other diagnostic procedures (consultation)	181,977	5.2%
Suture of skin and subcutaneous tissue	148,845	4.3%
Other diagnostic radiology and related techniques	131,092	3.7%
Traction; splints; other wound care	114,334	3.3%
Other therapeutic procedures	92,663	2.6%
Computerized axial tomography (CT) scan of head	51,781	1.5%
Treatment of fracture or dislocation of lower extremity	45,436	1.3%
Prophylactic vaccinations and inoculations	45,342	1.3%
Respiratory intubation and mechanical ventilation	39,880	1.1%
Routine chest X-ray	38,925	1.1%

Source: AHRQ, Center for Delivery, Organizations, and Markets, Healthcare and Utilization Project, Nationwide Emergency Department Sample (NEDS), 2006

Private insurance covers the majority (~55%) of motor vehicle accidents. However, ~25% of MVA-related visits are made by individuals without insurance and Medicaid covers approximately 10% of MVA ED visits. This compares with non-MVA related visits whereby only 34% of visits are covered by private insurance, 22% of visits are covered by Medicaid, 21% are covered by Medicare, and 18% are not covered by any insurance.

Exhibit 89

Private Insurance Covers 55% of All MVA-related ED Visits



Source: AHRQ, Center for Delivery, Organizations, and Markets, Healthcare and Utilization Project, Nationwide Emergency Department Sample (NEDS), 2006

Auto insurance typically pays before health insurance. Auto insurance companies generally make the first payments for medical care related to motor vehicle accidents. Auto policies most likely include personal injury protection (PIP), which will cover many of the same services as medical payments. Drivers can also add medical payments coverage to their auto policy. Most car insurance plans will not cover car accidents unless the driver has supplemental health insurance. Health insurance typically pays for medical claims after the auto policy's limit has been exhausted.

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

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

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

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

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

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

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Asian Corporates & China's Megatransition
November 8, 2010



The China Files
European Corporates & China's Megatransition
October 29, 2010

Petrochemicals
Preparing for a Supercycle
October 18, 2010

Solvency 2
Quantitative & Strategic Impact, The Tide is Going Out
September 22, 2010

The China Files
US Corporates and China's Megatransition
September 20, 2010

Brazil Infrastructure
Paving the Way
May 5, 2010

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(as of October 31, 2013)

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	Coverage Universe		Investment Banking Clients (IBC)		
Stock Rating Category	Count	% of Total	Count	% of Total IBC	% of Rating Category
Overweight/Buy	**988**	**34%**	**400**	**37%**	**40%**
Equal-weight/Hold	**1296**	**44%**	**496**	**46%**	**38%**
Not-Rated/Hold	**109**	**4%**	**28**	**3%**	**26%**
Underweight/Sell	**541**	**18%**	**152**	**14%**	**28%**
Total	**2,934**		**1076**		

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Ticker	Company Name	Close Price (as of 11/5/2013
ABFS.O	Arkansas Best Corporation	USD28.04
ALL.N	Allstate Corporation	USD36.79
AMBA.O	Ambarella Inc	USD20.58
AMT.N	American Tower Corp.	USD78.6
AOL.N	AOL Inc.	USD38.54
AAPL.O	Apple, Inc.	USD525.449
T.N	AT&T, Inc.	USD22.83
CAR.O	Avis Budget Group Inc	USD31.06
BMWG.DE	BMW	EUR81.2
BRKa.N	Berkshire Hathaway Inc.	USD172,980.00
CSCO.O	Cisco Systems Inc.	USD23.07
CNW.N	Con-Way Inc.	USD41.32
CONG.DE	Continental	EUR136.05
CCI.N	Crown Castle Corp.	USD76.14
DAIGn.DE	Daimler	EUR5.67
DAST.PA	Dassault Systemes SA	EUR86.39
DLPH.N	Delphi Automotive PLC	USD55.01
6902.T	Denso	JPY4755
EMC.N	EMC Corp.	USD23.55
FDX.N	FedEx Corporation	USD136.23
FIA.MI	Fiat SpA	EUR5.71
F.N	Ford Motor Company	USD17.09
GM.N	General Motors Company	USD37.09
GOOG.O	Google	USD1021.52
HPQ.N	Hewlett-Packard	USD25.47
HTLD.O	Heartland Express Inc.	INR55.75
HTZ.N	Hertz Global Holdings Inc	USD21.3
IBM.N	IBM	USD177.85
INTC.O	Intel Corporation	USD24.03
KNX.N	Knight Transportation Inc.	USD32.28
LLTC.O	Linear Technology Corp.	USD40.94

Ticker	Company Name	Close Price (as of 11/5/2013
7201.T	Nissan Motor	JPY885
NVDA.O	NVIDIA Corp.	USD14.8
NXPI.O	NXP Semiconductor NV	USD42.44
ODFL.O	Old Dominion Freight Line Inc	USD47.68
ORCL.N	Oracle Corporation	USD24.86
PGR.N	Progressive Corp	USD26.24
PEUP.PA	PSA Peugeot-Citroen	EUR10.08
PMTC.O	PTC Inc.	USD27.92
RHT.N	Red Hat, Inc.	USD42.93
RRTS.N	Roadrunner Transportation Systems Inc	USD25.6
SAIA.O	Saia, Inc.	USD32.46
SAPG.DE	SAP AG	EUR57.6
SBAC.O	SBA Communications	USD90.96
ST.N	Sensata Technologies Holding NV	USD37.47
SPLK.O	Splunk Inc	USD63.98
S.N	Sprint Nextel Corporation	USD7.19
SWFT.N	Swift Transportation	USD21.88
TAMO.NS	Tata Motors	INR395.3
TDC.N	Teradata	USD42.63
TSLA.O	Tesla Motors Inc.	USD176.81
TIBX.O	TIBCO Software Inc.	USD24.01
TMUS.N	T-Mobile US, Inc.	USD28.12
TOM2.AS	TomTom NV	EUR5.749
7203.T	Toyota Motor	JPY6350
TRW.N	TRW Automotive Holdings Corp.	USD75.07
UPS.N	United Parcel Service	USD100.3
VZ.N	Verizon Communications	USD50.1
VOWG_p.DE	Volkswagen	EUR190.9
VOLVb.ST	Volvo	SEK82.05
WERN.O	Werner Enterprises	USD23.3
ZURN.VX	Zurich Insurance	CHF249.29

Best's News Service via Bestwire - August 03, 2017 04:20 PM

Progressive Exec: Autonomous Features Reduce Frequency; Degree Varies By Coverage

MAYFIELD VILLAGE, Ohio - Automobile technology such as automatic braking and blind-spot warning show really good evidence for reducing frequency, although the impact varies by coverage, Progressive Corp. personal auto product development leader John Curtiss said during a second-quarter investors presentation.

Progressive projects auto frequency should decline slightly over the coming decade with or without crash avoidance technology. Lower frequency is more likely to be noticeable in property damage than collision, said Curtiss. There's some argument the same could be said for bodily injury improving more than comprehensive.

For example, he said automatic braking is largely intended to prevent rear-end crashes and a high percentage of property damage is from rear-end or side impact, which this feature is designed to prevent.

However a good deal of collision involves damage that can't be prevented by auto braking, such as backing up into a pole or sliding off an icy road.

Further complicating the picture is the way auto manufacturers bundle safety systems that may or may not be additive, leaving insurers to sort out "which ones show the most promise in reducing frequency so we can incorporate them in our pricing," Curtiss said. "There's still a lot to learn about the effects these technologies will have on the coverage we write."

Starting with this call and webcast, Progressive changed its quarterly format to highlight areas within its company, in addition to taking questions about earnings. Net income attributable to Progressive climbed 93% in the quarter to $367.6 million.

The combined ratio improved 3.6 points to 93.2 and net premiums written increased 14% to $6.75 billion. Catastrophe losses for the first half of the year rose to $347 million, from $319 million in the prior year period. June wind and hail

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AMB#	Company Name
058454	Progressive Corporation

losses accounted for about $88 million of the total, against $21 million in June 2016 (Best's News Service, July 18, 2017).

Progressive doesn't anticipate fully autonomous vehicles in the near future due to cost and complexity. When they are available, Curtiss said the first applications could be commercial, as ride-sharing vehicles or self-driving taxis confined by geofences.

President and Chief Executive Officer Tricia Griffith introduced the investors presentation with general auto statistics. Overall frequency has dropped 0.7% annually since 1986, while the number of vehicles in the United States has increased 1.3% yearly.

Severity also rose 1.3% each year, increasing to 1.8% annually since 2012 as medical costs outpace inflation and higher-tech cars cost more to repair, she said.

Progressive remains committed to a yearly combined ratio of 96 and has increased marketing.

Griffith said the company's underlying loss ratio has improved with time because the insurer is "definitely changing our mix," in part because the American Strategic Insurance Corp. acquisition brought a property book and a focus on bundling, and also because underwriting is "getting the right rate for each customer."

The top five writers of all private passenger auto in the United States in 2016, based on direct premiums written, were: State Farm Group, with an 18.33% market share; Berkshire Hathaway Insurance Group, 11.94%; Allstate Insurance Group, 9,73%; Progressive Insurance Group, 9.17%; and USAA Group, 5.46%, according to BestLink.

Most operating entities of Progressive Corp. currently have a Best's Financial Strength Rating of A+ (Superior).

Shares of Progressive Corp. (NYSE: PGR) were trading at $47.61 the afternoon of Aug. 3, up 0.83% from the previous close.

(By Renée Kiriluk-Hill, associate editor, BestWeek: Renee.Kiriluk-Hill@ambest.com)

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Select Legal Considerations for Shared Automated Driving

Draft Discussion Paper

Prepared for the Roundtable on
Cooperative Mobility Systems and Automated Driving
(06/12/2016, Ottawa)

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Table of Contents

Introduction

This discussion paper introduces several legal considerations for shared automated driving with a view toward grounding a broader policy discussion. It begins by discussing likely implementations of shared automated driving. It next considers the kinds of legal actions that developers and regulators of these automated driving systems might take to promote or police them. It then connects these potential actions to existing law by describing three ways of adapting that law to automated driving. Finally, it provides specific perspectives and recommendations on this and any legal change.

Background

Automated driving encompasses a diverse set of actual and potential technologies, applications, and business cases. A small subset of these—in particular, a fleet of truly driverless vehicles[1] accessible to the public—is most closely aligned with the vision of the ITF roundtable for which this paper was prepared. I have previously described these so-called robotaxis as one of three pathways to fully automated driving.[2] Others have analyzed how these vehicles might replace individually owned cars and how they could complement or challenge conventional mass transit.

Implementations other than robotaxis are also relevant to shared automation. Driving automation systems that merely assist the human driver could make conventional mass transit safer and more efficient in the near term. Delivery robots that carry goods rather than people could nonetheless eliminate some human trips altogether. The current model of individual vehicle ownership may even facilitate both sharing and automation—at least according to Tesla.

In contrast to the applications and business cases for shared automation, there is at least an emerging consensus on categorizing the underlying technologies. SAE International's Taxonomy and Definitions for Terms Related to Driving Automation Systems for On-Road Motor Vehicles (J3016), which is now freely available, reflects and reinforces this consensus.[3] The levels of automation are the most famous part of this taxonomy, and they are dutifully reproduced below:

1 SAE J3016 uses the term "automated driving system-dedicated vehicle" or "ADS-DV."
2 How Governments Can Promote Automated Driving, newlypossible.org.
3 SAE J3016, http://standards.sae.org/j3016_201609.

Level	Name	Narrative definition	*DDT*		*DDT fallback*	*ODD*
			Sustained lateral and longitudinal vehicle motion control	*OEDR*		
Driver performs part or all of the *DDT*						
0	No Driving Automation	The performance by the *driver* of the entire *DDT*, even when enhanced by *active safety systems*.	*Driver*	*Driver*	*Driver*	n/a
1	Driver Assistance	The *sustained* and *ODD*-specific execution by a *driving automation system* of either the *lateral* or the *longitudinal vehicle motion control* subtask of the DDT (but not both simultaneously) with the expectation that the *driver* performs the remainder of the *DDT*.	*Driver* and *System*	*Driver*	*Driver*	Limited
2	Partial Driving Automation	The *sustained* and *ODD*-specific execution by a *driving automation system* of both the *lateral* and *longitudinal vehicle motion control* subtasks of the *DDT* with the expectation that the *driver* completes the *OEDR* subtask and *supervises* the *driving automation system*.	***System***	*Driver*	*Driver*	Limited
ADS ("*System*") performs the entire *DDT* (while engaged)						
3	Conditional Driving Automation	The *sustained* and *ODD*-specific performance by an *ADS* of the entire DDT with the expectation that the *DDT fallback-ready user* is *receptive* to *ADS*-issued *requests to intervene*, as well as to *DDT performance-relevant system failures* in other *vehicle* systems, and will respond appropriately.	*System*	***System***	*Fallback-ready user (becomes the driver during fallback)*	Limited
4	High Driving Automation	The *sustained* and *ODD*-specific performance by an *ADS* of the entire *DDT* and *DDT fallback* without any expectation that a *user* will respond to a *request to intervene*.	*System*	*System*	***System***	Limited
5	Full Driving Automation	The *sustained* and unconditional (i.e., not *ODD*-specific) performance by an *ADS* of the entire *DDT* and *DDT fallback* without any expectation that a *user* will respond to a *request to intervene*.	*System*	*System*	*System*	**Unlimited**

These levels are initially useful for dispelling misconceptions about automated driving. Unfortunately, the vexing if understandable combination of secrecy and self-promotion within the private sector has contributed to widespread confusion about the current state of automated driving technologies and even the extent of their deployment. In particular, automated driving on public roads without real-time human supervision will represent a massive leap from the kinds of testing that predominate today. This gulf between level two and level four—and the challenges inherent in each level—are often lost in misleading reports that a company is testing "driverless" vehicles somewhere in the world.

Much of the discussion of and innovation in shared automation will likely focus on level four, in which an automated driving system performs all of the real-time driving tasks under specified conditions. These specified conditions are the system's operational design domain (ODD), a concept that is overshadowed by but at least as important as the level of automation. For technical, legal, economic, and prudential reasons, early shared automation systems may be limited to specific roads in specific communities.

The details of each particular implementation, including the location, will affect the legal analysis. A governmental operator, a commercial operator, and an individual who makes her vehicle available for sharing could face different legal obligations and liabilities, including with respect to licensing, the accommodation of disabled users, and other compliance issues. In the early days of the automobile, courts and legislatures in the United States addressed whether the legal operator of a vehicle was its chauffeur or its owner-occupier; automation may similarly raise the question of when the user of an automation system has no greater responsibilities than an ordinary passenger.

Legal and political battles over services like UberX and Lyft, including the invention of the term "transportation network company" to describe them, show both that details matter and that these details are malleable. Existing rules for taxi dispatchers and drivers could and probably did apply to these services. Calling them something else, however, created the conceptual foundation for regulating them differently—and, in many cases, more permissibly.

How Developers Might Act

Transportation network companies are a useful case study because they suggest the range of approaches that a given developer of a shared automation system may take toward existing law. In general, such a developer has an incentive to understand that law, to determine whether any changes are necessary or otherwise desirable, and to advocate for those changes.

However, developers may tolerate legal uncertainty to varying degrees. Some developers, especially established companies with political influence, may want to quickly craft and codify a clear legislative framework that supports their vision even to the exclusion of competing visions. Other developers, especially obscure startups, may be more comfortable operating with some legal uncertainty in their early activities. And still others, especially aggressive companies eager to court the market, may prefer to create facts on the ground that encourage eventual legal ratification.

How Governments Might Act

Whether independently or in connection with these private actors, governments will also decide whether and if so how to act with respect to automated driving. This action can include monitoring, educating, reacting, preparing, clarifying, restricting, promoting, and planning. Briefly consider each of these potential actions in turn without regard for their desirability:

Monitoring

Accurate information about automated driving is a predicate to effective regulation. Governments can collect this information informally (through consultations and connections) or formally (through requests for information, investigations, and reporting requirements). As automated driving is introduced onto public roads, systematic monitoring may be especially important so that specific technologies can be efficiently linked to specific incidents. This monitoring could involve, for example, incorporating automation information into vehicle databases and collecting data about crashes in a consistent manner.

Educating

As governments educate themselves on automated driving, they may also educate the general public on the risks and opportunities of these technologies. Public perception will affect whether technologies are used correctly, whether applications are accepted, and whether business cases are embraced. A misinformed public may expect too much or too little from the technologies and may prove fickle in the aftermath of a serious crash or other incident. These perceptions in turn can expand or restrict the flexibility available to public actors. For example, governments may be more willing to adopt a broadly permissive interpretation of the Conventions on Road Traffic if the public is broadly supportive of automated driving.

Reacting

The administrative functions of government will inevitably and repeatedly face automated driving. The national vehicle authority of an EU member state may be asked to grant type approval for a vehicle that incorporates an automated driving system, or Transport Canada may be asked to grant an exemption to a particular national vehicle safety standard. The US National Highway Traffic Safety Administration may receive reports of potential defects in an automated driving system. Local police may respond to a crash involving an automated driving system. A court may eventually hear a civil or criminal case involving that crash. The instances that actually occur will likely come faster—and demand a faster response—than many might expect. In many cases, for example, governments decided how existing law applied to Uber's business model only after the company had already established itself on the ground.

Preparing

In anticipation of these situations, governments can prepare to react. Developing and communicating a break-the-glass plan that details how an agency will respond to a serious automated driving crash is a concrete example of this preparation. More abstractly, governments may also ensure that agencies have sufficient resources, expertise, and authority to react appropriately to relevant automated driving developments. The US Department of Transportation's recent review of its existing and potential regulatory tools is an important step in this direction.

Clarifying

The current legal status of automated driving, including specific technologies and applications, is arguably unclear. My 2012 review of relevant law (including the Conventions on Road Traffic) noted various legal provisions that, depending on their construction, could be consistent or inconsistent with some forms of automated driving.[4] More recently, the US Department of Transportation identified additional provisions within the federal motor vehicle safety standards that may or may not conflict with specific implementations of automated driving.[5] The lack of authoritative interpretation provides flexibility but also uncertainty: Developers and regulators have more space for technical, business, and even regulatory innovation, but legal assumptions could be upended long after decisions have been made on the basis of them.

Restricting

Restricting an activity by conditioning its legality is regulation in the narrowest sense. In general, these restrictions may be necessary to check market failures that threaten key interests, including individual autonomy or safety and societal efficiency. Legislatures, administrative agencies, and courts can all have a restrictive effect, as can private actors such as industry (by developing standards), insurers (by setting conditions of insurance), certifiers (by setting conditions of certification), and litigants (by shifting economic costs). Restrictions can be imposed at various levels of government (including international, national, subnational, or local) and times (including before development, before deployment, after deployment, or after market saturation). Restrictions might apply to a variety of legal persons, including developers, producers, modifiers, owners, users, operators, insurers, and certifiers, and to a variety of activities, including design, testing, deployment, production, sale, modification, registration, insurance, deployment, use, maintenance, recall, and disposal. These lists, which are far from comprehensive, illustrate the complexity and diversity of restrictive regulation.

Promoting

Governments may also promote automated driving even as they restrict it. A recent article describes nearly fifty strategies with which governments at all levels can encourage the development and deployment of automated driving.[6] These strategies, some of which overlap with other governmental actions discussed in this section, include identifying a point person for automated driving, conducting a legal audit to identify potential complications under existing law, internalizing the costs of driving and parking, embracing regulatory flexibility, and developing a clear horizontal and vertical network of support, among many others. At the heart

4 Automated Vehicles Are Probably Legal in the United States, newlypossible.org.

5 Review of FMVSS for Automated Vehicles (Volpe Center), ntl.bts.gov/lib/57000/57000/57076/Review_FMVSS_AV_Scan.pdf; Letter from NHTSA to Google (February 4, 2016), isearch.nhtsa.gov/files/Google%20--%20compiled%20response%20to%2012%20Nov%20%2015%20interp%20request%20--%204%20Feb%2016%20final.htm.

6 How Governments Can Promote Automated Driving, newlypossible.org.

of the article is a call to expect more not only from automated driving systems but also from today's drivers in today's vehicles.

Planning

Planning is broader than preparing in scope, timing, and ambition. It seeks to understand how technologies can be used to advance larger social goals. As I wrote previously:

Planning of this kind is one of the most important contributions that governments can make to automated driving in the long term. The status quo is far from perfect. Automated driving may address some of today's problems while exacerbating others. Similarly, automated driving may be advantaged by some of those problems but disadvantaged by others. Understanding these issues—which may not necessarily be a priority for the companies developing and deploying relevant technologies—will help governments determine the role that automated driving can play in advancing larger public policy goals.7

Building From Today's Law

As the discussion above suggests, a range of legal changes and actions are possible. They may even be desirable—depending on the law, objectives, and legal philosophy of the particular jurisdiction as well as the applications, business model, and legal risk tolerance of the individual developers. Whether these actions apply, clarify, or modify existing law, they will necessarily engage with that law.

In this way, automated driving could implicate many of today's legal codes. These may include the Conventions on Road Traffic, international vehicle regulations, and (sub)national regimes for vehicle safety, vehicle registration, driver licensing, and traffic safety, and transport concessions, among many others. Many of these vary by country (or, in some cases, by federal state, province, or even municipality) in large or small ways.

Broadly, there are three potential approaches to dealing with one or more of these existing codes: redraft, replace, or reconcile.

Redraft

Redrafting a particular legal code would involve reviewing and changing relevant provisions so that every one of those provisions applied with equal clarity to both conventional and automated driving. Vehicle standards, for example, would simultaneously and specifically address vehicles with as well as without conventional steering wheels and foot brakes. This redrafting exercise would be massive but would also provide a unique opportunity to harmonize law across jurisdictions for conventional as well as automated driving.

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[7] Id.

Replace

Rather than redraft a particular legal code, a government might categorically exempt automated driving from the code and then start from scratch to develop a new regime applicable only to this form of driving. Laws regulating the transportation network companies discussed above are a more limited example of this approach: They supplant existing taxi regulations in favor of a specialized set of rules applicable only to these TNCs. Replacing a potentially anachronistic regime with one that is more targeted may be cleaner and simpler than redrafting the entire code but may also introduce boundary problems when the line between automated and conventional driving is not entirely clear. This, however, is less of a concern for the truly driverless vehicles that are likely to be the foundation for shared automation.

Reconcile

A hybrid approach that falls somewhere between redrafting and replacing, reconciling would use definitions, interpretive guidance, clarifications, and regulatory mechanisms to map existing law onto automated driving. In the United States, some states have started down this path by, for example, specifying the driver of a vehicle when its automated driving system is engaged. Unfortunately, these initial efforts to tackle the vehicle code will likely raise far more questions than they answer. In particular, somewhat arbitrarily assigning the label of "driver" to a person who may not be present or able to drive conventionally could confuse other obligations and liabilities.

A more thorough—but still far from perfect—example of reconciling a state's vehicle code with automated driving is the model language from my 2012 analysis.[8] This text also accepts the emphasis on drivers that is typical of vehicle codes. However, in language that is far too convoluted, it expands the definition of driver to include nonhuman entity that had developed the automated driving system. In this way, it places obligations of compliance on that developer. Rules of interpretation then address the many absurdities that would otherwise result from this expansion.

Perspectives and Recommendations

This section builds on the previous discussion in several specific areas: harmonization versus customization, testing versus deployment, and certainty versus flexibility.

Harmonization versus Customization

As a general matter, harmonization and even standardization are largely—though not entirely—beneficial. For early applications, however, it is probably not necessary. Moreover, the

[8] Automated Vehicles Are Probably Legal in the United States, newlypossible.org.

delay and uncertainty inherent in a massive international harmonization effort could actually impede some local deployments. As I wrote previously:

> Uniformity across jurisdictions may be desirable for mass-produced vehicles, while tailored regimes may support pilots, demonstrations, and local deployments. Rather than focusing on developing a uniform automated driving law, governments could cooperate on standardizing or harmonizing more of their underlying legal frameworks—particularly those that govern vehicles, drivers, driving, insurance, dealerships and commercial vehicle operations.[9]

Governments can also promote harmonization through principles of comity and reciprocity. Smaller jurisdictions unwilling or unable to devote resources to a regulatory regime for automated driving might simply defer to the regulatory determinations of other jurisdictions. While it is not free of friction, the European Union's homologation regime provides a useful model for a stronger form of reciprocity.

Testing versus Deployment

Any line drawn between testing and deployment will become increasingly arbitrary and unclear. However, tests—as well as field operational tests, pilots, beta projects, and demonstrations, among others—are simply terms that are used functionally.

These terms may be used to signal that an automated driving system is not fully "ready." But even a test vehicle should be operated as part of a broader system—perhaps involving some form of human supervision—that is appropriate for the task at hand. Moreover, a long history of automotive recalls suggests that not even production vehicles are always fully ready, and the gradual embrace of over-the-air updates will further blur whatever theoretical bright line existed between production systems and everything else.

These terms may also or alternately be used to avoid impractical legal requirements and restrictions that apply only to production vehicles. If so, then the better approach is to move from fiction to function by determining what conditions should apply to a particular activity. Under this approach, the risk of a particular activity matters more than its binary classification.

Certainty versus Flexibility

As noted above, there is tension in law between certainty and flexibility. Legal regimes for automated driving—and shared automation in particular—should be attentive to both objectives.

Jurisdictions should act with more clarity in specifying who is and is not the driver of a vehicle—in other words, the natural or legal person to whom a wide assortment of legal obligations and liabilities at least presumptively apply. Although some states in the United States have now affirmatively (if, as discussed, unsatisfying) defined the driver, no state has expressly indicated who is not a driver. This matters for shared automation systems that may be used by passengers who lack either a connection to the vehicle or an ability to drive.

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[9] How Governments Can Promote Automated Driving, newlypossible.org.

At the same time, jurisdictions should provide more flexibility for both technical and regulatory innovation. This is the driving motivation for the "public safety case" that I have previously advocated.[10] Rather than directing developers to comply with specific requirements that regulators could not realistically create and maintain, the public safety case invites these developers to share their safety philosophies with those regulators and the public that they serve. In order to obtain an approval or an exemption—or simply to avoid enhanced regulatory scrutiny—these developers would provide evidence of what they are doing and why they believe it to be reasonably safe. These submissions would in turn be evaluated not for their correctness but instead for their reasonableness.

Conclusion

Unlike math, law varies dramatically across both time and space. This variation complicates both analysis of and, ultimately, compliance with that law. But this variety also provides room for technical and regulatory innovation. At least initially, localized deployments of shared automation may vary by location, particularly if different developers advocate for different regimes while governments embrace a more flexible model of regulation. The many technologies, applications, and business cases that make up automated driving are rapidly evolving in ways that will allow for customization, comparison, and competition. The governments that are building tomorrow's law on the foundation of today's can do the same.

[10] Regulation and the Risk of Inaction, newlypossible.org; How Governments Can Promote Automated Driving, newlypossible.org; see also US Department of Transportation Automated Vehicles Policy, www.transportation.gov/AV (describing a 15-point safety assessment).

Roboethics: Social and Ethical Implications of Robotics

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64. Roboethics: Social and Ethical Implications of Robotics

Gianmarco Veruggio, Fiorella Operto

The present chapter outlines the main social and ethical issues raised by the ever-faster application of robots to our daily life, and especially to sensitive human areas.

Applied to society in numbers and volumes larger than today, robotics is going to trigger widespread social and economic changes, opening new social and ethical problems for which the designers, the end user, the public, and private policy must now be prepared.

Starting from a philosophical and sociological review of the depth and extent of the two lemmas of robotics and robot, this section summarizes the recent facts and issues about the relationship between techno-science and ethics.

The new applied ethics, called roboethics, is presented. It was put forward in 2001/2002, and publicly discussed in 2004 during the First International Symposium on Roboethics.

Some of the issues presented in the chapter are well known to engineers, and less or not known to scholars of humanities, and vice versa. However, because the subject is complex, articulated, and often misrepresented, some of the fundamental concepts relating ethics in science and technology are recalled and clarified.

At the conclusion of the chapter is presented a detailed taxonomy of the most significant ethical legal, and societal issues in Robotics. This study is based on the Euron Roboethics Roadmap, and it is the result of three years of discussions and research by and among roboticists and scholars of Humanities. This taxonomy identifies the most evident/urgent/sensitive ethical problems in the main applicative fields of robotics, leaving deeper analysis to further studies.

Many roboticists, as well as authoritative scholars of the history of science and technology, have already labeled the 21st century as the *age of the robots*. Actually, in the course of the present century, intelligent autonomous machines will gradually substitute many automatic machines [64.1].

Humanity has built tools to increase its power by eliminating manual labor and needless drudgery. This factor has become one of the keys to successful economic progress, especially since the Industrial Revolution and the emergence of a mechanized economy, and even more so with the introduction of automatic machines in the 20th century [64.2].

Today, progress in the field of computer science and telecommunications allows us to endow machines with enough intelligence that they can act autonomously. Thus, we can forecast that in the 21st century humanity will coexist with the first *alien* intelligence we have ever come into contact with – robots.

A few years from now, many more fields of application will be robotized, because robotics will have occupied more territories. The figures of the annual *World Robotics Survey*, issued by the United Nations (UN) Economic Commission for Europe and the International Federation of Robotics (IFR), show a steady tendency for growth with the characteristic curve of a rapidly developing field, with short slowdowns and steep climbing.

Certainly, robotics is changing our way of living, working, and operating in the world.

While the application field of robots is widening, the robot is coming out of the factories and into our homes – it is becoming a consumer item. The robot – which was expected to be an extended, intelligent tool for the human – is becoming a partner and a companion [64.3].

Moreover, robotics is also changing our method of conducting scientific inquiry and perhaps even our concept of ourselves [64.4]. Synergies between robotics, neurosciences, medicine, education, and psychology, have broadened the scope of application of the latter, making robotics a platform of global scientific research on humankind, on our galaxy and on the interaction between humankind and nature [64.5].

When robotics is applied to society in numbers and volumes larger than today, it will trigger widespread social and economic changes, for which public and private policy must now be prepared [64.6].

It will be an event rich in ethical, social and economic problems.

In the next decades in the industrialized world – in Japan, South Korea, Europe, United States – humanoid robots will be among us, companions to the elderly and children, assistants to nurses, physicians, firemen, and workers. They will have eyes, human voices, hands and legs, skin to cover their gears, and brains with multiple functions. Often, they will be smarter and quicker than people they ought to assist. Placing robots in human environments inevitably raises important issues of safety, ethics, and economics.

What is going to happen when these smart robots are our servants and house stewards, and when our lives will depend on them?

Could people who mean no good use these robots to harm others?

The theme of the relationship between humankind and *autonomous* machines appeared early in world literature, developed firstly through legends and myths, then in scientific and moral essays. In early mythology, the ancient peoples expressed their worries about the disrupting power of machines over the old societies: when these artificial creatures to which we have given birth have learned everything from us, or understood that we are weaker than them, will they try to dominate us [64.7]?

In our time, facing the development of ever more powerful computers and the variety of humanoid robots, some scholars and scientists have warned about the dangers of the unlimited use of technology, and especially about the hubristic endeavor to design and manufacture intelligent creatures [64.8, 9].

Their concern has been amplified by the harsh discussion around bioengineering and bioethics. The famous physicist and Nobel prize winner Joseph Rotblat said that robotics, genetic engineering, and computer science are threatening the life on our plante [64.8, 9].

> *Thinking computers, robots endowed with artificial intelligence and which can also replicate themselves (...) this uncontrolled self replication is one of the dangers in the new technologies.*

Less dramatically, others have pointed out the need to introduce ethical rules in technological applications, especially regarding the behavior of intelligent machines. In this frame, the most matter-of-fact issue is: what will be the cultural and social implications of the robotics invasion? Could robots be dangerous to humankind in any way [64.10]?

Under the pressure of public opinion and the media, roboticists cannot avoid engaging in a critical analysis of the social implications of their researches, in order to be able to give *scientific and technical*, as well as *philosophical*, answers to questions such as:

- How far can we go in embodying ethics in a robot?
- What kind of *ethics* is robotic ethics?
- How contradictory is, on one side, the need to implement in robots an ethics, and, on the other, the development of robot autonomy?
- Is it right to talk about the *consciousness*, *emotions*, and *personality* of robots [64.11, 12]?

64.1 A Methodological Note

This chapter is by its nature somewhat different from – although complementary to – the remainder of this Handbook, because it deals not only with the scientific and technological issues inherent in the matter, but also with cultural and moral topics related to the introduction of robots in sensitive human areas.

The authors worked on the assumption that:

- This handbook – and in particular the present chapter – is going to be read by roboticists, and also by nonroboticists, by students of robotics as well as by students and scholars of ethics, philosophy of science, sociology, laws, etc. Some of the issues presented here are well known to some, and less or not known to the others, and vice versa. Nonetheless, the authors deemed it useful and important to recall and clarify some of the fundamental concepts relating ethics in science and technology, because the subject is complex, articulated, and often misrepresented.
- Roboethics is an applied ethics that refers to studies and works done in the field of science and ethics (science studies, science and technology studies (S&TS), science technology and public policy, professional applied ethics), and whose main premises are derived from these studies. In fact, roboethics was not born without parents, but it derives its principles from the global guidelines of the universally adopted applied ethics [64.13]. This is the reason why the substantial part of this Chapter is devoted to this subject, before specifically discussing the sensitive areas of roboethics.
- Many of the issues of roboethics are already covered by applied ethics such as computer ethics or bioethics [64.14]. For instance, problems arising in roboethics of dependability, technological addiction, the digital divide, the preservation of human identity and integrity [64.15]; the applications of precautionary principles, economic and social discrimination, artificial system autonomy and accountability, related to responsibilities for (possibly unintended) warfare applications [64.16]; and the nature and impact of human–machine cognitive and affective bonds on individuals and society have already been matters of investigation in the fields of computer ethics and bioethics [64.16].

The specificity of robotics is underlined from a general point of view. Subsequently, in the taxonomy herein, the specific ethical issues related solely to robotics are carefully evaluated. The present taxonomy is not developed on the basis of affinity to the techno-scientific or disciplinary areas – like the index of the present book. Rather, the roboethics taxonomy is based on the application areas of robots, and on the specificity inherent to the human–robot interaction of these applications [64.17].

In terms of scope, we have taken into consideration – from the point of view of the ethical issues connected to robotics – a temporal range of two decades, in whose frame we could reasonably locate and infer – on the basis of the current state-of-the-art in robotics – certain foreseeable developments in the field.

For this reason, we consider premature – and have only hinted at – problems related to the possible emergence of human qualities in robots: consciousness, free will, self-consciousness, sense of dignity, emotions, and so on. Consequently, this is why we have not examined problems – debated in some other papers and essays – like the proposal to not behave with robots like with slaves, or the need to guarantee them the same respect, rights, and dignity we owe to human workers.

Likewise, and for the same reasons, the target of roboethics is not the robot and its artificial ethics, but the human ethics of the robots' designers, manufacturers, and users.

Although informed about the issues presented in some papers on the need and possibility to attribute moral values to robots' decisions [64.18], and about the chance that in the future robots might be moral entities like – if not more so than – human beings [64.19], the authors have chosen to examine the ethical issues of the human beings involved in the design, manufacturing, and use of the robots.

The authors felt that problems such as those connected with the application of robotics within the military and the possible use of military robots against some populations not provided with this sophisticated technology, as well as problems of terrorism in robotics and problems connected with biorobotics, implantations, and augmentation, were pressing and serious enough to deserve a focused and tailor-made investigation. It is absolutely clear that, without a deep rooting of roboethics in society, the premises for the implementation of an artificial ethics in the robots' control systems will be missing.

64.2 Specificity of Robotics

Robotics is a discipline originating from:

- Mechanics
- Automation
- Electronics
- Computer science
- Cybernetics
- Artificial intelligence

but it draws on from several other disciplines:

- Physics/mathematics
- Logic/linguistics
- Neuroscience/psychology
- Biology/physiology
- Anthropology/philosophy
- Art/industrial design

Is robotics a new science? On one side, robotics could be regarded only as a branch of engineering dealing with intelligent, autonomous machines. In this case, it shares experiences with other disciplines, and it is somehow the linear sum of all the knowledge.

On the other side, it could be seen as a new science, in its early stage. Actually, it is the first time in history that humanity is approaching the challenge of replicating a biological organism in the form of an intelligent and autonomous entity. This extraordinary mission gives to robotics the special feature of being a platform where sciences and humanities are converging – an experiment in itself [64.20].

It is not without some grounds that we could forecast that robotics will emerge as a new science, with its own theory, principles, theorems, proofs, and mathematical language [64.21].

However, even before that, robotics displays a specificity, which compels the scientific community to examine closely many of the notions until now applied only to human beings.

Although the authors consider it premature to study scientifically the possible emergence in the robot of human functions, we do not exclude that in the future we will be confronted with problems that today we can only imagine through the work of the artists of the science fiction [64.22, 23].

64.3 What Is a Robot?

From the point of view of how today's society sees robots, we can say that robotics scientists, researchers, and the general public have different evaluations about robots, as described below.

64.3.1 Robots Are Nothing Else But Machines

Many consider robots as mere machines: very sophisticated and helpful ones, but always machines. According to this view, robots do not have any hierarchically higher characteristics, nor will the designer provide them with human/animal qualities. In this frame, the issues of the social and ethical implications of robotics fall into the categories of applying ethics to engineering.

64.3.2 Robots (and Technology in General) Have an Ethical Dimension

This derives from a conception according to which technology *is not an addition to man but is, in fact, one of the ways in which mankind distinguishes itself from animals*. So that, as language, and computers, but even more so, humanoids robots are symbolic devices designed by humanity to improve its capacity of reproducing itself, and to act with charity and good. "The humanoid (...) is the most sophisticated thinking machine able to assist human beings in manifesting themselves, and this is ethically very good, as it supposes a radical increment of human symbolic capacity; humanoids will develop a lot of activities in order to increase the human quality of life and human intersubjectivity" [64.24].

64.3.3 Robots as Artificial Moral Agents (AMA)

According to this concept, robots and artificial agents extend the class of entities that can be involved in moral situations, for they can be conceived as moral patients (as entities that can be acted upon for good or evil) and also as moral agents [64.25] (not necessarily exhibiting free will, mental states or responsibility, but as entities that can perform actions, again for good or evil) [64.13].

64.3.4 Robots: the Evolution of a New Species

In the United States, one of the main discussions in the field of ethics and robotics is how to consider robots, as only *objects* or *subjects* which deserve legal rights: robots, not slaves.

According to this point of view, not only will our robotics machines have autonomy and consciousness, emotions and free will, but also humanity will create machines that "*exceed us in the moral as well as the intellectual dimensions*. Robots, with their rational mind and unshaken morality, will be the new species: Our machines will be better than us, and we will be better for having created them" [64.26].

64.4 Cultural Differences in Robot's Acceptance

While we analyze the present and future role of robots in our societies, we shall be aware of the underlying principles and paradigms that influence social groups and individuals in their relationships with intelligent machines.

Different cultures and religions regard differently intervention in sensitive fields such as human reproduction, neural therapies, implantations, and privacy. These differences originate from the cultural specificities towards the fundamental values regarding human life and death.

In different cultures, ethnic groups, and religions the very concept of *life* and *human life* differ, first of all concerning the immanence or transcendence of human life. While in some cultures women and children have fewer rights than adult males (not even *habeas corpus*), in others the ethical debate ranges from the development to a post-human status, to the rights of robots. Thus, the different approach in roboethics concerning the rights in diversity (gender, ethnicity, minorities), and the definition of human freedom and animal welfare. From these concepts derive all the other ethical specificities such as privacy, and the border between privacy and traceability of actions.

Cultural differences also emerge in the realm of *natural* versus *artificial*: think of the attitude of different peoples towards surgical or organ implantation. How could human enhancement be viewed [64.27]?

Bioethics has opened important discussions: How is the integrity of the person conceived? What is the perception of a human being?

Last but not least, the very concept of *intelligence*, human and artificial, is subject to different interpretation. In the field of AI and robotics alone, there is a terrain of dispute – let us imagine how harsh it could be outside of the circle of the inner experts [64.4].

64.5 From Literature to Today's Debate

Literature is the instrument by which society expresses itself, free from rigid constraints, and by which it can *simulate* future social developments. Sometimes, by way of literature, important and foresighted scientific issues have been anticipated.

The topic of the threat posed by artificial entities designed by human's ingenuity (legends like *the rebellions of automata*, Frankenstein' myth, the Golem) recurs in classical European literature, as well as the misuse or the evil use of the product of engineering (the myth of Dedalus). This is not the case in all world cultures. For instance, the Japanese culture does not include such a paradigm; on the contrary machines (and, in general, human products) are always beneficial and friendly to humanity.

In 1942, the outstanding novelist Isaac Asimov, who coined the word *robotics*, formulated his famous three laws of robotics in his novel *Runaround*:

- Law 1: A robot may not injure a human being, or through inaction, allow a human being to come to harm.
- Law 2: A robot must obey the orders given it by human beings except where such orders would conflict with the first law.
- Law 3: A robot must protect its own existence as long as such protection does not conflict with the first or second law.

Later on, in 1983, Asimov added the fourth law (known as the zeroth Law).

- Law 0: No robot may harm humanity or, through inaction, allow humanity to come to harm [64.28, 29].

Although farsighted and forewarning, could these laws really become the *ethics of robots* or are they too *naïve* to be considered seriously in this debate?

Over the last few decades, scientific and technological developments have brought forward the frontiers of robotics, so that those problems that years ago seemed only theoretical, or a matter of literature and science fiction, are becoming very practical, and even urgent.

Some of these problems have alerted the robotics community on the need to open a discussion on the principles that should inspire the design, manufacturing, and use of robots.

In 2001, the collaboration between the roboticist Paolo Dario and the philosopher José Maria Galván expressed the concept of technoethics [64.30].

In the same year, on the occasion of Italy–Japan 2001 (Tokyo, Japan), Paolo Dario and Japanese roboticist Atsuo Takanishi organized the Workshop *Humanoids. A Techno-Ontological Approach*, which was held at Waseda University. The lecture given by Galvan was published in the December 2003 issue of IEEE Robotics & Automation Magazine, *On Technoethics* [64.24].

64.6 Roboethics

In 2002 the roboticist Gianmarco Veruggio, in the framework of the cultural and educational activity of the Association School of Robotics, started to discuss the need for an ethics which could inspire the work of robotics scientists. He called this new applied ethics, roboethics.

> *Roboethics is an applied ethics whose objective is to develop scientific/cultural/technical tools that can be shared by different social groups and beliefs. These tools aim to promote and encourage the development of Robotics for the advancement of human society and individuals, and to help preventing its misuse against humankind [64.31].*

According to the definition, roboethics is not the *ethics of robots*, nor any artificial ethics, but it is the human ethics of robots' designers, manufacturers, and users.

In January 2004, in Sanremo, Italy, the authors, in collaboration with roboticists and philosophers, organized the First International Symposium on Roboethics, where the word roboethics was officially used for the first time.

On this occasion Paolo Dario (RAS president 2002-03) and Kazuo Tanie (RAS president 2004-05) established a technical committee (TC) on roboethics, with the aims of providing the IEEE Robotics and Automation Society with a framework for analyzing the ethical implications of robotics

Fig. 64.1 The Roboethics' logo, sketched by the renowned Italian artist Emanuele Luzzati (1920 – 2007), is represented by a young smiling girl receiving a flower from a chivalrous humanoid robot

research, by promoting the discussion among researchers, philosophers, ethicists, and manufacturers, but also by supporting the establishment of shared tools for managing ethical issues in this context.

In 2005, the European Robotics Research Network (EURON) funded the project called the EURON Roboethics Atelier, with the aim of drawing the first roboethics roadmap. In 2006, in Genoa, Italy, scholars from humanities met for three days with engineers and roboticists to draw the lines of the EURON roboethics roadmap [64.17].

Roboethics is not a veto or a prohibitionist ethics. Its main lines of development are: the promotion of culture and information; the permanent education; a vigorous and straight public debate; and the involvement in all these activities of the young generations who are the actors of the future [64.32].

Now, it is worth analyzing briefly the general principle of ethics.

64.7 Ethics and Morality

> *Ethics is the branch of philosophy concerned with the evaluation of human conduct [64.33].*

The difference between ethics and morality is subtle. According to Italian philosopher Remo Bodei: "The word Ethics is generally associated to our relationship with others, to our public dimension; while morality concerns more with our conscience's voice, our relationship with ourselves. The distinction, however, is purely conventional, because the word comes from the Greek word *ethos*, which means habit, and morality from Latin *mos/moris*, which again means habit."

Another definition is the following:

> *In simple terms morality is the right or wrong (or otherwise) of an action, a way of life or a decision, while ethics is the study of such standards as we use or propose to judge such things [64.34].*

In short *morality* is the subject of a science called *ethics* (although *morality* may also refer to a code of conduct: see http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/morality-definition/) [64.35].

64.8 Moral Theories

Apart from *virtue ethics*, the classical Greek moral philosophy, the dominant moral theories are:

- *Utilitarianism* - or more generally *consequentialism*: guideline properties that depend only on the consequences, not on the circumstances or the nature of the act in itself;
- *Contractualism*: morality as the result of an imaginary contract between rational agents, who are agreeing upon rules to govern their subsequent behavior. The idea is not that moral rules have resulted from some explicit contract entered into by human beings in an earlier historical era, a claim that is almost certainly false. (John Locke seems to have held a view of this sort.) Nor is the idea that we are, now, implicitly committed to a contract of the *I will not hit you if you do not hit me* variety, which implausibly reduces moral motivation;
- *Deontologism*, or duty-based ethics. What is my moral duty? What are my moral obligations? How do I weigh one moral duty against another? Kant's theory is an example of a deontological or duty-based ethics: it judges morality by examining the nature of actions and the will of agents rather than the goals achieved.

In scientific circles, *secular humanism* – a nontheistically ethical philosophy based upon naturalism, rationalism, and free thought – has gained great importance and influence [64.36].

It is true that in the scientific and technological domain a professional conception of ethics, closer to professional deontology, is becoming dominant and a universal standard of practice.

Furthermore, ethics in the digital world needs new approaches, beyond the classical moral theories, opening new and unresolved moral problems.

64.9 Ethics in Science and Technology

In the last years, concerned scientists, stakeholders, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), parents, and consumers associations have increased their influence on the development of the scientific and technological researches, proposing (often imposing) to scientists, manufacturers, distributors, and advertising agencies the adoption of ethical conducts. Sometimes their intervention was mild, other times it had the result of closing down wealthy lines of research.

That is one of the reasons why we cannot underestimate the impact of society's opinions on *science and society* issues, and on the trend of the advancement of science and technology.

How can ethical concerns and visions become practical rules of society [64.37]? How can the ethical principles discussed in transdisciplinary assemblies; expressed by warnings or the public's concern; suggested by religious personalities, theologians, and moral leaders; and/or forwarded by a community of concerned scientists modify research and development (R&D) [64.38]? How can ethical thrust be embodied in the R&D activity without imposing on it unjustified restrictions, so depriving the scientist of his/her own freedom of thought [64.39]?

Through the millennia of the history of science and technology, society has envisaged ways to express their ethical concern [64.40].

The professional *oath* is either a statement or a promise expressed by a new entry into professional careers to be faithful to the traditional values of the professional order he/she is entering in. The ancient *Hippocratic oath* is the recurrent example for other initiatives to develop and implement codes of conduct for scientists in general, and in specific areas in particular.

Otherwise, a *manifesto* is a public declaration of intentions, opinions, objectives or motives, often issued by a private organization or a government. For example, the Russell–Einstein Manifesto of 1955 is a public declaration against war and the further development of weapons of mass destruction.

A *statement* or a *declaration* can be employed to underline a given topic. As such, it can be either weakly or strongly prescriptive, morally or legally binding.

During the World Robot Conference which took place in Fukuoka, Japan, the participants released a three-part list of *expectations for next-generation robots*, called the *World Robot Declaration* issued on 25 February 2004. It states that:

- Next-generation robots will be partners that coexist with human beings;
- Next-generation robots will assist human beings both physically and psychologically;
- Next-generation robots will contribute to the realization of a safe and peaceful society.

A *recommendation* serves to induce acceptance or favor. It is a prescription only in the weak sense of offering advice: a normative suggestion that is neither legally nor morally binding. More conclusive is the *appeal*, an earnest request for support: a petition, entreaty, or plea.

A *resolution* is a formal expression of opinion or intention made (usually after voting) by a formal organization, legislature, or other group.

In the last 50 years, many professional associations have adopted their *code*: a written text that offers a collection of laws, regulations, guidelines, rules, directives or principles for moral conduct.

The *guiding principles* of the Code of Research Ethics are *non-malfeasance* and *beneficence*, indicating a systematic regard for the rights and interests of others in the full range of academic relationships and activities. *Non-malfeasance* is the principle of doing, or permitting, no official misconduct. It is the principle of doing no harm in the widest sense. *Beneficence* is the requirement to serve the interests and well being of others, including respect for their rights. It is the principle of doing well in the widest sense.

In the field of roboethics, the Government of Japan through the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry has issued a *hugely complex set of proposals*, which is an articulated set of guidelines to ensure a safe deployment of robots in nonstructured environments. Under these guidelines, all robots would be required to report back to a central database any and all injuries they cause to the people they are meant to be helping or protecting. The draft is currently open to public comment with a final set of principles being made public in 2007. Among the indications:

> *Via a structure of general regulation and the adoption of that regulation, the planning, manufacturing, administration, repair, sales and use of robots shall observe the need for safety at every stage (...) The reasonably predictable misuse of robots shall be defined as the management, sale and use of next-generation robots for purposes not intended by manufacturers (...) There should, in principle, be no serious accidents such as fatal accidents involving*

robots, and the frequency of such accidents should be lowered as far as possible. Affordable multiple security measures should be taken in case one protection method alone is insufficient.

The *charter* is an ancient form of agreement. An example is the charter of the United Nations. Charters have a legal character and are connected, in principle, to sanctions when not properly executed.

In 2007, the Government of the Republic of Korea announced the birth of a governmentally sponsored working group whose aim is the definition of a roboethics charter.

The process towards the Korean Roboethics Charter is the following. The first step concerns the establishing of a working group (WG) on roboethics composed by robot developers, chief executive officers (CEOs), psychologists, futurists, writers, government officials, users, lawyers, and doctors. The WG will release a draft that will be circulated for feedbacks among online international communities, and through public hearings [64.41].

The revised draft will go for deliberation to the *Robot Industry Policy Forum*, which will be composed of 40 members, representing the main stakeholders. Subsequently, the draft will go to the *Industrial Development Council* (composed of 29 members). At this point – presumably at the end of 2007 – the draft becomes the Korean Roboethics Charter, and it will be officially announced. Then, application rules and detailed guideline will be released.

Other means of implementing ethical concerns in science and technology are the *convention*, a form of agreement, or a contract, and also a practice established by general consent.

Then, principles established by a government applicable to a people and enforced by judicial decision become *law*.

64.10 Conditions for Implementation

Once the chosen code of research ethics has been defined, a list of conditions for implementation should be drawn up. Actually, no regulation can be implemented without at least some of those conditions, which should favor the application of the rules.

From the *individual* scientist's point of view, he/she has to guarantee some conditions, without which he/she is not in the position to adhere to nor to implement the Code of Ethics. These are: decision-making capacity, that is the empowered position and freedom to identify and choose alternatives based on the values and preferences defined and accepted; individual scientists' honesty and integrity; and transparency of processes.

On the other side, the given scientific institution, and in the final analysis society, should guarantee the individual scientist the reasonable general framework in which he/she finds the best conditions to work. These are:

- Periodic review of the application procedures
- Review and assistance by ethics committees
- Promotion of public debate
- Definition of risk assessment, management and prevention
- Transnational practices: comparison of conducts across countries and comparisons of professional ethics around the world

64.11 Operativeness of the Principles

The implementation of regulations or of codes of conduct should provide guidelines for operationalizing and reconciling the principles to be implemented, in case such principles appear inherently contradictory.

For instance, ethical guidelines may – by virtue of their collective nature – pose a threat to the individual's moral autonomy. Or, the public's demand for accountability could threaten the professions' pursuit of autonomy.

64.12 Ethical Issues in an ICT Society

The importance of ethics in science and technology has been demonstrated by our recent history. Three of the front-rank fields of science and technology: nuclear physics, bioengineering, and computer science, have already been forced to face the consequences of their research's applications because of pressure caused by dramatic events, or because of the concern of the general public.

The introduction of intelligent machines in our daily life brings up global social and ethical problems which are usually summarized as

- dual-use technology (every technology can be used and misused)
- anthropomorphization of technological products (it is well known and documented that people attribute intentions, goals, emotions, and personalities to even the simplest of machines with life-like movement or form)
- humanization of the human–machine relationship (cognitive and affective bonds toward machines)
- technology addiction;
- digital divide, socio-technological gap (per ages, social layer, per world areas)
- fair access to technological resources
- the effects of technology on the global distribution of wealth and power
- the environmental impact of technology

Due to the interdisciplinarity of robotics, roboethics shares problems and solutions with other applied ethics: computer ethics, information ethics, bioethics, technoethics and neuroethics.

Computer ethics (CE), a term coined by Walter Maner in the mid 1970s, denotes the field of research that studies ethical problems *aggravated, transformed or created by computer technology*.

Perhaps the first contact between ethics and computer science took place in the 1940s, when Norbert Wiener, professor at the MIT and one of the founding fathers of computer science, expressed his concern about the social effects of the technologies he himself contributed to develop [64.42]. In 1948, in his book *Cybernetics: or Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine*, and in his following book, *The Human Use of Human Beings*, he pointed out the dangers of nuclear war and the role of scientists in weapons development in 1947, shortly after Hiroshima. Although he did not use the term *computer ethics* he laid down a comprehensive foundation for computer ethics research and analysis. Wiener's foundation of computer ethics was far ahead of its time [64.43, 44].

It was not until 1968 that Wiener's concern became actual practice, when Donn Parker, one of the most famous scientist of the Stanford Research Institute (SRI) at Menlo Park, began to examine unethical and illegal uses of computers by computer professionals. He writes:

> *It seemed that when people entered the computer center, they left their ethics at the door.*

In 1968 he published his *Rules of Ethics in Information Processing* and promoted the development of the first code of professional conduct of the Association for Computing Machinery (ASM), which was adopted by the ACM in 1973.

During the late 1960s, Joseph Weizenbaum, the designer of the computer program Eliza, shocked by the emotional involvement of psychiatric scholars towards his simple programs, expressed his concern that an *information processing model* of human beings was reinforcing an already growing tendency among scientists, and even among the general public, to see humans as mere machines. Weizenbaum wrote the book *Computer Power and Human Reason*, in which he expressed his thoughtful ethical philosophy [64.45].

In the late 1970s, Walter Maner of the Virginia Old Dominion University was the first to employ the label *computer ethics* to define the field of inquiry dealing with ethical problems aggravated, transformed, or created by computer technology [64.46].

In 1985, James Moor of Dartmouth College published his article *What is Computer Ethics?* [64.47], and Deborah Johnson of the Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute published her book, *Computer Ethics*, the first textbook – and for more than a decade, the defining textbook – in the field. In 1983 the Computer Professional for Social Responsibility (CPSR) was founded at Palo Alto: a global organization promoting the responsible use of computer technology. Incorporated in 1983 (following discussions and organizing that began in 1981), CPSR is the first international association whose mission is to educates policymakers and the public on a wide range of issues [64.48].

In 1991 computer ethics was officially added as a subject to the programs in the computer science departments of the United States.

In the 1990s, it was proposed that the core of the issues of CE did not lie in the specific technology, but in the raw material manipulated by it (data/information), as a result of which several researchers (especially the team at Oxford led by Luciano Floridi) developed *information ethics* (IE).

Bioethics is the study of the ethical, social, legal, philosophical, and other related issues arising in health care and in the biological sciences (International Association of Bioethics, IAB) [64.49, 50].

In 1970 Van Rensselaer Potter (1911–2001) coined the term *bioethics* [64.50]. He was an American biochemist, Professor of Oncology at the McArdle Laboratory for Cancer Research at the University of Wisconsin, Madison. The first appearance of the term was in his book *Bioethics, A Bridge to the Future*. He coined it after trying for many months to find the right words to express the need to balance the scientific orientation of medicine with human values.

Potter's original concept of bioethics was comprised of a global integration of biology and values designed to guide human survival, with a new bioethics as the bridge between science and humanities. Increasingly, he felt the need to link what he came to realize had become mainstream biomedical ethics with environmental ethics.

During his career he continued to modify the term bioethics to differentiate his conceptions from the dominant view of biomedical ethics. He eventually selected the term global bioethics and this became the title of his second book [64.51]. In it, there is a new definition of the term bioethics, as *biology combined with diverse humanistic knowledge forging a science that sets a system of medical and environmental priorities for acceptable survival*.

The field of bioethics is at a critical stage of evolution, having now passed the 13th year of the development of bioethics programs. It is in a phase of professionalization attending to both the ethical framework for clinical and industrial bioethical consultation and the creation of the next level of academic organizational success, namely departments and PhD programs [64.52].

Technoethics is a recent definition, derived from Christian theology,

> *as a sum total of ideas that bring into evidence a system of ethical reference that justifies that profound dimension of technology as a central element in the attainment of a finalized perfection of man [64.53].*

Neuroethics is concerned with the ethical, legal, and social policy implications of neuroscience, and with aspects of neuroscience research itself [64.54]. Neuroethics encompasses a wide array of ethical issues emerging from different branches of clinical neuroscience (neurology, psychiatry, psychopharmacology) and basic neuroscience (cognitive neuroscience, affective neuroscience).

64.13 Harmonization of Principles

Internationally recognized institutions such as the United Nations, the World Health Organization (WHO), the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), the UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)'s World Commission on the Ethics of Scientific Knowledge and Technology (COMEST), the International Labor Organization (ILO), the World Medical Association, the World Summit on the Information Society, and the European Union have identified general ethical principles that have been adopted by most nations, cultures, and people of the world.

Furthermore, the international scientific, juridical, economic, and regulatory community has on many occasions proposed a harmonization of world ethical principles applied to science and technology, especially in those cases when these principles involve sensitive issues such as life, human reproduction, human dignity, and freedom.

The Ethics of Science and Technology Programme, part of UNESCO's Division of Ethics of Science and Technology in the Social and Human Sciences Sector, and COMEST, an advisory body to UNESCO composed of 18 independent experts, have proposed, in the field of bioethics, to start a process towards a *declaration on universal norms on bioethics*. In Rio de Janeiro in December 2003, COMEST organized an international conference on the issue of a *universal ethical oath for scientists.*

In Europe, the 6th Framework Program, funded, under the Science and Society work Programme, the ETHICBOTS project (an abbreviation for merging technoethics of human interaction with communication, bionic, and robotic systems). The project aims to promote and coordinate a multidisciplinary group of researchers in artificial intelligence, robotics, anthropology, moral philosophy, philosophy of science, psychology, and cognitive science, with the common purpose of identifying and analyzing technoethical issues concerning the integration of human beings and artificial (software/hardware) entities. Three kinds of integration are analyzed:

1. Human–softbot integration, as achieved by AI research on information and communication technologies

2. Human–robot noninvasive integration, as achieved by robotic research on autonomous systems inhabiting human environments
3. Physical, invasive integration, as achieved by bionic research

64.14 Ethics and Professional Responsibility

Although ethics in science and technology is not limited to deontology or professional ethics, but concerns a broader range of questions involving the fundamental beliefs and moral principles, its results and conclusions become guidelines for conduct in professional daily life.

From the social and ethical standpoints, in deciding the design, development, and application of a new technology, designers, manufacturers, and end users should be following rules, which are common to all human beings:

- human dignity and human rights
- equality, justice, and equity
- benefit and harm
- respect for cultural diversity and pluralism
- nondiscrimination and nonstigmatization
- autonomy and individual responsibility
- informed consent
- privacy and confidentiality
- solidarity and cooperation
- social responsibility
- sharing of benefits
- responsibility towards the biosphere
- obligatory cost-benefit analysis (whether ethical issues are to be considered as part of a proper cost–benefit analysis)
- exploiting potential for public discussion

(the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2001 [64.55]).

Computer and information ethics has developed a codes of ethics called *PAPA* (an acronym of: privacy, accuracy, intellectual property, and access), which could be adopted by robotics. It is composed as follows.

- *Privacy*: What information about ones self or ones associations must a person reveal to others, under what conditions, and with what safeguards? What things can people keep to themselves and not be forced to reveal to others?
- *Accuracy*: Who is responsible for the authenticity, fidelity, and accuracy of information? Similarly, who is to be held accountable for errors in information and how is the injured party to be made whole?
- *Property*: Who owns information? What are the just and fair prices for its exchange? Who owns the channels, especially the airways, through which information is transmitted? How should access to this scarce resource be allocated?
- *Accessibility*: What information does a person or an organization have a right or a privilege to obtain, under what conditions, and with what safeguards?

Problems of the *delegation* and *accountability* to and within technology are problems of daily life for every one of us. Today, we give responsibility for crucial aspects of our security, health, life-saving, and so on to machines.

Professionals are advised to apply, in performing sensitive technologies, the *precautionary principle*:

> *When an activity raises threats of harm to human health or the environment, precautionary measures should be taken even if some cause-and-effect relationships are not fully established scientifically.*

(*Source*: January 1998 Wingspread Statement on the Precautionary Principle; see also the Rio Declaration from the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Agenda 21; and the Commission of the European Communities, Brussels, 02.02.2000, com (2000) 1 communication from the Commission on the precautionary principle.)

From the precautionary principle other rules can be derived, such as:

- noninstrumentalization
- nondiscrimination
- Informed consent and equity
- Sense of reciprocity
- Data protection

All over the world, associations and orders of engineers have adopted codes of ethics guiding towards responsible conduct in research and practice. In this context, *security* and *reliability* are the most important ethical codes of conduct.

Among the other important recommendations are the following:

- Hold paramount the safety, health, and welfare of the public in the performance of their professional duties.
- Perform services only in areas of their competence.
- Issue public statements only in an objective and truthful manner.
- Act in professional matters for each client as faithful agents or trustees.
- Avoid improper solicitation of professional assignments.

(From the *American Council of Engineering Companies Ethical Guidelines*).

64.15 Roboethics Taxonomy

In this section we outline a first classification of the most evident ethical issues of robotics, based on the EURON roboethics roadmap.

Certainly, classifying the different branches of robotics is not an easy task. Likewise, it is a complex undertaking to organize a matrix of field of robotics/ethical issues. We have tried to classify these topics according to homogeneous fields from an applicative point of view.

Furthermore, in the present taxonomy, we have chosen the *triage process* of identify the most evident/urgent/sensitive ethical problems in robotics, leaving to other times and further studies more complex problems.

64.15.1 Humanoids

One of the most ambitious aims of robotics is to design an autonomous robot that could reach – and even surpass – human intelligence and performance in partially unknown, changing, and unpredictable environments.

Artificial intelligence will be able to lead the robot to fulfill the missions required by the end users. To achieve this goal, over the past decades scientists have worked on AI techniques in many fields, including:

1. Artificial vision
2. Perception and analysis of the environment
3. Natural language processing
4. Human interaction
5. Cognitive systems
6. Machine learning and behaviors
7. Neural networks

In this context, one of the fundamental aspects of the robots is their capability to learn: to learn the characteristics of the surrounding environment, that is, (1) the physical environment, but also (2) the living beings that inhabit it. This means that robots working in a given environment have to distinguish human beings from other *objects*.

In addition to learning about their environment, robots have to learn about their own behavior, through a self-reflective process. They have to learn from the experience, replicating somehow the natural processes of the evolution of intelligence in living beings (synthesis procedures, trying-and-error, learning by doing, and so on).

It is almost inevitable that human designers are inclined to replicate their own conception of intelligence in the intelligence of robots. In turn, the former gets wired into the control algorithm of the robots. Robotic intelligence is a learned intelligence, fed by the world models uploaded by the designers. It is a self-developed intelligence, evolved through the experience which robots have gained through the learned effects of their actions. Robotic intelligence also includes the ability to evaluate and attribute a judgment to the actions carried out by robots.

All these processes embodied in the robots produce a kind of intelligent machine endowed with the capability to express a certain degree of autonomy. It follows that a robot can behave, in some situations, in a way that is unpredictable to their human designers. Basically, the increasing autonomy of the robots could give rise to unpredictable and nonpredictable behaviors.

So, without necessarily imagining some science-fiction scenarios where robots are provided with consciousness, free will, and emotions, in a few years we are going to be cohabiting with robots endowed with self-knowledge and autonomy – in the engineering meaning of these words.

64.15.2 Artificial Body

Humanoids are robots whose body structure resembles the human one. They answer an age-old dream of humanity, and certainly do not spring only from rational, engineering, or utilitarian motivations, but also from psychoanthropological ones.

Humanoids are the expression of one of the demands of our European culture, that is, that humankind be the creator of some mechanical being in the shape of a human. In Japanese culture, it is the demand to carefully replicate nature in all its forms.

This is a very difficult and demanding enterprise, a project of the level of the mission to the moon. However, precisely because it is one of humanity's dreams, large investments are being made and progress is quick.

It has been forecast that in the not-so-distant future we will cohabit with humanoids whose shape will be so similar to that of human beings that it will render it possible to get mixed up in certain situations with the latter. Humanoids will assist human operators in human environments, will replace human beings, and will cooperate with human beings in many ways.

Given the high cost and the delicacy of the humanoids, they will probably be employed in tasks and in environments where the human shape would really be needed, that is, in all these situations where the human-robot interaction is primary, compared to any other mission – human-robot interactions in health care; children/disable people/elderly assistance; baby sitting; office clerks, museum guides; entertainers, sexual robots, and so on. Or, they will be employed as testimonials for commercial products.

The special tasks humanoid robots can fulfill are manifold. Humanoids are robots so adaptable and flexible that will be rapidly used in many situations and circumstances. They can assist humans to perform very difficult tasks, and behave like true and reliable companions in many ways. Their shape, and the sophisticated human–robot interaction, will be very useful for situations in which a human shape is needed.

The research carried out in humanoids laboratories throughout the world will have as a side-effect the development of a platform to study the human body, for training, haptic testing, and training, with extraordinary results for healthcare, education, edutainment, and so on [64.56].

Faced with an aging population, the Japanese society see humanoids robots as one way to enable people to continue to lead an active and productive life in their old age, without being a burden to other people.

From the point of view of *safety* in the use of humanoids, and taking into account that in the not distant future they will be used as companions to human beings, humanoids can rise serious problems related to the reliability of their *internal evaluation systems* and to the *unpredictability* of robots' behavior. Thus, designers should guarantee the traceability of evaluation/actions procedures, and the identification of robots.

Concerning safety, it should be underlined that an incorrect action by humanoids can lead to a dangerous situation for living beings and the environment. Furthermore, there could be also the case where the incorrect action by the robot is caused by a criminal intent, if robot's autonomy was controlled by ill-intentioned people, who modified the robot's behavior in a dangerous and fraudulent course.

Because humanoids combine almost all of the characteristics of the whole spectrum of robots, their use implies the emergence of nearly all of the problems we will examine below. In particular, their introduction into human environments, workplaces, homes, schools, hospitals, public places, offices, and so on, will deeply and dramatically modify our society.

There is already an important and well-documented literature on the implication of coexistence between human beings and humanoids. The problems range from the replacement of human beings (economic problems; human unemployment; reliability; dependability; and so on) to psychological problems (deviations in human emotions, problems of attachment, disorganization in children, fears, panic, confusion between the real and the artificial, feeling of subordination towards robots) [64.57].

On the technological and scientific side, trust towards and ever-greater autonomy of humanoids (and of the robots in general) are the dominant trends. From the ethical standpoint, many have expressed fear that too much autonomy can harm human beings. For instance, Japan's Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry are working on a new set of safety guidelines for next-generation robots. This set of regulations would constitute a first attempt at a formal version of the first of Asimov's science-fiction *laws of robotics*, or at least the portion that states that humans shall not be harmed by robots

Recently, Japan's ministry guidelines will require manufacturers to install a sufficient number of sensors to prevent robots from running into people. Lighter or softer materials will be preferred, to further prevent injury. Emergency shut-off buttons will also be required.

Another set of questions arises around the shape of the humanoids. Is it right that robots can exhibit a *personality*? Is it right that robot can express *emotion*? The concern expressed by psychologists is that, well before evolving to become conscious agents, humanoids can be an extraordinary tool used to control human beings.

In one of their papers, Wagner, Cannon, Van der Loos [64.58] list the main questions posed by the introduction of a new technology:

- Under what conditions should we decide that deployment is acceptable?
- At what point in the development of the technology is an increase in deployment acceptable?
- How do we weigh the associated risks against the possible benefits?
- What is the rate of the ethics of functional compensation or repair versus enhancement? This issue is especially notable regarding the problem of *augmentation*: In some cases a particular type of technology is regarded as a way of compensating for some function that is lacking compared to the majority of humans; in other cases, the same technology might be considered an enhancement over and above that which the majority of humans have. Are there cases where such enhancement should be considered unethical?
- Are there cases where a particular type of technology itself should be considered unacceptable even though it has the potential for compensation as well as enhancement?
- The question of identifying cause, and assigning responsibility, should some harm result from the deployment of robotic technology [64.59].

64.15.3 Industrial Robotics

An industrial robot is officially defined by ISO as an automatically controlled, reprogrammable, multipurpose manipulator.

Typical applications of industrial robots include welding, painting, ironing, assembly, pick and place, palletizing, product inspection, and testing, all accomplished with high endurance, speed, and precision.

Complexity can vary from simple single robot to very complex multirobot systems:

- Robotic arms
- Robotic work cells
- Assembly lines

From the social and economic standpoint, the benefits of these robots are extraordinary. They can relieve human beings of heavy work, dangerous workplaces, and routine and tedious activities.

In the future, we can imagine robotic factories, completely managed by robots. In the industrialized countries, which are facing a looming labor shortage due to their aging populations, robots in factories will cut costs.

Industrial robots increase productivity (higher speed, better endurance); they increase quality (precision, cleanliness, endurance); they make highly miniaturized devices possible (building the European Robotics Platform, EUROP).

Social problems stemming from the introduction of robots in factories are, first of all, loss of jobs and unemployment. On the other hand, while a welfare policy is to be implemented at a national level to facilitate workers' redeployment, and educational programs to create new skills, it should also be said that robots have also created new jobs directly and can create wealth, leading to the development of new industries and workplaces.

64.15.4 Adaptive Robot Servants

Robots come in several shapes and sizes (wheeled, legged, humanoids), equipped with different kinds of sensing systems (artificial vision systems, ultrasonic, radio) and manipulations (grippers, hands, tools, probes). Service robots support and back up human operators.

According the UN's annual World Robotics Survey issued by the UN Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) and the International Federation of Robotics, 607,000 automated domestic helpers were in use at the end of 2003, two-thirds of them purchased during that year. The survey forecasts that the use of robots around the home – to mow lawns, vacuum floors and manage other chores – will increase year on year.

By the end of the decade, the study said, robots will *not only clean our floors, mow our lawns and guard our homes but also assist old and handicapped people with sophisticated interactive equipment, carry out surgery, inspect pipes and sites that are hazardous to people, fight fire and bombs*.

Servant robots can: clean and housekeep; they are fast and accurate, and never bored. They can babysit, because they are patient, talkative, and able to play many games, both intellectual and physical. They can assist patients, the elderly, and the handicapped in clinics or at home, being always available, reliable, and taught to provide physical support.

Certainly, servant robots can guarantee a better quality of life, providing that designers guarantee safety and security (unpredictability of machine behavior from machine learning; assignment of liability for misbehavior or crime).

From a social and psychological standpoint, overuse could lead to technology addiction or invasion of privacy. Humans in robotized environments could face psychological problems [64.60].

64.15.5 Distributed Robotic Systems

The fast growth of the many wireless systems makes it possible to link all robots to the Web. Network robotics will allow remote human–robot interaction for teleoperation and telepresence, and also robot–robot interaction for data sharing, and cooperative working and learning. When Web speed become comparable to that of the internal local-area network (LAN) of the robot, the machine will explode into a set of specialized systems distributed over the net.

Complex robotic systems will be developed, constituted by a team of cooperating robotic agents/components connected through information and communication technology (ICT) and GRID, on distributed computing, technologies:

- Networked knowledge system
- Networked intelligence systems
- Multirobot systems

Multirobot systems are self-organizing robot teams consisting of a large number of heterogeneous team members. The organization in robot teams or squads is needed to perform specific tasks that require automatic task distribution and coordination at a global and local level, and when central control becomes impossible due to large distances and the lack of local information, or when signal transmission delays.

A full-scale robot team would be of tremendous value in a number of applications such as security, surveillance, monitoring, gardening, and pharmaceutical manufacturing. In addition, the coordination of heterogeneous teams of robots will also be of significant value in terms of planning, coordination, and the use of advanced manufacturing systems.

The benefits of robot teams are manifold, including increases in efficiency in performing complex tasks, and the capability to manage large-scale applications. They also provide abundant and replaceable interchangeable agents, which improves the reliability because the group can perform even after losing most of its parts.

On the other side, scientists should be aware of some of the risks in applying robot teams, for instance, the increasing dependability of primary services from complex systems, and the unpredictability of robot team behavior. From a criminal point of view the assignment of liability for misbehavior or crimes, vulnerability to hacking, and concerns about privacy are some of the important issues.

64.15.6 Outdoor Robotics

Outdoor robots are intelligent machines that explore, develop, secure, and feed our world. Robots could also be employed in dangerous operations such as laying explosives, going underground after blasting to stabilize a mine roof, and mining in areas where it is impossible for humans to work or even survive.

They can work in the following environments:

Land

- Mining (automated load–haul–dump trucks, robotic drilling and blasting devices)
- Cargo handling (cranes and other automation technology for cargo lift on/lift off)
- Agricultural (autonomous tractors, planters and harvesters, applicators for fertilizers and pest control)
- Road vehicles (autonomous vehicles for humans or cargo transportation)
- Rescue robotics (robots that support first-response units in disaster missions)
- Humanitarian demining (robots for detecting, localizing, and neutralizing landmines)
- Environmental protection (robots for pollution cleaning and decommissioning of dangerous facilities).

Sea

- Research (marine robots for oceanography, marine biology, geology)
- Offshore (underwater robots for inspection, maintenance, repair and monitoring of oil and gas facilities in deep and ultradeep waters)
- Search and rescue (underwater robots for first-response intervention in case of accidents at sea, such as a submarine that has run aground).

Air

- UAV (autonomous airplanes for weather forecasting, environmental monitoring, road traffic control, large-area survey, and patrolling).

Space

- Space exploration (deep-space vehicles, landing modules, rovers)

- Space stations (autonomous laboratories, control and communication facilities)
- Remote operation (autonomous or supervised dexterous arms and manipulators)

Mobile robots in particular can be highly valuable tools in urban rescue missions after catastrophes such as earthquakes, bomb or gas explosions, or everyday incidents such as fires and road accidents involving hazardous materials. Robots can be used to inspect collapsed structures, to assess the situation and to search and locate victims.

Among the benefits of employing such robots is the increased efficiency of the exploitation of natural resources, which could increase food production for the world's population.

Concerning space robotics, it is obvious that, on the basis of current knowledge and technology, the robot can be our pioneer in space travel and missions to explore the far planets of the solar system and beyond.

On the social front, the unrestrained use of outdoor robots could extend the excessive anthropization and exploitation of the planet, which can become in turn a threat to biodiversity and all other forms of life on the planet. As for AI, the other branch of robotics, this could lead to technology addiction. Furthermore, given the versatility of these robots, they can be converted from civilian use for warfare and misuse (terrorism, pollution).

64.15.7 Surgical Robotics

The field of surgery is entering a time of great change, spurred on by remarkable recent advances in surgical and computer technology. Computer-controlled diagnostic instruments have been used in the operating theater for years to help provide vital information through ultrasound, computer-aided tomography (CAT), and other imaging technologies. Recently robotic systems have made their way into the operating room as dexterity-enhancing surgical assistants and surgical planners, in answer to surgeons' demands for ways to overcome the surgical limitations of minimally invasive laparoscopic surgery, a technique developed in the 1980s. On 11 July 2000, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approved the first completely robotic surgical device.

Typical applications are:

- Robotic telesurgical workstations
- Robotic devices for endoluminal surgery
- Robotic systems for diagnosis (Cat Scan - Computerized Axial Tomography Scan; NMR, Nuclear magnetic resonance; PET - Positron emission tomography)
- Robots for therapy (laser eye treatment, targeted nuclear therapy, ultrasonic surgery, etc.)
- Virtual environments for surgical training and augmentation
- Haptic interfaces for surgery/physiotherapy training

64.15.8 Biorobotics

Biorobotics comprises many different but integrated field of researches. Among them, the design and fabrication of novel, high performance bio-inspired machines and systems, for many different potential applications. The development of nano/ micro/ macro devices that can better act on, substitute parts of, and assist human beings - in diagnosis, surgery, prosthetics, rehabilitation and personal assistance. The development of devices for biomedical applications (e.g. mini-invasive surgery and neuro-rehabilitation).

> *Biorobotics is a new scientific and technological area with a unique interdisciplinary character. It derives its methodology mainly from the sectors of robotics and biomedical engineering, but also includes knowledge from, and provides useful applications to, many sectors of engineering, basic and applied sciences (medicine, neuroscience, economics, law, bio/nanotechnologies in particular), and even the humanities (philosophy, psychology, ethics).*
> *Biorobotics offers a new paradigm for engineers. The engineer no longer just cooperates with neuroscientists, but has also become a scientist in order to discover basic biological principles that make their job easier [64.61].*

64.15.9 Biomechatronics

Human prostheses for locomotion, manipulation, vision, sensing, and other functions include:

- Artificial limbs (legs, arms)
- Artificial internal organs (heart, kidney)
- Artificial senses (eye, ears, etc.)
- Human augmentation (exoskeleton)

This field has an important connection with neuroscience, to develop neural interfaces and sensory-motor coordination systems for the integration of these bionics devices into the human body/brain.

64.15.10 Health Care and Quality of Life

Health care and quality-of-life robotics is certainly a very promising field, where progress will be directly measured by the well being of people. It is also the best way to promote robotics among the public, especially amongst aging populations.

Surgical robotics allows minimally invasive surgery, which can reduce patient recovery time, and may also improve accuracy and precision. Robotics systems increase the precision of microsurgery and enhance the performance of complex therapies. Surgical robots can restore a surgeon's dexterity. Robotic surgery is also applied to very delicate neurological procedures that are practically impossible to perform without robotic assistance.

Assistive technology will help many people to conduct a more independent life.

Biorobotics, while enhancing the quality of life after diseases or accidents, provides tools for studying biological behavior and brain functions, and is a test bed for the study and evaluation of biological algorithms and modeling.

From the social and ethical standpoint, this is one of the fields in robotics that suffers from the most difficult safety and ethical problems. From a technical point of view, scientists in robotic surgery are working on the problems of reduced dexterity, workspace, and sensory input and possible fatal trouble, which could originate from the breakdown of surgical robot systems. Issues of size, cost, and functionality should also be addressed in surgery, haptic, and assistive robotics.

In the context of assistive technology, some questions concerning the relationship between patients and the health structures in which they are treated can be posed. Are we going to mechanize hospitals and to dehumanize our patients? Shall we improve our health structures, where human nurses can care for patients? May we not develop new psychological and physical dependences?

As a general principle of awareness, we should underline that the high cost of robotic systems in the medical field could widen the digital divide between developed and developing countries, and between layers of the same population.

The field of implantations raises concerns related to the fact that direct brain interfaces may at the same time pose ethical questions related to the enhancement of human function.

The BioX program at the University of Stanford, and the Stanford Center for Biomedical Ethics, funded a pilot study in this domain called cross-cultural considerations in establishing roboethics for neuro-robot applications [64.62, 63]. This study explores funding mechanisms to investigate the span of ethical issues currently confronting direct brain interface investigators, how different kinds of interfaces may indicate different approaches to bioethics, and how other stakeholders in the deployment and use of this technology (for example, from law, government, and healthcare provider professions) perceive the relative importance of the various bioethics issues for the variety of interfaces that currently exist and those on the horizon.

64.15.11 Military Robotics

Intelligent Weapons

This field includes all devices resulting from the development of traditional military systems using robotics technology (automation, artificial intelligence, etc.):

- Integrated defense systems: an AI system for intelligence and surveillance, controlling weapons and aircraft capabilities
- Autonomous tanks: armored vehicles carrying weapons and/or tactical payloads
- Intelligent bombs and missiles
- Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs): unmanned spy planes and remotely piloted bombers
- Autonomous underwater vehicles (AUVs): intelligent torpedoes and autonomous submarines

Robot Soldiers

Humanoids will be employed to substitute humans in performing *sensitive* tasks and missions in environments populated by humans. The main reasons for using humanoids are to permit a one-by-one substitution, without modifying the environment, the human–human interaction, or the rules of engagement. This could be required where safeguarding human life is considered a priority in many different scenarios:

- Urban terrain combat
- Indoor security operations
- Patrolling
- Surveillance

Outdoor security robots could be able to make their night watch rounds and even chase criminals, directed by a remote-control system via an Internet connection or moving autonomously via their own artificial intelligence systems.

Superhumans

There are several projects aimed at developing a superhuman soldier. Actually, the human body cannot perform a task with the same strength, speed, and fatigue resistance as machines. Robotic *augmentation* describes the possibility of extending existing human capabilities through wearable robot exoskeletons, to create superhuman strength, speed, and endurance, including applications such as:

- artificial sensor systems
- augmented reality
- exoskeletons

The benefits of military robots are:

1. tactical/operational strength superiority
2. unemotional behavior, potentially more ethical than humans
3. limiting the loss of human lives in the robotized army
4. better performance of superhuman over human soldiers

Problems could arise from:

1. the inadequacy to manage the unstructured complexity of a hostile scenario
2. the unpredictability of machine behavior
3. the assignment of liability for misbehavior or crimes
4. the increased risk of starting a videogame-like war, due to the decreased perception of its deadly effects

From the human point of view, humans in mixed teams could face psychological problems, such as the practical and psychological problems of having to distinguish between humans from robots and the stress and dehumanization of superhuman soldiers.

In 2007, the Georgia Tech Mobile Robot Lab – lead by Ronald Arkin – led an online *opinion survey on the use of robots capable of lethal force in warfare*. the opinion survey is part of an important research project under a grant from the Army Research Office. The goal of this survey was to determine how acceptable the robots capable of lethal force in warfare are to different people of varying backgrounds and positions.

Military robotics should be thoroughly examined by specialized international organizations, as happens for every type of military technology, to be regulated by international conventions or agreements [64.64].

64.15.12 Educational Robot Kits

The beneficial applications of robotics in education are known and documented.

Robotics is a very good tool for teaching technology (and many other subjects) whilst, at the same time, always remaining very tightly anchored to reality. Robots are real three-dimensional objects which move in space and time, and can emulate human/animal behavior; but, unlike video games, they are real machines, true objects, and students learn much more quickly and easily if they can interact with concrete objects as opposed to formulas and abstract ideas.

In the age of electronics, computers, and networks, it is necessary to modernize not only educational content and tools, but also the methods used in traditional schools.

It is also important to consider that the lifestyle of young people has changed as well as the communication tools they use in their free time. Today, young people communicate via the Internet and mobile telephones using e-mail, SMS, and chat rooms, which allow them to be continually connected to a global community that has no limits regarding location and time.

Young people spend more time playing videogames, playing with their mobile phones or downloading files from the Internet. These activities provide them with experiences that are by now at the same standard as the most sophisticated technological systems. All this has accelerated the pace of life; so much so that fruition and consumption of experiences are both real and virtual. In fact, we are entering the age of cyberspace, which will not replace normal life relationships, but will certainly alter their characteristics.

In this context, we need to consider that traditional teaching and classical tools of support (books, documentaries) are at risk of becoming unsuitable when compared with the everyday possibilities offered to these young people by the world of mass media. Therefore, it is necessary to begin to plan new ways to transmit knowledge which exploit the potential of this new technology.

Learning about robotics is important not only for those students who want to become robotics engineers and scientists, but for every student, because it provides a strong method of reasoning and a powerful tool for grappling with the world. Robotics collects all the competencies needed for designing and constructing machines (mechanics, electrotechnics, electronics), computers, software, communications systems, and networks. The special features of robotics boost student creativity, communication skills, cooperation, and teamwork.

Learning about robotics promotes students' interest in and commitment to traditional basic disciplines (mathematics, physics, technical drawing). Robotic construction kits, which can combine the physical building of artifacts with their programming, can foster the development of new ways of thinking that encourage new reflections on the relationship between: (1) life and technology, (2) science and its experimental toolset, and (3) robot design, and values and identity.

64.15.13 Robot Toys

The Aibo robot is the Sony's robotic puppy dog with a software-controlled personality and abilities. The entertaining robot, which costs upwards of $2000, can dance, whimper, guard, and play, developing personalities based on interaction with its owners. Sony has sold over 150 000 Aibos since launching the product in May 1999.

Company officials said that there was a real effort this time to make the Aibo's movements more doglike; designers even studied the way dogs move. Developers replaced a relatively un-dog-like sideways head motion of one motor (as with the previous model, there are 20 motors) with a sort of forward-and-down movement.

Robot toys can be intelligent toys: they can be specifically designed to stimulate children's creativity and the development of their intellectual faculties. They can become children's companions, and – for only children – could play the role of *friends*, *brothers*, or the traditional *imaginary fiend*. They could also be used in the pedagogical assistance of autistic children.

On the negative side of technology, robot toys could cause psychological problems, such as:

- lost touch with the real world
- confusion between the natural and the artificial
- confusion between the real and the imaginary
- technology addiction [64.65]

64.15.14 Entertainment Robotics

Robots will enable the construction of real environments that could either be the perfect (or scaled) copies of some existing environments, or the reconstruction of settings existed centuries/millennia ago, and which we can populate with real or imaginary animals.

Robots and robotics settings will make it possible to build natural phenomena and biological processes, even cruel ones, without involving living beings.

In these settings, the users/audience could live interactive experiences, which are *real*, not only *virtual*.

As extraordinary theatrical machines, robots will develop ever more *real* special effects.

Entertaining robots are already used to display and advertise corporate logos, products, and events. These are marketing tools showed off by the manufacturers on special occasions.

In this framework, we should also consider sexual robots, which will be an important market. They could be used as sexual partners in many fields, from therapy to prostitution, and their use could decrease sexual exploitation of women and children [64.66]. This also raises issues related to intimacy/attachments, and about safety and reliability.

64.15.15 Robotic Art

The role of robotics in contemporary art, along with all the types of interactive artistic expressions (telecommunications, and interactive installations), is gaining importance and success.

Artists are employing advanced technologies to create environments and works of art, utilizing the actuators and sensor to allow their robots to react and change in relation to viewers.

Robotic art will spread because:

- It recalls (and it is inspired by) the mythological traditions of various cultures. These traditions have created fantastic synthetic creatures;
- Robots exert on the population at large a special fascination;
- Robots can be used as tools in artwork and enable the building of artistic expression in shorter times, thus expanding the borders of human creativity;
- Robots can also perform actor's rules and allow playing living art.

The social and individual problems that can be produced by robotic art are, on the one hand, the dissemination of misinformation (by spreading of false information using technology), while on the other hand, technology may prevail over creativity.

64.16 Conclusions and Further Reading

In this chapter we have analyzed the main social and ethical issues in robotics, five years after the birth of roboethics, and after three years of wide and intense international discussion. In the conclusions, we develop some assessments, foresee lines of progress, and five some indications for those who wish to study the subject of roboethics in more depth.

The so-called robotics invasion has not yet been unleashed. Surely, the recent figures of the World Robotics Report (Unece/Fir 2005) show a steady growing trend of the robotics production and sales. However, often the media demand more inventions and *gadgets* from the robotics laboratories than the laboratories can afford and, looking at the many automatons that are still struggling to walk, the latter's efforts have so far proved to be something of a disappointment. This is certainly a problem and a pressure for the robotics scientists. For the time being, robotics is a field of research and development that can be applied in, and depends, a high level of technology.

However, we are witnessing a true, growing interest in robots from the general public, who are often more excited than the insiders, whose feelings swing between a position of cultural indifference to a behavior dictated by external pressures, be they political or industrial. We are also noticing the modern change – which had already happened in the 1970s in the field of computer science – of the transformation of the robot from a research platform and a working tool to a consumer item, and an object of entertainment. This is a juvenile phenomenon, as shown by the increase of robotics contests among high-school students. Today's young people who are getting their hands on robotics kits will be the robotics professionals and consumers of tomorrow.

Growing interest in the social effects of robotics is easy to observe among international professional associations and orders, stretching over the sister fields of computer ethics and bioethics.

Certainly, roboethics is still far from being a well-established applied ethics, and by *well established* authors mean that it should demonstrate two qualities: to be universally accepted and standardized, or at least adopted by some communities, relevant in size and in political/economic/cultural influence, and to be embodied in the design, production, and use of robots.

In this chapter, we have mentioned two important steps in this general direction: the guidelines for the use of robots in the human environment, drawn up by the ad hoc group of the Japanese METI; and the Roboethics Charter, which is still in progress, being edited by the appointed committee of the Republic of South Korea. We should recall a few other projects that are studying the effects of the application of robotics to the neurosciences [64.58] and to bioethics/biorobotics [64.67,68]. However, there is no question that we are still at an initial stage of the subject's development.

In fact, considering the history of the two widely applied and structured ethics which are extensively studied and which reach a certain organic unity, bioethics and computer and information ethics [64.46], we acknowledge that their development, which has been happening for over 30 years, came about through leaps and contradictions, chasms and bends, and that they are far from being a suitable ethical standard shared by a plurality of subjects. Both these ethics were born in a policy and legislative vacuum, as technological changes outpaced ethical developments, bringing about unanticipated problems [64.47].

The standardization of roboethics requires the accomplishment of some fundamental steps, both culturally and institutionally. From the general standpoint, it demands that the application of robotics to the human environment, especially to sensitive areas of the human life, will be accepted by the quasi totality of cultures, as has happened with other techno-scientific innovations such as electricity and computer systems. (In the case of free access to the Internet, the issue is still questionable in many nations.) Should this be achieved, roboethics would have already passed the phase of being adjusted to fit different answers and situations, to being modified to the point of having acquired the capability of adapting to different points of views. Different cultures and religions regard the intervention in sensitive fields such as human reproduction, neural therapies, implantations, and privacy differently. These differences originate from cultural specificities regarding fundamental issues, for example, the limit between a human and a cyborg; the separation between the natural and the artificial; the difference between human and artificial intelligence; the border between privacy and the traceability of actions; the concept of integrity and the unity of the human being; the acceptance of diversity (in gender, ethnicity, minorities, etc.); the boundary between replacement and human enhancement; and so on [64.49]. These are all milestones in defining the underlying paradigms, which in turn influence the day-by-day behavior of everyone.

There are many different aspects to be looked at, for instance, in some cultures the reproduction of the human figure is forbidden. In others, the difference between human and nonhuman is not so sharp. The application of humanoid robots should be set against this background [64.69]. The diversity of ideas on these issues, such as natural versus artificial or animate versus inanimate, has immediate effects on the field of organ transplants, and subsequently of robotic organ implants. As a matter of fact, the debate on human enhancement versus rehabilitation is very active in Europe and the United States, for the time being mainly in the field of bioethics.

From the experience provided by more than 30 years of discussions and disputes in the fields of bioethics and information ethics, we know that all the achievements in the field of science and ethics are neither easy nor negligible.

For those who wish to thoroughly investigate some elements of philosophy of science; of history of science and ethics; of science and engineering's ethics; of the law applied to science and technology, we now suggest some fundamental steps.

In the field of the moral theories related to science and technology, we mention the considerable work of Tom L. Beauchamp from the Kennedy Institute of Ethics [64.49].

Two important annual gatherings of Computer Philosophy, CEPE, Computer Ethics Philosophical Enquiry and IACAP International Association for Computing and Philosophy, to mention just two, have recently added *roboethics* as one of their key topics.

We also encourage students and scholars to consult the works and website of the renowned Center for Computing and Social Responsibility (CCSR) of DeMontfort University, Leicester, UK. The CCSR is internationally recognized for its applied research expertise on the risks and opportunities of information technology. It also organizes the International Conference on the Social and Ethical Impacts of Information and Communication Technology (ETHICOMP) every year.

Furthermore, it is very useful to follow the activity of the regulatory bodies entitled to deal with the issues of science and ethics. In accordance with what was said in Sects. 64.4, 64.5, 64.12, and 64.13 of this chapter, the person's interest should start from the general principles that are essentially accepted by most of the worlds' Nations (at least, nominally), and to come down to the specific applications in our field.

The Ethics of Science and the Technology Programme is part of UNESCO's Division of the Ethics of Science and Technology in the Social and Human Sciences Sector. COMEST is an advisory body to UNESCO. The two bodies work to apply in science and technology the principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

The Unesco's Ethics of Science and Technology Programme was created in 1998 along with COMEST to provide ethical reflection on science, technology, and their applications. Currently, in accordance with Decision 3.6.1 of the 169th session of the Executive Board, UNESCO is initiating standard-setting action by drafting studies on some new technological areas.

Another body whose activity is useful to follow is the European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies and the Forum (EGE, European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies), established by the European Commission. The EGE is an independent, pluralist and multidisciplinary body that advise the European Commission on ethical aspects of science and new technologies, regarding the preparation and implementation of community legislation or policies. The forum has many complementary roles. The former body is appointed to provide high-level specialist ethical advice to the European Commission, particularly in relation to the policy arena. The latter was set up under the Framework Programme as a networking activity with the aim of sharing information and exchanging best practices on issues of ethics and science. They work on the basis of the Lisbon Declaration 2000 and the charter of fundamental rights of the European Union approved by all the member states in 2001 (Nice, France).

Concerning the role of science and technology in law, politics, and the public policy in modern democracies, there are important differences between each of the European, the American, and the – we could say – oriental approach. In the United States, the general attitude is definitely more science-based than it is in Europe. In the former case, science is said to speak the truth, and the regulatory process is based more on objective scientific data than on ethical considerations. At the same time, the subjective point of view is taken up by the courts, which are now also intervening directly in areas such as risks to society and scientific knowledge, although the current conceptual tools of jurisprudence in the field of science and technology are still very limited. Nonetheless, in the Anglo Saxon culture, *law does not speak the language of science* [64.70].

On the other hand, in Europe, against the backdrop of the ongoing process of European cohesion, regulation and legislation of science and technology is assuming the character of the foundation of a new political community – the European Union – which is centered around the relationship between science and its applications, and the community formed by the scientists, technology producers, and citizens. We can safely assume that, given the common classical origin of jurisprudence, the latter process could be helpful in influencing other cultures, for instance, the moderate Arab world.

On the subject of science, technology, and law in America and Europe, we recommend the impressive work by Sheila Jasanoff (Kennedy School of Government Faculty, Harvard University) whose research pivots on the role of science and technology in the law, politics, and public policy in Europe, the United States, and India, with particular reference to the behavior of the American courts in the regulation of science, and to the role of experts.

There is a third way to approach issues in science and society, which could be called oriental. In fact, in Japan and in the Republic of South Korea, issues of robotics and society have been handled more smoothly and pragmatically than in Europe and in America. Due to the general confidence from these societies towards the products of science and technology, the robotics community and the ad hoc ethical committees inside these governments have started to draw up guidelines for the regulation of the use of robotic artefacts. This nonideological nonphilosophical approach has its pros and cons, but it could encourage scientists and experts in Europe and the United States to adopt a more normative position.

For those who are interested in keeping up to date on these issues, a good habit to acquire is to consult the archives and websites of the academic institutions, private associations, and professional orders where problems of science and ethics are followed on a regular basis. The Nobel Prize Pugwash Conference for World Affairs is the umbrella association for this community and NGOs concerned with these issues. The IEEE Robotics & Automation Society's Technical Committee on Roboethics was formed for the purpose of promoting and collecting research on robotics and society.

The issue of the influence and the pressure provided by the market on science and R&D is handled by applied ethics, and is known as business ethics. In this framework, corporate social responsibility is one of the ways in which enterprises can affirm ethical principles and values. This view was introduced to the United States 15 years ago (especially in the field of health care) and is still running today. Also, training in the responsible conduct of research (RCR) has been adopted by the United States, and is still being applied. The domain of RCR training does not only include the ethical dimensions of research with human subjects, but every intricate dimension of responsible conduct in the planning, performance, analysis, and reporting of research. Difficulties here arisen from the small amounts of resources allocated; see also the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, on the ethical paragraphs.

Concerning the philosophical and epistemological aspect of the issues in ethics and robotics, one of the main problems that people who are interested in roboethics will have to handle is the persistent confusion – ontologically, but especially linguistically – between human and artificial intelligence, as well as between other fundamental concepts of perception, consciousness, self consciousness, emotions, and so on, as applied to humans and to machines.

It must be clarified that the contemporary roboethics is human ethics as applied to robotics, which is considered nonhuman. A strong base of human roboethics is needed in order to responsibly construct the foundations of the final question, which nobody can yet answer: can robots ever become *human*?

This triaging choice, far from rendering the problem simple, renders it technically manageable and fertile of solutions useful to robotics and to society.

At the same time, the need for serious and thorough work into the concepts of intelligence, knowledge, conscience, autonomy, freedom, free will etc. is highlighted. Indeed, the heterogeneous composition of specialists often leads to incessant discussions about the meaning of words, rather than on the content of the myriad, often pressing, issues that need to be faced.

This work is in fact one of the philosophies of robotics, aiming to better define the scientific paradigm. It is important work, as robotics faces the ideal challenge of recreating life artificially and synthetically, which imposes a reopening of discussion and, in some cases, a need to redefine seemingly simple concepts, as well as the need to create new concepts. All this takes place in a multicultural context, which fuels vastly different philosophical backgrounds.

All of this leads to the necessity for the international robotics community to become the author of its own destiny, so as to face directly the task which needs defining, whilst collaborating with academics in the fields of philosophy of law, and generally with experts from the human sciences, to engage with the ethics and social aspects of their research and the applications of the former. Nor should they feel relegated to a mere technoscientific role, delegating to others the task of reflecting and taking action on moral aspects. On the other hand, a closed-shop attitude would be damaging to the development of robotics, given the interdisciplinary nature of the much of the research undertaken in the field.

From this point of view, roboethics cannot fail to be beneficial to robotics, framing research in close connection with end users and society, and so avoiding many problems that other *sensitive* fields are now facing.

All this, and more, will be wishful thinking if engineering study curricula do not include subjects such as scientific philosophy, history of science, law, and the politics of science, as is already happening in some advanced polytechnics. Once again, we have to say that the deeper study of the history of science, for example, especially in the 19th and 20th centuries, cannot but aid a better understanding of that complex scientific galaxy which is robotics. Even a restricted knowledge of cybernetics and computer science, from Wiener, to von Neumann, to Weizenbaum, will immediately and directly demonstrate that these scientists immediately took care of the ethical and social aspects of their discoveries and realizations, which marked the beginning of the field of computers and robotics.

At the same time, it is necessary that those not involved in robotics keep up to date with the field's real and scientifically predictable developments, in order to base discussions on data supported by technical and scientific reality, and not on appearances or emotions generated by science fiction. In particular, apart from this handbook, one must look to serious magazines published by recognized scientific associations, and not rely on headlines about ambiguous and scandalizing creations that do not really exist.

Ethics is a 1000-year-old human science with an impressive literature. Its application to the field of science technology is no doubt more recent, even though precedents such as the Hippocratic oath suggest an extremely ancient origin. Research on robotics is throwing light on manifold issues across science and the humanities. No wonder it will also open new and unexpected field of studies and application in ethics.

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