REQUESTED ACTION: None, as the report is informational at this meeting.

The Committee on Standards of Attorney Conduct (COSAC) is in the process of a comprehensive review of the Rules of Professional Conduct. In this report, it is recommending amendments to Rules 1.16, 3.3, 3.4, and 3.6. The proposed amendments may be summarized as follows:

- **Rule 1.16(c)(5).** Amend the test for when a lawyer may withdraw because a client has failed to pay fees. The existing test permits withdrawal only when a client “deliberately disregards” an agreement or obligation to the lawyer as to expenses or fees. The amended test would instead permit a lawyer to withdraw if “the client fails substantially to fulfill an obligation to the lawyer regarding the lawyer’s services and has been given reasonable warning that the lawyer will withdraw unless the obligation is fulfilled.”

- **Rule 3.3(c).** Insert a proviso that a lawyer’s duty to remedy false testimony or criminal or fraudulent conduct before a tribunal ends at the conclusion of the proceeding.

- **Rule 3.4(a).** Insert a new provision prohibiting a lawyer from knowingly participating in or counseling the “the unlawful destruction or unlawful deletion of any document having potential evidentiary value.”

- **Rule 3.4(e).** Amend the existing prohibition on presenting or threatening “criminal charges solely to obtain an advantage in a civil case” so that it prohibits presenting “criminal or disciplinary charges to obtain an advantage in a civil matter, if those charges are not advanced in good faith or are unrelated to the civil matter.”

- **Rule 3.6(c).** Amend the introduction to the list of permitted forms of trial publicity in Rule 3.6(c) so that it reads “Notwithstanding paragraph (a)” rather than “Provided that the statement complies with paragraph (a).” The amendment will make Rule 3.6(c) a true safe harbor.
The report is being presented to you on an informational basis at this meeting. It will be scheduled for debate and vote at the January 2019 meeting.

Past president David M. Schraver, a member of COSAC, will present the report at the November 3 meeting.
The New York State Bar Association’s Committee on Standards of Attorney Conduct (“COSAC”) is engaged in a comprehensive review of the New York Rules of Professional Conduct. In this memorandum COSAC is circulating for public comment proposals to amend the Rules 1.16, 3.3, 3.4 and 3.6 of the New York Rules. We invite comments. **Comments are due at 5:00 p.m. on October 19, 2018**, which is ninety (90) days from the date of this memo. Please email comments to roy.simon@hofstra.edu, and please submit any proposed new or different language in redline style (like COSAC’s proposals below). Below are COSAC’s proposals. After a summary of the proposals, we explain the issues and reasoning that led COSAC to propose each particular amendment, and then set out the proposed amendment in redline style, striking out deleted language (in red) and underscoring added language (in blue).

**Summary of Proposals**

COSAC proposes the following changes to the black letter Rules, along with corresponding changes to the Comments:

- **Rule 1.16(c)(5).** Amend the test for when a lawyer may withdraw because a client has failed to pay fees. The existing test permits withdrawal only when a client “deliberately disregards” an agreement or obligation to the lawyer as to expenses or fees. The amended test would instead permit a lawyer to withdraw if “the client fails substantially to fulfill an obligation to the lawyer regarding the lawyer’s services and has been given reasonable warning that the lawyer will withdraw unless the obligation is fulfilled.”

- **Rule 3.3(c).** Insert a proviso that a lawyer’s duty to remedy false testimony or criminal or fraudulent conduct before a tribunal ends at the conclusion of the proceeding.

- **Rule 3.4(a).** Insert a new provision prohibiting a lawyer from knowingly participating in or counseling the “the unlawful destruction or unlawful deletion of any document having potential evidentiary value.”

- **Rule 3.4(e).** Amend the existing prohibition on presenting or threatening “criminal charges solely to obtain an advantage in a civil case” so that it prohibits presenting “criminal or disciplinary charges to obtain an advantage in a civil matter, if those charges are not advanced in good faith or are unrelated to the civil matter.”

- **Rule 3.6(c).** Amend the introduction to the list of permitted forms of trial publicity in Rule 3.6(c) so that it reads “Notwithstanding paragraph (a)” rather than “Provided that the statement complies with paragraph (a).” The amendment will make Rule 3.6(c) a true safe harbor.
Rule 1.16  
Declining or Terminating Representation

New York Rule 1.16(c)(5) currently provides that a lawyer may withdraw from representing a client (with court permission, if necessary) when “the client deliberately disregards an agreement or obligation to the lawyer as to expenses or fees.” When read literally, this standard can prevent an attorney from seeking to withdraw if a client cannot afford to pay fees or expenses. In United States v. Parker, 439 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2006), for example, the court said: “Non-payment of legal fees, without more, is not usually a sufficient basis to permit an attorney to withdraw from representation.” See also N.Y. State 783 n.2 (2005) (withdrawal may “not necessarily be appropriate where the client is financially unable to pay”); N.Y. State 719 (“Mere failure to pay an agreed fee, which is not deliberate, is not a ground for requesting” permission to withdraw). The “deliberately disregards” standard thus has the potential to create a hardship on an attorney where a client is willing, but nonetheless unable, to meet financial obligations to the attorney.

However, many courts and ethics opinions have recognized this potential hardship for attorneys who are not getting paid and have interpreted the phrase “deliberately disregards” in a manner more favorable to attorneys. The most expansive discussion of “deliberately” appears in N.Y. State 598 (1989), where the question was: “May an attorney withdraw from employment in a litigated matter because of nonpayment of fees where the client is financially unable to make payment?” The Committee recognized that “a client’s ‘mere failure to pay an agreed fee, which is not deliberate,’ does not warrant withdrawal by the attorney (citing N.Y. State 212 (1971)). Nevertheless, the Committee said:

[W]e conclude that a client’s non-payment of fees because of an inability to pay may in certain circumstances be deemed a “deliberate” breach of the client’s obligation to counsel and, therefore, warrant permissive withdrawal from the representation by counsel. Such withdrawal will be appropriate in a litigated matter only if the attorney has provided clear notice to the client of the attorney’s desire to withdraw, taken reasonable steps to avoid foreseeable prejudice to the client and obtained permission from the tribunal to withdraw .... [Emphasis added.]

Noting that the “key word is ‘deliberately,’” the Committee in N.Y. State 598 elaborated on the meaning of that word, stating:

... We believe that a client “deliberately disregards an agreement or obligation” to pay legal fees whenever the failure is conscious rather than inadvertent, and is not de minimus in either amount or duration. A client’s knowing and substantial failure to satisfy his or her financial obligations to a lawyer would justify the lawyer's withdrawal from employment .... This would be so even where the failure results from inability to pay. [Emphasis added.]

N.Y. State 598 also cited and expressly agreed with half a dozen judicial decisions that had expressed the same position, including two New York decisions, Boyle v. Revici, 1987 WL 28707 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 1987) (permitting withdrawal where clients had owed lawyers $25,000 for
several months and had “not been able to assure them that the $25,000 or amounts due for future work will be paid at any time”), and Cullen v. Olins Leasing, 91 A.D.2d 537, 457 N.Y.S.2d 9 (1st Dep't 1982) (law firm retained by insurance company to defend insureds was permitted to withdraw after insurance company was placed in liquidation and could not pay fees).

More recent cases are in accord with the cases cited in N.Y. State 598 – see, e.g., Aveos Fleet Performance Inc. v. Vision Airlines, Inc., 2013 WL 12250347 (N.D.N.Y. March 19, 2013) (client’s “inability to make significant contributions to a large, outstanding debt for a term of several months” is “sufficient to satisfy good cause” for withdrawal, citing Boyle and N.Y. State 598); Riverside Capital Advisers, Inc. v. First Secured Capital Corp., 2010 WL 4167222 (Nassau County Sup. Ct. Oct. 5, 2010) (granting motion to withdraw where “the non-payment issue has existed for some time” but client “cannot pay”).

Although N.Y. State 598 was decided based on DR 2-110(C)(1)(f), which was the predecessor to current Rule 1.16(c)(5), it remains the leading ethics opinion on the meaning of “deliberately,” and it continues to be cited. See, e.g., N.Y. State 1061 (2015) (noting that “lawyers are not compelled to provide free legal services to all clients,” citing N.Y. State 598 for the proposition that “client’s knowing and substantial failure to satisfy his or her financial obligations to a lawyer would justify lawyer’s withdrawal from employment”); N.Y. State 910 (2012) (citing N.Y. State 598 for discussion of “when a failure to pay a legal fee is ‘deliberate’”).

To bring the wording of Rule 1.16(c)(5) more closely into line with the interpretation by courts and ethics committees, and to avoid financial hardship to attorneys while also remaining fair to clients, COSAC proposes to amend Rule 1.16(c)(5) as follows:

(c) Except as stated in paragraph (d), a lawyer may withdraw from representing a client when . . . (5) the client deliberately disregards an agreement or obligation to the lawyer as to expenses or fees fails substantially to fulfill an obligation to the lawyer regarding the lawyer’s services and has been given reasonable warning that the lawyer will withdraw unless the obligation is fulfilled.

This change makes New York’s provision nearly identical to ABA Model Rule 1.16(b)(5). (The only difference is that the ABA lead-in clause uses the word “if” instead of “when” – a difference in style, not substance.) This formulation reflects the conclusion in N.Y. State 598 that a “knowing and substantial failure” to satisfy his or her financial obligations to a lawyer would justify the lawyer's withdrawal from employment ... even where the failure results from inability to pay” (emphasis added). It also enhances protection of clients by adding the condition that a lawyer seeking to withdraw for nonpayment of fees must first give the client “reasonable warning that the lawyer will withdraw unless the obligation is fulfilled.” Where a client is unable to pay, the “warning” clause will give the client a reasonable time to borrow money, solicit financial support from relatives, or otherwise find a way to pay past due and future fees.

In litigation matters, current Rule 1.16(d) will provide an additional safeguard for clients. In matters pending before a tribunal, lawyers will ordinarily need to obtain court permission to withdraw pursuant to Rule 1.16(d), which provides: “If permission for withdrawal from employment is required by the rules of a tribunal, a lawyer shall not withdraw from employment
in a matter before that tribunal without its permission.” Thus, courts will be able to ensure that lawyers do not abandon clients without substantial financial cause.

In non-litigation matters, a lawyer will have the option to withdraw when a client substantially fails to pay fees when due or otherwise substantially fails to abide by financial obligations in a retainer agreement or letter of engagement. COSAC does not think lawyers will abuse this right any more than lawyers abuse the dozen other grounds for optional withdrawal in Rule 1.16(c). Moreover, lawyers will often have a financial incentive to work out a payment plan or other arrangement that will enable the lawyers to get paid and keep the client rather than withdraw.

To preserve consistency with the amended text, COSAC also suggests amending current New York Comment [8] to match the ABA Model Rule version of Comment [8] to Rule 1.16. New York Comment [8] to Rule 1.16 would thus be modified to provide as follows:

[8] A lawyer may withdraw if the client refuses fails substantially to abide by the terms of an agreement relating to the representation, such as an agreement concerning fees or court costs or an agreement limiting the objectives of the representation.

Rule 3.3
Conduct Before a Tribunal

Rule 3.3(a)(3) and Rule 3.3(b) both obligate lawyers, in specified narrow circumstances, to reveal information to remedy misconduct by a client or other person, even if the revelation would otherwise be prohibited by Rule 1.6. If a lawyer comes to know that the client or another witness called by the lawyer “has offered material evidence” and “the lawyer comes to know of its falsity,” see Rule 3.3(a)(3), or if a lawyer who represents a client before a tribunal “knows that a person intends to engage, is engaging or has engaged in criminal or fraudulent conduct related to the proceeding,” see Rule 3.3(b), then the lawyer “shall take reasonable remedial measures, including, if necessary, disclosure to the tribunal,” see Rule 3.3(a) and (b). Disclosure to the tribunal is a momentous step, fraught with serious consequences for both lawyer and client, and even less drastic remedial measures can telegraph problems with a case. Therefore, it is important for lawyers to know when the duty to make disclosure or take other remedial measures ends.

ABA Model Rule 3.3(c) addresses the end point by providing that the duties in paragraphs (a) and (b) “continue to the conclusion of the proceeding.” COSAC recommended that language to the Courts in 2008, but the Courts declined to adopt that recommendation, and did not substitute any alternative end point. Thus, New York Rule 3.3 does not specify when a lawyer’s duty to take reasonable remedial measures under Rules 3.3(a) and 3.3(b) terminates. Rather, New York Rule 3.3(c) says only that the duties stated in paragraphs (a) and (b) of Rule 3.3 “apply even if compliance requires disclosure of information otherwise protected by Rule 1.6” (New York’s basic confidentiality rule).
Various New York ethics opinions have attempted to interpret Rule 3.3 to articulate a workable and practical time limit under Rule 3.3(c). These opinions have done so by limiting the phrase “remedial measures” to situations where disclosure or other measures will actually remedy the problem of false evidence. In N.Y. State 831 n.4 (2009), for example, the Committee said:

We believe the obligation extends for as long as the effect of the fraudulent conduct on the proceeding can be remedied, which may extend beyond the end of the proceeding — but not forever. If disclosure could not remedy the effect of the conduct on the proceeding, we do not believe the Rule 3.3 disclosure duty applies.

N.Y. State 837 (2010) revisited this issue and said:

16. ... [T]he duration of counsel's obligation under New York Rule 3.3(c) as adopted may continue even after the conclusion of the proceeding in which the false material was used. ... [T]he endpoint of the obligation nevertheless cannot sensibly or logically be viewed as extending beyond the point at which remedial measures are available, since a disclosure which exposes the client to jeopardy without serving any remedial purpose is not authorized under Rule 3.3. [Emphasis added; citations omitted.]

N.Y. City 2013-2 (2013) reached a similar conclusion, saying:

[T]he obligations under Rule 3.3(a)(3) survive the “conclusion of a proceeding” where the false evidence was presented. ABA Rule 3.3, cmt. [13] clarifies that the phrase “conclusion of a proceeding” means “when a final judgment in the proceeding has been affirmed on appeal or the time for review has passed.” We believe that the courts’ rejection of an explicit statement that the obligation ends when the proceeding ends, makes this evident.

N.Y. City 2013-2 thus concluded that Rule 3.3(c) requires a lawyer to disclose false evidence (i) to the tribunal to which the evidence was presented “as long as it is still possible to reopen the proceeding based on this disclosure,” or (ii) “to opposing counsel where another tribunal could amend, modify or vacate the prior judgment.”

COSAC believes that these tests inject too much uncertainty into determining whether disclosing false testimony to a tribunal or to opposing counsel, or taking other remedial measures, is still required after the conclusion of a proceeding. For the same reason, COSAC rejected the Texas version of Rule 3.3(c), which provides that a lawyer’s duties continue until remedial legal measures are “no longer reasonably possible.” See Texas Rule 3.03(c) (“The duties stated in paragraphs (a) and (b) continue until remedial legal measures are no longer reasonably possible”). Comment [14] to Texas Rule 3.04 elaborates on this test by saying: “The time limit on the obligation to rectify the presentation of false testimony or other evidence varies from case to case but continues as long as there is a reasonable possibility of taking corrective legal actions before a tribunal.”
In COSAC’s view, Rule 3.3(c) should articulate a bright line to mark the end point of the duty to take remedial measures under Rule 3.3(a) and (b). The certainty of a bright line is necessary both (i) to protect clients against belated accusations of perjury that may have no appreciable effect beyond damaging a client’s reputation, and (ii) to protect lawyers against discipline for failing to attempt remedial measures when a lawyer believes in good faith that remedial measures are no longer possible. COSAC therefore recommends that New York amend Rule 3.3(c) to match ABA Model Rule 3.3(c), which ends the lawyer’s obligation upon the “conclusion of the proceeding.” On balance, COSAC believes this bright line termination of the duty – at the conclusion of the proceeding – is preferable to New York’s current open-ended formulation, and is preferable to alternative formulations based on when remedial measures are no longer possible.

COSAC recognizes that, under the proposed formulation, some fraud on tribunals may go unremedied because the false evidence or other impropriety will not be discovered until after the conclusion of a proceeding. New York has a long tradition of a strong duty of confidentiality. Indeed, DR 7-102(B) in the old New York Code of Professional Responsibility did not ordinarily allow disclosure even to remedy a client’s fraud on a court if the information to be disclosed was protected as a confidence or secret. New York did not appear to suffer from frequent unremedied fraud on tribunals under the Code. Nevertheless, COSAC is separately considering whether Rule 1.6 should include a discretionary exception to the duty of confidentiality that would permit (but not require) a lawyer to disclose confidential information to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to remedy a fraud on a tribunal or a wrongful conviction based upon such a fraud.

In any event, COSAC believes that a lawyer who has offered false evidence will most often come to know of its falsity per Rule 3.3(a)(3) before the conclusion of the proceeding (perhaps when an opposing party’s cross-examination exposes the false evidence). Likewise, COSAC believes that a lawyer usually will learn before the conclusion of a proceeding that a person has engaged in criminal or fraudulent conduct related to the proceeding. Although no empirical evidence is available on these points, COSAC believes that the potential damage to confidentiality by requiring disclosure (or other remedial measures) after the conclusion of a proceeding out weigh the potential gain to the system of justice by retaining New York’s current version of Rule 3.3(c). Trust is the fundamental bedrock of a strong attorney-client relationship, and the broader the exceptions to the duty of confidentiality, the more difficult it will be for attorneys to gain and maintain the trust of their clients.

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1 DR 7-102(B) provided as follows:

B. A lawyer who receives information clearly establishing that:

1. The client has, in the course of the representation, perpetrated a fraud upon a person or tribunal shall promptly call upon the client to rectify the same, and if the client refuses or is unable to do so, the lawyer shall reveal the fraud to the affected person or tribunal, except when the information is protected as a confidence or secret.

2. A person other than the client has perpetrated a fraud upon a tribunal shall reveal the fraud to the tribunal. [Emphasis added.]
Thus, although there are arguments that requiring a lawyer to take remedial measures beyond the conclusion of the proceeding furthers the interests of justice, COSAC believes that adopting the ABA version of Rule 3.3(c) and the related Comments strikes a better balance and will provide needed clarity and certainty in this important area. In reviewing the Rules of Professional Conduct adopted by other states, COSAC noted that only three other states (Florida, Texas, and Wisconsin) require remedial measures after the close of proceedings. In contrast, more than thirty jurisdictions terminate Rule 3.3 remedial duties under Rule 3.3(a) and (b) at the conclusion of the proceeding, in line with ABA Model Rule 3.3(c) – see https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/mrpc_3_3.authcheckdam.pdf or https://bit.ly/2kfYBpx.

Accordingly, COSAC recommends amending Rule 3.3(c) as follows:

(c) The duties stated in paragraphs (a) and (b) continue to the conclusion of the proceeding, and apply even if compliance requires disclosure of information otherwise protected by Rule 1.6.

COSAC also recommends adopting ABA Comment [13] as new Comment [13] to New York Rule 3.3, with revisions to refer not only to “when a final judgment in the proceeding has been affirmed on appeal,” as in the ABA Comment, but also more broadly to “when a final judgment or order in the proceeding has been entered after appeal.” Thus, new Comment [13] would explain the time limit in Rule 3.3(c) as follows:

[13] A practical time limit on the obligation to rectify false evidence or false statements of law and fact has to be established. The conclusion of the proceeding is a reasonably definite point for the termination of the obligation. A proceeding has concluded within the meaning of this Rule when a final judgment or order in the proceeding has been entered after appeal or the time for review has passed.

(Existing New York Comment [13] to Rule 3.3, which is on a different topic and has no equivalent in the ABA Model Rules, would be renumbered as New York Comment [13B]. That renumbering would maintain consistency with ABA numbering and would continue New York’s convention of using capital letters to mark Comments adopted by New York but not by the ABA.)

### Rule 3.4

**Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel**

COSAC has two recommendations for changes to Rule 3.4.

*First*, amend Rule 3.4(a) to add the following new subparagraph (a)(6):

A lawyer shall not . . . (6) knowingly participate in or counsel the unlawful destruction or unlawful deletion of any document or material having potential evidentiary value.
The reason for the additional language is that Rule 3.4(a) currently prohibits creating false evidence, but does not prohibit destroying evidence. It should prohibit both, and should also prohibit the destruction of documents or materials that are not technically “evidence” but that have potential evidentiary value.

The recommended amendment would also align New York Rule 3.4(a) more closely with ABA Model Rule 3.4(a), which provides that a lawyer shall not “(a) unlawfully obstruct another party’s access to evidence or unlawfully alter, destroy or conceal a document or other material having potential evidentiary value. ...” (Emphasis added.)

However, despite the general advantages of uniformity with the ABA (and with jurisdictions that have adopted ABA Model Rule 3.4), COSAC does not recommend adding the ABA clause “unlawfully obstruct another party’s access to evidence.” COSAC does not recommend adopting that clause because it duplicates other subparagraphs of New York Rule 3.4(a) not found in ABA Model Rule 3.4. For example, New York Rule 3.4(a)(1) provides that a lawyer shall not “suppress any evidence that the lawyer or the client has a legal obligation to reveal or produce,” and New York Rule 3.4(a)(3) provides that a lawyer shall not “conceal or knowingly fail to disclose that which the lawyer is required by law to reveal.” New York subparagraphs (a)(1) and (a)(3) of Rule 3.34 thus already effectively prohibit a lawyer from unlawfully obstructing another party’s access to evidence.

(Current New York Rule 3.4(a)(6), which prohibits a lawyer from knowingly engaging in “other illegal conduct or conduct contrary to these Rules,” would be moved to Rule 3.4(a)(7), since a catch-all provision should come at the end of a rule.)

Second, COSAC recommends amending Rule 3.4(e) by expanding the rule to cover disciplinary charges and by narrowing the rule via adding two qualifying phrases. As amended, Rule 3.4(e) would provide:

A lawyer shall not ... (e) present, participate in presenting, or threaten to present criminal or disciplinary charges to obtain an advantage in a civil matter, if those charges are not advanced in good faith or are unrelated to the civil matter.

COSAC believes that, in its current form, Rule 3.4(e) is both too broad and too narrow. It is too broad because it might preclude a threat to honestly report a crime in an effort to obtain restitution for the harm done by the crime, something that Comment [5] to Rule 3.4 expressly says would not be improper. Comment [5] says:

[5] The use of threats in negotiation may constitute the crime of extortion. However, not all threats are improper. For example, if a lawyer represents a client who has been criminally harmed by a third person (for example, a theft of property), the lawyer’s threat to report the crime does not constitute extortion when honestly claimed in an effort to obtain restitution or indemnification for the harm done. But extortion is committed if the threat involves conduct of the third person unrelated to the criminal harm (for example, a threat to report tax evasion by the third person that is unrelated to the civil dispute). [Emphasis added.]
Since COSAC believes that Comment [5] correctly states the law, COSAC also believes that the current blanket ban on threatening to present criminal charges is too broad.

Rule 3.4(e) is also too narrow because it does not prohibit threatening meritless or unrelated disciplinary charges in ways that might be as improperly coercive as a threat to present criminal charges and might also pressure lawyers who are the target of such charges to act in ways that conflict with their clients’ best interests. For example, a lawyer who has been threatened with disciplinary charges might seek to settle litigation or might yield to a negotiating demand in a transaction on terms unfavorable to the lawyer’s client in the hope (or on the express condition) that the opposing lawyer would then drop the threat to file meritless disciplinary charges.

COSAC’s proposed changes to Rule 3.4(e) attempt to rectify these two problems.

**Rule 3.6**

**Trial Publicity**

COSAC recommends a small but significant amendment to Rule 3.6(a). Unlike the ABA Model Rule, New York Rule 3.6(a) prohibits all extrajudicial statements (with one exception, discussed below) that “will have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding.” A lawyer violates this rule if the lawyer knows, or reasonably should know, that the lawyer’s statement (a) will be disseminated by public communication and (b) will meet the “substantial likelihood” test just quoted.

ABA Model Rule 3.6(a) uses the same overarching “substantial likelihood” test, but creates a safe harbor for an enumerated list of certain types of statements that the ABA Rule says do not run afoul of the proscription, “notwithstanding” the “substantial likelihood” test above. The types of statements listed in the ABA Model Rule for both civil and criminal cases are either innocuous or necessary types of statements, boiling down in essence to:

- charge and defense information, including names of key people involved
- anything in a public record
- the fact of a pending investigation
- scheduling matters
- requests for assistance in obtaining evidence, and
- warnings of danger about people involved in litigation

Additionally, in criminal cases only, the following fall within the ABA safe harbor:

- pedigree information about the accused
- information necessary to aid in apprehending the accused
- the fact, time and place of arrest, and
- the identity of investigating and arresting officers or agencies involved
New York Rule 3.6(b) contains a nearly identical list, but instead of permitting extrajudicial statements regarding the items on the list “notwithstanding” the “substantial likelihood” test of 3.6(a), New York instead dictates that the statements on the list may be made only “[p]rovided that the statement complies with” the “substantial likelihood” test. New York’s “provided that” language deprives lawyers of a useful bright-line test and safe harbor, and therefore chills public statements of the type that are included on the list, for fear that even public statements falling within the safe harbors might be second-guessed based on the “substantial likelihood” test. Providing this safe harbor without the qualification would allay that fear, and would also help harmonize the New York Rules with the ABA Model Rules.

Accordingly, COSAC recommends the following change to Rule 3.6(c):

(c) Provided that the statement complies with paragraph (a), Notwithstanding paragraph (a), a lawyer may state the following without elaboration ….