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PREAMBLE:
A LAWYER’S RESPONSIBILITIES

[1] A lawyer, as a member of the legal profession, is a representative of clients and an officer of the legal system with special responsibility for the quality of justice. As a representative of clients, a lawyer assumes many roles, including advisor, advocate, negotiator, and evaluator. As an officer of the legal system, each lawyer has a duty to uphold the legal process; to demonstrate respect for the legal system; to seek improvement of the law; and to promote access to the legal system and the administration of justice. In addition, a lawyer should further the public’s understanding of and confidence in the rule of law and the justice system because, in a constitutional democracy, legal institutions depend on popular participation and support to maintain their authority.

[2] The touchstone of the client-lawyer relationship is the lawyer’s obligation to assert the client’s position under the rules of the adversary system, to maintain the client’s confidential information except in limited circumstances, and to act with loyalty during the period of the representation.

[3] A lawyer’s responsibilities in fulfilling these many roles and obligations are usually harmonious. In the course of law practice, however, conflicts may arise among the lawyer’s responsibilities to clients, to the legal system and to the lawyer’s own interests. The Rules of Professional Conduct often prescribe terms for resolving such conflicts. Nevertheless, within the framework of the Rules, many difficult issues of professional discretion can arise. The lawyer must resolve such issues through the exercise of sensitive professional and moral judgment, guided by the basic principles underlying the Rules.

[4] The legal profession is largely self-governing. An independent legal profession is an important force in preserving government under law, because abuse of legal authority is more readily challenged by a profession whose members are not dependent on government for the right to practice law. To the extent that lawyers meet these professional obligations, the occasion for government regulation is obviated.

[5] The relative autonomy of the legal profession carries with it special responsibilities of self-governance. Every lawyer is responsible for observance of the Rules of Professional Conduct and also should aid in securing their observance by other lawyers. Neglect of these responsibilities compromises the independence of the profession and the public interest that it serves. Compliance with the Rules depends primarily upon the lawyer’s understanding of the Rules and desire to comply with the professional norms they embody for the benefit of clients and the legal system, and, secondarily, upon reinforcement by peer and public opinion. So long as its practitioners are guided by these principles, the law will continue to be a noble profession.

SCOPE

[6] The Rules of Professional Conduct are rules of reason. They should be interpreted with reference to the purposes of legal representation and of the law itself. Some of the Rules are imperatives, cast in the terms “shall” or “shall not.” These Rules define proper conduct for purposes of professional discipline. Others, generally cast in the term “may,” are permissive and define areas under the Rules in which the lawyer has discretion to exercise professional judgment. No disciplinary action should be taken when the lawyer
chooses not to act or acts within the bounds of such discretion. Other Rules define the nature of relationships between the lawyer and others. The Rules are thus partly obligatory and disciplinary and partly constitutive and descriptive in that they define a lawyer’s professional role. Many of the Comments use the term “should.” Comments do not add obligations to the Rules but provide guidance for practicing in compliance with the Rules. The Rules state the minimum level of conduct below which no lawyer can fall without being subject to disciplinary action.

[7] The Rules presuppose a larger legal context shaping the lawyer’s role. That context includes court rules and statutes relating to matters of licensure, laws defining specific obligations of lawyers, and substantive and procedural law in general. The Comments are sometimes used to alert lawyers to their responsibilities under such other law.

[8] The Rules provide a framework for the ethical practice of law. Compliance with the Rules, as with all law in an open society, depends primarily upon understanding and voluntary compliance, secondarily upon reinforcement by peer and public opinion and finally, when necessary, upon enforcement through disciplinary proceedings. The Rules do not, however, exhaust the moral and ethical considerations that should inform a lawyer, for no worthwhile human activity can be completely defined by legal rules.

[9] Furthermore, for purposes of determining the lawyer’s authority and responsibility, principles of substantive law external to these Rules determine whether a client-lawyer relationship exists. Most of the duties flowing from the client-lawyer relationship attach only after the client has requested the lawyer to render legal services and the lawyer has agreed to do so. But there are some duties, such as that of confidentiality under Rule 1.6, that attach when the lawyer agrees to consider whether a client-lawyer relationship shall be established. See Rule 1.18. Whether a client-lawyer relationship exists for any specific purpose can depend on the circumstances and may be a question of fact.

[10] Under various legal provisions, including constitutional, statutory and common law, the responsibilities of government lawyers may include authority concerning legal matters that ordinarily reposes in the client in private client-lawyer relationships. For example, a lawyer for a government agency may have authority on behalf of the government to decide whether to agree to a settlement or to appeal from an adverse judgment. Such authority in various respects is generally vested in the attorney general and the state’s attorney in state government, and in their federal counterparts, and the same may be true of other government law officers. Also, lawyers under the supervision of these officers may be authorized to represent several government agencies in intragovernmental legal controversies in circumstances where a private lawyer could not represent multiple private clients. These Rules do not abrogate any such authority.

[11] Failure to comply with an obligation or prohibition imposed by a Rule is a basis for invoking the disciplinary process. The Rules presuppose that disciplinary assessment of a lawyer’s conduct will be made on the basis of the facts and circumstances as they existed at the time of the conduct in question and in recognition of the fact that a lawyer often has to act upon uncertain or incomplete evidence of the situation. Moreover, the Rules presuppose that whether discipline should be imposed for a violation, and the severity of a sanction, depend on all the circumstances, such as the willfulness and seriousness of the violation, extenuating factors and whether there have been previous violations.

[12] Violation of a Rule should not itself give rise to a cause of action against a lawyer nor should it create any presumption in such a case that a legal duty has been breached. In addition, violation of a Rule does not necessarily warrant any other nondisciplinary remedy, such as disqualification of a lawyer in pending
litigation. The Rules are designed to provide guidance to lawyers and to provide a structure for regulating conduct through disciplinary agencies. They are not designed to be a basis for civil liability. Furthermore, the purpose of the Rules can be subverted when they are invoked by opposing parties as procedural weapons. The fact that a Rule is a just basis for a lawyer’s self-assessment, or for sanctioning a lawyer under the administration of a disciplinary authority, does not imply that an antagonist in a collateral proceeding or transaction has standing to seek enforcement of the Rule. Nevertheless, because the Rules do establish standards of conduct by lawyers, a lawyer’s violation of a Rule may be evidence of breach of the applicable standard of conduct.

[13] The Comment accompanying each Rule explains and illustrates the meaning and purpose of the Rule. The Preamble and this note on Scope provide general orientation. The Comments are intended as guides to interpretation, but the text of each Rule is authoritative.
RULE 1.0:
TERMINOLOGY

(a) “Advertisement” means any public or private communication made by or on behalf of a lawyer or law firm about that lawyer or law firm’s services, the primary purpose of which is for the retention of the lawyer or law firm. It does not include communications to existing clients or other lawyers.

(b) “Belief” or “believes” denotes that the person involved actually believes the fact in question to be true. A person’s belief may be inferred from circumstances.

(c) “Computer-accessed communication” means any communication made by or on behalf of a lawyer or law firm that is disseminated through the use of a computer or related electronic device, including, but not limited to, web sites, weblogs, search engines, electronic mail, banner advertisements, pop-up and pop-under advertisements, chat rooms, list servers, instant messaging, or other internet presences, and any attachments or links related thereto.

(d) “Confidential information” is defined in Rule 1.6.

(e) “Confirmed in writing” denotes (i) a writing from the person to the lawyer confirming that the person has given consent, (ii) a writing that the lawyer promptly transmits to the person confirming the person’s oral consent, or (iii) a statement by the person made on the record of any proceeding before a tribunal. If it is not feasible to obtain or transmit the writing at the time the person gives oral consent, then the lawyer must obtain or transmit it within a reasonable time thereafter.

(f) “Differing interests” include every interest that will adversely affect either the judgment or the loyalty of a lawyer to a client, whether it be a conflicting, inconsistent, diverse, or other interest.

(g) “Domestic relations matter” denotes representation of a client in a claim, action or proceeding, or preliminary to the filing of a claim, action or proceeding, in either Supreme Court or Family Court, or in any court of appellate jurisdiction, for divorce, separation, annulment, custody, visitation, maintenance, child support or alimony, or to enforce or modify a judgment or order in connection with any such claim, action or proceeding.

(h) “Firm” or “law firm” includes, but is not limited to, a lawyer or lawyers in a law partnership, professional corporation, sole proprietorship or other association authorized to practice law; or lawyers employed in a qualified legal assistance organization, a government law office, or the legal department of a corporation or other organization.

(i) “Fraud” or “fraudulent” denotes conduct that is fraudulent under the substantive or procedural law of the applicable jurisdiction or has a purpose to deceive, provided that it does not include conduct that, although characterized as fraudulent by statute or administrative rule, lacks an element of scienter, deceit, intent to mislead, or
knowing failure to correct misrepresentations that can be reasonably expected to induce detrimental reliance by another.

(j) “Informed consent” denotes the agreement by a person to a proposed course of conduct after the lawyer has communicated information adequate for the person to make an informed decision, and after the lawyer has adequately explained to the person the material risks of the proposed course of conduct and reasonably available alternatives.

(k) “Knowingly,” “known,” “know,” or “knows” denotes actual knowledge of the fact in question. A person’s knowledge may be inferred from circumstances.

(l) “Matter” includes any litigation, judicial or administrative proceeding, case, claim, application, request for a ruling or other determination, contract, controversy, investigation, charge, accusation, arrest, negotiation, arbitration, mediation or any other representation involving a specific party or parties.

(m) “Partner” denotes a member of a partnership, a shareholder in a law firm organized as a professional legal corporation or a member of an association authorized to practice law.

(n) “Person” includes an individual, a corporation, an association, a trust, a partnership, and any other organization or entity.

(o) “Professional legal corporation” means a corporation, or an association treated as a corporation, authorized by law to practice law for profit.

(p) “Qualified legal assistance organization” means an office or organization of one of the four types listed in Rule 7.2(b)(1)-(4) that meets all of the requirements thereof.

(q) “Reasonable” or “reasonably,” when used in relation to conduct by a lawyer, denotes the conduct of a reasonably prudent and competent lawyer. When used in the context of conflict of interest determinations, “reasonable lawyer” denotes a lawyer acting from the perspective of a reasonably prudent and competent lawyer who is personally disinterested in commencing or continuing the representation.

(r) “Reasonable belief” or “reasonably believes,” when used in reference to a lawyer, denotes that the lawyer believes the matter in question and that the circumstances are such that the belief is reasonable.

(s) “Reasonably should know,” when used in reference to a lawyer, denotes that a lawyer of reasonable prudence and competence would ascertain the matter in question.

(t) “Screened” or “screening” denotes the isolation of a lawyer from any participation in a matter through the timely imposition of procedures within a firm that are reasonably adequate under the circumstances to protect information that the isolated lawyer or the firm is obligated to protect under these Rules or other law.
(u) “Sexual relations” denotes sexual intercourse or the touching of an intimate part of the lawyer or another person for the purpose of sexual arousal, sexual gratification or sexual abuse.

(v) “State” includes the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and other federal territories and possessions.

(w) “Tribunal” denotes a court, an arbitrator in an arbitration proceeding or a legislative body, administrative agency or other body acting in an adjudicative capacity. A legislative body, administrative agency or other body acts in an adjudicative capacity when a neutral official, after the presentation of evidence or legal argument by a party or parties, will render a legal judgment directly affecting a party’s interests in a particular matter.

(x) “Writing” or “written” denotes a tangible or electronic record of a communication or representation, including handwriting, typewriting, printing, photocopying, photography, audio or video recording, email or other electronic communication or any other form of recorded communication or recorded representation. A “signed” writing includes an electronic sound, symbol or process attached to or logically associated with a writing and executed or adopted by a person with the intent to sign the writing.

Comment

Confirmed in Writing

[1] Some Rules require that a person’s oral consent be “confirmed in writing.” E.g., Rules 1.5(g)(2) (client’s consent to division of fees with lawyer in another firm must be confirmed in writing), 1.7(b)(4) (client’s informed consent to conflict of interest must be confirmed in writing) and 1.9(a) (former client’s informed consent to conflict of interest must be confirmed in writing). The definition of “confirmed in writing” provides three distinct methods of confirming a person’s consent: (i) a writing from the person to the lawyer, (ii) a writing from the lawyer to the person, or (iii) consent by the person on the record in any proceeding before a tribunal. The confirming writing need not recite the information that the lawyer communicated to the person in order to obtain the person’s consent. For the definition of “informed consent” See Rule 1.0(j). If it is not feasible for the lawyer to obtain or transmit a written confirmation at the time the client gives oral consent, then the lawyer must obtain or transmit the confirming writing within a reasonable time thereafter. If a lawyer has obtained a client’s informed oral consent, the lawyer may act in reliance on that consent so long as it is confirmed in writing within a reasonable time thereafter.

Computer-Accessed Communication

[1A] Rule 1.0(e), which defines the phrase “computer-accessed communication,” embraces electronic and wireless communications of every kind and includes, without limitation, communication by devices such as cell phones, smartphones, and all other handheld or portable
devices that can send or receive communications by and electronic or wireless means, including cellular service, the Internet, wireless networks, or any other technology.

Firm

Whether two or more lawyers constitute a firm within paragraph (h) will depend on the specific facts. For example, two practitioners who share office space and occasionally consult or assist each other ordinarily would not be regarded as constituting a firm. However, if they present themselves to the public in a way that suggests that they are a firm or conduct themselves as a firm, they should be regarded as a firm for purposes of the Rules. The terms of any formal agreement between associated lawyers are relevant in determining whether they are a firm, as is the fact that they have mutual access to information concerning the clients they serve. Furthermore, it is relevant in doubtful cases to consider the underlying purpose of the Rule that is involved. For example, a group of lawyers could be regarded as a firm for purposes of determining whether a conflict of interest exists but not for application of the advertising rules.

With respect to the law department of an organization, there is ordinarily no question that the members of the department constitute a firm within the meaning of the Rules of Professional Conduct. There can be uncertainty, however, as to the identity of the client. For example, it may not be clear whether the law department of a corporation represents a subsidiary or an affiliated corporation, as well as the corporation by which the members of the department are directly employed. A similar question can arise concerning an unincorporated association and its local affiliates. Whether lawyers in a government agency or department constitute a firm may depend upon the issue involved or be governed by other law.

Similar questions can also arise with respect to lawyers in legal aid and legal services organizations. Depending upon the structure of the organization, the entire organization or components of it may constitute a firm or firms for purposes of these Rules.

Fraud

When used in these Rules, the terms “fraud” and “fraudulent” refer to conduct that is characterized as such under the substantive or procedural law of the applicable jurisdiction or has a purpose to deceive. This does not include merely negligent misrepresentation or negligent failure to apprise another of relevant information. For purposes of these Rules, it is not necessary that anyone has suffered damages or relied on the misrepresentation or failure to inform, so long as the necessary scienter is present and the conduct in question could be reasonably expected to induce detrimental reliance.

Informed Consent

Many of the Rules of Professional Conduct require the lawyer to obtain the informed consent of a client or other person (e.g., a former client or, under certain circumstances, a prospective client) before accepting or continuing representation or pursuing a course of conduct. E.g., Rules 1.2(c), 1.6(a) and 1.7(b). The communication necessary to obtain such consent will vary according to the Rule involved and the circumstances giving rise to the need to obtain informed consent. The lawyer must make reasonable efforts to ensure that the client or other person possesses information reasonably adequate to make an informed decision. Ordinarily, this
will require communication that includes a disclosure of the facts and circumstances giving rise to
the situation, any explanation reasonably necessary to inform the client or other person of the
material advantages and disadvantages of the proposed course of conduct, and a discussion of the
client’s or other person’s options and alternatives. In some circumstances it may be appropriate
for a lawyer to advise a client or other person to seek the advice of other counsel. A lawyer need
not inform a client or other person of facts or implications already known to the client or other
person; nevertheless, a lawyer who does not personally inform the client or other person assumes
the risk that the client or other person is inadequately informed and the consent is invalid. In
determining whether the information and explanation provided are reasonably adequate, relevant
factors include whether the client or other person is experienced in legal matters generally and in
making decisions of the type involved, and whether the client or other person is independently
represented by other counsel in giving the consent. Normally, such persons need less information
and explanation than others, and generally a client or other person who is independently
represented by other counsel in giving the consent should be assumed to have given informed
consent. Other considerations may apply in representing impaired clients. See Rule 1.14.

[7] Obtaining informed consent will usually require an affirmative response by the
client or other person. In general, a lawyer may not assume consent from a client’s or other
person’s silence. Consent may be inferred, however, from the conduct of a client or other person
who has reasonably adequate information about the matter. A number of Rules require that a
person’s consent be confirmed in writing. E.g., Rules 1.7(b) and 1.9(a). For definitions of
“writing” and “confirmed in writing” see paragraphs (x) and (e), respectively. Other Rules require
that a client’s consent be obtained in a writing signed by the client. E.g., Rules 1.8(a) and (g). For
the meaning of “signed,” see paragraph (x).

Screened or Screening

[8] The definition of “screened” or “screening” applies to situations where screening
of a personally disqualified lawyer is permitted to remove imputation of a conflict of interest under
Rule 1.11, 1.12 or 1.18. See those Rules for the particular requirements of establishing effective
screening.

[9] The purpose of screening is to ensure that confidential information known by the
personally disqualified lawyer remains protected. The personally disqualified lawyer should
acknowledge the obligation not to communicate with any of the other lawyers in the firm with
respect to the matter. Similarly, other lawyers in the firm who are working on the matter should
promptly be informed that the screening is in place and that they may not communicate with the
personally disqualified lawyer with respect to the matter. Additional screening measures that are
appropriate for the particular matter will depend on the circumstances. In any event, procedures
should be adequate to protect confidential information.

[10] In order to be effective, screening measures must be implemented as soon as
practicable after a lawyer or law firm knows or reasonably should know that there is a need for
screening.
RULE 1.1:
COMPETENCE

(a) A lawyer should provide competent representation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.

(b) A lawyer shall not handle a legal matter that the lawyer knows or should know that the lawyer is not competent to handle, without associating with a lawyer who is competent to handle it.

(c) A lawyer shall not intentionally:

(1) fail to seek the objectives of the client through reasonably available means permitted by law and these Rules; or

(2) prejudice or damage the client during the course of the representation except as permitted or required by these Rules.

Comment

Legal Knowledge and Skill

[1] In determining whether a lawyer employs the requisite knowledge and skill in a particular matter, relevant factors include the relative complexity and specialized nature of the matter, the lawyer’s general experience, the lawyer’s training and experience in the field in question, the preparation and study the lawyer is able to give the matter, and whether it is feasible to associate with a lawyer of established competence in the field in question. In many instances, the required proficiency is that of a general practitioner. Expertise in a particular field of law may be required in some circumstances. One such circumstance would be where the lawyer, by representations made to the client, has led the client reasonably to expect a special level of expertise in the matter undertaken by the lawyer.

[2] A lawyer need not necessarily have special training or prior experience to handle legal problems of a type with which the lawyer is unfamiliar. A newly admitted lawyer can be as competent as a practitioner with long experience. Some important legal skills, such as the analysis of precedent, the evaluation of evidence and legal drafting, are required in all legal problems. Perhaps the most fundamental legal skill consists of determining what kinds of legal problems a situation may involve, a skill that necessarily transcends any particular specialized knowledge. A lawyer can provide adequate representation in a wholly novel field through necessary study. Competent representation can also be provided through the association of a lawyer of established competence in the field in question.

[3] [Reserved.]
A lawyer may accept representation where the requisite level of competence can be achieved by adequate preparation before handling the legal matter. This applies as well to a lawyer who is appointed as counsel for an unrepresented person.

**Thoroughness and Preparation**

Competent handling of a particular matter includes inquiry into and analysis of the factual and legal elements of the problem, and use of methods and procedures meeting the standards of competent practitioners. It also includes adequate preparation. The required attention and preparation are determined in part by what is at stake; major litigation and complex transactions ordinarily require more extensive treatment than matters of lesser complexity and consequence. An agreement between the lawyer and the client may limit the scope of the representation if the agreement complies with Rule 1.2(c).

**Retaining or Contracting with Lawyers Outside the Firm**

Before a lawyer retains or contracts with other lawyers outside the lawyer’s own firm to provide or assist in the provision of legal services to a client, the lawyer should ordinarily obtain informed consent from the client and should reasonably believe that the other lawyers’ services will contribute to the competent and ethical representation of the client. See also Rules 1.2 (allocation of authority), 1.4 (communication with client), 1.5(g) (fee sharing with lawyers outside the firm), 1.6 (confidentiality), and 5.5(a) (unauthorized practice of law). The reasonableness of the decision to retain or contract with other lawyers outside the lawyer’s own firm will depend upon the circumstances, including the needs of the client; the education, experience and reputation of the outside lawyers; the nature of the services assigned to the outside lawyers; and the legal protections, professional conduct rules, and ethical environments of the jurisdictions in which the services will be performed, particularly relating to confidential information.

Client consent to contract with a lawyer outside the lawyer’s own firm may not be necessary for discrete and limited tasks supervised closely by a lawyer in the firm. However, a lawyer should ordinarily obtain client consent before contracting with an outside lawyer to perform substantive or strategic legal work on which the lawyer will exercise independent judgment without close supervision or review by the referring lawyer. For example, on one hand, a lawyer who hires an outside lawyer on a per diem basis to cover a single court call or a routing calendar call ordinarily would not need to obtain the client’s prior informed consent. On the other hand, a lawyer who hires an outside lawyer to argue a summary judgment motion or negotiate key points in a transaction ordinarily should seek to obtain the client’s prior informed consent.

When lawyer from more than one law firm are providing legal services to the client on a particular matter, the lawyers ordinarily should consult with each other about the scope of their respective roles and the allocation of responsibility among them. See Rule 1.2(a). When allocating responsibility in a matter pending before a tribunal, lawyers and parties may have additional obligations (e.g., under local court rules, the CPLR, or the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure) that are a matter of law beyond the scope of these Rules.
[7A] Whether a lawyer who contracts with a lawyer outside the firm needs to obtain informed consent from the client about the roles and responsibilities of the retaining and outside lawyers will depend on the circumstances. On one hand, if a lawyer retains an outside lawyer or law firm to work under the lawyer’s close direction and supervision, and the retaining lawyer closely reviews the outside lawyer’s work, the retaining lawyer usually will not need to consult with the client about the outside lawyer’s role and level of responsibility. On the other hand, if the outside lawyer will have a more material role and will exercise more autonomy and responsibility, then the retaining lawyer usually should consult with the client. In any event, whenever a retaining lawyer discloses a client’s confidential information to lawyers outside the firm, the retaining lawyer should comply with Rule 1.6(a).

[8] To maintain the requisite knowledge and skill, a lawyer should (i) keep abreast of changes in substantive and procedural law relevant to the lawyer’s practice, (ii) keep abreast of the benefits and risks associated with technology the lawyer uses to provide services to clients or to store or transmit confidential information, and (iii) engage in continuing study and education and comply with all applicable continuing legal education requirements under 22 N.Y.C.R.R. Part 1500.
RULE 1.2:
SCOPE OF REPRESENTATION AND ALLOCATION OF AUTHORITY BETWEEN CLIENT AND LAWYER

(a) Subject to the provisions herein, a lawyer shall abide by a client’s decisions concerning the objectives of representation and, as required by Rule 1.4, shall consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued. A lawyer shall abide by a client’s decision whether to settle a matter. In a criminal case, the lawyer shall abide by the client’s decision, after consultation with the lawyer, as to a plea to be entered, whether to waive jury trial and whether the client will testify.

(b) A lawyer’s representation of a client, including representation by appointment, does not constitute an endorsement of the client’s political, economic, social or moral views or activities.

(c) A lawyer may limit the scope of the representation if the limitation is reasonable under the circumstances, the client gives informed consent and where necessary notice is provided to the tribunal and/or opposing counsel.

(d) A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is illegal or fraudulent, except that the lawyer may discuss the legal consequences of any proposed course of conduct with a client.

(e) A lawyer may exercise professional judgment to waive or fail to assert a right or position of the client, or accede to reasonable requests of opposing counsel, when doing so does not prejudice the rights of the client.

(f) A lawyer may refuse to aid or participate in conduct that the lawyer believes to be unlawful, even though there is some support for an argument that the conduct is legal.

(g) A lawyer does not violate these Rules by being punctual in fulfilling all professional commitments, by avoiding offensive tactics, and by treating with courtesy and consideration all persons involved in the legal process.

Comment

Allocation of Authority Between Client and Lawyer

[1] Paragraph (a) confers upon the client the ultimate authority to determine the purposes to be served by legal representation, within the limits imposed by law and the lawyer’s professional obligations. The decisions specified in paragraph (a), such as whether to settle a civil matter, must also be made by the client. See Rule 1.4(a)(1) for the lawyer’s duty to communicate with the client about such decisions. The lawyer shall consult with the client with respect to the means by which the client’s objectives are to be pursued. See Rule 1.4(a)(2).

[2] Clients normally defer to the special knowledge and skill of their lawyer with respect to the means to be used to accomplish their objectives, particularly with respect to
technical, legal and tactical matters. On the other hand, lawyers usually defer to their clients regarding such questions as the expense to be incurred and concern for third persons who might be adversely affected. On occasion, however, a lawyer and a client may disagree about the means to be used to accomplish the client’s objectives. Because of the varied nature of the matters about which a lawyer and client might disagree, and because the actions in question may implicate the interests of a tribunal or other persons, this Rule does not prescribe how such disagreements are to be resolved. Other law, however, may be applicable and should be consulted by the lawyer. The lawyer should also consult with the client and seek a mutually acceptable resolution of the disagreement. If such efforts are unavailing and the lawyer has a fundamental disagreement with the client, the lawyer may withdraw from the representation. See Rule 1.16(c)(4). Likewise, the client may resolve the disagreement by discharging the lawyer, in which case the lawyer must withdraw from the representation. See Rule 1.16(b)(3).

[3] At the outset of a representation, the client may authorize the lawyer to take specific action on the client’s behalf without further consultation. Absent a material change in circumstances and subject to Rule 1.4, a lawyer may rely on such an advance authorization. The client, however, may revoke such authority at any time.

[4] In a case in which the client appears to be suffering diminished capacity, the lawyer’s duty to abide by the client’s decisions is to be guided by reference to Rule 1.14.

**Independence from Client’s Views or Activities**

[5] Legal representation should not be denied to any person who is unable to afford legal services, or whose cause is controversial or the subject of popular disapproval. By the same token, representing a client does not constitute approval of the client’s views or activities.

**Agreements Limiting Scope of Representation**

[6] The scope of services to be provided by a lawyer may be limited by agreement with the client or by the terms under which the lawyer’s services are made available to the client. When a lawyer has been retained by an insurer to represent an insured, for example, the representation may be limited to issues related to the insurance coverage. A limited representation may be appropriate because the client has limited objectives for the representation. In addition, the terms upon which representation is undertaken may exclude specific means that might otherwise be used to accomplish the client’s objectives. Such limitations may exclude actions that the client thinks are too costly or that the lawyer regards as repugnant or imprudent.

[6A] In obtaining consent from the client, the lawyer must adequately disclose the limitations on the scope of the engagement and the matters that will be excluded. In addition, the lawyer must disclose the reasonably foreseeable consequences of the limitation. In making such disclosure, the lawyer should explain that if the lawyer or the client determines during the representation that additional services outside the limited scope specified in the engagement are necessary or advisable to represent the client adequately, then the client may need to retain separate counsel, which could result in delay, additional expense, and complications.

[7] Although this Rule affords the lawyer and client substantial latitude to limit the representation, the limitation must be reasonable under the circumstances. If, for example, a
client’s objective is limited to securing general information about the law the client needs in order to handle a common and typically uncomplicated legal problem, the lawyer and client may agree that the lawyer’s services will be limited to a brief telephone consultation. Such a limitation, however, would not be reasonable if the time allotted were not sufficient to yield advice upon which the client could rely. Although an agreement for a limited representation does not exempt a lawyer from the duty to provide competent representation, the limitation is a factor to be considered when determining the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation. See Rule 1.1.


Illegal and Fraudulent Transactions

[9] Paragraph (d) prohibits a lawyer from counseling or assisting a client in conduct that the lawyer knows is illegal or fraudulent. This prohibition, however, does not preclude the lawyer from giving an honest opinion about the consequences that appear likely to result from a client’s conduct. Nor does the fact that a client uses advice in a course of action that is illegal or fraudulent of itself make a lawyer a party to the course of action. There is a critical distinction between presenting an analysis of legal aspects of questionable conduct and recommending the means by which a crime or fraud might be committed with impunity.

[10] When the client’s course of action has already begun and is continuing, the lawyer’s responsibility is especially delicate. The lawyer is required to avoid assisting the client, for example, by drafting or delivering documents that the lawyer knows are fraudulent or by suggesting how the wrongdoing might be concealed. When the representation will result in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law, the lawyer must advise the client of any relevant limitation on the lawyer’s conduct and remonstrate with the client. See Rules 1.4(a)(5) and 1.16(b)(1). Persuading a client to take necessary preventive or corrective action that will bring the client’s conduct within the bounds of the law is a challenging but appropriate endeavor. If the client fails to take necessary corrective action and the lawyer’s continued representation would assist client conduct that is illegal or fraudulent, the lawyer is required to withdraw. See Rule 1.16(b)(1). In some circumstances, withdrawal alone might be insufficient. In those cases the lawyer may be required to give notice of the fact of withdrawal and to disaffirm any opinion, document, affirmation or the like. See Rule 1.6(b)(3); Rule 4.1, Comment [3].

[11] Where the client is a fiduciary, the lawyer may be charged with special obligations in dealings with a beneficiary.

[12] Paragraph (d) prohibits a lawyer from assisting a client’s illegal or fraudulent activity against a third person, whether or not the defrauded party is a party to the transaction. Paragraph (d) does not preclude undertaking a criminal defense incident to a general retainer for legal services to a lawful enterprise, but does preclude such a retainer for an enterprise known to be engaged in illegal or fraudulent activity.

[13] If a lawyer comes to know or reasonably should know that a client expects assistance not permitted by the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law, or if the lawyer intends
to act contrary to the client’s instructions, the lawyer must consult with the client regarding the limitations on the lawyer’s conduct. See Rule 1.4(a)(5).

**Exercise of Professional Judgment**

[14] Paragraph (e) permits a lawyer to exercise professional judgment to waive or fail to assert a right of a client, or accede to reasonable requests of opposing counsel in such matters as court proceedings, settings, continuances, and waiver of procedural formalities, as long as doing so does not prejudice the rights of the client. Like paragraphs (f) and (g), paragraph (e) effectively creates a limited exception to the lawyer’s obligations under Rule 1.1(c) (a lawyer shall not intentionally “fail to seek the objectives of the client through reasonably available means permitted by law and these Rules” or “prejudice or damage the client during the course of the representation except as permitted or required by these Rules”). If the lawyer is representing the client before a tribunal, the lawyer is required under Rule 3.3(f)(1) to comply with local customs of courtesy or practice of the bar or a particular tribunal unless the lawyer gives opposing counsel timely notice of the intent not to comply.

**Refusal to Participate in Conduct a Lawyer Believes to Be Unlawful**

[15] In some situations such as those described in paragraph (d), a lawyer is prohibited from aiding or participating in a client’s improper or potentially improper conduct; but in other situations, a lawyer has discretion. Paragraph (f) permits a lawyer to refuse to aid or participate in conduct the lawyer believes to be unlawful, even if the conduct is arguably legal. In addition, under Rule 1.16(c)(2), the lawyer may withdraw from representing a client when the client persists in a course of action involving the lawyer’s services that the lawyer reasonably believes is criminal or fraudulent, even if the course of action is arguably legal. In contrast, when the lawyer knows (or reasonably should know) that the representation will result in a violation of law or the Rules of Professional Conduct, the lawyer must withdraw from the representation under Rule 1.16(b)(1). If the client “insists” that the lawyer pursue a course of conduct that is illegal or prohibited under the Rules, the lawyer must not carry out those instructions and, in addition, may withdraw from the representation under Rule 1.16(c)(13). If the lawyer is representing the client before a tribunal, additional rules may come into play. For example, the lawyer may be required to obtain the tribunal’s permission to withdraw under Rule 1.16(d), and the lawyer may be required to take reasonable remedial measures under Rule 3.3 with respect to false evidence or other criminal or fraudulent conduct relating to a proceeding.

**Fulfilling Professional Commitments and Treating Others with Courtesy**

[16] Both Rule 1.1(c)(1) and Rule 1.2(a) require generally that a lawyer seek the client’s objectives and abide by the client’s decisions concerning the objectives of the representation; but those rules do not require a lawyer to be offensive, discourteous, inconsiderate or dilatory. Paragraph (g) specifically affirms that a lawyer does not violate the Rules by being punctual in fulfilling professional commitments, avoiding offensive tactics and treating with courtesy and consideration all persons involved in the legal process. Lawyers should be aware of the New York State Standards of Civility adopted by the courts to guide the legal profession (22 NYCRR Part 1200 Appendix A). Although the Standards of Civility are not intended to be enforced by sanctions or disciplinary action, conduct before a tribunal that fails to comply with known local customs of
courtesy or practice, or that is undignified or discourteous, may violate Rule 3.3(f). Conduct in a proceeding that serves merely to harass or maliciously injure another would be frivolous in violation of Rule 3.1. Dilatory conduct may violate Rule 1.3(a), which requires a lawyer to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client.
RULE 1.3: DILIGENCE

(a) A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client.

(b) A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to the lawyer.

(c) A lawyer shall not intentionally fail to carry out a contract of employment entered into with a client for professional services, but the lawyer may withdraw as permitted under these Rules.

Comment

[1] A lawyer should pursue a matter on behalf of a client despite opposition, obstruction or personal inconvenience to the lawyer, and take whatever lawful and ethical measures are required to vindicate a client’s cause or endeavor. A lawyer must also act with commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and in advocacy upon the client’s behalf. A lawyer is not bound, however, to press for every advantage that might be realized for a client. For example, a lawyer may have authority to exercise professional discretion in determining the means by which a matter should be pursued. See Rule 1.2. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the lawyer should not use offensive tactics or fail to treat all persons involved in the legal process with courtesy and respect.

[2] A lawyer’s work load must be controlled so that each matter can be handled diligently and promptly. Lawyers are encouraged to adopt and follow effective office procedures and systems; neglect may occur when such arrangements are not in place or are ineffective.

[3] Perhaps no professional shortcoming is more widely resented than procrastination. A client’s interests often can be adversely affected by the passage of time or the change of conditions; in extreme instances, as when a lawyer overlooks a statute of limitations, the client’s legal position may be destroyed. Even when the client’s interests are not affected in substance, unreasonable delay can cause a client needless anxiety and undermine confidence in the lawyer’s trustworthiness. A lawyer’s duty to act with reasonable promptness, however, does not preclude the lawyer from agreeing to a reasonable request for a postponement that will not prejudice the lawyer’s client.

[4] Unless the relationship is terminated, as provided in Rule 1.16, a lawyer should carry through to conclusion all matters undertaken for a client. If a lawyer’s employment is limited to a specific matter, the relationship terminates when the matter has been resolved. If a lawyer has served a client over a substantial period in a variety of matters, the client sometimes may assume that the lawyer will continue to serve on a continuing basis unless the lawyer gives notice of withdrawal. Doubt about whether a client-lawyer relationship still exists should be clarified by the lawyer, preferably in writing, so that the client will not mistakenly suppose the lawyer is looking after the client’s affairs when the lawyer has ceased to do so. If a lawyer has handled a judicial or administrative proceeding that produced a result adverse to the client and the lawyer and the client have not agreed that the lawyer will handle the matter on appeal, Rule 1.16(e) may
require the lawyer to consult with the client about the possibility of appeal before relinquishing responsibility for the matter. Whether the lawyer is obligated to prosecute the appeal for the client depends on the scope of the representation the lawyer has agreed to provide to the client. See Rule 1.2.

[5] To avoid possible prejudice to client interests, a sole practitioner is well advised to prepare a plan that designates another competent lawyer to review client files, notify each client of the lawyer’s death or disability, and determine whether there is a need for immediate protective action.
RULE 1.4: COMMUNICATION

(a) A lawyer shall:

(1) promptly inform the client of:

   (i) any decision or circumstance with respect to which the client’s informed consent, as defined in Rule 1.0(j), is required by these Rules;

   (ii) any information required by court rule or other law to be communicated to a client; and

   (iii) material developments in the matter including settlement or plea offers.

(2) reasonably consult with the client about the means by which the client’s objectives are to be accomplished;

(3) keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the matter;

(4) promptly comply with a client’s reasonable requests for information; and

(5) consult with the client about any relevant limitation on the lawyer’s conduct when the lawyer knows that the client expects assistance not permitted by these Rules or other law.

(b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation.

Comment

[1] Reasonable communication between the lawyer and the client is necessary for the client to participate effectively in the representation.

Communicating with Client

[2] In instances where these Rules require that a particular decision about the representation be made by the client, paragraph (a)(1) requires that the lawyer promptly consult with the client and secure the client’s consent prior to taking action, unless prior discussions with the client have resolved what action the client wants the lawyer to take. For example, paragraph (a)(1)(iii) requires that a lawyer who receives from opposing counsel an offer of settlement in a civil controversy or a proffered plea bargain in a criminal case must promptly inform the client of its substance unless the client has previously made clear that the proposal will be acceptable or unacceptable or has authorized the lawyer to accept or to reject the offer. See Rule 1.2(a).
Paragraph (a)(2) requires that the lawyer reasonably consult with the client about the means to be used to accomplish the client’s objectives. In some situations — depending on both the importance of the action under consideration and the feasibility of consulting with the client — this duty will require consultation prior to taking action. In other circumstances, such as during a trial when an immediate decision must be made, the exigency of the situation may require the lawyer to act without prior consultation. In such cases, the lawyer must nonetheless act reasonably to inform the client of actions the lawyer has taken on the client’s behalf. Likewise, for routine matters such as scheduling decisions not materially affecting the interests of the client, the lawyer need not consult in advance, but should keep the client reasonably informed thereafter. Additionally, paragraph (a)(3) requires that the lawyer keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the matter, such as significant developments affecting the timing or the substance of the representation.

A lawyer’s regular communication with clients will minimize the occasions on which a client will need to request information concerning the representation. When a client makes a reasonable request for information, however, paragraph (a)(4) requires prompt compliance with the request, or if a prompt response is not feasible, that the lawyer or a member of the lawyer’s staff acknowledge receipt of the request and advise the client when a response may be expected. A lawyer should promptly respond to or acknowledge client communications, or arrange for an appropriate person who works with the lawyer to do so.

Explain Matters

The client should have sufficient information to participate intelligently in decisions concerning the objectives of the representation and the means by which they are to be pursued, to the extent the client is willing and able to do so. Adequacy of communication depends in part on the kind of advice or assistance that is involved. For example, when there is time to explain a proposal made in a negotiation, the lawyer should review all important provisions with the client before proceeding to an agreement. In litigation a lawyer should explain the general strategy and prospects of success and ordinarily should consult the client on tactics that are likely to result in significant expense or to injure or coerce others. On the other hand, a lawyer ordinarily will not be expected to describe trial or negotiation strategy in detail. The guiding principle is that the lawyer should fulfill reasonable client expectations for information consistent with the duty to act in the client’s best interest and the client’s overall requirements as to the character of representation. In certain circumstances, such as when a lawyer asks a client to consent to a representation affected by a conflict of interest, the client must give informed consent, as defined in Rule 1.0(j).

Ordinarily, the information to be provided is that appropriate for a client who is a comprehending and responsible adult. However, fully informing the client according to this standard may be impracticable, for example, where the client is a child or suffers from diminished capacity. See Rule 1.14. When the client is an organization or group, it is often impossible or inappropriate to inform every one of its members about its legal affairs; ordinarily, the lawyer should address communications to those who the lawyer reasonably believes to be appropriate persons within the organization. See Rule 1.13. Where many routine matters are involved, a system of limited or occasional reporting may be arranged with the client.
Withholding Information

[7] In some circumstances, a lawyer may be justified in delaying transmission of information when the client would be likely to react imprudently to an immediate communication. Thus, a lawyer might withhold a psychiatric diagnosis of a client when the examining psychiatrist indicates that disclosure would harm the client. A lawyer may not withhold information to serve the lawyer’s own interest or convenience or the interests or convenience of another person. Rules or court orders governing litigation may provide that information supplied to a lawyer may not be disclosed to the client. Rule 3.4(c) directs compliance with such rules or orders.

Departing Lawyers

[7A] A lawyer has a duty to keep a client informed about “material developments” in a matter under paragraph (a)(1)(iii) of this Rule, and about the “status of the matter” under paragraph (a)(3). This duty applies when a lawyer who has primary or substantial responsibility for current clients or for performing material legal services on one or more particular active matters is leaving a law firm to join another law firm (a “departing lawyer”). Thus, after a departing lawyer has informed a responsible member or members of the current firm of a concrete decision to move to another firm, the departing lawyer must give prompt notice of that decision to any potentially affected clients of the current firm.

[7B] A law firm has a corresponding duty, upon receiving the departing lawyer’s notice of intended departure, to notify potentially affected clients of the firm about the departing lawyer’s decision to join another law firm, unless (i) either the law firm or the departing lawyer knows that the other (or another departing lawyer) has already provided such notice and (ii) the law firm or the departing lawyer reasonably believes that the notice meets the criteria in Comment [7D] to this Rule.

[7C] The duties that Rule 1.4 imposes on lawyers and law firms when a lawyer has notified a law firm of a decision to leave the firm (as described in Comments [7A] and [7B]) also apply when a law firm has decided to cease operations as a going concern. When a law firm has decided to cease operations as a going concern, the firm or the lawyers who have primary or substantial responsibility for current clients or for performing material legal services on one or more particular active matters must give prompt notice to all potentially affected clients of the firm (in accordance with Comment [7D] below) of the decision to cease operations.

[7D] Any notice pursuant to Comments [7A], [7B], or [7C] may initially be given orally, but if notice is given orally, it should be followed promptly by a writing containing the following information:

(i) the departing lawyer’s intention to leave the current law firm and the anticipated date of departure;

(ii) the departing lawyer’s future contact information;

(iii) with respect to each relevant matter, the fact that the
client has the right to choose counsel, and thus has the option to be represented by the departing lawyer after departure, or to remain a client of the current firm, or to be represented by other lawyers or law firms; and

(iv) the fact that the current firm will need the client to inform the firm of its choice of counsel and, if the client wishes to transfer the client’s files to the departing lawyer or to another lawyer or law firm, the firm will need the client to authorize the firm (preferably in writing) to transfer the client’s files or other property accordingly (unless the client has already notified the firm or the departing lawyer of its choice or has already provided such authorization to transfer the client’s files).

The notice need not include items (iii) and (iv) if the departing lawyer is unable or unwilling to continue to serve the client after departing from the current firm.

[7E] It is preferable (but not required) that the departing lawyer and the law firm jointly notify all potentially affected clients consistent with Comment [7D]. Accordingly, the departing lawyer and the firm should attempt to craft a joint notice. Whether the notice is unilateral or joint, notice must be given to the potentially affected clients promptly. The time frame for “promptly” communicating with a client may depend on the circumstances, but neither the departing lawyer nor the firm may delay the process longer than is necessary to ensure that accurate and meaningful notice is provided to clients in accordance with Comment [7D] to this Rule.

[7F] Because Rule 1.4 mandates prompt notice of a departing lawyer’s decision to change firms, a law firm shall not include provisions in its partnership, shareholder, operating, employment, or other similar type of agreement, and shall not engage in conduct, that prohibits, unduly delays, or discourages the departing lawyer (through financial disincentives or otherwise) from providing the requisite notice to potentially affected clients. See Rule 5.6(a)(1).

[7G] These Comments are intended to address the obligations of lawyers and law firms solely under Rule 1.4. They are not intended to address the rights or obligations of a law firm or a departing lawyer under any other Rule or under the law of fiduciary duties, partnership law, contract law, tort law, or other law. For example, when a departing lawyer or a law firm that has decided to cease operations is representing a client in a matter pending before a tribunal, Rule 1.16(d) may require notice to the tribunal and may require the tribunal’s permission to withdraw

[7H] Notwithstanding the definition of “law firm” in Rule 1.0(h), the foregoing Comments regarding departing lawyers do not apply when a lawyer is leaving a qualified legal assistance organization, a government law office, or the legal department of an organization.
RULE 1.5:
FEES AND DIVISION OF FEES

(a) A lawyer shall not make an agreement for, charge, or collect an excessive or illegal fee or expense. A fee is excessive when, after a review of the facts, a reasonable lawyer would be left with a definite and firm conviction that the fee is excessive. The factors to be considered in determining whether a fee is excessive may include the following:

(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly;

(2) the likelihood, if apparent or made known to the client, that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer;

(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services;

(4) the amount involved and the results obtained;

(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by circumstances;

(6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;

(7) the experience, reputation and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and

(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent.

(b) A lawyer shall communicate to a client the scope of the representation and the basis or rate of the fee and expenses for which the client will be responsible. This information shall be communicated to the client before or within a reasonable time after commencement of the representation and shall be in writing where required by statute or court rule. This provision shall not apply when the lawyer will charge a regularly represented client on the same basis or rate and perform services that are of the same general kind as previously rendered to and paid for by the client. Any changes in the scope of the representation or the basis or rate of the fee or expenses shall also be communicated to the client.

(c) A fee may be contingent on the outcome of the matter for which the service is rendered, except in a matter in which a contingent fee is prohibited by paragraph (d) or other law. Promptly after a lawyer has been employed in a contingent fee matter, the lawyer shall provide the client with a writing stating the method by which the fee is to be determined, including the percentage or percentages that shall accrue to the lawyer in the event of settlement, trial or appeal; litigation and other expenses to be deducted from the recovery; and whether such expenses are to be deducted before or, if not prohibited by statute or court rule, after the contingent fee is calculated. The writing must clearly notify the client of any expenses for which the client will be liable regardless of whether the client is the prevailing party. Upon conclusion of a contingent fee matter, the lawyer shall provide the client with a
writing stating the outcome of the matter and, if there is a recovery, showing the remittance to the client and the method of its determination.

(d) A lawyer shall not enter into an arrangement for, charge or collect:

(1) a contingent fee for representing a defendant in a criminal matter;

(2) a fee prohibited by law or rule of court;

(3) a fee based on fraudulent billing;

(4) a nonrefundable retainer fee; provided that a lawyer may enter into a retainer agreement with a client containing a reasonable minimum fee clause if it defines in plain language and sets forth the circumstances under which such fee may be incurred and how it will be calculated; or

(5) any fee in a domestic relations matter if:

   (i) the payment or amount of the fee is contingent upon the securing of a divorce or of obtaining child custody or visitation or is in any way determined by reference to the amount of maintenance, support, equitable distribution, or property settlement;

   (ii) a written retainer agreement has not been signed by the lawyer and client setting forth in plain language the nature of the relationship and the details of the fee arrangement; or

   (iii) the written retainer agreement includes a security interest, confession of judgment or other lien without prior notice being provided to the client in a signed retainer agreement and approval from a tribunal after notice to the adversary. A lawyer shall not foreclose on a mortgage placed on the marital residence while the spouse who consents to the mortgage remains the titleholder and the residence remains the spouse’s primary residence.

(e) In domestic relations matters, a lawyer shall provide a prospective client with a Statement of Client’s Rights and Responsibilities at the initial conference and prior to the signing of a written retainer agreement.

(f) Where applicable, a lawyer shall resolve fee disputes by arbitration at the election of the client pursuant to a fee arbitration program established by the Chief Administrator of the Courts and approved by the Administrative Board of the Courts.

(g) A lawyer shall not divide a fee for legal services with another lawyer who is not associated in the same law firm unless:

   (1) the division is in proportion to the services performed by each lawyer
or, by a writing given to the client, each lawyer assumes joint responsibility for the representation;

(2) the client agrees to employment of the other lawyer after a full disclosure that a division of fees will be made, including the share each lawyer will receive, and the client’s agreement is confirmed in writing; and

(3) the total fee is not excessive.

(h) Rule 1.5(g) does not prohibit payment to a lawyer formerly associated in a law firm pursuant to a separation or retirement agreement.

Comment

[1] Paragraph (a) requires that lawyers not charge fees that are excessive or illegal under the circumstances. The factors specified in paragraphs (a)(1) through (a)(8) are not exclusive, nor will each factor be relevant in each instance. The time and labor required for a matter may be affected by the actions of the lawyer’s own client or by those of the opposing party and counsel. Paragraph (a) also requires that expenses for which the client will be charged must not be excessive or illegal. A lawyer may seek payment for services performed in-house, such as copying, or for other expenses incurred in-house, such as telephone charges, either by charging an amount to which the client has agreed in advance or by charging an amount that reflects the cost incurred by the lawyer, provided in either case that the amount charged is not excessive.

[1A] A billing is fraudulent if it is knowingly and intentionally based on false or inaccurate information. Thus, under an hourly billing arrangement, it would be fraudulent to knowingly and intentionally charge a client for more than the actual number of hours spent by the lawyer on the client’s matter; similarly, where the client has agreed to pay the lawyer’s cost of in-house services, such as for photocopying or telephone calls, it would be fraudulent knowingly and intentionally to charge a client more than the actual costs incurred. Fraudulent billing requires an element of scienter and does not include inaccurate billing due to an innocent mistake.

[1B] A supervising lawyer who submits a fraudulent bill for fees or expenses to a client based on submissions by a subordinate lawyer has not automatically violated this Rule. In this situation, whether the lawyer is responsible for a violation must be determined by reference to Rules 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3. As noted in Comment [8] to Rule 5.1, nothing in that Rule alters the personal duty of each lawyer in a firm to abide by these Rules and in some situations, other Rules may impose upon a supervising lawyer a duty to ensure that the books and records of a firm are accurate. See Rule 1.15(j).

Basis or Rate of Fee

[2] When the lawyer has regularly represented a client, they ordinarily will have evolved an understanding concerning the basis or rate of the fee and the expenses for which the client will be responsible. In a new client-lawyer relationship, however, an understanding as to fees and expenses must be promptly established. Court rules regarding engagement letters require that such an understanding be memorialized in writing in certain cases. See 22 N.Y.C.R.R. Part
Even where not required, it is desirable to furnish the client with at least a simple memorandum or copy of the lawyer’s customary fee arrangements that states the general nature of the legal services to be provided, the basis, rate or total amount of the fee, and whether and to what extent the client will be responsible for any costs, expenses or disbursements in the course of the representation. A written statement concerning the terms of the engagement reduces the possibility of misunderstanding.

[3] Contingent fees, like any other fees, are subject to the excessiveness standard of paragraph (a). In determining whether a particular contingent fee is excessive, or whether it is excessive to charge any form of contingent fee, a lawyer must consider the factors that are relevant under the circumstances. Applicable law may impose limitations on contingent fees, such as a ceiling on the percentage allowable, or may regulate the type or amount of the fee that may be charged.

Terms of Payment

[4] A lawyer may require advance payment of a fee, but is obliged to return any unearned portion. See Rule 1.16(e). A lawyer may charge a minimum fee, if that fee is not excessive, and if the wording of the minimum fee clause of the retainer agreement meets the requirements of paragraph (d)(4). A lawyer may accept property in payment for services, such as an ownership interest in an enterprise, providing this does not involve acquisition of a proprietary interest in the cause of action or subject matter of the litigation contrary to Rule 1.8(i). A fee paid in property instead of money may, however, be subject to the requirements of Rule 1.8(a), because such fees often have the essential qualities of a business transaction with the client.

[5] An agreement may not be made if its terms might induce the lawyer improperly to curtail services for the client or perform them in a way contrary to the client’s interest. For example, a lawyer should not enter into an agreement whereby services are to be provided only up to a stated amount when it is foreseeable that more extensive services probably will be required, unless the situation is adequately explained to the client. Otherwise, the client might have to bargain for further assistance in the midst of a proceeding or transaction. In matters in litigation, the court’s approval for the lawyer’s withdrawal may be required. See Rule 1.16(d). It is proper, however, to define the extent of services in light of the client’s ability to pay. A lawyer should not exploit a fee arrangement based primarily on hourly charges by using wasteful procedures.

[5A] The New York Court Rules require every lawyer with an office located in New York to post in that office, in a manner visible to clients of the lawyer, a “Statement of Client’s Rights.” See 22 N.Y.C.R.R. § 1210.1. Paragraph (e) requires a lawyer in a domestic relations matter, as defined in Rule 1.0(g), to provide a prospective client with the “Statement of Client’s Rights and Responsibilities,” as further set forth in 22 N.Y.C.R.R. § 1400.2, at the initial conference and, in any event, prior to the signing of a written retainer agreement.

Prohibited Contingent Fees

[6] Paragraph (d) prohibits a lawyer from charging a contingent fee in a domestic relations matter when payment is contingent upon the securing of a divorce or upon the amount of alimony or support or property settlement to be obtained or upon obtaining child custody or
visitation. This provision also precludes a contract for a contingent fee for legal representation in connection with the recovery of post-judgment balances due under support, alimony or other financial orders. See Rule 1.0(g) (defining “domestic relations matter” to include an action to enforce such a judgment).

**Division of Fee**

[7] A division of fee is a single billing to a client covering the fee of two or more lawyers who are not affiliated in the same firm. A division of fee facilitates association of more than one lawyer in a matter in which neither alone could serve the client as well. Paragraph (g) permits the lawyers to divide a fee either on the basis of the proportion of services they render or if each lawyer assumes responsibility for the representation as a whole in a writing given to the client. In addition, the client must agree to the arrangement, including the share that each lawyer is to receive, and the client’s agreement must be confirmed in writing. Contingent fee arrangements must comply with paragraph (c). Joint responsibility for the representation entails financial and ethical responsibility for the representation as if the lawyers were associated in a partnership. See Rule 5.1. A lawyer should refer a matter only to a lawyer who the referring lawyer reasonably believes is competent to handle the matter. See Rule 1.1.

[8] Paragraph (g) does not prohibit or regulate division of fees to be received in the future for work done when lawyers were previously associated in a law firm. Paragraph (h) recognizes that this Rule does not prohibit payment to a previously associated lawyer pursuant to a separation or retirement agreement.

**Disputes over Fees**

[9] A lawyer should seek to avoid controversies over fees with clients and should attempt to resolve amicably any differences on the subject. The New York courts have established a procedure for resolution of fee disputes through arbitration and the lawyer must comply with the procedure when it is mandatory. Even when it is voluntary, the lawyer should conscientiously consider submitting to it.
RULE 1.6:
CONFIDENTIALITY OF INFORMATION

(a) A lawyer shall not knowingly reveal confidential information, as defined in this Rule, or use such information to the disadvantage of a client or for the advantage of the lawyer or a third person, unless:

(1) the client gives informed consent, as defined in Rule 1.0(j);

(2) the disclosure is impliedly authorized to advance the best interests of the client and is either reasonable under the circumstances or customary in the professional community; or

(3) the disclosure is permitted by paragraph (b).

“Confidential information” consists of information gained during or relating to the representation of a client, whatever its source, that is (a) protected by the attorney-client privilege, (b) likely to be embarrassing or detrimental to the client if disclosed, or (c) information that the client has requested be kept confidential. “Confidential information” does not ordinarily include (i) a lawyer’s legal knowledge or legal research or (ii) information that is generally known in the local community or in the trade, field or profession to which the information relates.

(b) A lawyer may reveal or use confidential information to the extent that the lawyer reasonably believes necessary:

(1) to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm;

(2) to prevent the client from committing a crime;

(3) to withdraw a written or oral opinion or representation previously given by the lawyer and reasonably believed by the lawyer still to be relied upon by a third person, where the lawyer has discovered that the opinion or representation was based on materially inaccurate information or is being used to further a crime or fraud;

(4) to secure legal advice about compliance with these Rules or other law by the lawyer, another lawyer associated with the lawyer’s firm or the law firm;

(5) (i) to defend the lawyer or the lawyer’s employees and associates against an accusation of wrongful conduct; or

(ii) to establish or collect a fee; or

(6) when permitted or required under these Rules or to comply with other law or court order.
(c) A lawyer make reasonable efforts to prevent the inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure or use of, or unauthorized access to, information protected by Rules 1.6, 1.9(c), or 1.18(b).

Comment

Scope of the Professional Duty of Confidentiality

[1] This Rule governs the disclosure of information protected by the professional duty of confidentiality. Such information is described in these Rules as “confidential information” as defined in this Rule. Other rules also deal with confidential information. See Rules 1.8(b) and 1.9(c)(1) for the lawyer’s duties with respect to the use of such information to the disadvantage of clients and former clients; Rule 1.9(c)(2) for the lawyer’s duty not to reveal information relating to the lawyer’s prior representation of a former client; Rule 1.14(c) for information relating to representation of a client with diminished capacity; Rule 1.18(b) for the lawyer’s duties with respect to information provided to the lawyer by a prospective client; Rule 3.3 for the lawyer’s duty of candor to a tribunal; and Rule 8.3(c) for information gained by a lawyer or judge while participating in an approved lawyer assistance program.

[2] A fundamental principle in the client-lawyer relationship is that, in the absence of the client’s informed consent, or except as permitted or required by these Rules, the lawyer must not knowingly reveal information gained during and related to the representation, whatever its source. See Rule 1.0(j) for the definition of informed consent. The lawyer’s duty of confidentiality contributes to the trust that is the hallmark of the client-lawyer relationship. The client is thereby encouraged to seek legal assistance and to communicate fully and frankly with the lawyer, even as to embarrassing or legally damaging subject matter. The lawyer needs this information to represent the client effectively and, if necessary, to advise the client to refrain from wrongful conduct. Typically, clients come to lawyers to determine their rights and what is, in the complex of laws and regulations, deemed to be legal and correct. Based upon experience, lawyers know that almost all clients follow the advice given, and the law is thereby upheld.

[3] The principle of client-lawyer confidentiality is given effect in three related bodies of law: the attorney-client privilege of evidence law, the work-product doctrine of civil procedure and the professional duty of confidentiality established in legal ethics codes. The attorney-client privilege and the work-product doctrine apply when compulsory process by a judicial or other governmental body seeks to compel a lawyer to testify or produce information or evidence concerning a client. The professional duty of client-lawyer confidentiality, in contrast, applies to a lawyer in all settings and at all times, prohibiting the lawyer from disclosing confidential information unless permitted or required by these Rules or to comply with other law or court order. The confidentiality duty applies not only to matters communicated in confidence by the client, which are protected by the attorney-client privilege, but also to all information gained during and relating to the representation, whatever its source. The confidentiality duty, for example, prohibits a lawyer from volunteering confidential information to a friend or to any other person except in compliance with the provisions of this Rule, including the Rule’s reference to other law that may compel disclosure. See Comments [12]-[13]; see also Scope.
Paragraph (a) prohibits a lawyer from knowingly revealing confidential information as defined by this Rule. This prohibition also applies to disclosures by a lawyer that do not in themselves reveal confidential information but could reasonably lead to the discovery of such information by a third person. A lawyer’s use of a hypothetical to discuss issues relating to the representation with persons not connected to the representation is permissible so long as there is no reasonable likelihood that the listener will be able to ascertain the identity of the client.

Paragraph (a) protects all factual information “gained during or relating to the representation of a client.” Information relates to the representation if it has any possible relevance to the representation or is received because of the representation. The accumulation of legal knowledge or legal research that a lawyer acquires through practice ordinarily is not client information protected by this Rule. However, in some circumstances, including where the client and the lawyer have so agreed, a client may have a proprietary interest in a particular product of the lawyer’s research. Information that is generally known in the local community or in the trade, field or profession to which the information relates is also not protected, unless the client and the lawyer have otherwise agreed. Information is not “generally known” simply because it is in the public domain or available in a public file.

Use of Information Related to Representation

The duty of confidentiality also prohibits a lawyer from using confidential information to the advantage of the lawyer or a third person or to the disadvantage of a client or former client unless the client or former client has given informed consent. See Rule 1.0(j) for the definition of “informed consent.” This part of paragraph (a) applies when information is used to benefit either the lawyer or a third person, such as another client, a former client or a business associate of the lawyer. For example, if a lawyer learns that a client intends to purchase and develop several parcels of land, the lawyer may not (absent the client’s informed consent) use that information to buy a nearby parcel that is expected to appreciate in value due to the client’s purchase, or to recommend that another client buy the nearby land, even if the lawyer does not reveal any confidential information. The duty also prohibits disadvantageous use of confidential information unless the client gives informed consent, except as permitted or required by these Rules. For example, a lawyer assisting a client in purchasing a parcel of land may not make a competing bid on the same land. However, the fact that a lawyer has once served a client does not preclude the lawyer from using generally known information about that client, even to the disadvantage of the former client, after the client-lawyer relationship has terminated. See Rule 1.9(c)(1).

Authorized Disclosure

Except to the extent that the client’s instructions or special circumstances limit that authority, a lawyer may make disclosures of confidential information that are impliedly authorized by a client if the disclosures (i) advance the best interests of the client and (ii) are either reasonable under the circumstances or customary in the professional community. In some situations, for example, a lawyer may be impliedly authorized to admit a fact that cannot properly be disputed or to make a disclosure that facilitates a satisfactory conclusion to a matter. In addition, lawyers in a firm may, in the course of the firm’s practice, disclose to each other information relating to a client of the firm, unless the client has instructed that particular information be confined to specified
lawyers. Lawyers are also impliedly authorized to reveal information about a client with diminished capacity when necessary to take protective action to safeguard the client’s interests. See Rules 1.14(b) and (c).

Disclosure Adverse to Client

[6] Although the public interest is usually best served by a strict rule requiring lawyers to preserve the confidentiality of information relating to the representation of their clients, the confidentiality rule is subject to limited exceptions that prevent substantial harm to important interests, deter wrongdoing by clients, prevent violations of the law, and maintain the impartiality and integrity of judicial proceedings. Paragraph (b) permits, but does not require, a lawyer to disclose information relating to the representation to accomplish these specified purposes.

[6A] The lawyer’s exercise of discretion conferred by paragraphs (b)(1) through (b)(3) requires consideration of a wide range of factors and should therefore be given great weight. In exercising such discretion under these paragraphs, the lawyer should consider such factors as: (i) the seriousness of the potential injury to others if the prospective harm or crime occurs, (ii) the likelihood that it will occur and its imminence, (iii) the apparent absence of any other feasible way to prevent the potential injury, (iv) the extent to which the client may be using the lawyer’s services in bringing about the harm or crime, (v) the circumstances under which the lawyer acquired the information of the client’s intent or prospective course of action, and (vi) any other aggravating or extenuating circumstances. In any case, disclosure adverse to the client’s interest should be no greater than the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to prevent the threatened harm or crime. When a lawyer learns that a client intends to pursue or is pursuing a course of conduct that would permit disclosure under paragraphs (b)(1), (b)(2) or (b)(3), the lawyer’s initial duty, where practicable, is to remonstrate with the client. In the rare situation in which the client is reluctant to accept the lawyer’s advice, the lawyer’s threat of disclosure is a measure of last resort that may persuade the client. When the lawyer reasonably believes that the client will carry out the threatened harm or crime, the lawyer may disclose confidential information when permitted by paragraphs (b)(1), (b)(2) or (b)(3). A lawyer’s permissible disclosure under paragraph (b) does not waive the client’s attorney-client privilege; neither the lawyer nor the client may be forced to testify about communications protected by the privilege, unless a tribunal or body with authority to compel testimony makes a determination that the crime-fraud exception to the privilege, or some other exception, has been satisfied by a party to the proceeding. For a lawyer’s duties when representing an organizational client engaged in wrongdoing, see Rule 1.13(b).

[6B] Paragraph (b)(1) recognizes the overriding value of life and physical integrity and permits disclosure reasonably necessary to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm. Such harm is reasonably certain to occur if it will be suffered imminently or if there is a present and substantial risk that a person will suffer such harm at a later date if the lawyer fails to take action necessary to eliminate the threat. Thus, a lawyer who knows that a client has accidentally discharged toxic waste into a town’s water supply may reveal this information to the authorities if there is a present and substantial risk that a person who drinks the water will contract a life-threatening or debilitating disease and the lawyer’s disclosure is necessary to eliminate the threat or reduce the number of victims. Wrongful execution of a person is a life-threatening and imminent harm under paragraph (b)(1) once the person has been convicted and sentenced to death. On the other hand, an event that will cause property damage but is unlikely to cause substantial
bodily harm is not a present and substantial risk under paragraph (b)(1); similarly, a remote possibility or small statistical likelihood that any particular unit of a mass-distributed product will cause death or substantial bodily harm to unspecified persons over a period of years does not satisfy the element of reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm under the exception to the duty of confidentiality in paragraph (b)(1).

[6C] Paragraph (b)(2) recognizes that society has important interests in preventing a client’s crime. Disclosure of the client’s intention is permitted to the extent reasonably necessary to prevent the crime. In exercising discretion under this paragraph, the lawyer should consider such factors as those stated in Comment [6A].

[6D] Some crimes, such as criminal fraud, may be ongoing in the sense that the client’s past material false representations are still deceiving new victims. The law treats such crimes as continuing crimes in which new violations are constantly occurring. The lawyer whose services were involved in the criminal acts that constitute a continuing crime may reveal the client’s refusal to bring an end to a continuing crime, even though that disclosure may also reveal the client’s past wrongful acts, because refusal to end a continuing crime is equivalent to an intention to commit a new crime. Disclosure is not permitted under paragraph (b)(2), however, when a person who may have committed a crime employs a new lawyer for investigation or defense. Such a lawyer does not have discretion under paragraph (b)(2) to use or disclose the client’s past acts that may have continuing criminal consequences. Disclosure is permitted, however, if the client uses the new lawyer’s services to commit a further crime, such as obstruction of justice or perjury.

[6E] Paragraph (b)(3) permits a lawyer to withdraw a legal opinion or to disaffirm a prior representation made to third parties when the lawyer reasonably believes that third persons are still relying on the lawyer’s work and the work was based on “materially inaccurate information or is being used to further a crime or fraud.” See Rule 1.16(b)(1), requiring the lawyer to withdraw when the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the representation will result in a violation of law. Paragraph (b)(3) permits the lawyer to give only the limited notice that is implicit in withdrawing an opinion or representation, which may have the collateral effect of inferentially revealing confidential information. The lawyer’s withdrawal of the tainted opinion or representation allows the lawyer to prevent further harm to third persons and to protect the lawyer’s own interest when the client has abused the professional relationship, but paragraph (b)(3) does not permit explicit disclosure of the client’s past acts unless such disclosure is permitted under paragraph (b)(2).

[7] [Reserved.]

[8] [Reserved.]

[9] A lawyer’s confidentiality obligations do not preclude a lawyer from securing confidential legal advice about compliance with these Rules and other law by the lawyer, another lawyer in the lawyer’s firm, or the law firm. In many situations, disclosing information to secure such advice will be impliedly authorized for the lawyer to carry out the representation. Even when the disclosure is not impliedly authorized, paragraph (b)(4) permits such disclosure because of the importance of a lawyer’s compliance with these Rules, court orders and other law.
[10] Where a claim or charge alleges misconduct of the lawyer related to the representation of a current or former client, the lawyer may respond to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to establish a defense. Such a claim can arise in a civil, criminal, disciplinary or other proceeding and can be based on a wrong allegedly committed by the lawyer against the client or on a wrong alleged by a third person, such as a person claiming to have been defrauded by the lawyer and client acting together or by the lawyer acting alone. The lawyer may respond directly to the person who has made an accusation that permits disclosure, provided that the lawyer’s response complies with Rule 4.2 and Rule 4.3, and other Rules or applicable law. A lawyer may make the disclosures authorized by paragraph (b)(5) through counsel. The right to respond also applies to accusations of wrongful conduct concerning the lawyer’s law firm, employees or associates.

[11] A lawyer entitled to a fee is permitted by paragraph (b)(5) to prove the services rendered in an action to collect it. This aspect of the rule expresses the principle that the beneficiary of a fiduciary relationship may not exploit it to the detriment of the fiduciary.

[12] Paragraph (b) does not mandate any disclosures. However, other law may require that a lawyer disclose confidential information. Whether such a law supersedes Rule 1.6 is a question of law beyond the scope of these Rules. When disclosure of confidential information appears to be required by other law, the lawyer must consult with the client to the extent required by Rule 1.4 before making the disclosure, unless such consultation would be prohibited by other law. If the lawyer concludes that other law supersedes this Rule and requires disclosure, paragraph (b)(6) permits the lawyer to make such disclosures as are necessary to comply with the law.

[13] A tribunal or governmental entity claiming authority pursuant to other law to compel disclosure may order a lawyer to reveal confidential information. Absent informed consent of the client to comply with the order, the lawyer should assert on behalf of the client nonfrivolous arguments that the order is not authorized by law, the information sought is protected against disclosure by an applicable privilege or other law, or the order is invalid or defective for some other reason. In the event of an adverse ruling, the lawyer must consult with the client to the extent required by Rule 1.4 about the possibility of an appeal or further challenge, unless such consultation would be prohibited by other law. If such review is not sought or is unsuccessful, paragraph (b)(6) permits the lawyer to comply with the order.

[14] Paragraph (b) permits disclosure only to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes the disclosure is necessary to accomplish one of the purposes specified in paragraphs (b)(1) through (b)(6). Before making a disclosure, the lawyer should, where practicable, first seek to persuade the client to take suitable action to obviate the need for disclosure. In any case, a disclosure adverse to the client’s interest should be no greater than the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to accomplish the purpose, particularly when accusations of wrongdoing in the representation of a client have been made by a third party rather than by the client. If the disclosure will be made in connection with an adjudicative proceeding, the disclosure should be made in a manner that limits access to the information to the tribunal or other persons having a need to know the information, and appropriate protective orders or other arrangements should be sought by the lawyer to the fullest extent practicable.
Paragraph (b) permits but does not require the disclosure of information relating to a client’s representation to accomplish the purposes specified in paragraphs (b)(1) through (b)(6). A lawyer’s decision not to disclose as permitted by paragraph (b) does not violate this Rule. Disclosure may, however, be required by other Rules or by other law. See Comments [12]-[13]. Some Rules require disclosure only if such disclosure would be permitted by paragraph (b). E.g., Rule 8.3(c)(1). Rule 3.3(c), on the other hand, requires disclosure in some circumstances whether or not disclosure is permitted or prohibited by this Rule.

Withdrawal

If the lawyer’s services will be used by the client in materially furthering a course of criminal or fraudulent conduct, the lawyer must withdraw pursuant to Rule 1.16(b)(1). Withdrawal may also be required or permitted for other reasons under Rule 1.16. After withdrawal, the lawyer is required to refrain from disclosing or using information protected by Rule 1.6, except as this Rule permits such disclosure. Neither this Rule, nor Rule 1.9(c), nor Rule 1.16(e) prevents the lawyer from giving notice of the fact of withdrawal. For withdrawal or disaffirmance of an opinion or representation, see paragraph (b)(3) and Comment [6E]. Where the client is an organization, the lawyer may be in doubt whether the organization will actually carry out the contemplated conduct. Where necessary to guide conduct in connection with this Rule, the lawyer may, and sometimes must, make inquiry within the organization. See Rules 1.13(b) and (c).

Duty to Preserve Confidentiality

Paragraph (c) imposes three related obligations. It requires a lawyer to make reasonable efforts to safeguard confidential information against unauthorized access by third parties and against inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure by the lawyer or other persons who are participating in the representation of the client or who are otherwise subject to the lawyer’s supervision. See Rules 1.1, 5.1 and 5.3. Confidential information includes not only information protected by Rule 1.6(a) with respect to current clients but also information protected by Rule 1.9(c) with respect to former clients and information protected by Rule 1.18(b) with respect to prospective clients. Unauthorized access to, or the inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure of, information protected by Rules 1.6, 1.9, or 1.18, does not constitute a violation of paragraph (c) if the lawyer has made reasonable efforts to prevent the unauthorized access or disclosure. Factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of the lawyer’s efforts include, but are not limited to: (i) the sensitivity of the information; (ii) the likelihood of disclosure if additional safeguards are not employed; (iii) the cost of employing additional safeguards; (iv) the difficulty of implementing the safeguards; and (v) the extent to which the safeguards adversely affect the lawyer’s ability to represent clients (e.g., by making a device or software excessively difficult to use). A client may require the lawyer to implement special security measures not required by this Rule, or may give informed consent to forgo security measures that would otherwise be required by this Rule. For a lawyer’s duties when sharing information with nonlawyers inside or outside the lawyer’s own firm, see Rule 5.3, Comment [2].

When transmitting a communication that includes information relating to the representation of a client, the lawyer must take reasonable precautions to prevent the information from coming into the hands of unintended recipients. Paragraph (c) does not ordinarily require that
the lawyer use special security measures if the method of communication affords a reasonable expectation of confidentiality. However, a lawyer may be required to take specific steps to safeguard a client’s information to comply with a court order (such as a protective order) or to comply with other law (such as state and federal laws or court rules that govern data privacy or that impose notification requirements upon the loss of, or unauthorized access to, electronic information). For example, a protective order may extend a high level of protection to documents marked “Confidential” or “Confidential – Attorneys’ Eyes Only”; the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (“HIPAA”) may require a lawyer to take specific precautions with respect to a client’s or adversary’s medical records; and court rules may require a lawyer to block out a client’s Social Security number or a minor’s name when electronically filing papers with the court. The specific requirements of court orders, court rules, and other laws are beyond the scope of these Rules.

Lateral Moves, Law Firm Mergers, and Confidentiality

[18A] When lawyers or law firms (including in-house legal departments) contemplate a new association with other lawyers or law firms through lateral hiring or merger, disclosure of limited information may be necessary to resolve conflicts of interest pursuant to Rule 1.10 and to address financial, staffing, operational, and other practical issues. However, Rule 1.6(a) requires lawyers and law firms to protect their clients’ confidential information, so lawyers and law firms may not disclose such information for their own advantage or for the advantage of third parties absent a client’s informed consent or some other exception to Rule 1.6.

[18B] Disclosure without client consent in the context of a possible lateral move or law firm merger is ordinarily permitted regarding basic information such as: (i) the identities of clients or other parties involved in a matter; (ii) a brief summary of the status and nature of a particular matter, including the general issues involved; (iii) information that is publicly available; (iv) the lawyer’s total book of business; (v) the financial terms of each lawyer-client relationship; and (vi) information about aggregate current and historical payment of fees (such as realization rates, average receivables, and aggregate timeliness of payments). Such information is generally not “confidential information” within the meaning of Rule 1.6.

[18C] Disclosure without client consent in the context of a possible lateral move or law firm merger is ordinarily not permitted, however, if information is protected by Rule 1.6(a), 1.9(c), or Rule 1.18(b). This includes information that a lawyer knows or reasonably believes is protected by the attorney-client privilege, or is likely to be detrimental or embarrassing to the client, or is information that the client has requested be kept confidential. For example, many clients would not want their lawyers to disclose their tardiness in paying bills; the amounts they spend on legal fees in particular matters; forecasts about their financial prospects; or information relating to sensitive client matters (e.g., an unannounced corporate takeover, an undisclosed possible divorce, or a criminal investigation into the client’s conduct).

[18D] When lawyers are exploring a new association, whether by lateral move or by merger, all lawyers involved must individually consider fiduciary obligations to their existing firms that may bear on the timing and scope of disclosures to clients relating to conflicts and financial concerns, and should consider whether to ask clients for a waiver of confidentiality if
consistent with these fiduciary duties – see Rule 1.10(e) (requiring law firms to check for conflicts of interest). Questions of fiduciary duty are legal issues beyond the scope of the Rules.

[18E] For the unique confidentiality and notice provisions that apply to a lawyer or law firm seeking to sell all or part of its practice, see Rule 1.17 and Comment [7] to that Rule.

[18F] Before disclosing information regarding a possible lateral move or law firm merger, law firms and lawyers moving between firms – both those providing information and those receiving information – should use reasonable measures to minimize the risk of any improper, unauthorized or inadvertent disclosures, whether or not the information is protected by Rule 1.6(a), 1.9(c), or 1.18(b). These steps might include such measures as: (1) disclosing client information in stages; initially identifying only certain clients and providing only limited information, and providing a complete list of clients and more detailed financial information only at subsequent stages; (2) limiting disclosure to those at the firm, or even a single person at the firm, directly involved in clearing conflicts and making the business decision whether to move forward to the next stage regarding the lateral hire or law firm merger; and/or (3) agreeing not to disclose financial or conflict information outside the firm(s) during and after the lateral hiring negotiations or merger process.
RULE 1.7:
CONFLICT OF INTEREST: CURRENT CLIENTS

(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b), a lawyer shall not represent a client if a reasonable lawyer would conclude that either:

(1) the representation will involve the lawyer in representing differing interests; or

(2) there is a significant risk that the lawyer’s professional judgment on behalf of a client will be adversely affected by the lawyer’s own financial, business, property or other personal interests.

(b) Notwithstanding the existence of a concurrent conflict of interest under paragraph (a), a lawyer may represent a client if:

(1) the lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer will be able to provide competent and diligent representation to each affected client;

(2) the representation is not prohibited by law;

(3) the representation does not involve the assertion of a claim by one client against another client represented by the lawyer in the same litigation or other proceeding before a tribunal; and

(4) each affected client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing.

Comment

General Principles

[1] Loyalty and independent judgment are essential aspects of a lawyer’s relationship with a client. The professional judgment of a lawyer should be exercised, within the bounds of the law, solely for the benefit of the client and free of compromising influences and loyalties. Concurrent conflicts of interest, which can impair a lawyer’s professional judgment, can arise from the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client, a former client or a third person, or from the lawyer’s own interests. A lawyer should not permit these competing responsibilities or interests to impair the lawyer’s ability to exercise professional judgment on behalf of each client. For specific Rules regarding certain concurrent conflicts of interest, see Rule 1.8. For former client conflicts of interest, see Rule 1.9. For conflicts of interest involving prospective clients, see Rule 1.18. For definitions of “differing interests,” “informed consent” and “confirmed in writing,” see Rules 1.0(f), (j) and (e), respectively.

[2] Resolution of a conflict of interest problem under this Rule requires the lawyer, acting reasonably, to: (i) identify clearly the client or clients, (ii) determine whether a conflict of interest exists, i.e., whether the lawyer’s judgment may be impaired or the lawyer’s loyalty may be divided if the lawyer accepts or continues the representation, (iii) decide whether the
representation may be undertaken despite the existence of a conflict, i.e., whether the conflict is consentable under paragraph (b); and if so (iv) consult with the clients affected under paragraph (a) and obtain their informed consent, confirmed in writing. The clients affected under paragraph (a) include all of the clients who may have differing interests under paragraph (a)(1) and any clients whose representation might be adversely affected under paragraph (a)(2).

[3] A conflict of interest may exist before representation is undertaken, in which event the representation must be declined, unless the lawyer obtains the informed consent of each client under the conditions of paragraph (b). See Rule 1.10(e), which requires every law firm to create, implement and maintain a conflict-checking system.

[4] If a conflict arises after representation has been undertaken, the lawyer ordinarily must withdraw from the representation unless the lawyer has obtained the informed consent of the client under the conditions of paragraph (b). See Rule 1.16(b)(1). Where more than one client is involved, whether the lawyer may continue to represent any of the clients is determined both by the lawyer’s ability to comply with duties owed to the former client and by the lawyer’s ability to represent adequately the remaining client or clients, given the lawyer’s duties to the former client. See Rule 1.9; see also Comments [5], [29A].

[5] Unforeseeable developments, such as changes in corporate and other organizational affiliations or the addition or realignment of parties in litigation, might create conflicts in the midst of a representation, as when a company sued by the lawyer on behalf of one client is acquired by another client represented by the lawyer in an unrelated matter. Depending on the circumstances, the lawyer may have the option to withdraw from one of the representations in order to avoid the conflict. The lawyer must seek court approval where necessary and take steps to minimize harm to the clients. See Rules 1.16(d) and (e). The lawyer must continue to protect the confidences of the client from whose representation the lawyer has withdrawn. See Rule 1.9(c).

**Identifying Conflicts of Interest**

[6] The duty to avoid the representation of differing interest prohibits, among other things, undertaking representation adverse to a current client without that client’s informed consent. For example, absent consent, a lawyer may not advocate in one matter against another client that the lawyer represents in some other matter, even when the matters are wholly unrelated. The client as to whom the representation is adverse is likely to feel betrayed and the resulting damage to the client-lawyer relationship is likely to impair the lawyer’s ability to represent the client effectively. In addition, the client on whose behalf the adverse representation is undertaken may reasonably fear that the lawyer will pursue that client’s case less effectively out of deference to the other client, that is, that the lawyer’s exercise of professional judgment on behalf of that client will be adversely affected by the lawyer’s interest in retaining the current client. Similarly, a conflict may arise when a lawyer is required to cross-examine a client appearing as a witness in a lawsuit involving another client, as when the testimony will be damaging to the client represented in the lawsuit. On the other hand, simultaneous representation in unrelated matters of clients whose interests are only economically adverse, such as representation of competing economic enterprises in unrelated litigation, does not ordinarily constitute a conflict of interest and thus may not require consent of the respective clients.
Differing interests can also arise in transactional matters. For example, if a lawyer is asked to represent the seller of a business in negotiations with a buyer represented by the lawyer, not in the same transaction but in another, unrelated matter, the lawyer could not undertake the representation without the informed consent of each client.

Differing interests exist if there is a significant risk that a lawyer’s exercise of professional judgment in considering, recommending or carrying out an appropriate course of action for the client will be adversely affected or the representation would otherwise be materially limited by the lawyer’s other responsibilities or interests. For example, the professional judgment of a lawyer asked to represent several individuals operating a joint venture is likely to be adversely affected to the extent that the lawyer is unable to recommend or advocate all possible positions that each client might take because of the lawyer’s duty of loyalty to the others. The conflict in effect forecloses alternatives that would otherwise be available to the client. The mere possibility of subsequent harm does not itself require disclosure and consent. The critical questions are the likelihood that a difference in interests will eventuate and, if it does, whether it will adversely affect the lawyer’s professional judgment in considering alternatives or foreclose courses of action that reasonably should be pursued on behalf of the client.

**Lawyer’s Responsibilities to Former Clients and Other Third Persons**

In addition to conflicts with other current clients, a lawyer’s duties of loyalty and independence may be adversely affected by responsibilities to former clients under Rule 1.9, or by the lawyer’s responsibilities to other persons, such as fiduciary duties arising from a lawyer’s service as a trustee, executor or corporate director.

**Personal-Interest Conflicts**

The lawyer’s own financial, property, business or other personal interests should not be permitted to have an adverse effect on representation of a client. For example, if the probity of a lawyer’s own conduct in a transaction is in serious question, it may be difficult or impossible for the lawyer to give a client detached advice. Similarly, when a lawyer has discussions concerning possible employment with an opponent of the lawyer’s client or with a law firm representing the opponent, such discussions could materially limit the lawyer’s representation of the client. In addition, a lawyer may not allow related business interests to affect representation, for example, by referring clients to an enterprise in which the lawyer has an undisclosed financial interest. See Rule 5.7 on responsibilities regarding nonlegal services and Rule 1.8 pertaining to a number of personal-interest conflicts, including business transactions with clients.

When lawyers representing different clients in the same matter or in substantially related matters are closely related, there may be a significant risk that client confidences will be revealed and that the lawyer’s family relationship will interfere with both loyalty and professional judgment. As a result, each client is entitled to know of the existence and implications of the relationship between the lawyers, before the lawyer agrees to undertake the representation. Thus, a lawyer who has a significant intimate or close family relationship with another lawyer ordinarily may not represent a client in a matter where that other lawyer is representing another party, unless each client gives informed consent, as defined in Rule 1.0(j).
A lawyer is prohibited from engaging in sexual relations with a client in domestic relations matters. In all other matters a lawyer’s sexual relations with a client are circumscribed by the provisions of Rule 1.8(j).

**Interest of Person Paying for Lawyer’s Services**

A lawyer may be paid from a source other than the client, including a co-client, if the client is informed of that fact and consents and the arrangement does not compromise the lawyer’s duty of loyalty or independent judgment to the client. See Rule 1.8(f). If acceptance of the payment from any other source presents a significant risk that the lawyer’s exercise of professional judgment on behalf of a client will be adversely affected by the lawyer’s own interest in accommodating the person paying the lawyer’s fee or by the lawyer’s responsibilities to a payer who is also a co-client, then the lawyer must comply with the requirements of paragraph (b) before accepting the representation, including determining whether the conflict is consentable and, if so, that the client has adequate information about the material risks of the representation.

**Prohibited Representations**

Ordinarily, clients may consent to representation notwithstanding a conflict. As paragraph (b) indicates, however, some conflicts are nonconsentable. If a lawyer does not reasonably believe that the conditions set forth in paragraph (b) can be met, the lawyer should neither ask for the client’s consent nor provide representation on the basis of the client’s consent. A client’s consent to a nonconsentable conflict is ineffective. When the lawyer is representing more than one client, the question of consentability must be resolved as to each client.

Consentability is typically determined by considering whether the interests of the clients will be adequately protected if the clients consent to representation burdened by a conflict of interest. Thus, under paragraph (b)(1), notwithstanding client consent, a representation is prohibited if, in the circumstances, the lawyer cannot reasonably conclude that the lawyer will be able to provide competent and diligent representation. See Rule 1.1 regarding competence and Rule 1.3 regarding diligence.

Paragraph (b)(2) describes conflicts that are nonconsentable because the representation is prohibited by applicable law. For example, federal criminal statutes prohibit certain representations by a former government lawyer despite the informed consent of the former governmental client. In addition, there are some instances where conflicts are nonconsentable under decisional law.

Paragraph (b)(3) describes conflicts that are nonconsentable because of the institutional interest in vigorous development of each client’s position when the clients are aligned directly against each other in the same litigation or other proceeding before a tribunal. Whether clients are aligned directly against each other within the meaning of this paragraph requires examination of the context of the proceeding. Although this paragraph does not preclude a lawyer’s multiple representation of adverse parties to mediation (because mediation is not a proceeding before a “tribunal” as defined in Rule 1.0(w)), such representation may be precluded by paragraph (b)(1).
Informed Consent

[18] Informed consent requires that each affected client be aware of the relevant circumstances, including the material and reasonably foreseeable ways that the conflict could adversely affect the interests of that client. Informed consent also requires that the client be given the opportunity to obtain other counsel if the client so desires. See Rule 1.0(j). The information that a lawyer is required to communicate to a client depends on the nature of the conflict and the nature of the risks involved, and a lawyer should take into account the sophistication of the client in explaining the potential adverse consequences of the conflict. There are circumstances in which it is appropriate for a lawyer to advise a client to seek the advice of a disinterested lawyer in reaching a decision as to whether to consent to the conflict. When representation of multiple clients in a single matter is undertaken, the information must include the implications of the common representation, including possible effects on loyalty, confidentiality and the attorney-client privilege, and the advantages and risks involved. See Comments [30] and [31] concerning the effect of common representation on confidentiality.

[19] Under some circumstances it may be impossible to make the disclosure necessary to obtain consent. For example, when the lawyer represents different clients in related matters and one client refuses to consent to the disclosure necessary to permit the other client to make an informed decision, the lawyer cannot properly ask the latter to consent. In some cases the alternative to common representation is that each party obtains separate representation with the possibility of incurring additional costs. These costs, along with the benefits of securing separate representation, are factors that may be considered by the affected client in determining whether common representation is in the client’s interests. Where the fact, validity or propriety of client consent is called into question, the lawyer has the burden of establishing that the client’s consent was properly obtained in accordance with the Rule.

Client Consent Confirmed in Writing

[20] Paragraph (b) requires the lawyer to obtain the informed consent of the client, confirmed in writing. Such a writing may consist of (i) a document from the client, (ii) a document that the lawyer promptly transmits to the client confirming an oral informed consent, or (iii) a statement by the client made on the record of any proceeding before a tribunal, whether before, during or after a trial or hearing. See Rule 1.0(e) for the definition of “confirmed in writing.” See also Rule 1.0(x) (“writing” includes electronic transmission). If it is not feasible to obtain or transmit the writing at the time the client gives informed consent, then the lawyer must obtain or transmit it within a reasonable time thereafter. The Rule does not require that the information communicated to the client by the lawyer necessary to make the consent “informed” be in writing or in any particular form in all cases. See Rules 1.0(e) and (j). The requirement of a writing does not supplant the need in most cases for the lawyer to talk with the client to explain the risks and advantages, if any, of representation burdened with a conflict of interest, as well as reasonably available alternatives, and to afford the client a reasonable opportunity to consider the risks and alternatives and to raise questions and concerns. Rather, the writing is required in order to impress upon clients the seriousness of the decision the client is being asked to make and to avoid disputes or ambiguities that might later occur in the absence of a writing. See Comment [18].
Revoking Consent

[21] A client who has given consent to a conflict may revoke the consent and, like any other client, may terminate the lawyer’s representation at any time. Whether revoking consent to the client’s own representation precludes the lawyer from continuing to represent other clients depends on the circumstances, including the nature of the conflict, whether the client revoked consent because of a material change in circumstances, the reasonable expectations of the other clients, and whether material detriment to the other clients or the lawyer would result.

Consent to Future Conflict

[22] Whether a lawyer may properly request a client to waive conflicts that might arise in the future is subject to the conditions set forth in paragraph (b). The effectiveness of advance waivers is generally determined by the extent to which the client reasonably understands the material risks that the waiver entails. At a minimum, the client should be advised generally of the types of possible future adverse representations that the lawyer envisions, as well as the types of clients and matters that may present such conflicts. The more comprehensive the explanation and disclosure of the types of future representations that might arise and the actual and reasonably foreseeable adverse consequences of those representations, the greater the likelihood that the client will have the understanding necessary to make the consent “informed” and the waiver effective. See Rule 1.0(j). The lawyer should also disclose the measures that will be taken to protect the client should a conflict arise, including procedures such as screening that would be put in place. See Rule 1.0(t) for the definition of “screening.” The adequacy of the disclosure necessary to obtain valid advance consent to conflicts may also depend on the sophistication and experience of the client. For example, if the client is unsophisticated about legal matters generally or about the particular type of matter at hand, the lawyer should provide more detailed information about both the nature of the anticipated conflict and the adverse consequences to the client that may ensue should the potential conflict become an actual one. In other instances, such as where the client is a child or an incapacitated or impaired person, it may be impossible to inform the client sufficiently, and the lawyer should not seek an advance waiver. On the other hand, if the client is an experienced user of the legal services involved and is reasonably informed regarding the risk that a conflict may arise, an advance waiver is more likely to be effective, particularly if, for example, the client is independently represented or advised by in-house or other counsel in giving consent. Thus, in some circumstances, even general and open-ended waivers by experienced users of legal services may be effective.

[22A] Even if a client has validly consented to waive future conflicts, however, the lawyer must reassess the propriety of the adverse concurrent representation under paragraph (b) when an actual conflict arises. If the actual conflict is materially different from the conflict that has been waived, the lawyer may not rely on the advance consent previously obtained. Even if the actual conflict is not materially different from the conflict the client has previously waived, the client’s advance consent cannot be effective if the particular circumstances that have created an actual conflict during the course of the representation would make the conflict nonconsentable under paragraph (b). See Comments [14]-[17] and [28] addressing nonconsentable conflicts.
Conflicts in Litigation

[23] Paragraph (b)(3) prohibits representation of opposing parties in the same litigation, regardless of the clients’ consent. On the other hand, simultaneous representation of parties whose interests in litigation may conflict, such as co-plaintiffs or co-defendants, is governed by paragraph (a)(1). A conflict may exist by reason of substantial discrepancy in the parties’ testimony, incompatibility in positions in relation to an opposing party or the fact that there are substantially different possibilities of settlement of the claims or liabilities in question. Such conflicts can arise in criminal as well as civil cases. Some examples are those in which a lawyer is asked to represent co-defendants in a criminal case, co-plaintiffs or co-defendants in a personal injury case, an insured and insurer, or beneficiaries of the estate of a decedent. In a criminal case, the potential for conflict of interest in representing multiple defendants is so grave that ordinarily a lawyer should decline to represent more than one co-defendant. On the other hand, multiple representation of persons having similar interests in civil litigation is proper if the requirements of paragraph (b) are met.

[24] Ordinarily a lawyer may take inconsistent legal positions in different tribunals at different times on behalf of different clients. The mere fact that advocating a legal position on behalf of one client might create precedent adverse to the interests of a client represented by the lawyer in an unrelated matter does not create a conflict of interest. A conflict of interest exists, however, if there is a significant risk that a lawyer’s action on behalf of one client will materially limit the lawyer’s representation of another client in a different case; for example, when a decision favoring one client will create a precedent likely to weaken seriously the position taken on behalf of the other client. Factors relevant in determining whether the clients need to be advised of this risk include: (i) where the cases are pending, (ii) whether the issue is substantive or procedural, (iii) the temporal relationship between the matters, (iv) the significance of the issue to the immediate and long-term interests of the clients involved, and (v) the clients’ reasonable expectations in retaining the lawyer. Similar concerns may be present when lawyers advocate on behalf of clients before other entities, such as regulatory authorities whose regulations or rulings may significantly implicate clients’ interests. If there is significant risk of an adverse effect on the lawyer’s professional judgment, then absent informed consent of the affected clients, the lawyer must decline the representation.

[25] When a lawyer represents or seeks to represent a class of plaintiffs or defendants in a class-action lawsuit, unnamed members of the class are ordinarily not considered to be clients of the lawyer for purposes of applying paragraph (a)(1). Thus, the lawyer does not typically need to get the consent of such a person before representing a client suing the person in an unrelated matter. Similarly, a lawyer seeking to represent an opponent in a class action does not typically need the consent of an unnamed member of the class whom the lawyer represents in an unrelated matter.

Nonlitigation Conflicts

[26] Conflicts of interest under paragraph (a)(1) arise in contexts other than litigation. For a discussion of such conflicts in transactional matters, see Comment [7]. Regarding paragraph (a)(2), relevant factors in determining whether there is a significant risk that the lawyer’s professional judgment will be adversely affected include: (i) the importance of the matter to each client, (ii) the duration and intimacy of the lawyer’s relationship with the client or clients involved, (iii) the functions being performed by the lawyer, (iv) the likelihood that significant disagreements
will arise, (v) the likelihood that negotiations will be contentious, (vi) the likelihood that the matter will result in litigation, and (vii) the likelihood that the client will suffer prejudice from the conflict. The issue is often one of proximity (how close the situation is to open conflict) and degree (how serious the conflict will be if it does erupt). See Comments [8], [29] and [29A].

[27] For example, conflict questions may arise in estate planning and estate administration. A lawyer may be called upon to prepare wills for several family members, such as husband and wife, and, depending upon the circumstances, a conflict of interest may be present at the outset or may arise during the representation. In order to avoid the development of a disqualifying conflict, the lawyer should, at the outset of the common representation and as part of the process of obtaining each client’s informed consent, advise each client that information will be shared (and regardless of whether it is shared, may not be privileged in a subsequent dispute between the parties) and that the lawyer will have to withdraw from one or both representations if one client decides that some matter material to the representation should be kept secret from the other. See Comment [31].

[28] Whether a conflict is consentable depends on the circumstances. For example, a lawyer may not represent multiple parties to a negotiation if their interests are fundamentally antagonistic to one another, but common representation is permissible where the clients are generally aligned in interest, even though there is some difference in interest among them. Thus, a lawyer may seek to establish or adjust a relationship between clients on an amicable and mutually advantageous basis. Examples include helping to organize a business in which two or more clients are entrepreneurs, working out the financial reorganization of an enterprise in which two or more clients have an interest, and arranging a property distribution in settlement of an estate. The lawyer seeks to resolve potentially adverse interests by developing the parties’ mutual interests. Otherwise, each party might have to obtain separate representation, with the possibility of incurring additional cost, complication or even litigation. Given these and other relevant factors, the clients may prefer that the lawyer act for all of them.

Special Considerations in Common Representation

[29] In civil matters, two or more clients may wish to be represented by a single lawyer in seeking to establish or adjust a relationship between them on an amicable and mutually advantageous basis. For example, clients may wish to be represented by a single lawyer in helping to organize a business, working out a financial reorganization of an enterprise in which two or more clients have an interest, arranging a property distribution of an estate or resolving a dispute between clients. The alternative to common representation can be that each party may have to obtain separate representation, with the possibility of incurring additional cost, complication or even litigation that might otherwise be avoided, or that some parties will have no lawyer at all. Given these and other relevant factors, clients may prefer common representation to separate representation or no representation. A lawyer should consult with each client concerning the implications of the common representation, including the advantages and the risks involved, and the effect on the attorney-client privilege, and obtain each client’s informed consent, confirmed in writing, to the common representation.

[29A] Factors may be present that militate against a common representation. In considering whether to represent multiple clients in the same matter, a lawyer should be mindful
that if the common representation fails because the potentially adverse interests cannot be reconciled, the result can be additional cost, embarrassment and recrimination. Ordinarily, absent the informed consent of all clients, the lawyer will be forced to withdraw from representing all of the clients if the common representation fails. See Rule 1.9(a). In some situations, the risk of failure is so great that multiple representation is plainly impossible. For example, a lawyer cannot undertake common representation of clients where contentious litigation or negotiations between them are imminent or contemplated. Moreover, because the lawyer is required to be impartial between or among commonly represented clients, representation of multiple clients is improper when it is unlikely that impartiality can be maintained. Generally, if the relationship between the parties has already assumed antagonism, it is unlikely that the clients’ interests can be adequately served by common representation. For example, a lawyer who has represented one of the clients for a long period or in multiple matters might have difficulty being impartial between that client and one to whom the lawyer has only recently been introduced.

[30] A particularly important factor in determining the appropriateness of common representation is the effect on client-lawyer confidentiality and the attorney-client privilege. With regard to the attorney-client privilege, the prevailing rule is that, as between commonly represented clients, the privilege does not attach. It must therefore be assumed that if litigation eventuates between the clients, the privilege will not protect any such communications, and the clients should be so advised.

[31] As to the duty of confidentiality, continued common representation will almost certainly be inadequate if one client asks the lawyer not to disclose to the other client information relevant to the common representation. This is so because the lawyer has an equal duty of loyalty to each client, and each client has the right to be informed of anything bearing on the representation that might affect that client’s interests and the right to expect that the lawyer will use that information to that client’s benefit. See Rule 1.4. At the outset of the common representation and as part of the process of obtaining each client’s informed consent, the lawyer should advise each client that information will be shared and that the lawyer will have to withdraw if one client decides that some matter material to the representation should be kept from the other. In limited circumstances, it may be appropriate for the lawyer to proceed with the representation when the clients have agreed, after being properly informed, that the lawyer will keep certain information confidential even as among the commonly represented clients. For example, the lawyer may reasonably conclude that failure to disclose one client’s trade secrets to another client will not adversely affect representation involving a joint venture between the two clients and agree to keep that information confidential with the informed consent of both clients.

[32] When seeking to establish or adjust a relationship between clients, the lawyer should make clear that the lawyer’s role is not that of partisanship normally expected in other circumstances and, thus, that the clients may be required to assume greater responsibility for decisions than when each client is separately represented. Any limitation on the scope of the representation made necessary as a result of the common representation should be fully explained to the clients at the outset of the representation. See Rule 1.2(c).

[33] Subject to the above limitations, each client in the common representation has the right to loyal and diligent representation and the protection of Rule 1.9 concerning the obligations to a former client. The client also has the right to discharge the lawyer as stated in Rule 1.16.
Organizational Clients

[34] A lawyer who represents a corporation or other organization does not, simply by virtue of that representation, necessarily represent any constituent or affiliated organization, such as a parent or subsidiary. See Rule 1.13(a). Although a desire to preserve good relationships with clients may strongly suggest that the lawyer should always seek informed consent of the client organization before undertaking any representation that is adverse to its affiliates, Rule 1.7 does not require the lawyer to obtain such consent unless: (i) the lawyer has an understanding with the organizational client that the lawyer will avoid representation adverse to the client’s affiliates, (ii) the lawyer’s obligations to either the organizational client or the new client are likely to adversely affect the lawyer’s exercise of professional judgment on behalf of the other client, or (iii) the circumstances are such that the affiliate should also be considered a client of the lawyer. Whether the affiliate should be considered a client will depend on the nature of the lawyer’s relationship with the affiliate or on the nature of the relationship between the client and its affiliate. For example, the lawyer’s work for the client organization may be intended to benefit its affiliates. The overlap or identity of the officers and boards of directors, and the client’s overall mode of doing business, may be so extensive that the entities would be viewed as “alter egos.” Under such circumstances, the lawyer may conclude that the affiliate is the lawyer’s client despite the lack of any formal agreement to represent the affiliate.

[34A] Whether the affiliate should be considered a client of the lawyer may also depend on: (i) whether the affiliate has imparted confidential information to the lawyer in furtherance of the representation, (ii) whether the affiliated entities share a legal department and general counsel, and (iii) other factors relating to the legitimate expectations of the client as to whether the lawyer also represents the affiliate. Where the entities are related only through stock ownership, the ownership is less than a controlling interest, and the lawyer has had no significant dealings with the affiliate or access to its confidences, the lawyer may reasonably conclude that the affiliate is not the lawyer’s client.

[34B] Finally, before accepting a representation adverse to an affiliate of a corporate client, a lawyer should consider whether the extent of the possible adverse economic impact of the representation on the entire corporate family might be of such a magnitude that it would materially limit the lawyer’s ability to represent the client opposing the affiliate. In those circumstances, Rule 1.7 will ordinarily require the lawyer to decline representation adverse to a member of the same corporate family, absent the informed consent of the client opposing the affiliate of the lawyer’s corporate client.

Lawyer as Corporate Director

[35] A lawyer for a corporation or other organization who is also a member of its board of directors should determine whether the responsibilities of the two roles may conflict. The lawyer may be called on to advise the corporation in matters involving actions of the directors. Consideration should be given to the frequency with which such situations may arise, the potential intensity of the conflict, the effect of the lawyer’s resignation from the board, and the possibility of the corporation’s obtaining legal advice from another lawyer in such situations. If there is material risk that the dual role will compromise the lawyer’s professional judgment, the lawyer should not serve as a director or should cease to act as the corporation’s lawyer when conflicts of
interest arise. The lawyer should advise the other members of the board that, in some circumstances, matters discussed at board meetings while the lawyer is present in the capacity of director might not be protected by the attorney-client privilege and that conflict of interest considerations might require the lawyer’s recusal as a director or might require the lawyer and the lawyer’s firm to decline representation of the corporation in a matter.
RULE 1.8:
CURRENT CLIENTS:
SPECIFIC CONFLICT OF INTEREST RULES

(a) A lawyer shall not enter into a business transaction with a client if they have differing interests therein and if the client expects the lawyer to exercise professional judgment therein for the protection of the client, unless:

(1) the transaction is fair and reasonable to the client and the terms of the transaction are fully disclosed and transmitted in writing in a manner that can be reasonably understood by the client;

(2) the client is advised in writing of the desirability of seeking, and is given a reasonable opportunity to seek, the advice of independent legal counsel on the transaction; and

(3) the client gives informed consent, in a writing signed by the client, to the essential terms of the transaction and the lawyer’s role in the transaction, including whether the lawyer is representing the client in the transaction.

(b) A lawyer shall not use information relating to representation of a client to the disadvantage of the client unless the client gives informed consent, except as permitted or required by these Rules.

(c) A lawyer shall not:

(1) solicit any gift from a client, including a testamentary gift, for the benefit of the lawyer or a person related to the lawyer; or

(2) prepare on behalf of a client an instrument giving the lawyer or a person related to the lawyer any gift, unless the lawyer or other recipient of the gift is related to the client and a reasonable lawyer would conclude that the transaction is fair and reasonable.

For purposes of this paragraph, related persons include a spouse, child, grandchild, parent, grandparent or other relative, or individual with whom the lawyer or the client maintains a close, familial relationship.

(d) Prior to conclusion of all aspects of the matter giving rise to the representation or proposed representation of the client or prospective client, a lawyer shall not negotiate or enter into any arrangement or understanding with:

(1) a client or a prospective client by which the lawyer acquires an interest in literary or media rights with respect to the subject matter of the representation or proposed representation; or

(2) any person by which the lawyer transfers or assigns any interest in
literary or media rights with respect to the subject matter of the representation of a client or prospective client.

(e) While representing a client in connection with contemplated or pending litigation, a lawyer shall not advance or guarantee financial assistance to the client, except that:

(1) a lawyer may advance court costs and expenses of litigation, the repayment of which may be contingent on the outcome of the matter;

(2) a lawyer representing an indigent or pro bono client may pay court costs and expenses of litigation on behalf of the client;

(3) a lawyer, in an action in which an attorney’s fee is payable in whole or in part as a percentage of the recovery in the action, may pay on the lawyer’s own account court costs and expenses of litigation. In such case, the fee paid to the lawyer from the proceeds of the action may include an amount equal to such costs and expenses incurred; and

(4) a lawyer providing legal services without fee, a not-for-profit legal services or public interest organization, or a law school clinical or pro bono program, may provide financial assistance to indigent clients but may not promise or assure financial assistance prior to retention, or as an inducement to continue the lawyer-client relationship. Funds raised for any legal services or public interest organization for purposes of providing legal services will not be considered useable for providing financial assistance to indigent clients, and financial assistance referenced in this subsection may not include loans or any other form of support that causes the client to be financially beholden to the provider of the assistance.

(f) A lawyer shall not accept compensation for representing a client, or anything of value related to the lawyer’s representation of the client, from one other than the client unless:

(1) the client gives informed consent;

(2) there is no interference with the lawyer’s independent professional judgment or with the client-lawyer relationship; and

(3) the client’s confidential information is protected as required by Rule 1.6.

(g) A lawyer who represents two or more clients shall not participate in making an aggregate settlement of the claims of or against the clients, absent court approval, unless each client gives informed consent in a writing signed by the client. The lawyer’s disclosure shall include the existence and nature of all the claims involved and of the participation of each person in the settlement.
(h) A lawyer shall not:

(1) make an agreement prospectively limiting the lawyer’s liability to a client for malpractice; or

(2) settle a claim or potential claim for such liability with an unrepresented client or former client unless that person is advised in writing of the desirability of seeking, and is given a reasonable opportunity to seek, the advice of independent legal counsel in connection therewith.

(i) A lawyer shall not acquire a proprietary interest in the cause of action or subject matter of litigation the lawyer is conducting for a client, except that the lawyer may:

(1) acquire a lien authorized by law to secure the lawyer’s fee or expenses; and

(2) contract with a client for a reasonable contingent fee in a civil matter subject to Rule 1.5(d) or other law or court rule.

(j) (1) A lawyer shall not:

(i) as a condition of entering into or continuing any professional representation by the lawyer or the lawyer’s firm, require or demand sexual relations with any person;

(ii) employ coercion, intimidation or undue influence in entering into sexual relations incident to any professional representation by the lawyer or the lawyer’s firm; or

(iii) in domestic relations matters, enter into sexual relations with a client during the course of the lawyer’s representation of the client.

(2) Rule 1.8(j)(1) shall not apply to sexual relations between lawyers and their spouses or to ongoing consensual sexual relationships that predate the initiation of the client-lawyer relationship.

(k) Where a lawyer in a firm has sexual relations with a client but does not participate in the representation of that client, the lawyers in the firm shall not be subject to discipline under this Rule solely because of the occurrence of such sexual relations.

Comment

Business Transactions Between Client and Lawyer

[1] A lawyer’s legal skill and training, together with the relationship of trust and confidence between lawyer and client, create the possibility of overreaching when the lawyer
participates in a business, property or financial transaction with a client, for example, a loan or sales transaction or a lawyer’s investment on behalf of a client. For these reasons business transactions between a lawyer and client are not advisable. If a lawyer nevertheless elects to enter into a business transaction with a current client, the requirements of paragraph (a) must be met if the client and lawyer have differing interests in the transaction and the client expects the lawyer to exercise professional judgment therein for the benefit of the client. This will ordinarily be the case even when the transaction is not related to the subject matter of the representation, as when a lawyer drafting a will for a client learns that the client needs money for unrelated expenses and offers to make a loan to the client. The Rule applies to lawyers engaged in the sale of goods or services related to the practice of law, such as the sale of title insurance or investment services to existing clients of the lawyer’s legal practice. See Rule 5.7. It also applies to lawyers purchasing property from estates they represent.

[2] Paragraphs (a)(1), (a)(2) and (a)(3) set out the conditions that a lawyer must satisfy under this Rule. Paragraph (a)(1) requires that the transaction itself be fair to the client and that its essential terms be communicated in writing to the client in a manner that can be reasonably understood. Paragraph (a)(2) requires that the client also be advised in writing of the desirability of seeking the advice of independent legal counsel. It also requires that the client be given a reasonable opportunity to obtain such advice. Paragraph (a)(3) requires that the lawyer obtain the client’s informed consent, in a writing signed by the client, both to the essential terms of the transaction and to the lawyer’s role. When necessary, the lawyer should discuss both the material risks of the proposed transaction, including any risk presented by the lawyer’s involvement and the existence of reasonably available alternatives, and should explain why the advice of independent legal counsel is desirable. See Rule 1.0(j) for the definition of “informed consent.”

[3] The risk to a client is greatest when the client expects the lawyer to represent the client in the transaction itself or when the lawyer’s financial interest otherwise poses a significant risk that the lawyer’s representation of the client will be materially adversely affected by the lawyer’s financial interest in the transaction. Here the lawyer’s role requires that the lawyer must comply, not only with the requirements of paragraph (a), but also with the requirements of Rule 1.7. Under that Rule, the lawyer must disclose the risks associated with the lawyer’s dual role as both legal adviser and participant in the transaction, such as the risk that the lawyer will structure the transaction or give legal advice in a way that favors the lawyer’s interests at the client’s expense. Moreover, the lawyer must obtain the client’s informed consent. In some cases, the lawyer’s interest may be such that Rule 1.7 will preclude the lawyer from seeking the client’s consent to the transaction. A lawyer has a continuing duty to monitor the inherent conflicts of interest that arise out of the lawyer’s business transaction with a client or because the lawyer has an ownership interest in property in which the client also has an interest. A lawyer is also required to make such additional disclosures to the client as are necessary to obtain the client’s informed consent to the continuation of the representation.

[3A] The self-interest of a lawyer resulting from a business transaction with a client may interfere with the lawyer’s exercise of independent judgment on behalf of the client. If such interference will occur should a lawyer agree to represent a prospective client, the lawyer should decline the proffered employment. After accepting employment, a lawyer should not acquire property rights that would adversely affect the lawyer’s professional judgment in representing the client. Even if the property interests of a lawyer do not presently interfere with the exercise of
independent judgment, but the likelihood of interference can be reasonably foreseen by the lawyer, the lawyer should explain the situation to the client and should decline employment or withdraw unless the client gives informed consent to the continued representation, confirmed in writing. A lawyer should not seek to persuade a client to permit the lawyer to invest in an undertaking of the client nor make improper use of a professional relationship to influence the client to invest in an enterprise in which the lawyer is interested.

[4] If the client is independently represented in the transaction, paragraph (a)(2) is inapplicable, and the requirement of full disclosure in paragraph (a)(1) is satisfied by a written disclosure by either the lawyer involved in the transaction or the client’s independent counsel. The fact that the client was independently represented in the transaction is relevant in determining whether the agreement was fair and reasonable to the client, as paragraph (a)(1) further requires.

[4A] Rule 1.8(a) does not apply to business transactions with former clients, but the line between current and former clients is not always clear. A lawyer entering into a business transaction with a former client may not use information relating to the representation to the disadvantage of the former client unless the information has become generally known. See Rule 1.9(c).

[4B] The Rule does not apply to standard commercial transactions between the lawyer and the client for products or services that the client generally markets to others, for example, banking or brokerage services, medical services, products manufactured or distributed by the client, and utilities services. In such transactions, the lawyer has no advantage in dealing with the client, and the restrictions in paragraph (a) are unnecessary and impracticable.

[4C] This Rule also does not apply to ordinary fee arrangements between client and lawyer reached at the inception of the client-lawyer relationship, which are governed by Rule 1.5. The requirements of the Rule ordinarily must be met, however, when the lawyer accepts an interest in the client’s business or other nonmonetary property as payment of all or part of the lawyer’s fee. For example, the requirements of paragraph (a) must ordinarily be met if a lawyer agrees to take stock (or stock options) in the client in lieu of cash fees. Such an exchange creates a risk that the lawyer’s judgment will be skewed in favor of closing a transaction to such an extent that the lawyer may fail to exercise professional judgment as to whether it is in the client’s best interest for the transaction to close. This may occur where the client expects the lawyer to provide professional advice in structuring a securities-for-services exchange. If the lawyer is expected to play any role in advising the client regarding the securities-for-services exchange, especially if the client lacks sophistication, the requirements of fairness, full disclosure and written consent set forth in paragraph (a) must be met. When a lawyer represents a client in a transaction concerning literary property, Rule 1.8(d) does not prohibit the lawyer from agreeing that the lawyer’s fee shall consist of a share of the ownership of the literary property or a share of the royalties or license fees from the property, but the lawyer must ordinarily comply with Rule 1.8(a).

[4D] An exchange of securities for legal services will also trigger the requirements of Rule 1.7 if the lawyer’s ownership interest in the client would, or reasonably may, affect the lawyer’s exercise of professional judgment on behalf of the client. For example, where a lawyer has agreed to accept securities in a client corporation as a fee for negotiating and documenting an equity investment, or for representing a client in connection with an initial public offering, there
is a risk that the lawyer’s judgment will be skewed in favor of closing the transaction to such an extent that the lawyer may fail to exercise professional judgment. (The lawyer’s judgment may be skewed because unless the transaction closes, the securities will be worthless.) Unless a lawyer reasonably concludes that he or she will be able to provide competent, diligent and loyal representation to the client, the lawyer may not undertake or continue the representation, even with the client’s consent. To determine whether a reasonable possibility of such an adverse effect on the representation exists, the lawyer should analyze the nature and relationship of the particular interest and the specific legal services to be rendered. Some salient factors may be (i) the size of the lawyer’s investment in proportion to the holdings of other investors, (ii) the potential value of the investment in relation to the lawyer’s or law firm’s earnings or other assets, and (iii) whether the investment is active or passive.

[4E] If the lawyer reasonably concludes that the lawyer’s representation of the client will not be adversely affected by the agreement to accept client securities as a legal fee, the Rules permit the representation, but only if full disclosure is made to the client and the client’s informed consent is obtained and confirmed in writing. See Rules 1.0(e) (defining “confirmed in writing”), 1.0(j) (defining “informed consent”), and 1.7.

[4F] A lawyer must also consider whether accepting securities in a client as payment for legal services constitutes charging or collecting an unreasonable or excessive fee in violation of Rule 1.5. Determining whether a fee accepted in the form of securities is unreasonable or excessive requires a determination of the value of the securities at the time the agreement is reached and may require the lawyer to engage the services of an investment professional to appraise the value of the securities to be given. The lawyer and client can then make their own advised decisions as to whether the securities-for-fees exchange results in a reasonable fee.

[5] A lawyer’s use of information relating to the representation to the disadvantage of the client violates the lawyer’s duty of loyalty. Paragraph (b) applies when the information is used to benefit either the lawyer or a third person, such as another client or a business associate of the lawyer, at the expense of a client. For example, if a lawyer learns that a client intends to purchase and develop several parcels of land, the lawyer may not use that information to purchase one of the parcels in competition with the client or to recommend that another client make such a purchase. But the rule does not prohibit uses that do not disadvantage the client. For example, a lawyer who learns a government agency’s interpretation of trade legislation during the representation of one client may properly use that information to benefit other clients. Paragraph (b) prohibits use of client information to the disadvantage of the client unless the client gives informed consent, except as permitted or required by these Rules. Rules that permit or require use of client information to the disadvantage of the client include Rules 1.6, 1.9(c) and 3.3.

Gifts to Lawyers

[6] A lawyer may accept a gift from a client if the transaction meets general standards of fairness. If a client offers the lawyer a gift, paragraph (c) does not prohibit the lawyer from accepting it, although such a gift may be voidable by the client. Before accepting a gift offered by a client, a lawyer should urge the client to secure disinterested advice from an independent, competent person who is cognizant of all of the circumstances. In any event, due to concerns about
overreaching and imposition on clients, a lawyer may not suggest that a gift be made to the lawyer or for the lawyer’s benefit.

[6A] This Rule does not apply to success fees, bonuses and the like from clients for legal services. These are governed by Rule 1.5.

[7] If effectuation of a gift requires preparing a legal instrument such as a will or conveyance, the client should have the detached advice that another lawyer can provide. The sole exception to this Rule is where the client is related to the donee and a reasonable lawyer would conclude that the transaction is fair and reasonable, as set forth in paragraph (c).

[8] This Rule does not prohibit a lawyer or a partner or associate of the lawyer from being named as executor of the client’s estate or named to another fiduciary position. Nevertheless, such appointments will be subject to the general conflict of interest provision in Rule 1.7 when there is a significant risk that the lawyer’s interest in obtaining the appointment will adversely affect the lawyer’s professional judgment in advising the client concerning the choice of an executor or other fiduciary. In obtaining the client’s informed consent to the conflict, the lawyer should advise the client concerning the nature and extent of the lawyer’s financial interest in the appointment, as well as the availability of alternative candidates for the position.

**Literary or Media Rights**

[9] An agreement by which a lawyer acquires literary or media rights concerning the subject matter of the representation creates a conflict between the interest of the client and the personal interests of the lawyer. The lawyer may be tempted to subordinate the interests of the client to the lawyer’s own anticipated pecuniary gain. For example, a lawyer in a criminal case who obtains from the client television, radio, motion picture, newspaper, magazine, book, or other literary or media rights with respect to the case may be influenced, consciously or unconsciously, to a course of conduct that will enhance the value of the literary or media rights to the prejudice of the client. To prevent this adverse impact on the representation, such arrangements should be scrupulously avoided prior to the termination of all aspects of the matter giving rise to the representation, even though the representation has previously ended. Likewise, arrangements with third parties, such as book, newspaper or magazine publishers or television, radio or motion picture producers, pursuant to which the lawyer conveys whatever literary or media rights the lawyer may have, should not be entered into prior to the conclusion of all aspects of the matter giving rise to the representation.

[9A] Rule 1.8(d) does not prohibit a lawyer representing a client in a transaction concerning intellectual property from agreeing that the lawyer’s fee shall consist of an ownership share in the property, if the arrangement conforms to paragraph (a) and Rule 1.5.

**Financial Assistance**

[9B] Paragraph (e) eliminates the former requirement that the client remain “ultimately liable” to repay any costs and expenses of litigation that were advanced by the lawyer regardless of whether the client obtained a recovery. Accordingly, a lawyer may make repayment from the client contingent on the outcome of the litigation, and may forgo repayment if the client obtains no recovery or a recovery less than the amount of the advanced costs and expenses. A lawyer may
also, in an action in which the lawyer’s fee is payable in whole or in part as a percentage of the
recovery, pay court costs and litigation expenses on the lawyer’s own account. However,
subparagraphs (e)(1)-(3) limit permitted financial assistance to court costs directly related to
litigation. Examples of permitted expenses include filing fees, expenses of investigation, medical
diagnostic work connected with the matter under litigation and treatment necessary for the
diagnosis, and the costs of obtaining and presenting evidence. Permitted expenses under
subparagraphs (e)(1)-(3) do not include living or medical expenses other than those listed above.

[10] Except in representations covered by subparagraph (e)(4), lawyers may not
subsidize lawsuits or administrative proceedings brought on behalf of their clients, including
making or guaranteeing loans to their clients for living expenses, because to do so would encourage
clients to pursue lawsuits that might not otherwise be brought and because such assistance gives
lawyers too great a financial stake in the litigation. These dangers do not warrant a prohibition
against a lawyer lending a client money for court costs and litigation expenses, including the
expenses of medical examination and testing and the costs of obtaining and presenting evidence,
because these advances are virtually indistinguishable from contingent fee agreements and help
ensure access to the courts. Similarly, an exception is warranted permitting lawyers representing
indigent or pro bono clients to pay court costs and litigation expenses whether or not these funds
will be repaid.

[10A] Subparagraph (e)(4) allows lawyers providing legal services “without fee,” not-for-
profit legal services and public interest organizations, and law school clinical and pro bono
programs, to provide financial assistance (beyond court costs and expenses of litigation) to
indigent clients in connection with contemplated or pending litigation. Examples of financial
assistance permitted under subparagraph (e)(4) include payments to cover food, rent, clothing,
personal incidentals, and medicine. If financial assistance may have adverse consequences for the
client, including, e.g., for receipt of government benefits, receipt of social services, or tax liability,
the lawyer should consult with the client about these consequences. See Rule 1.4(b) (“A lawyer
shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed
decisions regarding the representation”). Subparagraph (e)(4) does not permit lawyers,
organizations, or programs to provide financial assistance beyond court costs and expenses of
litigation to clients who are not indigent.

[10B] The term “without fee” means traditional pro bono arrangements for representation
of indigent clients in which a lawyer provides services without fee or expectation of fee, even if a
statutory attorney fee is ultimately awarded in a case originally accepted as pro bono. See Rule
6.1 Comment [4]. However, a lawyer providing legal services under a contingent fee agreement
or other arrangement where the fee is payable from the indigent client’s recovery would not be
providing legal services “without fee” for purposes of subparagraph (e)(4), even if the lawyer does
not eventually receive a fee.

[10C] Subparagraph (e)(4) is narrowly drawn to avoid potential conflicts of interest and to
avoid incentivizing abuses. Thus, subparagraph (e)(4) prohibits loans or any other forms of
support that cause the indigent client (or the indigent client’s relatives or others affiliated with the
client) to be financially beholden to the lawyer, organization or program providing financial
assistance. Similarly, subparagraph (e)(4) does not permit a lawyer, organization or program to
promise or assure financial assistance (i) to a prospective indigent client as a means of inducing
the indigent client to retain the lawyer, organization, or program, or (ii) as a means of inducing the indigent client to continue an existing lawyer-client relationship. However, the prohibitions in subparagraph (e)(4) on loans, promises, and assurances do not apply to the costs and expenses of litigation that subparagraphs (e)(1)-(3) of this Rule permit a lawyer, program, or organization to advance or pay.

[10D] Legal service or public interest organizations that raise funds for the provision of legal services are prohibited from using those funds to provide the financial assistance permitted by subparagraph (e)(4). Thus, these organizations need to account separately for (i) funds they raise to provide legal services and (ii) funds they raise to provide financial assistance permitted by subparagraph (e)(4). Subparagraph (e)(4) pertains only to direct financial assistance by the organizations or lawyers themselves and does not affect the ability of an organization or program, and the lawyers or others it employs, engages, or supervises, to help an indigent client find other sources of financial assistance. The restriction in subparagraph (e)(4) on using funds raised to provide legal services does not apply to financial assistance for court costs and expenses of litigation referred to in subparagraphs (e)(1)-(3) of the Rule.

[10E] Any financial assistance provided under subparagraph (e)(4) is voluntary and not part of a lawyer’s duty when representing an indigent client. Thus, nothing in subparagraph (e)(4) prevents a lawyer from declining to provide such financial assistance. Nor does subparagraph (e)(4) prevent a law firm, organization, or program from having a policy that centralizes decisions on whether and how to provide financial assistance to indigent clients, or a policy that bars or discourages lawyers (or others the law firm, organization, or program employs, engages, or supervises) from providing such assistance, in order, for example, to assure fairness among clients or to avoid subjecting individual lawyers to financial requests that may impair their relationships with pro bono clients.

**Person Paying for a Lawyer’s Services**

[11] Lawyers are frequently asked to represent clients under circumstances in which a third person will compensate them, in whole or in part. The third person might be a relative or friend, an indemnitor (such as a liability insurance company) or a co-client (such as a corporation sued along with one or more of its employees). Third-party payers frequently have interests that may differ from those of the client. A lawyer is therefore prohibited from accepting or continuing such a representation unless the lawyer determines that there will be no interference with the lawyer’s professional judgment and there is informed consent from the client. *See also* Rule 5.4(c), prohibiting interference with a lawyer’s professional judgment by one who recommends, employs or pays the lawyer to render legal services for another.

[12] Sometimes it will be sufficient for the lawyer to obtain the client’s informed consent regarding the fact of the payment and the identity of the third-party payer. If, however, the fee arrangement creates a conflict of interest for the lawyer, then the lawyer must comply with Rule 1.7. The lawyer must also conform to the requirements of Rule 1.6 concerning confidentiality. Under Rule 1.7(a), a conflict of interest may exist if the lawyer will be involved in representing differing interests or if there is a significant risk that the lawyer’s professional judgment on behalf of the client will be adversely affected by the lawyer’s own interest in the fee arrangement or by the lawyer’s responsibilities to the third-party payer (for example, when the third-party payer is a
Under Rule 1.7(b), the lawyer may accept or continue the representation with the informed consent of each affected client, unless the conflict is nonconsentable under that paragraph. Under Rule 1.7(b), the informed consent must be confirmed in writing. See Rules 1.0(e) (definition of “confirmed in writing”), 1.0(j) (definition of “informed consent”), and 1.0(x) (definition of “writing” or “written”).

Aggregate Settlements

[13] Differences in willingness to make or accept an offer of settlement are among the risks of common representation of multiple clients by a single lawyer. Under Rule 1.7, this is one of the risks that should be discussed before undertaking the representation, as part of the process of obtaining the clients’ informed consents. In addition, Rule 1.2(a) protects each client’s right to have the final say in deciding whether to accept or reject an offer of settlement. Paragraph (g) is a corollary of both these Rules and provides that, before any settlement offer is made or accepted on behalf of multiple clients, the lawyer must inform each of them about all the material terms of the settlement, including what the other clients will receive or pay if the settlement is accepted. See also Rule 1.0(j) (definition of “informed consent”). Lawyers representing a class of plaintiffs or defendants, or those proceeding derivatively, may not have a full client-lawyer relationship with each member of the class; nevertheless, such lawyers must comply with applicable rules regulating notification of class members and other procedural requirements designed to ensure adequate protection of the entire class.

Limiting Liability and Settling Malpractice Claims

[14] Agreements prospectively limiting a lawyer’s liability for malpractice are prohibited because they are likely to undermine competent and diligent representation. Also, many clients are unable to evaluate the desirability of making such an agreement before a dispute has arisen, particularly if they are currently represented by the lawyer seeking the agreement. This paragraph does not, however, prohibit a lawyer from entering into an agreement with the client to arbitrate legal malpractice claims, provided such agreements are enforceable and the client is fully informed of the scope and effect of the agreement. Nor does this paragraph limit the ability of lawyers to practice in the form of a limited-liability entity, where permitted by law, provided that each lawyer remains personally liable to the client for the lawyer’s own conduct and the firm complies with any conditions required by law, such as provisions requiring client notification or maintenance of adequate liability insurance. Nor does it prohibit an agreement in accordance with Rule 1.2 that defines the scope of the representation, although a definition of scope that makes the obligations of representation illusory will amount to an attempt to limit liability.

[15] Agreements settling a claim or a potential claim for malpractice are not prohibited by this Rule. Nevertheless, in view of the danger that a lawyer will take unfair advantage of an unrepresented client or former client, the lawyer must first advise such a person in writing of the appropriateness of independent representation in connection with such a settlement. In addition, the lawyer must give the client or former client a reasonable opportunity to find and consult independent counsel.
Acquiring Proprietary Interest in Litigation

[16] Paragraph (i) states the traditional general rule that lawyers are prohibited from acquiring a proprietary interest in litigation. Like paragraph (e), the general rule has its basis in common law champerty and maintenance and is designed to avoid giving the lawyer too great an interest in the representation. In addition, when the lawyer acquires an ownership interest in the subject of the representation, it will be more difficult for a client to discharge the lawyer if the client so desires. The rule is subject to specific exceptions developed in decisional law and continued in these Rules. The exception for certain advances of the costs of litigation is set forth in paragraph (e). In addition, paragraph (i) sets forth exceptions for liens authorized by law to secure the lawyer’s fees or expenses and contracts for reasonable contingent fees. These may include liens granted by statute, liens originating in common law and liens acquired by contract with the client. When a lawyer acquires by contract a security interest in property other than that recovered through the lawyer’s efforts in the litigation, such an acquisition is a business or financial transaction with a client and is governed by the requirements of paragraph (a). Contracts for contingent fees in civil matters are governed by Rule 1.5.

Client-Lawyer Sexual Relationships

[17] The relationship between lawyer and client is a fiduciary one in which the lawyer occupies the highest position of trust and confidence. The relationship is often unequal; thus, a sexual relationship between lawyer and client can involve unfair exploitation of the lawyer’s fiduciary role, in violation of the lawyer’s basic ethical obligation not to use the trust of the client to the client’s disadvantage. In addition, such a relationship presents a significant danger that if the sexual relationship leads to the lawyer’s emotional involvement, the lawyer will be unable to represent the client without impairing the lawyer’s exercise of professional judgment. Moreover, a blurred line between the professional and personal relationships may make it difficult to predict the extent to which client confidences will be protected by the attorney-client evidentiary privilege. A client’s sexual involvement with the client’s lawyer, especially if the sexual relations create emotional involvement, will often render it unlikely that the client could rationally determine whether to consent to the conflict created by the sexual relations. If a client were to consent to the conflict created by the sexual relations without fully appreciating the nature and implications of that conflict, there is a significant risk of harm to client interests. Therefore, sexual relations between lawyers and their clients are dangerous and inadvisable. Out of respect for the desires of consenting adults, however, paragraph (j) does not flatly prohibit client-lawyer sexual relations in matters other than domestic relations matters. Even when sexual relations between a lawyer and client are permitted under paragraph (j), however, they may lead to incompetent representation in violation of Rule 1.1. Because domestic relations clients are often emotionally vulnerable, domestic relations matters entail a heightened risk of exploitation of the client. Accordingly, lawyers are flatly prohibited from entering into sexual relations with domestic relations clients during the course of the representation even if the sexual relationship is consensual and even if prejudice to the client is not immediately apparent. For a definition of “sexual relations” for the purposes of this Rule, see Rule 1.0(u).

[17A] The prohibitions in paragraph (j)(1) apply to all lawyers in a firm who know of the representation, whether or not they are personally representing the client. The Rule prohibits any lawyer in the firm from exploiting the client-lawyer relationship by directly or indirectly requiring
or demanding sexual relations as a condition of representation by the lawyer or the lawyer’s firm. Paragraph (j)(1)(i) thus seeks to prevent a situation where a client may fear that a willingness or unwillingness to have sexual relations with a lawyer in the firm may have an impact on the representation, or even on the firm’s willingness to represent or continue representing the client. The Rule also prohibits the use of coercion, undue influence or intimidation to obtain sexual relations with a person known to that lawyer to be a client or a prospective client of the firm. Paragraph (j)(1)(ii) thus seeks to prevent a lawyer from exploiting the professional relationship between the client and the lawyer’s firm. Even if a lawyer does not know that the firm represents a person, the lawyer’s use of coercion or intimidation to obtain sexual relations with that person might well violate other Rules or substantive law. Where the representation of the client involves a domestic relations matter, the restrictions stated in paragraphs (j)(1)(i) and (j)(1)(ii), and not the per se prohibition imposed by paragraph (j)(1)(iii), apply to lawyers in a firm who know of the representation but who are not personally representing the client. Nevertheless, because domestic relations matters may be volatile and may entail a heightened risk of exploitation of the client, the risk that a sexual relationship with a client of the firm may result in a violation of other Rules is likewise heightened, even if the sexual relations are not per se prohibited by paragraph (j).

[17B] A law firm’s failure to educate lawyers about the restrictions on sexual relations – or a firm’s failure to enforce those restrictions against lawyers who violate them – may constitute a violation of Rule 5.1, which obligates a law firm to make reasonable efforts to ensure that all lawyers in the firm conform to these Rules.

[18] Sexual relationships between spouses or those that predate the client-lawyer relationship are not prohibited. Issues relating to the exploitation of the fiduciary relationship and client dependency are diminished when the sexual relationship existed prior to the commencement of the client-lawyer relationship. However, before proceeding with the representation in these circumstances, the lawyer should consider whether the lawyer’s ability to represent the client will be materially limited by the sexual relationship and therefore constitute an impermissible conflict of interest. See Rule 1.7(a)(2).

[19] When the client is an organization, paragraph (j) applies to sexual relations between a lawyer for the organization (whether inside counsel or outside counsel) and a constituent of the organization who supervises, directs or regularly consults with that lawyer or a lawyer in that lawyer’s firm concerning the organization’s legal matters.

Imputation of Prohibitions

[20] Where a lawyer who is not personally representing a client has sexual relations with a client of the firm in violation of paragraph (j), the other lawyers in the firm are not subject to discipline solely because those improper sexual relations occurred. There may be circumstances, however, where a violation of paragraph (j) by one lawyer in a firm gives rise to violations of other Rules by the other lawyers in the firm through imputation. For example, sexual relations between a lawyer and a client may give rise to a violation of Rule 1.7(a), and such a conflict under Rule 1.7 may be imputed to all other lawyers in the firm under Rule 1.10(a).
RULE 1.9:
DUTIES TO FORMER CLIENTS

(a) A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter in which that person’s interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former client unless the former client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing.

(b) Unless the former client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing, a lawyer shall not knowingly represent a person in the same or a substantially related matter in which a firm with which the lawyer formerly was associated had previously represented a client:

(1) whose interests are materially adverse to that person; and

(2) about whom the lawyer had acquired information protected by Rules 1.6 or paragraph (c) of this Rule that is material to the matter.

(c) A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter or whose present or former firm has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter:

(1) use confidential information of the former client protected by Rule 1.6 to the disadvantage of the former client, except as these Rules would permit or require with respect to a current client or when the information has become generally known; or

(2) reveal confidential information of the former client protected by Rule 1.6 except as these Rules would permit or require with respect to a current client.

Comment

[1] After termination of a client-lawyer relationship, a lawyer has certain continuing duties with respect to confidentiality and conflicts of interest and thus may not represent another client except in conformity with these Rules. Under this Rule, for example, a lawyer could not properly seek to rescind on behalf of a new client a contract drafted on behalf of a former client. So also, a lawyer who has prosecuted an accused person could not properly represent that person in a subsequent civil action against the government concerning the same transaction. Nor could a lawyer who has represented multiple clients in a matter represent one of the clients against the others in the same or a substantially related matter after a dispute arose among the clients in that matter, unless all affected clients give informed consent. See Comment [9]. Current and former government lawyers must comply with this Rule to the extent required by Rule 1.11.

[2] The scope of a “matter” for purposes of this Rule depends on the facts of a particular situation or transaction. The lawyer’s involvement in a matter can also be a question of degree. When a lawyer has been directly involved in a specific transaction, subsequent representation of other clients with materially adverse interests in that transaction clearly is prohibited. On the other hand, a lawyer who recurrently handled a type of problem for a former client is not precluded from later representing another client in a factually distinct problem of that type, even though the
subsequent representation involves a position adverse to the prior client. Similar considerations can apply to the reassignment of military lawyers between defense and prosecution functions within the same military jurisdictions. The underlying question is whether the lawyer was so involved in the matter that the subsequent representation can be justly regarded as a changing of sides in the matter in question.

[3] Matters are “substantially related” for purposes of this Rule if they involve the same transaction or legal dispute or if, under the circumstances, a reasonable lawyer would conclude that there is otherwise a substantial risk that confidential factual information that would normally have been obtained in the prior representation would materially advance the client’s position in the subsequent matter. For example, a lawyer who has represented a businessperson and learned extensive private financial information about that person may not then represent that person’s spouse in seeking a divorce. Similarly, a lawyer who has previously represented a client in securing environmental permits to build a shopping center would be precluded from representing neighbors seeking to oppose rezoning of the property on the basis of environmental considerations; however, the lawyer would not be precluded, on the grounds of substantial relationship, from defending a tenant of the completed shopping center in resisting eviction for nonpayment of rent. Information that has been disclosed to the public or to other parties adverse to the former client ordinarily will not be disqualifying. Information acquired in a prior representation may have been rendered obsolete by the passage of time, a circumstance that may be relevant in determining whether two representations are substantially related. In the case of an organizational client, general knowledge of the client’s policies and practices ordinarily will not preclude a subsequent representation. On the other hand, knowledge of specific facts gained in a prior representation that are relevant to the matter in question ordinarily will preclude such a representation. A former client is not required to reveal the confidential information learned by the lawyer in order to establish a substantial risk that the lawyer has confidential information to use in the subsequent matter. A conclusion about the possession of such information may be based on the nature of the services the lawyer provided the former client and information that would in ordinary practice be learned by a lawyer providing such services.

[4] [Moved to Comment to Rule 1.10.]

[5] [Moved to Comment to Rule 1.10.]

[6] [Moved to Comment to Rule 1.10.]

[7] Independent of the prohibition against subsequent representation, a lawyer changing professional association has a continuing duty to preserve confidentiality of information about a client formerly represented. See Rules 1.6, 1.9(c).

[8] Paragraph (c) generally extends the confidentiality protections of Rule 1.6 to a lawyer’s former clients. Paragraph (c)(1) provides that information acquired by the lawyer in the course of representing a client may not subsequently be used by the lawyer to the disadvantage of the client. However, the fact that a lawyer has once served a client does not preclude the lawyer from using generally known information about that client when later representing another client. Paragraph (c)(2) provides that a lawyer may not reveal information acquired in the course of
representing a client except as these Rules would permit or require with respect to a current client. See Rules 1.6, 3.3.

[9] The provisions of this Rule are for the protection of former clients and can be waived if the client gives informed consent, which consent must be confirmed in writing under paragraph (a). See also Rule 1.0(j) for the definition of “informed consent.” With regard to the effectiveness of an advance waiver, see Rule 1.7, Comments [22]-[22A]. With regard to disqualification of a firm with which a lawyer is or was formerly associated, see Rule 1.10.
RULE 1.10:
IMPUTATION OF CONFLICTS OF INTEREST

(a) While lawyers are associated in a firm, none of them shall knowingly represent a client when any one of them practicing alone would be prohibited from doing so by Rule 1.7, 1.8 or 1.9, except as otherwise provided therein.

(b) When a lawyer has terminated an association with a firm, the firm is prohibited from thereafter representing a person with interests that the firm knows or reasonably should know are materially adverse to those of a client represented by the formerly associated lawyer and not currently represented by the firm if the firm or any lawyer remaining in the firm has information protected by Rule 1.6 or Rule 1.9(c) that is material to the matter.

(c) When a lawyer becomes associated with a firm, the firm may not knowingly represent a client in a matter that is the same as or substantially related to a matter in which the newly associated lawyer, or a firm with which that lawyer was associated, formerly represented a client whose interests are materially adverse to the prospective or current client unless the newly associated lawyer did not acquire any information protected by Rule 1.6 or Rule 1.9(c) that is material to the current matter.

(d) A disqualification prescribed by this Rule may be waived by the affected client or former client under the conditions stated in Rule 1.7.

(e) A law firm shall make a written record of its engagements, at or near the time of each new engagement, and shall implement and maintain a system by which proposed engagements are checked against current and previous engagements when:

(1) the firm agrees to represent a new client;

(2) the firm agrees to represent an existing client in a new matter;

(3) the firm hires or associates with another lawyer; or

(4) an additional party is named or appears in a pending matter.

(f) Substantial failure to keep records or to implement or maintain a conflict-checking system that complies with paragraph (e) shall be a violation thereof regardless of whether there is another violation of these Rules.

(g) Where a violation of paragraph (e) by a law firm is a substantial factor in causing a violation of paragraph (a) by a lawyer, the law firm, as well as the individual lawyer, shall be responsible for the violation of paragraph (a).

(h) A lawyer related to another lawyer as parent, child, sibling or spouse shall not represent in any matter a client whose interests differ from those of another party to the matter who the lawyer knows is represented by the other lawyer unless the client consents to
the representation after full disclosure and the lawyer concludes that the lawyer can adequately represent the interests of the client.

Comment

Definition of “Firm”

[1] For purposes of these Rules, the term “firm” includes, but is not limited to, (i) a lawyer or lawyers in a law partnership, professional corporation, sole proprietorship or other association authorized to practice law, and (ii) lawyers employed in a legal services organization, a government law office or the legal department of a corporation or other organization. See Rule 1.0(h). Whether two or more lawyers constitute a “firm” within this definition will depend on the specific facts. See Rule 1.0, Comments [2]-[4].

Principles of Imputed Disqualification

[2] The rule of imputed disqualification stated in paragraph (a) gives effect to the principle of loyalty to the client as it applies to lawyers who practice in a law firm. Such situations can be considered from the premise that a firm of lawyers is essentially one lawyer for purposes of the rules governing loyalty to the client, or from the premise that each lawyer is vicariously bound by the obligation of loyalty owed by each lawyer with whom the lawyer is associated. Paragraph (a) operates only among the lawyers currently associated in a firm. When a lawyer moves from one firm to another, the situation is governed by paragraphs (b) and (c).

[3] [Reserved]

[4] The rule in paragraph (a) also does not prohibit representation by others in the law firm where the person prohibited from involvement in a matter is a nonlawyer, such as a paralegal or legal secretary. Such persons, however, ordinarily must be screened from any personal participation in the matter to avoid communication to others in the firm of confidential information that both the nonlawyers and the firm have a legal duty to protect. See Rules 1.0(t), 5.3.

Lawyers Moving Between Firms

[4A] The principles of imputed disqualification are modified when lawyers have been associated in a firm and then end their association. The nature of contemporary law practice and the organization of law firms have made the fiction that the law firm is the same as a single lawyer unrealistic in certain situations. In crafting a rule to govern imputed conflicts, there are several competing considerations. First, the former client must be reasonably assured that the client’s confidentiality interests are not compromised. Second, the principles of imputed disqualification should not be so broadly cast as to preclude others from having reasonable choice of counsel. Third, the principles of imputed disqualification should not unreasonably hamper lawyers from forming new associations and taking on new clients after leaving a firm. In this connection, it should be recognized that today most lawyers practice in firms, that many limit their practice to, or otherwise concentrate in, one area of law, and that many move from one association to another multiple times in their careers. If the principles of imputed disqualification were defined too strictly, the result would be undue curtailment of the opportunity of lawyers to move from one practice setting to another, of the opportunity of clients to choose counsel, and of the opportunity
of firms to retain qualified lawyers. For these reasons, a functional analysis that focuses on preserving the former client’s reasonable confidentiality interests is appropriate in balancing the competing interests.

[5] Paragraph (b) permits a law firm, under certain circumstances, to represent a client with interests directly adverse to those of a client represented by a lawyer who formerly was associated with the firm. The Rule applies regardless of when the formerly associated lawyer represented the client. However, under Rule 1.7 the law firm may not represent a client with interests adverse to those of a current client of the firm. Moreover, the firm may not represent the client where the matter is the same or substantially related to a matter in which (i) the formerly associated lawyer represented the client, and (ii) the firm or any lawyer currently in the firm has information protected by Rule 1.6 and Rule 1.9(c) that is material to the matter.

[5A] In addition to information that may be in the possession of one or more of the lawyers remaining in the firm, information in documents or files retained by the firm itself may preclude the firm from opposing the former client in the same or substantially related matter.

[5B] Rule 1.10(c) permits a law firm to represent a client in a matter that is the same as or substantially related to a matter in which the newly associated lawyer, or the firm with which the lawyer was previously associated, represented a client whose interests are materially adverse to that client, provided the newly associated lawyer did not acquire any confidential information of the previously represented client that is material to the current matter.

Client Consent

[6] Rule 1.10(d) removes imputation with the informed consent of the affected client or former client under the conditions stated in Rule 1.7. The conditions stated in Rule 1.7 require the lawyer to determine that the representation is not prohibited by Rule 1.7(b) and that each affected client or former client has given informed consent to the representation, confirmed in writing. In some cases, the risk may be so severe that the conflict cannot be cured by client consent. For a discussion of the effectiveness of client waivers of conflicts that might arise in the future, see Rule 1.7, Comments [22]-[22A]. For a definition of “informed consent,” see Rule 1.0(j).

Former Government Lawyers

[7] Where a lawyer has joined a private firm after having represented the government, imputation is governed by Rule 1.11(b), not this Rule.

Relationship Between this Rule and Rule 1.8(k)

[8] Where a lawyer is prohibited from engaging in certain transactions under Rule 1.8(a) through (i), this Rule imputes that prohibition to other lawyers associated in a firm with the personally prohibited lawyer. Under Rule 1.8(k), however, where a lawyer in a firm has sexual relations with a client but does not participate in the representation of that client, the other lawyers in the firm are not subject to discipline under Rule 1.8 solely because such sexual relations occur.
Conflict-Checking Procedures

[9] Under paragraph (e), every law firm, no matter how large or small (including sole practitioners), is responsible for creating, implementing and maintaining a system to check proposed engagements against current and previous engagements and against new parties in pending matters. The system must be adequate to detect conflicts that will or reasonably may arise if: (i) the firm agrees to represent a new client, (ii) the firm agrees to represent an existing client in a new matter, (iii) the firm hires or associates with another lawyer, or (iv) an additional party is named or appears in a pending matter. The system will thus render effective assistance to lawyers in the firm in avoiding conflicts of interest. See also Rule 5.1.

[9A] Failure to create, implement and maintain a conflict-checking system adequate for this purpose is a violation of this Rule by the firm. In cases in which a lawyer, despite reasonably diligent efforts to do so, could not acquire the information that would have revealed a conflict because of the firm’s failure to maintain an adequate conflict-checking system, the firm shall be responsible for the violation. However, a lawyer who knows or should know of a conflict in a matter that the lawyer is handling remains individually responsible for the violation of these Rules, whether or not the firm’s conflict-checking system has identified the conflict. In cases in which a violation of paragraph (e) by the firm is a substantial factor in causing a violation of these Rules by a lawyer, the firm, as well as the individual lawyer, is responsible for the violation. As to whether a client-lawyer relationship exists or is continuing, see Scope [9]-[10]; Rule 1.3, Comment [4].

[9B] The records required to be maintained under paragraph (e) must be in written form. See Rule 1.0(x) for the definition of “written,” which includes tangible or electronic records. To be effective, a conflict-checking system may also need to supplement written information with recourse to the memory of the firm’s lawyers through in-person, telephonic, or electronic communications. An effective conflict-checking system as required by this Rule may not, however, depend solely on recourse to lawyers’ memories or other such informal sources of information.

[9C] The nature of the records needed to render effective assistance to lawyers will vary depending on the size, structure, history, and nature of the firm’s practice. At a minimum, however, a firm must record information that will enable the firm to identify (i) each client that the firm represents, (ii) each party in a litigated, transactional or other matter whose interests are materially adverse to the firm’s clients, and (iii) the general nature of each matter.

[9D] To the extent that the records made and maintained for the purpose of complying with this Rule contain confidential information, a firm must exercise reasonable care to protect the confidentiality of these records. See Rule 1.6(c).

[9E] The nature of a firm’s conflict-checking system may vary depending on a number of factors, including the size and structure of the firm, the nature of the firm’s practice, the number and location of the firm offices, and the relationship among the firm’s separate offices. In all cases, however, an effective conflict-checking system should record and maintain information in a way that permits the information to be checked systematically and accurately when the firm is considering a proposed engagement. A small firm or a firm with a small number of engagements
may be able to create and maintain an effective conflict-checking system through the use of hard-copy rather than electronic records. But larger firms, or firms with a large number of engagements, may need to create and maintain records in electronic form so that the information can be accessed quickly and efficiently.

**Organizational Clients**

[9F] Representation of corporate or other organizational clients makes it prudent for a firm to maintain additional information in its conflict-checking system. For example, absent an agreement with the client to the contrary, a conflict may arise when a firm desires to oppose an entity that is part of a current or former client’s corporate family (e.g., an affiliate, subsidiary, parent or sister organization). See Rule 1.7, Comments [34]-[34B]. Although a law firm is not required to maintain records showing every corporate affiliate of every corporate client, if a law firm frequently represents corporations that belong to large corporate families, the law firm should make reasonable efforts to institute and maintain a system for alerting the firm to potential conflicts with the members of the corporate client’s family.

[9G] Under certain circumstances, a law firm may also need to include information about the constituents of a corporate client. Although Rule 1.13 provides that a firm is the lawyer for the entity and not for any of its constituents, confusion may arise when a law firm represents small or closely held corporations with few shareholders, or when a firm represents both the corporation and individual officers or employees but bills the corporate client for the legal services. In other situations, a client-lawyer relationship may develop unintentionally between the law firm and one or more individual constituents of the entity. Accordingly, a firm that represents corporate clients may need a system for determining whether or not the law firm has a client-lawyer relationship with individual constituents of an organizational client. If so, the law firm should add the names of those constituents to the database of its conflict-checking system.

[9H] Rule 1.10(e) requires a law firm to avoid conflicts of interest by checking proposed engagements against current and previous engagements. When lawyers move from one firm to another firm as lateral hires, or when two law firms merge, the lateral lawyers’ conflicts and the merging firms’ conflicts arising under Rule 1.9(a) and (b) will be imputed to the hiring or newly merged firms under Rule 1.10(a). To fulfill the duty to check for conflicts before hiring laterals or before merging firms, the hiring or merging should ordinarily obtain such information as (i) the identity of each client that the lateral lawyers or merging firms currently represent; (ii) the identity of each client that the lateral lawyers or merging firms, within a reasonable period in the past, either formerly represented within the meaning of Rule 1.9(a), or about whom the lateral lawyers or the lawyers in the merging firms acquired material confidential information within the meaning of Rule 1.9(b); (iii) the identity of other parties to the matters in which the lateral lawyers or merging firms represented those clients; and (iv) the general nature of each such matter. The hiring or merging firms may also request aggregate financial data for all clients or from groups of clients (such as past billings, pending receivables, timeliness of payment, and probable future billings) to determine whether the employment or merger is economically justified.

[9I] Whether lawyers may disclose information in response to such requests depends on the nature of the information. Some of this information is ordinarily not confidential (e.g., the names of clients and adversaries in publicly disclosed matters, the general nature of such matters, and
aggregate information about legal fees from all clients or from groups of clients), but other information is ordinarily confidential (e.g., non-public criminal or matrimonial representations, or client-specific payment information). The lateral lawyers or merging firms should carefully assess the nature of the information being requested to determine whether it is confidential before asking lawyers to disclose it. Some measures to assist attorneys in abiding by confidentiality requirements in the lateral and merger context are discussed in Comments [18A]-[18F] to Rule 1.6.
RULE 1.11:
SPECIAL CONFLICTS OF INTEREST FOR FORMER AND CURRENT GOVERNMENT OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES

(a) Except as law may otherwise expressly provide, a lawyer who has formerly served as a public officer or employee of the government:

(1) shall comply with Rule 1.9(c); and

(2) shall not represent a client in connection with a matter in which the lawyer participated personally and substantially as a public officer or employee, unless the appropriate government agency gives its informed consent, confirmed in writing, to the representation. This provision shall not apply to matters governed by Rule 1.12(a).

(b) When a lawyer is disqualified from representation under paragraph (a), no lawyer in a firm with which that lawyer is associated may knowingly undertake or continue representation in such a matter unless:

(1) the firm acts promptly and reasonably to:

   (i) notify, as appropriate, lawyers and nonlawyer personnel within the firm that the personally disqualified lawyer is prohibited from participating in the representation of the current client;

   (ii) implement effective screening procedures to prevent the flow of information about the matter between the personally disqualified lawyer and the others in the firm;

   (iii) ensure that the disqualified lawyer is apportioned no part of the fee therefrom; and

   (iv) give written notice to the appropriate government agency to enable it to ascertain compliance with the provisions of this Rule; and

(2) there are no other circumstances in the particular representation that create an appearance of impropriety.

(c) Except as law may otherwise expressly provide, a lawyer having information that the lawyer knows is confidential government information about a person, acquired when the lawyer was a public officer or employee, may not represent a private client whose interests are adverse to that person in a matter in which the information could be used to the material disadvantage of that person. As used in this Rule, the term “confidential government information” means information that has been obtained under governmental authority and that, at the time this Rule is applied, the government is prohibited by law from disclosing to the public or has a legal privilege not to disclose, and that is not otherwise available to the public. A firm with which that lawyer is associated may undertake or
continue representation in the matter only if the disqualified lawyer is timely and effectively screened from any participation in the matter in accordance with the provisions of paragraph (b).

(d) Except as law may otherwise expressly provide, a lawyer currently serving as a public officer or employee shall not:

(1) participate in a matter in which the lawyer participated personally and substantially while in private practice or nongovernmental employment, unless under applicable law no one is, or by lawful delegation may be, authorized to act in the lawyer’s stead in the matter; or

(2) negotiate for private employment with any person who is involved as a party or as lawyer for a party in a matter in which the lawyer is participating personally and substantially.

(e) As used in this Rule, the term “matter” as defined in Rule 1.0(l) does not include or apply to agency rulemaking functions.

(f) A lawyer who holds public office shall not:

(1) use the public position to obtain, or attempt to obtain, a special advantage in legislative matters for the lawyer or for a client under circumstances where the lawyer knows or it is obvious that such action is not in the public interest;

(2) use the public position to influence, or attempt to influence, a tribunal to act in favor of the lawyer or of a client; or

(3) accept anything of value from any person when the lawyer knows or it is obvious that the offer is for the purpose of influencing the lawyer’s action as a public official.

Comment

[1] A lawyer who has served or is currently serving as a public officer or employee is personally subject to the Rules of Professional Conduct, including the prohibition against concurrent conflicts of interest stated in Rule 1.7. In addition, such a lawyer may be subject to statutes and government regulations regarding conflicts of interest. Such statutes and regulations may circumscribe the extent to which the government agency may give consent under this Rule. See Rule 1.0(j) for the definition of “informed consent.”

[2] Paragraphs (a), (d) and (f) restate the obligations of an individual lawyer who has served or is currently serving as an officer or employee of the government toward a former government or private client. Paragraph (b) sets forth special imputation rules for former government lawyers, with screening and notice provisions, and rule 1.10 is not applicable to these conflicts. See Comments [6]-[7B] concerning imputation of the conflicts of former government lawyers.
Paragraphs (a)(2), (d) and (f) apply regardless of whether a lawyer is adverse to a former client and are thus designed not only to protect the former client, but also to prevent a lawyer from exploiting public office for the advantage of another client. For example, a lawyer who has pursued a claim on behalf of the government may not pursue the same claim on behalf of a private client after the lawyer has left government service, except when authorized to do so by the government agency under paragraph (a). Similarly, a lawyer who has pursued a claim on behalf of a private client may not pursue the claim on behalf of the government, except when authorized to do so.

This Rule represents a balancing of interests. On the one hand, where the successive clients are a government agency and another client, public or private, the risk exists that power or discretion vested in that agency might be used for the special benefit of the other client. A lawyer should not be in a position where benefit to the other client might affect performance of the lawyer’s professional functions on behalf of the government. Also, unfair advantage could accrue to the other client by reason of access to confidential government information about the client’s adversary obtainable only through the lawyer’s government service. On the other hand, the rules governing lawyers presently or formerly employed by a government agency should not be so restrictive as to inhibit transfer of employment to and from the government. The government has a legitimate need to attract qualified lawyers as well as to maintain high ethical standards. A former government lawyer is therefore disqualified only from particular matters in which the lawyer participated personally and substantially. The provisions for screening and waiver in paragraph (b) are necessary to prevent the disqualification rule from imposing too severe a deterrent to entering public service. The limitation on disqualification in paragraphs (a)(2) and (d) to matters involving a specific party or specific parties, rather than extending disqualification to all substantive issues on which the lawyer worked, serves a similar function.

By requiring a former government lawyer to comply with Rule 1.9(c), Rule 1.11(a)(1) protects information obtained while working for the government to the same extent as information learned while representing a private client. Accordingly, unless the information acquired during government service is “generally known” or these Rules would otherwise permit or require its use or disclosure, the information may not be used or revealed to the government’s disadvantage. This provision applies regardless of whether the lawyer was working in a “legal” capacity. Thus, information learned by the lawyer while in public service in an administrative, policy or advisory position also is covered by Rule 1.11(a)(1). Paragraph (c) of Rule 1.11 adds further protections against exploitation of confidential information. Paragraph (c) prohibits a lawyer who has information about a person acquired when the lawyer was a public officer or employee, that the lawyer knows is confidential government information, from representing a private client whose interests are adverse to that person in a matter in which the information could be used to that person’s material disadvantage. A firm with which the lawyer is associated may undertake or continue representation in the matter only if the lawyer who possesses the confidential government information is timely and effectively screened. Because Rule 1.11 is not among the Rules enumerated in Rule 1.10, Rule 1.10 is not applicable to (and therefore does not impute) conflicts arising under Rule 1.11. Thus, the purpose and effect of the prohibitions contained in Rule 1.11(c) are to prevent the private client of a law firm with which the former public officer or official is associated from obtaining an unfair advantage by using the lawyer’s confidential government information about the private client’s adversary.
When a lawyer has been employed by one government agency and then moves to a second government agency, it may be appropriate to treat that second agency as another client for purposes of this Rule, as when a lawyer is employed by a municipality and subsequently is employed by a federal agency. The question whether two government agencies should be regarded as the same or different clients for conflict of interest purposes is beyond the scope of these Rules. See Rule 1.13, Comment [9].

Former Government Lawyers: Using Screening to Avoid Imputed Disqualification

Paragraphs (b) and (c) contemplate the use of screening procedures that permit the law firm of a personally disqualified former government lawyer to avoid imputed disqualification. Nevertheless, there may be circumstances where, despite screening, representation by the personally disqualified lawyer’s firm could still undermine the public’s confidence in the integrity of the legal system. Such a circumstance may arise, for example, where the personally disqualified lawyer occupied a highly visible government position prior to entering private practice, or where other facts and circumstances of the representation itself create an appearance of impropriety. Where the particular circumstances create an appearance of impropriety, a law firm must decline the representation. See Rule 1.0(t) for the definition of “screened” and “screening.”

A firm seeking to avoid disqualification under this Rule should also consider its ability to implement, maintain, and monitor the screening procedures permitted by paragraphs (b) and (c) before undertaking or continuing the representation. In deciding whether the screening procedures permitted by this Rule will be effective to avoid imputed disqualification, a firm should consider a number of factors, including how the size, practices and organization of the firm will affect the likelihood that any confidential information acquired about the matter by the personally disqualified lawyer can be protected. If the firm is large and is organized into separate departments, or maintains offices in multiple locations, or for any reason the structure of the firm facilitates preventing the sharing of information with lawyers not participating in the particular matter, it is more likely that the requirements of this Rule can be met and imputed disqualification avoided. Although a large firm will find it easier to maintain effective screening, lack of timeliness in instituting, or lack of vigilance in maintaining, the procedures required by this Rule may make those procedures ineffective in avoiding imputed disqualification. If a personally disqualified lawyer is working on other matters with lawyers who are participating in a matter requiring screening, it may be impossible to maintain effective screening procedures. Although the size of the firm may be considered as one of the factors affecting the firm’s ability to institute and maintain effective screening procedures, it is not a dispositive factor. A small firm may need to exercise special care and vigilance to maintain effective screening but, if appropriate precautions are taken, small firms can satisfy the requirements of paragraphs (b) and (c).

In order to prevent any lawyer in the firm from acquiring confidential information about the matter from the newly associated lawyer, it is essential that notification be given and screening procedures implemented promptly. If the matter requiring screening is already pending before the personally disqualified lawyer joins the firm, the procedures required by this Rule should be implemented before the lawyer joins the firm. If a newly associated lawyer joins a firm before a conflict requiring screening arises, the requirements of this Rule should be satisfied as soon as practicable after the conflict arises. If any lawyer in the firm acquires confidential information about the matter from the personally disqualified lawyer, the requirements of this Rule
cannot be met, and any subsequent efforts to institute or maintain screening will not be effective in avoiding the firm’s disqualification. Other factors may affect the likelihood that screening procedures will be effective in preventing the flow of confidential information between the personally disqualified lawyer and other lawyers in the firm in a given matter.

[7B] To enable the government agency to determine compliance with the Rule, notice to the appropriate government agency generally should be given as soon as practicable after the need for screening becomes apparent.

[8] Paragraph (c) operates only when the lawyer in question has actual knowledge of the information. It does not operate with respect to information that merely could be imputed to the lawyer.

[9] Paragraph (a) does not prohibit a lawyer from representing a private party and a government agency jointly when doing so is permitted by Rule 1.7 and is not otherwise prohibited by law.

[9A] Paragraph (d)(1) prohibits a lawyer currently serving as a government officer or employee from participating in a matter in which the lawyer participated personally and substantially while in private practice or other non-governmental employment, unless under applicable law no one else is, or by lawful designation could be, authorized to act in the lawyer’s stead. Informed consent on the part of the government agency is not required where such necessity exists. Conversely, informed consent does not suffice to overcome the conflict in the absence of necessity.

[9B] Unlike paragraphs (a) and (c), paragraph (d)(1) contains no special rules providing for imputation of the conflict addressed in paragraph (d)(1) to other lawyers in the same agency. Moreover, Rule 1.10 by its terms does not apply to conflicts under paragraph (d)(1). Thus, even where paragraph (d)(1) bars one lawyer in a government law office from working on a matter, other lawyers in the office may ordinarily work on the matter unless prohibited by other law. Where a government law office’s representation is materially adverse to a government lawyer’s former private client, however, the representation would, absent informed consent of the former client, also be prohibited by Rule 1.9. Rule 1.10 remains applicable to that former client conflict so as to impute the conflict to all lawyers associated in the same government law office. In applying Rule 1.10 to such conflicts, see Rule 1.0(h) (defining “firm” and “law firm”).

[10] For purposes of paragraph (e), a “matter” may continue in another form. In determining whether two particular matters are the same, the lawyer should consider the extent to which (i) the matters involve the same basic facts, (ii) the matters involve the same or related parties, and (iii) time has elapsed between the matters.
RULE 1.12: SPECIFIC CONFLICTS OF INTEREST FOR FORMER JUDGES, ARBITRATORS, MEDIATORS OR OTHER THIRD-PARTY NEUTRALS

(a) A lawyer shall not accept private employment in a matter upon the merits of which the lawyer has acted in a judicial capacity.

(b) Except as stated in paragraph (e), and unless all parties to the proceeding give informed consent, confirmed in writing, a lawyer shall not represent anyone in connection with a matter in which the lawyer participated personally and substantially as:

(1) an arbitrator, mediator or other third-party neutral; or

(2) a law clerk to a judge or other adjudicative officer or an arbitrator, mediator or other third-party neutral.

(c) A lawyer shall not negotiate for employment with any person who is involved as a party or as lawyer for a party in a matter in which the lawyer is participating personally and substantially as a judge or other adjudicative officer or as an arbitrator, mediator or other third-party neutral.

(d) When a lawyer is disqualified from representation under this Rule, no lawyer in a firm with which that lawyer is associated may knowingly undertake or continue representation in such a matter unless:

(1) the firm acts promptly and reasonably to:

   (i) notify, as appropriate, lawyers and nonlawyer personnel within the firm that the personally disqualified lawyer is prohibited from participating in the representation of the current client;

   (ii) implement effective screening procedures to prevent the flow of information about the matter between the personally disqualified lawyer and the others in the firm;

   (iii) ensure that the disqualified lawyer is apportioned no part of the fee therefrom; and

   (iv) give written notice to the parties and any appropriate tribunal to enable it to ascertain compliance with the provisions of this Rule; and

(2) there are no other circumstances in the particular representation that create an appearance of impropriety.

(e) An arbitrator selected as a partisan of a party in a multimember arbitration panel is not prohibited from subsequently representing that party.
Comment

[1] A lawyer acts in a “judicial capacity” within the meaning of paragraph (a) when the lawyer serves as a judge or other adjudicative officer. Where a judge or other adjudicative officer in a multimember court, leaves judicial office to practice law, the former judge or adjudicative officer is not prohibited from representing a client in a matter that was pending in the court if the former judge or adjudicative officer did not act upon the merits in that matter. So also, the fact that a former judge or adjudicative officer exercised administrative responsibility in a court does not prevent the former judge or adjudicative officer from acting as a lawyer in a matter where the judge or adjudicative officer had previously exercised remote or incidental administrative responsibility that did not affect the merits. See Rule 1.11, Comment [4] (a former government lawyer is disqualified “only from particular matters I which the lawyer participated personally and substantially”). A former judge or adjudicative officer may not, however, accept private employment in a matter upon the merits of which the judge or adjudicative officer has acted in a judicial capacity and – unlike conflicts for lawyers who have acted in a capacity listed in Rule 1.12 (b) – a conflict arising under paragraph (a) cannot be waived. The term “adjudicative officer” in paragraphs (b)(2) and (c) includes such officials as judges pro tempore, referees, special masters, hearing officers and other parajudicial officers.

[2] A lawyer who has served as an arbitrator, mediator or other third-party neutral may be asked to represent a client in a matter in which the lawyer participated personally and substantially. This Rule forbids such representation unless all of the parties to the proceedings give their informed consents, confirmed in writing. See Rules 1.0(j), (e). Other law or codes of ethics governing third-party neutrals may impose more stringent standards of personal or imputed disqualification. See Rule 2.4.

[3] Although lawyers who serve as third-party neutrals do not obtain information concerning the parties that is protected under Rule 1.6, they typically owe the parties an obligation of confidentiality under law or codes of ethics governing third-party neutrals. Paragraph (d) therefore provides that conflicts of the personally disqualified lawyer will be imputed to other lawyers in a law firm unless the conditions of this paragraph are met.

[4] Requirements for screening procedures are stated in paragraph (d). “Screened” and “screening” are defined in Rule 1.0(t).

[4A] A firm seeking to avoid imputed disqualification under this Rule must prohibit the personally disqualified lawyer from sharing in the fees in the matter.

[4B] A firm seeking to avoid disqualification under this Rule should also consider its ability to implement, maintain, and monitor the screening procedures permitted by paragraph (d) before undertaking or continuing the representation. In deciding whether the screening procedures permitted by this Rule will be effective to avoid imputed disqualification, a firm should consider a number of factors, including how the size, practices and organization of the firm will affect the likelihood that any confidential information acquired about the matter by the personally disqualified lawyer can be protected. If the firm is large and is organized into separate departments, or maintains offices in multiple locations, or for any reason the structure of the firm facilitates preventing the sharing of information with lawyers not participating in the particular
matter, it is more likely that the requirements of this Rule can be met and imputed disqualification avoided. Although a large firm will find it easier to maintain effective screening, lack of timeliness in instituting, or lack of vigilance in maintaining, the procedures required by this Rule may make those procedures ineffective in avoiding imputed disqualification. If a personally disqualified lawyer is working on other matters with lawyers who are participating in a matter requiring screening, it may be impossible to maintain effective screening procedures. The size of the firm may be considered as one of the factors affecting the firm’s ability to institute and maintain effective screening procedures, it is not a dispositive factor. A small firm may need to exercise special care and vigilance to maintain effective screening but, if appropriate precautions are taken, small firms can satisfy the requirements of paragraph (d).

[4C] In order to prevent any lawyer in the firm from acquiring confidential information about the matter from the newly associated lawyer, it is essential that notification be given and screening procedures implemented promptly. If the matter requiring screening is already pending before the personally disqualified lawyer joins the firm, the procedures required by this Rule should be implemented before the lawyer joins the firm. If a newly associated lawyer joins a firm before a conflict requiring screening arises, the requirements of this Rule should be satisfied as soon as practicable after the conflict arises. If any lawyer in the firm acquires confidential information about the matter from the personally disqualified lawyer, the requirements of this Rule cannot be met, and any subsequent efforts to institute or maintain screening will not be effective in avoiding the firm’s disqualification. Other factors may affect the likelihood that screening procedures will be effective in preventing the flow of confidential information between the personally disqualified lawyer and others in the firm in a given matter.

[5] To enable the tribunal to determine compliance with the Rule, notice to the parties and any appropriate tribunal generally should be given as soon as practicable after the need for screening becomes apparent.
RULE 1.13:
ORGANIZATION AS CLIENT

(a) When a lawyer employed or retained by an organization is dealing with the organization’s directors, officers, employees, members, shareholders or other constituents, and it appears that the organization’s interests may differ from those of the constituents with whom the lawyer is dealing, the lawyer shall explain that the lawyer is the lawyer for the organization and not for any of the constituents.

(b) If a lawyer for an organization knows that an officer, employee or other person associated with the organization is engaged in action or intends to act or refuses to act in a matter related to the representation that (i) is a violation of a legal obligation to the organization or a violation of law that reasonably might be imputed to the organization, and (ii) is likely to result in substantial injury to the organization, then the lawyer shall proceed as is reasonably necessary in the best interest of the organization. In determining how to proceed, the lawyer shall give due consideration to the seriousness of the violation and its consequences, the scope and nature of the lawyer’s representation, the responsibility in the organization and the apparent motivation of the person involved, the policies of the organization concerning such matters and any other relevant considerations. Any measures taken shall be designed to minimize disruption of the organization and the risk of revealing information relating to the representation to persons outside the organization. Such measures may include, among others:

(1) asking reconsideration of the matter;

(2) advising that a separate legal opinion on the matter be sought for presentation to an appropriate authority in the organization; and

(3) referring the matter to higher authority in the organization, including, if warranted by the seriousness of the matter, referral to the highest authority that can act in behalf of the organization as determined by applicable law.

(c) If, despite the lawyer’s efforts in accordance with paragraph (b), the highest authority that can act on behalf of the organization insists upon action, or a refusal to act, that is clearly in violation of law and is likely to result in a substantial injury to the organization, the lawyer may reveal confidential information only if permitted by Rule 1.6, and may resign in accordance with Rule 1.16.

(d) A lawyer representing an organization may also represent any of its directors, officers, employees, members, shareholders or other constituents, subject to the provisions of Rule 1.7. If the organization’s consent to the concurrent representation is required by Rule 1.7, the consent shall be given by an appropriate official of the organization other than the individual who is to be represented, or by the shareholders.
Comment

The Entity as the Client

[1] An organizational client is a legal entity, but it cannot act except through its officers, directors, employees, members, shareholders and other constituents. Officers, directors, employees and shareholders are the constituents of the corporate organizational client. The duties defined in this Rule apply equally to unincorporated associations. “Other constituents” as used in this Rule means the positions equivalent to officers, directors, employees, and shareholders held by persons acting for organizational clients that are not corporations.

[2] When one of the constituents of an organizational client communicates with the organization’s lawyer in that person’s organizational capacity, the communication is protected by Rule 1.6. Thus, for example, if an organizational client requests its lawyer to investigate allegations of wrongdoing, interviews between the lawyer and the client’s employees or other constituents made in the course of that investigation are covered by Rule 1.6. This does not mean, however, that constituents of an organizational client are the clients of the lawyer. The lawyer may not disclose to such constituents information relating to the representation except for disclosures explicitly or impliedly authorized by the organizational client in order to carry out the representation or as otherwise permitted by Rule 1.6.

[2A] There are times when the organization’s interests may differ from those of one or more of its constituents. In such circumstances, the lawyer should advise any constituent whose interest differs from that of the organization: (i) that a conflict or potential conflict of interest exists, (ii) that the lawyer does not represent the constituent in connection with the matter, unless the representation has been approved in accordance with Rule 1.13(d), (iii) that the constituent may wish to obtain independent representation, and (iv) that any attorney-client privilege that applies to discussions between the lawyer and the constituent belongs to the organization and may be waived by the organization. Care must be taken to ensure that the constituent understands that, when there is such adversity of interest, the lawyer for the organization cannot provide legal representation for that constituent, and that discussions between the lawyer for the organization and the constituent may not be privileged.

[2B] Whether such a warning should be given by the lawyer for the organization to any constituent may turn on the facts of each case.

Acting in the Best Interest of the Organization

[3] When constituents of the organization make decisions for it, the decisions ordinarily must be accepted by the lawyer, even if their utility or prudence is doubtful. Decisions concerning policy and operations, including ones entailing serious risk, are not as such in the lawyer’s province. Paragraph (b) makes clear, however, that when the lawyer knows that the organization is likely to be substantially injured by action of an officer or other constituent that violates a legal obligation to the organization or is in violation of law that might be imputed to the organization, the lawyer must proceed as is reasonably necessary in the best interest of the organization. Under Rule 1.0(k), a lawyer’s knowledge can be inferred from circumstances, and a lawyer cannot ignore the obvious. The terms “reasonable” and “reasonably” connote a range of
conduct that will satisfy the requirements of Rule 1.13. In determining what is reasonable in the best interest of the organization, the circumstances at the time of determination are relevant. Such circumstances may include, among others, the lawyer’s area of expertise, the time constraints under which the lawyer is acting, and the lawyer’s previous experience and familiarity with the client.

[4] In determining how to proceed under paragraph (b), the lawyer should give due consideration to the seriousness of the violation and its consequences, the scope and nature of the lawyer’s representation, the responsibility within the organization and the apparent motivation of the person involved, the policies of the organization concerning such matters, and any other relevant considerations. Measures to be taken may include, among others, asking the constituent to reconsider the matter. For example, if the circumstances involve a constituent’s innocent misunderstanding of law and subsequent acceptance of the lawyer’s advice, the lawyer may reasonably conclude that the best interest of the organization does not require that the matter be referred to higher authority. If a constituent persists in conduct contrary to the lawyer’s advice, it may be necessary for the lawyer to take steps to have the matter reviewed by a higher authority in the organization. If the matter is of sufficient seriousness and importance or urgency to the organization, referral to higher authority in the organization may be necessary even if the lawyer has not communicated with the constituent. Any measures taken should, to the extent practicable, minimize the risk of revealing information relating to the representation to persons outside the organization. Even in circumstances where a lawyer is not obligated by Rule 1.13 to proceed, a lawyer may bring to the attention of an organizational client, including its highest authority, matters that the lawyer reasonably believes to be of sufficient importance to warrant doing so in the best interest of the organization. See Rule 1.4.

[5] The organization’s highest authority to which a matter may be referred ordinarily will be the board of directors or similar governing body. However, applicable law may prescribe that under certain conditions the highest authority reposes elsewhere, for example, in the independent directors of a corporation.

Relation to Other Rules

[6] The authority and responsibility provided in this Rule are concurrent with the authority and responsibility provided in other Rules. In particular, this Rule does not limit or expand the lawyer’s responsibility under Rule 1.6, Rule 1.8, Rule 1.16, Rule 3.3 or Rule 4.1. Rules 1.6(b)(2) and (b)(3) may permit the lawyer in some circumstances to disclose confidential information. In such circumstances Rule 1.2(d) may also be applicable, in which event withdrawal from the representation under Rule 1.16(b)(1) may be required.

[7] The authority of a lawyer to disclose information relating to a representation under Rule 1.6 does not apply with respect to information relating to a lawyer’s engagement by an organization to investigate an alleged violation of law or to defend the organization or an officer, employee or other person associated with the organization against a claim arising out of an alleged past violation of law. Having a lawyer who cannot disclose confidential information concerning past acts relevant to the representation for which the lawyer was retained enables an organizational client to enjoy the full benefits of legal counsel in conducting an investigation or defending against a claim.
[8] A lawyer for an organization who reasonably believes that the lawyer’s discharge was because of actions taken pursuant to paragraph (b), or who withdraws in circumstances that require or permit the lawyer to take action under paragraph (b), must proceed as “reasonably necessary in the best interest of the organization.” Under some circumstances, the duty of communication under Rule 1.4 and the duty under Rule 1.16(e) to protect a client’s interest upon termination of the representation, in conjunction with this Rule, may require the lawyer to inform the organization’s highest authority of the lawyer’s discharge or withdrawal, and of what the lawyer reasonably believes to be the basis for the discharge or withdrawal.

**Government Agency**

[9] The duties defined in this Rule apply to governmental organizations. Defining precisely the identity of the client and prescribing the resulting obligations of such lawyers may be more difficult in the government context. Although in some circumstances the client may be a specific agency, it may also be a branch of government, such as the executive branch, or the government as a whole. For example, if the action or failure to act involves the head of a bureau, either the department of which the bureau is a part or the relevant branch of government may be the client for purposes of this Rule. Defining or identifying the client of a lawyer representing a government entity depends on applicable federal, state and local law and is a matter beyond the scope of these Rules. See Scope [9]. Moreover, in a matter involving the conduct of government officials, a government lawyer may have greater authority under applicable law to question such conduct than would a lawyer for a private organization in similar circumstances. Thus, when the client is a governmental organization, a different balance may be appropriate between maintaining confidentiality and assuring that the wrongful act is prevented or rectified. In addition, duties of lawyers employed by the government or lawyers in military service may be defined by statutes and regulation. This Rule does not limit that authority. See Scope [10].


**Concurrent Representation**

[12] Paragraph (d) recognizes that a lawyer for an organization may also represent a principal officer or major shareholder, subject to the provisions of Rule 1.7. If the corporation’s informed consent to such a concurrent representation is needed, the lawyer should advise the principal officer or major shareholder that any consent given on behalf of the corporation by the conflicted officer or shareholder may not be valid, and the lawyer should explain the potential consequences of an invalid consent.

**Derivative Actions**

[13] Under generally prevailing law, the shareholders or members of a corporation may bring suit to compel the directors to perform their legal obligations in the supervision of the organization. Members of unincorporated associations have essentially the same right. Such an action may be brought nominally by the organization, but usually is, in fact, a legal controversy over management of the organization.
The question can arise whether counsel for the organization may defend such an action. The proposition that the organization is the lawyer’s client does not alone resolve the issue. Most derivative actions are normal incidents of an organization’s affairs, to be defended by the organization’s lawyer like any other suits. However, if the claim involves serious charges of wrongdoing by those in control of the organization, a conflict may arise between the lawyer’s duty to the organization and the lawyer’s relationship with the board. In those circumstances, Rule 1.7 governs who should represent the directors and the organization.
RULE 1.14:
CLIENT WITH DIMINISHED CAPACITY

(a) When a client’s capacity to make adequately considered decisions in connection with a representation is diminished, whether because of minority, mental impairment or for some other reason, the lawyer shall, as far as reasonably possible, maintain a conventional relationship with the client.

(b) When the lawyer reasonably believes that the client has diminished capacity, is at risk of substantial physical, financial or other harm unless action is taken and cannot adequately act in the client’s own interest, the lawyer may take reasonably necessary protective action, including consulting with individuals or entities that have the ability to take action to protect the client and, in appropriate cases, seeking the appointment of a guardian ad litem, conservator or guardian.

(c) Information relating to the representation of a client with diminished capacity is protected by Rule 1.6. When taking protective action pursuant to paragraph (b), the lawyer is impliedly authorized under Rule 1.6(a) to reveal information about the client, but only to the extent reasonably necessary to protect the client’s interests.

Comment

[1] The responsibilities of a lawyer may vary according to the intelligence, experience, mental condition or age of a client, the obligation of a public officer, or the nature of a particular proceeding. The conventional client-lawyer relationship is based on the assumption that the client, when properly advised and assisted, is capable of making decisions about important matters. Any condition that renders a client incapable of communicating or making a considered judgment on the client’s own behalf casts additional responsibilities upon the lawyer. When the client is a minor or suffers from a diminished mental capacity, maintaining the conventional client-lawyer relationship may not be possible in all respects. In particular, a severely incapacitated person may have no power to make legally binding decisions. Nevertheless, a client with diminished capacity often has the ability to understand, deliberate upon and reach conclusions about matters affecting the client’s own well-being.

[2] The fact that a client suffers a disability does not diminish the lawyer’s obligation to treat the client attentively and with respect.

[3] The client may wish to have family members or other persons participate in discussions with the lawyer. The lawyer should consider whether the presence of such persons will affect the attorney-client privilege. Nevertheless, the lawyer must keep the client’s interests foremost and, except for protective action authorized under paragraph (b), must look to the client, and not family members, to make decisions on the client’s behalf.

[4] If a legal representative has already been appointed for the client, the lawyer should ordinarily look to the representative for decisions on behalf of the client. In matters involving a minor, with or without a disability, the question whether the lawyer should look to the parents as natural guardians may depend on the type of proceeding or matter in which the lawyer is representing the minor. If the lawyer represents the guardian as distinct from the ward, and
reasonably believes that the guardian is acting adversely to the ward’s interest, the lawyer may have an obligation to prevent or rectify the guardian’s misconduct. See Rule 1.2(d).

**Taking Protective Action**

[5] If a lawyer reasonably believes that a client is at risk of substantial physical, financial or other harm unless action is taken, and that a conventional client-lawyer relationship cannot be maintained as provided in paragraph (a) because the client lacks sufficient capacity to communicate or to make adequately considered decisions in connection with the representation, then paragraph (b) permits the lawyer to take reasonably necessary protective measures. Such measures could include: consulting with family members, using a reconsideration period to permit clarification or improvement of circumstances, using voluntary surrogate decision-making tools such as durable powers of attorney, or consulting with support groups, professional services, adult-protective agencies or other individuals or entities that have the ability to protect the client. In taking any protective action, the lawyer should be guided by such factors as the wishes and values of the client to the extent known, the client’s best interest, and the goals of minimizing intrusion into the client’s decision-making autonomy and maximizing respect for the client’s family and social connections.

[6] In determining the extent of the client’s diminished capacity, the lawyer should consider and balance such factors as: (i) the client’s ability to articulate reasoning leading to a decision, (ii) variability of state of mind and ability to appreciate consequences of a decision; the substantive fairness of a decision, and (iii) the consistency of a decision with the known long-term commitments and values of the client. In appropriate circumstances, the lawyer may seek guidance from an appropriate diagnostician.

[7] If a legal representative has not been appointed, the lawyer should consider whether appointment of a guardian ad litem, conservator or guardian is necessary to protect the client’s interests. Thus, if a client with diminished capacity has substantial property that should be sold for the client’s benefit, effective completion of the transaction may require appointment of a legal representative. In addition, rules of procedure in litigation sometimes provide that a minor or a person with diminished capacity must be represented by a guardian or next friend if they do not have a general guardian. In many circumstances, however, appointment of a legal representative may be unnecessarily expensive or traumatic for the client. Seeking a guardian or conservator without the client’s consent (including doing so over the client’s objection) is appropriate only in the limited circumstances where a client’s diminished capacity is such that the lawyer reasonably believes that no other practical method of protecting the client’s interests is readily available. The lawyer should always consider less restrictive protective actions before seeking the appointment of a guardian or conservator. The lawyer should act as petitioner in such a proceeding only when no other person is available to do so.

[7A] Prior to withdrawing from the representation of a client whose capacity is in question, the lawyer should consider taking reasonable protective action. See Rule 1.16(e).
Disclosure of the Client’s Condition

[8] Disclosure of the client’s diminished capacity could adversely affect the client’s interests. For example, raising the question of diminished capacity could, in some circumstances, lead to proceedings for involuntary commitment. Information relating to the representation is protected by Rule 1.6. Therefore, unless authorized to do so, the lawyer may not disclose such information. When taking protective action pursuant to paragraph (b), the lawyer is impliedly authorized to make the necessary disclosures, even when the client directs the lawyer to the contrary. Nevertheless, given the risks of disclosure, paragraph (c) limits what the lawyer may disclose in consulting with other individuals or entities or in seeking the appointment of a legal representative. At the very least, the lawyer should determine whether it is likely that the person or entity consulted will act adversely to the client’s interests before discussing matters related to the client.
RULE 1.15:
PRESCRIBING IDENTITIY OF FUNDS AND PROPERTY OF OTHERS; FIDUCIARY RESPONSIBILITY; COMMINGLING AND MISAPPROPRIATION OF CLIENT FUNDS OR PROPERTY; MAINTENANCE OF BANK ACCOUNTS; RECORD KEEPING; EXAMINATION OF RECORDS

(a) Prohibition Against Commingling and Misappropriation of Client Funds or Property.

A lawyer in possession of any funds or other property belonging to another person, where such possession is incident to his or her practice of law, is a fiduciary, and must not misappropriate such funds or property or commingle such funds or property with his or her own.

(b) Separate Accounts.

(1) A lawyer who is in possession of funds belonging to another person incident to the lawyer’s practice of law shall maintain such funds in a banking institution within New York State that agrees to provide dishonored check reports in accordance with the provisions of 22 N.Y.C.R.R. Part 1300. “Banking institution” means a state or national bank, trust company, savings bank, savings and loan association or credit union. Such funds shall be maintained, in the lawyer’s own name, or in the name of a firm of lawyers of which the lawyer is a member, or in the name of the lawyer or firm of lawyers by whom the lawyer is employed, in a special account or accounts, separate from any business or personal accounts of the lawyer or lawyer’s firm, and separate from any accounts that the lawyer may maintain as executor, guardian, trustee or receiver, or in any other fiduciary capacity; into such special account or accounts all funds held in escrow or otherwise entrusted to the lawyer or firm shall be deposited; provided, however, that such funds may be maintained in a banking institution located outside New York State if such banking institution complies with 22 N.Y.C.R.R. Part 1300 and the lawyer has obtained the prior written approval of the person to whom such funds belong specifying the name and address of the office or branch of the banking institution where such funds are to be maintained.

(2) A lawyer or the lawyer’s firm shall identify the special bank account or accounts required by Rule 1.15(b)(1) as an “Attorney Special Account,” “Attorney Trust Account,” or “Attorney Escrow Account,” and shall obtain checks and deposit slips that bear such title. Such title may be accompanied by such other descriptive language as the lawyer may deem appropriate, provided that such additional language distinguishes such special account or accounts from other bank accounts that are maintained by the lawyer or the lawyer’s firm.

(3) Funds reasonably sufficient to maintain the account or to pay account charges may be deposited therein.
(4) Funds belonging in part to a client or third person and in part currently or potentially to the lawyer or law firm shall be kept in such special account or accounts, but the portion belonging to the lawyer or law firm may be withdrawn when due unless the right of the lawyer or law firm to receive it is disputed by the client or third person, in which event the disputed portion shall not be withdrawn until the dispute is finally resolved.

(c) Notification of Receipt of Property; Safekeeping; Rendering Accounts; Payment or Delivery of Property.

A lawyer shall:

(1) promptly notify a client or third person of the receipt of funds, securities, or other properties in which the client or third person has an interest;

(2) identify and label securities and properties of a client or third person promptly upon receipt and place them in a safe deposit box or other place of safekeeping as soon as practicable;

(3) maintain complete records of all funds, securities, and other properties of a client or third person coming into the possession of the lawyer and render appropriate accounts to the client or third person regarding them; and

(4) promptly pay or deliver to the client or third person as requested by the client or third person the funds, securities, or other properties in the possession of the lawyer that the client or third person is entitled to receive.

(d) Required Bookkeeping Records.

(1) A lawyer shall maintain for seven years after the events that they record:

(i) the records of all deposits in and withdrawals from the accounts specified in Rule 1.15(b) and of any other bank account that concerns or affects the lawyer’s practice of law; these records shall specifically identify the date, source and description of each item deposited, as well as the date, payee and purpose of each withdrawal or disbursement;

(ii) a record for special accounts, showing the source of all funds deposited in such accounts, the names of all persons for whom the funds are or were held, the amount of such funds, the description and amounts, and the names of all persons to whom such funds were disbursed;

(iii) copies of all retainer and compensation agreements with clients;

(iv) copies of all statements to clients or other persons showing the disbursement of funds to them or on their behalf;
(v) copies of all bills rendered to clients;

(vi) copies of all records showing payments to lawyers, investigators or other persons, not in the lawyer’s regular employ, for services rendered or performed;

(vii) copies of all retainer and closing statements filed with the Office of Court Administration; and

(viii) all checkbooks and check stubs, bank statements, prenumbered canceled checks and duplicate deposit slips.

(2) Lawyers shall make accurate entries of all financial transactions in their records of receipts and disbursements, in their special accounts, in their ledger books or similar records, and in any other books of account kept by them in the regular course of their practice, which entries shall be made at or near the time of the act, condition or event recorded.

(3) For purposes of Rule 1.15(d), a lawyer may satisfy the requirements of maintaining “copies” by maintaining any of the following items: original records, photocopies, microfilm, optical imaging, and any other medium that preserves an image of the document that cannot be altered without detection.

(e) Authorized Signatories.

All special account withdrawals shall be made only to a named payee and not to cash. Such withdrawals shall be made by check or, with the prior written approval of the party entitled to the proceeds, by bank transfer. Only a lawyer admitted to practice law in New York State shall be an authorized signatory of a special account.

(f) Missing Clients.

Whenever any sum of money is payable to a client and the lawyer is unable to locate the client, the lawyer shall apply to the court in which the action was brought if in the unified court system, or, if no action was commenced in the unified court system, to the Supreme Court in the county in which the lawyer maintains an office for the practice of law, for an order directing payment to the lawyer of any fees and disbursements that are owed by the client and the balance, if any, to the Lawyers’ Fund for Client Protection for safeguarding and disbursement to persons who are entitled thereto.

(g) Designation of Successor Signatories.

(1) Upon the death of a lawyer who was the sole signatory on an attorney trust, escrow or special account, an application may be made to the Supreme Court for an order designating a successor signatory for such trust, escrow or special account, who shall be a member of the bar in good standing and admitted to the practice of law in New York State.
(2) An application to designate a successor signatory shall be made to the Supreme Court in the judicial district in which the deceased lawyer maintained an office for the practice of law. The application may be made by the legal representative of the deceased lawyer’s estate; a lawyer who was affiliated with the deceased lawyer in the practice of law; any person who has a beneficial interest in such trust, escrow or special account; an officer of a city or county bar association; or counsel for an attorney disciplinary committee. No lawyer may charge a legal fee for assisting with an application to designate a successor signatory pursuant to this Rule.

(3) The Supreme Court may designate a successor signatory and may direct the safeguarding of funds from such trust, escrow or special account, and the disbursement of such funds to persons who are entitled thereto, and may order that funds in such account be deposited with the Lawyers’ Fund for Client Protection for safeguarding and disbursement to persons who are entitled thereto.

(h) Dissolution of a Firm.

Upon the dissolution of any firm of lawyers, the former partners or members shall make appropriate arrangements for the maintenance, by one of them or by a successor firm, of the records specified in Rule 1.15(d).

(i) Availability of Bookkeeping Records: Records Subject to Production in Disciplinary Investigations and Proceedings.

The financial records required by this Rule shall be located, or made available, at the principal New York State office of the lawyers subject hereto, and any such records shall be produced in response to a notice or subpoena duces tecum issued in connection with a complaint before or any investigation by the appropriate grievance or departmental disciplinary committee, or shall be produced at the direction of the appropriate Appellate Division before any person designated by it. All books and records produced pursuant to this Rule shall be kept confidential, except for the purpose of the particular proceeding, and their contents shall not be disclosed by anyone in violation of the attorney-client privilege.

(j) Disciplinary Action.

A lawyer who does not maintain and keep the accounts and records as specified and required by this Rule, or who does not produce any such records pursuant to this Rule, shall be deemed in violation of these Rules and shall be subject to disciplinary proceedings.

Comment

[1] A lawyer should hold the funds and property of others using the care required of a professional fiduciary. Securities and other property should be kept in a safe deposit box, except when some other form of safekeeping is warranted by special circumstances. All property that is the property of clients or third persons, including prospective clients, must be kept separate from the lawyer’s business and personal property and, if monies, in one or more trust accounts, including an account established pursuant to the “Interest on Lawyer Accounts” law where appropriate. See State Finance Law § 97-v(4)(a); Judiciary Law § 497(2); 21 N.Y.C.R.R. § 7000.10. Separate trust
accounts may be warranted or required when administering estate monies or acting in similar fiduciary capacities.

[2] While normally it is impermissible to commingle the lawyer’s own funds with client funds, paragraph (b)(3) provides that it is permissible when necessary to pay bank service charges on that account. Accurate records must be kept regarding which portion of the funds belongs to the lawyer.

[3] Lawyers often receive funds from which the lawyer’s fee will or may be paid. A lawyer is not required to remit to the client funds that the lawyer reasonably believes represent fees owed to the lawyer. However, a lawyer may not withhold the client’s share of the funds to coerce the client into accepting the lawyer’s claim for fees. While a lawyer may be entitled under applicable law to assert a retaining lien on funds in the lawyer’s possession, a lawyer may not enforce such a lien by taking the lawyer’s fee from funds that the lawyer holds in an attorney’s trust account, escrow account or special account, except as may be provided in an applicable agreement or directed by court order. Furthermore, any disputed portion of the funds must be kept in or transferred into a trust account, and the lawyer should suggest means for prompt resolution of the dispute, such as arbitration. The undisputed portion of the funds is to be distributed promptly.

[4] Paragraph (c)(4) also recognizes that third parties may have lawful claims against specific funds or other property in a lawyer’s custody, such as a client’s creditor who has a lien on funds recovered in a personal injury action. A lawyer may have a duty under applicable law to protect such third party claims against wrongful interference by the client. In such cases, when the third-party claim is not frivolous under applicable law, the lawyer must refuse to surrender the property to the client until the claims are resolved. A lawyer should not unilaterally assume to arbitrate a dispute between the client and the third party, but, when there are substantial grounds for dispute as to the person entitled to the funds, the lawyer may file an action to have a court resolve the dispute.

[5] The obligations of a lawyer under this Rule are independent of those arising from activity other than rendering legal services. For example, a lawyer who serves only as an escrow agent is governed by the applicable law relating to fiduciaries even though the lawyer does not render legal services in the transaction and is not governed by this Rule.
RULE 1.16:
DECLINING OR TERMINATING REPRESENTATION

(a) A lawyer shall not accept employment on behalf of a person if the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that such person wishes to:

(1) bring a legal action, conduct a defense, or assert a position in a matter, or otherwise have steps taken for such person, merely for the purpose of harassing or maliciously injuring any person; or

(2) present a claim or defense in a matter that is not warranted under existing law, unless it can be supported by a good faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.

(b) Except as stated in paragraph (d), a lawyer shall withdraw from the representation of a client when:

(1) the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the representation will result in a violation of these Rules or of law;

(2) the lawyer’s physical or mental condition materially impairs the lawyer’s ability to represent the client;

(3) the lawyer is discharged; or

(4) the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the client is bringing the legal action, conducting the defense, or asserting a position in the matter, or is otherwise having steps taken, merely for the purpose of harassing or maliciously injuring any person.

(c) Except as stated in paragraph (d), a lawyer may withdraw from representing a client when:

(1) withdrawal can be accomplished without material adverse effect on the interests of the client;

(2) the client persists in a course of action involving the lawyer’s services that the lawyer reasonably believes is criminal or fraudulent;

(3) the client has used the lawyer’s services to perpetrate a crime or fraud;

(4) the client insists upon taking action with which the lawyer has a fundamental disagreement;

(5) the client deliberately disregards an agreement or obligation to the lawyer as to expenses or fees;
(6) the client insists upon presenting a claim or defense that is not warranted under existing law and cannot be supported by good faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law;

(7) the client fails to cooperate in the representation or otherwise renders the representation unreasonably difficult for the lawyer to carry out employment effectively;

(8) the lawyer’s inability to work with co-counsel indicates that the best interest of the client likely will be served by withdrawal;

(9) the lawyer’s mental or physical condition renders it difficult for the lawyer to carry out the representation effectively;

(10) the client knowingly and freely assents to termination of the employment;

(11) withdrawal is permitted under Rule 1.13(c) or other law;

(12) the lawyer believes in good faith, in a matter pending before a tribunal, that the tribunal will find the existence of other good cause for withdrawal; or

(13) the client insists that the lawyer pursue a course of conduct which is illegal or prohibited under these Rules.

(d) If permission for withdrawal from employment is required by the rules of a tribunal, a lawyer shall not withdraw from employment in a matter before that tribunal without its permission. When ordered to do so by a tribunal, a lawyer shall continue representation notwithstanding good cause for terminating the representation.

(e) Even when withdrawal is otherwise permitted or required, upon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take steps, to the extent reasonably practicable, to avoid foreseeable prejudice to the rights of the client, including giving reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for employment of other counsel, delivering to the client all papers and property to which the client is entitled, promptly refunding any part of a fee paid in advance that has not been earned and complying with applicable laws and rules.

Comment

[1] A lawyer should not accept representation in a matter unless it can be performed competently, promptly, without improper conflict of interest and to completion. Ordinarily, a representation in a matter is completed when the agreed-upon assistance has been concluded. See Rules 1.2(c), 6.5; see also Rule 1.3, Comment [4].

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Mandatory Withdrawal

[2] A lawyer ordinarily must decline or withdraw from representation under paragraph (a), (b)(1) or (b)(4), as the case may be, if the client demands that the lawyer engage in conduct that is illegal or that violates these Rules or other law. The lawyer is not obliged to decline or withdraw simply because the client suggests such a course of conduct; a client may make such a suggestion in the hope that a lawyer will not be constrained by a professional obligation.

[3] Court approval or notice to the court is often required by applicable law, and when so required by applicable law is also required by paragraph (d), before a lawyer withdraws from pending litigation. Difficulty may be encountered if withdrawal is based on the client’s demand that the lawyer engage in unprofessional conduct. The court may request an explanation for the withdrawal, while the lawyer may be bound to keep confidential the facts that would constitute such an explanation. The lawyer’s statement that professional considerations require termination of the representation ordinarily should be accepted as sufficient. Lawyers should be mindful of their obligations to both clients and the court under Rule 1.6 and Rule 3.3.

Discharge

[4] As provided in paragraph (b)(3), a client has a right to discharge a lawyer at any time, with or without cause, subject to liability for payment for the lawyer’s services. Where future dispute about the withdrawal may be anticipated, it may be advisable to prepare a written statement reciting the circumstances.

[5] Whether a client can discharge appointed counsel may depend on applicable law. A client seeking to do so should be given a full explanation of the consequences. These consequences may include a decision by the appointing authority that appointment of successor counsel is unjustified, thus requiring self-representation by the client.

[6] If the client has severely diminished capacity, the client may lack the legal capacity to discharge the lawyer, and in any event the discharge may be seriously adverse to the client’s interests. The lawyer should make special effort to help the client consider the consequences and may take reasonably necessary protective action as provided in Rule 1.14(b).

Optional Withdrawal

[7] Under paragraph (c), a lawyer may withdraw from representation in some circumstances. The lawyer has the option to withdraw if withdrawal can be accomplished without material adverse effect on the client’s interests. Withdrawal is also justified if the client persists in a course of action that the lawyer reasonably believes is criminal or fraudulent, for a lawyer is not required to be associated with such conduct even if the lawyer does not further it. Withdrawal is also permitted if the lawyer’s services were misused in the past, even if withdrawal would materially prejudice the client. The lawyer may also withdraw where the client insists on taking action with which the lawyer has a fundamental disagreement.

[7A] In accordance with paragraph (c)(4), a lawyer should use reasonable foresight in determining whether a proposed representation will involve client objectives or instructions with which the lawyer has a fundamental disagreement. A client’s intended action does not create a
fundamental disagreement simply because the lawyer disagrees with it. See Rule 1.2 regarding the allocation of responsibility between client and lawyer. The client has the right, for example, to accept or reject a settlement proposal; a client’s decision on settlement involves a fundamental disagreement only when no reasonable person in the client’s position, having regard for the hazards of litigation, would have declined the settlement. In addition, the client should be given notice of intent to withdraw and an opportunity to reconsider.

[8] Under paragraph (c)(5), a lawyer may withdraw if the client refuses to abide by the terms of an agreement concerning fees or court costs (or other expenses or disbursements).

[8A] Continuing to represent a client may impose an unreasonable burden unexpected by the client and lawyer at the outset of the representation. However, lawyers are ordinarily better suited than clients to foresee and provide for the burdens of representation. The burdens of uncertainty should therefore ordinarily fall on lawyers rather than clients unless they are attributable to client misconduct. That a representation will require more work or significantly larger advances of expenses than the lawyer contemplated when the fee was fixed is not grounds for withdrawal under paragraph (c)(5).

Assisting the Client upon Withdrawal

[9] Even if the lawyer has been unfairly discharged by the client, under paragraph (e) a lawyer must take all reasonable steps to mitigate the consequences to the client. The lawyer may retain papers as security for a fee only to the extent permitted by law. See Rule 1.15.
RULE 1.17:  
SALE OF LAW PRACTICE

(a) A lawyer retiring from a private practice of law; a law firm, one or more members of which are retiring from the private practice of law with the firm; or the personal representative of a deceased, disabled or missing lawyer, may sell a law practice, including goodwill, to one or more lawyers or law firms, who may purchase the practice. The seller and the buyer may agree on reasonable restrictions on the seller’s private practice of law, notwithstanding any other provision of these Rules. Retirement shall include the cessation of the private practice of law in the geographic area, that is, the county and city and any county or city contiguous thereto, in which the practice to be sold has been conducted.

(b) Confidential information.

(1) With respect to each matter subject to the contemplated sale, the seller may provide prospective buyers with any information not protected as confidential information under Rule 1.6.

(2) Notwithstanding Rule 1.6, the seller may provide the prospective buyer with information as to individual clients:

   (i) concerning the identity of the client, except as provided in paragraph (b)(6);

   (ii) concerning the status and general nature of the matter;

   (iii) available in public court files; and

   (iv) concerning the financial terms of the client-lawyer relationship and the payment status of the client’s account.

(3) Prior to making any disclosure of confidential information that may be permitted under paragraph (b)(2), the seller shall provide the prospective buyer with information regarding the matters involved in the proposed sale sufficient to enable the prospective buyer to determine whether any conflicts of interest exist. Where sufficient information cannot be disclosed without revealing client confidential information, the seller may make the disclosures necessary for the prospective buyer to determine whether any conflict of interest exists, subject to paragraph (b)(6). If the prospective buyer determines that conflicts of interest exist prior to reviewing the information, or determines during the course of review that a conflict of interest exists, the prospective buyer shall not review or continue to review the information unless the seller shall have obtained the consent of the client in accordance with Rule 1.6(a)(1).

(4) Prospective buyers shall maintain the confidentiality of and shall not use any client information received in connection with the proposed sale in the same manner and to the same extent as if the prospective buyers represented the client.
(5) Absent the consent of the client after full disclosure, a seller shall not provide a prospective buyer with information if doing so would cause a violation of the attorney-client privilege.

(6) If the seller has reason to believe that the identity of the client or the fact of the representation itself constitutes confidential information in the circumstances, the seller may not provide such information to a prospective buyer without first advising the client of the identity of the prospective buyer and obtaining the client’s consent to the proposed disclosure.

(c) Written notice of the sale shall be given jointly by the seller and the buyer to each of the seller’s clients and shall include information regarding:

(1) the client’s right to retain other counsel or to take possession of the file;

(2) the fact that the client’s consent to the transfer of the client’s file or matter to the buyer will be presumed if the client does not take any action or otherwise object within 90 days of the sending of the notice, subject to any court rule or statute requiring express approval by the client or a court;

(3) the fact that agreements between the seller and the seller’s clients as to fees will be honored by the buyer;

(4) proposed fee increases, if any, permitted under paragraph (e); and

(5) the identity and background of the buyer or buyers, including principal office address, bar admissions, number of years in practice in New York State, whether the buyer has ever been disciplined for professional misconduct or convicted of a crime, and whether the buyer currently intends to resell the practice.

(d) When the buyer’s representation of a client of the seller would give rise to a waivable conflict of interest, the buyer shall not undertake such representation unless the necessary waiver or waivers have been obtained in writing.

(e) The fee charged a client by the buyer shall not be increased by reason of the sale, unless permitted by a retainer agreement with the client or otherwise specifically agreed to by the client.

Comment

[1] The practice of law is a profession, not merely a business. Clients are not commodities that can be purchased and sold at will. Pursuant to this Rule, when a lawyer or an entire firm ceases to practice, and other lawyers or firms take over the representation, the selling lawyer or firm may obtain compensation for the reasonable value of the practice, as may withdrawing partners of law firms.
Termination of Practice by Seller

[2] The requirement that all of the private practice be sold is satisfied if the seller in good faith makes the entire practice available for sale to the buyers. The fact that a number of the seller’s clients decide not to be represented by the buyers but take their matters elsewhere, therefore, does not result in a violation. Return to private practice as a result of an unanticipated change in circumstances does not necessarily result in a violation. For example, a lawyer who has sold the practice to accept an appointment to judicial office does not violate the requirement that the sale be attendant to cessation of practice if the lawyer later resumes private practice upon being defeated in a contested or a retention election for the office or resigns from a judiciary position. Although the requirements of this Rule may not be violated in these situations, contractual provisions in the agreement governing the sale of the practice may contain reasonable restrictions on a lawyer’s resuming private practice. See Rule 5.6, Comment [1], regarding restrictions on right to practice.

[3] The private practice of law refers to a private law firm or lawyer, not to a public agency, legal services entity, or in-house counsel to a business. The requirement that the seller cease to engage in the private practice of law therefore does not prohibit employment as a lawyer on the staff of a public agency or a legal services entity that provides legal services to the poor, or as in-house counsel to a business.

[4] The Rule permits a sale of an entire practice attendant upon retirement from the private practice of law within a geographic area, defined as the county and city and any county or city contiguous thereto, in which the practice to be sold has been conducted. Its provisions therefore accommodate the lawyer who sells the practice on the occasion of moving to another city and county that does not border on the city or county.

[5] [Reserved.]

Sale of Entire Practice

[6] The Rule requires that the seller’s entire practice be sold. The prohibition against sale of less than an entire practice protects those clients whose matters are less lucrative and who might find it difficult to secure other counsel if a sale could be limited to substantial fee-generating matters. The buyers are required to undertake all client matters in the practice, subject to client consent. This requirement is not violated even if a buyer is unable to undertake a particular client matter because of a conflict of interest and the seller therefore remains as attorney of record for the matter in question.

Client Confidences, Consent and Notice

[7] Giving the buyer access to client-specific information relating to the representation and to the file requires client consent. Rule 1.17 provides that before such information can be disclosed by the seller to the buyer, the client must be given actual written notice of the contemplated sale, including the identity of the buyer, and must be told that the decision to consent or make other arrangements must be made within 90 days. If nothing is heard from the client within that time, consent to the sale is presumed under paragraph (c)(2).
[8] A lawyer or law firm ceasing to practice cannot be required to remain in practice because some clients cannot be given actual notice of the proposed purchase. The selling lawyer must make a good-faith effort to notify all of the lawyer’s current clients. Where clients cannot be given actual notice and therefore cannot themselves consent to the purchase or direct any other disposition of their files, they are nevertheless protected by the fact that the buyer has the duty to maintain their confidences under paragraph (b)(4).

[9] All elements of client autonomy, including the client’s absolute right to discharge a lawyer and transfer the representation to another, survive the sale of the practice.

Fee Arrangements Between Client and Buyer

[10] The sale may not be financed by increases in fees charged to the clients of the purchased practice except to the extent permitted by subparagraph (e) of this Rule. Under subparagraph (e), the buyer must honor existing arrangements between the seller and the client as to fees unless the seller’s retainer agreement with the client permits a fee increase or the buyer obtains a client’s specific agreement to a fee increase in compliance with the strict standards of Rule 1.8(a) (governing business transactions between lawyers and clients).

Other Applicable Ethical Standards

[11] Lawyers participating in the sale or purchase of a law practice are subject to the ethical standards applicable to involving another lawyer in the representation of a client. Examples include (i) the seller’s obligation to exercise competence in identifying a buyer qualified to assume the practice and the buyer’s obligation to undertake the representation competently under Rule 1.1, (ii) the obligation of the seller and the buyer to avoid disqualifying conflicts, and to secure the client’s informed consent for those conflicts that can be agreed to under Rule 1.7, and (iii) the obligation of the seller and the buyer to protect information relating to the representation under Rule 1.6 and Rule 1.9. See also Rule 1.0(j) for the definition of “informed consent.”

[12] If approval of the substitution of the purchasing lawyer for the selling lawyer is required by the rules of any tribunal in which a matter is pending, such approval must be obtained before the matter can be included in the sale. See Rule 1.16. If a tribunal refuses to give its permission for the substitution and the seller therefore must continue in the matter, the seller does not thereby violate the portion of this Rule requiring the seller to cease practice in the described geographic area.

Applicability of the Rule

[13] [Reserved.]

[14] This Rule does not apply to: (i) admission to or retirement from a law partnership or professional association, (ii) retirement plans and similar arrangements, (iii) a sale of tangible assets of a law practice, or (iv) the transfers of legal representation between lawyers when such transfers are unrelated to the sale of a practice. This Rule governs the sale of an entire law practice upon retirement, which is defined in paragraph (a) as the cessation of the private practice of law in a given geographic area. Rule 5.4(a)(2) provides for the compensation of a lawyer who undertakes to complete one or more unfinished pieces of legal business of a deceased lawyer.
RULE 1.18:
DUTIES TO PROSPECTIVE CLIENTS

(a) Except as provided in Rule 1.18(e), a person who consults with a lawyer about the possibility of forming a client-lawyer relationship with respect to a matter is a prospective client.

(b) Even when no client-lawyer relationship ensues, a lawyer who has learned information from a prospective client shall not use or reveal that information, except as Rule 1.9 would permit with respect to information of a former client.

(c) A lawyer subject to paragraph (b) shall not represent a client with interests materially adverse to those of a prospective client in the same or a substantially related matter if the lawyer received information from the prospective client that could be significantly harmful to that person in the matter, except as provided in paragraph (d). If a lawyer is disqualified from representation under this paragraph, no lawyer in a firm with which that lawyer is associated may knowingly undertake or continue representation in such a matter, except as provided in paragraph (d).

(d) When the lawyer has received disqualifying information as defined in paragraph (c), representation is permissible if:

(1) both the affected client and the prospective client have given informed consent, confirmed in writing; or

(2) the lawyer who received the information took reasonable measures to avoid exposure to more disqualifying information than was reasonably necessary to determine whether to represent the prospective client; and

(i) the firm acts promptly and reasonably to notify, as appropriate, lawyers and nonlawyer personnel within the firm that the personally disqualified lawyer is prohibited from participating in the representation of the current client;

(ii) the firm implements effective screening procedures to prevent the flow of information about the matter between the disqualified lawyer and the others in the firm;

(iii) the disqualified lawyer is apportioned no part of the fee therefrom; and

(iv) written notice is promptly given to the prospective client; and

(3) a reasonable lawyer would conclude that the law firm will be able to provide competent and diligent representation in the matter.

(e) A person is not a prospective client within the meaning of paragraph (a) if the
person:

(1) communicates information unilaterally to a lawyer, without any reasonable expectation that the lawyer is willing to discuss the possibility of forming a client-lawyer relationship; or

(2) communicates with a lawyer for the purpose of disqualifying the lawyer from handling a materially adverse representation on the same or a substantially related matter.

Comment

[1] Prospective clients, like current clients, may disclose information to a lawyer, place documents or other property in the lawyer’s custody, or rely on the lawyer’s advice. A lawyer’s consultations with a prospective client usually are limited in time and depth and leave both the prospective client and the lawyer free (and sometimes required) to proceed no further. Prospective clients should therefore receive some, but not all, of the protection afforded clients.

[2] A person becomes a prospective client by consulting with a lawyer about the possibility of forming a client-lawyer relationship with respect to a matter. Whether communications, including written, oral, or electronic communications, constitute a consultation depends on the circumstances. For example, a consultation is likely to have occurred of a lawyer, either in person or through the lawyer’s advertising in any medium, specifically requests or invites the submission of information about a potential representation without clear and reasonably understandable warnings and cautionary statements that limit the lawyer’s obligations, and a person provides information in response. In contrast, a consultation does not occur of a person provides information to a lawyer in response to advertising that merely describes the lawyer’s education, experience, areas of practice, and contact information, or provides legal information of general interest. Such a person communicates information unilaterally to lawyer without any reasonable expectation that the lawyer is willing to discuss the possibility of forming a client-lawyer relationship, and is thus not a “prospective client.” Moreover, a person who communicates with a lawyer for the purpose of disqualifying the lawyer is not a “prospective client” – see Rule 1.18(e).

[3] It is often necessary for a prospective client to reveal information to the lawyer during an initial consultation prior to the decision about formation of a client-lawyer relationship. The lawyer often must learn such information to determine whether there is a conflict of interest with an existing client and whether the matter is one that the lawyer is willing to undertake. Paragraph (b) prohibits the lawyer from using or revealing that information, except as permitted by Rule 1.9, even if the client or lawyer decides not to proceed with the representation. The duty exists regardless of how brief the initial conference may be.

[4] In order to avoid acquiring disqualifying information from a prospective client, a lawyer considering whether to undertake a new matter should limit the initial consultation to only such information as reasonably appears necessary for that purpose. Where the information indicates that a conflict of interest or other reason for non-representation exists, the lawyer should so inform the prospective client or decline the representation. If the prospective client wishes to
retain the lawyer, and if consent is possible under Rule 1.7 or Rule 1.9, then consent from all affected current or former clients must be obtained before accepting the representation. The representation must be declined if the lawyer will be unable to provide competent, diligent and adequate representation to the affected current and former clients and the prospective client.

[5] A lawyer may condition a consultation with a prospective client on the person’s informed consent that no information disclosed during the consultation will prohibit the lawyer from representing a different client in the matter. See Rule 1.0(j) for the definition of “informed consent,” and with regard to the effectiveness of an advance waiver see Rule 1.7, Comments [22]-[22A] and Rule 1.9, Comment [9]. If permitted by law and if the agreement expressly so provides, the prospective client may also consent to the lawyer’s subsequent use of information received from the prospective client.

[6] Under paragraph (c), even in the absence of an agreement the lawyer is not prohibited from representing a client with interests adverse to those of the prospective client in the same or a substantially related matter unless the lawyer has received from the prospective client information that could be significantly harmful if used in that matter.

[7] Under paragraph (c), the prohibition in this Rule is imputed to other lawyers as provided in Rule 1.10, but, under paragraph (d)(1), imputation may be avoided if the lawyer obtains the informed consent, confirmed in writing, of both the prospective and affected clients. In the alternative, imputation may be avoided if the conditions of paragraph (d)(2) are met and all disqualified lawyers are timely screened, and written notice is promptly given to the prospective client. See Rule 1.10. Paragraph (d)(2)(i) does not prohibit the screened lawyer from receiving a salary or partnership share established by prior independent agreement, but that lawyer may not receive compensation directly related to the matter in which the lawyer is disqualified. Before proceeding under paragraph (d)(1) or paragraph (d)(2), however, a lawyer must be mindful of the requirement of paragraph (d)(3) that “a reasonable lawyer would conclude that the law firm will be able to provide competent and diligent representation in the matter.”

[7A] Paragraph (d)(2) sets out the basic procedural requirements that a law firm must satisfy to ensure that a personally disqualified lawyer is effectively screened from participation in the matter. This Rule requires that the firm promptly: (i) notify, as appropriate, lawyers and relevant nonlawyer personnel within the firm that the personally disqualified lawyer is prohibited from participating in the representation of the current client, and (ii) implement effective screening procedures to prevent the flow of information about the matter between the personally disqualified lawyer and others in the firm.

[7B] A firm seeking to avoid disqualification under this Rule should also consider its ability to implement, maintain, and monitor the screening procedures permitted by paragraph (d)(2) before undertaking or continuing the representation. In deciding whether the screening procedures permitted by this Rule will be effective to avoid imputed disqualification, a firm should consider a number of factors, including how the size, practices and organization of the firm will affect the likelihood that any confidential information acquired about the matter by the personally disqualified lawyer can be protected. If the firm is large and is organized into separate departments, or maintains offices in multiple locations, or for any reason the structure of the firm facilitates preventing the sharing of information with lawyers not participating in the particular
matter, it is more likely that the requirements of this Rule can be met and imputed disqualification avoided. Although a large firm will find it easier to maintain effective screening, lack of timeliness in instituting, or lack of vigilance in maintaining, the procedures required by this Rule may make those procedures ineffective in avoiding imputed disqualification. If a personally disqualified lawyer is working on other matters with lawyers who are participating in a matter requiring screening, it may be impossible to maintain effective screening procedures. The size of the firm may be considered as one of the factors affecting the firm’s ability to institute and maintain effective screening procedures, but it is not a dispositive factor. A small firm may need to exercise special care and vigilance to maintain effective screening but, if appropriate precautions are taken, small firms can satisfy the requirements of paragraph (d)(2).

[7C] In order to prevent any other lawyer in the firm from acquiring confidential information about the matter from the disqualified lawyer, it is essential that notification be given and screening procedures implemented promptly. If any lawyer in the firm acquires confidential information about the matter from the disqualified lawyer, the requirements of this Rule cannot be met, and any subsequent efforts to institute or maintain screening will not be effective in avoiding the firm’s disqualification. Other factors may affect the likelihood that screening procedures will be effective in preventing the flow of confidential information between the disqualified lawyer and other lawyers in the firm in a given matter.

[8] Notice under paragraph (d)(2), including a general description of the subject matter about which the lawyer was consulted and of the screening procedures employed, generally should be given as soon as practicable after the need for screening becomes apparent.

[9] For the duty of competence of a lawyer who gives assistance on the merits of a matter to a prospective client, see Rule 1.1. For a lawyer’s duties when a prospective client entrusts valuables or papers to the lawyer’s care, see Rule 1.15.
RULE 2.1: ADVISOR

In representing a client, a lawyer shall exercise independent professional judgment and render candid advice. In rendering advice, a lawyer may refer not only to law but to other considerations such as moral, economic, social, psychological, and political factors that may be relevant to the client’s situation.

Comment

Scope of Advice

[1] A client is entitled to straightforward advice expressing the lawyer’s honest assessment. Legal advice often involves unpleasant facts and alternatives that a client may be disinclined to confront. In presenting advice, a lawyer endeavors to sustain the client’s morale and may put advice in as acceptable a form as honesty permits. Nevertheless, a lawyer should not be deterred from giving candid advice by the prospect that the advice will be unpalatable to the client.

[2] Advice couched in narrow legal terms may be of little value to a client, especially where practical considerations, such as cost or effects on other people, are predominant. Purely technical legal advice, therefore, can sometimes be inadequate. It is proper for a lawyer to refer to relevant moral and ethical considerations in giving advice. Although a lawyer is not a moral advisor as such, moral and ethical considerations impinge upon most legal questions and may decisively influence how the law will be applied.

[3] A client may expressly or impliedly ask the lawyer for purely technical advice. When such a request is made by a client experienced in legal matters, the lawyer may accept it at face value. When such a request is made by a client inexperienced in legal matters, however, the lawyer’s responsibilities as advisor may include the responsibility to indicate that more may be involved than strictly legal considerations. For the allocation of responsibility in decision making between lawyer and client, see Rule 1.2.

[4] Matters that go beyond strictly legal questions may also be in the domain of another profession. Family matters can involve problems within the professional competence of psychiatry, clinical psychology or social work; business matters can involve problems within the competence of the accounting profession or of financial or public relations specialists. Where consultation with a professional in another field is itself something a competent lawyer would recommend, the lawyer should make such a recommendation. At the same time, a lawyer’s advice at its best often consists of recommending a course of action in the face of conflicting recommendations of experts.

Offering Advice

[5] In general, a lawyer is not expected to give advice until asked by the client. However, when a lawyer knows that a client proposes a course of action that is likely to result in substantial adverse legal consequences to the client, the lawyer’s duty to the client under Rule 1.4 may require that the lawyer offer advice if the client’s course of action is related to the representation. Similarly, when a matter is likely to involve litigation, it may be advisable under
Rule 1.4 to inform the client of forms of dispute resolution that might constitute reasonable alternatives to litigation. A lawyer ordinarily has no duty to initiate investigation of a client’s affairs or to give advice that the client has indicated is unwanted, but a lawyer may initiate advice to a client when doing so appears to be in the client’s interest.
RULE 2.2:
[RESERVED]
RULE 2.3:
EVALUATION FOR USE BY THIRD PERSONS

(a) A lawyer may provide an evaluation of a matter affecting a client for the use of someone other than the client if the lawyer reasonably believes that making the evaluation is compatible with other aspects of the lawyer’s relationship with the client.

(b) When the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the evaluation is likely to affect the client’s interests materially and adversely, the lawyer shall not provide the evaluation unless the client gives informed consent.

(c) Unless disclosure is authorized in connection with a report of an evaluation, information relating to the evaluation is protected by Rule 1.6.

Comment

Definition

[1] An evaluation may be performed at the client’s direction or if the lawyer reasonably believes that making the evaluation is compatible with other aspects of the lawyer’s relationship with the client. Such an evaluation may be for the primary purpose of establishing information for the benefit of third parties: for example, an opinion concerning the title of property rendered at the behest of a vendor for the information of a prospective purchaser, or at the behest of a borrower for the information of a prospective lender. In some situations, the evaluation may be required by a government agency: for example, an opinion concerning the legality of securities registered for sale under the securities laws. In other instances, the evaluation may be required by a third person, such as a purchaser of a business, or of intellectual property or a similar asset.

[2] A legal evaluation should be distinguished from an investigation of a person with whom the lawyer does not have a client-lawyer relationship. For example, a lawyer retained by a purchaser to analyze a vendor’s title to property does not have a client-lawyer relationship with the vendor. So also, an investigation into a person’s affairs by a government lawyer or by special counsel employed by the government is not an “evaluation” as that term is used in this Rule. The question is whether the lawyer is retained by the person whose affairs are being examined. When the lawyer is retained by that person, the general rules concerning loyalty to a client and preservation of confidences apply, which is not the case if the lawyer is retained by someone else. For this reason, it is essential to identify the person by whom the lawyer is retained. This should be made clear not only to the person under examination, but also to others to whom the results are to be made available.

Duties Owed to Third Person and Client

[3] When the evaluation is intended for the information or use of a third person, a legal duty to that person may or may not arise. That legal question is beyond the scope of this Rule. However, because such an evaluation involves a departure from the normal client-lawyer relationship, careful analysis of the situation is required. The lawyer must be satisfied as a matter of professional judgment that making the evaluation is compatible with other functions undertaken on behalf of the client. For example, if the lawyer is acting as advocate in defending the client
against charges of fraud, it would normally be incompatible with that responsibility for the lawyer to perform an evaluation for others concerning the same or a related transaction. Assuming no such impediment is apparent, however, the lawyer should advise the client of the implications of the evaluation, particularly the lawyer’s responsibilities to third persons and the duty to disseminate the findings.

Access to and Disclosure of Information

[4] The quality of an evaluation depends on the freedom and extent of the investigation upon which it is based. Ordinarily a lawyer should have whatever latitude of investigation seems necessary as a matter of professional judgment. Under some circumstances, however, the terms of the evaluation may be limited. For example, certain issues or sources may be categorically excluded, or the scope of the search may be limited by time constraints or the non-cooperation of persons having relevant information. Any such limitations that are material to the evaluation should be described in the report. If, after a lawyer has commenced an evaluation, the client refuses to comply with the terms upon which it was understood the evaluation was to have been made, the lawyer’s obligations are determined by law having reference to the terms of the client’s agreement and the surrounding circumstances. In no circumstances is the lawyer permitted knowingly to make a false statement of fact or law in providing an evaluation under this Rule. See Rule 4.1. A knowing omission of information that must be disclosed to make statements in the evaluation not false or misleading may violate this Rule.

Obtaining Client’s Informed Consent

[5] Information relating to an evaluation is protected by Rule 1.6. In many situations, providing an evaluation to a third party poses no significant risk to the client; thus, the lawyer may be impliedly authorized to disclose information to carry out the representation, if the disclosures (i) advance the best interests of the client and (ii) are either reasonable under the circumstances or customary in the professional community. See Rule 1.6(a)(2). Where, however, it is reasonably likely that providing the evaluation will affect the client’s interests materially and adversely, the lawyer must first obtain the client’s consent after the lawyer has consulted with the client and the client has been adequately informed concerning the conditions of the evaluation, the nature of the information to be disclosed and important possible effects on the client’s interests. See Rules 1.0(j), 1.6(a).

Financial Auditors’ Requests for Information

[6] When a question is raised by the client’s financial auditor concerning the legal situation of a client, and the question is referred to the lawyer, the lawyer’s response may be made in accordance with procedures recognized in the legal profession. Such a procedure is set forth in the American Bar Association Statement of Policy Regarding Lawyers’ Responses to Auditors’ Requests for Information, adopted in 1975.
RULE 2.4: LAWYER SERVING AS THIRD-PARTY NEUTRAL

(a) A lawyer serves as a “third-party neutral” when the lawyer assists two or more persons who are not clients of the lawyer to reach a resolution of a dispute or other matter that has arisen between them. Service as a third-party neutral may include service as an arbitrator, a mediator or in such other capacity as will enable the lawyer to assist the parties to resolve the matter.

(b) A lawyer serving as a third-party neutral shall inform unrepresented parties that the lawyer is not representing them. When the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that a party does not understand the lawyer’s role in the matter, the lawyer shall explain the difference between the lawyer’s role as a third-party neutral and a lawyer’s role as one who represents a client.

Comment

[1] Alternative dispute resolution has become a substantial part of the civil justice system. In addition to representing clients in dispute-resolution processes, lawyers often serve as third-party neutrals. A “third-party neutral” is a person such as a mediator, arbitrator, conciliator or evaluator or a person serving in another capacity that assists the parties, represented or unrepresented, in the resolution of a dispute or in the arrangement of a transaction. Whether a third-party neutral serves primarily as a facilitator, evaluator or decision maker depends on the particular process that is either selected by the parties or mandated by a court.

[2] The role of a third-party neutral is not unique to lawyers although, in some court-connected contexts, only lawyers are permitted to serve in this role or to handle certain types of cases. In performing this role, the lawyer may be subject to court rules or other law that applies either to third-party neutrals generally or to lawyers serving as third-party neutrals. Lawyer-neutrals may also be subject to various codes of ethics, such as the Code of Ethics for Arbitration in Commercial Disputes prepared by a joint committee of the American Bar Association and the American Arbitration Association or the Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators jointly prepared by the American Bar Association, the American Arbitration Association and the Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution.

[3] Unlike nonlawyers who serve as third-party neutrals, lawyers serving in this role may experience unique problems as a result of differences between the role of a third-party neutral and a lawyer’s service as a client representative. The potential for confusion is significant when the parties are unrepresented in the process. Thus, paragraph (b) requires a lawyer-neutral to inform unrepresented parties that the lawyer is not representing them. For some parties, particularly those who frequently use dispute-resolution processes, this information will be sufficient. For others, particularly those who are using the process for the first time, more information will be required. Where appropriate, the lawyer should inform unrepresented parties of the important differences between the lawyer’s role as a third-party neutral and as a client representative, including the inapplicability of the attorney-client evidentiary privilege. The extent of disclosure required under this paragraph will depend on the particular parties involved and the
subject matter of the proceeding, as well as the particular features of the dispute-resolution process selected.

[4] A lawyer who serves as a third-party neutral may be asked subsequently to serve as a lawyer representing a client in the same matter. The conflicts of interest that arise for both the lawyer and the lawyer’s law firm are addressed in Rule 1.12.

[5] Lawyers who represent clients in alternative dispute-resolution processes are governed by the Rules of Professional Conduct. When the dispute-resolution process takes place before a tribunal, as in binding arbitration (see Rule 1.0(w)), the lawyer’s duty of candor is governed by Rule 3.3. Otherwise, the lawyer’s duty of candor toward both the third-party neutral and other parties is governed by Rule 4.1.
RULE 3.1: NON-MERITORIOUS CLAIMS AND CONTENTIONS

(a) A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing so that is not frivolous. A lawyer for the defendant in a criminal proceeding or for the respondent in a proceeding that could result in incarceration may nevertheless so defend the proceeding as to require that every element of the case be established.

(b) A lawyer’s conduct is “frivolous” for purposes of this Rule if:

(1) the lawyer knowingly advances a claim or defense that is unwarranted under existing law, except that the lawyer may advance such claim or defense if it can be supported by good faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law;

(2) the conduct has no reasonable purpose other than to delay or prolong the resolution of litigation, in violation of Rule 3.2, or serves merely to harass or maliciously injure another; or

(3) the lawyer knowingly asserts material factual statements that are false.

Comment

[1] The advocate has a duty to use legal procedure for the fullest benefit of the client’s cause, but also a duty not to abuse legal procedure. The law, both procedural and substantive, establishes the limits within which an advocate may proceed. However, the law is not always clear and is never static. Accordingly, in determining the proper scope of advocacy, account must be taken of the law’s ambiguities and potential for change.

[2] The filing of a claim or defense or similar action taken for a client is not frivolous merely because the facts have not first been fully substantiated or because the lawyer expects to develop vital evidence only by discovery. Lawyers are required, however, to inform themselves about the facts of their clients’ cases and the applicable law, and determine that they can make good-faith arguments in support of their clients’ positions. Such action is not frivolous even though the lawyer believes that the client’s position ultimately will not prevail. The action is frivolous, however, if the action has no reasonable purpose other than to harass or maliciously injure a person, or if the lawyer is unable either to make a good-faith argument on the merits of the action taken or to support the action taken by a good-faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law (which includes the establishment of new judge-made law). The term “knowingly,” which is used in Rule 3.1(b)(1) and (b)(3), is defined in Rule 1.0(k).

[3] The lawyer’s obligations under this Rule are subordinate to federal or state constitutional law that entitles a defendant in a criminal matter to the assistance of counsel in presenting a claim or contention that otherwise would be prohibited by this Rule.
RULE 3.2:
DELAY OF LITIGATION

In representing a client, a lawyer shall not use means that have no substantial purpose other than to delay or prolong the proceeding or to cause needless expense.

Comment

[1] Dilatory practices bring the administration of justice into disrepute. Such tactics are prohibited if their only substantial purpose is to frustrate an opposing party’s attempt to obtain rightful redress or repose. It is not a justification that such tactics are often tolerated by the bench and bar. The question is whether a competent lawyer acting in good faith would regard the course of action as having some substantial purpose other than delay or needless expense. Seeking or realizing financial or other benefit from otherwise improper delay in litigation is not a legitimate interest of the client.
RULE 3.3:
CONDUCT BEFORE A TRIBUNAL

(a) A lawyer shall not knowingly:

   (1) make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to correct a false statement of material fact or law previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer;

   (2) fail to disclose to the tribunal controlling legal authority known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the client and not disclosed by opposing counsel; or

   (3) offer or use evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. If a lawyer, the lawyer’s client, or a witness called by the lawyer has offered material evidence and the lawyer comes to know of its falsity, the lawyer shall take reasonable remedial measures, including, if necessary, disclosure to the tribunal. A lawyer may refuse to offer evidence, other than the testimony of a defendant in a criminal matter, that the lawyer reasonably believes is false.

(b) A lawyer who represents a client before a tribunal and who knows that a person intends to engage, is engaging or has engaged in criminal or fraudulent conduct related to the proceeding shall take reasonable remedial measures, including, if necessary, disclosure to the tribunal.

(c) The duties stated in paragraphs (a) and (b) apply even if compliance requires disclosure of information otherwise protected by Rule 1.6.

(d) In an ex parte proceeding, a lawyer shall inform the tribunal of all material facts known to the lawyer that will enable the tribunal to make an informed decision, whether or not the facts are adverse.

(e) In presenting a matter to a tribunal, a lawyer shall disclose, unless privileged or irrelevant, the identities of the clients the lawyer represents and of the persons who employed the lawyer.

(f) In appearing as a lawyer before a tribunal, a lawyer shall not:

   (1) fail to comply with known local customs of courtesy or practice of the bar or a particular tribunal without giving to opposing counsel timely notice of the intent not to comply;

   (2) engage in undignified or discourteous conduct;
(3) intentionally or habitually violate any established rule of procedure or of evidence; or

(4) engage in conduct intended to disrupt the tribunal.

Comment

[1] This Rule governs the conduct of a lawyer who is representing a client in the proceedings of a tribunal. See Rule 1.0(w) for the definition of “tribunal.” It also applies when the lawyer is representing a client in an ancillary proceeding conducted pursuant to the tribunal’s adjudicative authority, such as a deposition. Thus, for example, paragraph (a)(3) requires a lawyer to take reasonable remedial measures if the lawyer comes to know that a client has offered false evidence in a deposition.

[2] This Rule sets forth the special duties of lawyers as officers of the court to avoid conduct that undermines the integrity of the adjudicative process. A lawyer acting as an advocate in an adjudicative proceeding has an obligation to present the client’s case with persuasive force. Performance of that duty while maintaining confidences of the client, however, is qualified by the advocate’s duty of candor to the tribunal. Consequently, although a lawyer in an adversary proceeding is not required to present an impartial exposition of the law and may not vouch for the evidence submitted in a cause, the lawyer must not allow the tribunal to be misled by false statements of law or fact or by evidence that the lawyer knows to be false.

Representations by a Lawyer

[3] An advocate is responsible for pleadings and other documents prepared for litigation, but is usually not required to have personal knowledge of matters asserted therein because litigation documents ordinarily present assertions by the client or by someone on the client’s behalf and not assertions by the lawyer. Compare Rule 3.1. However, an assertion purporting to be based on the lawyer’s own knowledge, as in an affidavit or declaration by the lawyer or in a statement in open court, may properly be made only when the lawyer knows the assertion is true or believes it to be true on the basis of a reasonably diligent inquiry. There are circumstances where failure to make a disclosure is the equivalent of an affirmative misrepresentation. The obligation prescribed in Rule 1.2(d) not to counsel a client to commit or assist the client in committing a fraud applies in litigation. See also Rule 8.4(b), Comments [2]-[3].

Legal Argument

[4] Although a lawyer is not required to make a disinterested exposition of the law, legal argument based on a knowingly false representation of law constitutes dishonesty toward the tribunal. Paragraph (a)(2) requires an advocate to disclose directly adverse and controlling legal authority that is known to the lawyer and that has not been disclosed by the opposing party. A tribunal that is fully informed on the applicable law is better able to make a fair and accurate determination of the matter before it.
Offering or Using False Evidence

[5] Paragraph (a)(3) requires that the lawyer refuse to offer or use evidence that the lawyer knows to be false, regardless of the client’s wishes. This duty is premised on the lawyer’s obligation as an officer of the court to prevent the trier of fact from being misled by false evidence. A lawyer does not violate this Rule if the lawyer offers the evidence for the purpose of establishing its falsity.

[6] If a lawyer knows that the client intends to testify falsely or wants the lawyer to introduce or use false evidence, the lawyer should seek to persuade the client that the evidence should not be offered. If the persuasion is ineffective and the lawyer continues to represent the client, the lawyer must refuse to offer the false evidence. If only a portion of a witness’s testimony will be false, the lawyer may call the witness to testify but may not (i) elicit or otherwise permit the witness to present testimony that the lawyer knows is false or (ii) base arguments to the trier of fact on evidence known to be false.

[6A] The duties stated in paragraphs (a) and (b) – including the prohibitions against offering and using false evidence – apply to all lawyers, including lawyers for plaintiffs and defendants in civil matters, and to both prosecutors and defense counsel in criminal cases. In criminal matters, therefore, Rule 3.3(a)(3) requires a prosecutor to refrain from offering or using false evidence, and to take reasonable remedial measures to correct any false evidence that the government has already offered. For example, when a prosecutor comes to know that a prosecution witness has testified falsely, the prosecutor should either recall the witness to give truthful testimony or should inform the tribunal about the false evidence. At the sentencing stage, a prosecutor should correct any material errors in a presentence report. In addition, prosecutors are subject to special duties and prohibitions that are set out in Rule 3.8.

[7] If a criminal defendant insists on testifying and the lawyer knows that the testimony will be false, the lawyer may have the option of offering the testimony in a narrative form, though this option may require advance notice to the court or court approval. The lawyer’s ethical duties under paragraphs (a) and (b) may be qualified by judicial decisions interpreting the constitutional rights to due process and to counsel in criminal cases. The obligation of the advocate under the Rules of Professional Conduct is subordinate to such requirements.

[8] The prohibition against offering or using false evidence applies only if the lawyer knows that the evidence is false. A lawyer’s reasonable belief that evidence is false does not preclude its presentation to the trier of fact. A lawyer’s knowledge that evidence is false, however, can be inferred from the circumstances. See Rule 1.0(k) for the definition of “knowledge.” Thus, although a lawyer should resolve doubts about the veracity of testimony or other evidence in favor of the client, the lawyer cannot ignore an obvious falsehood.

[9] Although paragraph (a)(3) prohibits a lawyer from offering or using evidence the lawyer knows to be false, it permits the lawyer to refuse to offer testimony or other proof that the lawyer reasonably believes to be false. Offering such proof may impair the integrity of an adjudicatory proceeding. Because of the special protections historically provided criminal defendants, however, this Rule does not permit a lawyer to refuse to offer the testimony of a criminal defense client where the lawyer reasonably believes, but does not know, that the
testimony will be false. Unless the lawyer knows the testimony will be false, the lawyer must honor the criminal defendant’s decision to testify.

Remedial Measures

[10] A lawyer who has offered or used material evidence in the belief that it was true may subsequently come to know that the evidence is false. Or, a lawyer may be surprised when the lawyer’s client or another witness called by the lawyer offers testimony the lawyer knows to be false, either during the lawyer’s direct examination or in response to cross-examination by the opposing lawyer. In such situations, or if the lawyer knows of the falsity of testimony elicited from the client during a deposition, the lawyer must take reasonable remedial measures. The advocate’s proper course is to remonstrate with the client confidentially, advise the client of the lawyer’s duty of candor to the tribunal, and seek the client’s cooperation with respect to the withdrawal or correction of the false statements or evidence. If that fails, the advocate must take further remedial action. If withdrawal from the representation is not permitted or will not undo the effect of the false evidence, the advocate must make such disclosure to the tribunal as is reasonably necessary to remedy the situation, even if doing so requires the lawyer to reveal confidential information that otherwise would be protected by Rule 1.6. It is for the tribunal then to determine what should be done, such as making a statement about the matter to the trier of fact, ordering a mistrial, taking other appropriate steps or doing nothing.

[11] The disclosure of a client’s false testimony can result in grave consequences to the client, including not only a sense of betrayal but also loss of the case and perhaps a prosecution for perjury. But the alternative is for the lawyer to cooperate in deceiving the court, thereby subverting the truth-finding process, which the adversary system is designed to implement. See Rule 1.2(d). Furthermore, unless it is clearly understood that the lawyer will act upon the duty to disclose the existence of false evidence, the client can simply reject the lawyer’s advice to reveal the false evidence and insist that the lawyer keep silent. The client could therefore in effect coerce the lawyer into being a party to a fraud on the court.

Preserving Integrity of the Adjudicative Process

[12] Lawyers have a special obligation as officers of the court to protect a tribunal against criminal or fraudulent conduct that undermines the integrity of the adjudicative process. Accordingly, paragraph (b) requires a lawyer who represents a client in an adjudicative proceeding to take reasonable remedial measures, including disclosure if necessary, whenever the lawyer knows that a person, including the lawyer’s client, intends to engage, is engaging or has engaged in criminal or fraudulent conduct related to the proceeding. Such conduct includes, among other things, bribing, intimidating or otherwise unlawfully communicating with a witness, juror, court official or other participant in the proceeding; unlawfully destroying or concealing documents or other evidence related to the proceeding; and failing to disclose information to the tribunal when required by law to do so. For example, under some circumstances a person’s omission of a material fact may constitute a crime or fraud on the tribunal.

[12A] A lawyer’s duty to take reasonable remedial measures under paragraph (b) does not apply to another lawyer who is retained to represent a person in an investigation or proceeding concerning that person’s conduct in the prior proceeding.
[13] Judicial hearings ought to be conducted through dignified and orderly procedures designed to protect the rights of all parties. A lawyer should not engage in conduct that offends the dignity and decorum of proceedings or that is intended to disrupt the tribunal. While maintaining independence, a lawyer should be respectful and courteous in relations with a judge or hearing officer before whom the lawyer appears. In adversary proceedings, ill feeling may exist between clients, but such ill feeling should not influence a lawyer’s conduct, attitude, and demeanor toward opposing lawyers. A lawyer should not make unfair or derogatory personal reference to opposing counsel. Haranguing and offensive tactics by lawyers interfere with the orderly administration of justice and have no proper place in our legal system.

Ex Parte Proceedings

[14] Ordinarily, an advocate has the limited responsibility of presenting one side of the matters that a tribunal should consider in reaching a decision; the opposing position is expected to be presented by the adverse party. However, in any ex parte proceeding, such as an application for a temporary restraining order, there may be no presentation by opposing advocates. The object of an ex parte proceeding is nevertheless to yield a substantially just result. The judge has an affirmative responsibility to accord the opposing party, if absent, just consideration. The lawyer for the represented party has the correlative duty to make disclosures of material facts known to the lawyer that the lawyer reasonably believes are necessary to an informed decision.

Withdrawal

[15] A lawyer’s compliance with the duty of candor imposed by this Rule does not automatically require that the lawyer withdraw from the representation of a client whose interests will be or have been adversely affected by the lawyer’s disclosure. The lawyer, however, may be required by Rule 1.16(d) to seek permission of the tribunal to withdraw if the lawyer’s compliance with this Rule’s duty of candor results in such an extreme deterioration of the client-lawyer relationship that the lawyer can no longer competently represent the client. See also Rule 1.16(c) for the circumstances in which a lawyer will be permitted to seek a tribunal’s permission to withdraw. In connection with a request for permission to withdraw that is premised on a client’s misconduct, a lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation only to the extent reasonably necessary to comply with this Rule or as otherwise permitted by Rule 1.6.
RULE 3.4:
FAIRNESS TO OPPOSING PARTY AND COUNSEL

A lawyer shall not:

(a) (1) suppress any evidence that the lawyer or the client has a legal obligation to reveal or produce;

(2) advise or cause a person to hide or leave the jurisdiction of a tribunal for the purpose of making the person unavailable as a witness therein;

(3) conceal or knowingly fail to disclose that which the lawyer is required by law to reveal;

(4) knowingly use perjured testimony or false evidence;

(5) participate in the creation or preservation of evidence when the lawyer knows or it is obvious that the evidence is false; or

(6) knowingly engage in other illegal conduct or conduct contrary to these Rules;

(b) offer an inducement to a witness that is prohibited by law or pay, offer to pay or acquiesce in the payment of compensation to a witness contingent upon the content of the witness’s testimony or the outcome of the matter. A lawyer may advance, guarantee or acquiesce in the payment of:

(1) reasonable compensation to a witness for the loss of time in attending, testifying, preparing to testify or otherwise assisting counsel, and reasonable related expenses; or

(2) a reasonable fee for the professional services of an expert witness and reasonable related expenses;

(c) disregard or advise the client to disregard a standing rule of a tribunal or a ruling of a tribunal made in the course of a proceeding, but the lawyer may take appropriate steps in good faith to test the validity of such rule or ruling;

(d) in appearing before a tribunal on behalf of a client:

(1) state or allude to any matter that the lawyer does not reasonably believe is relevant or that will not be supported by admissible evidence;

(2) assert personal knowledge of facts in issue except when testifying as a witness;

(3) assert a personal opinion as to the justness of a cause, the credibility of
a witness, the culpability of a civil litigant or the guilt or innocence of an accused but
the lawyer may argue, upon analysis of the evidence, for any position or conclusion
with respect to the matters stated herein; or

(4) ask any question that the lawyer has no reasonable basis to believe is
relevant to the case and that is intended to degrade a witness or other person; or

(e) present, participate in presenting, or threaten to present criminal charges
solely to obtain an advantage in a civil matter.

Comment

[1] The procedure of the adversary system contemplates that the evidence in a case is
to be marshaled competitively by the contending parties. Fair competition in the adversary system
is secured by prohibitions against destruction or concealment of evidence, improperly influencing
witnesses, obstructionist tactics in discovery procedure, and the like. The Rule applies to any
conduct that falls within its general terms (for example, “obstruct another party’s access to
evidence”) that is a crime, an intentional tort or prohibited by rules or a ruling of a tribunal. An
example is “[advis[ing]] or caus[ing] a person to hide or leave the jurisdiction of a tribunal for the
purpose of making the person unavailable as a witness therein.”

[2] Documents and other evidence are often essential to establish a claim or defense.
Subject to evidentiary privileges, the right of an opposing party, including the government, to
obtain evidence through discovery or subpoena is an important procedural right. The exercise of
that right can be frustrated if relevant material is altered, concealed or destroyed. Paragraph (a)
protects that right. Evidence that has been properly requested must be produced unless there is a
good-faith basis for not doing so. Applicable state and federal law may make it an offense to
destroy material for the purpose of impairing its availability in a pending or reasonably foreseeable
proceeding, even though no specific request to reveal or produce evidence has been made.
Paragraph (a) applies to evidentiary material generally, including computerized information.

[2A] Falsifying evidence, dealt with in paragraph (a), is also generally a criminal offense.
Of additional relevance is Rule 3.3(a)(3), dealing with use of false evidence in a proceeding before
a tribunal. Applicable law may permit a lawyer to take temporary possession of physical evidence
of client crimes for the purpose of conducting a limited examination that will not alter or destroy
material characteristics of the evidence. In such a case, applicable law may require the lawyer to
turn the evidence over to the police or other prosecuting authority, depending on the circumstances.

[3] Paragraph (b) applies generally to any inducement to a witness that is prohibited by
law. It is not improper to pay a witness’s reasonable expenses or to compensate an expert witness
on terms permitted by law. However, any fee contingent upon the content of a witness’ testimony
or the outcome of the case is prohibited.

[3A] Paragraph (d) deals with improper statements relating to the merits of a case when
representing a client before a tribunal: alluding to irrelevant matters, asserting personal knowledge
of facts in issue, and asserting a personal opinion on issues to be decided by the trier of fact. See
also Rule 4.4, prohibiting the use of any means that have no substantial purpose other than to
embarrass or harm a third person. However, a lawyer may argue, upon analysis of the evidence, for any position or conclusion supported by the record. The term “admissible evidence” refers to evidence considered admissible in the particular context. For example, admission of evidence in an administrative adjudication or an arbitration proceeding may be governed by different standards than those applied in a jury trial.

[4] In general, a lawyer is prohibited from giving legal advice to an unrepresented person, other than the advice to secure counsel, when the interests of that person are or may have a reasonable possibility of being in conflict with the interests of the lawyer’s client. See Rule 4.3.

[5] The use of threats in negotiation may constitute the crime of extortion. However, not all threats are improper. For example, if a lawyer represents a client who has been criminally harmed by a third person (for example, a theft of property), the lawyer’s threat to report the crime does not constitute extortion when honestly claimed in an effort to obtain restitution or indemnification for the harm done. But extortion is committed if the threat involves conduct of the third person unrelated to the criminal harm (for example, a threat to report tax evasion by the third person that is unrelated to the civil dispute).
RULE 3.5:
MAINTAINING AND PRESERVING THE IMPARTIALITY OF TRIBUNALS AND JURORS

(a) A lawyer shall not:

(1) seek to or cause another person to influence a judge, official or employee of a tribunal by means prohibited by law or give or lend anything of value to such judge, official, or employee of a tribunal when the recipient is prohibited from accepting the gift or loan but a lawyer may make a contribution to the campaign fund of a candidate for judicial office in conformity with Part 100 of the Rules of the Chief Administrator of the Courts;

(2) in an adversarial proceeding communicate or cause another person to do so on the lawyer’s behalf, as to the merits of the matter with a judge or official of a tribunal or an employee thereof before whom the matter is pending, except:

(i) in the course of official proceedings in the matter;

(ii) in writing, if the lawyer promptly delivers a copy of the writing to counsel for other parties and to a party who is not represented by a lawyer;

(iii) orally, upon adequate notice to counsel for the other parties and to any party who is not represented by a lawyer; or

(iv) as otherwise authorized by law, or by Part 100 of the Rules of the Chief Administrator of the Courts;

(3) seek to or cause another person to influence a juror or prospective juror by means prohibited by law;

(4) communicate or cause another to communicate with a member of the jury venire from which the jury will be selected for the trial of a case or, during the trial of a case, with any member of the jury unless authorized to do so by law or court order;

(5) communicate with a juror or prospective juror after discharge of the jury if:

(i) the communication is prohibited by law or court order;

(ii) the juror has made known to the lawyer a desire not to communicate;

(iii) the communication involves misrepresentation, coercion, duress or harassment; or
(iv) the communication is an attempt to influence the juror’s actions in future jury service; or

(6) conduct a vexatious or harassing investigation of either a member of the venire or a juror or, by financial support or otherwise, cause another to do so.

(b) During the trial of a case a lawyer who is not connected therewith shall not communicate with or cause another to communicate with a juror concerning the case.

(c) All restrictions imposed by this Rule also apply to communications with or investigations of members of a family of a member of the venire or a juror.

(d) A lawyer shall reveal promptly to the court improper conduct by a member of the venire or a juror, or by another toward a member of the venire or a juror or a member of his or her family of which the lawyer has knowledge.

Comment

[1] Many forms of improper influence upon a tribunal are proscribed by criminal law. In addition, gifts and loans to judges and judicial employees, as well as contributions to candidates for judicial election, are regulated by the New York Code of Judicial Conduct, with which an advocate should be familiar. See New York Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 4(D)(5), 22 N.Y.C.R.R. § 100.4(D)(5) (prohibition of a judge’s receipt of a gift, loan, etc., and exceptions) and Canon 5(A)(5), 22 N.Y.C.R.R. § 100.5(A)(5) (concerning lawyer contributions to the campaign committee of a candidate for judicial office). A lawyer is prohibited from aiding a violation of such provisions. Limitations on contributions in the Election Law may also be relevant.

[2] Unless authorized to do so by law or court order, a lawyer is prohibited from communicating ex parte with persons serving in a judicial capacity in an adjudicative proceeding, such as judges, masters or jurors, or to employees who assist them, such as law clerks. See New York Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3(B)(6), 22 N.Y.C.R.R. § 100.3(B)(6).

[3] A lawyer may on occasion want to communicate with a juror or prospective juror after the jury has been discharged. Paragraph (a)(5) permits a lawyer to do so unless the communication is prohibited by law or a court order, but the lawyer must respect the desire of a juror not to talk with the lawyer. The lawyer may not engage in improper conduct during the communication.

[4] The advocate’s function is to present evidence and argument so that the cause may be decided according to law. Refraining from abusive or obstreperous conduct is a corollary of the advocate’s right to speak on behalf of litigants. A lawyer may stand firm against abuse by a judge but should avoid reciprocation; the judge’s misbehavior is no justification for similar dereliction by an advocate. An advocate can present the cause, protect the record for subsequent review and preserve professional integrity by patient firmness no less effectively than by belligerence or theatrics.
Paragraph (b) prohibits lawyers who are not connected with a case from communicating (or causing another to communicate) with jurors concerning the case.

Paragraph (c) extends the rules concerning communications with jurors and members of the venire to communication with family members of the jurors and venire members.

Paragraph (d) imposes a reporting obligation on lawyers who have knowledge of improper conduct by or toward jurors, members of the venire, or family members thereof.
RULE 3.6:
TRIAL PUBLICITY

(a) A lawyer who is participating in or has participated in a criminal or civil matter shall not make an extrajudicial statement that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know will be disseminated by means of public communication and will have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding in the matter.

(b) A statement ordinarily is likely to prejudice materially an adjudicative proceeding when it refers to a civil matter triable to a jury, a criminal matter or any other proceeding that could result in incarceration, and the statement relates to:

(1) the character, credibility, reputation or criminal record of a party, suspect in a criminal investigation or witness, or the identity of a witness or the expected testimony of a party or witness;

(2) in a criminal matter that could result in incarceration, the possibility of a plea of guilty to the offense or the existence or contents of any confession, admission or statement given by a defendant or suspect, or that person’s refusal or failure to make a statement;

(3) the performance or results of any examination or test, or the refusal or failure of a person to submit to an examination or test, or the identity or nature of physical evidence expected to be presented;

(4) any opinion as to the guilt or innocence of a defendant or suspect in a criminal matter that could result in incarceration;

(5) information the lawyer knows or reasonably should know is likely to be inadmissible as evidence in a trial and would, if disclosed, create a substantial risk of prejudicing an impartial trial; or

(6) the fact that a defendant has been charged with a crime, unless there is included therein a statement explaining that the charge is merely an accusation and that the defendant is presumed innocent until and unless proven guilty.

(c) Provided that the statement complies with paragraph (a), a lawyer may state the following without elaboration:

(1) the claim, offense or defense and, except when prohibited by law, the identity of the persons involved;

(2) information contained in a public record;

(3) that an investigation of a matter is in progress;

(4) the scheduling or result of any step in litigation;
(5) a request for assistance in obtaining evidence and information necessary thereto;

(6) a warning of danger concerning the behavior of a person involved, when there is reason to believe that there exists the likelihood of substantial harm to an individual or to the public interest; and

(7) in a criminal matter:

(i) the identity, age, residence, occupation and family status of the accused;

(ii) if the accused has not been apprehended, information necessary to aid in apprehension of that person;

(iii) the identity of investigating and arresting officers or agencies and the length of the investigation; and

(iv) the fact, time and place of arrest, resistance, pursuit and use of weapons, and a description of physical evidence seized, other than as contained only in a confession, admission or statement.

(d) Notwithstanding paragraph (a), a lawyer may make a statement that a reasonable lawyer would believe is required to protect a client from the substantial prejudicial effect of recent publicity not initiated by the lawyer or the lawyer’s client. A statement made pursuant to this paragraph shall be limited to such information as is necessary to mitigate the recent adverse publicity.

(e) No lawyer associated in a firm or government agency with a lawyer subject to paragraph (a) shall make a statement prohibited by paragraph (a).

Comment

[1] It is difficult to strike a balance between protecting the right to a fair trial and safeguarding the right of free expression. Preserving the right to a fair trial necessarily entails some curtailment of the information that may be disseminated about a party prior to trial, particularly where trial by jury is involved. If there were no such limits, the result would be the practical nullification of the protective effect of the rules of forensic decorum and the exclusionary rules of evidence. On the other hand, there are vital social interests served by the free dissemination of information about events having legal consequences and about legal proceedings themselves. The public has a right to know about threats to its safety and measures aimed at assuring its security. It also has a legitimate interest in the conduct of judicial proceedings, particularly in matters of general public concern. Furthermore, the subject matter of legal proceedings is often of direct significance in debate and deliberation over questions of public policy.
[2] Special rules of confidentiality may validly govern proceedings in juvenile, domestic relations and mental disability proceedings and perhaps other types of litigation. Rule 3.4(c) requires compliance with such rules.

[3] The Rule sets forth a basic general prohibition against a lawyer making statements that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know will have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding. It recognizes that the public value of informed commentary is great and that the likelihood of prejudice to a proceeding because of the commentary of a lawyer who is not involved in the proceeding is small. Thus, the Rule applies only to lawyers who are participating or have participated in the investigation or litigation of a matter and their associates.

[4] There are certain subjects that are more likely than not to have a material prejudicial effect on a proceeding, particularly when they refer to a civil matter triable to a jury, a criminal matter or any other proceeding that could result in incarceration. Paragraph (b) specifies certain statements that ordinarily will have prejudicial effect.

[5] Paragraph (c) identifies specific matters about which a lawyer’s statements would not ordinarily be considered to present a substantial likelihood of material prejudice. Nevertheless, some statements in criminal cases are also required to meet the fundamental requirements of paragraph (a), for example, those identified in paragraph (c)(7)(iv). Paragraph (c) is not intended to be an exhaustive listing of the subjects upon which a lawyer may make a statement; statements on other matters may be permissible under paragraph (a).

[6] Another relevant factor in determining prejudice is the nature of the proceeding involved. Criminal jury trials will be most sensitive to extrajudicial speech. Civil trials may be less sensitive. Non-jury hearings and arbitration proceedings may be even less affected. The Rule will still place limitations on prejudicial comments in these cases, but the likelihood of prejudice may be different depending on the type of proceeding.

[7] Extrajudicial statements that might otherwise raise a question under this Rule may be permissible when they are made in response to statements made publicly by another party, another party’s lawyer or third persons, where a reasonable lawyer would believe a public response is required in order to avoid prejudice to the lawyer’s client. When prejudicial statements have been publicly made by others, responsive statements may have the salutary effect of lessening any resulting adverse impact on the adjudicative proceeding. Paragraph (d) permits such responsive statements, provided they contain only such information as is necessary to mitigate undue prejudice created by the statements made by others.

RULE 3.7:  
LAWYER AS WITNESS

(a) A lawyer shall not act as advocate before a tribunal in a matter in which the lawyer is likely to be a witness on a significant issue of fact unless:

(1) the testimony relates solely to an uncontested issue;

(2) the testimony relates solely to the nature and value of legal services rendered in the matter;

(3) disqualification of the lawyer would work substantial hardship on the client;

(4) the testimony will relate solely to a matter of formality, and there is no reason to believe that substantial evidence will be offered in opposition to the testimony; or

(5) the testimony is authorized by the tribunal.

(b) A lawyer may not act as advocate before a tribunal in a matter if:

(1) another lawyer in the lawyer’s firm is likely to be called as a witness on a significant issue other than on behalf of the client, and it is apparent that the testimony may be prejudicial to the client; or

(2) the lawyer is precluded from doing so by Rule 1.7 or Rule 1.9.

Comment

[1] Combining the roles of advocate and witness can prejudice the tribunal and the opposing party and also can create a conflict of interest between the lawyer and client.

Advocate-Witness Rule

[2] The tribunal may properly object when the trier of fact may be confused or misled by a lawyer’s serving as both advocate and witness. The opposing party may properly object where the combination of roles may prejudice that party’s rights in the litigation. A witness is required to testify on the basis of personal knowledge, while an advocate is expected to explain and comment on evidence given by others. It may not be clear whether a statement by an advocate-witness should be taken as proof or as an analysis of the proof. The requirement that the testimony of the advocate-witness be on a significant issue of fact provides a materiality limitation.

[3] To protect the tribunal, the Rule prohibits a lawyer from simultaneously serving as advocate and witness except in those circumstances specified in paragraph (a). Paragraph (a)(1) recognizes that if the testimony will be uncontested, the ambiguities in the dual role are purely theoretical. Testimony relating solely to a formality is uncontested when the lawyer reasonably believes that no substantial evidence will be offered in opposition to the testimony. Paragraph
(a)(2) recognizes that where the testimony concerns the extent and value of legal services rendered in the action in which the testimony is offered, permitting the lawyer to testify avoids the need for a second trial with new counsel to resolve that issue. Moreover, in such a situation the judge has firsthand knowledge of the matter in issue; hence, there is less dependence on the adversary process to test the credibility of the testimony.

[4] Apart from these two exceptions, paragraph (a)(3) recognizes that a balancing is required among the interests of the client, of the tribunal, and of the opposing party. Whether the tribunal is likely to be misled or the opposing party is likely to suffer prejudice depends on the nature of the case, the importance and probable tenor of the lawyer’s testimony and the probability that the lawyer’s testimony will conflict with that of other witnesses. Even if there is risk of such prejudice, in determining whether the lawyer should be disqualified, due regard must be given to the effect of disqualification on the lawyer’s client. It is relevant that one or both parties could reasonably foresee that the lawyer would probably be a witness. The conflict of interest principles stated in Rule 1.7, 1.9 and 1.10, which may separately require disqualification of the lawyer-advocate, have no application to the tribunal’s determination of the balancing of judicial and party interests required by paragraph (a)(3).

[5] The tribunal is not likely to be misled when a lawyer acts as advocate before a tribunal in a matter in which another lawyer in the lawyer’s firm testifies as a witness. Therefore, paragraph (b) permits the non-testifying lawyer to act as advocate before the tribunal except (1) when another lawyer in the lawyer’s firm is likely to be called as a witness on a significant issue other than on behalf of the client, and it is apparent that the testimony may be prejudicial to the client, or (2) when either Rule 1.7 or Rule 1.9 would prohibit the non-testifying lawyer from acting as advocate before the tribunal. Moreover, unless Rules 1.7 or 1.9 preclude it, the non-testifying lawyer and the testifying lawyer may continue to represent the client outside of the tribunal, with the client’s informed consent, in pretrial activities such as legal research, fact gathering, and preparation or argument of motions and briefs on issues of law, and may be consulted during the trial by the lawyer serving as advocate.

Conflict of Interest

[6] In determining whether it is permissible to act as advocate before a tribunal in which the lawyer will be a witness, the lawyer must also consider that the dual role may give rise to a conflict of interest that will require compliance with Rule 1.7 or Rule 1.9. For example, if there is likely to be substantial conflict between the testimony of the client and that of the lawyer, the representation involves a conflict of interest that requires compliance with Rule 1.7. This would be true even though the lawyer might not be prohibited by paragraph (a) from simultaneously serving as advocate and witness because the lawyer’s disqualification would work a substantial hardship on the client. Similarly, a lawyer who might be permitted to serve simultaneously as an advocate and a witness by paragraph (a)(3) might be precluded from doing so by Rule 1.9. The problem can arise whether the lawyer is called as a witness on behalf of the client or is called by the opposing party. Determining whether such a conflict exists is primarily the responsibility of the lawyer involved. If there is a conflict of interest, the lawyer must secure the client’s informed consent, confirmed in writing. In some cases, the lawyer will be precluded from seeking the client’s consent. See Rule 1.7. See Rule 1.0(e) for the definition of “confirmed in writing” and Rule 1.0(j) for the definition of “informed consent.”
RULE 3.8:
SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF PROSECUTORS AND OTHER GOVERNMENT LAWYERS

(a) A prosecutor or other government lawyer shall not institute, cause to be instituted or maintain a criminal charge when the prosecutor or other government lawyer knows or it is obvious that the charge is not supported by probable cause.

(b) A prosecutor or other government lawyer in criminal litigation shall make timely disclosure to counsel for the defendant or to a defendant who has no counsel of the existence of evidence or information known to the prosecutor or other government lawyer that tends to negate the guilt of the accused, mitigate the degree of the offense, or reduce the sentence, except when relieved of this responsibility by a protective order of a tribunal.

(c) When a prosecutor knows of new, credible and material evidence creating a reasonable likelihood that a convicted defendant did not commit an offense of which the defendant was convicted, the prosecutor shall within a reasonable time:

(1) disclose that evidence to an appropriate court or prosecutor’s office; or

(2) if the conviction was obtained by that prosecutor’s office,

(A) notify the appropriate court and the defendant that the prosecutor’s office possesses such evidence unless a court authorizes delay for good cause shown;

(B) disclose that evidence to the defendant unless the disclosure would interfere with an ongoing investigation or endanger the safety of a witness or other person, and a court authorizes delay for good cause shown; and

(C) undertake or make reasonable efforts to cause to be undertaken such further inquiry or investigation as may be necessary to provide a reasonable belief that the conviction should or should not be set aside.

(d) When a prosecutor knows of clear and convincing evidence establishing that a defendant was convicted, in a prosecution by the prosecutor’s office, of an offense that the defendant did not commit, the prosecutor shall seek a remedy consistent with justice, applicable law, and the circumstances of the case.

(e) A prosecutor’s independent judgment, made in good faith, that the new evidence is not of such nature as to trigger the obligations of sections (c) and (d), though subsequently determined to have been erroneous, does not constitute a violation of this rule.
Comment

[1] A prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate. This responsibility carries with it specific obligations to see that the defendant is accorded procedural justice and that guilt is decided upon the basis of sufficient evidence. Applicable state or federal law may require other measures by the prosecutor, and knowing disregard of those obligations or a systematic abuse of prosecutorial discretion could constitute a violation of Rule 8.4. A government lawyer in a criminal case is considered a “prosecutor” for purposes of this Rule.

[2] A defendant who has no counsel may waive a preliminary hearing or other important pretrial rights and thereby lose a valuable opportunity to challenge probable cause. Accordingly, prosecutors should not seek to obtain waivers of preliminary hearings or other important pretrial rights from unrepresented accused persons. This would not be applicable, however, to an accused appearing pro se with the approval of the tribunal, or to the lawful questioning of an uncharged suspect who has knowingly waived the rights to counsel and silence.

[3] The exception in paragraph (b) recognizes that a prosecutor may seek an appropriate protective order from the tribunal if disclosure of information to the defense could result in substantial harm to an individual or to the public interest.

[4] [Reserved.]

[5] Rule 3.6 prohibits extrajudicial statements that have a substantial likelihood of prejudicing an adjudicatory proceeding. In the context of a criminal prosecution, a prosecutor’s extrajudicial statement can create the additional problem of increasing public condemnation of the accused. Although the announcement of an indictment, for example, will necessarily have severe consequences for the accused, a prosecutor can, and should, avoid comments that have no legitimate law enforcement purpose and have a substantial likelihood of increasing public opprobrium against the accused. A prosecutor in a criminal case should make reasonable efforts to prevent persons under the prosecutor’s supervisory authority, which may include investigators, law enforcement personnel, employees and other persons assisting or associated with the prosecutor, from making extrajudicial statements that the prosecutor would be prohibited from making under Rule 3.6. See Rule 5.3. Nothing in this Comment is intended to restrict the statements that a prosecutor may make that comply with Rule 3.6(c) or Rule 3.6(d).

[6] Like other lawyers, prosecutors are subject to Rule 5.1 and Rule 5.3, which relate to responsibilities regarding lawyers and nonlawyers who work for or are associated with the lawyer’s office. Prosecutors should bear in mind the importance of these obligations in connection with the unique dangers of improper extrajudicial statements in a criminal case, and should exercise reasonable care to prevent persons assisting or associated with the prosecutor from making improper extrajudicial statements. Ordinarily, the reasonable care standard will be satisfied if the prosecutor issues the appropriate cautions to law enforcement personnel and other relevant individuals.

[6A] Reference to a “prosecutor” in this Rule includes the office of the prosecutor and all lawyers affiliated with the prosecutor’s office who are responsible for the prosecution function.
Like other lawyers, prosecutors are subject to Rule 3.3, which requires a lawyer to take reasonable remedial measures to correct material evidence that the lawyer has offered when the lawyer comes to know of its falsity. See Rule 3.3, Comment [6A].

[7] When a prosecutor knows of new, credible and material evidence creating a reasonable likelihood that a person outside the prosecutor’s jurisdiction was convicted of a crime that the person did not commit, paragraph (c) requires reasonably timely disclosure to the court or other appropriate authority, such as the chief prosecutor of the jurisdiction where the conviction occurred. If the conviction was obtained in the prosecutor’s jurisdiction, paragraph (c) requires the prosecutor to examine the evidence and undertake, or make reasonable efforts to cause to be undertaken, further inquiry or investigation to support a reasonable belief that the conviction should or should not be set aside. Paragraph (c) also requires the prosecutor to notify the court and defendant that the prosecutor possesses such evidence, and to disclose that evidence to the defendant, absent court-authorized delay for good cause. Consistent with the objectives of Rules 4.2 and 4.3, disclosure to a represented defendant must be made through the defendant’s counsel, and in the case of an unrepresented defendant, may also be accompanied by a request to the court for the appointment of counsel to assist the defendant in taking such legal measures as may be appropriate.

[8] Under paragraph (d), once the prosecutor knows of clear and convincing evidence that the defendant was convicted of an offense that the defendant did not commit, the prosecutor must seek a remedy consistent with justice, applicable law, and the circumstances of the case.

[9] A prosecutor’s independent judgment, made in good faith, that the new evidence is not of such nature as to trigger the obligations of sections (c) and (d), though subsequently determined to have been erroneous, does not constitute a violation of this Rule.
RULE 3.9:
ADVOCATE IN NON-ADJUDICATIVE MATTERS

A lawyer communicating in a representative capacity with a legislative body or administrative agency in connection with a pending non-adjudicative matter or proceeding shall disclose that the appearance is in a representative capacity, except when the lawyer seeks information from an agency that is available to the public.

Comment

[1] In representation before bodies such as legislatures, municipal councils and executive and administrative agencies acting in a rule-making or policy-making capacity, lawyers present facts, formulate issues and advance arguments regarding the matters under consideration. The legislative body or administrative agency is entitled to know that the lawyer is appearing in a representative capacity. Ordinarily the client will consent to being identified, but if not, such as when the lawyer is appearing on behalf of an undisclosed principal, the governmental body at least knows that the lawyer is acting in a representative capacity as opposed to advancing the lawyer’s personal opinion as a citizen. Representation in such matters is governed by Rules 4.1 through 4.4, and 8.4.

[1A] Rule 3.9 does not apply to adjudicative proceedings before a tribunal. Court rules and other law require a lawyer, in making an appearance before a tribunal in a representative capacity, to identify the client or clients and provide other information required for communication with the tribunal or other parties.

[2] [Reserved.]

[3] [Reserved.]
RULE 4.1:
TRUTHFULNESS IN STATEMENTS TO OTHERS

In the course of representing a client, a lawyer shall not knowingly make a false statement of fact or law to a third person.

Comment

Misrepresentation

[1] A lawyer is required to be truthful when dealing with others on a client’s behalf, but generally has no affirmative duty to inform an opposing party of relevant facts. A misrepresentation can occur if the lawyer incorporates or affirms a statement of another person that the lawyer knows is false. Misrepresentations can also occur by partially true but misleading statements or omissions that are the equivalent of affirmative false statements. As to dishonest conduct that does not amount to a false statement or for misrepresentations by a lawyer other than in the course of representing a client, see Rule 8.4.

Statements of Fact

[2] This Rule refers to statements of fact. Whether a particular statement should be regarded as one of fact can depend on the circumstances. Under generally accepted conventions in negotiation, certain types of statements ordinarily are not taken as statements of fact. Estimates of price or value placed on the subject of a transaction and a party’s intentions as to an acceptable settlement of a claim are ordinarily in this category; so is the existence of an undisclosed principal, except where nondisclosure of the principal would constitute fraud. Lawyers should be mindful of their obligations under applicable law to avoid criminal and tortious misrepresentation.

Illegal or Fraudulent Conduct by Client

[3] Under Rule 1.2(d), a lawyer is prohibited from counseling or assisting a client as to conduct that the lawyer knows is illegal or fraudulent. Ordinarily, a lawyer can avoid assisting a client’s illegality or fraud by withdrawing from the representation. See Rule 1.16(c)(2). Sometimes it may be necessary for the lawyer to give notice of the fact of withdrawal and to disaffirm an opinion, document, affirmation or the like. See Rules 1.2(d), 1.6(b)(3).
RULE 4.2:
COMMUNICATION WITH PERSON REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL

(a) In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate or cause another to communicate about the subject of the representation with a party the lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the prior consent of the other lawyer or is authorized to do so by law.

(b) Notwithstanding the prohibitions of paragraph (a), and unless otherwise prohibited by law, a lawyer may cause a client to communicate with a represented person unless the represented person is not legally competent, and may counsel the client with respect to those communications, provided the lawyer gives reasonable advance notice to the represented person’s counsel that such communications will be taking place.

(c) A lawyer who is acting pro se or is represented by counsel in a matter is subject to paragraph (a), but may communicate with a represented person, unless otherwise prohibited by law and unless the represented person is not legally competent, provided the lawyer or the lawyer’s counsel gives reasonable advance notice to the represented person’s counsel that such communications will be taking place.

Comment

[1] This Rule contributes to the proper functioning of the legal system by protecting a person who has chosen to be represented by a lawyer in a matter against possible overreaching by other lawyers who are participating in the matter, interference by those lawyers with the client-lawyer relationship, and uncounseled disclosure of information relating to the representation.

[2] Paragraph (a) applies to communications with any party who is represented by counsel concerning the matter to which the communication relates.

[3] Paragraph (a) applies even though the represented party initiates or consents to the communication. A lawyer must immediately terminate communication with a party if after commencing communication, the lawyer learns that the party is one with whom communication is not permitted by this Rule.

[4] This Rule does not prohibit communication with a represented party or person or an employee or agent of such a party or person concerning matters outside the representation. For example, the existence of a controversy between a government agency and a private party or person or between two organizations does not prohibit a lawyer for either from communicating with nonlawyer representatives of the other regarding a separate matter. Nor does this Rule preclude communication with a represented party or person who is seeking advice from a lawyer who is not otherwise representing a client in the matter. A lawyer having independent justification or legal authorization for communicating with a represented party or person is permitted to do so.

[5] Communications authorized by law may include communications by a lawyer on behalf of a client who is exercising a constitutional or other legal right to communicate with the government. Communications authorized by law may also include investigative activities of
lawyers representing governmental entities, directly or through investigative agents, prior to the commencement (as defined by law) of criminal or civil enforcement proceedings. When communicating with the accused in a criminal matter, a government lawyer must comply with this Rule in addition to honoring the state or federal rights of the accused. The fact that a communication does not violate a state or federal right is insufficient to establish that the communication is permissible under this Rule. This Rule is not intended to effect any change in the scope of the anti-contact rule in criminal cases.

[6] [Reserved.]

[7] In the case of a represented organization, paragraph (a) ordinarily prohibits communications with a constituent of the organization who: (i) supervises, directs or regularly consults with the organization’s lawyer concerning the matter, (ii) has authority to obligate the organization with respect to the matter, or (iii) whose act or omission in connection with the matter may be imputed to the organization for purposes of civil or criminal liability. Consent of the organization’s lawyer is not required for communication with a former unrepresented constituent. If an individual constituent of the organization is represented in the matter by the person’s own counsel, the consent by that counsel to a communication will be sufficient for purposes of this Rule. In communicating with a current or former constituent of an organization, a lawyer must not use methods of obtaining evidence that violate the legal rights of the organization. See Rules 1.13, 4.4.

[8] The prohibition on communications with a represented party applies only in circumstances where the lawyer knows that the party is in fact represented in the matter to be discussed. This means that the lawyer has actual knowledge of the fact of the representation; but such knowledge may be inferred from the circumstances. See Rule 1.0(k) for the definition of “knowledge.” Thus, the lawyer cannot evade the requirement of obtaining the consent of counsel by ignoring the obvious.

[9] In the event the party with whom the lawyer communicates is not known to be represented by counsel in the matter, the lawyer’s communications are subject to Rule 4.3.

[10] A lawyer may not make a communication prohibited by paragraph (a) through the acts of another. See Rule 8.4(a).

Client-to-Client Communications

[11] Persons represented in a matter may communicate directly with each other. A lawyer may properly advise a client to communicate directly with a represented person, and may counsel the client with respect to those communications, provided the lawyer complies with paragraph (b). Agents for lawyers, such as investigators, are not considered clients within the meaning of this Rule even where the represented entity is an agency, department or other organization of the government, and therefore a lawyer may not cause such an agent to communicate with a represented person, unless the lawyer would be authorized by law or a court order to do so. A lawyer may also counsel a client with respect to communications with a represented person, including by drafting papers for the client to present to the represented person. In advising a client in connection with such communications, a lawyer may not advise the client
to seek privileged information or other information that the represented person is not personally authorized to disclose or is prohibited from disclosing, such as a trade secret or other information protected by law, or to encourage or invite the represented person to take actions without the advice of counsel.

[12] A lawyer who advises a client with respect to communications with a represented person should be mindful of the obligation to avoid abusive, harassing, or unfair conduct with regard to the represented person. The lawyer should advise the client against such conduct. A lawyer shall not advise a client to communicate with a represented person if the lawyer knows that the represented person is legally incompetent. See Rule 4.4.

[12A] When a lawyer is proceeding pro se in a matter, or is being represented by his or her own counsel with respect to a matter, the lawyer’s direct communications with a counterparty are subject to the no-contact rule, Rule 4.2. Unless authorized by law, the lawyer must not engage in direct communications with a party the lawyer knows to be represented by counsel without either (i) securing the prior consent of the represented party’s counsel under Rule 4.2(a), or (ii) providing opposing counsel with reasonable advance notice that such communications will be taking place.
RULE 4.3:
COMMUNICATING WITH UNREPRESENTED PERSONS

In communicating on behalf of a client with a person who is not represented by counsel, a lawyer shall not state or imply that the lawyer is disinterested. When the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the unrepresented person misunderstands the lawyer’s role in the matter, the lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to correct the misunderstanding. The lawyer shall not give legal advice to an unrepresented person other than the advice to secure counsel if the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the interests of such person are or have a reasonable possibility of being in conflict with the interests of the client.

Comment

[1] An unrepresented person, particularly one not experienced in dealing with legal matters, might assume that a lawyer is disinterested in loyalties or is a disinterested authority on the law even when the lawyer represents a client. In order to avoid a misunderstanding, a lawyer will typically need to identify the lawyer’s client and, where necessary, explain that the client has interests opposed to those of the unrepresented person. As to misunderstandings that sometimes arise when a lawyer for an organization deals with an unrepresented constituent, see Rule 1.13(a), Comment [2A].

[2] The Rule distinguishes between situations involving unrepresented parties whose interests may be adverse to those of the lawyer’s client and those in which the person’s interests are not in conflict with the client’s. In the former situation, the possibility that the lawyer will compromise the unrepresented person’s interests is so great that the Rule prohibits the giving of any advice apart from the advice to obtain counsel. Whether a lawyer is giving impermissible advice may depend on the experience and sophistication of the unrepresented party, as well as the setting in which the behavior and comments occur. This Rule does not prohibit a lawyer from negotiating the terms of a transaction or settling a dispute with an unrepresented person. So long as the lawyer has explained that the lawyer represents an adverse party and is not representing the person, the lawyer may inform the person of the terms on which the lawyer’s client will enter into an agreement or settle a matter, prepare documents that require the person’s signature, and explain the lawyer’s own view of the meaning of the document or the lawyer’s view of the underlying legal obligations.
RULE 4.4:  
RESPECT FOR RIGHTS OF THIRD PERSONS

(a) In representing a client, a lawyer shall not use means that have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass or harm a third person or use methods of obtaining evidence that violate the legal rights of such a person.

(b) A lawyer who receives a document, electronically stored information, or other writing relating to the representation of the lawyer’s client and knows or reasonably should know that it was inadvertently sent shall promptly notify the sender.

Comment

[1] Responsibility to a client requires a lawyer to subordinate the interests of others to those of the client, but that responsibility does not imply that a lawyer may disregard the rights of third persons. It is impractical to catalogue all such rights, but they include legal restrictions on methods of obtaining evidence from third persons and unwarranted intrusions into privileged relationships, such as the client-lawyer relationship.

[2] Paragraph (b) recognizes that lawyers and law firms sometimes receive a document, electronically stored information, or other “writing as defined in Rule 1.0(x), that was mistakenly sent, produced, or otherwise inadvertently made available by opposing parties or their lawyers. A document, electronically stored information, or other writing is “inadvertently sent” within the meaning of paragraph (b) when it is accidentally transmitted, such as when an email or letter is misaddressed or a document or other writing is accidentally included with information that was intentionally transmitted. One way to resolve this situation is for lawyers and law firms to enter into agreements containing explicit provisions as to how the parties will deal with inadvertently sent documents. In the absence of such an agreement, however, if a lawyer or law firm knows or reasonably should know that such a document or other writing was sent inadvertently, this Rule requires only that the receiving lawyer promptly notify the sender in order to permit that person to take protective measures. Although this Rule does not require that the receiving lawyer refrain from reading or continuing to read the document, a lawyer who reads or continues to read a document that contains privileged or confidential information may be subject to court-imposed sanctions, including disqualification and evidence-preclusion. Whether the lawyer or law firm is required to take additional steps, such as returning the document or other writing, is a matter of law beyond the scope of these Rules, as is the question whether the privileged status of a document or other writing has been waived. Similarly, this Rule does not address the legal duties of a lawyer who receives a document or other writing that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know may have been inappropriately obtained by the sending person. For purposes of this Rule, “document, electronically stored information or other writing” includes not only paper documents, but also email and other forms of electronically stored information – including embedded data (commonly referred to as “metadata”) – that is subject to being read or put into readable form. See Rule 1.0(x).

[3] Refraining from reading or continuing to read a document or other writing once a lawyer realizes that it was inadvertently sent and returning the document to the sender or permanently deleting electronically stored information, honors the policy of these Rules to protect the principles of client confidentiality. Because there are circumstances where a lawyer’s ethical
obligations should not bar use of the information obtained from an inadvertently sent document or other writing, however, this Rule does not subject a lawyer to professional discipline for reading and using that information. Nevertheless, substantive law or procedural rules may require a lawyer to refrain from reading an inadvertently sent document or other writing, or to return the document or other writing to the sender or permanently delete electronically stored information, or both. Accordingly, in deciding whether to retain or use an inadvertently received document or other writing, some lawyers may take into account whether the attorney-client privilege would attach. But if applicable law or rules do not address the situation, decisions to refrain from reading such a document or other writing or instead to return them, or both, are matters of professional judgment reserved to the lawyer. See Rules 1.2, 1.4.
RULE 4.5:
COMMUNICATION AFTER INCIDENTS INVOLVING PERSONAL INJURY OR WRONGFUL DEATH

(a) In the event of a specific incident involving potential claims for personal injury or wrongful death, no unsolicited communication shall be made to an individual injured in the incident or to a family member or legal representative of such an individual, by a lawyer or law firm, or by any associate, agent, employee or other representative of a lawyer or law firm representing actual or potential defendants or entities that may defend and/or indemnify said defendants, before the 30th day after the date of the incident, unless a filing must be made within 30 days of the incident as a legal prerequisite to the particular claim, in which case no unsolicited communication shall be made before the 15th day after the date of the incident.

(b) An unsolicited communication by a lawyer or law firm, seeking to represent an injured individual or the legal representative thereof under the circumstance described in paragraph (a) shall comply with Rule 7.3(e).

Comment

[1] Paragraph (a) imposes a 30-day (or 15-day) restriction on unsolicited communications directed to potential claimants relating to a specific incident involving potential claims for personal injury or wrongful death, by lawyers or law firms who represent actual or potential defendants or entities that may defend or indemnify those defendants. However, if potential claimants are represented by counsel, it is proper for defense counsel to communicate with potential plaintiffs’ counsel even during the 30-day (or 15-day) period. See also Rule 7.3(e).
RULE 5.1:
RESPONSIBILITIES OF LAW FIRMS, PARTNERS, MANAGERS AND SUPERVISORY LAWYERS

(a) A law firm shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that all lawyers in the firm conform to these Rules.

(b) (1) A lawyer with management responsibility in a law firm shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that other lawyers in the law firm conform to these Rules.

(2) A lawyer with direct supervisory authority over another lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the supervised lawyer conforms to these Rules.

(c) A law firm shall ensure that the work of partners and associates is adequately supervised, as appropriate. A lawyer with direct supervisory authority over another lawyer shall adequately supervise the work of the other lawyer, as appropriate. In either case, the degree of supervision required is that which is reasonable under the circumstances, taking into account factors such as the experience of the person whose work is being supervised, the amount of work involved in a particular matter, and the likelihood that ethical problems might arise in the course of working on the matter.

(d) A lawyer shall be responsible for a violation of these Rules by another lawyer if:

(1) the lawyer orders or directs the specific conduct or, with knowledge of the specific conduct, ratifies it; or

(2) the lawyer is a partner in a law firm or is a lawyer who individually or together with other lawyers possesses comparable managerial responsibility in a law firm in which the other lawyer practices or is a lawyer who has supervisory authority over the other lawyer; and

(i) knows of such conduct at a time when it could be prevented or its consequences avoided or mitigated but fails to take reasonable remedial action; or

(ii) in the exercise of reasonable management or supervisory authority should have known of the conduct so that reasonable remedial action could have been taken at a time when the consequences of the conduct could have been avoided or mitigated.

Comment

[1] Paragraph (a) applies to law firms; paragraph (b) applies to lawyers with management responsibility in a law firm or a lawyer with direct supervisory authority over another lawyer.
Paragraph (b) requires lawyers with management authority within a firm or those having direct supervisory authority over other lawyers to make reasonable efforts to establish internal policies and procedures designed to provide reasonable assurance that all lawyers in the firm will conform to these Rules. Such policies and procedures include those designed (i) to detect and resolve conflicts of interest (see Rule 1.10(e)), (ii) to identify dates by which actions must be taken in pending matters, (iii) to account for client funds and property, and (iv) to ensure that inexperienced lawyers are appropriately supervised.

Other measures that may be required to fulfill the responsibility prescribed in paragraph (b) can depend on the firm’s structure and the nature of its practice. In a small firm of experienced lawyers, informal supervision and periodic review of compliance with the required systems ordinarily will suffice. In a large firm, or in practice situations in which difficult ethical problems frequently arise, more elaborate measures may be necessary. Some firms, for example, have a procedure whereby junior lawyers can make confidential referral of ethical problems directly to a designated senior partner or special committee. See Rule 5.2. Firms, whether large or small, may also rely on continuing legal education in professional ethics. In any event, the ethical atmosphere of a firm can influence the conduct of all its members and lawyers with management authority may not assume that all lawyers associated with the firm will inevitably conform to the Rules.

Paragraph (d) expresses a general principle of personal responsibility for acts of other lawyers in the law firm. See also Rule 8.4(a).

Paragraph (d) imposes such responsibility on a lawyer who orders, directs or ratifies wrongful conduct and on lawyers who are partners or who have comparable managerial authority in a law firm who know or reasonably should know of the conduct. Whether a lawyer has supervisory authority in particular circumstances is a question of fact. Partners and lawyers with comparable authority have at least indirect responsibility for all work being done by the firm, while a partner or manager in charge of a particular matter ordinarily also has supervisory responsibility for the work of other firm lawyers engaged in the matter. Partners and lawyers with comparable authority, as well as those who supervise other lawyers, are indirectly responsible for improper conduct of which they know or should have known in the exercise of reasonable managerial or supervisory authority. Appropriate remedial action by a partner or managing lawyer would depend on the immediacy of that lawyer’s involvement and the seriousness of the misconduct. A supervisor is required to intervene to prevent misconduct or to prevent or mitigate avoidable consequences of misconduct if the supervisor knows that the misconduct occurred.

Professional misconduct by a lawyer under supervision could reveal a violation of paragraph (a), (b) or (c) on the part of a law firm, partner or supervisory lawyer even though it does not entail a violation of paragraph (d) because there was no direction, ratification or knowledge of the violation or no violation occurred.

Apart from this Rule and Rule 8.4(a), a lawyer does not have disciplinary liability for the conduct of another lawyer. Whether a lawyer may be liable civilly or criminally for another lawyer’s conduct is a question of law beyond the scope of these Rules.
The duties imposed by this Rule on managing and supervising lawyers do not alter the personal duty of each lawyer in a firm to abide by these Rules. See Rule 5.2(a).
RULE 5.2:
RESPONSIBILITIES OF A SUBORDINATE LAWYER

(a) A lawyer is bound by these Rules notwithstanding that the lawyer acted at the direction of another person.

(b) A subordinate lawyer does not violate these Rules if that lawyer acts in accordance with a supervisory lawyer’s reasonable resolution of an arguable question of professional duty.

Comment

[1] Although a lawyer is not relieved of responsibility for a violation by the fact that the lawyer acted at the direction of a supervisor, that fact may be relevant in determining whether a lawyer had the knowledge required to render conduct a violation of these Rules. For example, if a subordinate filed a frivolous pleading at the direction of a supervisor, the subordinate would not be guilty of a professional violation unless the subordinate knew of the document’s frivolous character.

[2] When lawyers in a supervisor-subordinate relationship encounter a matter involving professional judgment as to ethical duty, the supervisor may assume responsibility for making the judgment. Otherwise, a consistent course of action or position could not be taken. If the question can reasonably be answered only one way, the duty of both lawyers is clear, and they are equally responsible for fulfilling it. However, if the question is reasonably arguable, someone has to decide upon the course of action. That authority ordinarily reposes in the supervisor, and a subordinate may be guided accordingly. To evaluate the supervisor’s conclusion that the question is arguable and the supervisor’s resolution of it is reasonable in light of applicable law, it is advisable that the subordinate lawyer undertake research, consult with a designated senior partner or special committee, if any (see Rule 5.1, Comment [3]), or use other appropriate means. For example, if a question arises whether the interests of two clients conflict under Rule 1.7, the supervisor’s reasonable resolution of the question should protect the subordinate professionally if the resolution is subsequently challenged.
RULE 5.3: LAWYER’S RESPONSIBILITY FOR CONDUCT OF NONLAWYERS

(a) A law firm shall ensure that the work of nonlawyers who work for the firm is adequately supervised, as appropriate. A lawyer with direct supervisory authority over a nonlawyer shall adequately supervise the work of the nonlawyer, as appropriate. In either case, the degree of supervision required is that which is reasonable under the circumstances, taking into account factors such as the experience of the person whose work is being supervised, the amount of work involved in a particular matter and the likelihood that ethical problems might arise in the course of working on the matter.

(b) A lawyer shall be responsible for conduct of a nonlawyer employed or retained by or associated with the lawyer that would be a violation of these Rules if engaged in by a lawyer, if:

(1) the lawyer orders or directs the specific conduct or, with knowledge of the specific conduct, ratifies it; or

(2) the lawyer is a partner in a law firm or is a lawyer who individually or together with other lawyers possesses comparable managerial responsibility in a law firm in which the nonlawyer is employed or is a lawyer who has supervisory authority over the nonlawyer; and

(i) knows of such conduct at a time when it could be prevented or its consequences avoided or mitigated but fails to take reasonable remedial action; or

(ii) in the exercise of reasonable management or supervisory authority should have known of the conduct so that reasonable remedial action could have been taken at a time when the consequences of the conduct could have been avoided or mitigated.

Comment

[1] This Rule requires a law firm to ensure that work of nonlawyers is appropriately supervised. In addition, a lawyer with direct supervisory authority over the work of nonlawyers must adequately supervise those nonlawyers. Comments [2] and [3] to Rule 5.1, which concern supervision of lawyers, provide guidance by analogy for the methods and extent of supervising nonlawyers.

[2] With regard to nonlawyers, who are not themselves subject to these Rules, the purpose of the supervision is to give reasonable assurance that the conduct of all nonlawyers employed by or retained by or associated with the law firm, including nonlawyers outside the firm working on firm matters, is compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyers and firm. Lawyers typically employ nonlawyer assistants in their practice, including secretaries, investigators, law student interns and paraprofessionals. Such nonlawyer assistants, whether they are employees or independent contractors, act for the lawyer in rendition of the lawyer’s professional services. Likewise, lawyers may employ nonlawyers outside the firm to assist in
rendering those services. See Comment [6] to Rule 1.1 (retaining lawyers outside the firm). A
law firm must ensure that such nonlawyer assistants are given appropriate instruction and
supervision concerning the ethical aspects of their employment, particularly regarding the
obligation not to disclose confidential information – see Rule 1.6 (e) (requiring lawyers to take
reasonable care to avoid unauthorized disclosure of confidential information. Lawyers also should
be responsible for the work done by their nonlawyer assistants. The measures employed in
supervising nonlawyers should take account of the fact that they do not have legal training and are
not subject to professional discipline. A law firm should make reasonable efforts to ensure that
the firm has in effect measures giving reasonable assurance that nonlawyers in the firm and
nonlawyers outside the firm who work on firm matters will act in a way compatible with the
professional obligations of the lawyer. A lawyer with supervisory authority over a nonlawyer
within or outside the firm has a parallel duty to provide appropriate supervision of the supervised
nonlawyer.

[2A] Paragraph (b) specifies the circumstances in which a lawyer is responsible for
conduct of a nonlawyer that would be a violation of these Rules if engaged in by a lawyer. For
guidance by analogy, see Rule 5.1, Comments [5]-[8].

[3] A lawyer may use nonlawyers outside the firm to assist the lawyer in rendering
legal services to the client. Examples include (i) retaining or contracting with an investigative or
paraprofessional service, (ii) hiring a document management company to create and maintain a
database for complex litigation, (iii) sending client documents to a third party for printing or
scanning, and (iv) using an Internet-based service to store client information. When using such
services outside the firm, a lawyer or law firm must make reasonable efforts to ensure that the
services are provided in a manner that is compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer
and law firm. The extent of the reasonable efforts required under this Rule will depend upon the
circumstances, including: (a) the education, experience and reputation of the nonlawyer; (b) the
nature of the services involved; (c) the terms of any arrangements concerning the protection of
client information; (d) the legal and ethical environments of the jurisdictions in which the services
will be performed, particularly with regard to confidentiality; (e) the sensitivity of the particular
kind of confidential information at issue; (f) whether the client will be supervising all or part of
the nonlawyer’s work. See also Rules 1.1 (competence), 1.2 (allocation of authority), 1.4
(communication with client), 1.6 (confidentiality), 5.4 (professional independence of the lawyer)
and 5.5 (unauthorized practice of law). When retaining or directing a nonlawyer outside the firm,
a lawyer should communicate directions appropriate under the circumstances to give reasonable
assurance that the nonlawyer’s conduct is compatible with the professional obligations of the
lawyer.
RULE 5.4:
PROFESSIONAL INDEPENDENCE OF A LAWYER

(a) A lawyer or law firm shall not share legal fees with a nonlawyer, except that:

(1) an agreement by a lawyer with the lawyer’s firm or another lawyer
associated in the firm may provide for the payment of money, over a reasonable
period of time after the lawyer’s death, to the lawyer’s estate or to one or more
specified persons;

(2) a lawyer who undertakes to complete unfinished legal business of a
deceased lawyer may pay to the estate of the deceased lawyer that portion of the total
compensation that fairly represents the services rendered by the deceased lawyer;
and

(3) a lawyer or law firm may compensate a nonlawyer employee or include
a nonlawyer employee in a retirement plan based in whole or in part on a profit-
sharing arrangement.

(b) A lawyer shall not form a partnership with a nonlawyer if any of the activities
of the partnership consist of the practice of law.

(c) Unless authorized by law, a lawyer shall not permit a person who recommends,
employs or pays the lawyer to render legal service for another to direct or regulate the
lawyer’s professional judgment in rendering such legal services or to cause the lawyer to
compromise the lawyer’s duty to maintain the confidential information of the client under
Rule 1.6.

(d) A lawyer shall not practice with or in the form of an entity authorized to
practice law for profit, if:

(1) a nonlawyer owns any interest therein, except that a fiduciary
representative of the estate of a lawyer may hold the stock or interest of the lawyer
for a reasonable time during administration;

(2) a nonlawyer is a member, corporate director or officer thereof or
occupies a position of similar responsibility in any form of association other than a
corporation; or

(3) a nonlawyer has the right to direct or control the professional judgment
of a lawyer.

Comment

[1] The provisions of this Rule express traditional limitations on sharing fees. These
limitations are to protect the lawyer’s professional independence of judgment. Where someone
other than the client pays the lawyer’s fee or salary, or recommends employment of the lawyer,
that arrangement does not modify the lawyer’s obligation to the client. As stated in paragraph (c), such arrangements should not interfere with the lawyer’s professional judgment.

[1A] Paragraph (a)(2) governs the compensation of a lawyer who undertakes to complete one or more unfinished pieces of legal business of a deceased lawyer. Rule 1.17 governs the sale of an entire law practice upon retirement, which is defined as the cessation of the private practice of law in a given geographic area.

[1B] Paragraph (a)(3) permits limited fee sharing with a nonlawyer employee, where the employee’s compensation or retirement plan is based in whole or in part on a profit-sharing arrangement. Such sharing of profits with a nonlawyer employee must be based on the total profitability of the law firm or a department within a law firm and may not be based on the fee resulting from a single case.

[2] This Rule also expresses traditional limitations on permitting a third party to direct or regulate the lawyer’s professional judgment in rendering legal services to another. See also Rule 1.8(f), providing that a lawyer may accept compensation from a third party as long as there is no interference with the lawyer’s professional judgment and the client gives informed consent.
RULE 5.5:
UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW

(a) A lawyer shall not practice law in a jurisdiction in violation of the regulation of the legal profession in that jurisdiction.

(b) A lawyer shall not aid a nonlawyer in the unauthorized practice of law.

Comment

[1] A lawyer may practice law only in a jurisdiction in which the lawyer is authorized to practice. A lawyer may be admitted to practice law in a jurisdiction on a regular basis or may be authorized by court rule or order or by law to practice for a limited purpose or on a restricted basis. Paragraph (a) applies to unauthorized practice of law in another jurisdiction by a lawyer through the lawyer’s direct action, and paragraph (b) prohibits a lawyer from aiding a nonlawyer in the unauthorized practice of law.

[2] The definition of the “practice of law” is established by law and varies from one jurisdiction to another. Whatever the definition, limiting the practice of law to members of the bar protects the public against rendition of legal services by unqualified persons. This Rule does not prohibit a lawyer from employing the services of paraprofessionals and delegating functions to them, so long as the lawyer supervises the delegated work and retains responsibility for their work. See Rule 5.3.
RULE 5.6:
RESTRICTIONS ON RIGHT TO PRACTICE

(a) A lawyer shall not participate in offering or making:

(1) a partnership, shareholder, operating, employment, or other similar type of agreement that restricts the right of a lawyer to practice after termination of the relationship, except an agreement concerning benefits upon retirement; or

(2) an agreement in which a restriction on a lawyer’s right to practice is part of the settlement of a client controversy.

(b) This Rule does not prohibit restrictions that may be included in the terms of the sale of a law practice pursuant to Rule 1.17.

Comment

[1] An agreement restricting the right of a lawyer who has left a firm (a “departed lawyer”) to practice after leaving a firm limits the freedom of clients to choose a lawyer and limits the professional autonomy of lawyers. Paragraph (a) prohibits such agreements, except (i) restrictions incident to provisions concerning retirement benefits for service with the firm or (ii) restrictions justified by special circumstances described in this Comment. Throughout this Comment, the phrase “law firm” shall have the meaning given in the definition in Rule 1.0(h).

[1A] This Rule and this Comment are intended to address the obligations of lawyers and law firms solely under Rule 5.6. They are not intended to address the rights or obligations of a law firm or a departed lawyer under other Rules or under the law of fiduciary duties, partnership law, contract law, tort law, or other law.

[1B] Paragraph (a)(1) applies to any written or oral agreement governing or intended to govern:

(i) the operation of a law firm;
(ii) the terms of partnership, shareholding, or of counsel status at a law firm; and
(iii) the terms of an individual lawyer’s full-time or part-time employment at a law firm or other entity.

[1C] Paragraph (a)(1) applies whether the agreement is embodied in a written or oral contract, a firm or employee handbook, a memorandum, or any other kind of document. Paragraph (a)(1) prohibits any agreement (other than a provision relating to retirement benefits) that prohibits or limits a departed lawyer from contacting or serving the firm’s current, former, or prospective clients, except that:

(i) an agreement may include provisions to protect confidential or proprietary information belonging to the law firm or to the law firm’s current, former, or prospective clients; and

(ii) an agreement may include provisions that impose reasonable restrictions or remedies on a departed lawyer in the circumstances described in Comment [1H].
Paragraph (a)(1) applies not only to agreements regarding lawyers in private practice but also to agreements between employed (“in-house”) attorneys and the clients or entities that employ them, whether in a legal or non-legal capacity. However, paragraph (a)(1) does not prevent an entity and its employed lawyers from agreeing to restrictions on post-departure non-legal functions. In every type of law firm, the departed lawyer and the law firm must balance their rights and obligations to each other in a manner consistent with the Rules of Professional Conduct and the law governing contracts, partnerships, and fiduciary obligations, all while recognizing the primacy of client interests and client autonomy. With this in mind, Comment [1E] addresses restrictions that ordinarily violate the Rule, and Comments [1F], [1G], and [1H] address restrictions that ordinarily do not violate the Rule.

**Prohibited Agreements**

Agreements that ordinarily violate paragraph (a)(1) (unless they fit within the exception for retirement benefits) include, but are not limited to, agreements that purport to do any of the following:

(i) prohibit or limit a departed lawyer from contacting or representing some or all current, former, or prospective clients of the firm;

(ii) prohibit or limit a departed lawyer from practicing law for any period of time following his or her withdrawal (e.g., imposing a mandatory “garden leave”);

(iii) prohibit or limit a departed lawyer from contacting or soliciting law firm employees after the lawyer has departed from the firm; or

(iv) impose more severe financial penalties on departed lawyers who intend to compete, actually compete, are suspected of competing, or are presumed to be competing with the firm than are imposed on departed lawyers who do not compete.

**Permissible Agreements**

Agreements that ordinarily do not violate paragraph (a)(1) include, but are not limited to, agreements prescribing a minimum period between a departing lawyer’s notice to the firm and the lawyer’s departure, as long as the notice period is reasonable. Notice periods should be applied flexibly and should not unduly restrict lawyer mobility, because a notice period that is unreasonably long or inflexibly applied impairs client choice and lawyer autonomy. Whether the minimum period after notice is reasonable in this context will depend on the facts and circumstances, but the length of the notice period should balance three broad factors:

(i) the firm’s need for the departing lawyer to complete administrative tasks connected to departure, such as notifying clients, sending invoices, and transitioning files;

(ii) the client’s right to the lawyer of the client’s choice; and

(iii) the lawyer’s right to autonomy and mobility.

Likewise, because the purpose of Rule 5.6 is to facilitate each client’s choice of counsel, after a departing lawyer has announced a decision to leave, a law firm may not suspend, limit, or prohibit the departing lawyer from continuing to practice at the firm unless the firm has good cause, such as:
a reasonable, good faith belief that the departing lawyer is improperly or illegally accessing (or planning to access) the firm’s confidential or proprietary information, the firm’s personnel, or client funds or property held by the firm, or

(ii) a reasonable, good faith belief that the lawyer, due to diminished capacity, is harming a client or is incapable of continuing to serve a client.

[1H] Other agreements that ordinarily do not violate paragraph (a)(1) include agreements permitting a firm to impose reasonable restrictions or remedies if:

(i) a departing lawyer has approved, within a reasonable time before departing from the firm, a specific, significant financial undertaking with respect to the firm that remains outstanding where the lawyer’s departure will have a material effect on the firm’s ability to satisfy that undertaking; or

(ii) a departing lawyer has, before leaving the firm, breached material employment or partnership responsibilities to the firm in a manner that has caused or is likely to cause material financial or reputational harm to the firm.

**Reasonable Management Discretion**

[1I] Paragraph (a)(1) is not intended to prohibit a law firm in the ordinary course of its operations from exercising reasonable management discretion regarding case assignments, case staffing, promotions, demotions, compensation, or other aspects of a law firm’s operations, finances, and management. The Rule is intended to prevent overly restrictive practices with respect to lawyers who have provided notice of an intention to leave a firm, or who have taken affirmative steps toward planning to leave the firm (with or without notice to the firm).
RULE 5.7:
RESPONSIBILITIES REGARDING NONLEGAL SERVICES

(a) With respect to lawyers or law firms providing nonlegal services to clients or other persons:

(1) A lawyer or law firm that provides nonlegal services to a person that are not distinct from legal services being provided to that person by the lawyer or law firm is subject to these Rules with respect to the provision of both legal and nonlegal services.

(2) A lawyer or law firm that provides nonlegal services to a person that are distinct from legal services being provided to that person by the lawyer or law firm is subject to these Rules with respect to the nonlegal services if the person receiving the services could reasonably believe that the nonlegal services are the subject of a client-lawyer relationship.

(3) A lawyer or law firm that is an owner, controlling party or agent of, or that is otherwise affiliated with, an entity that the lawyer or law firm knows to be providing nonlegal services to a person is subject to these Rules with respect to the nonlegal services if the person receiving the services could reasonably believe that the nonlegal services are the subject of a client-lawyer relationship.

(4) For purposes of paragraphs (a)(2) and (a)(3), it will be presumed that the person receiving nonlegal services believes the services to be the subject of a client-lawyer relationship unless the lawyer or law firm has advised the person receiving the services in writing that the services are not legal services and that the protection of a client-lawyer relationship does not exist with respect to the nonlegal services, or if the interest of the lawyer or law firm in the entity providing nonlegal services is de minimis.

(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (a), a lawyer or law firm that is an owner, controlling party, agent, or is otherwise affiliated with an entity that the lawyer or law firm knows is providing nonlegal services to a person shall not permit any nonlawyer providing such services or affiliated with that entity to direct or regulate the professional judgment of the lawyer or law firm in rendering legal services to any person, or to cause the lawyer or law firm to compromise its duty under Rule 1.6(a) and Rule 1.6(c) with respect to the confidential information of a client receiving legal services.

(c) For purposes of this Rule, “nonlegal services” shall mean those services that lawyers may lawfully provide and that are not prohibited as an unauthorized practice of law when provided by a nonlawyer.

Comment

[1] For many years, lawyers have provided nonlegal services to their clients. By participating in the delivery of these services, lawyers can serve a broad range of economic and
other interests of clients. Whenever a lawyer directly provides nonlegal services, the lawyer must avoid confusion on the part of the client as to the nature of the lawyer’s role, so that the person for whom the nonlegal services are performed understands that the services may not carry with them the legal and ethical protections that ordinarily accompany a client-lawyer relationship. The recipient of the nonlegal services may expect, for example, that the protection of client confidences and secrets, prohibitions against representation of persons with conflicting interests, and obligations of a lawyer to maintain professional independence apply to the provision of nonlegal services when that may not be the case. The risk of confusion is especially acute when the lawyer renders both legal and nonlegal services with respect to the same matter. Under some circumstances, the legal and nonlegal services may be so closely entwined that they cannot be distinguished from each other. In this situation, the recipient is likely to be confused as to whether and when the relationship is protected as a client-lawyer relationship. Therefore, where the legal and nonlegal services are not distinct, paragraph (a)(1) requires that the lawyer providing nonlegal services adhere to all of the requirements of these Rules with respect to the nonlegal services. Paragraph (a)(1) applies to the provision of nonlegal services by a law firm if the person for whom the nonlegal services are being performed is also receiving legal services from the firm that are not distinct from the nonlegal services.

[2] Even when the lawyer believes that the provision of nonlegal services is distinct from any legal services being provided, there is still a risk that the recipient of the nonlegal services might reasonably believe that the recipient is receiving the protection of a client-lawyer relationship. Therefore, paragraph (a)(2) requires that the lawyer providing the nonlegal services adhere to these Rules, unless the person understands that the nonlegal services are not the subject of a client-lawyer relationship. Nonlegal services also may be provided through an entity with which a lawyer is affiliated, for example, as owner, controlling party or agent. In this situation, there is still a risk that the recipient of the nonlegal services might reasonably believe that the recipient is receiving the protection of a client-lawyer relationship. Therefore, paragraph (a)(3) requires that the lawyer involved with the entity providing nonlegal services adhere to all of these Rules with respect to the nonlegal services, unless the person understands that the nonlegal services are not the subject of a client-lawyer relationship.

[3] These Rules will be presumed to apply to a lawyer who directly provides or is otherwise involved in the provision of nonlegal services unless the lawyer complies with paragraph (a)(4) by communicating in writing to the person receiving the nonlegal services that the services are not legal services and that the protection of a client-lawyer relationship does not exist with respect to the nonlegal services. Such a communication should be made before entering into an agreement for the provision of nonlegal services in a manner sufficient to ensure that the person understands the significance of the communication. In certain circumstances, however, additional steps may be required to ensure that the person understands the distinction. For example, while the written disclaimer set forth in paragraph (a)(4) will be adequate for a sophisticated user of legal and nonlegal services, a more detailed explanation may be required for someone unaccustomed to making distinctions between legal services and nonlegal services. Where appropriate and especially where legal services are provided in the same transaction as nonlegal services, the lawyer should counsel the client about the possible effect of the proposed provision of services on the availability of the attorney-client privilege. The lawyer or law firm will not be required to comply with these requirements if its interest in the entity providing the nonlegal services is so small as to be de minimis.
Although a lawyer may be exempt from the application of these Rules with respect to nonlegal services on the face of paragraph (a), the scope of the exemption is not absolute. A lawyer who provides or who is involved in the provision of nonlegal services may be excused from compliance with only those Rules that are dependent upon the existence of a representation or client-lawyer relationship. Other Rules, such as those prohibiting lawyers from misusing the confidences or secrets of a former client (see Rule 1.9), requiring lawyers to report certain lawyer misconduct (see Rule 8.3), and prohibiting lawyers from engaging in illegal, dishonest, fraudulent or deceptive conduct (see Rule 8.4), apply to a lawyer irrespective of the existence of a representation, and thus govern a lawyer not covered by paragraph (a). A lawyer or law firm rendering legal services is always subject to these Rules.

Provision of Legal and Nonlegal Services in the Same Transaction

In some situations it may be beneficial to a client to purchase both legal and nonlegal services from a lawyer, law firm or affiliated entity in the same matter or in two or more substantially related matters. Examples include: (i) a law firm that represents corporations and also provides public lobbying, public relations, investment banking and business relocation services, (ii) a law firm that represents clients in environmental matters and also provides engineering consulting services to those clients, and (iii) a law firm that represents clients in litigation and also provides consulting services relating to electronic document discovery. In these situations, the lawyer may have a financial interest in the nonlegal services that would constitute a conflict of interest under Rule 1.7(a)(2), which governs conflicts between a client and a lawyer’s personal interests.

Under Rule 1.7(a)(2), a concurrent conflict of interest exists when a reasonable lawyer would conclude that there is a significant risk that the lawyer’s professional judgment on behalf of a client will be adversely affected by the lawyer’s own financial, business, property or personal interests. When a lawyer or law firm provides both legal and nonlegal services in the same matter (or in substantially related matters), a conflict with the lawyer’s own interests will nearly always arise. For example, if the legal representation involves exercising judgment about whether to recommend nonlegal services and which provider to recommend, or if it involves overseeing the provision of the nonlegal services, then a conflict with the lawyer’s own interests under Rule 1.7(a)(2) is likely to arise. However, when seeking the consent of a client to such a conflict, the lawyer should comply with both Rule 1.7(b) regarding the conflict affecting the legal representation of the client and Rule 1.8(a) regarding the business transaction with the client.

Thus, the client may consent if: (i) the lawyer complies with Rule 1.8(a) with respect to the transaction in which the lawyer agrees to provide the nonlegal services, including obtaining the client’s informed consent in a writing signed by the client, (ii) the lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer can provide competent and diligent legal representation despite the conflict within the meaning of Rule 1.7(b), and (iii) the client gives informed consent pursuant to Rule 1.7(b), confirmed in writing. In certain cases, it will not be possible to provide both legal and nonlegal services because the lawyer could not reasonably believe that he or she can represent the client competently and diligently while providing both legal and nonlegal services in the same or substantially related matters. Whether providing dual services gives rise to an impermissible conflict must be determined on a case-by-case basis, taking into account all of the facts and circumstances, including factors such as: (i) the experience and sophistication of the client in
obtaining legal and nonlegal services of the kind being provided in the matter, (ii) the relative size of the anticipated fees for the legal and nonlegal services, (iii) the closeness of the relationship between the legal and nonlegal services, and (iv) the degree of discretion the lawyer has in providing the legal and nonlegal services.

[6] In the context of providing legal and nonlegal services in the same transaction, Rule 1.8(a) first requires that: (i) the nonlegal services be provided on terms that are fair and reasonable to the client, (ii) full disclosure of the terms on which the nonlegal services will be provided be made in writing to the client in a manner understandable by the client, (iii) the client is advised to seek the advice of independent counsel about the provision of the nonlegal services by the lawyer, and (iv) the client gives informed consent, as set forth in Rule 1.8(a)(3), in a writing signed by the client, to the terms of the transaction in which the nonlegal services are provided and to the lawyer’s inherent conflict of interest.

[7] In addition, in the context of providing legal and nonlegal services in the same transaction, Rule 1.8(a) requires a full disclosure of the nature and extent of the lawyer’s financial interest or stake in the provision of the nonlegal services. By its terms, Rule 1.8(a) requires that the nonlegal services be provided on terms that are fair and reasonable to the client. (Where the nonlegal services are provided on terms generally available to the public in the marketplace, that requirement is ordinarily met.) Consequently, as a further safeguard against conflicts that may arise when the same lawyer provides both legal and nonlegal services in the same or substantially related matters, a lawyer may do so only if the lawyer not only complies with Rule 1.8(a) with respect to the nonlegal services, but also obtains the client’s informed consent, pursuant to Rule 1.7(b), confirmed in writing, after fully disclosing the advantages and risks of obtaining legal and nonlegal services from the same or affiliated providers in a single matter (or in substantially related matters), including the lawyer’s conflict of interest arising from the lawyer’s financial interest in the provision of the nonlegal services.

[8] [Reserved.]

[9] [Reserved.]

[10] [Reserved.]

[11] [Reserved.]
RULE 5.8:
CONTRACTUAL RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN LAWYERS AND NONLEGAL PROFESSIONALS

(a) The practice of law has an essential tradition of complete independence and uncompromised loyalty to those it serves. Recognizing this tradition, clients of lawyers practicing in New York State are guaranteed “independent professional judgment and undivided loyalty uncompromised by conflicts of interest.” Indeed, these guarantees represent the very foundation of the profession and allow and foster its continued role as a protector of the system of law. Therefore, a lawyer must remain completely responsible for his or her own independent professional judgment, maintain the confidences and secrets of clients, preserve funds of clients and third parties in his or her control, and otherwise comply with the legal and ethical principles governing lawyers in New York State.

Multi-disciplinary practice between lawyers and nonlawyers is incompatible with the core values of the legal profession and therefore, a strict division between services provided by lawyers and those provided by nonlawyers is essential to protect those values. However, a lawyer or law firm may enter into and maintain a contractual relationship with a nonlegal professional or nonlegal professional service firm for the purpose of offering to the public, on a systematic and continuing basis, legal services performed by the lawyer or law firm as well as other nonlegal professional services, notwithstanding the provisions of Rule 1.7(a), provided that:

(1) the profession of the nonlegal professional or nonlegal professional service firm is included in a list jointly established and maintained by the Appellate Divisions pursuant to Section 1205.3 of the Joint Appellate Division Rules;

(2) the lawyer or law firm neither grants to the nonlegal professional or nonlegal professional service firm, nor permits such person or firm to obtain, hold or exercise, directly or indirectly, any ownership or investment interest in, or managerial or supervisory right, power or position in connection with the practice of law by the lawyer or law firm, nor, as provided in Rule 7.2(a)(1), shares legal fees with a nonlawyer or receives or gives any monetary or other tangible benefit for giving or receiving a referral; and

(3) the fact that the contractual relationship exists is disclosed by the lawyer or law firm to any client of the lawyer or law firm before the client is referred to the nonlegal professional service firm, or to any client of the nonlegal professional service firm before that client receives legal services from the lawyer or law firm; and the client has given informed written consent and has been provided with a copy of the “Statement of Client’s Rights In Cooperative Business Arrangements” pursuant to section 1205.4 of the Joint Appellate Divisions Rules.

(b) For purposes of paragraph (a):

(1) each profession on the list maintained pursuant to a Joint Rule of the Appellate Divisions shall have been designated sua sponte, or approved by the
Appellate Divisions upon application of a member of a nonlegal profession or nonlegal professional service firm, upon a determination that the profession is composed of individuals who, with respect to their profession:

(i) have been awarded a bachelor’s degree or its equivalent from an accredited college or university, or have attained an equivalent combination of educational credit from such a college or university and work experience;

(ii) are licensed to practice the profession by an agency of the State of New York or the United States Government; and

(iii) are required under penalty of suspension or revocation of license to adhere to a code of ethical conduct that is reasonably comparable to that of the legal profession;

(2) the term “ownership or investment interest” shall mean any such interest in any form of debt or equity, and shall include any interest commonly considered to be an interest accruing to or enjoyed by an owner or investor.

(c) This Rule shall not apply to relationships consisting solely of non-exclusive reciprocal referral agreements or understandings between a lawyer or law firm and a nonlegal professional or nonlegal professional service firm.

Comment

Contractual Relationships Between Lawyers and Nonlegal Professionals

[1] Lawyers may enter into interprofessional contractual relationships for the systematic and continuing provision of legal and nonlegal professional services, provided the nonlegal professional or nonlegal professional service firm with which the lawyer or law firm is affiliated does not own, control, supervise or manage, directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, the lawyer’s or law firm’s practice of law. The nonlegal professional or nonlegal professional service firm may not play a role in, for example, (i) deciding whether to accept or terminate an engagement to provide legal services in a particular matter or to a particular client, (ii) determining the manner in which lawyers are hired or trained, (iii) assigning lawyers to handle particular matters or to provide legal services to particular clients, (iv) deciding whether to undertake pro bono and other public-interest legal work, (v) making financial and budgetary decisions relating to the legal practice, and (vi) determining the compensation and advancement of lawyers and of persons assisting lawyers on legal matters.

[2] The contractual relationship permitted by this Rule may include the sharing of premises, general overhead or administrative costs and services on an arm’s length basis. Such financial arrangements, in the context of an agreement between lawyers and other professionals to provide legal and other professional services on a systematic and continuing basis, are permitted subject to the requirements of paragraph (a) and Rule 7.2(a). Similarly, lawyers participating in such arrangements remain subject to general ethical principles in addition to those set forth in this
Rule including, at a minimum, Rule 1.7, Rule 1.8(f), Rule 1.9, Rule 5.7(b) and Rule 7.5(a). Thus, the lawyer or law firm may not, for example, include in its firm name the name of the nonlegal professional service firm or any individual nonlegal professional, enter into formal partnerships with nonlawyers, or practice in an organization authorized to practice law for a profit in which nonlawyers own any interest. Moreover, a lawyer or law firm may not enter into an agreement or arrangement for the use of a name in respect of which a nonlegal professional or nonlegal professional service firm has or exercises a proprietary interest if, under or pursuant to the agreement or arrangement, that nonlegal professional or firm acts or is entitled to act in a manner inconsistent with paragraph (a)(2) or Comment [1]. More generally, the existence of a contractual relationship permitted by this Rule does not by itself create a conflict of interest in violation of Rule 1.8(a). Whenever a law firm represents a client in a matter in which the nonlegal professional service firm’s client is also involved, the law firm’s interest in maintaining an advantageous relationship with a nonlegal professional service firm might, in certain circumstances, adversely affect the professional judgment of the law firm.

[3] Each lawyer and law firm having a contractual relationship under paragraph (a) has an ethical duty to observe these Rules with respect to the lawyer’s or law firm’s own conduct in the context of that relationship. For example, the lawyer or law firm cannot permit the obligation to maintain client confidences, as required by Rule 1.6, to be compromised by the contractual relationship or by its implementation by or on behalf of nonlawyers involved in the relationship. In addition, the prohibition in Rule 8.4(a) against circumventing a Rule through actions of another applies generally to the lawyer or law firm in the contractual relationship.

[4] The contractual relationship permitted by paragraph (a) may provide for the reciprocal referral of clients by and between the lawyer or law firm and the nonlegal professional or nonlegal professional service firm. When in the context of such a contractual relationship a lawyer or law firm refers a client to the nonlegal professional or nonlegal professional service firm, the lawyer or law firm shall observe the ethical standards of the legal profession in verifying the competence of the nonlegal professional or nonlegal professional services firm to handle the relevant affairs and interests of the client. Referrals should be made only when requested by the client or deemed to be reasonably necessary to serve the client. Thus, even if otherwise permitted by paragraph (a), a contractual relationship may not require referrals on an exclusive basis. See Rule 7.2(a).

[5] To ensure that only appropriate professional services are involved, a contractual relationship for the provision of services is permitted under paragraph (a) only if the nonlegal party thereto is a professional or professional service firm meeting appropriate standards regarding ethics, education, training and licensing. The Appellate Divisions maintain a public list of eligible professions at 22 N.Y.C.R.R. § 1205.5. A member of the nonlegal profession or a professional service firm may apply for the inclusion of particular professions on the list or professions may be added to the list by the Appellate Divisions sua sponte. A lawyer or law firm not wishing to affiliate with a nonlawyer on a systematic and continuing basis, but only to engage a nonlawyer on an ad hoc basis to assist in a specific matter, is not governed by this Rule when so dealing with the nonlawyer. Thus, a lawyer advising a client in connection with a discharge of chemical wastes may engage the services of and consult with an environmental engineer on that matter without the need to comply with this Rule. Likewise, the requirements of this Rule need not be met when a lawyer retains an expert witness in a particular litigation.
[6] Depending upon the extent and nature of the relationship between the lawyer or law firm, on the one hand, and the nonlegal professional or nonlegal professional service firm, on the other hand, it may be appropriate to treat the parties to a contractual relationship permitted by paragraph (a) as a single law firm for purposes of these Rules, as would be the case if the nonlegal professional or nonlegal professional service firm were in an “of counsel” relationship with the lawyer or law firm. If the parties to the relationship are treated as a single law firm, the principal effects would be that conflicts of interest are imputed as between them pursuant to Rule 1.10(a) and that the law firm would be required to maintain systems for determining whether such conflicts exist pursuant to Rule 1.10(f). To the extent that the rules of ethics of the nonlegal profession conflict with these Rules, the rules of the legal profession will still govern the conduct of the lawyers and the law firm participants in the relationship. A lawyer or law firm may also be subject to legal obligations arising from a relationship with nonlawyer professionals, who are themselves subject to regulation.
RULE 6.1: VOLUNTARY PRO BONO SERVICE

Lawyers are strongly encouraged to provide pro bono legal services to benefit poor persons.

(a) Every lawyer should aspire to:

(1) provide at least 50 hours of pro bono legal services each year to poor persons; and

(2) contribute financially to organizations that provide legal services to poor persons. Lawyers in private practice or employed by a for-profit entity should aspire to contribute annually in an amount at least equivalent to (i) the amount typically billed by the lawyer (or the firm with which the lawyer is associated) for one hour of time; or (ii) if the lawyer’s work is performed on a contingency basis, the amount typically billed by lawyers in the community for one hour of time; or (iii) the amount typically paid by the organization employing the lawyer for one hour of the lawyer’s time; or (iv) if the lawyer is underemployed, an amount not to exceed one-tenth of one percent of the lawyer’s income.

(b) Pro bono legal services that meet this goal are:

(1) professional services rendered in civil matters, and in those criminal matters for which the government is not obliged to provide funds for legal representation, to persons who are financially unable to compensate counsel;

(2) activities related to improving the administration of justice by simplifying the legal process for, or increasing the availability and quality of legal services to, poor persons; and

(3) professional services to charitable, religious, civic and educational organizations in matters designed predominantly to address the needs of poor persons.

(c) Appropriate organizations for financial contributions are:

(1) organizations primarily engaged in the provision of legal services to the poor; and

(2) organizations substantially engaged in the provision of legal services to the poor, provided that the donated funds are to be used for the provision of such legal services.

(d) This Rule is not intended to be enforced through the disciplinary process, and the failure to fulfill the aspirational goals contained herein should be without legal consequence.
Comment

[1] As our society has become one in which rights and responsibilities are increasingly defined in legal terms, access to legal services has become of critical importance. This is true for all people, rich, poor or of moderate means. However, because the legal problems of the poor often involve areas of basic need, their inability to obtain legal services can have dire consequences. The vast unmet legal needs of the poor in New York have been recognized in several studies undertaken over the past two decades. Each lawyer – including members of the judiciary and government lawyers, and regardless of professional prominence or professional work load – is strongly encouraged to provide or to assist in providing pro bono legal services to the poor.

[2] Paragraph (a) urges all lawyers to provide a minimum of 50 hours of pro bono legal service annually without fee or expectation of fee, either directly to poor persons or to organizations that serve the legal or other basic needs of persons of limited financial means. It is recognized that in some years a lawyer may render greater or fewer hours than the annual standard specified, but during the course of the lawyer’s career, the lawyer should render on average per year, the number of hours set forth in this Rule. Services can be performed in civil matters or in criminal or quasi-criminal matters for which there is no government obligation to provide funds for legal representation, such as post-conviction death penalty appeal cases.

[2A] Paragraph (a)(2) provides that, in addition to providing the services described in paragraph (a), lawyers should provide financial support to organizations that provide legal services to the poor. This goal is separate from and not a substitute for the provision of legal services described in paragraph (a). To assist the funding of civil legal services for low income people, when selecting a bank for deposit of funds into an “IOLA” account pursuant to Judiciary Law § 497, a lawyer should take into consideration the interest rate offered by the bank on such funds.

[2B] Paragraphs (a)(1) and (a)(2) recognize the critical need for legal services that exists among poor persons. Legal services under these paragraphs consist of a full range of activities, including individual and class representation, the provision of legal advice, legislative lobbying, administrative rulemaking and the provision of free training or mentoring to those who represent poor persons.

[3] “Poor persons” under paragraphs (a)(1) and (a)(2) include both (i) individuals who qualify for participation in programs funded by the Legal Services Corporation and (ii) individuals whose incomes and financial resources are slightly above the guidelines utilized by Legal Services Corporation programs but nevertheless cannot afford counsel. To satisfy the goal of paragraph (a)(1), lawyers may provide legal services to individuals in either of those categories, or, pursuant to paragraph (b)(3), may provide legal services to organizations such as homeless shelters, battered women’s shelters, and food pantries that serve persons in either of those categories.

[4] To qualify as pro bono service within the meaning of paragraph (a)(1) the service must be provided without fee or expectation of fee, so the intent of the lawyer to render free legal services is essential. Accordingly, services rendered cannot be considered pro bono if an
anticipated fee is uncollected, but the award of statutory attorneys’ fees in a case originally accepted as pro bono would not disqualify such services from inclusion under this Rule. Lawyers who do receive fees in such cases are encouraged to contribute an appropriate portion of such fees to organizations or projects that benefit persons of limited means.

[5] Constitutional, statutory or regulatory restrictions may prohibit or impede government and public sector lawyers and judges from performing the pro bono service outlined in paragraph (b)(1). Accordingly, where those restrictions apply, government and public sector lawyers and judges may fulfill their pro bono responsibility by making financial contributions to organizations that help meet the legal and other basic needs of the poor, as described in paragraphs (a)(2), (c)(1) and (c)(2) or by performing some of the services outlined in paragraph (b)(2) or (b)(3).

[6] [Reserved.]

[7] In addition to rendering pro bono services directly to the poor and making financial contributions, lawyers may fulfill the goal of rendering pro bono services by serving on the boards or giving legal advice to organizations whose mission is helping poor persons. While a lawyer may fulfill the annual goal to perform pro bono service exclusively through activities described in paragraphs (a)(1) and (a)(2), all lawyers are urged to render public-interest and pro bono service in addition to assisting the poor.

[8] Paragraphs (c)(1) and (c)(2) essentially reiterate the goal as set forth in (a)(2) with the further provision that the lawyer should seek to ensure that the donated money be directed to providing legal assistance to the poor rather than the general charitable objectives of such organizations.

[9] Law firms should act reasonably to enable and encourage all lawyers in the firm to provide the pro bono legal service called for by this Rule.
RULE 6.2:
[RESERVED]
RULE 6.3:
MEMBERSHIP IN A LEGAL SERVICES ORGANIZATION

A lawyer may serve as a director, officer or member of a not-for-profit legal services organization, apart from the law firm in which the lawyer practices, notwithstanding that the organization serves persons having interests that differ from those of a client of the lawyer or the lawyer’s firm. The lawyer shall not knowingly participate in a decision or action of the organization:

(a) if participating in the decision or action would be incompatible with the lawyer’s obligations to a client under Rules 1.7 through 1.13; or

(b) where the decision or action could have a material adverse effect on the representation of a client of the organization whose interests differ from those of a client of the lawyer or the lawyer’s firm.

Comment

[1] Lawyers should be encouraged to support and participate in legal services organizations. A lawyer who is an officer or a member of such an organization does not thereby have a client-lawyer relationship with persons served by the organization. However, there is potential conflict between the interests of such persons and the interests of the lawyer’s clients. If the possibility of such conflict disqualified a lawyer from serving on the board of a legal services organization, the profession’s involvement in such organizations would be severely curtailed.

[1A] This Rule applies to legal services organizations organized and operating on a not-for-profit basis.

[2] It may be necessary in appropriate cases to reassure a client of the organization that the representation will not be affected by conflicting loyalties of a member of the board. Established, written policies in this respect can enhance the credibility of such assurances.
RULE 6.4:
LAW REFORM ACTIVITIES AFFECTING CLIENT INTERESTS

A lawyer may serve as a director, officer or member of an organization involved in reform of the law or its administration, notwithstanding that the reform may affect the interests of a client of the lawyer. When the lawyer knows that the interests of a client may be materially benefitted by a decision in which the lawyer actively participates, the lawyer shall disclose that fact to the organization, but need not identify the client. In determining the nature and scope of participation in such activities, a lawyer should be mindful of obligations to clients under other Rules, particularly Rule 1.7.

Comment

[1] Lawyers involved in organizations seeking law reform generally do not have a client-lawyer relationship with the organization. Otherwise, it might follow that a lawyer could not be involved in a bar association law reform program that might indirectly affect a client. For example, a lawyer concentrating in antitrust litigation might be regarded as disqualified from participating in drafting revisions of rules governing that subject. In determining the nature and scope of participation in such activities, a lawyer should be mindful of obligations to clients. A lawyer’s identification with the organization’s aims and purposes, under some circumstances, may give rise to a personal-interest conflict with client interests implicating the lawyer’s obligations under other Rules, particularly Rule 1.7. A lawyer is also professionally obligated to protect the integrity of the law reform program by making an appropriate disclosure within the organization when the lawyer knows a private client might be materially affected.
RULE 6.5:
PARTICIPATION IN LIMITED PRO BONO LEGAL SERVICES PROGRAMS

(a) A lawyer who, under the auspices of a program sponsored by a court, government agency, bar association or not-for-profit legal services organization, provides short-term limited legal services to a client without expectation by either the lawyer or the client that the lawyer will provide continuing representation in the matter:

(1) shall comply with Rules 1.7, 1.8 and 1.9, concerning restrictions on representations where there are or may be conflicts of interest as that term is defined in these Rules, only if the lawyer has actual knowledge at the time of commencement of representation that the representation of the client involves a conflict of interest; and

(2) shall comply with Rule 1.10 only if the lawyer has actual knowledge at the time of commencement of representation that another lawyer associated with the lawyer in a law firm is affected by Rules 1.7, 1.8 and 1.9.

(b) Except as provided in paragraph (a)(2), Rule 1.7 and Rule 1.9 are inapplicable to a representation governed by this Rule.

(c) Short-term limited legal services are services providing legal advice or representation free of charge as part of a program described in paragraph (a) with no expectation that the assistance will continue beyond what is necessary to complete an initial consultation, representation or court appearance.

(d) The lawyer providing short-term limited legal services must secure the client’s informed consent to the limited scope of the representation, and such representation shall be subject to the provisions of Rule 1.6.

(e) This Rule shall not apply where the court before which the matter is pending determines that a conflict of interest exists or, if during the course of the representation, the lawyer providing the services becomes aware of the existence of a conflict of interest precluding continued representation.

Comment

[1] Legal services organizations, courts, government agencies, bar associations and various non-profit organizations have established programs through which lawyers provide free short-term limited legal services, such as advice or the completion of legal forms, to assist persons to address their legal problems without further representation by a lawyer. In these programs, such as legal-advice hotlines, advice-only clinics or pro se counseling programs, a client-lawyer relationship is established, but there is no expectation that the lawyer’s representation of the client will continue beyond the limited consultation. Such programs are normally operated under circumstances in which it is not feasible for a lawyer to utilize the conflict-checking system required by Rule 1.10(e) before providing the short-term limited legal services contemplated by this Rule. See also Rules 1.7, 1.8, 1.9, 1.10.
[2] A lawyer who provides short-term limited legal services pursuant to this Rule must secure the client’s informed consent to the limited scope of the representation. See Rule 1.2(c). If a short-term limited representation would not be reasonable under the circumstances, the lawyer may offer advice to the client, but must also advise the client of the need for further assistance of counsel. Except as provided in this Rule, these Rules, including Rules 1.6 and Rule 1.9(c), are applicable to the limited representation.

[3] Because a lawyer who is representing a client in the circumstances addressed by this Rule ordinarily is not able to check systematically for conflicts of interest, paragraph (a) requires compliance with Rules 1.7, 1.8 and 1.9 only if the lawyer knows that the representation presents a conflict of interest for the lawyer, and with Rule 1.10 only if the lawyer knows that another lawyer in the lawyer’s firm is affected by these Rules.

[4] Because the limited nature of the services significantly reduces the risk of conflicts of interest with other matters being handled by the lawyer’s firm, paragraph (b) provides that Rules 1.7 and 1.9 are inapplicable to a representation governed by this Rule, except as provided by paragraph (a)(2). Paragraph (a)(2) requires the participating lawyer to comply with Rule 1.10 only when the lawyer knows that the lawyer’s firm is affected by Rules 1.7, 1.8 or 1.9.

[5] If, after commencing a short-term limited representation in accordance with this Rule, a lawyer undertakes to represent the client in the matter on an ongoing basis, Rules 1.7, 1.9(a) and 1.10 become applicable.
RULE 7.1: ADVERTISING

(a) A lawyer or law firm shall not use or disseminate or participate in the use or dissemination of any advertisement that:

(1) contains statements or claims that are false, deceptive or misleading; or
(2) violates a Rule.

(b) Subject to the provisions of paragraph (a), an advertisement may include information as to:

(1) legal and nonlegal education; degrees and other scholastic distinctions; dates of admission to any bar; areas of the law in which the lawyer or law firm practices, as authorized by these Rules; public offices and teaching positions held; publications of law-related matters authored by the lawyer; memberships in bar associations or other professional societies or organizations, including offices and committee assignments therein; foreign language fluency; and bona fide professional ratings;

(2) names of clients regularly represented, provided that the client has given prior written consent;

(3) bank references; credit arrangements accepted; prepaid or group legal services programs in which the lawyer or law firm participates; nonlegal services provided by the lawyer or law firm or by an entity owned and controlled by the lawyer or law firm; the existence of contractual relationships between the lawyer or law firm and a nonlegal professional or nonlegal professional service firm, to the extent permitted by Rule 5.8, and the nature and extent of services available through those contractual relationships; and

(4) legal fees for initial consultation; contingent fee rates in civil matters, when accompanied by a statement disclosing the information required by paragraph (p); range of fees for legal and nonlegal services, provided that there be available to the public free of charge a written statement clearly describing the scope of each advertised service, hourly rates, and fixed fees for specified legal and nonlegal services.

(c) An advertisement shall not:

(1) include a paid endorsement of, or testimonial about, a lawyer or law firm without disclosing that the person is being compensated therefor;

(2) include the portrayal of a fictitious law firm, the use of a fictitious name to refer to lawyers not associated together in a law firm, or otherwise imply that lawyers are associated in a law firm if that is not the case;
(3) use actors to portray a judge, the lawyer, members of the law firm, or clients, or utilize depictions of fictionalized events or scenes, without disclosure of same;

(4) be made to resemble legal documents.

(d) An advertisement that complies with paragraph (e) may contain the following:

(1) statements that are reasonably likely to create an expectation about results the lawyer can achieve;

(2) statements that compare the lawyer’s services with the services of other lawyers;

(3) testimonials or endorsements of clients, and of former clients; or

(4) statements describing or characterizing the quality of the lawyer’s or law firm’s services.

(e) It is permissible to provide the information set forth in paragraph (d) provided:

(1) its dissemination does not violate paragraph (a);

(2) it can be factually supported by the lawyer or law firm as of the date on which the advertisement is published or disseminated; and

(3) it is accompanied by the following disclaimer: “Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome”; and

(4) in the case of a testimonial or endorsement from a client with respect to a matter still pending, the client gives informed consent confirmed in writing.

(f) Every advertisement other than those appearing in a radio, television or billboard advertisement, in a directory, newspaper, magazine or other periodical (and any web sites related thereto), or made in person pursuant to Rule 7.3(a)(1), shall be labeled “Attorney Advertising” on the first page, or on the home page in the case of a web site. If the communication is in the form of a self-mailing brochure or postcard, the words “Attorney Advertising” shall appear therein. In the case of electronic mail, the subject line shall contain the notation “ATTORNEY ADVERTISING.”

(g) A lawyer or law firm shall not utilize meta-tags or other hidden computer codes that, if displayed, would violate these Rules.

(h) All advertisements shall include the name, principal law office address and telephone number of the lawyer or law firm whose services are being offered.
(i) Any words or statements required by this Rule to appear in an advertisement must be clearly legible and capable of being read by the average person, if written, and intelligible if spoken aloud. In the case of a web site, the required words or statements shall appear on the home page.

(j) A lawyer or law firm advertising any fixed fee for specified legal services shall, at the time of fee publication, have available to the public a written statement clearly describing the scope of each advertised service, which statement shall be available to the client at the time of retainer for any such service. Such legal services shall include all those services that are recognized as reasonable and necessary under local custom in the area of practice in the community where the services are performed.

(k) All advertisements shall be pre-approved by the lawyer or law firm, and a copy shall be retained for a period of not less than three years following its initial dissemination. Any advertisement contained in a computer-accessed communication shall be retained for a period of not less than one year. A copy of the contents of any web site covered by this Rule shall be preserved upon the initial publication of the web site, any major web site redesign, or a meaningful and extensive content change, but in no event less frequently than once every 90 days.

(l) If a lawyer or law firm advertises a range of fees or an hourly rate for services, the lawyer or law firm shall not charge more than the fee advertised for such services. If a lawyer or law firm advertises a fixed fee for specified legal services, or performs services described in a fee schedule, the lawyer or law firm shall not charge more than the fixed fee for such stated legal service as set forth in the advertisement or fee schedule, unless the client agrees in writing that the services performed or to be performed were not legal services referred to or implied in the advertisement or in the fee schedule and, further, that a different fee arrangement shall apply to the transaction.

(m) Unless otherwise specified in the advertisement, if a lawyer publishes any fee information authorized under this Rule in a publication that is published more frequently than once per month, the lawyer shall be bound by any representation made therein for a period of not less than 30 days after such publication. If a lawyer publishes any fee information authorized under this Rule in a publication that is published once per month or less frequently, the lawyer shall be bound by any representation made therein until the publication of the succeeding issue. If a lawyer publishes any fee information authorized under this Rule in a publication that has no fixed date for publication of a succeeding issue, the lawyer shall be bound by any representation made therein for a reasonable period of time after publication, but in no event less than 90 days.

(n) Unless otherwise specified, if a lawyer broadcasts any fee information authorized under this Rule, the lawyer shall be bound by any representation made therein for a period of not less than 30 days after such broadcast.

(o) A lawyer shall not compensate or give anything of value to representatives of the press, radio, television or other communication medium in anticipation of or in return for professional publicity in a news item.
(p) All advertisements that contain information about the fees charged by the lawyer or law firm, including those indicating that in the absence of a recovery no fee will be charged, shall comply with the provisions of Judiciary Law § 488(3).

(q) A lawyer may accept employment that results from participation in activities designed to educate the public to recognize legal problems, to make intelligent selection of counsel or to utilize available legal services.

(r) Without affecting the right to accept employment, a lawyer may speak publicly or write for publication on legal topics so long as the lawyer does not undertake to give individual advice.

Comment

Advertising

[1] The need of members of the public for legal services is met only if they recognize their legal problems, appreciate the importance of seeking assistance, and are able to obtain the services of competent legal counsel. Hence, important functions of the legal profession are to educate people to recognize their problems, to facilitate the process of intelligent selection of lawyers, and to assist in making legal services fully available.

[2] The public’s need to know about legal services can be fulfilled in part through advertising. People of limited means who have not made extensive use of legal services in many instances rely on advertising to find appropriate counsel. While a lawyer’s reputation may attract some clients, lawyers may also make the public aware of their services by advertising to obtain work.

[3] Advertising by lawyers serves two principal purposes: first, it educates potential clients regarding their need for legal advice and assists them in obtaining a lawyer appropriate for those needs. Second, it enables lawyers to attract clients. To carry out these two purposes and because of the critical importance of legal services, it is of the utmost importance that lawyer advertising not be false, deceptive or misleading. Truthful statements that are misleading are prohibited by this Rule. A truthful statement is misleading if it omits a fact necessary to make the lawyer’s communication, considered as a whole, not materially misleading. A truthful statement is also misleading if there is a substantial likelihood that it will lead a reasonable person to formulate a specific conclusion about the lawyer or the lawyer’s services, or about the results a lawyer can achieve, for which there is no reasonable factual foundation. For example, a lawyer might truthfully state, “I have never lost a case,” but that statement would be misleading if the lawyer settled virtually all cases that the lawyer handled. A communication to anyone that states or implies that the lawyer has the ability to influence improperly a court, court officer, governmental agency or government official is improper under Rule 8.4(e).

[4] To be effective, advertising must attract the attention of viewers, readers or recipients and convey its content in ways that will be understandable and helpful to them. Lawyers may therefore use advertising techniques intended to attract attention, such as music, sound effects, graphics and the like, so long as those techniques do not render the advertisement false, deceptive or misleading. Lawyer advertising may use actors or fictionalized events or scenes for this
purpose, provided appropriate disclosure of their use is made. Some images or techniques, however, are highly likely to be misleading. So, for instance, legal advertising should not be made to resemble legal documents.

[5] The “Attorney Advertising” label serves to dispel any confusion or concern that might be created when nonlawyers receive letters or emails from lawyers. The label is not necessary for advertising in newspapers or on television, or similar communications that are self-evidently advertisements, such as billboards or press releases transmitted to news outlets, and as to which there is no risk of such confusion or concern. The ultimate purpose of the label is to inform readers where they might otherwise be confused.

[6] Not all communications made by lawyers about the lawyer or the law firm’s services are advertising. Advertising by lawyers consists of communications made in any form about the lawyer or the law firm’s services, the primary purpose of which is retention of the lawyer or law firm for pecuniary gain as a result of the communication. However, non-commercial communications motivated by a not-for-profit organization’s interest in political expression and association are generally not considered advertising. Of course, all communications by lawyers, whether subject to the special rules governing lawyer advertising or not, are governed by the general rule that lawyers may not engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation, or knowingly make a material false statement of fact or law. By definition, communications to existing clients are excluded from the Rules governing advertising. A client who is a current client in any matter is an existing client for all purposes of these Rules. (Whether a client is a current client for purposes of conflicts of interest and other issues may depend on other considerations. Generally, the term “current client” for purposes of the advertising exemption should be interpreted more broadly than it is for determining whether a client is a “current client” for purposes of a conflict of interest analysis.)

[7] Communications to former clients that are germane to the earlier representation are not considered to be advertising. Likewise, communications to other lawyers, including those made in bar association publications and other publications targeted primarily at lawyers, are excluded from the special rules governing lawyer advertising even if their purpose is the retention of the lawyer or law firm. Topical newsletters, client alerts, or blogs intended to educate recipients about new developments in the law are generally not considered advertising. However, a newsletter, client alert, or blog that provides information or news primarily about the lawyer or law firm (for example, the lawyer or law firm’s cases, personnel, clients or achievements) generally would be considered advertising. Communications, such as proposed retainer agreements or ordinary correspondence with a prospective client who has expressed interest in, and requested information about, a lawyer’s services, are not advertising. Accordingly, the special restrictions on advertising and solicitation would not apply to a lawyer’s response to a prospective client who has asked the lawyer to outline the lawyer’s qualifications to undertake a proposed retention or the terms of a potential retention.

[8] The circulation or distribution to prospective clients by a lawyer of an article or report published about the lawyer by a third party is advertising if the lawyer’s primary purpose is to obtain retentions. In circulating or distributing such materials the lawyer should include information or disclaimers as necessary to dispel any misconceptions to which the article may give rise. For example, if a lawyer circulates an article discussing the lawyer’s successes that is
reasonably likely to create an expectation about the results the lawyer will achieve in future cases, a disclaimer is required by paragraph (e)(3). If the article contains misinformation about the lawyer’s qualifications, any circulation of the article by the lawyer should make any necessary corrections or qualifications. This may be necessary even when the article included misinformation through no fault of the lawyer or because the article is out of date, so that material information that was true at the time is no longer true. Some communications by a law firm that may constitute marketing or branding are not necessarily advertisements. For example, pencils, legal pads, greeting cards, coffee mugs, T-shirts or the like with the law firm name, logo, and contact information printed on them do not constitute “advertisements” within the definition of this Rule if their primary purpose is general awareness and branding, rather than the retention of the law firm for a particular matter.

Recognition of Legal Problems

[9] The legal professional should help the public to recognize legal problems because such problems may not be self-revealing and might not be timely noticed. Therefore, lawyers should encourage and participate in educational and public-relations programs concerning the legal system, with particular reference to legal problems that frequently arise. A lawyer’s participation in an educational program is ordinarily not considered to be advertising because its primary purpose is to educate and inform rather than to attract clients. Such a program might be considered to be advertising if, in addition to its educational component, participants or recipients are expressly encouraged to hire the lawyer or law firm. A lawyer who writes or speaks for the purpose of educating members of the public to recognize their legal problems should carefully refrain from giving or appearing to give a general solution applicable to all apparently similar individual problems, because slight changes in fact situations may require a material variance in the applicable advice; otherwise, the public may be misled and misadvised. Talks and writings by lawyers for nonlawyers should caution them not to attempt to solve individual problems on the basis of the information contained therein.

[10] As members of their communities, lawyers may choose to sponsor or contribute to cultural, sporting, charitable or other events organized by not-for-profit organizations. If information about the lawyer or law firm disseminated in connection with such an event is limited to the identification of the lawyer or law firm, the lawyer’s or law firm’s contact information, a brief description of areas of practice, and the fact of sponsorship or contribution, the communication is not considered advertising.

Statements Creating Expectations, Characterizations of Quality, and Comparisons

[11] Lawyer advertising may include statements that are reasonably likely to create an expectation about results the lawyer can achieve, statements that compare the lawyer’s services with the services of other lawyers, or statements describing or characterizing the quality of the lawyer’s or law firm’s services, only if they can be factually supported by the lawyer or law firm as of the date on which the advertisement is published or disseminated and are accompanied by the following disclaimer: “Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.” Accordingly, if true and accompanied by the disclaimer, a lawyer or law firm could advertise “Our firm won 10 jury verdicts over $1,000,000 in the last five years,” “We have more Patent Lawyers than any other firm in X County,” or “I have been practicing in the area of divorce law for more than 10 years.”
Even true factual statements may be misleading if presented out of the context of additional information needed to properly understand and evaluate the statements. For example, a truthful statement by a lawyer that the lawyer’s average jury verdict for a given year was $100,000 may be misleading if that average was based on a large number of very small verdicts and one $10,000,000 verdict. Likewise, advertising that truthfully recites judgment amounts would be misleading if the lawyer failed to disclose that the judgments described were overturned on appeal or were obtained by default.

[12] Descriptions of characteristics of the lawyer or law firm that are not comparative and do not involve results obtained are permissible even though they cannot be factually supported. Such statements are understood to be general descriptions and not claims about quality, and would not be likely to mislead potential clients. Accordingly, a law firm could advertise that it is “Hard-Working,” “Dedicated,” or “Compassionate” without the necessity to provide factual support for such subjective claims. On the other hand, descriptions of characteristics of the law firm that compare its services with those of other law firms and that are not susceptible of being factually supported could be misleading to potential clients. Accordingly, a lawyer may not advertise that the lawyer is the “Best,” “Most Experienced,” or “Hardest Working.” Similarly, some claims that involve results obtained are not susceptible of being factually supported and could be misleading to potential clients. Accordingly, a law firm may not advertise that it will obtain “Big $$$,” “Most Money,” or “We Win Big.”

Bona Fide Professional Ratings

[13] An advertisement may include information regarding bona fide professional ratings by referring to the rating service and how it has rated the lawyer, provided that the advertisement contains the “past results” disclaimer as required under paragraphs (d) and (e). However, a rating is not “bona fide” unless it is unbiased and nondiscriminatory. Thus, it must evaluate lawyers based on objective criteria or legitimate peer review in a manner unbiased by the rating service’s economic interests (such as payment to the rating service by the rated lawyer) and not subject to improper influence by lawyers who are being evaluated. Further, the rating service must fairly consider all lawyers within the pool of those who are purported to be covered. For example, a rating service that purports to evaluate all lawyers practicing in a particular geographic area or in a particular area of practice or of a particular age must apply its criteria to all lawyers within that geographic area, practice area, or age group.

Meta-Tags

[14] Meta-tags are hidden computer software codes that direct certain Internet search engines to the web site of a lawyer or law firm. For example, if a lawyer places the meta-tag “NY personal injury specialist” on the lawyer’s web site, then a person who enters the search term “personal injury specialist” into a search engine will be directed to that lawyer’s web page. That particular meta-tag is prohibited because Rule 7.4(a) generally prohibits the use of the word “specialist.” However, a lawyer may use an advertisement employing meta-tags or other hidden computer codes that, if displayed, would not violate a Rule.
Advertisements Referring to Fees and Advances

[15] All advertisements that contain information about the fees or expenses charged by the lawyer or law firm, including advertisements indicating that in the absence of a recovery no fee will be charged, must comply with the provisions of section 488(3) of the Judiciary Law. However, a lawyer or law firm that offers any of the fee and expense arrangements permitted by section 488(3) must not, either directly or in any advertisement, state or imply that the lawyer’s or law firm’s ability to advance or pay costs and expenses of litigation is unique or extraordinary when that is not the case. For example, if an advertisement promises that the lawyer or law firm will advance the costs and expenses of litigation contingent on the outcome of the matter, or promises that the lawyer or law firm will pay the costs and expenses of litigation for indigent clients, then the advertisement must not say that such arrangements are “unique in the area,” “unlike other firms,” available “only at our firm,” “extraordinary,” or words to that effect, unless that is actually the case. However, if the lawyer or law firm can objectively demonstrate that this arrangement is unique or extraordinary, then the lawyer or law firm may make such a claim in the advertisement.

Retention of Copies; Filing of Copies; Designation of Principal Office

[16] Where these Rules require that a lawyer retain a copy of an advertisement or file a copy of a solicitation or other information, that obligation may be satisfied by any of the following: original records, photocopies, microfilm, optical imaging, and any other medium that preserves an image of the document that cannot be altered without detection.

[17] A law firm that has no office it considers its principal office may comply with paragraph (h) by listing one or more offices where a substantial amount of the law firm’s work is performed.
RULE 7.2:
PAYMENT FOR REFERRALS

(a) A lawyer shall not compensate or give anything of value to a person or organization to recommend or obtain employment by a client, or as a reward for having made a recommendation resulting in employment by a client, except that:

(1) a lawyer or law firm may refer clients to a nonlegal professional or nonlegal professional service firm pursuant to a contractual relationship with such nonlegal professional or nonlegal professional service firm to provide legal and other professional services on a systematic and continuing basis as permitted by Rule 5.8, provided however that such referral shall not otherwise include any monetary or other tangible consideration or reward for such, or the sharing of legal fees; and

(2) a lawyer may pay the usual and reasonable fees or dues charged by a qualified legal assistance organization or referral fees to another lawyer as permitted by Rule 1.5(g).

(b) A lawyer or the lawyer’s partner or associate or any other affiliated lawyer may be recommended, employed or paid by, or may cooperate with one of the following offices or organizations that promote the use of the lawyer’s services or those of a partner or associate or any other affiliated lawyer, or request one of the following offices or organizations to recommend or promote the use of the lawyer’s services or those of the lawyer’s partner or associate, or any other affiliated lawyer as a private practitioner, if there is no interference with the exercise of independent professional judgment on behalf of the client:

(1) a legal aid office or public defender office:
   (i) operated or sponsored by a duly accredited law school;
   (ii) operated or sponsored by a bona fide, non-profit community organization;
   (iii) operated or sponsored by a governmental agency; or
   (iv) operated, sponsored, or approved by a bar association;

(2) a military legal assistance office;

(3) a lawyer referral service operated, sponsored or approved by a bar association or authorized by law or court rule; or

(4) any bona fide organization that recommends, furnishes or pays for legal services to its members or beneficiaries provided the following conditions are satisfied:
(i) Neither the lawyer, nor the lawyer’s partner, nor associate, nor any other affiliated lawyer nor any nonlawyer, shall have initiated or promoted such organization for the primary purpose of providing financial or other benefit to such lawyer, partner, associate or affiliated lawyer;

(ii) Such organization is not operated for the purpose of procuring legal work or financial benefit for any lawyer as a private practitioner outside of the legal services program of the organization;

(iii) The member or beneficiary to whom the legal services are furnished, and not such organization, is recognized as the client of the lawyer in the matter;

(iv) The legal service plan of such organization provides appropriate relief for any member or beneficiary who asserts a claim that representation by counsel furnished, selected or approved by the organization for the particular matter involved would be unethical, improper or inadequate under the circumstances of the matter involved; and the plan provides an appropriate procedure for seeking such relief;

(v) The lawyer does not know or have cause to know that such organization is in violation of applicable laws, rules of court or other legal requirements that govern its legal service operations; and

(vi) Such organization has filed with the appropriate disciplinary authority, to the extent required by such authority, at least annually a report with respect to its legal service plan, if any, showing its terms, its schedule of benefits, its subscription charges, agreements with counsel and financial results of its legal service activities or, if it has failed to do so, the lawyer does not know or have cause to know of such failure.

Comment

Paying Others to Recommend a Lawyer

[1] Except as permitted under paragraphs (a)(1)-(a)(2) of this Rule or under Rule 1.17, lawyers are not permitted to pay others for recommending the lawyer’s services or for channeling professional work in a manner that would violate Rule 7.3 if engaged in by a lawyer. See Rule 8.4(a) (lawyer may not violate or attempt to violate a Rule, knowingly assist another to do so, or do so through the acts of another). A communication contains a recommendation of it endorses or vouches for a lawyer’s credentials, abilities, competence, character, or other professional qualities. Paragraph (a), however, does not prohibit a lawyer from paying for advertising and communications permitted by these Rules, including the costs of print directory listings, online directory listings, newspaper ads, television and radio airtime, domain name registrations, sponsorship fees, Internet-based advertisements, search engine optimization, and group advertising. A lawyer may also compensate employees, agents and vendors who are engaged to provide marketing or client development services, such as publicists, public-relations personnel,
marketing personnel, business development staff, and web site designers. Moreover, a lawyer may pay others for generating clients leads, such as Internet-based client leads, as long as (i) the lead generator does not recommend the lawyers, (ii) any payment to the lead generator is consistent with Rules 1.5(g) (division of fees) and 5.4 (professional independence of the lawyer), (iii) the lawyer complies with Rule 1.8(f) (prohibiting interference with a lawyer’s independent professional judgment by a person who recommends the lawyer’s services), and (iv) the lead generator’s communications are consistent with Rules 7.1 (Advertising) and 7.3 (Solicitation and Recommendation of Professional Employment). To comply with Rule 7.1, a lawyer must not pay a lead generator that states, implies, or creates a reasonable impression that it is recommending the lawyer, id making the referral without payment from the lawyer, or has analyzed a person’s legal problems when determining which lawyer should receive the referral. See also Rule 5.3 (Lawyer’s Responsibility for Conduct of Nonlawyers).

[2] A lawyer may pay the usual charges of a qualified legal assistance organization. A lawyer so participating should make certain that the relationship with a qualified legal assistance organization in no way interferes with independent professional representation of the interests of the individual client. A lawyer should avoid situations in which officials of the organization who are not lawyers attempt to direct lawyers concerning the manner in which legal services are performed for individual members and should also avoid situations in which considerations of economy are given undue weight in determining the lawyers employed by an organization or the legal services to be performed for the member or beneficiary, rather than competence and quality of service.

[3] A lawyer who accepts assignments or referrals from a qualified legal assistance organization must act reasonably to ensure that the activities of the plan or service are compatible with the lawyer’s professional obligations. See Rule 5.3. The lawyer must ensure that the organization’s communications with potential clients are in conformity with these Rules. Thus, advertising must not be false or misleading, as would be the case if the organization’s communications falsely suggested that it was a lawyer referral service sponsored by a state agency or bar association. Nor could the lawyer allow in-person, telephonic or real-time interactive electronic contacts that would violate this Rule.

[4] A lawyer also may agree to refer clients to another lawyer or a nonlawyer in return for the undertaking of that person to refer clients or customers to the lawyer. Such reciprocal referral arrangements must not interfere with the lawyer’s professional judgment as to making referrals or as to providing substantive legal services. See Rules 2.1, 5.4(c). Except as provided in Rule 1.5(e), a lawyer who receives referrals from a lawyer or nonlawyer must not pay anything solely for the referral, but the lawyer does not violate paragraph (a) by agreeing to refer clients to the other lawyer or nonlawyer so long as the reciprocal referral agreement is not exclusive and the client is informed of the referral agreement. A lawyer may enter into such an arrangement only if it is nonexclusive on both sides, so that both the lawyer and the nonlawyer are free to refer clients to others if that is in the best interest of those clients. Conflicts of interest created by such arrangements are governed by Rule 1.7. A lawyer’s interest in receiving a steady stream of referrals from a particular source must not undermine the lawyer’s professional judgment on behalf of clients. Reciprocal referral agreements should not be of indefinite duration and should be reviewed periodically to determine whether they comply with these Rules. This Rule does not
restrict referrals or divisions of revenues or net income among lawyers within firms comprising multiple entities.

[5] Campaign contributions by lawyers to government officials or candidates for public office who are, or may be, in a position to influence the award of a legal engagement may threaten governmental integrity by subjecting the recipient to a conflict of interest. Correspondingly, when a lawyer makes a significant contribution to a public official or an election campaign for a candidate for public office and is later engaged by the official to perform legal services for the official’s agency, it may appear that the official has been improperly influenced in selecting the lawyer, whether or not this is so. This appearance of influence reflects poorly on the integrity of the legal profession and government as a whole. For these reasons, just as the Code prohibits a lawyer from compensating or giving anything of value to a person or organization to recommend or obtain employment by a client, the Code prohibits a lawyer from making or soliciting a political contribution to any candidate for government office, government official, political campaign committee or political party, if a disinterested person would conclude that the contribution is being made or solicited for the purpose of obtaining or being considered eligible to obtain a government legal engagement. This would be true even in the absence of an understanding between the lawyer and any government official or candidate that special consideration will be given in return for the political contribution or solicitation.

[6] In determining whether a disinterested person would conclude that a contribution to a candidate for government office, government official, political campaign committee or political party is or has been made for the purpose of obtaining or being considered eligible to obtain a government legal engagement, the factors to be considered include (a) whether legal work awarded to the contributor or solicitor, if any, was awarded pursuant to a process that was insulated from political influence, such as a “Request for Proposal” process, (b) the amount of the contribution or the contributions resulting from a solicitation, (c) whether the contributor or any law firm with which the lawyer is associated has sought or plans to seek government legal work from the official or candidate, (d) whether the contribution or solicitation was made because of an existing personal, family or non-client professional relationship with the government official or candidate, (e) whether prior to the contribution or solicitation in question, the contributor or solicitor had made comparable contributions or had engaged in comparable solicitations on behalf of governmental officials or candidates for public office for which the lawyer or any law firm with which the lawyer is associated did not perform or seek to perform legal work, (f) whether the contributor has made a contribution to the government official’s or candidate’s opponent(s) during the same campaign period and, if so, the amounts thereof, and (g) whether the contributor is eligible to vote in the jurisdiction of the governmental official or candidate, and if not, whether other factors indicate that the contribution or solicitation was nonetheless made to further a genuinely held political, social or economic belief or interest rather than to obtain a legal engagement.
RULE 7.3:  
SOLICITATION AND RECOMMENDATION OF PROFESSIONAL EMPLOYMENT  

(a) A lawyer shall not engage in solicitation:

(1) by in-person or telephone contact, or by real-time or interactive computer-accessed communication unless the recipient is a close friend, relative, former client or existing client; or

(2) by any form of communication if:

   (i) the communication or contact violates Rule 4.5, Rule 7.1(a), or paragraph (e) of this Rule;

   (ii) the recipient has made known to the lawyer a desire not to be solicited by the lawyer;

   (iii) the solicitation involves coercion, duress or harassment;

   (iv) the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the age or the physical, emotional or mental state of the recipient makes it unlikely that the recipient will be able to exercise reasonable judgment in retaining a lawyer; or

   (v) the lawyer intends or expects, but does not disclose, that the legal services necessary to handle the matter competently will be performed primarily by another lawyer who is not affiliated with the soliciting lawyer as a partner, associate or of counsel.

(b) For purposes of this Rule, “solicitation” means any advertisement initiated by or on behalf of a lawyer or law firm that is directed to, or targeted at, a specific recipient or group of recipients, or their family members or legal representatives, the primary purpose of which is the retention of the lawyer or law firm, and a significant motive for which is pecuniary gain. It does not include a proposal or other writing prepared and delivered in response to a specific request.

(c) A solicitation directed to a recipient in this State shall be subject to the following provisions:

   (1) A copy of the solicitation shall at the time of its dissemination be filed with the attorney disciplinary committee of the judicial district or judicial department wherein the lawyer or law firm maintains its principal office. Where no such office is maintained, the filing shall be made in the judicial department where the solicitation is targeted. A filing shall consist of:

      (i) a copy of the solicitation;
(ii) a transcript of the audio portion of any radio or television solicitation; and

(iii) if the solicitation is in a language other than English, an accurate English-language translation.

(2) Such solicitation shall contain no reference to the fact of filing.

(3) If a solicitation is directed to a predetermined recipient, a list containing the names and addresses of all recipients shall be retained by the lawyer or law firm for a period of not less than three years following the last date of its dissemination.

(4) Solicitations filed pursuant to this subdivision shall be open to public inspection.

(5) The provisions of this paragraph shall not apply to:

(i) a solicitation directed or disseminated to a close friend, relative, or former or existing client;

(ii) a web site maintained by the lawyer or law firm, unless the web site is designed for and directed to or targeted at persons affected by an identifiable actual event or occurrence or by an identifiable prospective defendant; or

(iii) professional cards or other announcements the distribution of which is authorized by Rule 7.5(a).

(d) A written solicitation shall not be sent by a method that requires the recipient to travel to a location other than that at which the recipient ordinarily receives business or personal mail or that requires a signature on the part of the recipient.

(e) No solicitation relating to a specific incident involving potential claims for personal injury or wrongful death shall be disseminated before the 30th day after the date of the incident, unless a filing must be made within 30 days of the incident as a legal prerequisite to the particular claim, in which case no unsolicited communication shall be made before the 15th day after the date of the incident.

(f) Any solicitation made in writing or by computer-accessed communication and directed to a pre-determined recipient, if prompted by a specific occurrence involving or affecting a recipient, shall disclose how the lawyer obtained the identity of the recipient and learned of the recipient’s potential legal need.

(g) If a retainer agreement is provided with any solicitation, the top of each page shall be marked “SAMPLE” in red ink in a type size equal to the largest type size used in the
agreement and the words “DO NOT SIGN” shall appear on the client signature line.

(h) Any solicitation covered by this section shall include the name, principal law office address and telephone number of the lawyer or law firm whose services are being offered.

(i) The provisions of this Rule shall apply to a lawyer or members of a law firm not admitted to practice in this State who shall solicit retention by residents of this State.

Comment

Solicitation

[1] In addition to seeking clients through general advertising (either by public communications in the media or by private communications to potential clients who are neither current clients nor other lawyers), many lawyers attempt to attract clients through a specialized category of advertising called “solicitation.” Not all advertisements are solicitations within the meaning of this Rule. All solicitations, however, are advertisements with certain additional characteristics. By definition, a communication that is not an advertisement is not a solicitation. Solicitations are subject to all of the Rules governing advertising and are also subject to additional Rules, including filing a copy of the solicitation with the appropriate attorney disciplinary authority (including a transcript of the audio portion of any radio or television solicitation and, if the solicitation is in a language other than English, an accurate English language translation). These and other additional requirements will facilitate oversight by disciplinary authorities.

[2] A “solicitation” means any advertisement: (i) that is initiated by a lawyer or law firm (as opposed to a communication made in response to an inquiry initiated by a potential client), (ii) with a primary purpose of persuading recipients to retain the lawyer or law firm (as opposed to providing educational information about the law, see Rule 7.1, Comment [7]), (iii) that has as a significant motive for the lawyer to make money (as opposed to a public-interest lawyer offering pro bono services), and (iv) that is directed to or targeted at a specific recipient or group of recipients, or their family members or legal representatives. Any advertisement that meets all four of these criteria is a solicitation, and is governed not only by the Rules that govern all advertisements but also by special Rules governing solicitation.

Directed or Targeted

[3] An advertisement may be considered to be directed to or targeted at a specific recipient or recipients in two different ways. First, an advertisement is considered “directed to or targeted at” a specific recipient or recipients if it is made by in-person or telephone contact or by real-time or interactive computer-accessed communication or if it is addressed so that it will be delivered to the specific recipient or recipients or their families or agents (as with letters, emails, express packages). Advertisements made by in-person or telephone contact or by real-time or interactive computer-accessed communication are prohibited unless the recipient is a close friend, relative, former client or current client. Advertisements addressed so that they will be delivered to the specific recipient or recipients or their families or agents (as with letters, emails, express packages) are subject to various additional rules governing solicitation (including filing and public
inspection) because otherwise they would not be readily subject to disciplinary oversight and review. Second, an advertisement in public media such as newspapers, television, billboards, web sites or the like is a solicitation if it makes reference to a specific person or group of people whose legal needs arise out of a specific incident to which the advertisement explicitly refers. The term “specific incident” is explained in Comment [5].

[4] Unless it falls within Comment [3], an advertisement in public media such as newspapers, television, billboards, web sites or the like is presumed not to be directed to or targeted at a specific recipient or recipients. For example, an advertisement in a public medium is not directed to or targeted at “a specific recipient or group of recipients” simply because it is intended to attract potential clients with needs in a specified area of law. Thus, a lawyer could advertise in the local newspaper that the lawyer is available to assist homeowners in reducing property tax assessments. Likewise, an advertisement by a patent lawyer is not directed or targeted within the meaning of the definition solely because the magazine is geared toward inventors. Similarly, a lawyer could advertise on television or in a newspaper or web site to the general public that the lawyer practices in the area of personal injury or Workers’ Compensation law. The fact that some recipients of such advertisements might actually be in need of specific legal services at the time of the communication does not transform such advertisements into solicitations.

Solicitations Relating To a Specific Incident Involving Potential Claims for Personal Injury or Wrongful Death

[5] Solicitations relating to a specific incident involving potential claims for personal injury or wrongful death are subject to a further restriction, in that they may not be disseminated until 30 days (or in some cases 15 days) after the date of the incident. This restriction applies even where the recipient is a close friend, relative, or former client, but not where the recipient is a current client. A “specific incident” is a particular identifiable event (or a sequence of related events occurring at approximately the same time and place) that causes harm to one or more people. Specific incidents include such events as traffic accidents, plane or train crashes, explosions, building collapses, and the like.

[6] A solicitation that is intended to attract potential claims for personal injury or wrongful death arising from a common cause but at disparate times and places, does not relate to a specific incident and is not subject to the special 30-day (or 15-day) rule, even though it is addressed so that it will be delivered to specific recipients or their families or agents (as with letters, emails, express packages), or is made in a public medium such as newspapers, television, billboards, web sites or the like and makes reference to a specific person or group of people, see Comments [3]-[4]. For example, solicitations intended to be of interest only to potential claimants injured over a period of years by a defective medical device or medication do not relate to a specific incident and are not subject to the special 30-day (or 15-day) rule.

[7] An advertisement in the public media that makes no express reference to a specific incident does not become a solicitation subject to the 30-day (or 15-day) rule solely because a specific incident has occurred within the last 30 (or 15) days. Thus, a law firm that advertises on television or in newspapers that it can “help injured people explore their legal rights” is not violating the 30-day (or 15-day) rule by running or continuing to run its advertisements even though a mass disaster injured many people within hours or days before the advertisement
appeared. Unless an advertisement in the public media explicitly refers to a specific incident, it is not a solicitation subject to the 30-day (or 15-day) blackout period. However, if a lawyer causes an advertisement to be delivered (whether by mail, email, express service, courier, or any other form of direct delivery) to a specific recipient (i) with knowledge that the addressee is either a person killed or injured in a specific incident or that person’s family member or agent, and (ii) with the intent to communicate with that person because of that knowledge, then the advertisement is a solicitation subject to the 30-day (or 15-day) rule even if it makes no reference to a specific incident and even if it is part of a mass mailing.

Extraterritorial Application of Solicitation Rules

[8] All of the special solicitation rules, including the special 30-day (or 15-day) rule, apply to solicitations directed to recipients in New York State, whether made by a lawyer admitted in New York State or a lawyer admitted in any another jurisdiction. Solicitations by a lawyer admitted in New York State directed to or targeted at a recipient or recipients outside of New York State are not subject to the filing and related requirements set out in Rule 7.3(c). Whether such solicitations are subject to the special 30-day (or 15-day) rule depends on the application of Rule 8.5.

In-Person, Telephone and Real-Time or Interactive Computer-Accessed Communication

[9] Paragraph (a) generally prohibits in-person solicitation, which has historically been disfavored by the bar because it poses serious dangers to potential clients. For example, in-person solicitation poses the risk that a lawyer, who is trained in the arts of advocacy and persuasion, may pressure a potential client to hire the lawyer without adequate consideration. These same risks are present in telephone contact or in real-time or interactive computer-accessed communication. These same risks are also present in all other real-time or interactive electronic communications, whether by computer, phone or related electronic means – see Rule 1.0(c) (defining “computer-accessed communication”) – and are regulated in the same manner. The prohibitions on in-person or telephone contact and the prohibitions on contact by real-time or interactive computer-accessed communication do not apply if the recipient is a close friend, relative, former or current client. Communications with these individuals do not pose the same dangers as solicitations to others. However, when the special 30-day (or 15-day) rule applies, it does so even where the recipient is a close friend, relative, or former client. Ordinarily, email communications and web sites are not considered to be real-time or interactive communication. Similarly, automated pop-up advertisements on a web site that are not a live response are not considered to be real-time or interactive communication. However, instant messaging (“IM”), chat rooms, and other similar types of conversational computer-accessed communications – whether sent or received via a desktop computer, a portable computer, a cell phone, or any similar electronic or wireless device, and whether sent directly or via social media – are considered to be real-time or interactive communication.
RULE 7.4:
IDENTIFICATION OF PRACTICE AND SPECIALTY

(a) A lawyer or law firm may publicly identify one or more areas of law in which the lawyer or the law firm practices, or may state that the practice of the lawyer or law firm is limited to one or more areas of law, provided that the lawyer or law firm shall not state that the lawyer or law firm is a specialist or specializes in a particular field of law, except as provided in Rule 7.4(c).

(b) A lawyer admitted to engage in patent practice before the United States Patent and Trademark Office may use the designation “Patent Attorney” or a substantially similar designation.

(c) A lawyer may state that the lawyer has been recognized or certified as a specialist only as follows:

(1) A lawyer who is certified as a specialist in a particular area of law or law practice by a private organization approved for that purpose by the American Bar Association may state the fact of certification if, in conjunction therewith, the certifying organization is identified and the following statement is prominently made: “This certification is not granted by any governmental authority.”

(2) A lawyer who is certified as a specialist in a particular area of law or law practice by the authority having jurisdiction over specialization under the laws of another state or territory may state the fact of certification if, in conjunction therewith, the certifying state or territory is identified and the following statement is prominently made: “This certification is not granted by any governmental authority within the State of New York.”

(3) A statement is prominently made if:

(i) when written, it is clearly legible and capable of being read by the average person, and is in a font size at least two font sizes larger than the largest text used to state the fact of certification; and

(ii) when spoken aloud, it is intelligible to the average person, and is at a cadence no faster, and a level of audibility no lower, than the cadence and level of audibility used to state the fact of certification.

Comment

[1] Paragraph (a) permits a lawyer to indicate areas of practice in which the lawyer practices, or that his or her practice is limited to those areas.

[2] Paragraph (b) recognizes the long-established policy of the Patent and Trademark Office for the designation of lawyers practicing before the Office.
Paragraph (c) permits a lawyer to state that the lawyer specializes or is certified as a specialist in a field of law if such certification is granted by an organization approved or accredited by the American Bar Association or by the authority having jurisdiction over specialization under the laws of another jurisdiction provided that the name of the certifying organization or authority must be included in any communication regarding the certification together with the disclaimer required by paragraph (c).
RULE 7.5:
PROFESSIONAL NOTICES, LETTERHEADS AND SIGNS

(a) A lawyer or law firm may use internet web sites, professional cards, professional announcement cards, office signs, letterheads or similar professional notices or devices, provided the same do not violate these Rules or any statute or court rule.

(b) (1) A lawyer in private practice shall not practice under:

   (i) a false, deceptive or misleading trade name;

   (ii) a false, deceptive, or misleading domain name; or

   (iii) a name that is misleading as to the identity of the lawyer or lawyers practicing under such name.

(2) Specific Guidance Regarding Law Firm Names

   (i) Such terms as “legal aid,” “legal service office,” “legal assistance office,” “defender office,” and the like may be used only by bona fide legal assistance organizations.

   (ii) A law firm name, trade name, or domain name may not use the terms “non-profit” or “not-for-profit” unless the law firm qualifies for those designations under applicable law.

   (iii) A lawyer or law firm in private practice may not include the name of a nonlawyer in its firm name.

   (iv) The name of a professional corporation shall contain “PC” or such symbols permitted by law.

   (v) The name of a limited liability company or limited liability partnership shall contain “LLC,” “LLP” or such symbols permitted by law.

   (vi) A lawyer or law firm may utilize a telephone number that contains a trade name, domain name, nickname, moniker, or motto that does not otherwise violate these Rules.

(3) A lawyer or law firm that has a contractual relationship with a nonlegal professional or nonlegal professional service firm pursuant to Rule 5.8 to provide legal and other professional services on a systematic and continuing basis may not include in its firm name the name of the nonlegal professional service firm or any individual nonlegal professional affiliated therewith.

(4) A lawyer who assumes a judicial, legislative or public executive or administrative post or office shall not permit the lawyer’s name to remain in the name
of a law firm or to be used in professional notices of the firm during any significant period in which the lawyer is not actively and regularly practicing law as a member of the firm and, during such period, other members of the firm shall not use the lawyer’s name in the firm name or in professional notices of the firm.

(c) Lawyers shall not hold themselves out as having a partnership with one or more other lawyers unless they are in fact partners.

(d) A partnership shall not be formed or continued between or among lawyers licensed in different jurisdictions unless all enumerations of the members and associates of the firm on its letterhead and in other permissible listings make clear the jurisdictional limitations on those members and associates of the firm not licensed to practice in all listed jurisdictions; however, the same firm name may be used in each jurisdiction.

Comment

Professional Affiliations and Designations

[1] A lawyer’s or law firm’s name, trade name, domain name, web site, social media pages, office sign, business cards, letterhead, and professional designations are communications concerning a lawyer’s services and must not be false, deceptive, or misleading. They must comply with this Rule and with Rule 7.1.

[2] A lawyer or law firm may not use any name that is false, deceptive, or misleading. It is not false, deceptive, or misleading for a firm to be designated by the names of all or some of its current members or by the names of retired or deceased members where there has been a continuing line of succession in the firm’s identity. A lawyer or law firm may practice under a trade name or domain name if it is not false, deceptive, or misleading. A lawyer or law firm also may practice under a distinctive website address, social media username, or comparable professional designation, provided that the name is not false, deceptive, or misleading.

[3] By way of example, the name of a law firm in private practice is deceptive or misleading if it implies a connection with (i) a government agency, (ii) a deceased or retired lawyer who was not a former member of the firm in a continuing line of succession, (iii) a lawyer not associated with the firm or a predecessor firm, (iv) a nonlawyer, or (v) a public or charitable legal services organization. A lawyer or law firm may not use a name, trade name, domain name, or other designation that includes words such as “Legal Services,” “Legal Assistance,” or “Legal Aid” unless the lawyer or law firm is a bona fide legal assistance organization.

[4] It is misleading to use the name of a lawyer holding a public office in the name of a law firm, or in communications on the law firm’s behalf, during any substantial period in which the lawyer is not actively and regularly practicing with the firm.

[5] Lawyers may not imply or hold themselves out as practicing together in one firm when they are not a “firm” as defined in Rule 1.0(h), because to do so would be false and misleading. In particular, it is misleading for lawyers to hold themselves out as having a partnership with one or more other lawyers unless they are in fact partners. It is also misleading for lawyers to hold themselves out as being counsel, associates, or other affiliates of a law firm if that is not a fact, or
to hold themselves out as partners, counsel, or associates if they only share offices. Likewise, law firms may not claim to be affiliated with other law firms if that is not a fact.

**Professional Web Sites, Cards, Office Signs, and Letterhead**

[6] A lawyer or law firm may use internet web sites, social media pages, professional cards, professional announcement cards, office signs, letterheads or similar professional notices or devices, provided they do not violate any statute or court rule and are in accordance with Rule 7.1. Thus, a lawyer may use the following:

(i) a professional card identifying the lawyer by name and as a lawyer, and giving addresses, telephone numbers, the name of the lawyer’s law firm, the names of the law firm’s members, counsel, and associates, and any information permitted under Rules 7.1 and 7.4;

(ii) a professional announcement card stating new or changed associations or addresses, change of firm name, or similar matters pertaining to the professional offices of a lawyer or law firm or any nonlegal business conducted by the lawyer or law firm pursuant to Rule 5.7. It may state biographical data, the names of members of the firm, counsel, and associates, and the names and dates of predecessor firms in a continuing line of succession. It may state or describe the nature of the legal practice to the extent permitted under Rules 7.1 and 7.4;

(iii) a sign in or near the office and in the building directory identifying the law office and any nonlegal business conducted by the lawyer or law firm pursuant to Rule 5.7. The sign may state the nature of the legal practice to the extent permitted under Rules 7.1 and 7.4;

(iv) a letterhead identifying the lawyer by name and as a lawyer, and giving addresses, telephone numbers, the name of the law firm, and any information permitted under Rules 7.1 and 7.4. A letterhead of a law firm may also give the names of members, associates, and counsel, names and dates relating to deceased and retired members, and the names and dates of predecessor firms in a continuing line of succession; and

(v) internet web sites or social media pages or sites that comply with these Rules.

**Professional Status**

[7] To avoid misleading clients, courts, and the public, lawyers should be scrupulous in representing their professional status. For example:

(i) A lawyer or law firm may be designated “Counsel,” “Special Counsel,” “Of Counsel,” and the like on a letterhead or professional card if there is a continuing relationship with another lawyer or law firm other than as a partner or associate;

(ii) A lawyer or law firm may be designated as “General Counsel” or by similar professional reference on stationery of a client if the lawyer or law firm devotes a substantial amount of professional time to representing that client;

(iii) To alert clients, the public, and those who deal with a lawyer or law firm about possible limitations on liability, the name of a professional corporation shall contain “PC” or such symbols permitted by law, and the name of a limited liability company or limited liability partnership shall contain “LLC,” “PLLC,” “LLP” or such symbols permitted by law;

(iv) A law firm name, trade name, or domain name may not include the terms “non-profit” or “not-for-profit” unless the law firm qualifies for those designations under applicable law, such as the New York Not-for-Profit Corporation Law (“NPCL”).
A law firm with offices in more than one jurisdiction may use the same name or other professional designation in each jurisdiction, but all enumerations of the lawyers listed on the firm’s letterhead and in other permissible listings should make clear the jurisdictional limitations on those members, counsel, and associates of the firm not licensed to practice in all listed jurisdictions.

**Trade Names and Domain Names**

Some lawyers and law firms may prefer to practice under trade names and/or domain names to make it easier for clients to remember or locate them. A lawyer may practice under a trade name or domain name that is not false, deceptive, or misleading. Provided a lawyer or law firm uses a name otherwise complying with these Rules, it is proper to practice under the lawyer’s or law firm’s own name, initials, trade name, domain name, abbreviations, areas of practice, variations of the foregoing, or a combination of those features, among other things.

For example, with respect to trade names, a law firm whose practice includes real estate matters may use and practice under a name such as AbleBaker Real Estate Lawyers, A&B Real Estate Lawyers, or Dirt Lawyers. Likewise, a law firm may use and practice under a trade name such as Albany Personal Injury Lawyers if the firm practices in Albany and its practice includes personal injury law. With respect to domain names, if the law firm of Able & Baker practices real estate law, the firm may use and practice under a descriptive domain name such as www.realestatelaw.com or www.ableralestatelaw.com, or under a colloquial domain name such as www.dirtlawyers.com, as long as the name is not false, deceptive, or misleading.

Neither trade names nor domain names may be false, deceptive, or misleading. A law firm may not use a trade name such as “Win Your Case,” or a domain name such as www.winyourcase.com because those names imply that the law firm can obtain favorable results regardless of the particular facts and circumstances. In all events, neither a trade name nor a domain name may be false, deceptive, or misleading or violate Rule 7.1 or any other Rule.

**Telephone Numbers**

A lawyer or law firm may use telephone numbers that spell words or contain a trade name, domain name, nickname, moniker, or motto that does not otherwise violate these Rules. As with domain names, lawyers and law firms may always properly use telephone numbers consisting of (i) their own names or initials, or (ii) combinations of names, initials, numbers, and words. For example, the law firm of Red & Blue may properly use phone numbers such as RED-BLUE, 4-RED-LAW, or RB-LEGAL. By way of further example, a personal injury law firm may use the numbers 1-800-ACCIDENT, 1-800-HURT-BAD, or 1-800-INJURY-LAW, but may not use the numbers 1-800-WINNERS, 1-800-2WIN-BIG, or 1-800-GET-CASH. (Phone numbers with more letters than the number of digits in a phone number are acceptable as long as the words do not violate a Rule.)
RULE 8.1:  
CANDOR IN THE BAR ADMISSION PROCESS

(a) A lawyer shall be subject to discipline if, in connection with the lawyer’s own application for admission to the bar previously filed in this state or in any other jurisdiction, or in connection with the application of another person for admission to the bar, the lawyer knowingly:

(1) has made or failed to correct a false statement of material fact; or

(2) has failed to disclose a material fact requested in connection with a lawful demand for information from an admissions authority.

Comment

[1] If a person makes a material false statement in connection with an application for admission, it may be the basis for subsequent disciplinary action if the person is admitted and in any event may be relevant in a subsequent admission application. The duty imposed by this Rule applies to a lawyer’s own admission as well as that of another.

[2] This Rule is subject to the provisions of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and corresponding provisions of state constitutions. A person relying on such a provision in response to a question, however, should do so openly and not use the right of nondisclosure as a justification for failure to comply with this Rule.
RULE 8.2:
JUDICIAL OFFICERS AND CANDIDATES

(a) A lawyer shall not knowingly make a false statement of fact concerning the qualifications, conduct or integrity of a judge or other adjudicatory officer or of a candidate for election or appointment to judicial office.

(b) A lawyer who is a candidate for judicial office shall comply with the applicable provisions of Part 100 of the Rules of the Chief Administrator of the Courts.

Comment

[1] Assessments by lawyers are relied on in evaluating the professional or personal fitness of persons being considered for election or appointment to judicial office. Expressing honest and candid opinions on such matters contributes to improving the administration of justice. False statements of fact by a lawyer can unfairly undermine public confidence in the administration of justice.

[2] When a lawyer seeks judicial office, the lawyer may engage in constitutionally protected speech, but is bound by valid limitations on speech and political activity.

[3] To maintain the fair and independent administration of justice, lawyers are encouraged to continue traditional efforts to defend judges and courts unjustly criticized.
RULE 8.3:
REPORTING PROFESSIONAL MISCONDUCT

(a) A lawyer who knows that another lawyer has committed a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct that raises a substantial question as to that lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer shall report such knowledge to a tribunal or other authority empowered to investigate or act upon such violation.

(b) A lawyer who possesses knowledge or evidence concerning another lawyer or a judge shall not fail to respond to a lawful demand for information from a tribunal or other authority empowered to investigate or act upon such conduct.

(c) This Rule does not require disclosure of:

(1) information otherwise protected by Rule 1.6; or

(2) information gained by a lawyer or judge while participating in a bona fide lawyer assistance program.

Comment

[1] Self-regulation of the legal profession requires that members of the profession initiate disciplinary investigation when they know of a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct. Lawyers have a similar obligation to cooperate with authorities empowered to investigate judicial misconduct. An apparently isolated violation may indicate a pattern of misconduct that only a disciplinary investigation can uncover. Reporting a violation is especially important where the victim is unlikely to discover the offense.

[2] A report about misconduct is not required where it would result in violation of Rule 1.6. However, a lawyer should encourage a client to consent to disclosure where prosecution would not substantially prejudice the client’s interests.

[3] If a lawyer were obliged to report every violation of the Rules, the failure to report any violation would itself be a professional offense. Such a requirement existed in many jurisdictions, but proved to be unenforceable. This Rule limits the reporting obligation to those offenses that a self-regulating profession must vigorously endeavor to prevent. A measure of judgment is therefore required in complying with the provisions of this Rule. The term “substantial” refers to the seriousness of the possible offense and not the quantum of evidence of which the lawyer is aware. A report should be made to a tribunal or other authority empowered to investigate or act upon the violation.

[3A] Paragraph (b) requires a lawyer in certain situations to respond to a lawful demand for information concerning another lawyer or a judge. This Rule is subject to the provisions of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and corresponding provisions of state law. A person relying on such a provision in response to a question, however, should do so openly and not use the right of nondisclosure as a justification for failure to comply with this Rule.
[4] The duty to report professional misconduct does not apply to a lawyer retained to represent a lawyer whose professional conduct is in question. Such a situation is governed by the Rules applicable to the client-lawyer relationship.

[5] Information about a lawyer’s or judge’s misconduct or fitness may be received by a lawyer in the course of that lawyer’s participation in a bona fide assistance program for lawyers or judges. In that circumstance, providing for an exception to the reporting requirements of paragraphs (a) and (b) encourages lawyers and judges to seek assistance and treatment through such a program. Without such an exception, lawyers and judges may hesitate to seek assistance and treatment from these programs, and this may result in additional harm to their professional careers and additional injury to the welfare of clients and the public.
RULE 8.4:
MISCONDUCT

A lawyer or law firm shall not:

(a) violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so through the acts of another;

(b) engage in illegal conduct that adversely reflects on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer;

(c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation;

(d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice;

(e) state or imply an ability:

(1) to influence improperly or upon irrelevant grounds any tribunal, legislative body or public official; or

(2) to achieve results using means that violate these Rules or other law;

(f) knowingly assist a judge or judicial officer in conduct that is a violation of applicable rules of judicial conduct or other law;

(g) engage in conduct in the practice of law that the lawyer or law firm knows or reasonably should know constitutes:

(1) unlawful discrimination; or

(2) harassment, whether or not unlawful, on the basis of one or more of the following protected categories: race, color, sex, pregnancy, religion, national origin, ethnicity, disability, age, sexual orientation, gender identity, gender expression, marital status, status as a member of the military, or status as a military veteran.

(3) “Harassment” for purposes of this Rule, means physical contact, verbal conduct, and/or nonverbal conduct such as gestures or facial expressions that is:

a. directed at an individual or specific individuals; and

b. derogatory or demeaning.

Conduct that a reasonable person would consider as petty slights or trivial inconveniences does not rise to the level of harassment under this Rule.

(4) This Rule does not limit the ability of a lawyer or law firm to, consistent with these Rules:
a. accept, decline, or withdraw from a representation;

b. express views on matters of public concern in the context of teaching, public speeches, continuing legal education programs, or other forms of public advocacy or education, or in any other form of written or oral speech protected by the United States Constitution or the New York State Constitution; or

c. provide advice, assistance, or advocacy to clients

(5) “Conduct in the practice of law” includes:

a. representing clients;

b. interacting with witnesses, coworkers, court personnel, lawyers, and others, while engaging in the practice of law; and

c. operating or managing a law firm or practice; or

(h) engage in any other conduct that adversely reflects on the lawyer’s fitness as a lawyer.

Comment

[1] Lawyers are subject to discipline when they violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so through the acts of another, as when they request or instruct an agent to do so on their behalf. Paragraph (a), however, does not prohibit a lawyer from advising a client concerning action the client is legally entitled to take.

[2] Many kinds of illegal conduct reflect adversely on fitness to practice law. Illegal conduct involving violence, dishonesty, fraud, breach of trust, or serious interference with the administration of justice is illustrative of conduct that reflects adversely on fitness to practice law. A pattern of repeated offenses, even ones of minor significance when considered separately, can indicate indifference to legal obligation.

[3] The prohibition on conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice is generally invoked to punish conduct, whether or not it violates another ethics rule, that results in substantial harm to the justice system comparable to those caused by obstruction of justice, such as advising a client to testify falsely, paying a witness to be unavailable, altering documents, repeatedly disrupting a proceeding, or failing to cooperate in an attorney disciplinary investigation or proceeding. The assertion of the lawyer’s constitutional rights consistent with Rule 8.1, Comment [2] does not constitute failure to cooperate. The conduct must be seriously inconsistent with a lawyer’s responsibility as an officer of the court.

[4] A lawyer may refuse to comply with an obligation imposed by law if such refusal is based upon a reasonable good-faith belief that no valid obligation exists because, for example,
the law is unconstitutional, conflicts with other legal or professional obligations, or is otherwise invalid. As set forth in Rule 3.4(c), a lawyer may not disregard a specific ruling or standing rule of a tribunal, but can take appropriate steps to test the validity of such a rule or ruling.

[4A] A lawyer harms the integrity of the law and the legal profession when the lawyer states or implies an ability to influence improperly any officer or agency of the executive, legislative or judicial branches of government.

[5] Lawyers holding public office assume legal responsibilities going beyond those of other citizens. A lawyer's abuse of public office can suggest an inability to fulfill the professional role of lawyers. The same is true of abuse of positions of private trust such as trustee, executor, administrator, guardian, agent and officer, director or manager of a corporation or other organization.

[5A] Discrimination and harassment in the practice of law undermine confidence in the legal profession and the legal system and discourage or prevent capable people from becoming or remaining lawyers or reaching their potential as lawyers.

[5B] “Unlawful discrimination” refers to discrimination that violates federal, state, or local law.

[5C] Petty slights or trivial inconveniences without more are not harassment. However, harassment can consist of a single instance. Verbal conduct includes written as well as oral communication.

[5D] A lawyer’s conduct does not violate Rule 8.4(g) when the conduct in question is protected under the First Amendment of the Constitution of the United States or under Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution of the State of New York. This Rule is not intended to discourage and does not prohibit free expression, no matter how popular or unpopular the speaker’s views.

[5E] This Rule is not intended to prohibit or discourage lawyers or law firms from engaging in conduct undertaken to promote diversity, equity or inclusion in the legal profession, such as by implementing initiatives aimed at (i) recruiting, hiring, retaining, and advancing employees in one or more of the protected categories, or (ii) encouraging or assisting lawyers and law students to participate in organizations intended to promote the interests of persons in one or more of the protected categories.

[5F] A trial judge’s finding that peremptory challenges were exercised on a discriminatory basis does not alone establish a violation of paragraph (g).

[5G] Nothing in Rule 8.4(g) is intended to narrow or limit the scope or applicability of Rule 8.4(h) (prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct, whether in or outside the practice of law, that “adversely reflects on the lawyer’s fitness as a lawyer”). Thus, Rule 8.4(h) may reach conduct that is not covered by Rule 8.4(g).
RULE 8.5:
DISCIPLINARY AUTHORITY AND CHOICE OF LAW

(a) A lawyer admitted to practice in this state is subject to the disciplinary authority of this state, regardless of where the lawyer’s conduct occurs. A lawyer may be subject to the disciplinary authority of both this state and another jurisdiction where the lawyer is admitted for the same conduct.

(b) In any exercise of the disciplinary authority of this state, the rules of professional conduct to be applied shall be as follows:

(1) For conduct in connection with a proceeding in a court before which a lawyer has been admitted to practice (either generally or for purposes of that proceeding), the rules to be applied shall be the rules of the jurisdiction in which the court sits, unless the rules of the court provide otherwise; and

(2) For any other conduct:

(i) If the lawyer is licensed to practice only in this state, the rules to be applied shall be the rules of this state, and

(ii) If the lawyer is licensed to practice in this state and another jurisdiction, the rules to be applied shall be the rules of the admitting jurisdiction in which the lawyer principally practices; provided, however, that if particular conduct clearly has its predominant effect in another jurisdiction in which the lawyer is licensed to practice, the rules of that jurisdiction shall be applied to that conduct.

Comment

Disciplinary Authority

[1] It is longstanding law that the conduct of a lawyer admitted to practice in this state is subject to the disciplinary authority of this state, regardless of where the conduct occurs.

Choice of Law

[2] A lawyer may be potentially subject to more than one set of rules of professional conduct, imposing different obligations. The lawyer may be licensed to practice in more than one jurisdiction with differing rules, or may be admitted to practice before a particular court with rules that differ from those of the jurisdiction or jurisdictions in which the lawyer is licensed to practice. Additionally, the lawyer’s conduct may involve significant contacts with more than one jurisdiction.

[3] Paragraph (b) seeks to resolve such potential conflicts. Its premise is that minimizing conflicts between rules, as well as uncertainty about which rules are applicable, is in the best interest of clients and the profession (as well as the bodies having authority to regulate the
profession). Accordingly, it takes the approach of (i) providing that any particular conduct of a lawyer shall be subject to only one set of rules of professional conduct, and (ii) making the determination of which set of rules applies to particular conduct as straightforward as possible, consistent with recognition of appropriate regulatory interests of relevant jurisdictions.

[4] Paragraph (b)(1) provides that as to a lawyer’s conduct relating to a proceeding pending before a court before which the lawyer is admitted to practice either generally or for purposes of that proceeding, the lawyer shall be subject only to the rules of the jurisdiction in which the court sits unless the rules of the court, including its choice-of-law rules, provide otherwise. As to all other conduct, paragraph (b)(2) provides that a lawyer shall be subject to the rules of the admitting jurisdiction in which the lawyer principally practices or, if the predominant effect of the conduct clearly is in another jurisdiction in which the lawyer is licensed to practice, the rules of that jurisdiction shall be applied to the conduct. In the case of conduct in anticipation of a proceeding that is likely to be before a court, the predominant effect of such conduct could be where the lawyer principally practices, where the conduct occurred, where the court in which the proceeding is ultimately brought sits, or in another jurisdiction.

[5] When a lawyer is licensed to practice in New York and another jurisdiction and the lawyer’s conduct involves significant contacts with more than one jurisdiction, it may not be clear whether the predominant effect of the lawyer’s conduct will occur in an admitting jurisdiction other than the one in which the lawyer principally practices. For conduct governed by paragraph (b)(2), as long as the lawyer’s conduct conforms to the rules of the jurisdiction in which the lawyer principally practices, the lawyer should not be subject to discipline unless the predominant effect of the lawyer’s conduct will clearly occur in another admitting jurisdiction.

[6] If two admitting jurisdictions were to proceed against a lawyer for the same conduct, they should, applying this Rule, identify the same governing ethics rules. They should take all appropriate steps to see that they do apply the same rule to the same conduct, and in all events should avoid proceeding against a lawyer on the basis of two inconsistent rules.

[7] The choice-of-law provision applies to lawyers engaged in transnational practice, unless international law, treaties or other agreements between or among competent regulatory authorities in the affected jurisdictions provide otherwise.
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