Report and recommendations of the New York State Bar Association
Task Force on Mental Health and Trauma Informed Representation

June 2023

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Report and Recommendations of the Task Force on Mental Health and Trauma Informed Representation

April 2023
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CONTENTS
Preface – A Note on Language

Executive Summary

Creation of Task Force on Mental Health and Trauma Informed Representation

Investigation

Overview of Recommendations

• Court System
• Legislature
• Trauma Informed Practices
• Systems Reform
• Criminal Justice
• Civil Justice
• Accommodations
• NYSBA

I. Historical Antecedents to Current Crisis

II. Areas of Inquiry

A. Overview Interplay of Policy and Practice
   Court System
   Executive
   Legislature

B. Trauma Informed Practices
   • Restorative justice

C. Seamless Systems
   • Office of Mental Health
   • Office for People With Developmental Disabilities
   • Office of Addiction Services and Supports
   • State and Local Governmental Units

D. Criminal Justice
   • Toward More Humane Treatment of People with Mental Illness: Deflection and Diversion
Reforming the Competency to Stand Trial System
Practice considerations for article 730
Reforming CPL 330.20

E. Civil Justice

- Promote Individual Autonomy through Psychiatric Advance Directives
- Promote Individual Autonomy through Supported Decision Making
- Guardianship Reform
  - Article 81 of the MHL
  - Article 17-A of the SCPA
  - Single Transaction Orders
- Article 9 of the Mental Hygiene Law
- Assisted Outpatient Treatment
- Provide a Right to Counsel for Respondents in CPLR Article 63-a Proceedings
- Repeal and Replace Mental Hygiene

F. Accommodations

III. Conclusion
APPENDIX

Document 1: Testimony to the Joint Legislative Budget Hearing Proposed 2023-2024 NYS Budget Hearing on Mental Hygiene (Feb. 16, 2023 (Joseph Glazer, Esq.- Deputy Commissioner Westchester Department of Community Mental Health)

Document 2: Report to the Executive Committee of the New York State Bar Association on the Use and Efficacy of Penal Law 40.15 and Criminal Procedure Law 330.20 and Recommendation to Establish a Mental Health Task Force or Committee (Robert Dean, Chair) (2018)

Document 3: Bonita Weddle, New York State Archives, Mental Health in New York State 1945-1998, An Historical Overview (Publication Number 70


Document 9: Interim Report: Respite Care Services Workgroup (April 2011)

Document 10: Treatment Not Jail Act, NYSBA Memorandum in Support (2022)

Document 11: Report of the New York State Bar Association Disability Rights Committee, Guardianship for People with
Developmental Disabilities: Examination and Reform of Surrogate's Court Procedure Act Article 17-A is a Constitutional Imperative (Joe Ranni, Alison Morris, Co-Chairs) (2021)


Preface to the Report – A Note on Language

In rendering this report the members of the Task Force begin with a comment on language. As Nicholas Kristoff reminds us, language can be inclusive or alienating and it can also be divisive. 1 Many organizations have guides to writing style. For example, the American Medical Association (“AMA”) released a 54- page guide on language to advance health equity. 2 The AMA states its goal is not to provide a list of “correct terms” but to provide guidance on equity-focused, person-first language and to among other things, avoid stigma. 3 Language promotes stigma when an illness is placed before the person, giving primacy of the illness (e.g., mental illness) over the human being. 4 Throughout this Report we have endeavored to use “person-first” language. 5

As Dr. Thomas Insel, former director of the National Institute of Mental Health (“NIMH”) reminds us, “the labels we use are simply conventions with limitations. Labels like ‘illness’ or ‘disorder’ describe a set of symptoms. They do not define a person.” 6 Mr. Kristoff cautions that inclusive language must be a call to action and not a substitute for it. 7 Toward this end, and with a call for action,

3 Id. at p. 7, 45.
4 Id. at p. 45-46
5 This choice recognizes that some people with disabilities might prefer “identity first” language. While person first language is used in the title of the 1990 landmark civil rights law, the Americans with Disabilities Act, many in the disability community now prefer identity language which expresses disability pride with direct statements – such as I am deaf or I am autistic. A recommendation emerges from the University of Kansas Research and Training Center on Independent Living to ask the person you are writing or speaking about which approach they prefer. In a report such as this, person first language is recognized as respectful. See, https://rtcil.org
6 Thomas Insel, M.D., Our Path from Mental Illness to Mental Health (2022)
7 Supra, note 1.
Task Force member Chris Liberati-Conant persuasively argues in his January/February 2023 New York State Bar Association Journal article that “It’s time to take ‘hygiene’ out of the Mental Hygiene Law”\textsuperscript{8} Mr. Liberati-Conant observes, “there are many difficult issues related to mental health. This is not one of them.” As his article explains, the term “mental hygiene” in our State Constitution and related statutes is associated with the eugenics movement. The Task Force agrees that it is time to remove “hygiene” from the Mental Hygiene Law. Adopting a modern nomenclature that does not stigmatize people with mental disabilities is certainly more reflective of the values of our community. This change is long overdue. A final note on language, because our Task Force investigation is not exclusive to people with mental illness, in this report we use the statutory term “mental disability” in context because that term is defined more broadly to encompass “mental illness, intellectual disability, developmental disability, or an addictive disorder.”\textsuperscript{9}

**Executive Summary**

According to the NIMH nearly one in five adults in the United States live with a mental illness-over 50 million people in 2020-and over 13 million adults live with serious mental illness.\textsuperscript{10} In his book, “Healing: Our Path from Mental Illness to Mental Health,”\textsuperscript{11} Thomas Insel chronicles the failures in virtually every

\textsuperscript{8} Chris Liberati-Conant, *It’s Time to Take ‘Hygiene’ Out of the Mental Hygiene Law*, 95 -Feb N. Y. St. B. J. 21 (2023).

\textsuperscript{9} MHL § 1.03 (3).

\textsuperscript{10} [https://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/statistics/mental-illness](https://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/statistics/mental-illness)

According to the NIMH website, the data is from the 2020 National Survey on Drug Use and Health (“NSDUH”) by the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (“SAMHSA”). For inclusion in NSDUH prevalence estimates, mental illnesses include those that are diagnosable currently or within the past year; of sufficient duration to meet diagnostic criteria specified within the 4th edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (“DSM-IV”); and exclude developmental and substance use disorders. Any mental illness (“AMI”) is defined as a mental, behavioral, or emotional disorder. AMI can vary in impact, ranging from no impairment to mild, moderate, and even severe impairment (e.g., individuals with serious mental illness as defined below). Serious mental illness (“SMI”) is defined as a mental, behavioral, or emotional disorder resulting in serious functional impairment, which substantially interferes with or limits one or more major life activities. The burden of mental illnesses is particularly concentrated among those who experience disability due to SMI.

\textsuperscript{11} Insel, *supra*, note 6.
aspect of our mental health system, including the ineffective delivery of care, the gutting of community health services and the reliance on police and jails for crisis services. Insel describes an “epiphany” during his last year at NIMH, after he had delivered a presentation to a group of advocates, touting researchers’ progress on identifying genetic markers for various mental illnesses. A man in a flannel shirt appeared increasingly agitated during the presentation. When the question-and-answer period began, he rose to his feet to ask the Dr. Insel a question: “You really don't get it. My twenty-three-year-old son has schizophrenia. He has been hospitalized five times, made three suicide attempts, and now he is homeless. Our house is on fire,” the man said, “and you are talking about the chemistry of the paint. What are you doing to put out this fire?” Dr. Insel writes that in that moment, “I knew he was right. Nothing my colleagues and I were doing addressed the ever-increasing urgency or magnitude of the suffering millions of Americans were living through — and dying from.”

In March 2020, the Conference of Chief Justices (“CCJ”) and Conference of State Court Administrators (“COSCA”) established the National Judicial Task Force to Examine State Courts’ Response to Mental Illness to “assist state courts in their efforts to more effectively respond to the needs of court involved individuals with severe mental illness.” Former New York Chief Administrative Judge Lawrence K. Marks was a Task Force Co-Chair.

The October 2022 report of the Task Force, State Courts Leading Change, observed:

“Court leaders cannot solve the ‘chaos and heartbreak of mental health in America.’ Court leaders can, and must, however, address the impact of the broken mental health system on the nation’s courts—especially in partnership with behavioral health systems. The broken system too often negatively impacts court cases involving those with mental illness, especially in competency proceedings, criminal and juvenile cases, civil commitment cases, guardianship proceedings for adults and juveniles, and family law cases. Each state court, as well

as CCJ and COSCA, are urged to initiate a thorough examination of the mental health crisis and its impact on fair justice.”

**Creation of Task Force on Mental Health and Trauma Informed Representation**

Recognizing that the mental health crisis confronts our nation, state, localities and court system in profound ways, NYBA President Sherry Levin Wallach conceived and convened a NYSBA “Task Force on Mental Health and Trauma Informed Representation” as one of her first official acts. The mission statement of the Task Force was ambitious and provided:

“The Task Force on Mental Health and Trauma Informed Representation is created to explore, study, and evaluate the intersection between the mental health crisis and our civil and criminal justice systems. There is a well-documented crisis of mental health care in the United States that has failed to meet the needs of people with mental health challenges and/or histories of trauma. People living with mental health challenges or trauma histories are increasingly incarcerated, homeless, or boarded in hospital emergency rooms. They often bear additional burdens and stigma of racial discrimination, sex or gender identity discrimination, and poverty. The task force will focus on the need for the bar to better serve individuals with mental health challenges and/or trauma histories, both adults and children, through trauma-informed practice, such as informing attorneys and the judiciary of available resources to assist in the representation of clients, by raising awareness of intersectional stigma and trauma and by recommending education on best practices in the representation of these clients. Criminal diversion and civil processes will be examined to ensure that people living with mental health challenges and/or trauma histories are able to fully participate in legal proceedings that impact their liberty and well-being. State policy and budget priorities will be examined and appropriate recommendations made.”

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The Task Force membership included lawyers engaged in the private practice, advocates for people with disabilities, criminal law attorneys, attorneys who advise local and state governmental entities delivering mental health services, attorneys with disabilities and attorneys with joint degrees who are practicing psychologists. The Task Force had a psychiatric advisor. With the Committee on Attorney Well-Being, the Task Force co-sponsored the January 18, 2023, NYSBA Presidential Summit where the theme was *Mental Health and the Justice System: Impacts, Challenges, Potential Solutions*. A remarkable conversation with Zack McDermott and his mother, Cindy McGilvrey, authors of the *Gorilla and the Bird: A Memoir of Madness and a Mother’s Love*, was facilitated by Task Force Member Libby Coreno, at the Annual Meeting. That interview provided the audience with a remarkable account and lived experiences of a person who is a practicing lawyer with mental illness.\(^\text{14}\)

When reporting to the House of Delegates on January 20, 2023, Task Force co-chair Joseph Glazer personalized the charge of the Task Force when he said: “I become informed by reading … I become responsive by taking action. We have a responsibility to meet our clients where they are.” The theme of the January/February issue of the New York State Bar Association *Journal* was *Trauma, Mental Health and the Lawyer*. The lead article was written by Task Force member Libby Coreno. Task Force co-chairs Joseph Glazer and Sheila Shea and members Patricia Warth, and Chris Liberati-Conant were also contributors to the *Journal*.\(^\text{15}\) The full Task Force report explores the historical antecedents to the current mental health crisis. It identifies the areas of inquiry that the Task Force undertook and seeks to meet the challenge of President Sherry Levin Wallach who stated in her President’s Message leading the January/February *Journal*:

“There is considerable work to be done to ensure equity and fairness in the justice systems for people with mental illness, trauma and disabilities. We need to have a system of care that is set up to the challenging task of serving clients with complex needs. Our organization must lead and join with others to ensure diversity and equity across all programs designed to improve outcomes for people with mental disabilities who are involved in the criminal justice

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\(^\text{15}\) Task Force member Jamie A. Rosen with Douglas Stern, was subsequently published in the March/April 2023 NYSBA Journal, writing on *The Unique Role of the Guardian in Inpatient Psychiatric Care.95 -Apr N. Y. St. B. J. 43 (2023).*
system. We must act now. Our task force, comprising more than two dozen leaders across New York State, will publish a report in the coming year. A choir of voices and perspectives is needed in every effort to improve court and community responses to individuals with mental disabilities. We need to be among the more prominent voices in that chorus urging reform.”

_Investigation_

The full membership of the Task Force convened regularly commencing in August of 2022, and later broke into separate sub-committees that studied issues pertaining to criminal justice, civil justice, seamless systems and trauma informed practice. It met periodically with experts and advocates to inform its judgments. The Task Force invited the Honorable Matthew D’Emic, Brooklyn Mental Health Court, to be its first guest presenter. Trista Borra, J.D., M.S.W., New York State Unified Court System, Office for Justice Initiatives, Statewide Director, Child Welfare Court Improvement Project (“CWCIP”), Aimee L. Neri, M.S.W., CWCIP 8th Judicial District Coordinator, Bridget O’Connell, J.D., M.S.W., Alternative Dispute Resolution (“ADR”) Coordinator, 5th, 6th, 7th and 8th Judicial Districts and Court of Claims, and Sadie Ishee, J.D., Deputy Chief Attorney, Mental Hygiene Legal Service, First Judicial Department followed to address the Task Force on trauma and informed practices. Stephanie Marquesano, J.D., founder and president of “the harris project,” provided tremendous insights to the Task Force toward promoting co-occurring disorders awareness, prevention and advocacy. Harvey Rosenthal, Executive Director and Luke Sikinyi, Policy Director, New York Association of Psychiatric Rehabilitation Services (“NYAPRS”) offered the Task Force with perspectives from the advocacy community. Cheryl Roberts, Esq., Executive Director, Greenburger Center for Social and Criminal Justice, spoke to the Task Force from multiple perspectives, including as a part-time City Judge implementing justice initiatives in her Columbia County community. Dr. David Moore addressed the Task Force remotely from Australia where he successfully advocated to bring restorative justice principles into practice. The Commissioner of the Office of

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17 Judge Roberts described the Sequential Intercept Model (“SIM”) and explained how Hudson, New York created a SIM map for its community. See Report to Begin Decriminalizing Substance Use Disorders and Serious Mental Illness [Decriminalizing Substance Use Disorders and Serious Mental Illness (cityofhudson.org)](https://cityofhudson.org)
Mental Health (“OMH”), Dr. Ann Marie T. Sullivan addressed the Task Force as did the Commissioner of the Office for People With Developmental Disabilities (“OPWDD”), Kerri Neifeld, through her designee, Dr. Jill Pettinger. Task Force Member Sophie I. Feal, also attended and reported back to the Task Force on the progress of the Attorney General Letitia James’ public hearings on the mental health crisis in New York State. Task Force Members Jeffrey Berman and Sabina Kahn testified at the Attorney General’s New York City hearing.

While the Task Force investigation was ongoing, New York Governor Kathy Hochul released her 2023-2024 Executive Budget proposal on February 2, 2023. The Executive Budget identified many priorities of interest to the Task Force, including:

- $700 million to bolster mental health inpatient, outpatient and residential programs statewide, bringing total investment in mental hygiene sector to $10.5 billion for the upcoming fiscal year.

- $890 million in capital investment to build 3,150 new residential beds for people with mental illness who need varying levels of support.

- Adding 1,000 inpatient beds in the OMH system which is part of a multi-year plan to increase capacity at mental health facilities. Included in this total are 850 acute care beds in psychiatric wards of general hospitals that were “repurposed” during the COVID crisis as medical-surgical beds and 150 new beds in State operated psychiatric hospitals.

- Adding 39 beds at a cost of $11.7 million dollars in the OPWDD system at the former Finger Lakes Developmental Center campus as an intensive treatment option for people with developmental disabilities.

- 2.5 % cost-of-living increases to community based not-for-profit human services providers.

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18 Mental Health Hearing | New York State Attorney General (ny.gov)
On February 16, 2023, the New York State Legislature convened a Joint Legislative Public Hearing on the 2023 Executive Budget Proposal. The Task Force considered the public hearing testimony when rendering its report.20

The Task Force closed its investigation on March 31, 2023, and emerged with recommendations addressed to the Executive, Legislative and Judicial branches of government. An overview of the recommendations follows. The balance of the Task Force report provides context for its recommendations with an appendix of sources considered during its deliberations. The Task Force mission was broad, and the condensed time within which to conduct our inquiry led to a consensus that NYSBA should exercise continuing leadership in this space and consider creating a standing mental health committee that continues this valuable work. This recommendation is not new. On November 18, 2018, the NYSBA Committee on Mandated Representation issued a report and recommendation to establish a task force or standing committee on mental health.21 Part of that goal was realized with the creation of the Task Force on Mental Health and Trauma Informed Representation. The Task Force has completed its work, but there is a need for education and advocacy to continue because the scope of the issues pertaining to mental health and trauma that confront our society are enormous. In our opinion, there is no more persuasive justification for the establishment of a standing mental health committee than the words of Professor Michael Perlin who observed:

“Mental Disability is no longer-if it ever was-an obscure subspeciality of legal practice study. Each of its multiple strands forces us to make hard social policy choices about troubling social issues-psychiatry and social control, the use of institutions, informed consent, personal autonomy, the relationship between public perception and social reality, the many levels of ‘competency,’ the role of free will in the

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20 Joint Legislative Public Hearing on 2023 Executive Budget Proposal: Topic Mental Hygiene | NY State Senate (nysenate.gov)
21 See, Report to the Executive Committee of the New York State Bar Association on the Use and Efficacy of Penal Law 40.15 and Criminal Procedure Law 330.20 and Recommendation to Establish a Mental Health Task Force or Committee (Robert Dean, Chair) (2018). Appendix Document 2
criminal law system, the limits of confidentiality, the protection duty of mental health professionals, the role of power in forensic evaluations. These are all difficult and complex questions that are not susceptible to easy, formulistic answers.”

As the quote from Professor Perlin reminds us, the work of the Task Force only touches upon some of the many issues that are worthy of continued study by the Association.

Overview of Recommendations

Court System

- In his 2023 *State of Our Judiciary* address, Judge Anthony Cannataro, Acting Chief Judge of the State of New York, announced that the court system will create a committee to implement the recommendations from the National Judicial Task Force to Examine State Courts’ Response to Mental Illness (*State Courts Leading Change*). The Task Force supports this initiative and recommends that the newly formed committee include representatives from within the court system, including judges, court personnel, court officers, Americans with Disabilities (“ADA”) compliance officers, and the directors of Attorneys For Children (“AFC”) and Mental Hygiene Legal Service (“MHLS”) programs and outside of the Office of Court Administration (“OCA”), such as prosecutors, public defense providers, legal service organizations and New York’s federally funded protection and advocacy organization, Disability Rights New York (“DRNY”)

- The court system should also study innovations emerging from other states, including Texas and its Judicial Commission on Mental Health (“TJCMH”). The TJCMH has developed literature and tool kits toward connecting people to treatment rather than jails while preserving community safety by diverting non-violent adults and youth with behavioral health issues to less restrictive, more healing environments to promote reform.

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23 [Texas JCMH | Texas Judicial Commission on Mental Health](#)
The Task Force joins in the recommendations of the “Report from the Special Adviser on Equal Justice in the New York State Courts” (the “Johnson Report”) that there be substantial implicit bias training of Judges, court personnel and juries as a high priority of the court system in New York.

The court system should conduct training on implicit bias and disability.

The Task Force agrees that a full-time mental health professional should be engaged by OCA to oversee the implementation of these training programs.

Further, additional funding should be available, especially to smaller communities, for the creation of specialty courts in those areas and for the training of both judicial and non-judicial personnel in the proper operation of those courts.

The court system should collect relevant data regarding the demographics of those involved in the criminal justice system and the outcomes of their cases so that further study can help to continue to improve the goal of equality of justice especially for those who are mentally disabled or a member of a traditionally targeted racial or gender population.

The court system should also develop a methodology to encourage the submission of the ideas and suggestions of individual judges, lawyers, correction officials, and staff as well as those who are directly impacted by the current inequities in the system to improve the system.

OCA should add information and forms to its website guiding users in the process to remove a guardian and to the newly enacted Supported Decision Making statute (“SDM”) as a guardianship alternative.  

24 See, Mental Hygiene Law (“MHL”) Article 82. Surrogate’s Court Article 17-A guardianship forms can be found at: https://ww2.nycourts.gov/forms/surrogates/guardianship.shtml
• OCA should update its guidelines for attorneys accepting guardian ad litem appointments.  

Legislature

• Pass the *Treatment Not Jail Act* (S. 1976, A.1263), or consistent legislation that would provide courts with guided discretion needed to authorize diversion, as opposed to incarceration, for people entangled in our criminal justice system who need services and support for mental disabilities.

• Restore legislative appropriations for the New York State Law Revision Commission (“LRC”) to promote criminal and civil law reform.

• Hold public hearings on particularly vexing problems within the service delivery system such as the boarding of people with multiple disabilities in emergency rooms and hospitals.

• Hold public hearings to study comprehensive and collaborative community responses to people in crisis in formed by studies and models of responses in various jurisdictions.

• Hold public hearings to study the repeal of Social Services Law § 384-b(4)(c) and consideration of a parent’s status as a person with mental illness or intellectual disability in other family court proceedings.

• Hold public hearings on the need for guardianship reform in New York State.

• Introduce legislation to specifically recognize Psychiatric Advance Directives (“PADs”) in New York State.

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25 [Publications Home Page | NYCOURTS.GOV](https://www.nycourts.gov) - Guidelines for Guardian Ad Litem, with Sample Reports and Forms.

26 Legislative Law § 70 is the enabling statute of the New York State Law Revision Commission (“LRC”). The LRC is the oldest continuous agency in the common-law world devoted to law reform through legislation. See, [New York State Law Revision Commission | Revitalizing the law through reform and legislation](https://www.lrc.state.ny.us) Unfortunately, the LRC has not received legislative appropriations for over a decade completely frustrating its laudatory purpose.
Trauma Informed Practice

- The court system and state and local bar associations should be encouraged to develop and implement attorney-focused practicum on mental disabilities and trauma to ensure a consistent and level understanding among practitioners and jurists.

- In conjunction with the New York State Judicial Institute, OCA should sponsor additional and training programs on trauma and trauma informed practices for judges and court attorneys.27

- OCA should also continue to encourage and support trauma informed training for attorneys within the court system working with vulnerable populations including the AFC and MHLS programs.

- The resources of existing model programs within the court system such as the Child Welfare Court Improvement Project (“CWCIP”), with its focus on trauma informed representation, should be promoted and enhanced.

- OCA should also study and implement principles of “restorative justice” in New York State as restorative justice is trauma informed.

- Law Schools should encourage trauma informed approaches in clinical legal education.

Systems Reform

- State and local authorities administering programs for people with mental disabilities should promote “seamless systems” change which would have three components: 1) people with needs being able to connect to the system of care at any point; 2) each point in the various systems of care recognizing their needs and being able to connect them to the proper service providers and supports; and 3) emphasis on maintaining recovery, with person-

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27 Established by Judiciary Law 219-a, the New York State Judicial Institute is a statewide, year-round center for judicial education, training and research. Another goal of the Judicial Institute is to provide a framework for facilitating an improved dialogue between the Judiciary, the practicing bar and the public. Judicial Institute - N.Y. State Courts (nycourts.gov)
centered treatment planning as well as attention to social supports and determinants of health.

- Promote a seamless system that includes and addresses co-occurring disorders, recognizing that individuals in need frequently have multiple or overlapping needs and disabilities.
- Seek alternatives to coercive interventions and promote non-hospital community voluntary crisis stabilization programs.
- Support “peer bridging” as a link between the hospital and a successful discharge plan.
- Promote community investment in supported housing units.
- Recommend that the Office of Mental Health (“OMH”), the Office for People With Developmental Disabilities (“OPWDD”), and the Office of Addiction Services and Supports (“OASAS”) and the Department of Health to collaborate and adopt integrated service regulations without further delay.
- Recommend that OMH and OPWDD operate or fund respite beds for children and adults with disabilities to avoid boarding in hospital emergency rooms.

**Criminal Justice**

- Support courts and communities in the use the Sequential Intercept Model to map resources, opportunities and gaps, and develop plans to improve court and community responses to individuals with mental illness, addiction, developmental disabilities, and co-occurring conditions.
- Advocate for funding and resources needed to implement a continuum of diversion programs, treatment and related services to improve public safety as a more humane and cost-effective approach when individuals with mental illness, addiction, developmental disabilities, and co-occurring conditions interface with the criminal legal system.
- Adequately fund beds in both the OMH and OPWDD systems for inpatient restoration for people in the criminal justice system determined to be incapacitated, while requiring OMH and OPWDD to expand and promote
the clinical infrastructure required to permit outpatient restoration whenever possible.

- Recommend that those people admitted to the hospital or a developmental center for restoration must receive full and co-occurring competent care.

- Recommend an amendment to Article 730 of the Criminal Procedure Law ("CPL") to remove statutory requirement that the District Attorney consent to outpatient restoration, while providing prosecutor with notice and an opportunity to be heard before an outpatient restoration order is issued.

- Promote the development and utilization of community-based alternatives to CPL Article 730, including respite and crisis respite, crisis services and community-based restoration.

- OCA should promulgate official forms to implement CPL Article 730.

- Study and re-examine CPL 330.20 to ensure that it meets its dual objectives of promoting public safety while meeting the treatment needs of people subject to its provisions.

- OCA should update official forms that implement CPL 330 to reflect those commitments can be to either the custody of OMH or OPWDD.

- Foster and support efforts to ensure that diversion and problem-solving courts are linked to service systems that competently, effectively and efficiently serve participants, allowing for better outcomes and the fullest possible application of justice.

- Consistent with the recommendation made in the State Courts Leading Change report, explore, foster and support efforts to deflect and divert people with mental disabilities from the criminal legal system prior to or immediately after arrest.

- Commit to full implementation of Humane Alternatives to Long-Term ("HALT") Solitary Confinement Act and resist efforts to rollback these reforms that are critical to the human and effective treatment of people with mental disabilities who are incarcerated.

Civil Justice

- Promote autonomy of individuals with mental disabilities through supported decision-making principles.
● Introduce legislation to require recognition of PADs even without proxies in all settings, to fund peer and provider trainings to facilitate their use, and to establish means of transmission, such as registries and web-based access.

● Amend MHL Article 81 to explicitly include supporters for decision-making as “available resources” as defined under MHL § 81.03(e), when considering the need for and/or scope of guardianship.

● OMH should convene a working group to review supported decision-making processes in New York State, to promote peer supports and social environments that are conducive to supported decision-making and to explore the possibility of a pilot project relating SDM and psychiatric advance directives.

● OMH and OPWDD should collaborate to further the use of SDM for individuals with dual diagnoses, including any necessary reasonable accommodations, and to address the needs of people who are dually diagnosed when developing the upcoming OPWDD regulations implementing MHL Article 82.

● Promote reform of guardianship statutes in New York State and provide procedural pathways for individuals subject to guardianship to seek modification of existing orders and restoration of rights.

● Promote Single Transaction Orders as a less restrictive intervention than a plenary guardianship.

● Support amendment of the Extreme Risk Protection Order statute, CPLR Article 63-a, to add a right to counsel for respondents.

● Support amendment of the New York State Constitution and related statutes to remove references to “mental hygiene” and adopting a modern nomenclature that does not stigmatize people with mental health conditions and is more reflective of the values of the community.

Accommodations

The Task Force recommends that the court system adopt the following recommendations with respect to disability accommodations:

- Ensure centralized decision-making to reduce inconsistency throughout the court system.
- Establish an administrative review process for all judicial accommodation denials.
• Documentation for judicial accommodation requests should be the same as required for administrative accommodations.
• Place guidelines for reviewing accommodation requests into the Judge’s Desk Book.

The Task Force also endorses a recommendation made by the New York Lawyers Assistance Group (“NYLAG”) in a report it published in 2021 which is that “whenever litigants with disabilities struggle with either in-person or virtual proceedings, the court must consider whether a switch to the other format would serve as an appropriate accommodation.”

NYSBA

• Establish a standing Mental Health Committee to address pronounced systemic issues that may not fit within an existing single Section or Committee’s purview. Elder Law and Special Needs Section, Health Law Section, Committees on Civil Rights, Mandated Representation and Disability Rights should have at least one member serve as a liaison to the standing Mental Health Committee.

I. Historical Antecedents to Current Crisis

Author Andrew Scull writes that if we are to confront the challenges that mental disabilities present to all of us, we shall have to take account of social and

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29 One area of further study for a standing committee is the efficacy of Rule 1.14 of the Rules of Professional Conduct (Client with Diminished Capacity). As a threshold proposition, a lawyer is a representative of a client and an officer of the legal system with special responsibility for the quality of justice (see Rules of Prof. Con., Ref. & Annos, McK. Consol. Laws, Book 29 App). Our Task Force approached its work with urgency to address the quality of justice afforded to people with mental disabilities. The various ethical issues that may confront individual attorneys representing clients with diminished capacity, and Rule 1.14 in particular, is addressed substantially in the NYSBA publication Disability Law and Practice (see Nancy Maurer, Clients with Diminished Capacity) (2013). Disability Law and Practice is currently undergoing revision and publication is anticipated in 2023 or 2024.
political realities. "The decisions to confine the mentally ill to the madhouse and, more recently, to decant them to unwelcoming ‘communities’ have drastically affected what it means to be mentally ill."

Almost sixty years ago, in 1963, the federal Community Mental Health Act (“CMA”) was adopted with great hope and promise. President John F. Kennedy remarked upon passage of the Act “that the mentally ill and the mentally retarded need no longer be alien to our affections or beyond the help of our communities.” The CMA accelerated the process of deinstitutionalization, but what was supposed to be a comprehensive, community-based health care system collapsed under the weight of the Vietnam War, the Watergate scandal and shifting federal priorities. During the Reagan administration, remaining funds for the Act were converted to mental health block grants for the States. From 1981 onward, “the federal government’s reluctant disengagement from mental health policy quickly

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30 Andrew Schull, *Desperate Remedies: Psychiatry's Turbulent Quest to Cure Mental Illness* (2022), 384.
31 *Id.*
32 Public Law 88-164; https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/88/s1576
The legislation is also known as the Community Mental Health Centers Construction Act (“CMHCCA”). The Act established federal funds to help defray the costs of constructing (but not staffing) local clinics. Federal support for staffing, which was administered by the federal department of Health Education and Welfare (“HEW”), was passed in 1965. CMHCCA was a radical break from previous national mental health policy in both the kind of facilities it supported and the degree of direct federal involvement that it represented but did not clearly define the target populations of the community centers or their relationship to other local health-care institutions. *See*, Bonita Weddle, *New York State Archives, Mental Health in New York State 1945-1998, An Historical Overview* (Publication Number 70), text citing to note 54 (publication is not paginated). Appendix Document 3
33 In terms of closing state hospitals and reducing the number of people confined to mental health institutions, the deinstitutionalization movement was an overwhelming success. “Between 1950 and 2000 the number of people with serious mental illness living in psychiatric institutions dropped from almost half a million people to about fifty thousand,” while the number of beds in state and county psychiatric hospitals declined by more than 90%. *See*, Patricia Warth, *Unjust Punishment: The Impact of Incarceration on Mental Health*, 95 Feb-N. Y. St. B. J. 11-12 (2023), citing Alisa Roth, *Insane: America’s Criminal Treatment of Mental Illness* 81,92 (2018).
34 Insel, *supra*, note 6 at p. 28-34. *See*, Weddle, *supra* note 31, text citing to note 69 - The escalating conflict in Vietnam “increasingly occupied attention of President Johnson” and “drained money from social welfare programs.” The pace of center development fell far short of projections. As of early 1967, 26 centers were receiving funding for construction and staffing, when 2,000 centers were projected to open nationwide.
35 *See* Smith, Michelle R. (20 October 2013). *50 years later, Kennedy's vision for mental health not realized, The Seattle Times.*
gave way to determined retreat.”  As noted by Dr. Insel, federal policy failed people with serious mental illness contributing to homelessness, incarceration and early mortality for this population.

Task Force member Patricia Warth echoes this observation and further explains in her compelling article *Unjust Punishment: The Impact of Incarceration on Mental Health*, that in the last quarter of the 20th century, the dramatic reduction of inpatient mental health care was accompanied by an equally dramatic increase in criminalization and incarceration. Often referred to as “transinstitutionalization,” this increase in incarceration was historically unprecedented.

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36 See, Weddle, supra note 31, text citing to notes 172, 173. The federal government’s abdication of responsibility occurred at the same time the states and local governments were confronted with monumental social and economic problems, and as a result was “particularly disastrous for the mentally ill.” Id., citing Gerald N. Grob, *The Mad Among Us* (1994) pp. 286-287.


38 Warth, supra, note 32.

39 In 1973, the United States incarcerated adults at a rate of 161 per 100,000 adults; by 2007, this rate had quintupled to 767 per 100,000. In absolute terms, “the growth in the size of the penal population has been extraordinary; in 2012, the total of 2.23 million people held in U.S. prisons and jails was nearly seven times the number in 1972.” See, Warth, supra note 34, National Research Council 2014, *The Growth of Incarceration in the United States: Exploring Causes and Consequences*, Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, [https://doi.org/10.17226/18613](https://doi.org/10.17226/18613), at 33, 35-36.

40 Sol Wachler & Keri Bagala, *From the Asylum to Solitary: Transinstitutionalization*, 77 Alb. L. Rev. 915 (2014). Patients were also moved from state hospitals to other institutional settings such as nursing homes. Fiscal policy choices incentivized discharges as the New York State Archives report explained. See, Weddle, supra note 31, text citing to note 67. Medicare and Medicaid were created in 1965 and among other things sharply limited Medicaid reimbursement for the cost of care furnished in state hospitals causing “unanticipated and dramatic consequences.” The Hon. Cheryl Roberts, who addressed the Task Force, explains the origins of the federal Institutions of Mental Disease or “IMD Rule,” and its consequences for people with severe mental illness. Judge Roberts argues that federal funding should be restored for certain facilities with bed limitations that would extend the continuum of care, while guarding against abuses of the past. [https://greenburgercenter.org/congress-must-stop-blocking-mental-health-clinics-from-needed-money-cheryl-roberts-nydn-op-ed/](https://greenburgercenter.org/congress-must-stop-blocking-mental-health-clinics-from-needed-money-cheryl-roberts-nydn-op-ed/)
In 1993, New York State adopted its own Community Mental Health Reinvestment Act\(^{41}\) designed to ensure that funds from steadily closing state psychiatric hospital beds followed people living with mental illness back to the community, but the goals of the legislation were not achieved. For example, large numbers of people with mental illness were placed into other types of institutions, including nursing homes and adult homes. This was the result of a “conscious State policy” to discharge patients from psychiatric hospitals into these facilities “due to the absence of other housing alternatives at a time when psychiatric centers were under pressure to downsize.” \(^{42}\) Even now, despite more investment in mental health services, OMH maintains that 3.1 million New Yorker’s live in federal and/or state designated “mental health shortage areas.” \(^{43}\) Innumerable commentators and our own observations as lawyers lead us to conclude that the system of care is broken with unsustainable trends, and partially explained in large part by the lack of resources available to support people with significant mental health needs who are often living in poverty.\(^{44}\)

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\(^{41}\) L. 1993, c. 723 § 9 included community mental health reinvestment services in a five-year plan and annual implementation plans and budgets. See MHL § 41.55; Swidler RN, Tauriello JV, New York State Community Mental Health Reinvestment Act. Psychiatr Serv. 1995 May: 46(5); 496-500. Appendix Document 4 The goals of the 1993 Reinvestment Act were frustrated. Using “notwithstanding” language in many annual state budgets, funds intended to be allocated for local community-based programs were redirected to general government expenses. Contrary to the legislative intent, billions of dollars have not followed people from the inpatient psychiatric hospitals back to their communities and homes.


\(^{42}\) See Disability Advocates, Inc. v Paterson, 598 F. Supp. 2d 289, 297 (E.D.N.Y. 2009).


\(^{44}\) “Although most spending on social services, mental health, and public health flows through - and is reflected in - county budgets, the bulk of the money in those categories comes from state aid, not money the county itself raises or controls. From 2011 to 2019, New York State: cut aid to counties for behavioral health and social services by 8 percent — from $12.3 billion to $11.3 billion; and reduced state spending (that does not flow through county budgets) on human services by 21 percent from 2011 to 2017 and by 26 percent from 2017 to 2018.” see [The Cost of Incarceration in New York State (2021)](https://www.vera.org/publications/the-cost-of-incarceration-in-new-york-state)
II. Task Force Areas of Inquiry

A. Overview - Policy and Practice

Court System

Promoting systemic change in a broad context means contributions from all branches of government are required. Indeed, in the State Courts Leading Change report, it is recommended that a state-level inter-branch mental health task force be established in each state and that the Administrative Office of the court system in each state consider the appointment of a behavioral health director and team to improve court responses for court-involved individuals with serious mental illness. The court system has tremendous incentive to contribute to solving the mental health crisis through specialty courts and other means. The 2023 State of Our Judiciary address includes a section on “Mental Health in Our Courts.” The court system announced it will form a committee to implement the recommendations from the National Judicial Task Force to Examine State Courts’ Response to Mental Illness (State Courts Leading Change). Guided by the National Task Force's report, OCA states it will focus on strengthening its community partnerships and reviewing its existing procedures and protocols to ensure that, in every way possible, the courts are taking an empathetic, humane, and effective approach to mental and behavioral health. The Honorable Matthew D'Emic, who is a pioneer in mental health courts, will chair the OCA committee. Further, the State of the Judiciary address indicates that the blue-ribbon committee will bring together experts, governmental partners, and community leaders to put the recommendations of the National Task Force into practice.

The Task Force endorses the creation of the committee described in the 2023 State of Our Judiciary address. We further recommend that the newly formed

45 See, State Courts Leading Change, supra note 13 at 47.
47 Id. The 2023 State of Our Judiciary speech observes: “Our problem-solving courts - overseen by Judge Toko Serita - include 42 Mental Health Courts across the state, and we have more mental health initiatives in development. The Ninth Judicial District, administered by Judge Anne E. Minihan, recently launched a misdemeanor wellness mental health court in Westchester County to complement its existing felony mental health court. And, in the Fourth Judicial District, supervised by Administrative Judge Felix J. Catena, Essex County recently opened a Superior Part for Mental Health Treatment.”
committee include representatives from within the court system, including, judges, court personnel, court officers, Americans with Disabilities (“ADA”) compliance officers, and the directors of Attorneys For Children (“AFC”) and Mental Hygiene Legal Service (“MHLS”) programs and outside of OCA, such as prosecutors, public defense providers, legal service organizations and New York’s federally funded protection and advocacy organization, Disability Rights New York (“DRNY”). The Task Force further observes that the Texas Judicial Commission on Mental Health (“TJCMH”) is a potential model for an OCA-sponsored Task Force within the New York judiciary. The TJCMH devotes itself toward connecting people to treatment rather than jail while preserving community safety by diverting non-violent adults and youth with behavioral health issues to less restrictive, more healing environments.

The OCA plan to invest further resources to mental health courts is desperately needed. The Task Force is mindful, though, that contrary to general assumptions, mental illness is not considered a risk factor for criminal conduct. Mental health courts work, but as Carol Fisler, a New York City-based consultant and formerly with the Center for Court Innovation argues, more research is needed to identify the current aspects of court design and operations that should be emphasized while at the same time introducing new program elements based upon research findings.

Finally, any discussion of problems in the justice system would be remiss if it did not highlight rampant racial inequity and injustice. A recent study commissioned by former Chief Judge DiFiore and conducted by former Homeland Security Secretary Jeh Johnson entitled “Report from the Special Adviser on Equal Justice in the New York State Courts” (the “Johnson Report”) remarked that:

“The sad picture that emerges is in effect, a second-class system of justice for people of color in New York State. This is not new. In 1991, a Minorities Commission appointed by then Chief Judge Wachtler declared ‘there are two justice systems at work in the

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51 Id. at p. 11.
courts of New York State, one for Whites and a very different one for minorities and the poor.”

The Johnson Report also highlighted what it referred to as “the vile, racist Facebook posting by a Brooklyn-based court officer” which it said “appears to have peeled the lid off long-simmering racial tensions and intolerance within the court officer community” noting that that situation had also been mentioned in the 1991 Minorities Commission report.

For Black, Indigenous, People of Color (BIPOC), or those in the LGBTQIA+ community who live with a mental health condition, racism and prejudice can exacerbate their challenges. The stigma of mental illness is intersectional: a person’s race, ethnicity gender, social class, age or housing status in addition to their mental health diagnosis, generates differing stigma experiences. For example, even if two people have the same diagnosis (e.g., bipolar disorder) a young and homeless BIPOC living in poverty is exposed to more extensive stigmatization than a young White non-Latinx middle-class person who is stably housed. Moreover, due to the shameful legacy of racism and discrimination, Black and Brown communities are more impacted by poverty and less likely to receive adequate treatment for underlying mental health issues. Mental health diagnoses such as major depression go undiagnosed and untreated at disproportionately greater rates in majority Black and Latinx communities.\(^{52}\) The same systemic failures that propagate generational poverty and mental illness also make it more likely for impacted people to be unable to access therapeutic services.\(^{53}\)

The emerging literature on the family and community effects of mass incarceration points to negative health impacts on the female partners and children of incarcerated men and raises concerns that excessive incarceration could harm entire communities and thus might partly underlie health disparities both in the USA and between the USA and other developed countries. The Johnson Report also mentions that “countless interviewees told us that mandatory implicit bias and cultural sensitivity training is long overdue for judicial and non-judicial

\(^{52}\) Racial Disparities In Diagnosis and Treatment of Major Depression, Blue Cross Blue Shield, May 31, 2022, Racial Disparities in Diagnosis and Treatment of Major Depression (bcbs.com

\(^{53}\)https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5192088/#:~:text=Barriers%20to%20Accessing%20and%20Using%20Mental%20Health%20Services&text=It%20is%20estimated%20that%20among,and%20even%20fewer%20complete%20treatment
personnel in the New York State court system. At present, it appears that such training is both inconsistent and insufficient."

The Task Force joins in the recommendations of the “Report from the Special Adviser on Equal Justice in the New York State Courts” (the “Johnson Report”) that there be substantial implicit bias training of Judges, court personnel and juries as a high priority of the court system in New York. Training is also needed to ensure that courts take an empathetic, humane, and effective approach to mental and behavioral health. The Task Force agrees that a full-time mental health professional should be engaged by OCA to oversee the implementation of these training programs. Additional funding should be available, especially to smaller communities, for the creation of specialty courts in those areas and for the training of both judicial and non-judicial personnel in the proper operation of those courts.

The court should collect relevant data regarding the demographics of those involved in the criminal justice system and the outcomes of their cases so that further study can help to continue to improve the goal of equality of justice especially for those who are mentally disabled or a member of a traditionally targeted racial or gender population. While this information should be made public, such transparency should be accomplished in a manner sensitive to the immigration status or other collateral consequences impacting disenfranchised people. The court system should also develop a methodology to encourage the submission of the ideas and suggestions of individual judges, lawyers, correction officials, and staff as well as those who are directly impacted by the current inequities in the system to improve the system.

Executive

In the narratives that follow, the Task Force will explain that the “O” agencies comprising the Department of Mental Hygiene in New York will likely spend near $10.5 billion dollars in fiscal year 2024 to meet the needs of more than 1,000,000 people with mental disabilities in New York State. 54 This sizeable investment includes a 17% budget increase for OMH which Commissioner Sullivan characterized as “historic” during her testimony before the Joint Legislative Committee on February 16, 2023. While the investment is desperately needed, it must also be smart to achieve its objectives.

Legislature

54 Briefing Book | FY 2023 Executive Budget (ny.gov)
a. **Hold public hearings on emergent critical issues in the service delivery system.**

The Legislature should consider holding public hearings to address tragic gaps in the system of care that result, for example, in teens and young adults boarding in hospital emergency rooms when community supports could not be marshaled to prevent a crisis or establish a safe discharge plan. In one reported case, a teenager with intellectual disabilities spent over 36 days in the emergency room at the Champlain Valley Physicians Hospital in Plattsburgh, New York.\(^5^5\) Regrettably, these and similar cases repeat themselves in substantial numbers and at great harm as well documented by both the American College of Emergency Room Physicians and thirty-four other signatories on a November 22, 2022 letter to the Biden Administration (on a national level) and the Healthcare Association of New York State ("HANYS").\(^5^6\) HASNY observes that hospitals across the country and in New York have reported an alarming rise in patients who become caught in limbo in emergency departments and inpatient units for weeks, months, and even years after they are medically ready for discharge. These delays most often occur due to a lack of care options, the inability to pay for post-discharge care and/or administrative gridlock. Complex case discharge delays, also known as bed blocking or boarding, are devastating for patient, exacerbate bed shortages and result in enormous unnecessary costs. Some of the longest delays are experienced by children with mental health needs and people with developmental disabilities.\(^5^7\)

Another urgent area for study by the Legislature is the response to mental health crisis calls in the community. This is an issue of federal, state and local concern. On the federal level, on May 25, 2022, the Biden Administration issued Executive Order ("E.O.") \(^14074\) entitled *Advancing Effective, Accountable Policing and Criminal Justice Practices to Enhance Public Trust and Public Safety*. Section 14 of E.O. 14074 provides:

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\(^5^5\) *See, MHLS v Delaney*, 176 A.D. 3d 24 (3d Dept. 2019), *appl dismissed*, 38 N.Y.3d 1076 (2022)


The psychiatric advisor to the Task Force, Dr. Laura Gardner, also shared a letter sent by the American College of Emergency Physicians and 34 other signatories to the Biden Administration explaining the national scope and tremendous personal and economic costs associated with maintaining people in emergency rooms and hospitals without medical need. Appendix Document 5

\(^5^7\) The Seamless Systems section of this report will further explain the crisis and describe a potential response in Massachusetts that New York may wish to study.
“Promoting Comprehensive and Collaborative Responses to Persons in Behavioral or Mental Health Crisis. (a) Within 180 days of the date of this order, the Attorney General and the Secretary of HHS, in coordination with the heads of other agencies and after consultation with stakeholders, including service providers, nonprofit organizations, and law enforcement organizations, as appropriate, shall assess and issue guidance to State, Tribal, local, and territorial officials on best practices for responding to calls and interacting with persons in behavioral or mental health crisis or persons who have disabilities.

(b) The assessment made under subsection (a) of this section shall draw on existing evidence and include consideration of co-responder models that pair law enforcement with health or social work professionals; alternative responder models, such as mobile crisis response teams for appropriate situations; community-based crisis centers and the facilitation of post-crisis support services, including supported housing, assertive community treatment, and peer support services; the risks associated with administering sedatives and pharmacological agents such as ketamine outside of a hospital setting to subdue individuals in behavioral or mental health crisis (including an assessment of whether the decision to administer such agents should be made only by individuals licensed to prescribe them); and the Federal resources, including Medicaid, that can be used to implement the identified best practices.”

On February 7, 2023, a coalition of advocates wrote to the Department of Justice to emphasize their commitment to alternative unarmed responders for crisis calls involving vulnerable populations - including people with mental health conditions, deaf people, autistic people, and people with intellectual and developmental disabilities. The letter noted that these populations are at heightened risk for harm from police encounters, which can often turn deadly.

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58 [Federal Register :: Advancing Effective, Accountable Policing and Criminal Justice Practices To Enhance Public Trust and Public Safety](https://www.federalregister.gov/a/2023-03632)

59 The coalition was comprised of The Leadership Conference, Legal Defense Fund, Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law, National Urban League, Human Rights Watch, NAACP, the Arc of the United States, and the Vera Institute of Justice. Appendix Document 6
especially when the person involved is Black. The advocates further observed that the risk of harm to the vulnerable individual is so great, and the actual threat to public safety usually small, that law enforcement response to a mental health crisis be avoided whenever possible. The advocates letter to the President highlighted local communities, including Albany County, New York, that have piloted programs where unarmed teams answer 911 calls that would otherwise receive a police response by default.

During our investigation, the Task Force considered various studies and bills that could lead to crisis response and systems reform in New York State. We endorse the following (12) fundamental guiding principles for developing or modifying response systems that currently place people with mental illness in danger. The principles emerge from the John Jay College of Criminal Justice, Disability Rights New York report Systems in Crisis Identifying Critical Issues in Response to Mental Health Crisis Calls:

1. Replacement of Police Officers as First Responders

Review the legal, ethical and cultural factors that support replacement of police officers as first responders in the majority of circumstances where a call for assistance for a person in acute mental health crisis has been made.

2. Engage Community Stakeholders

Engage diverse stakeholders to discuss a non-police response model. Communities are urged to take the time required to accomplish such engagement and digest the information gained during the engagement process. Stakeholders must be kept apprised of all critical benchmarks in the development process. Communities should not succumb to demands for identification of a model and plan for implementation by federal or state entities which provide an inadequate timeline in which to make critical decisions. Stakeholders must avoid the “us vs. them” distinctions between the community at large and people with mental illness. It should be recognized by all stakeholders that people with mental illness are members of the community that members of the community may have current or past

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60 Citing, Legal Defense Fund & Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law, Advancing An Alternative to Police: Community-Based Services for Black People with Mental Illness (2022) Appendix Document 7

61 https://www.albanycounty.com › home › showpublisheddocument › 22105 (Albany County Crisis Officials Responding and Diverting [ACCORD])

mental illness, and that police officers also develop mental illness. By breaking down these barriers and acknowledging that mental health crisis can occur to anyone, stakeholders can consider what kind of crisis response they would want for themselves or their loved ones.

3. Utilize Data

Utilize a data-driven approach to develop alternative response models. Consider patterns of response outcomes in individual neighborhoods and particularized impact on BIPOC individuals. Where relevant data is not immediately available, every effort should be made to access such data before critical determinations are made regarding the models being considered.

4. Create the Model That is Right for Your Community

Evaluate the unique cultural dynamics of the community to develop a model for respond to community members needing mental health assistance. This includes attaining stakeholder input about community goals and priorities, examining other successful models, and exploring new creative solutions and the means to attain them.

5. Work for Consensus on Community Safety

Seek consensus, based on feedback from diverse stakeholders, about what factors will be used to determine when dispatchers shift from initiating a presumptive non-police response to initiating a high-acuity response that includes police officers. Community discussion must consider the harms that result from addressing mental health crisis from a criminal perspective.

6. Carefully Consider Mechanism of Dispatch

Careful consideration should be given to how a caller places a request for assistance. Where the traditional 9-1-1 system is being considered, stakeholders must acknowledge that the police department, using traditional dispatch protocols within its purview, may maintain a high level of control over response determinations. Where an alternative number and/or platform for communication is being considered, a protocol for collaborative evaluation of some calls for assistance will be required. Where stakeholders are considering an alternative number/platform, they must consider the need for a robust public education campaign to inform the public when and how the new system is to be accessed. Stakeholders must consider developing the right professional profile for dispatch
personnel, and the need for robust and continuing training which integrates dispatch personnel into training provided to response team members.

7. Identify the Right Professionals for First Response

First response should include a multidisciplinary team of professionals who are uniquely suited to the important task of safely assisting people in acute mental health crisis. Team members may include mental health professionals, emergency services professionals and peer specialists whose skills compliment and support those of other team members. Communities should not rule out creation of team positions for individuals who combine elements of these disciplines and others, providing for development of a specialized vocation ideally suited to the agreed-upon standards of community stakeholders, including people with mental illness.

8. Incorporate Robust and Sustained Training

Training must be comprehensive and reinforced to regularly incorporate information derived from stakeholder experiences. Training should be culturally competent and explicitly trauma informed, including the implications of vicarious trauma. Training should place the work in a historical context, encouraging understanding of how police culture and the experiences of BIPOC community members’ impact on behaviors exhibited during response. Wherever practicable, team members should be trained together to enhance the value of multidisciplinary exchange and support team cohesion. Training should adhere to the principles of “recovery-oriented” services that de-emphasizes coercion and emphasizes participant choice whenever possible, so that crisis workers are not used as de-facto police officers.

9. Revise Training for Police Officers Responding to High-Acuity Calls

Where police officers in new response models will respond only in designated high-acuity situations and in the context of a team response model, police officer training should be revised to reflect the role of the police officers in relation to other team members. Police officer training should also be immediately adapted to incorporate information (as set forth above) regarding the intersections of mental health and race, the unique impacts of such events on BIPOC communities, the impacts of such events on children with mental illness, and the need to view all people in crisis as representative of multiple identities. Police training must be regularly
updated and, to every degree practicable, integrated into the training of other team members and dispatchers with whom they will partner.

10. Adopt A Presumption Against Non-Confinement

Communities should develop a model that embraces a presumption against non-confinement, including emergency admission into acute care facilities, where other available options are appropriate. Inherent in this presumption is a community commitment to develop and cultivate mental health services and supportive housing options. Response team training should consistently emphasize this presumption.

11. Incorporate Localized Mental Health Services

Stakeholders should examine existing neighborhood mental health services and cultivate and support expansion of creative new services by highly localized providers that support objectives of the chosen model. Where commitment of resources to a new response model is matched with commitment to highly localized non-acute mental health services, the potential for acute mental health crises, and the potential for tragedy, will be reduced.

12. Commit to Transparency and Adaptation

Communities should commit to full transparency in reports back to the community on model successes and failures. This commitment must include addressing any deficiencies in modification of original policies and procedures, with priority given to those which directly impact on the safety of people in mental crisis and response team members.63

b. Restore funding for Law Revision Commission.

The Legislature should restore appropriations for the New York State Law Revision Commission ("LRC"). Defunded since 2016, the LRC is the oldest continuous agency in the common-law world devoted to law reform through legislation. Among many other initiatives, the LRC was the drafter of the Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1980 and Article 81 of the MHL, the general guardianship statute in our state. The Task Force makes several recommendations for further study and possible legislative reform and the LRC should be a partner in these endeavors.

c. Hold public hearings to study the repeal of Social Services Law § 384-b(4)(c) and consideration of a parent’s status as a person with mental illness or intellectual disability in other family court proceedings.

In the mid-1970s, New York enacted its contemporary law governing the termination of parental rights, Social Services Law § 384-b. Under § 384-b(4)(c), a court may terminate a parent’s rights if they “are presently and for the foreseeable future unable, by reason of mental illness or intellectual disability, to provide proper and adequate care for a child who has been in the care of an authorized agency for the period of one year immediately prior to the date on which the petition is filed in the court ….” In the years 2006 - 2008, between 346 and 296 petitions to terminate parental rights were brought in New York on the ground of mental illness or intellectual disability.

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64 New York State Law Revision Commission | Revitalizing the law through reform and legislation


66 L. 1992, c. 698. A three-year study by the LRC led to the enactment of MHL Article 81. The statute repealed and replaced New York’s conservator and committee statutes (former Articles 77 and 78 of the MHL).

67 Social Services Law § 384-b(6)(a) defines the term “mental illness” and 384-b(6)(b) defines the term “intellectual disability.”

68 Mental Health Association of New York State, Termination of Parental Rights Bill Update (June 5, 2009).

In 2009, a coalition of organizations advocated for the elimination of this ground for termination of parental rights. As noted in a statement in support of S.2835/A.6668, when the law was drafted in 1975, “it would have been difficult to predict the changes that have taken place over the last thirty-five years for individuals with psychiatric disabilities. The thought process in 1975 was that these are static conditions that could not be changed. As we know now, nothing could be further from the truth.” The coalition stated that, “[t]o use mental illness as grounds for permanent termination is an archaic vestige of an outmoded and discredited view of mental disabilities still reflected by a law written almost forty years ago. It is a discriminatory practice that treats people with psychiatric disabilities and developmental disabilities as second-class citizens without the same rights as individuals without these disabilities.” A similar bill has been proposed as recently as 2018.

Several articles have addressed the discriminatory nature of New York’s law. In addition to the problems with focusing on the status of the parent as a person with a mental illness or intellectual disability, “New York courts have

69 https://assembly.state.ny.us/leg/?default_fld=&leg_video=&bn=A06668&term=2009&Summary=Y&Actions=Y&Memo=Y&Text=Y

70 Mental Health Association of New York State, Termination of Parental Rights Bill Update (June 5, 2009).


72 At least one author has concluded that “New York’s law is also discriminatory in that it allows a court to terminate parental rights on the basis of status; without services, parents with mental disabilities cannot demonstrate their individual capabilities, and judges therefore cannot make decisions based on the mental illness instead of the parent’s individual capabilities.” Margolin, 15 VA J Soc Pol’y & L at 170. See also Leslie Francis, Maintaining the Legal Status of People with Intellectual Disabilities as Parents: The ADA and the CRPD, 57 Fam Court Rev 21 (2019)
consistently decided not to read the reasonable efforts requirement into the part of the statute governing cases of mental illness.” (citing Matter of Jammie “CC,” 149 A.D.2d 822 (3d Dept 1989).

In 2017, the American Bar Association’s House of Delegates adopted Resolution 114 urging all governments:

“to enact legislation and implement public policy providing that custody, visitation, and access shall not be denied or restricted, nor shall a child be removed or parental rights be terminated, based on a parent’s disability, absent a showing—supported by clear and convincing evidence—that the disability is causally related to a harm or an imminent risk of harm to the child that cannot be alleviated with appropriate services, supports, and other reasonable modifications.”

The New York State Legislature should hold public hearings to study whether § 384-b(4)(c) should be repealed. This study should also address whether other statutes or caselaw permit the family court to consider a parent’s status as a person with mental illness or intellectual disability in a way that does not reflect current understanding of such disabilities and the resources available to support parents.73

**Recommendations**

- The Task Force endorses creation of a committee within the court system to implement the recommendations from the National Judicial Task Force to Examine State Courts’ Response to Mental Illness. The Task Force recommends that the newly formed committee include representatives from within the court system, including, judges, court personnel, court officers, Americans with Disabilities (“ADA”) compliance officers, and the directors of Attorneys For Children (“AFC”) and Mental Hygiene Legal Service (“MHLS”) programs and outside of OCA, such as prosecutors, public defense providers, legal service organizations and New York’s federally funded protection and advocacy organization, Disability Rights New York (“DRNY”).

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• The court system should study innovations emerging from other states, including Texas and its Judicial Commission on Mental Health (“TJCMH”). The TJCMH has developed literature and tool kits toward connecting people to treatment rather than jails while preserving community safety by diverting non-violent adults and youth with behavioral health issues to less restrictive, more healing environments to promote reform.

• The Task Force joins in the recommendations of Secretary Johnson that substantial quality training of Judges, court personnel and juries on implicit bias should be a high priority of the court system in New York.

• The court system should conduct training on implicit bias and disability.

• The Task Force agrees that a full-time mental health professional should be engaged by OCA to oversee the implementation of these training programs.

• Further, additional funding should be available, especially to smaller communities, for the creation of specialty courts in those areas and for the training of both judicial and non-judicial personnel in the proper operation of those courts.

• The court system should collect relevant data regarding the demographics of those involved in the criminal justice system and the outcomes of their cases so that further study can help to continue to improve the goal of equality of justice especially for those who are mentally disabled or a member of a traditionally targeted racial or gender population.

• The court system should also develop a methodology to encourage the submission of the ideas and suggestions of individual judges, lawyers, correction officials, and staff as well as those who are directly impacted by the current inequities in the system to improve the system.

• The Legislature should hold public hearings on particularly vexing problems within the service delivery system such as the boarding of people with multiple disabilities in emergency rooms and hospitals.

• The Legislature should public hearings to study comprehensive and collaborative community responses to people in crisis in formed by studies and models of responses in various jurisdictions.
• The Legislature should hold public hearings to study the repeal of Social Services Law § 384-b(4)(c) and consideration of a parent’s status as a person with mental illness or intellectual disability in other family court proceedings.

• The Legislature should restore appropriations for the LRC to promote criminal and civil law reform.

B. Trauma Informed Practices

“On its most basic level, trauma occurs when an event happens to an individual, or group, over which they have no control, with little power to change their circumstances, and which overwhelms their ability to cope...”

The Task Force endeavored to define trauma as a foundational exercise upon which to build recommendations. The American Psychological Association defines trauma as “[A]n emotional response to a terrible event like an accident, rape, or natural disaster.” Task Force member Dr. Robert Goldman, J.D., Psy.D., defines trauma as “a deeply distressing or disturbing event that has long-lasting effects on an individual's mental, emotional, and physical well-being. A single event, such as a car accident or a natural disaster, or prolonged exposure to traumatic circumstances, such as abuse, crime, or combat can cause it. Trauma can manifest in various ways, including anxiety, depression, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and, most notably, crime.”

Comprehensive research has found that multiple childhood traumatic events have lifelong impact on those subjected to them. Often referred to as “ACEs” (adverse childhood experiences), a study conducted in the mid-1990s by the Centers for Disease Control and the Kaiser Foundation determined the long-

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74 Libby Coreno, Trauma, Mental Health the Lawyer, 95-Feb. N. Y. St. B.J. 8 (2023).
75 http://apa.org/search?query=trauma
term impact of childhood trauma. Specifically, the collaborative study of hundreds of thousands of Kaiser Permanente patients, led by pediatrician Dr. Nadine Burke Harris and conducted between 1995 and 1997, was the first to examine the relationship between early childhood adversity and negative lifelong health effects. The research found that the long-term impact of ACEs determined future health risks, chronic disease, and premature death. Individuals who had experienced multiple ACEs also faced higher risks of depression, addiction, obesity, attempted suicide, mental health disorders, and other health concerns. It also revealed that ACEs were surprisingly common – almost two-thirds of respondents, part of the white, well-off sample, reported at least one ACE. While the study demonstrated a high prevalence of trauma sustained by children, adults can frequently be traumatized as well. And the impact of trauma manifests for years to come, especially if undiagnosed and unresolved.77

As Task Force member Libby Coreno noted in her lead article in January/February 2023 NYSBA Journal, Trauma, Mental Health and the Lawyer, there is no question that anyone who traverses the legal system - particularly the criminal justice system or our family courts - is at risk for exposure to trauma. She quotes Natalie Netzel, who states that:

“On its most basic level, trauma occurs when an event happens to an individual, or group, over which they have no control, with little power to change their circumstances, and which overwhelms their ability to cope...”78

New research suggests that experiencing psychological trauma at a young age nearly triples a person’s risk to suffer from mental illness in the future, with researchers thus concluding that trauma can be considered a “transdiagnostic construct”79 Dr. Goldman observes that research has shown that there is a strong link between trauma and criminal behavior.80 Further, Dr. Goldman argues that

77 See, Sheila E. Shea Joseph A. Glazer, 50 Years After Willowbrook: Mental Disabilities and the Law in New York State, 95 Feb-N. Y. St. B. J. 17 (2023) and the authorities cited therein.  
78 Libby Coreno, Trauma, Mental Health the Lawyer, 95-Feb. N. Y. St. B.J. 8 (2023).  
79 See, Massive review study suggests psychological trauma nearly triples a person’s risk of mental disorder, PsyPost, 1/10/23  
the current criminal justice system can be retraumatizing to individuals who have experienced trauma in a number of ways. Some examples include:

1. Re-victimization: The process of reporting a crime, going through a trial, and facing the offender can be re-traumatizing for the victim, especially if they are not provided with appropriate support and resources.

2. Lack of sensitivity: Many criminal justice professionals may not be trained to recognize the signs and symptoms of trauma and may not understand the impact their words or actions can have on a trauma survivor.

3. Re-traumatization during incarceration: Prisons and jails can be high-stress environments that can trigger memories and feelings of past traumatic experiences for individuals who have been incarcerated.

4. Inadequate mental health care: Individuals with trauma-related mental health conditions may not receive appropriate care while in the criminal justice system, leading to an increased likelihood of reoffending and perpetuation of their trauma.

5. Stigma: Trauma survivors may be stigmatized by criminal justice professionals, which can further compound the feelings of shame, guilt, and isolation they may already be experiencing.

Dr. Goldman credits the many criminal justice professionals and organizations who are working to address these issues and implement trauma-informed practices to minimize the re-traumatization of individuals in the criminal justice system. The Task Force also heard from people engaged intimately in trauma informed practices at OCA. Our members were greatly influenced by the presentations of Trista Borra, J.D., Statewide Director, Child Welfare Court Improvement Project (“CWCIP”), Aimee L. Neri, M.S.W., the CWCIP 8th Judicial District Coordinator, Bridget O’Connell, J.D., M.S.W., an Alternative Dispute Resolution Coordinator, and Sadie Ishee, J.D., Deputy Chief Attorney, Mental Hygiene Legal Service, First Judicial Department, who have brought trauma informed principles from theory to practice.  

81 Families involved in the family court system often experience trauma, particularly during the course of custody and visitation, abuse and neglect, permanency, and termination of parental
Court system employees can also experience vicarious trauma. The October 22, 2022, *Leading Change* report observes that sixty-three percent of judges have at least one symptom of secondary or vicarious trauma and fifty percent of court child protection staff experience high or very high levels of compassion fatigue. Recognizing the enormous implications of trauma for litigants, attorneys, and court personnel, the Task Force recommends training judges, court personnel and attorneys in relation to trauma.

In this regard, trauma-informed care for judges refers to an approach to the administration of justice that recognizes the prevalence of trauma among those who intersect with the legal system. It acknowledges the impact that trauma can have on their experiences and behaviors. In a trauma-informed judicial system, judges, and other court personnel are trained to understand the effects of trauma and how it can influence an individual’s interactions with the legal system. This includes recognizing signs of trauma in litigants, witnesses, and other participants in the justice process and making steps to mitigate the re-traumatization that can occur because of judicial proceedings.

A trauma-informed judicial system also involves creating a safe and supportive environment in the courtroom. This can include providing clear and understandable information about the judicial process to litigants, avoiding practices that could be anticipated to retraumatize individuals, and making reasonable accommodations to support the participation of individuals who have experienced trauma. The goal of a trauma-informed approach to justice is to improve the experiences of litigants and others who participate in the judicial rights proceedings. The ongoing work of the CWCIP to bring trauma informed principles to family courts is encouraging and should be expanded to local child protective services agencies and the New York State Office of Children and Family Services. There is substantial work that needs to be done within the child welfare and family court systems to avoid stigmatization of parents with mental illness or intellectual disabilities.

82 *State Courts Leading Change, supra,* note 13, at p 41.
process to better ensure that justice is served and to promote healing and recovery for individuals who have experienced trauma.

The components of trauma-informed training for judges typically include the following:

1. **Understanding trauma**: Judges and court personnel are trained to understand the nature and effects of trauma, including the biological, psychological, and social impacts of traumatic experiences.

2. **Recognizing trauma**: Participants in the training learn how to recognize signs of trauma in individuals who interact with the court system, and to respond in a way that minimizes re-traumatization.

3. **Creating a safe environment**: Training focuses on creating a safe, supportive and respectful environment in the court, where individuals who have experienced trauma can participate effectively.  

4. **Minimizing re-traumatization**: Judges and court personnel are trained to understand how court proceedings and practices can retraumatize individuals and to take steps to minimize this risk.

5. **Trauma-informed communication**: Training teaches participants to communicate in a trauma-informed manner, including avoiding language and practices that might retraumatize individuals.

The research findings published by Duke University provide clear examples of trauma-informed practice. One recommendation is to reimagine the courtroom. Judges described the need to “soften” the courtroom environment, structurally and procedurally. Regarding structure, several judges expressed support for the use of round conference tables in the well of the courtroom to discuss disposition decisions. They described situations in which it would be beneficial to come off the bench, perhaps without a robe on, and join courtroom participants at their same level to discuss next steps and solutions together. As for procedural changes, several judges noted the need to re-think who is in the courtroom and when. As one judge questioned: “I don’t know what effect it might have if we have a murder case and the next case behind it is a kid who got in a fight in school . . . and they’re seeing the murder defendant walking out in chains. Does that affect them?” Taking intentional steps toward creating an environment that is calming, supportive, and not re-traumatizing is an essential component of a trauma-informed courtroom.  

[https://judicature.duke.edu/articles/trauma-informed-judicial-practice-from-the-judges-perspective/#:~:text=All%20judges%20recognized%20prioritization%20of,that%20courtroom%20in%20the%20future](https://judicature.duke.edu/articles/trauma-informed-judicial-practice-from-the-judges-perspective/#:~:text=All%20judges%20recognized%20prioritization%20of,that%20courtroom%20in%20the%20future)
individuals, and using language that is clear, respectful and not stigmatizing.

6. **Understanding and addressing trauma in diverse populations:** Participants learn about the unique experiences and needs of individuals from diverse populations who have experienced trauma, and how to address their needs in a culturally responsive manner.

7. **Preparing judges:** Preparing judges to address traumatic triggers in various contexts.

8. **Self-care:** Training often includes components of self-care, to help judges and court personnel manage the emotion and psychological impact of working with individuals who have experienced trauma.  

The specific components of training for trauma-informed care for judges may vary, but the goal is always to improve the experiences of individuals who encounter the court system and to promote healing and recovery for those who have experienced trauma. Toward this end, video-hearings and trauma informed practices in remote environments must be considered and ongoing study is warranted.  

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85 *Id.*, in part drawn from the “4Rs” of the SAMSHA trauma informed care approach. *Realizing* the prevalence of trauma and potential pathways for recovery; *recognizing* signs and symptoms of trauma in the people who come through the courtroom; *responding* by integrating knowledge of trauma into practice; and actively *resisting* re-traumatization. [https://ncsacw.acf.hhs.gov/userfiles/files/SAMHSA_Trauma.pdf](https://ncsacw.acf.hhs.gov/userfiles/files/SAMHSA_Trauma.pdf)

86 During the COVID crisis, physical distancing measures required courts to quickly adapt operations, the National Center for State Courts (‘NCSC’) saw an opportunity to examine the experience of families and child welfare court professionals in virtual hearings. With support from Annie E. Casey Foundation Inc. and Casey Family Programs, NCSC began a study that aimed to describe how families and court professionals experienced online court proceedings through the lenses of procedural fairness, access, and judicial engagement. The report of the study is found here: [https://judicature.duke.edu/articles/best-practices-for-trauma-informed-virtual-hearings/](https://judicature.duke.edu/articles/best-practices-for-trauma-informed-virtual-hearings/)
Lawyers must also engage in a professional shift from self-care to mutual care as so persuasively described by Libby Coreno. Tremendous work was done by NYSBA’s Task Force on Attorney Well-Being which noted in its October 2021 report: “While the well-being of lawyers may seem like an individual’s lawyer’s problem, the data has been sounding an alarm for the better part of three decades that the training, culture, and economics of law contribute exponentially to the suffering in our profession.” NYSBA has newly formed a Committee on Attorney Well-Being and has begun to cultivate new training programs for NYSBA members that focus on issue awareness and professional skill development - targeting the existential struggles, traumas and isolation that lead to suffering in our profession. This essential work must continue.

Finally, the Task Force encourages law schools and clinical legal education programs to implement trauma informed practices. The hallmarks of trauma-informed practice are when the practitioner puts the realities of the client's trauma experiences at the forefront in engaging with the client and adjusts the practice approach informed by the individual client's trauma experience. Trauma-informed practice also encompasses the practitioner employing modes of self-care to counterbalance the effect the client's trauma experience may have on the practitioner. Teaching trauma-informed practice in law school clinics furthers the goals of clinical teaching and is a critical aspect of preparing law students for legal careers.

Clinical professors Sarah Katz and Deeya Haldar⁸⁷ argue that teaching trauma-informed practice in law school clinics furthers the goals of clinical teaching and is a critical aspect of preparing law students for legal careers. According to the authors, trauma-informed practice is relevant to many legal practice areas and while clinical professors endeavor to teach students how to connect with their clients, equally challenging and important is helping students cultivate insight into identifying and addressing trauma and its effects. It is particularly crucial that law students be educated the effects of vicarious trauma and help them develop tools to manage its effects as they move through their clinical work and ultimately into legal practice.⁸⁸ At least four benefits can be anticipated:

1. **Better understanding of clients:** Trauma can have a significant impact on individuals, and a trauma-informed approach can help law students better

⁸⁸ *Id.* at p. 361.
understand the experiences of their clients and the challenges they may face in legal proceedings.

2. *Improved client outcomes*: By teaching trauma-informed practices, it can be anticipated that law students will learn to work more effectively with clients to address their needs and achieve better outcomes in legal cases. This can help reduce the adverse effects of trauma and increase the likelihood of positive outcomes for clients.

3. *Increased empathy*: A trauma-informed approach can help law students develop greater empathy for their clients and a deeper understanding of the complex issues clients may face. This can foster a more supportive and legal environment for clients.

4. *Improved professional conduct*: A trauma-informed approach can help prepare law students for the demands of practice and provide insights into avoiding re-traumatization of clients and maintaining confidentiality. 89

Restorative Justice

One response to trauma that can promote personal accountability and healing is restorative justice. As explained by our Task Force member, Dr. Robert Goldman, “restorative justice” is a philosophy and a set of practices that aims to repair the harm caused by criminal behavior and address the needs of both the victim and the offender. Instead of focusing solely on punishment, restorative justice emphasizes the importance of repairing harm, restoring relationships, and rebuilding communities. This can involve bringing the offender and victim together in a facilitated meeting, called a restorative conference, where they can discuss the impact of the crime and work towards a resolution that addresses the needs of all parties involved. Unlike the traditional criminal justice system, restorative justice is victim focused. The traditional justice system often overlooks the needs of victims of crime. Research suggests that victims who participate in restorative justice processes are generally more satisfied with the outcome than those who go through the traditional criminal justice system. Victims who participate in restorative justice have reported feeling more heard and validated and have experienced a greater sense of closure and healing. They also reported feeling more satisfied with the outcome of the process, believing that justice was served and that the offender took responsibility for their actions. 90

89 Id.
Restorative justice models can be found in around the world. The model is described in the following narrative:

“Restorative justice can use a trauma-informed approach by recognizing the impact of trauma on both the victim and the offender and addressing those effects in the process of restoring harm and repairing relationships. By focusing on the traumatic impact, preventive strategies can be formulated. A trauma-informed restorative justice process would involve understanding the prevalence of trauma, recognizing signs and symptoms, responding with empathy and support, and taking steps to avoid re-traumatization. For the victim, a trauma-informed restorative justice process would involve creating a safe and supportive environment for them to share their experiences, feelings, and needs. It would also involve providing appropriate support and resources for them to heal from the trauma. For the offender, a trauma-informed restorative justice process would involve understanding the role of trauma in their criminal behavior and addressing those underlying issues as part of their rehabilitation. Additionally, a trauma-informed restorative justice process would involve training and educating all involved parties, including facilitators, about trauma and its effects to create a more empathetic and effective process.”

On March 2, 2023, the Task Force heard from Dr. David Moore a restorative justice expert from Australia. Dr. Moore explained that restorative justice may seem like a new idea, but it has ancient origins. In fact, the concept has origins with indigenous peoples around the world, including Native American and Canadian First Nations civilizations. In New Zealand, where all juvenile crimes except murder go through a restorative process and adult crimes are automatically referred for similar consideration, the genesis lies in Maori traditions. During his March 2, 2023 presentation, Dr. Moore informed the Task Force that restorative justice programs in the criminal context typically function in one of three ways: as a form of diversion from the criminal process, allowing offenders—

91 Id.
92 See also, Lydiayle Gibson, Restoring Justice: Exploring an alternative to crime and punishment (2021). Restoring justice | Harvard Magazine
especially young or first-time offenders—to avoid charges and a conviction; as a form of alternative sentencing; or, in more serious cases, as a way to reduce a criminal sentence. To date, 45 states in the United States have passed laws permitting the use of restorative justice in at least some criminal cases.93

Task Force Member Katherine LeGeros Bajuk observed that New York County District Attorney Alvin Bragg, Jr. implemented a restorative justice initiative.94 Task Force Member Susan Bryant referred to the restorative justice program at the New York State Defender’s Association (“NYSDA”) where she is the Executive Director. NYSDA’s program seeks to end cycles of violence and abuse at a community level, decrease incarceration and promote healing using restorative justice and trauma-informed practices. The program has focused on the Albany area, fostering healing in communities in Albany, Schenectady, and Ulster counties. As explained by NYSDA, restorative practices provide healthy and just alternatives to incarceration, detention, and suspension for a range of cases.95

The Task Force recommends the study, implementation and expansion of “restorative justice” programs in New York State. The NYSDA program can provide a model for other organizations to follow.

**Recommendations**

- The court system and state and local bar associations should be encouraged to develop and implement attorney-focused practicum on mental

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93 *Id.*

94 [D.A. Bragg Creates “Pathways to Public Safety” Division to Elevate the use of Alternatives to Incarceration Across D.A.’s Office – Manhattan District Attorney’s Office (manhattanda.org)](https://manhattanda.org/district-attorneys-office/new-york-county-das-first-pathways-to-public-safety-division/) - On March 2, 2022, the New York County D.A. created the Office’s first Pathways to Public Safety Division (“Pathways”) to elevate the use of diversion and evidence-based programming, ensuring individuals involved in the criminal justice system receive necessary services to reduce recidivism and enhance public safety. According to the press release announcing the program, this major restructuring will strengthen the Office’s work related to alternatives to incarceration, specialized court parts, pre-arraignment diversion, restorative justice practices, and reentry practices. Additionally, Pathways will provide each of the six existing Trial Division bureaus with a dedicated prosecutor to serve as a resource from arraignment to sentencing, proactively identifying individuals who would benefit from diversion and programming without jeopardizing community safety.

95 [https://www.nysda.org/page/RestorativeJustice](https://www.nysda.org/page/RestorativeJustice)
disabilities and trauma to ensure a consistent and level understanding among practitioners and jurists.

- In conjunction with the New York State Judicial Institute, OCA should sponsor additional and training programs on trauma and trauma informed practices for judges and court attorneys.

- OCA should also continue to encourage and support trauma informed training for attorneys within the court system working with vulnerable populations including the AFC and MHLS programs.

- The resources of existing model programs within the court system such as the Child Welfare Court Improvement Project (“CWCIP”), with its focus on trauma informed representation, should be promoted and enhanced.

- OCA should also study and implement principles of “restorative justice” in New York State as restorative justice is trauma informed.

- Law Schools should encourage trauma informed approaches in clinical legal education.

C. Seamless Systems

“Mental health systems optimally include a care continuum to meet people’s needs in the most accessible, least restrictive environment. In broad perspectives, this continuum includes a range of services such as crisis services, accessible outpatient services, rehabilitation and recovery support services and inpatient psychiatric care.”

The seemingly basic formulation of an optimally operating system of care has proven to be incredibly difficult to achieve in New York and across the country. The Task Force attempted to examine the service delivery system in New York toward making recommendations that will promote the integration of services to meet people where they are and at their greatest time of need. To better

serve clients with complex needs, it is crucial to have a system of care that is up to the task. That not only means a full array of services, but a coordinated system that meets the needs of people with multiple and co-occurring disorders.

The “system” of care in New York state is vast. This report provides a brief overview of the system to provide additional context for the reader. To begin, there are no fewer than twelve state and local agencies are responsible for delivering services to people with mental disabilities in our state, in addition to the various funding streams and services, primarily Medicaid, provided through the federal and state governments. On the State level, the Department of Mental Hygiene is divided into three autonomous agencies – OMH, OPWDD and OASAS – and each agency will be briefly described in turn, below.

**Office of Mental Health (OMH)**

The public mental health system in New York is vast and the prevalence of mental illness in the population is high. It is estimated that 832,509 people were served in the public mental health system in 2019. This statistic reflects a steady rise from 2013, for example, when 729,000 were served. Comparatively, the New York State population has remained relatively stable. OMH attributes the increase in its population served to several factors, including expanded eligibility criteria, behavioral health parity initiatives, high demand, increased awareness of mental health issues and stigma-reduction efforts.

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97 Briefing Book | FY 2023 Executive Budget (ny.gov) This total includes the near 49-million-dollar budget of the Justice Center for the Protection of People with Special Needs which performs a myriad of oversight functions to prevent the abuse and mistreatment of people with mental disabilities. See generally, https://www.justicecenter.ny.gov/.

98 The Executive Budget for proposes $10.5 billion dollars of combined spending in fiscal year 2024. The Task Force heard from invited experts that the “O” agency silos have hindered the rendition of appropriate services and supports for people with dual or co-occurring diagnoses.


100 This number may now approach 900,000 as stated in the Governor's Fiscal Year 2024 Budget Briefing Book, p.112.  
101 *Id.* at p. 10.  
Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration ("SAMHSA") defines any mental illness ("AMI") "as having at least one mental disorder, other than a developmental or substance-use disorder, in the past 12 months, regardless of the level of impairment." Applying this metric, the prevalence rate of AMI for the New York State general population within the past 12 months for adults aged 18 and over in 2019 was 19.5%.  

As a provider of service, OMH operates 24 inpatient facilities for civil, forensic and research purposes. There are approximately 3,000 adult and children's beds in the OMH system and 700 forensic beds for people referred for admission from the criminal justice system. In addition, OMH licenses over 100 acute care psychiatric units in general hospitals that have an aggregate capacity of 5,000 beds. In 2019, there were approximately 128,000 admissions to hospitals licensed or operated by OMH. Under the model of care developed by OMH, acute inpatient admissions are largely directed to the Public Health Law article 28 general hospitals with psychiatric units. Longer term care, if clinically indicated, is delivered by OMH state hospitals. Lengths of stay in OMH hospitals can be years in duration, particularly when a patient is referred from the criminal justice system.

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106 As reported to the Mental Hygiene Legal Service (MHL § 9.11). MHLS is an auxiliary agency of the Appellate Divisions of State Supreme Court and provides legal services and assistance to patients and residents of mental hygiene facilities pursuant to article 47 of the MHL.

Due to the large number of people who are incarcerated and have significant mental health needs, OMH operates an inpatient hospital, the Central New York Psychiatric Center, for people serving sentences. There are also 29 satellite and “outpatient” mental health units with over 1,000 beds across mental health staffed prison programs.  

People entering state prison are assessed to determine if they require mental health services. There is a range of need between levels 1-4, with level 1 indicating the most serious mental health diagnoses and level 4 the least serious. As of February 1, 2023, there were 31,449 persons in the custody of the Department of Corrections and Community Services ("DOCCS"), a substantial decrease from 2016, for example, when the population was 52,340. Even as the population of people confined in state correctional facilities has steadily declined, however, the percentage of people on the OMH caseload has increased. Statistics reflect that in 2016, 20% of the DOCCS population in custody at the time were on the OMH caseload. As of January 1, 2020, 23% of individuals in DOCCS custody had an OMH service designation. The percentage had risen again, according to Jack Beck, former director of the Prison Visiting Project at the Correctional Association of New York State, who spoke at the NYSBA annual meeting. As of September 2021, 8,174 people, representing 26% of DOCCS population were on the OMH caseload.

In the community, OMH operates and regulates nearly 800 licensed outpatient programs. Assertive Community Treatment ("ACT") teams, Personalized Recovery-Oriented Services ("PROS") programs, Article 31 clinics, and other services are available to those in need.

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110 Forensic Mental Health Services (ny.gov) - 
113 Shea & Goldman, supra, note 102 at p. 1043
115 To address some of the tremendous need for advocacy, Prisoners’ Legal Services has established a mental health advocacy program for people who are incarcerated - Mental Health Project – Youth and Veterans – Prisoners’ Legal Services of New York (plsnyny.org) The Mental Health Project provides legal and advocacy services to ensure that incarcerated youth and veterans obtain the mental health care they need and are not subjected to conditions that exacerbate their mental illness. Youth or Veterans can be designated any service level by OMH. There is no minimum OMH service level to request services from the Mental Health Project.
and Day Treatment programs provide treatment and rehabilitation to service recipients in need of community-based support to maintain their mental health.\textsuperscript{116} The most common and most largely utilized outpatient services are clinic treatment services, which make up 64 % of all outpatient service programs. \textsuperscript{117}

OMH states that community based residential services are provided to maximize access to housing opportunities, particularly for persons with histories of multiple or extended psychiatric hospitalizations, homelessness, involvement with the criminal justice system, and co-occurring substance use disorder.\textsuperscript{118} In addition, these services assist individuals in developing functional skills needed to live independently and preserve tenure in the community.\textsuperscript{119} Residential services are also offered to children to provide short-term residential assessment, treatment, and aftercare planning.\textsuperscript{120} In 2019, OMH residential programs provided more than 46,000 beds statewide. Services include Supported Housing, Apartment Treatment, Supported/Single Room Occupancy, Community Residence, Community Residence/Single Room Occupancy and Other (Family Care and Residential Care Centers for Adults).\textsuperscript{121} Supported housing is the most independent housing model. OMH contributes a stipend to the program providers which covers rent and supportive services, generally case management. There is generally not a time limit for individuals to reside in supportive housing whereas the treatment and congregate residential programs are limited from one year to 18 months.\textsuperscript{122}

\textbf{Office for People With Developmental Disabilities (OPWDD)}

OPWDD is responsible for ensuring that New Yorkers with developmental disabilities “are provided with services including care and treatment, that such services are of high quality and effectiveness, and that the personal and civil rights of persons receiving such services are protected.” \textsuperscript{123} The services provided by

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{117} \textit{Id.}
\textsuperscript{118} \textit{Id. at} 27.
\textsuperscript{119} \textit{Id.}
\textsuperscript{120} \textit{Id.}
\textsuperscript{121} \textit{Id.}
\textsuperscript{122} That these programs are intended to be of limited duration is also reflected in OMH regulations governing residential programs for adults. The regulations provide that each “program shall ensure that a discharge planning process for each resident begins upon admission.” 14 N.Y.C.R.R. 595.9 (a).
\textsuperscript{123} MHL § 13.07 (c).
\end{quote}
OPWDD are designed to promote and attain independence, inclusion, individuality and productivity for persons with developmental disabilities. Ninety-five percent of the people accessing OPWDD services and supports have Medicaid provided under the Home and Community Based Services (“HCBS”) waiver. In 2019, nearly 120,000 people received OPWDD Medicaid services and supports. According to the 2024 fiscal year budget narrative, nearly 131,000 people receive OPWDD services in New York State. The OPWDD system is largely community-based with the closure of most developmental center placements. Over one-half of Medicaid enrollees from the OPWDD system live at home or with family care givers. Those people needing residential placement live in community residences licensed or operated by OPWDD. These include “Individualized Residential Alternatives” which may have up to 14 residents and provide room, board and individualized service options. Intermediate Care Facilities (“ICF”) are a residential option for individuals with specific medical or behavioral needs whose disabilities severely limit their ability to live independently. Sunmount Developmental Center and the Valley Ridge Center for Intensive Treatment) are classified as ICFs for purposes of the Medicaid program.

Office of Addiction Services and Support (OASAS)

OASAS provides a full array of services to a large and culturally diverse population. OASAS funds, certifies and regulates the State’s system of substance use disorder (“SUD”) and problem gambling treatment and prevention services, including the direct operation of 12 Addiction Treatment Centers (“ATCs”) statewide. The OASAS treatment system serves about 232,000 people

124 Id.
125 https://opwdd.ny.gov/providers/home-and-community-based-services-waiver
126 https://opwdd.ny.gov/data
127 Briefing Book | FY 2023 Executive Budget (ny.gov), p.112.
128 OPWDD operates two developmental centers located in Franklin County (Sunmount) and Chenango County (Valley Ridge). Statutorily defined as “schools” (see MHL§ 1.03[11), OPWDD now refers to these centers as “Intensive Treatment Options” in its continuum of care. The 2024 Executive Budget proposed opening 39 developmental center beds in Rochester.
129 https://opwdd.ny.gov/data Agencies licensed by OPWDD are often referred to as “voluntary providers” and they are non-profit organizations.
130 See 14 NYCRR 686.16.
131 Id., see 42 C.F.R. part 440-intermediate care facility (ICF/IDD services).
132 See, MHL article 19, 14 N.Y.C.R.R. part 800
each year, with an average daily enrollment of approximately 100,000 across more than 900 certified programs. During the 2018-19 school year, approximately 4,435,000 residents were reached by a one-time, population-based prevention service and 430,000 youth received a direct prevention service. The service continuum includes community-based treatment including inpatient, residential, outpatient, crisis and opioid treatment services, school and community-based prevention services as well as intervention, support, and crisis services. OASAS supports a comprehensive prevention system by supporting approximately 159 providers that implement evidence-based programs and practices in schools and local communities; community-based coalitions that implement environmental strategies; and statewide public awareness campaigns. OASAS also supports six Prevention Resource Centers (“PRCs”) across the state that provide training and technical assistance further promoting coalition efforts and local prevention services. In addition, recovery-focused services include permanent supportive housing as well as peer engagement specialists, family support navigators, youth clubhouses, recovery centers, and regional addiction resource centers.\footnote{133}

\textit{People with Co-occurring Conditions}

Mental Hygiene Law (“MHL”) § 5.05 (b) provides that the commissioners of OMH, OPWDD and OASAS shall constitute an inter-office coordinating council (“IOCC”). Consistent with the autonomy of each office for matters within its jurisdiction, the council shall ensure that the state policy for the prevention, care, treatment and rehabilitation of individuals with mental illness and developmental disabilities, alcoholism, alcohol abuse, substance abuse, substance dependence, and chemical dependence is planned, developed and implemented comprehensively. Gaps in services to individuals with multiple disabilities are to be eliminated under state law and no person is to be denied treatment and services because he or she has more than one disability. During her March 16, 2023, presentation to the Task Force, OMH Commissioner Sullivan informed Members that the IOCC has not been active, but she is the incoming chair and intends to revive its mission.

\footnote{133 The narrative about OASAS is derived from the agency’s 2020-2024 Statewide comprehensive plan which is available at: https://www.clmhd.org/img/uploads/OASAS_Statewide_Plan_20_24.pdf}
State and Local Government Planning

MHL § 41.16 requires OASAS, OMH, and OPWDD to guide and facilitate the local planning process. As part of the local planning process, Local Governmental Units ("LGUs") develop and annually submit a combined Local Services Plan ("LSP") to all three state mental hygiene agencies through the Mental Hygiene County Planning System ("CPS"). There are 58 LGUs in New York. The LSP must establish long-range goals and objectives that are consistent with statewide goals and objectives. The MHL also requires that each ‘O’ agency’s statewide comprehensive plan shall be based upon an analysis of local services plans developed by each LGU. Each LGU conducts a broad-based planning process to identify the mental hygiene service needs in the community to inform their LSP. In addition to describing their own local priorities and strategies, these plans also inform each state agency’s statewide comprehensive planning process.

Investigation

Inspired by the presentation of Stephanie Marquesano, founder and president of “the harris project,” and given the obvious complexity of the service delivery system in New York, the Task Force envisions and recommends realizing “seamless systems” change which would have three components:

1) people with needs being able to connect to the system of care at any point, and

2) each point in the various systems of care recognizing their needs and being able to connect them to the proper service providers and supports,

3) with an emphasis on maintaining recovery, with person-centered treatment planning as well as attention to social supports and determinants of health.

Particularly with respect to people with co-occurring disorders, the Task Force endorses the principle that there can be no “wrong door” when seeking services and supports. As stated by Dr. Ken Minkoff, a psychiatrist who has spent the past few decades helping governments around the world reform their mental health systems, too many systems treat people who suffer from both mental health

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135 MHL § 5.07.
136 LGU plans for 2020, 2021, and 2023 can be found by county: [https://www.clmhd.org/contact_local_mental_hygiene_departments/](https://www.clmhd.org/contact_local_mental_hygiene_departments/)
and substance use disorders as the exception, when in fact they are the rule. They make up more than half of all people who seek treatment for one condition or the other. “You can’t just create a few specialized programs for that many people,” Dr. Minkoff said. “You need to structure your entire system with them in mind.”

To learn more about the gaps and challenges in systems, as well as strengths that can be built upon, the Task Force reviewed a sample of recent county mental hygiene self-assessments from 2021 and 2023 to learn about the counties’ most recent determinations of their needs and to gain detailed information experienced at the county levels. In addition, the Task Force heard the testimony provided at the Attorney General Letitia James’ hearings on mental health care, held in New York City in September 2022 and Buffalo in January 2023, and reviewed OMH’s summary of public comments gathered through its 2021 Statewide Town Halls. Finally, the Task Force was informed by the legislative testimony of its Co-chair, Joseph Glazer which describes how Westchester County strives to create a seamless system of care, but fears the system could implode because service providers are in a staffing crisis and housing providers in a staffing and rent crisis. The following areas of need are explained below.

**Workforce Stabilization**

Continued workforce shortages persist in mental health treatment systems, affecting inpatient, outpatient, and crisis services, peer supports, care coordination, and cross-systems coordination, as well shortages of culturally competent and bilingual personnel. OMH, OPWDD and OASAS all identify stabilization of their workforces as tremendous challenges. The entire system of care faces collapse when a sustainable workforce cannot be maintained. Thus, for example, the OASAS 2020-2024 Comprehensive Statewide Plan contains the following narrative: “More than half of all LGUs reported unmet Mental Hygiene Workforce Recruitment and Retention needs. While many LGUs reporting unmet

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138 Albany, Broome, Columbia, Dutchess, Monroe, Nassau, Niagara, New York City, Oneida, Onondaga, Orange, Putnam, Rensselaer, Rockland, Saratoga, Schenectady, Sullivan, Westchester counties. [https://www.clmhd.org/contact_local_mental_hygiene_departments/](https://www.clmhd.org/contact_local_mental_hygiene_departments/)

139 In addition to this review, Task Force Members Jeffrey Berman and Sabina Kahn testified at the New York City hearing.

140 OMH, Local Services Plan and Statewide Town Hall Analysis, September 2022. [https://my.vimeo.co/v/1j6edpo3-9zg8pjm](https://my.vimeo.co/v/1j6edpo3-9zg8pjm)

141 See, Glazer testimony, Appendix Document 1
workforce needs were in rural areas, LGUs with large urban and suburban populations also reported difficulties filling behavioral healthcare positions. Some LGUs are reporting positions remaining vacant for up to 18 months.” 142

Workforce challenges in mental health treatment systems were further exacerbated by COVID and remain profound. In both inpatient and outpatient settings, vacancies for psychiatrists and nurse practitioners are causing limits in hospital admissions and community clinic capacity. Counseling and social work positions are also vacant, and vacancies extend as well to peer specialists. Many counties noted the availability of higher pay positions in other fields, and recommended COLA increases. Some OMH-funded positions had been cut, adding to the shortage. These shortfalls are particularly acute as more people with complex needs, exacerbated by the COVID pandemic, are seeking access to services.

Counties further recognized the need for diversity in the workforce to reflect communities served, and many observed as a priority the delivery of culturally competent and linguistically accessible services. This is needed in low-income communities of color who have historically had inequitable access to health services, as well as recently arrived immigrants and refugees. In many immigrant communities, mental health issues are highly stigmatized; to be successful, these services must be culturally competent and sensitive to perceived stigmas.

Also commonly noted as a workforce challenge, was the lack of experienced health home coordinators who must coordinate services for an increasingly complex population. There is a great deal of turnover in these positions. Health home coordinators have higher caseloads than did case managers prior to transition to managed care. The care coordination offered has therefore become less person-centered. Counties also noted the lack of experience with coordinating services across systems of care, affecting populations with co-occurring disorders. The introduction of “Health Home Plus” coordinating services, whereby a coordinator serves people with more intensive needs, has not been sufficient to meet the demand for this critical service.

142 See, OASAS 2020-2024 Statewide Comprehensive Plan at p. 11-12. OPWDD reports that stakeholder feedback consistently identifies sustaining the direct care workforce as the most critical issue to support people with developmental disabilities. The OPWDD 2023-2027 strategic plan reports a turnover rate of over 35% of the direct support personnel workforce and a vacancy rate of over 17% in these positions. https://opwdd.ny.gov/strategic-planning
It was noted that while the promotion and development of telehealth services have helped to alleviate some of the workforce as well universally noted transportation challenges, telehealth is not beneficial for low-income communities that have limited access to technology and the internet. The Task Force further notes the powerful and repeated testimony presented to the New York State Attorney General Letitia James’ hearings in September 2022 and January 2023 reviewing crisis in mental health treatment services, in both inpatient and outpatient settings.

To address workforce challenges, the Executive Budget proposed a 2.5% Cost of Living Adjustment (“COLA”) Increase and Career Advancement Supports for Mental Health Para-Position. Unfortunately, the lack of COLA increases is so longstanding, that the Governor’s proposed increase will not suffice to boost staffing in these critical programs. Although a COLA statute was enacted in 2006 specifically for mental health treatment and human services providers, COLA increases were not in fact funded in most years since 2006. In the three years in which a COLA was provided, there was a 0.2%, 1.0% and a 5.4% COLA totaling 6.6%, while the consumer price index increased during that period a total of 35.31%. (In two other years, there were modest salary increases for mental health treatment programs but no across-the-board increases). Thus, the cumulative, compounded impact of deferred COLA increases is thus over 30% loss in reimbursement, when compared to the increase in inflation, over those 16 years. As a result, most mental health and substance use disorder providers have extreme difficulty hiring and retaining staff positions and many have double digit vacancy rates.

The Governor’s historic proposed expansion of mental health services in her FY 2024 Executive Budget, would, in the opinion of the Task Force, have limited impact without increasing funding to existing providers to pay competitive salaries to recruit and retain competent staff. The Task Force, instead, supported the 8.5% COLA recommendation of the Legislature, NYAPRS and other advocates and issued a legislative memorandum for public release on March 16, 2023. The legislative memorandum of the Task Force is reproduced in the Appendix to this report. The Task Force also recommends hiring bonuses for clinicians and peer specialists who have needed bilingual language skills.

143 Task Force Memorandum supporting S. 4007-B, Part DD, A. 3007, Part DD. Appendix Document 8
The lack of affordable housing is a longstanding problem affecting both the availability of residential supportive housing and independent supportive housing.

Every county sampled reported lack of sufficient affordable housing, with many mentioning the lack of accessibility as an issue as well, preventing adults with psychiatric disability from aging in place, and limiting the housing available to individuals with both mobility impairments and psychiatric disability. Waitlists for independent housing (supported) can extend to years in all regions of New York State. Individuals generally must wait, though for not as long, for congregate staffed or apartment treatment housing. Counties commented that people favor the most independent level of housing. The Task Force notes that this is also a more permanent housing option, in contrast to the transitional congregate housing models.

Problems affecting the supply include the rise in fair market rental prices in most regions of New York, while OMH’s reimbursement rates for supported housing have remained static. Landlords leave the OMH housing system because they can charge higher rentals outside that system. Task Force Co-Chair Joseph Glazer’s legislative testimony explains the problem concisely with the implications for Westchester County service recipients and providers:

“Currently the Supported Housing allocation and guidelines for Westchester County provide $1699 for a one bedroom. The median rental rate in Westchester County, is $1796 a month for a one-bedroom apartment. That means that well over 50% of available apartments are not available to our population in need. The minimal increases in rental allowance included the last two years have proven to be insufficient to keep up with skyrocketing rental rates. Our mental health housing programs currently have a waitlist of 750 people on the Support Housing referral list. There are people on our waitlist for housing who have been on the list for up to five years. The average wait time for each program is:

Community Residence – 2 years
Treatment Apartment – 9 months
Supported Housing – 5 years

Beyond the overall insufficiency of the number of allocated beds, there are currently 60 vacant openings in Supported Housing because we cannot find rental apartments willing to accept the
amount provides in the rental guidelines. Simply put, this means we have ‘residential beds’ that exist on paper in our housing system, but they do not actually exist because we cannot find landlords willing to accept the rental rate.”  

There is also an unmet need for supportive, harm reduction housing for persons with co-occurring psychiatric and substance use disorders. However, “Not In My Back Yard” public resistance can obstruct the development of housing for individuals with psychiatric disability alone or co-occurring disorders. In addition to being directly related to treatment through the OMH system, stable, safe and affordable housing is a crucial social determinant of health. Several counties noted the stress on their communities of color, who suffer inequities in access to housing for both socioeconomic and historically racial reasons. Many areas of New York remain segregated racially and economically. In high risk, historically marginalized communities, racial strife and extreme rates of poverty all lead to higher stress and increased need for mental health services. Homelessness is greatest among Blacks, and disproportionately so in relation to other populations.

The Empire State Supportive Housing Initiative (“ESSHI”), which awarded up to $25,000 in grants for services and operating costs and was available to all three “O” agencies, awarded its last contracts in 2021 and appears to have had limited impact on the state’s overall needs. There is some supportive housing development, with more coming on board, but the eligibility criteria linking to risk of homelessness is perceived by some counties as overly stringent. In addition, ESSHI does not fund capital costs, which has limited the development

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144 See, Glazer testimony, Appendix Document 1

145 See, e.g.,
https://www.clmhd.org/contact_local_mental_hygiene_departments/erie_15_county.htm;
https://www.clmhd.org/contact_local_mental_hygiene_departments/newyork_31_county.htm

146 In a March 12, 2023, perspective piece published in the Albany Times Union, Kevin O’Connor, the Executive Director of Joseph’s House Shelter in Troy, New York explains that the New York State Supported Housing Program (“NYSSHP”), the first state-funded program, has been left behind and it still receiving about the same level of financial support it received in 1987. The ESSHI program, in contrast, was created in 2016 and pays five times more in service funding than NYSSHP. However, as Mr. O’Connor explains, the state never brought the original NYSSHP in line with ESSHI, and thus “housing programs that began under the NYSSHP umbrella remain chronically underfunded and struggle to sustain themselves.”
of sufficient housing to address regional needs. Awards were not based on a statewide assessment of need. Instead, local providers applied for housing that was recognized by the local CoC’s determination of need.

Governor Hochul proposes high levels of both capital and operating expenses for supportive housing. Specifically, the Governor’s plan includes $890 million in capital and $120 million in operating funding to establish and operate 3,500 new residential units for New Yorkers with mental illness. These units include 500 community residence-single room occupancy units, which provide housing and intensive services to individuals with serious mental illness who are at the highest risk of homelessness; 900 transitional step-down units; 600 licensed apartment units serving individuals who require an intermediate level of services.

Also funded through this allocation would be 1,500 supportive housing units, which would serve individuals who have less acute needs but still require support to live in the community. In addition, the plan includes $25 million in capital and $7.3 million in operating costs for 60 community step-down housing units in New York City to serve formerly unhoused individuals who are transitioning from inpatient care.

The Task Force applauds the Governor’s commitment to invest in housing. However, given the consistently longer wait lists for supported housing than for congregate models, the balance of funds would be better allocated with the majority for more independent supportive housing. With flexible services that can vary intensity such as mobile teams and peer support, people whose needs may become acute can be well served in independent housing.

The Task Force notes the OMH Rehabilitative and Tenancy Support Services (“1115 Waiver”) has been helpful to counties. This waiver increases the accessibility of Supported Housing to individuals with more complex needs by providing the support services necessary to promote stability in the community. For supported housing, this funding leaves more room in the original Supported Housing contracts for much needed rent to obtain more appropriate housing. OMH has included this waiver request in its 2023 package of Medicaid waiver services awaiting CMS approval. ¹⁴⁷

Practitioners on the Task Force have observed, as well, the gaps in access to housing that can exist for individuals who are incarcerated. One important gap is that supportive housing providers rarely interview people for housing during ¹⁴⁷ This program was initiated in 2022.

https://omh.ny.gov/omhweb/adults/supportedhousing/supportedhousingguidelines.html
their incarceration. Solutions are needed to facilitate applications for incarcerated persons, such as videoconferencing. In addition, the State has requested CMS approval of a Medicaid waiver 30 days prior to an individual’s release from jail or prison, which would include coverage of care coordination services. Individuals with developmental disabilities, psychiatric disability, and/or substance use disorders would qualify for such services. This added support for discharge planning should greatly enhance access to supportive housing for individuals with mental health or co-occurring needs.

Need for more crisis services/stabilization/ crisis respite beds to divert from hospitals and reduce interaction with law enforcement.

Counties are benefitting from the new intensive crisis stabilization centers, such as those in the Hudson Valley, which serve to divert individuals experiencing crisis from emergency room admissions. However, long emergency department waits remain, particularly for individuals with co-occurring SUD, developmental disabilities, or medical needs with mental health needs. More training for people with developmental disabilities, as well as establishing a single point of contact for crisis services for individuals with mental health, SUD, and/or developmental disabilities is greatly desired. With more funding to permit longer stays, crisis centers could do more than divert from inpatient admission. These would be more in the model of crisis residences and crisis stabilization centers. The workforce challenge bears repeating here, as well, as counties see a need for more trauma-informed professionals to respond to mental emergencies. Counties noted good pilot programs where mobile crisis teams work together with law enforcement. Because of workforce challenges, this seems a necessary model to develop, particularly in rural areas. The need for peer specialists to augment crisis services was noted, as well.

Governor Hochul is proposing to establish 12 new comprehensive psychiatric emergency programs providing hospital-level crisis care; creating 42 additional Assertive Community Treatment teams to provide mobile, high intensity services to the most at-risk New Yorkers and eight additional Safe Options Support teams - five in New York City and three in the rest of state - to provide outreach and connection to services for homeless populations with mental illness and substance use disorders.

Coordinating Systems of Care

Mid-Hudson counties have come together to form a region-wide Co-Occurring System of Care (“COSOC”) committee to address multiple, complex
needs across a variety of behavioral health and other systems. This committee uses the Comprehensive Continuous Integrated Systems of Care (“CCISC”) model, an evidenced-based SAMHSA “best practice” model\(^{148}\) which brings together cross system partners to respond to complexity of needs regardless of where the individual initially touches down. Providers strive to become integrated and co-occurring, but are still constrained by lack of resources and type of licensure. Providers share a vision of a welcoming system of care that expects individuals to have complex needs and is prepared to provide competent integrated treatment and support in an empathic, hopeful, integrated, and strength-based way, a truly no wrong door approach.

Cross system coordination and improved access to care would be further enhanced through increased funding flexibility including the ability to braid and blend funds and dually license treatment and residential programs. Helpfully, the Governor’s budget includes dually licensed behavioral health clinics, which will triple in number from 13 to 39. These clinics will offer integrated mental health and substance use disorder services for New Yorkers of all ages on a walk-in, immediate basis, regardless of insurance status.

The need for planning for people with co-occurring conditions is essential to the functioning of a seamless system of care. The Task Force placed a particular focus on co-occurring disorders (“COD”) which refers to a diagnosis of one or more mental health disorders plus substance (drug and/or alcohol) misuse and/or addiction. Materials produced by “the harris project” explains that COD involves two diagnostic areas: mental health and substance misuse and/or addiction (as well as the impact of trauma).\(^{149}\) Mental health disorders commonly associated with COD include:

- mood disorders like depression or bipolar disorder
- anxiety disorders like generalized anxiety disorder, social anxiety, panic disorder
- post-traumatic stress disorder, oppositional defiance disorder
- obsessive-compulsive disorder.\(^{150}\)

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\(^{148}\) Minkoff & Cline, 2004, 2005
\(^{149}\) [https://theharrisproject.org](https://theharrisproject.org)
\(^{150}\) [http://www.dpt.samhsa.gov/comor/co‐occurring.aspx](http://www.dpt.samhsa.gov/comor/co‐occurring.aspx)
Compared to those who have a mental health disorder or substance misuse and/or addiction alone, people with COD often experience more severe and chronic medical, social, and emotional problems. The challenge is to address both diagnostic areas without compromising the best treatment for either one.\textsuperscript{151} Approximately 10.2 million Americans meet the diagnostic criteria each year and it is estimated that approximately 70\% of those addicted to substances have COD.\textsuperscript{152} As the mental health and substance misuse and/or addiction pieces impact one another greatly, they should be treated with an integrated, comprehensive plan.\textsuperscript{153} As stated by “the harris project”:

“many of those diagnosed with COD who seek treatment are often bounced among different programs because each fails to provide a model delivering integrated, comprehensive treatment. Unfortunately, most rehabilitation programs, while claiming to address COD, focus almost exclusively on the substance piece, and most find abstinence to be nearly impossible to maintain because of the unaddressed mental health disorder(s). On the flip side, addressing the mental health piece while still misusing substances compromises the success of any mental health program …”\textsuperscript{154}

\textsuperscript{151} \url{http://www.psychologytoday.com/conditions/co-occurring-disorders}

\textsuperscript{152} \url{http://www.nami.org/factsheets/mentalillness_factsheet.pdf}

\textsuperscript{153} \url{https://www.samhsa.gov/disorders}

\textsuperscript{154} \url{http://www.helpguide.org/mental/dual_diagnosis.htm} Statistics cited by “the harris project” are devasting. Every day in the United States, 197 people die because of drug overdose, and another 6,748 are treated in emergency departments (“ED”) for the misuse or abuse of drugs. Drug overdose was the leading cause of injury death in 2016. Among people 25 to 64 years old, drug overdose caused more deaths than motor vehicle traffic crashes. In 2012, 33,175 (79.9\%) of the 41,502 drug overdose deaths in the United States were unintentional. In 2011, drug misuse and abuse caused about 2.5 million ED visits. Of these, more than 1.4 million ED visits were related to pharmaceuticals. And those numbers continue to rise daily. Nearly 9 out of 10 poisoning deaths are caused by drugs. In 2012, of the 41,502 drug overdose deaths in the United States, 22,114 (53 percent) were related to pharmaceuticals. In 2017 over 72,000 Americans died by overdose. \url{https://theharrisproject.org}
In her remarks to the Task Force on March 16, 2023, OMH Commissioner Sullivan explained the initiatives undertaken by New York State try make its systems more seamless and break down silos of care. What remains unaddressed, but desperately needed in the view of the Task Force, is for the mental hygiene commissioners and the Department of Health to promulgate integrated service regulations. In pertinent part, the MHL provides:

\[\text{MHL } \S 31.02 \text{ (f):} \]

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\text{“No provision of this article or any other provision of law shall be construed to require a provider licensed pursuant to article twenty-eight of the public health law or certified pursuant to article sixteen or article thirty-two of this chapter to obtain an operating certificate from the office of mental health if such provider has been authorized to provide integrated services in accordance with regulations issued by the commissioner of the office of mental health in consultation with the commissioner of the department of health, the commissioner of the office of alcoholism and substance abuse services and the commissioner of the office for people with developmental disabilities …”} \text{ (emphasis added).} \]

Regulations have not been proposed by the responsible state agencies forgoing a legislative remedy to redress a significant obstacle to creating a seamless system of care. The Task Force urges the state agencies to adopt integrated service regulations without further delay.

**Limited inpatient resources**

County self-assessments reveal that the lack of enough inpatient beds. This is a national trend as explained in the 2022 report of the American Psychiatric Association.\(^{156}\) New York also experienced the repurposing of psychiatric beds in some Article 28 psychiatric units during COVID exacerbating a pre-existing

\(^{155}\) See also, MHL § 32.05 (b)(ii)

\(^{156}\) See, supra, note 36, *The Psychiatric Bed Crisis in the U.S.: Understanding the Problem and Moving Toward Solutions*, p 3. As explained by the APA, access to inpatient psychiatric beds “undergrids local mental health systems, providing essential services to help treat adults or young people who are experiencing mental illness, just like inpatient medical hospitalization serves the most acutely ill.”
crisis. New York also altered Medicaid to incentivize earlier discharges from acute care settings – hospitals simply are not paid once the individual’s needs are no longer acute. At the same time, OMH’s intermediate long-term bed admissions now employ a higher criterion for admission. For example, OMH hospital staff may respond to a proposed admission requesting trials of a medication treatment before an admission, but that cannot be completed at the acute care setting. Counties and community providers find that often the acute care hospital discharge planners fail to coordinate with community-based providers to ensure that services and housing are in place. In addition, there simply may not be enough time, on the Medicaid dollars, to set a discharge plan. Task Force practitioners have also found that hospital staff are not submitting SPOA referrals and HRA 2010E supportive housing applications likely for lack of time. It is essential that hospitals submit applications as early as possible during the patient’s psychiatric hospitalization and that step-down programs are available for individuals to await the housing decision.

Governor Hochul proposes new requirements that hospitals responsibly admit and discharge patients, with new, comprehensive standards for evaluation and increased state-level oversight to ensure that new protocols are being used effectively. To ensure the success of these new requirements for discharge planning, a $28 million investment will create 50 new Critical Time Intervention care coordination teams to help provide wrap-around services for discharged patients - from housing to job supports.

It should be noted that in many counties, during COVID access to outpatient services decreased even more severely than inpatient. Bronxworks and Center for Community Services, Improving Care Coordination for Homeless Individuals with Severe Mental Illness in NYC, p. 4 (February 2022). The APA similarly noted in its 2022 report that utilization review criteria that limit inpatient stay to the minimum “medically necessary” can lead to premature discharge and adverse consequences including relapse, hospital readmission, homelessness, criminal justice involvement and all-cause mortality including suicide. Supra, note 86 at p. 31.

SPOA is an acronym for Single Point of Access, the system in place to access various OMH housing alternatives. https://www.nyconnects.ny.gov/services/single-point-of-access-spoa-omh-pr-705507562002

An application, commonly called the HRA 2010e, must be submitted electronically by an approved provider to the Human Resources Administration’s Placement, Assessment and Client Tracking (PACT) Unit in order to apply for supportive housing Approved providers include any NYC shelter, hospital staff, NYC corrections staff, residential treatment program staff or mental health professionals.
**Insurance Parity**

Many counties noted the need to enforce insurance parity. Outpatient, care coordination, and mobile services are better covered by Medicaid than by private insurers. Governor Hochul’s Article VII legislation would close gaps in insurance coverage for behavioral health services and prohibit carriers from denying access to medically necessary, high-need, acute and crisis mental health services for both adults and children, including medications for substance use disorder. This includes eliminating pre-authorization requirements for ACT and mobile crisis services.

**Expansion of Peer Specialists and Clubhouses**

Clinical care alone is not a complete foundation for recovery for people who have psychiatric disabilities. As Dr. Insel observes, “recovery is not just relief from symptoms, it’s finding connection, sanctuary, and meaning not defined or delimited by mental illness”- also framed in his book as “recovery: people, place and purpose.” ¹⁶² Recovery is a growing process of self-determination that is supported through relationships and social networks. The person, not an illness, is at the center of this process. Peer specialists who have lived experience with psychiatric conditions, as well as training in supporting their peers, are essential to recovery and wellness. ¹⁶³

Counties repeated recognized the need for more peer specialists in all aspects of the care system and to support diversion from hospitals. This is also an important theme in the public input provided to OMH through its Town Hall process. According to OMH’s summary of public comments from the 2021 Statewide Town Hall, many comments focused on the expansion of peer support services and emphasized the need to devote workforce funding to increase the roles of people with lived experience and paying an adequate living wage. The Task Force strongly advocates for expansion of peer programs, as most effective and motivating for individuals and the best way to engage people to make

¹⁶² Insel, supra, note 6 at p 160-161.
¹⁶³ Harvey Rosenthal’s description of the role that peers can play in facilitating successful discharges from hospitals resonated with the Task Force. Mr. Rosenthal referred to this concept as “peer bridging.” The role of peer support is especially important when placed into the broader issues described in the APA report, specifically, that “today psychiatric care is complex and encompasses many factors that reflect a struggle to provide compassionate care with diminishing resources and within time frames that are often too short to evaluate treatment response or facilitate meaningful recovery.” See, supra, note 36, The Psychiatric Bed Crisis in the U.S.: Understanding the Problem and Moving Toward Solutions, p 3.
informed decisions and choices in treatment. Unless choice is supported, even if the person experiences momentary benefit from a medication, the individual’s involvement is not likely to last. And for people who do not have support of family or friends, clubhouses are an established way of supporting recovery through supportive community.

The Governor proposes to invest $2.8 million to expand the Intensive and Sustained Engagement Treatment program to offer peer-based outreach and engagement for adults with serious mental illness. The Task Force supports this investment, and would call for greater increases for peer supports, including in crisis programs and residence to divert from hospitalization, as well as to bridge from hospital to community. The Task Force supports as well, training in crisis planning and psychiatric advance directives as part of the certification curriculum for peer specialists. In this way, individuals can exercise choice in treatments even when undergoing crisis, and thereby avoid traumatizing coercive interventions.

**Racial Inequities in Access to Care and Exposure to Trauma**

Commenters in OMH’s Statewide Town Hall pointed out how vastly disproportionately, it is black and brown children who have lost parents and caregivers, lending a backdrop of trauma to their lives. County systems, as well, recognized the impact of racism and poverty on communities. Public commenters asked, how will OMH systems and crisis stabilization address racial trauma and reacted powerfully to the experience of mandatory treatment: “Get these AOT orders down, and these arrests down, and these fatalities down.” Supportive engagement, and supporting safe and accessible housing, person-centered treatments of choice, need to be the pillars of the treatment system. Trauma is also the experience of many refugees who have settled in our state. Many suffer from undiagnosed trauma on account of political turbulence, war, and harrowing personal ordeals, which may affect the approach used to treat substance abuse disorder and/or mental illness and may hinder expected progress in treatment.

**Serving the Mental Health Needs of Immigrants and Refugees**

There are two obvious hurdles to serving the mental health needs of immigrants and refugees. One is cultural: mental health is a taboo issue in many new American communities, and mental illness is a source of shame in societies with a strong belief in honor versus shame. In addition, Western “talk therapy” is practically unknown outside the Global north. Instead, the family plays a critical role in a person’s well-being in many countries and cultures, and as such, involving spouses or close family in the treatment of recent immigrants can help, a practice that is not widely embraced in the United States. Second, access to
interpreters is unavailable in the group therapy context so learners of English are often simply excluded from this form of therapy even if it is part of the court-mandated behavioral health regimen. Recently, a Rockland County resident sued the county’s drug court and the state court system, accusing court officials of barring him from a diversion program because of his limited English proficiency. As well, some treatment providers do not have easy access to reliable, professional interpretation services for optimum one-on-one mental health care.

*Boarding in emergency rooms and an innovative response*

In addition to studying local county mental health self-assessments, the Task Force focused its efforts on the vexing problem of patients boarding in emergency rooms and hospitals as a systems issue.

As explained earlier, the Healthcare Association of New York State (“HANYS”) reports that hospitals across the country have reported an alarming rise in patients who become caught in limbo in emergency departments and inpatient units for weeks, months and even years after they are medically ready for discharge. These delays most often occur due to a lack of care options, the inability to pay for post-discharge care and/or administrative gridlock. Complex case discharge delays, also known as bed blocking or boarding, are devastating for patients, exacerbate bed shortages and result in enormous, unnecessary costs. HANYS described the impact upon patients as follows:

> “Unnecessary hospital stays can lead to an irreversible decline in functional status and negatively impact psychological well-being, especially for older adults and children. Patients living in limbo in the hospital environment lose their autonomy, become socially isolated and lack access to the intellectual and physical activity necessary to thrive. Discharge delays also exacerbate hospital bed shortages, risk staff safety and well-being and result in extraordinary costs to our healthcare delivery system.”

HANYS’ 2021 white paper, *The Complex Case Discharge Delay Problem*, provided an overview of the long-standing challenges facing real

165 [https://www.hanys.org/communications/publications/complex_case_discharge_delays/](https://www.hanys.org/communications/publications/complex_case_discharge_delays/)
people and hospitals and highlighted real cases to emphasize the magnitude of the problem. This graphic is copied from the HASNY and lends a powerful image:

To learn more about the scope of complex case discharge delays in New York, HANYS conducted a three-month data collection pilot with hospitals statewide. In 2023, HANYS released a summary of the pilot findings and a framework to focus solutions. The data affirms that the fiscal cost of the problem is enormous. Fifty hospitals reported 992 patients experiencing discharge delays of more than two weeks between April 1 and June 30, 2022, at an estimated total cost of $167 million, or an average of $168,000 per case. Individuals who had an undocumented non-citizen status (most commonly uninsured or emergency Medicaid) experienced the longest average delayed days, followed by those with Medicaid fee-for-service. HANYS developed the following framework to focus efforts to ensure that patients no longer languish in hospitals for months to years after they are ready for discharge:

• prevent unnecessary hospitalization;
• intervene early when patients at high risk of delay arrive at the hospital;
• respond to patient needs during unavoidable extended delays; and
• increase visibility of delays in access to care.

The Task Force notes unique concerns about boarding and its impact upon children. This issue is not lost on New York State. In 2011, New York State convened a Respite Care Services Workgroup at the behest of the Committee on Cross-systems Youth. Group membership included the Council on Children and Families, OPWDD, DOH and OMH, among other state agencies. The workgroup noted that emergency respite availability is virtually non-existent for cross-system youth and consequently, children in crisis may be picked up by law enforcement or present at hospital emergency rooms. A report was rendered in April of 2011 and is included in the Appendix to this report. Interim recommendations included strengthening respite care services as a preventative strategy within the system of care to meet the needs of high-risk youth. As far as the Task Force is aware, the working group did not issue any other reports and its interim findings and recommendations were never implemented.

Massachusetts ABC legislation

The Massachusetts Mental Health “ABC” Act – Addressing Barriers to Care – was passed unanimously in 2022 could be a model for New York and other states to follow. The Commonwealth’s legislation attempts to reform the service delivery system with the goal that everyone who needs mental health care will be able to receive it. Here are six initiatives among any that are identified as priorities in Massachusetts:

166 Respite is a term of art and means intermittent, temporary substitute care of a person on behalf of a caregiver who requires relief from the responsibilities of daily caregiving. See, e.g., 14 NYCRR 635-10.4.

167 The term “cross system youth” is understood by the Task Force to include children eligible to be served by more than one state or local agency and would commonly include children with multiple disabilities.

168 See Appendix, Document 9

169 Session Law - Acts of 2022 Chapter 177 (malegislature.gov)

170 Mental Health ABC Act signed into law in Massachusetts | WWLP
• facilitate the development of interagency initiatives that: (i) are informed by the science of promotion and prevention; (ii) advance health equity and trauma-responsive care; and (iii) address the social determinants of health;

• develop and implement a comprehensive plan to strengthen community and state-level promotion programming and infrastructure through training, technical assistance, resource development and dissemination and other initiatives;

• advance the identification and dissemination of evidence-based practices designed to further promote behavioral health and the provision of supportive behavioral health services and programming to address substance use conditions and to prevent violence through trauma-responsive intervention and rehabilitation;

• collect and analyze data measuring population-based indicators of behavioral health from existing data sources, track changes over time and make programming and policy recommendations to address the needs of populations at greatest risk;

• coordinate behavioral health promotion and wellness programs, campaigns and initiatives;

• hold public hearings and meetings to accept comment from the public and to seek advice from experts, including, but not limited to, those in the fields of neuroscience, public health, behavioral health, education and prevention science.171

The law takes specific aim at emergency room boarding and requires ER’s to have a behavioral health clinician available. It will also create an online portal to speed up care for patients.172 The portal “enables health care providers, health care facilities, payors and relevant state agencies to access real-time data on children and adolescents who are boarding, awaiting residential disposition or in the care or custody of a state agency and are awaiting discharge to an appropriate

171 Session Law - Acts of 2022 Chapter 177 (malegislature.gov) sec. 1

172 “The Massachusetts statute offers a definition of boarding. Boarding means “waiting not less than 12 hours to be placed in an appropriate therapeutic setting after: (i) being assessed; (ii) being determined in need of acute psychiatric treatment, crisis stabilization unit placement, community-based acute treatment, intensive community-based acute treatment, continuing care unit placement or post-hospitalization residential placement; and (iii) receiving a determination from a licensed health care provider of medical stability without the need for urgent medical assessment or hospitalization for a physical condition.”
foster home or a congregate or group care program.” Among other things, the online portal shall include information on the specific availability of pediatric acute psychiatric beds, crisis stabilization unit beds, community-based acute treatment beds, intensive community-based acute treatment beds, continuing care beds and post-hospitalization residential beds.

The Massachusetts ABC law also requires the state to develop a similar portal for adults. The statute provides:

“The secretary of health and human services shall facilitate psychiatric and substance use disorder inpatient admissions for adults seeking to be admitted from an emergency department or hospital medical floor by developing and maintaining a confidential and secure online portal that enables health care providers, health care facilities and payors to conduct a real-time bed search for patient placement. The online portal shall provide real-time information on the specific availability of all licensed psychiatric and substance use disorder inpatient beds that shall include, but not be limited to: (i) location; (ii) care specialty; and (iii) insurance requirements…”173

The Task Force urges New York to similarly hold public hearings elevate the issue of boarding in ERs and hospitals because there is a crisis that needs to be remedied. The human and fiscal cost is enormous. The very existence of the complex case discharge delay problem as framed by the APA and HANYS is evidence that our systems of care are broken.

**Recommendations**

- State and local authorities administering programs for people with mental disabilities should promote “seamless systems” change which would have three components: 1) people with needs being able to connect to the system of care at any point; 2) each point in the various systems of care recognizing their needs and being able to connect them to the proper service providers and supports; and 3) emphasis on maintaining recovery, with person-centered treatment planning as well as attention to social supports and determinants of health.

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● Promote a seamless system that includes and addresses co-occurring disorders, recognizing that individuals in need frequently have multiple or overlapping needs and disabilities.
● Seek alternatives to coercive interventions and promote non-hospital community voluntary crisis stabilization programs.
● Support “peer bridging” as a link between the hospital and a successful discharge plan.
● Promote community investment in supported housing units.
● Recommend that the Office of Mental Health (“OMH”), the Office for People With Developmental Disabilities (“OPWDD”), and the Office of Addiction Services and Supports (“OASAS”) and the Department of Health to collaborate and adopt integrated service regulations without further delay.
● Recommend that OMH and OPWDD operate or fund respite beds for children and adults with disabilities to avoid boarding in hospital emergency rooms.

D. **Criminal Justice**

“America Has Made Mental Illness a Crime”

As observed by Task Force member Patricia Warth, quoting author Alicia Roth, “America as Made Mental Illness a Crime.”

During the last quarter of the 20th century, the dramatic reduction of inpatient mental health care capacity was accompanied by an equally dramatic increase in criminalization and incarceration. This increase in incarceration was historically unprecedented and occurred after decades of relative stability in incarceration numbers and

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175 In 1973, the United States incarcerated adults at a rate of 161 per 100,000 adults; by 2007, this rate had quintupled to 767 per 100,000. In absolute terms, “the growth in the size of the penal population has been extraordinary; in 2012, the total of 2.23 million people held in U.S. prisons and jails was nearly seven times the number in 1972.” See Warth, *supra* note 11, National Research Council 2014, *The Growth of Incarceration in the United States: Exploring Causes and Consequences*, Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, https://doi.org/10.17226/18613, at 33, 35-36.
Yet four decades of “tough on crime” rhetoric led to harsher sentencing policies and the criminalization of mental illness and substance dependence. This rhetoric is wholly inconsistent with crime victims’ views that diversion - as opposed to incarceration - is the preferred outcome for an accused person, and also resulted in over-policing and over-criminalizing drug possession and “quality of life” issues, which in turn led to the U.S.’s overreliance on arrest, severe penalties, and increased incarceration. Today, “[p]olicing, arrest, and criminal punishment have become the default response not only to violence and other harms, but also to poverty, mental health crisis, drug use and addiction, HIV and other health conditions, and school discipline.” Our nation’s overreliance on arrest and incarceration, combined with the failure to provide meaningful treatment options for people with mental illness, has resulted in far too many people with mental health conditions being ensnared in our criminal legal system. The statistics are stark:

- The National Alliance on Mental Illness estimates that between 25% and 45% of all Americans with mental illness will be incarcerated at some point in their lives. In contrast, only 6.6% of the general population will experience incarceration.
- People with mental illness in the U.S. are 10 times more likely to be incarcerated than they are to be hospitalized.
- More than 70% of people in U.S. jails and prisons have at least one diagnosed mental illness or substance use disorder or both, and up to a third of incarcerated people have a serious mental illness.
- The problem is most acute for women who are incarcerated; a 2017 study found that 20% of women in jail and 30% in prisons had

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178 Warth, supra note 32, Unjust Punishment: The Impact of Incarceration on Mental Health, 95 Feb-N. Y. St. B. J. at 12.
experienced “serious psychological distress” in the month before the survey, compared to only 14% of jailed men and 26% of imprisoned men.

• The numbers of mentally ill in carceral settings continues to increase. In 2010, approximately 30% of people jailed at Rikers Island had a mental illness; by 2022 it had risen to 50%.

The “tough on crime” rhetoric that fueled mass incarceration also fostered a mistaken belief that rehabilitation is ineffective, often leaving punishment as the primary focus of our criminal legal system. As our jail and prison population continued to increase, the will for a fiscal investment in rehabilitation and treatment programs waned, as did the will to fund mental health care both in and out of prison. As observed by CCJ and COSCA, “For too many individuals with serious mental illness, substance abuse disorder, or both, the justice system is the de facto entry point for obtaining treatment and services. There are many causes, not the least of which is the criminalization of mental illness and the lack of alternative approaches and resources to support the diversion of individuals from the courts and into treatment.”

Toward More Humane Treatment of People with Mental Illness: Diversion and Deflection

Patricia Warth poignantly observes that America must develop a commitment to humanely care for, rather than criminalize people with mental

181 People with mental illness are overrepresented in New York State’s largest jail system, the New York City Department of Corrections. More than half (52%) of the people in the New York City Department of Correction’s custody are recommended for mental health services, and in 2020, an average of 17% of incarcerated people were diagnosed with a “serious mental illness”. New York City Comptroller. (March 2021). FY 2022 Agency Watch List: Department of Correction. Available at: https://comptroller.nyc.gov/wp-content/uploads/documents/Watch_List_DOC_FY2022.pdf

182 Mental health care on Rikers: New York’s largest psychiatric provider - City & State New York (cityandstateny.com)

183 Warth, supra note 32, Unjust Punishment: The Impact of Incarceration on Mental Health, 95 Feb-N. Y. St. B. J. at 13.

illness and she says doing so asks us to address two questions: (1) who are we incarcerating and (2) how are we incarcerating them?\textsuperscript{185}

Regarding the first question, the Task Force urges implementation of reforms to dramatically reduce the number of people with mental illness who are arrested and processed through our criminal legal system and, for those people who are arrested, reduce the reliance on incarceration. Such reforms must include the codification of mental health courts in New York State; decriminalizing conduct that is a result of untreated mental illness, such as substance abuse, homelessness, and vagrancy; deflecting people from the criminal legal system before charges are filed, at the point of police contact; and importantly, expanding judicial diversion options for people who become entangled in the criminal legal system because of their health conditions, so that justice-involved individuals can be diverted to treatment, rather than incarceration.\textsuperscript{186}

Investing in treatment courts and addressing the root causes that drive criminal behavior will save the state money. According to the Office of Court Administration, for every $1 invested in treatment courts, the state produces $2.21 in benefits, which comes to a net savings of $10,330 per participant over five years\textsuperscript{187}. When accounting for the community impact beyond the savings of reduced incarceration and court system costs, like health and child welfare, the Center for Justice Innovation predicts that investment in diversion yields a far more staggering return, potentially saving the state $10 for every $1 invested. This savings is especially urgent in New York City, where taxpayers spend over $556,000 per year for the incarceration of a single individual. In the immediate term, investing in up-front costs to achieve savings in future years is exactly the kind of smart policy approach New York should be taking.

New York’s pending Treatment Not Jail Act (“TNJ”)\textsuperscript{188} legislation is a much-needed evidence-based reform for judicially diverting individuals who become entangled in the criminal legal system due to their untreated functional

\textsuperscript{185} Warth, supra note 32, Unjust Punishment: The Impact of Incarceration on Mental Health, 95 Feb-N. Y. St. B. J. at 15

\textsuperscript{186} Id.


\textsuperscript{188} S. 1976-Ramos/A.1263-Forrest-
impairment – be it a mental health condition, substance use disorder or other cognitive or intellectual disability. Significantly, NYSBA endorsed TNJ in a May 13, 2022, memorandum in support. 189 TNJ would amend New York’s 2009 judicial diversion/drug court statute as codified in Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) article 216 and expand eligibility beyond substance use disorders and limited specified crimes. Under TNJ, mental health courts will also be codified into law, be available for any charged offense, and applicable not only to substance use disorders, but also to mental health conditions or other disabilities so long as the individual’s “functional impairment” contributed to their pending charges. TNJ also expands and guides judicial discretion to divert a person from incarceration to treatment; incorporates treatment court best practices including harm reduction, adherence to clinical opinions, person-centered treatment, and voluntary participation; offers pre-plea participation in treatment; ensures equity, due process, and procedural justice in treatment courts; and establishes diversion parts in every county in New York State. Importantly, TNJ requires the presiding judge to engage in a public safety analysis based on clinical evaluation of potential participants and reflecting on the current case to determine whether a treatment mandate is in both the public and individual’s best interests. The bill has the potential to address many of the concerns identified in the Leading Change report and acknowledges that evidence-based diversion courts work and significantly reduce recidivism.

The goal of deflecting people from the criminal legal system at the point of police contact is one shared by the Biden administration. In March 2022, the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy (“ONDCP”) announced release of the Model Law Enforcement and First Responders Deflection Act to encourage all states to develop and use deflection programs-i.e., programs that deflect people with a mental disability away from the criminal legal system and to evidence-based-treatment heard reduction, recovery and prevention services. 190 The Task Force urges examination of this Model Act as a potential source of legislation in New York that can improve policing in a manner that not only saves lives, but also diminishes the number of people with a mental disability caught up in our criminal legal system.

For the second question of how we incarcerate, the Task Force maintains that society must reject the notion that rehabilitation does not work and shift the

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189 See, Appendix document 10
190 White House Announces State Model Law to Expand Programs that Defect People with Addiction to Care, available at: White House Announces State Model Law to Expand Programs that Defect People with Addiction to Care | ONDCP | The White House
focus of our prisons and jails from punishment to rehabilitation and treatment. We must also hold jails and prisons accountable for their treatment of incarcerated people by, among other things, requiring accurate reporting and rejecting practices that are not evidence-based, such as solitary confinement.\textsuperscript{191} A starting point is acknowledging the failure to fully implement the 2008 SHU exclusion legislation and the 2021 Humane Alternatives to Long-Term ("HALT") Solitary Confinement Act and requiring the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision ("DOCCS") to meaningfully implement these critically important reforms.\textsuperscript{192} As so aptly stated by our Task Force member, Ms. Warth:

"... we must recognize that the solution to caring for people with mental illness before they become ensnared in the criminal legal system--a network of community mental health centers with a single point of entry--has existed for decades but has never been adequately funded. It is time to commit the fiscal resources necessary to break the cycle of failure that has plagued our nation and to meaningfully care for our most vulnerable citizens." \textsuperscript{193}

\textbf{Reforming the Competency to Stand Trial System}

The October 22, 2022, \textit{Leading Change} report also identified as a priority reforming the competency to stand trial system. The report observed that nationally, "large numbers of defendants, including many who are charged with misdemeanors or non-violent felonies, spend excessive time in jail awaiting mental health evaluations and competency restoration, often staying longer in custody than they would have if they had been convicted of the crime, creating unnecessary cost that could be reinvested in community treatment. Those that then go through a restoration process often emerge legally competent, but remain untreated, and are returned to their communities with a poor prognosis for the future." \textsuperscript{194} \textit{Leading Change} recommends: 1) reserving the competency process,

\textsuperscript{191} Warth, supra note 32, \textit{Unjust Punishment: The Impact of Incarceration on Mental Health}, 95 Feb-N. Y. St. B. J. at 15

\textsuperscript{192} See, Correctional Association of New York Releases Report on Implementation of HALT Solitary Confinement Law — Correctional Association of New York A lawsuit has been filed challenging the failure to implement the HALT law and class certification is sought. Lawsuit seeks compliance from state prisons with HALT Act | News 4 Buffalo (wivb.com)

\textsuperscript{193} Id.

\textsuperscript{194} State Courts Leading Change, Report and Recommendations (October 2022) p 25.
which in New York is codified at article 730 of the CPL, for defendants charged with the most serious crimes; 2) creating competency dockets that facilitate access to appropriate diversion and outpatient restoration services; 3) active management of competency cases to avoid an individual languishing in jail and decompensating; and 4) requiring competency hearings to be scheduled and held without delay at every juncture.\textsuperscript{195}

The Task Force recommends changes to the Criminal Procedure Law such as those advanced in a bill proposed by the New York State Association of Counties and the Conference of Local Mental Hygiene Directors to amend CPL 730.\textsuperscript{196} The current provisions of this law have resulted in the diversion of scarce resources to the wasteful attempt to prepare mentally ill people to stand trial rather than helping them to receive the treatment they need. In New York State, for example, the cost of inpatient restoration services by OMH and OPWDD are charged to the counties currently at the rate of approximately $1,100 per day.\textsuperscript{197} Consequently, local governmental units are forced to expend hundreds of thousands or even millions of dollars, in failed attempts at restoration, particularly for defendants who may have intellectual disabilities or dementia. Often judges will order such restoration on the mistaken belief that they are helping a defendant to receive treatment leading to recovery.

If enacted, the bill would update and modernize article 730 to eliminate provisions which have been deemed unconstitutional and would 1) require that the reports of professionals examining the defendant include the examiner’s professional opinion of a reasonable possibility that the person can be restored; 2) create a definition of restoration services to make it clear that restoration is not aimed at recovery but simply at making the defendant legally able to stand trial; 3) delete the provision that the DA must agree to outpatient restoration so a court can make this decision independently and (4) allow the conversion of the

\textsuperscript{195} Id.
\textsuperscript{196} A. 8402A/S.7461A(2022).
\textsuperscript{197} The New York State statute governing the commitment of defendants who lack capacity to assist in their own defense is codified at Criminal Procedure Law (“CPL”) article 730. See People v Schaffer, 86 N.Y. 2d 460 (1995). The costs of article 730 commitments are a county charge. See MHL § 43.03 (c). Until 2020, the State only passed on half of the cost of these services to localities. In 2020, the State began charging the full charge of approximately $1,000 a day for in-patient restoration.
defendant from a criminal status to a civil status so the defendant can receive mental health treatment leading to recovery. 198

All that said, a functioning competency restoration system requires OMH and OPWDD to provide appropriate services on an inpatient and outpatient basis. On the inpatient side, a shortage of bed capacity within OMH and OPWDD has caused people adjudicated as incapacitated to languish in local jails awaiting restoration services in state facilities. As an example, in January of 2023, MHLS commenced three proceedings in State Supreme Court on behalf of individuals determined to lack capacity who were confined at the Chenango County Correctional Facility.199 Two of the individuals had been previously ordered by criminal court to the custody of OMH for restoration and the other individual was ordered to the custody of OPWDD. One of the individuals determined to be incapacitated had been waiting 41 days and the other 52 days to be transferred to the custody of OMH. The individual ordered to the custody of OPWDD had been waiting 218 days for an OPWDD bed and from the time of his arraignment had spent over 494 days in the county jail. OMH and OPWDD both maintained that there was a bed shortage that prevented them from taking timely custody of the individuals. Ultimately, the proceedings were withdrawn when OMH and OPWDD agreed to take custody of the individuals pursuant to the court orders and article 730 of the CPL. In addition to the Chenango County proceedings, similar cases were commenced in 2022 in Rensselaer County by MHLS and in Putnam County by DRNY on behalf of CPL 730 respondents committed to the custody of OPWDD.200

The cases and investigations proceeding them identified a systemic issue in New York State. Both OMH and OPWDD who receive defendants found to lack capacity and assist in their own defense for restoration services were at capacity in their forensic facilities. OMH, as a matter of policy, receives all CPL 730 respondents for restoration in one of four secure facilities. 201 OPWDD operates

199 Index numbers 2023-00005001, 00005002, 00005003
200 Putnam County Sup Ct, Index No: 500954/2022; Rensselaer County Index No: 2022–272453. Commissioner Sullivan informed the Task Force during her March 16, 2023, presentation that OMH would open additional forensic beds at the Rochester Psychiatric Center to alleviate the delays experienced in placing article 730 respondents. Commissioner Sullivan also stated that in 2022 there was a 20% increase in article 730 commitment orders issued by local criminal courts.
201 Forensic Mental Health Services (ny.gov) - the facilities are: the Northeast Regional Forensic Facility, Kirby Forensic Psychiatric Center, Mid-Hudson Forensic Psychiatric Center
two inpatient developmental centers which may receive 730 respondents for restoration - the Sunmount Developmental Center and the Valley Ridge Center for Intensive Treatment). Litigation in other jurisdictions has resulted in settlements and court orders establishing that a State’s failure to provide timely competency evaluations and restoration services to individuals with disabilities who languish in city and county jails, violates substantive due process rights guaranteed under the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution202 A new lawsuit has been commenced in Oklahoma. 203

CPL section 730.60(1) provides, in part, that when a local criminal court issues a final or temporary order of observation or an order of commitment, it must forward such order and a copy of the examination reports and the accusatory instrument to the Commissioner, and, if available, a copy of the pre-sentence report. Upon receipt thereof, the Commissioner must designate an appropriate institution operated by the department of mental hygiene in which the defendant is to be placed. The sheriff must hold the defendant in custody pending such designation by the Commissioner, and when notified of the designation, the sheriff must deliver the defendant to the superintendent of such institution. There is no time limit by which the Commissioner must make a designation and the provision is particularly onerous and constitutionally infirm when, as described above, the Commissioners fail to make a timely designation leaving a defendant found to be incapacitated languishing in jail. The Task Force recommends that article 730 be amended to require that a designation by the Commissioners occur by a date and the Rochester Psychiatric Center Forensic Unit. Confinement of 730 respondents in secure facilities raises constitutional concerns. A person who has been indicted, but not yet convicted, should not be confined in a setting which is more restrictive than necessary to achieve the purpose for which the individual is confined (see, Jackson v Indiana, 406 U.S. 715; McGraw v Wack, 220 A.D.2d 291; People ex rel. Jesse F. v Bennett, 242 A.D.2d 342 [2d Dept 1997]).

202 ACLU-PA Settles Lawsuit Over Unconstitutional Delays in Treatment for Hundreds of Defendants With Severe Mental Illness | ACLU Pennsylvania (aclupa.org); Trueblood v Washington State Dept. of Social and Health Services, 73 F. Supp 3d 1311 [WD Wash 2014 - finding that wait times to admit those ordered to receive competency restoration services beyond 7 days are constitutionally suspect. Trueblood has extensive history beyond the scope of this report. Further history and a summary of the proceedings can be found at Trueblood v. Washington State Dept’ of Soc. & Health Servs., 822 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 2016).

certain. Until that time and where a court is ordering an individual to the custody of OMH or OPWDD for restoration services, the agencies should be transparent and report to the court system if facilities are at capacity or if substantial delays can be anticipated.\textsuperscript{204}

The Task Force also urges that renewed consideration be given to outpatient restoration. With a 2012 chapter amendment to CPL 730,\textsuperscript{205} New York joined the majority of other states that allow for outpatient restoration of capacity.\textsuperscript{206} Commentators have suggested that outpatient restoration may offer the most promise for individuals with disabilities in the criminal justice system if all of the following apply: (a) the community has a program to restore competency that is suitable for the treatment needs of the defendant; (b) the program provides intensive, individualized competency training tailored to the demands of the case and the defendant's particular competency deficits; (c) the defendant has a stable living arrangement with individuals who can assist with compliance with appointments and with treatment; and (d) the defendant is compliant with treatment.\textsuperscript{207} In New York, OMH has issued policy guidance on outpatient restoration, although outpatient restoration remains an underutilized remedy.\textsuperscript{208} Commissioner Sullivan informed the Task Force that OMH would be interested in working with NYSBA to promote outpatient restoration particularly since there is enhanced funding for community services.\textsuperscript{209} The Task Force observes that

\textsuperscript{204} The same should be true for commitments under section 330.20 of the CPL and article 10 of the MHL - the discrete commitment statute for sex offenders nearing anticipated release.


\textsuperscript{206} See Reena Kapoor, Jail-Based Competency Restoration, 39 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 311, 311 (2011).

\textsuperscript{207} Placement of Individuals found Incompetent to Stand Trial: A Review of Competency Programs and Recommendations 25-26 (Disability Rights Cal., Paper. No. CM52.01, 2015).


\textsuperscript{209} The Commissioner’s comments when read with Joseph Glazer’s legislative testimony illustrates the potential for outpatient models of support. Mr. Glazer states that “we should be considering alternatives to the triggering of CPL 730, and allowing crisis, respite and enhanced and intensive community-based services to be utilized before a person is deemed CPL 730
outpatient restoration may find more use, and avoid a potential constitutional challenge, if the statutory requirement that the prosecutor consent to the order of outpatient restoration be amended to allow for notice to the people and an opportunity to be heard prior to the entry of the order.

Lastly, forensic hospitals treating individuals under a 730 order of commitment do not typically engage in any discharge planning. This glaring missed opportunity is extremely harmful to incarcerated whom after multiple months, are transferred back to local jails who must begin discharge planning efforts from scratch putting these individuals at the end of a waitlist for intensive mental health services and housing options. It is critical that forensic hospitals treating people under a CPL 730 order engage in meaningful and appropriate discharge planning well in advance of a return to fitness. Such planning may include the filing of a Single Point of Access (“SPOA”) application seeking Assertive Community Treatment (“ACT”) or Intensive Mobile Treatment (“IMT”), as well as a supportive housing application, noting that the failure to make such referrals in a timely manner is disadvantageous to the individual’s future community stability and safety.

**Practice considerations for article 730**

In 1988, the Westchester County Supreme Court struck down the automatic 90-day commitment authorized by section 730.40 (final orders of observation) as unconstitutional in the case of *Ritter v. Surles*. The state officer defendants (then OMH and OMRDD) elected not to appeal the order entered in *Ritter* and instead instituted a policy in OMH facilities hospitals requiring a defendant to be discharged within 72 hours following remand by the criminal court unless the defendant meets the criteria for either a voluntary or an involuntary admission to the hospital pursuant to article 9 of the MHL. In contrast, OMRDD did not immediately adopt any published regulations or policies concerning the retention, care, and treatment of defendants remanded to the Commissioner’s custody pursuant to CPL section 730.40. Currently, the OPWDD Bureau of Institutional and Transitional Services (“BITS”) makes a placement recommendation for the defendant. The defendant may be admitted to a developmental center pursuant to article 15 of the MHL, but more likely will be referred for community-based services. The statute has never been amended to reflect the *Ritter* decision. In practice, Town and village justices, county court judges, prosecutors, and defense incapacitated, which results in their hospitalization and long delays, in the justice system.”

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210 144 Misc. 2d 495.
attorneys in New York are often not aware of *Ritter v. Surles* and the fact that there is a declining infrastructure of in-patient beds to receive criminal defendants. *Ritter* should be codified, and the 90-day automatic commitment repealed.

The current CPL article 730 was enacted in 1970. In 1972, the U.S. Supreme Court held in *Jackson v. Indiana*\(^{211}\) that a person charged with a criminal offense who is committed solely on account of his incapacity to proceed to trial cannot be held more than the reasonable period of time necessary to determine whether there is a substantial probability that he will attain that capacity in the foreseeable future. If it is determined that this is not the case, then the state must either institute the customary civil confinement proceeding that would be required to commit indefinitely any other citizen or release the defendant. Furthermore, even if it is determined that the defendant probably soon will be able to stand trial, his continued commitment must be justified by progress toward that goal.\(^{212}\) The constitutional limitation on the confinement of an incapacitated criminal defendant as enunciated by the Supreme Court in *Jackson* has never been codified in New York. Currently, the only temporal limitation of the permissible period in New York of an article 730 retention is that the retention “must not exceed two-thirds of the authorized maximum term of imprisonment for the highest-class felony charged in the indictment.”\(^{213}\) Upon reaching the two-thirds maximum, the indictment is dismissed, and the defendant may only continuously be retained as a civil patient. Currently, rights guaranteed by *Jackson* may be vindicated only through motion practice, which may be commenced by the defendant or the Commissioner. However, albeit rarely, District Attorneys will also commence *Jackson* motions in some cases to relieve counties of the burden of paying the cost of article 730 confinement. It is time for article 730 to be examined by the legislature. New York should have a maximum period of court-imposed retention for restoration that has a nexus to social science research and that also considers the needs of special populations, such as those with intellectual disabilities or dementia.\(^{214}\)

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\(^{211}\) 406 U.S. 715

\(^{212}\) *Id.* at 738.

\(^{213}\) CPL 730.50

Court rules implementing CPL article 730 need updating. The regulations contemplate commitment only to the custody of OMH. The regulations should be amended to recognize that a person can be committed to either OMH or OPWDD. Also, references in part 111 to the “Mental Health Information Service” should be changed to “Mental Hygiene Legal Service.” Section 111.8 of the rules address official forms. The regulations provide that “[f]orms promulgated by the Chief Administrator of the Courts and the Commissioner of Mental Health, or either of them, shall be the official forms for uniform use throughout the state in implementation of article 730 of the Criminal Procedure Law.” However, the section of the regulations where the forms are to be found is “reserved.” While there is an index of CPL article 730 forms at section 111.8 of the regulations, there are no official forms promulgated to the knowledge of the Task Force.

It is also time to consider anew the benefit of official forms following the decision in *Hirschfeld v. Stone*. In that case, incapacitated defendants confined under article 730 challenged the release of personal information, including HIV status, in fitness reports conveyed to criminal courts. The District Court issued a preliminary injunction, holding that the state’s interests in including personal information in reports submitted to courts and used to determine capacity were outweighed by the defendant’s privacy interests. The *Hirschfeld v. Stone* litigation concluded upon the entry of a consent order endorsed by the District Court, which resulted in the creation of a model competency report. However, the model competency report is not uniform because OPWDD was not a party in the *Hirschfeld* litigation. Further, given that outpatient restoration is now legally authorized, examiners should be asked to opine whether the defendant would be a candidate for outpatient restoration. Toward the goal of promoting consistent practices, official forms should be promulgated.

Finally, in 1990, a law was enacted “directing the Law Revision Commission to study provisions of the Criminal Procedure Law and Correction Law to determine their impact [upon people] with mental retardation who are accused of” crimes and to recommend statutory revisions. The study was to take

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216 22 N.Y.C.R.R. 111.2.
217 22 N.Y.C.R.R. 111.8
218 22 N.Y.C.R.R. Subtitle D, Chapter I (CPL 730 forms reserved).
219 193 F.R.D. 175 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
into account the “cognitive ability and adaptive behavior” of persons with mental retardation and was to be conducted in consultation with executive branch agencies, the Mental Hygiene Legal Service, the Commission on Correction, and prosecutor and defense associations, among others. While a bill was never enacted as a result of the Law Revision Commission investigation into these compelling issues, there is no question that over thirty years later, people with developmental disabilities, including those with autism, continue to encounter significant difficulties and great risk in the criminal justice system.\textsuperscript{221}

\textit{Reforming CPL 330.20}

In New York, the current procedures for the retention, care, and treatment of persons found not responsible by reason of mental disease or defect, were enacted in 1980. The current statute was designed to comply with the constitutional mandates of \textit{Matter of Torsney}\textsuperscript{222} and followed a study conducted by the LRC.\textsuperscript{223} The detailed statutory scheme, codified at CPL 330.20, was

\textsuperscript{221} See Michelle Walton, \textit{Barriers to Justice: Inaccessibility of New York’s Criminal Justice System for Individuals with Intellectual Disabilities}. 14 Alb. Gov't L. Rev. 72, 91-92 (2020-2021). The author notes, for example, that in New York, individuals with prison sentences greater than one year are held in the custody of DOCCS. The only screening intellectual disabilities for inmates upon entry into the DOCCS system is a BETA IQ test. Those who score below seventy are referred for full-scale IQ testing and may be referred to the Special Needs Unit (“SNU”). However, individuals with mild or “borderline” intellectual disabilities defined as having an IQ score between seventy and eighty-five, still experience difficulties with adaptive functioning. In 1991, the former Commission on Quality of Care (now the Justice Center for the Protection of People with Special Needs) reported that DOCCS’s “battery of academic achievement tests and the Revised Beta IQ test administered to all incoming prison inmates at the reception centers appears to be unreliable in identifying inmates who may be developmentally disabled.” A 2016 report by Disability Rights New York found that DOCCS is still not incorporating adaptive functioning assessments into its screening processes for people with developmental disabilities. DOCCS’ overreliance on solely IQ testing is concerning because individuals with IQ scores over seventy who have adaptive functioning deficits are not being identified as having a disability, and thus receive no disability-related supports and accommodations.

\textsuperscript{222} 47 N.Y.2d 667,674-675 (1979). In \textit{Torsney}, Court of Appeals held that, because insanity acquittees lack criminal culpability, “[b]eyond automatic commitment ... for a reasonable period to determine [acquittees’] present sanity, justification for distinctions in treatment between persons involuntarily committed under the Mental Hygiene Law and persons committed under CPL § 330.20 draws impermissibly thin.”

\textsuperscript{223} As explained in \textit{Matter of Martin B.}, 138 Misc. 2d 685, CPL 330.20 was a major part of the Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1980. L.1980, c. 548. That Act, in turn, was recommended by the New York Law Revision Commission in a Report prepared in response to a specific request of Governor Carey. Session Laws of New York, 1981, pp. 2251–2293; see also Memorandum
intended to mirror the MHL, but created “new procedures for aspects of post-verdict supervision” applicable only to people charged with a crime who are found not responsible by reason of mental disease or defect. The NYSBA Committee on Mandated Representation issued a report on November 18, 2018, examining the use and efficacy of the Insanity Defense and CPL 330. This Task Force does not repeat that work in its endeavors, but does see value in raising again for public consideration that the insanity defense is rarely invoked and even more rarely successful, while the numbers of people who are incarcerated and have serious mental illness is shockingly high. People charged with a crime who successfully raise the insanity defense statistically will be confined in psychiatric hospitals for significantly longer periods of time than civil patients, despite the evidence showing that longer confinement is not correlated with reduced rates of recidivism. In short, once person has been acquitted based upon insanity and thereby adjudged to lack criminal culpability, she faces indefinite detention that can exceed the maximum time for which she could have been imprisoned. As the Committee on Mandated Representation commented in 2018, it is little wonder that the defense is so rarely invoked. New York’s system for the retention, care, and treatment of those found not responsible by reason of mental disease or defect appears entrenched. However, the statute is over 40 years old and worthy of study and re-examination to ensure that it meets its dual

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224 Report to the Executive Committee of the New York State Bar Association on the Use and Efficacy of Penal Law 40.15 and Criminal Procedure Law 330.20 and Recommendation to Establish a Mental Health Task Force or Committee (2018) (Robert Dean, Chair). Excerpts of the report were later published in an article written by Task Force Members Sheila E. Shea and Christopher Liberati-Conant, ‘You Have to Be Crazy to Plead Insanity, How an Acquittal Can Lead to a Lifetime of Confinement, 91-May N.Y. St. B. J. 28 (2019).

225 See, Shea & Liberati-Conant at p. 31. New York State does not track how often the defense is invoked, but data secured informally be the authors indicates that over the five-year period from 2013-2017, only 11 defendants, out of 19,041 felony and misdemeanor trials statewide, were found not responsible by reason of mental disease or defect after a trial. During the same five-year period, 241 defendants entered a plea of not responsible, compared to 1,375,096 convictions for felonies and misdemeanors. According to OMH, as of June 30, 2018, 260 CPL 330.20 respondents were in secure confinement and 452 were in the community subject to orders of conditions. Meanwhile, as of 2016, approximately 20 % of the people serving sentences in New York State prisons had mental health diagnoses that required OMH services.

226 Miraglia & Hall, supra note 108 at p. 526.
objectives of promoting public safety while meeting the treatment needs of people subject to its provisions.

Recommendations

- Support courts and communities in the use the Sequential Intercept Model to map resources, opportunities and gaps, and develop plans to improve court and community responses to individuals with mental illness, addiction, developmental disabilities, and co-occurring conditions.

- Advocate for funding and resources needed to implement a continuum of diversion programs, treatment and related services to improve public safety as a more humane and cost-effective approach when individuals with mental illness, addiction, developmental disabilities, and co-occurring conditions interface with the criminal legal system.

- Adequately fund beds in both the OMH and OPWDD systems for inpatient restoration for people in the criminal justice system determined to be incapacitated, while requiring OMH and OPWDD to expand and promote the clinical infrastructure required to permit outpatient restoration whenever possible.

- Those people admitted to the hospital or a developmental center for restoration must receive full and co-occurring competent care. 227

- Recommend CPL article 730 amendment to remove statutory requirement that the prosecution consent to outpatient restoration, while providing prosecutor with notice and an opportunity to be heard before an outpatient restoration order is issued.

- Promote the development and utilization of community-based alternatives to CPL article 730, including Respite and Crisis Respite, Crisis Services and community-based restoration.

- Require OCA to promulgate forms to implement article 730 so that consistent practices are promoted throughout New York State. 228

228 Title 22 New York Code Rules and Regulations, Judiciary, Subtitle D (Ch 1)
- Study and re-examine CPL 330.20 to ensure that it meets its dual objectives of promoting public safety while meeting the treatment needs of people subject to its provisions.

- Official forms to implement CPL article 330 should be updated to reflect that commitments can be to either the custody of OMH or OPWDD. 229

- Foster and support efforts to ensure that diversion and problem-solving courts are linked to service systems that competently, effectively and efficiently serve participants, allowing for better outcomes and the fullest possible application of justice.

- Consistent with the recommendation made in the State Courts Leading Change report, explore, foster and support efforts to deflect and divert people with mental disabilities from the criminal legal system prior to or immediately after arrest.

- Commit to full implementation of Humane Alternatives to Long-Term (“HALT”) Solitary Confinement Act and resist efforts to rollback these reforms that are critical to the human and effective treatment of people with mental disabilities who are incarcerates.

E. Civil Justice

*Legal capacity is a human right which persons with disabilities have the right to enjoy “on an equal basis with others in all aspects of life,” and persons with disabilities should be provided with “the support they may require in exercising their legal capacity.”* 230

The Task Force membership includes attorneys who practice and have expertise in family law, protection and advocacy systems, guardianship, mental hygiene legal service, and in county and state government. The Task Force recommends reforms of civil justice systems that promote the autonomy and assist people with mental disabilities in exercising their legal capacity. The narrative

229 Title 22 New York Code Rules and Regulations, Judiciary, Subtitle D (Ch II)
that follows discusses the execution of advance directives and supported decision making. The report further makes the case for guardianship reform and examines article 9 of the MHL.\textsuperscript{231} Reforms in family court and imposing a right to counsel in ERPO proceedings are also recommended. Finally, this section of the report closes with a call to repeal and replace the “hygiene” from the Mental Hygiene Law to adopt a modern nomenclature that does not stigmatize people with mental disabilities.

\textit{Promote Individual Autonomy through Psychiatric Advance Directives}

Under New York common law, every individual of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body and to control the course of his medical treatment.\textsuperscript{232} Patient autonomy and self-determination are basic tenets of New York law that have been faithfully adhered to by courts and codified in various statutes governing informed consent and health care decision making.\textsuperscript{233} The priority of the patient's decision is a firmly ensconced principle in New York State law.\textsuperscript{234}

As life-sustaining medical technology advanced through the 20\textsuperscript{th} century, it became clear, however, that there was a need for consistent decision-making procedures for patients who lost decision-making capacity.\textsuperscript{235} Beginning with California in 1976, all states enacted advance directive statutes of some sort, including either living wills or durable powers of attorney (appointing a surrogate decision maker) or both.\textsuperscript{236} In 1990, the federal Patient Self-Determination Act ("PSDA") was enacted to promote the use of written advance directives.\textsuperscript{237} The

\textsuperscript{231} The reader is referred to an article written by Task Force member Jamie Rosen, with Douglas Stern, published in the March/April 2023 edition of the NYSBA Journal, \textit{The Unique Role of the Guardian in Inpatient Psychiatric Care}, that explains the intersection of our state's guardianship and civil commitment statutes and the important role a guardian can play as an advocate for appropriate care and discharge planning. 95-Apr N. Y. St. B. J. 43 (2023).


\textsuperscript{233} \textit{Rivers v. Katz}, 67 N.Y.2d 485 (1986), 492-493; PHL 2405, 2805-d

\textsuperscript{234} PHL § 2983(5), 2994-c (6).


PSDA requires health care facilities receiving federal funds to inform patients of their rights under state law to prepare an advance directive, to inquire and document whether patients have executed a directive, to ensure compliance with state laws by respecting advance directives, and to educate health care providers regarding these legal instruments. The same year the federal PSDA was enacted, New York amended its Public Health Law (“PHL”) to permit a patient with capacity to appoint a health care agent. Codified at article 29-C of the PHL, the health care proxy statute was in derogation of the common law which did not permit a third person to decide to forego life sustaining treatment on behalf of a patient lacking decision-making capacity in the absence of clear and convincing evidence of the patient's prior competent choice. There is no legislation in New York expressly authorizing living wills, but they are recognized under the common law as evidence of the patient’s intentions pertaining to the rendition or withholding of treatment.

While legal scrutiny in New York has been afforded primarily to life sustaining treatment cases, a legally authorized surrogate, such as a health care agent, is empowered to make any health care decisions on the principal's behalf that the principal could make. “Health care” is broadly defined under the proxy statute to mean “any treatment, service or procedure to diagnose or treat an individual’s physical or mental condition.” Courts have long recognized that all patients, including patients with severe mental illness, have the right to participate meaningfully to determine the course of their own treatment, to be free from unnecessary or unwanted medication, and to have their rights of personal autonomy and bodily integrity respected by agents of the state. A person is not deemed incapable of making medical decisions simply by virtue of a psychiatric diagnosis. Nonetheless, a mental illness may render a person temporarily unable to make informed choices regarding his or her care and treatment, at a time when they may be in need of treatment.

among other things, that the United States Constitution did not forbid Missouri from requiring that there be clear and convincing evidence of an incompetent patient's wishes relative to the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment.

238 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc(f).
239 L. 1990, c. 752. The legislation was based upon the consensus recommendations of the Task Force on Life and the Law convened by Governor Mario Cuomo in 1985.
240 See, In Re Westchester County Med. Ctr. (O’Connor), 72 N.Y. 2d 517.
241 PHL § 2980 (4).
243 Id. at 494.
Psychiatric advance directives (‘PADs’) are a means for people with psychiatric conditions to retain choice and control over their own mental health treatment during periods of decisional incapacity. A PAD can consist solely of a person’s preferences and instructions regarding treatments to be administered or refused when incapacitated, or it can take the form of a proxy directive by which the person appoints a representative to make health care decisions, or a combination of both. Preparing a psychiatric advance directive can be empowering for an individual who has been subject to involuntary commitment and treatment. By thinking through and planning for a possible future mental health crisis, the individual can regain control and temper the worst possibilities. Such plans can designate supporters, describe calming techniques and identify triggers, as well the individual’s preferences for hospitals, alternatives to hospitalization, crisis programs, treatments and therapies; and clearly state treatments that the individual would not agree to and the reasons for these choices. People prepare the plans to ideally avoid coercive interventions that they have experienced as traumatic.

The use of psychiatric advance directives has indeed been shown to reduce coercive interventions such as civil commitments and involuntary medications, as well as contacts with law enforcement. It also has been shown to improve shared understanding and alignment with treatment providers as well as follow through with chosen treatments. Facilitation and support for completing a PAD can greatly enhance a person’s ability to complete the document. This support can come from clinicians or trained peer specialists.

The Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (‘CMS’) endorses the use of the PAD in its hospital survey protocol and its inpatient psychiatric facilities quality reporting standards, recognizing that a PAD is akin to a traditional advance

244 National Resource Center on Psychiatric Advance Directives, https://nrc-pad.org/
245 Id.
247 Jeffrey W. Swanson et al., Facilitated Psychiatric Advance Directives: A Randomized Trial of an Intervention to Foster Advance Treatment Planning Among Persons with Severe Mental Illness, 163 Am J Psychiatry 1943 (November 2006);
250 Id.
directive for health care and is a critical means for a patient to participate in the
development and implementation of his or her plan of care.\textsuperscript{251} CMS requires that,
as a condition for participation in Medicare and Medicaid, a hospital accord a
PAD the same respect and consideration given to a traditional advance directive
for physical health care.\textsuperscript{252} The Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services
Administration offers information, resources,\textsuperscript{253} and the Department of Health and
Human Services requires certified community behavioral health clinic staff to
educate consumers about PADs, and to develop crisis plans, including PAD’s,
with consumers.\textsuperscript{254}

In New York, for Medicaid recipients who have behavioral health histories,
a PAD can be uploaded through the Psychiatric Services and Clinical Knowledge
Enhancement System (“PSYCKES”) database. The New York State Office of
Mental Health reiterates the CMS requirement in regulation for all OMH facilities
participating in Medicare and/or Medicaid.\textsuperscript{255} Providers are to consider health care
proxy instructions when developing treatment plans for assisted outpatient
treatment.\textsuperscript{256}

It is the experience of the Task Force that despite these steps and obligations
under federal and state law, hospitals often do not honor psychiatric advance
directives as they do other health care proxies and living wills. Individuals who
issue instructions about their crisis care but who cannot name a trusted proxy are
particularly vulnerable to not having their choices overridden because they have
not conformed to the health care proxy law. A Supreme Court decision, citing to
Rivers \textit{v. Katz} and New York common law, held in 1991 that a hospital must
respect an involuntarily committed patient’s refusal of electroconvulsive therapy
expressed while she had the capacity to refuse treatment.\textsuperscript{257} However, this
decision has had little apparent influence in the field. The perception of
individuals with psychiatric histories— which is well-founded – is that advance
treatment decisions will be ignored.\textsuperscript{258} This is a significant barrier, particularly

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Center for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), “Inpatient Psychiatric Facility Quality Reporting
Regulations and Interpretive Guidelines for Hospitals, Rev. 200, 02-21-20, pp.99-100.
\item \textit{Id.}
\item https://www.samhsa.gov/sites/default/files/programs_campaigns/ccbhc-criteria.pdf
\item 14 N.Y.C.R.R. 527.7
\item M.H.L. 9.6 (h)(5)(ii)(2)
\item It is very likely that, pursuant to Rivers \textit{v. Katz}, a provider can override a PAD in an
emergency, such as when there is imminent danger to a patient or others in the immediate
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
for engaging in a process that can involve revisiting painful experiences of unwanted treatment.

The Task Force supports efforts to expand the use of PAD’s because individual choice is an important aspect of recovery as well as a foundation in New York law. Notably, New York City’s newly released mental health plan includes a policy and advocacy priority to “[e]xpand provider education, training and accountability for psychiatric advanced directives, and make sure they are integrated into mental health quality improvement policies and programs,” in order to “help improve health, decrease suffering, promote social connection and improve overall well-being for people living with SMI.”

When effectively developed, disseminated, and respected, PADs can help avoid repeated traumatizing coercive interventions, such as involuntary psychiatric admissions or restraint and seclusion. PADs should also be considered an available resource, along with other advance directives, as less restrictive alternative to guardianship. The Task Force recommends consideration of developing legislation that require recognition of PADs even without proxies in all settings, to fund peer and provider trainings to facilitate their use, and to establish means of transmission, such as registries and web-based access.

**Promote Individual Autonomy through Supported Decision Making**

In cases where a person is alleged to be unable to make his or her own decisions, the law has traditionally responded by empowering surrogates, including legal proxies or guardians, to act for or on behalf of the individual. Surrogate decision making regimes have increasingly been scrutinized and criticized, however, for curtailing the rights of people with disabilities to autonomy and self-determination. In 2006, the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (“CRPD”) recognized legal capacity as a

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“human right” which persons with disabilities have the right to enjoy “on an equal basis with others in all aspects of life,” and that persons with disabilities should be provided with “the support they may require in exercising their legal capacity.” Article 12 of the CRPD is widely recognized as the cornerstone for supported decision making and is regarded by some as a mandate to abolish surrogate decision making regimes.

Supported decision-making (“SDM”) is a concept rooted in respect for the decision-maker’s dignity, autonomy and right to self-determination. A person makes decisions with the assistance of a trusted person, or network of trusted people or supporters. Supporters assist by helping the person to understand and appreciate the options and the consequences of choices to be made, helping the person to gather information needed to decide, and to evaluate the information according to values or principles that the person feels are important. When necessary, the supporter communicates the decision to others. Essentially, SDM broadens how a person is understood to exercise decision-making, thereby advancing the person’s autonomy. In 2016, with a grant from the Developmental Disabilities Planning Council (“DDPC”), Supported Decision Making New York (“SDMNY”) was formed as a five-year pilot project to explore the use of SDM in New York for people with developmental disabilities. In 2021, a bill to codify SDM and Supported Decision Making Agreements (“SDMA”) was first proposed by OPWDD. On July 26, 2022, MHL article 82 was enacted. New York is now one of fourteen states, plus the District of Columbia, whose laws formalize supported decision making.


262 Id. Supports will be unique to everyone and may involve “gathering relevant information, explaining that information in simplified language, weighing the pros and cons of a decision, considering the consequences of making--or not making--a particular decision, communicating the decision to third parties, and assisting the person with a disability to implement the decision.” Kristin Booth Glen, What Judges Need To Know About Supported Decision-Making, And Why, 58 No. 1 Judges’ J. 26, 27 (2019).

263 Largent and Andrew Peterson, Supported Decision-Making in the United States and Abroad, supra, note 251 at p. 283-284.

264 SDMNY was originally composed as a “consortium of Hunter College/CUNY; the New York Alliance for Inclusion and Innovation (formerly NYSACRA), a statewide association of provider agencies; and Arc Westchester, a large provider organization.” https://sdmny.org/the-sdmny-project/history-and-goals/

265 See A. 8586; S.7107 (2021).

266 L. 2022, c. 41.
the elements of supported decision-making agreements, including provisions that protect and enhance the autonomy of the decision-maker. Article 82 will be effective upon promulgation of implementing regulations prescribing a process for creating SDMA for people with developmental disabilities who receive or are eligible to receive OPWDD services. These agreements must follow a recognized SDM facilitation or education process.

Only supported decision-making agreements of people with developmental disabilities completed in accordance with statute and regulations will be afforded full legal recognition under the statute. However, Article 82 contains two provisions signaling the potential for broader application of this decision-making model. The intent of the Legislature is to:

“strongly urge relevant state agencies and civil society to research and develop appropriate and effective means of support for older persons with cognitive decline, persons with traumatic brain injuries, and persons with psychosocial disabilities, so that full legislative recognition can also be accorded to the decisions made with supported decision-making agreements by persons with such conditions, based on a consensus about what kinds of support are most effective and how they can best be delivered.”

Further, MHL § 81.15 states that “additional regulations related to this article may be promulgated by state agencies whose service populations may benefit from the implementation of supported decision-making.” In fact, people with

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267 In addition to New York, Alaska, California, Colorado, Delaware, District of Columbia, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Nevada, North Dakota, Rhode Island, Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin each have laws establishing SDM.

268 Regarding the effective date of MHL article 82, the chapter amendment provides: “This act shall take effect ninety days from the date that the regulations issued in accordance with section one of this act appear in the New York State Register, or the date such regulations are adopted, whichever is later; and provided that the commissioner of mental hygiene shall notify the legislative bill drafting commission upon the occurrence of the appearance of the regulations in the New York State Register or the date such regulations are adopted, whichever is later, in order that the commission may maintain an accurate and timely effective data base of the official text of laws of the state of New York in furtherance of effectuating the provisions of section 44 of the legislative law and section 70–b of the public officers law.”

269 MHL § 82.01 (d).

psychiatric disabilities and histories in psychiatric systems very strongly advocated for Article 12, with the goal of curbing forced interventions based upon perceived or actual decision-making impairments.271 Countries which ratified the U.N. Convention, and are therefore obligated to reduce reliance on guardianship, have developed SDM more widely for people who have psychiatric disabilities, than has the United States.272 However, in the United States, supported decision-making is naturally found among social networks for people with psychiatric disabilities. Clubhouses are intentional communities of peers who share common purpose and tasks and promote individual development and recovery in a supportive environment of trusting relationships. These are natural environments for supported decision-making to develop from trusting relationships.273 Texas and California have each developed supported decision-making projects which promote supported decision-making through peer specialists and networks to further development of psychiatric advance directives. Crisis planning, such as Wellness Recovery Action Plans (“WRAP”) plans,274 also often involves identifying supporters and assistance with decision-making when needed. While these projects and networks generally do not rely on formal agreements, the process is just as valuable and important to recovery.

The Task Force recommends amending to Article 81 to explicitly include supporters for decision-making as “available resources” as defined under MHL

272 Countries include Canada, Australia, Sweden, United Kingdom, India, Bulgaria, See Mental Health, Legal Capacity and Human Rights (2021).
274 WRAP is a recovery-oriented plan to manage psychiatric conditions based on five concepts: hope, education, person responsibility, self-advocacy and support. In 1997, an eight-day peer support retreat led by Mary Ellen Copeland identified strategies to prevent emotional and mental breakdown and maintain positive mental health, including: tools that can be used every day to maintain wellness: words to describe wellness: unexpected things that can be “triggers”: early warning sign that things are “off”: how to know when things have gotten much worse and what to do; action plans for times that are overwhelming; and what to include in a crisis plan or advance directive. The Copeland Center for Wellness and Recovery is a peer-run nonprofit founded in 2002 to spread and meet the growing demand for WRAP Co-Facilitation workshops, empowering people from diverse communities to use WRAP for their own personal recovery journeys. https://www.welnessrecoveryactionapplan.com/what-iswrap/the-wrap-story
81.03(e), when considering the need for and/or scope of guardianship. Informal SDM, as well as formal agreements that may differ from Article 82 should be recognized. The Task Force urges OMH to convene a working group to review supported decision-making processes in New York State, to promote peer supports and social environments that are conducive to supported decision-making, and to explore the possibility of a pilot project relating SDM and psychiatric advance directives. The Task Force further urges collaboration between OMH and OPWDD to further the use of SDM for dually-diagnosed individuals, including any necessary reasonable accommodations, and to address the needs of the dually-diagnosed when developing the upcoming OPWDD regulations implementing Article 82.

Guardianship Reform

Article 81 of the MHL

The general guardianship statute in New York is codified at Article 81 of the MHL. The purpose of Article 81 is to satisfy either personal or property management needs of an incapacitated person in a manner tailored to the individual needs of that person, which takes in account the personal wishes, preferences and desires of the person, and which affords the person the greatest amount of independence and self-determination and participation in all the

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275 Additional recommendations to reform Article 81 appear in the next section.
276 When expanding supported decision-making models reports and evaluations of current models should be considered. For example, an evaluation of the SDMNY pilot commissioned by the Developmental Disabilities Planning Council was completed by the Burton Blatt Institute (“BBI”) of Syracuse University in 2022. The BBI report, entitled Looking Back, Looking Forward: An Evaluation of the Surrogate Decision-Making Project with Recommendations to Increase Knowledge, Use, and Acceptance of Supported Decision Making in New York, lauds the efforts of New York in enacting an SDM statute, but offers a critical examination of certain provisions of the new article 82 of the MHL. Among other things, the BBI report expresses concern that requiring a facilitation process pursuant to OPWDD regulations for an SDMA agreement to be legally recognized by third parties may actually limit rights in cases where people with developmental disabilities are capable of making their own decisions without facilitation. As SDM is implemented for people with developmental disabilities and considered for expansion to other populations, further study should be undertaken. Refinement of the laws and regulations promoting the laudable purpose of SDM is in the public interest.
decisions affecting such person’s life. Article 81 was the careful product of study and review by the New York State Law Revision Commission. Its procedural and substantive due process safeguards were a vast improvement from the old conservator/committee framework and have withstood the test of time.

That said, Task Force members are aware of frequent inquiries from people adjudicated to need guardians who are dissatisfied with their guardians. The complaints often arise in the metropolitan New York City area and involve community guardian programs, but upstate, inquiries of this nature are received, as well. Under MHL § 81.36, a person subject to guardianship or anyone concerned with his or her welfare can request a hearing on the continued need for guardianship powers\(^\text{277}\), and the burden of proof is on the guardian to show by clear and convincing evidence that the incapacitated person is still incapable of making reasoned treatment decisions and the guardian’s powers are still necessary.\(^\text{278}\) While there is a statutory remedy under MHL to modify or terminate guardianships, it is not practical for a person to invoke the remedy, particularly if that person is indigent and unable to retain counsel. The Task Force concerns are shared by the NYSBA Disability Rights which identified as one of its 14 general principles of guardianship that “a person under guardianship has a right to seek review of the guardianship and restoration of rights. There must be a clear process to initiate restoration that permits the person under guardianship to initiate and obtain access to counsel at public expense.”\(^\text{279}\)

The Task Force offers two recommendations. First, article 81 court examiners should receive training to restore a matter to the guardianship calendar should the examiner receive an inquiry that a person subject to guardianship seeks to modify or terminate the order of appointment. Practices vary around New York State, but some examiners do not engage in oversight relative to personal needs, only property. Another possible avenue for consideration is the development of a form letter or simplified motion procedure so that a person adjudicated to need a guardian can request the appointment of counsel. Counsel could then investigate the matter, advise their client on whether pursuit of termination or modification of the order is likely to be effective, and represent the person under guardianship should she wish to proceed to a hearing. For those people who cannot afford counsel, an attorney should be assigned under County Law Article

\(^{277}\) See, MHL § 81.36 (b), (c); § 81.06(a)(6).
\(^{278}\) MHL § 81.36 (d).
\(^{279}\) See, Sheila E. Shea, Guardianship’s Article 17-A: Marooned in Time and in Need of Reform, 95-Feb N. Y. St. B. J. 26, 30 (2023).
or the Mental Hygiene Legal Service could be appointed where its jurisdiction is implicated. In short, in post-adjudication circumstances, particularly where a person may have consented to the appointment of a guardian and is now dissatisfied with the guardian, there ought to be a path to return to court with representation by counsel. Thus, in an 81.36 proceeding, the individual seeking termination or modification should be afforded the same procedural protections and right to counsel as in the hearing for appointment of a guardian in the first instance.

Article 17-A of the SCPA

A discrete guardianship statute exists in New York that may be invoked for people alleged to require a guardian by reason of an intellectual or other developmental disability or traumatic brain injury (“TBI”). That statute, codified at Article 17-A of the Surrogate’s Court Procedure Act (“SCPA”), is a plenary statute the purpose of which at its inception in 1969 was largely to permit parents to exercise continued control over the affairs of their adult children with disabilities. In essence, the statute rested upon a widely embraced assumption that “mentally retarded” people were perpetual children.

Under New York law, a person with developmental disabilities (or a TBI) can be subject to either guardianship statute, despite the considerable substantive and procedural variations between Article 81 and Article 17-A. An injustice arises, as a result, because a petitioner for guardianship can choose between two statutes and petitioner’s choice will determine the due process protections to be afforded to a respondent with developmental disabilities.

Article 17-A is marooned in time and a counterweight to progressive principles that typically emerge in New York State, and which are reflected in the newly enacted MHL Article 82. Last year, the NYSBA Disability Rights Committee issued a report arguing that there is an urgent need to reform Article 17-A. The committee maintained that there are 14 general principles that a guardianship statute for adults with intellectual and developmental disabilities should recognize:

See, Matter of Marie H, 89 NY 2d 889

Report of Disability Rights Committee, Guardianship for People with Developmental Disabilities: Examination and Reform of Surrogate's Court Procedure Act Article 17-A is a Constitutional Imperative (Joe Ranni, Alison Morris, Co-Chairs) (2021) Appendix Document 11
1. Neither the alleged developmental disability nor the age of the individual alleged to have a developmental disability should be the sole basis for the appointment of a guardian. Rather, the individual’s ability to function in society with available supports should be the focus of the court’s inquiry into the need for a guardian.

2. The appointment of a guardian must be designed to encourage the development of maximum self-reliance and independence in the individual. The standard for appointment should be that the person is unable to provide for personal needs and/or property management with available supports, and the person cannot adequately understand and appreciate the nature and consequences of such inability.

3. The appointment of a guardian must be necessary and the least restrictive form of intervention available to meet the personal and/or property needs of the individual as determined by a court.

4. A guardianship petition must allege the other available resources for decision-making, if any, that have been considered by the petitioner and the petitioner’s opinion as to their sufficiency and appropriateness, or lack thereof. Other resources include, but are not limited to, powers of attorney, health care proxies, trusts, representative and protective payees and supported decision-making.

5. All persons alleged to be in need of the appointment of a guardian are entitled to due process protections including, but not limited to, notice of the proceeding in plain language and right to counsel of their own choosing or the appointment of counsel guaranteed at public expense.\(^{282}\)

6. A guardian should not be appointed absent a hearing where the person alleged to be in need of a guardian is present. The person’s appearance at the hearing may be dispensed with in exceptional circumstances at the

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\(^{282}\) Some courts will appoint a guardian ad litem for the respondent in a 17-A proceeding. The Task Force notes anecdotally that many GALs are not familiar with the needs of people with developmental disabilities and would benefit from training, especially now with changes in the law that will be forthcoming following the enactment of the supported decision making statute. We take this opportunity to comment and recommend that OCA update its guidelines for attorneys accepting guardian ad litem appointments. The guidelines were last revised twenty years ago, in 2003.
court’s discretion and in accordance with statutory standards. The person has the right to a jury trial.

7. The need for the guardianship must be established by clear and convincing evidence of the person’s functional limitations that impair the person’s ability to provide for personal needs; the person’s lack of understanding and appreciation of the nature and consequences of his or her functional limitations; the likelihood that the person will suffer harm because of the person’s functional limitations and inability to adequately understand and appreciate the nature and consequences of such functional limitations; and necessity of the appointment of a guardian to prevent such harm.

8. The powers of the guardian should be identified in the order/decree issued by the court and tailored to meet the needs of the individual in the least restrictive manner possible. The person subject to guardianship retains any powers not expressly conveyed to the guardian.

9. The individual must be included in all decisions to the maximum extent possible and practicable, in order to encourage autonomy. The guardian should be encouraging the development of maximum self-reliance and independence in the individual.

10. The duties of the guardian should be specified in the order or decree. Among other things, the guardian’s duty is to make decisions that give maximum consideration to the individual’s preferences, wishes, desires, and functioning level. A guardian should protect the individual from unreasonable risks of harm, while supporting and encouraging the individual to achieve maximum autonomy.

11. The duration of a guardianship should be determined by the court and conform to the proof adduced at the hearing. For instance, time limited guardianships may be appropriate including where a guardianship is sought for a young adult between the ages of 18 and 25. Where a guardianship of limited duration has been ordered by the court, any application to extend the guardianship should require proof by clear and convincing evidence by the petitioner that it is necessary to continue the guardianship.

12. A person under guardianship has a right to seek review of the guardianship and restoration of rights. There must be a clear process to initiate restoration that permits the person under guardianship to initiate and obtain access to counsel at public expense.
13. The court should retain jurisdiction over the guardianship and entertain modification and termination proceedings where the burden of proof shall be on the person objecting to discharge or seeking increased powers for the guardian rather than on the respondent.

14. The person or entity appointed guardian must be subject to monitoring and oversight by the court. For instance, guardians should periodically file reports as to their activities.

The 14 principles enunciated above are contained within the article 81 guardianship statute. Article 17-A, in contrast, is devoid of most of these essential and fundamental due process safeguards.

While SCPA Article 17-A cries out for reform, it remains a surrogate decision-making remedy in New York State. As stated in the Practice Commentaries to the article, the statute is revered by parents who often commence guardianship applications without the assistance of counsel and at less expense than a typical Article 81 proceeding. Also, many 17-A proceedings are not challenged, causing some to argue that the relative ease in proceeding be retained. Nonetheless, even where a guardianship proceeding is not contested, the relief granted by the court should be informed by the functional abilities of the respondent and constitute the least restrictive form of intervention. Recently reported cases where SCPA article 17-A guardianships were terminated reveal that the plenary nature of the 17-A adjudication is often not consistent with the lived experience of people with developmental disabilities. With the enactment of MHL Article 82, New York now has both supported and surrogate decision-making models for a discrete population: people with developmental disabilities. SCPA Article 17-A and MHL Article 82 stand in stark contrast to one another. Article 17-A results in a plenary adjudication of the need for a guardian with a complete loss of civil rights. Article 82, by comparison, recognizes that “a person’s right to make their own decisions is critical to their autonomy and self-

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283 See Margaret Valentine Turano, Practice Commentaries, McKinney’s Cons. Laws of N.Y. SCPA 1750: “Admittedly, the Article 17-A guardianship is not for every disabled person ... On the other hand, the Article 17-A guardianship gives modest families access to affordable judicial process.”

“determination” and that people with developmental disabilities “are often denied that right because of stigma and outdated beliefs about their capability.”

Given the passage of MHL Article 82, the Task Force concludes that it is time to amend and modernize SCPA Article 17-A. The Task Force recommends that the Article 17-A guardianship statute should provide that, where supported decision-making can meet the individual’s needs, guardianship is to be avoided as unnecessary. Further, because Article 17-A guardianship remains an available remedy in New York, guardians should be informed of supported decision-making and be guided by its principles. Finally, Article 17-A must be reformed to ensure that the constitutional rights of people subject to the statute are protected. This would include clarifying the rights of people who are currently subject to the statute to seek modification or termination of the guardianship with the burden of proof being on the guardian to demonstrate the need for the guardianship to continue. People who wish to pursue modification or termination of 17-A guardianships should be afforded access to their court files and the right to counsel. The Task Force also recommends that OCA provide forms and instructions on its website addressing the right of a person to seek restoration of their rights. Currently, the OCA website only has forms which assist a person seeking to petition for guardianship, while offering no alternative information for people already subject to the statute who desire to modify or terminate a guardianship.

Promote Single Transaction Remedies

An underutilized provision of New York’s adult guardianship law, MHL § 81.16(b), permits a judge to “authorize a [necessary] transaction or transactions” that can solve a single problem or a series of interrelated problems that stem from a health concern. Informally known as a “one-shot” provision, section 81.16(b) can, for example, meet a health care provider’s need for informed consent to a medical procedure. Using section 81.16(b) thus avoids the imposition of guardianship, permits a person to retain all their rights, personhood, and dignity, while offering a solution to the vulnerable person’s immediate health concerns and, importantly, takes into consideration that individual’s specific, related challenges. In addition to decisions that are directly related to a person’s health and medical treatment, a single transaction solution can also encompass related issues that impact on a person’s health, such as preserving that person’s home

285 MHL § 82.01.
from foreclosure, or securing an inheritance and that makes it possible to pay for necessities. For clients served in the OMH and OPWDD systems, single transaction dispositions have been used very effectively to establish special needs trusts, in those instances where the person may have received an inheritance or a retroactive SSA benefit. The Task Force recommends that OCA encourage through education of the Bench and Bar the single transaction disposition, where appropriate, to avoid unnecessary guardianships.

**Article 9 of the Mental Hygiene Law**

*Removal from the Community and Admission to Psychiatric Hospitals*

The principal statute governing inpatient psychiatric hospitalization in New York State is article 9 of the MHL. In 2019, there were over 120,830 legal status admissions to hospitals in New York State.\(^\text{286}\) It is well recognized that involuntary civil commitment constitutes a "massive curtailment of liberty," which is constitutionally permissible only if stringent substantive and procedural due process standards are met.\(^\text{287}\) Even the "willing patients" (voluntary and informal in New York) are not immune from such loss of liberty, as there is always the potential for these individuals to be converted to an involuntary legal status (e.g., by improperly classifying as voluntary those patients who are unable to understand or exercise their rights or by applying to the court for involuntary retention). They, too, are entitled to constitutional protections.\(^\text{288}\)

In general, New York subscribes to a medical model for inpatient admission rather than a strictly legal or judicial model. Voluntary patients must be suitable and willing to be admitted to the hospital.\(^\text{289}\) Involuntary admission for a period of up to 60 days is accomplished solely on the certifications of examining physicians,

\(^{286}\) As reported to the Mental Hygiene Legal Service in accordance with MHL § 9.11. There are parallel provisions codified at Article 15 of the MHL governing admissions to developmental centers in New York State. There are only two developmental centers currently operating in our state which receive people with developmental disabilities on legal status.\(^\text{287}\) *Humphrey v. Cady*, 405 U.S. 504 (1972).\(^\text{288}\) *In re Buttonow*, 23 N.Y.2d 385 (1968).\(^\text{289}\) MHL § 9.13. MHL § 9.17 provides that In order for a person to be suitable for admission to a hospital as a voluntary or informal patient, or for conversion to such status he must be notified of and have the ability to understand the following: 1. that the hospital to which he is requesting admission is a hospital for the mentally ill. 2. that he is making an application for admission. 3. the nature of the voluntary or informal status, as the case may be and the provisions governing release or conversion to involuntary status.
without mandatory judicial review. During this initial admission period, judicial review is elective, and a challenge to involuntary hospitalization must be affirmatively exercised by the patient or others. Mandatory and periodic judicial review applies to admissions that exceed 60 days.

Article 9 sets forth the legal requirements for civil admissions to a hospital. The statutory scheme, in effect since 1965, establishes a two-tiered or two-stage process for admission and retention of patients in hospitals. The first stage employs the medical model, allowing up to 60 days’ confinement without mandatory judicial review. For patients in need of continued involuntary inpatient hospitalization beyond 60 days, the second stage provides for periodic court orders of retention. It has been argued that the medical model is constitutionally impermissible, or at least suspect; and indeed, most states do afford every involuntary patient a probable-cause hearing within five to 15 days of admission. However, both the New York Court of Appeals and the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit have held that New York’s statutory scheme is constitutional due to its substantial procedural due process protections, including the availability of the Mental Hygiene Legal Service (hereinafter “MHLS”).

There are several means of involuntary admission under New York’s medical model. These sections of the MHL are procedurally and substantively intricate. To the extent that such stringent, detailed requirements make involuntary admission less than easy, they reflect the gravity of the liberty interests at stake. Full compliance with statutory requirements is expected. The Task Force does not endeavor to explain the entirety of the procedural and substantive requirements to sustain civil admissions in New York State and refers the reader to other resources.

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290 MHL § 9.27, 9.37.
291 MHL § 9.31.
292 MHL § 9.33.
293 See Project Release v. Prevost, 551 F. Supp. 1298 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), aff’d, 722 F.2d 960 (2d Cir. 1983); Fhagen v. Miller, 29 N.Y.2d 348 (1972). The MHLS (formerly the Mental Health Information Service), operates pursuant to Article 47 of the MHL and is an auxiliary agency of the Appellate Divisions. The Service has several functions which are defined by statute and uniform regulations of the Appellate Divisions. These duties include, among other things, to study and review the admission and retention of all patients, and to provide legal counsel for its clients in judicial proceedings concerning admission, retention, transfer, care and treatment.

294 See Project Release v. Prevost, supra note 373.
for that purpose. However, during the period of the Task Force’s investigation, there was heightened attention to the processes that are used to remove people from the community and transport them to hospitals for psychiatric evaluation and potential admission. Thus, this Report addresses the standards for emergency admission (Section 9.39 of the MHL) and the statutory provisions that permit a person to be removed from the community for transport and evaluation for admission.

**Emergency Admission for Immediate Observation, Care and Treatment**

For a period of up to 15 days, a hospital approved by OMH may admit any person who, upon the examination of a staff physician, is alleged to have a mental illness for which immediate observation, care and treatment in a hospital is appropriate, and which likely would result in serious harm to that person or others. “Likelihood to result in serious harm” is defined as:

- a substantial risk of physical harm to himself as manifested by threats of or attempts at suicide or serious bodily harm or other conduct demonstrating that he is dangerous to himself; or

- a substantial risk of physical harm to other persons as manifested by homicidal or other violent behavior by which others are placed in reasonable fear of serious physical harm.

While the emergency admission is valid for 15 days, the patient may not be retained for more than 48 hours, unless a staff psychiatrist confirms the need for hospitalization. At any time after admission, the patient, a relative or friend, or the MHLS may demand a hearing, which shall be held as soon as practicable, but no more than five days after the court receives the request. The court must determine the matter in accordance with the foregoing standard for admission. Involuntary hospitalization beyond 15 days may be continued by the execution of a two-physician certificate pursuant to Section 9.27 of the MHL.

An additional class of facility called a comprehensive psychiatric emergency program (“CPEP”) was created to deal with the large number of patients,

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296 *See Rights in Facilities*, included in New York State Bar Association publication Representing People with Disabilities, available online at [MHLS Articles (nycourts.gov)](https://nycourts.gov)


299 [Id.](https://nycourts.gov).
particularly in the downstate region, who were held in hospital emergency rooms for extended periods of time while awaiting the availability of regular hospital admission. The first such program began in 1990.\textsuperscript{300} Section 9.40 of the MHL provides for the admission of patients who are dangerous to self or others, as defined above. The initial examination must be made within six hours, and it may result in admission for up to 24 hours, with an extension to 72 hours based upon a confirming examination by a second physician. Notice and hearing provisions are set forth in Section 9.30 and continued hospitalization is permitted by means of Section 9.39 or 9.27.

\textit{Removal Provisions}

People may be removed from the community and brought to a 9.39 hospital or CPEP for evaluation and if appropriate, for involuntary admission under section 9.39, by:

\begin{itemize}
  \item By peace officers and police officers;\textsuperscript{301}
  \item By order of courts of inferior or general jurisdiction; \textsuperscript{302}
  \item By order of the local director of community services; \textsuperscript{303}
  \item By direction of a qualified psychiatrist who is treating or supervising the treatment of the patient at an outpatient mental health clinic or program;\textsuperscript{304}
  \item By the director of a general hospital, as defined in Article 28 of the PHL, that does not have a psychiatric unit;\textsuperscript{305}
  \item By an approved mobile crisis outreach team.\textsuperscript{306}
\end{itemize}

The common standard for all removals is that the person: “appears to be mentally ill and is conducting himself or herself in a manner which is likely to result in serious harm to the person or others.” The person may be transported to a 9.39 hospital or a CPEP. In addition, a 2021 chapter amendment to Section 9.41 provides that

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
  \item L. 1989, c. 723
  \item MHL § 9.41.
  \item MHL § 9.43.
  \item MHL § 9.45.
  \item MHL § 9.57.
  \item MHL § 9.57.
  \item MHL § 9.58.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
“a person otherwise determined to meet the criteria for an emergency assessment pursuant to this section may voluntarily agree to be transported to a crisis stabilization center under section 36.01 … for care and treatment and, in accordance with this article, an assessment by the crisis stabilization center determines that they are able to meet the service needs of the person.”  

On February 18, 2022, OMH Commissioner Ann Marie T. Sullivan and Chief Medical Officer Thomas Smith issued interpretive guidance which set forth the circumstances under which courts have determined that the MHL “permits persons who appear to be mentally ill and who display an inability to meet basic living needs” to be mandated into emergency psychiatric assessments and emergency and involuntary inpatient psychiatric admissions. This document was issued by OMH in connection with New York State Governor Kathy Hochul’s and New York City Mayor Eric Adams’ release of a joint plan to remove people from the New York City subway system. The OMH guidance document does not reference the standards that require probable cause and danger to self or others that underpin a mental hygiene “arrest” under Section 9.41. However, the OMH guidance does specify that for purposes of a Section 9.41 removal, the refusal or inability of a person to meet his or her essential needs for food, shelter, …

307 L.2021, c. 57, pt. AA, § 4, eff. Oct. 1, 2021. A crisis stabilization center shall serve as a voluntary and urgent service provider for persons at risk of a mental health or substance abuse crisis or who are experiencing a crisis related to a psychiatric and/or substance use disorder that are in need of crisis stabilization services. Each crisis stabilization center shall provide or contract to provide person centered and patient driven crisis stabilization services for mental health or substance use twenty-four hours per day, seven days per week, including but not limited to: (i) Engagement, triage and assessment; (ii) Continuous observation; (iii) Mild to moderate detoxification; (iv) Sobering services; (v) Therapeutic interventions; (vi) Discharge and after care planning; (vii) Telemedicine; (viii) Peer support services; and (ix) Medication assisted treatment.


310 See, Anthony v. City of New York, 339 F. 3d 129 (2d Cir. 2003).
clothing or health care must be immediate; that is, the refusal or inability is likely to result in serious harm if there is no immediate hospitalization.\textsuperscript{311}

On November 29, 2022, Mayor Adams delivered an “Address on the Mental Health Crisis in New York City”.\textsuperscript{312} Referred to by some as the “NYC Removal Directive,” New York City sought to provide guidance to police officers who may be called upon to decide whether a person should be transported to a hospital for evaluation. The announcement prompted objections by, among others, the Association of the Bar of the City of New York.\textsuperscript{313} The City Bar maintained that the NYC Removal Directive was vague and raised significant legal issues to ensure the City’s compliance with City, State, and Federal anti-discrimination laws, as well as State laws governing mental health treatment and the United States Constitution. The City Bar testimony quoted reports that the police effectuated more than 1,000 removals under Sections 9.41 and 9.58 of the MHL in 2022 before the Removal Directive was issued. The City Bar testimony also concludes that the OMH guidance aligns with case law interpreting Section 9.41 arrests with respect to both the probable cause standard and the requirement of an inability to meet basic needs such that a person represents a present risk of harm to self. The NYC Removal Directive provides examples of reasonable indicia that could result in a removal to include – serious untreated physical injury, unawareness or delusional misapprehension of surroundings, or unawareness or delusional misapprehension of physical condition or health. The standards are argued by the City Bar to be vague, broad, undefined and untethered from case law while missing the temporal urgency standard found in the OMH guidance.

The Task Force is persuaded by the City Bar’s analysis of existing statutory and case authorities and likewise would recommend adherence to OMH guidance as the proper standard to apply when removal and transport for evaluation and possible involuntary admission to a hospital is under consideration. Our members are also influenced by the urging of advocates that crisis stabilization centers

\textsuperscript{311} https://omh.ny.gov/omhweb/guidance/interpretive-guidance-involuntary-emergency-admissions.pdf

\textsuperscript{312} Transcript available online at: https://www.nyc.gov/office-of-the-mayor/news/871-22/transcript-mayor-eric-adams-delivers-address-mental-health-crisis-new-york-city-holds

\textsuperscript{313} See, Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Written Testimony on Mental Health Removals and Mayor Adams Recently Announced Plan. Appendix Document 12
authorized by MHL § 36.01, which are voluntary alternatives to a psychiatric emergency room, remain largely untested in New York State and should be funded and promoted as a matter of policy.

**Assisted Outpatient Treatment**

On January 3, 1999, Kendra Webdale was pushed to her death before an oncoming subway train in New York City by Andrew Goldstein, a person with a severe mental illness who was untreated. Responding to this tragedy, the Legislature enacted Mental Hygiene Law § 9.60. At that time of its enactment, nearly 40 other states had enacted a system of assisted outpatient treatment, or “AOT,” pursuant to which people with mental illness unlikely to survive safely in the community without supervision may be subject to court-ordered mental health treatment. Before a court may issue an order for assisted outpatient treatment, the statute requires that a hearing be held at which several criteria must be established, each by clear and convincing evidence. Significantly, the statute has certain prerequisites limiting its application to people who have a history of lack of compliance with treatment for mental illness that has either (a) at least twice within the last 36 months been a significant factor in necessitating hospitalization, or receipt of services in a forensic or other mental health unit of a correctional facility or a local correctional facility, not including any period during which the person was hospitalized or incarcerated immediately preceding the filing of the petition, or (b) resulted in one or more acts of serious violent behavior toward self or others or threats of, or attempts at, serious physical harm to self or others within the last 48 months, not including any period in which the person was hospitalized or incarcerated immediately preceding the filing of the petition. The court must also find by clear and convincing evidence that the assisted outpatient treatment sought is the least restrictive treatment appropriate and feasible for the respondent.

In 2022, one of the prerequisites was amended to permit an AOT application to be filed when an assisted outpatient treatment order has expired within the last six months, and:

“...since the expiration of the order, the person has experienced a substantial increase in symptoms of mental illness and such symptoms substantially interferes with or limits one or more major

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314 L. 1999, c. 408 “Kendra’s Law.”
315 See, MHL § 9.60 (c).
316 See, MHL § 9.60 (j)(2).
life activities as determined by a director of community services who previously was required to coordinate and monitor the care of any individual who was subject to such expired assisted outpatient treatment order. The applicable director of community services or their designee shall arrange for the individual to be evaluated by a physician. If the physician determines court ordered services are clinically necessary and the least restrictive option, the director of community services may initiate a court proceeding.”

If the individual subject to assisted outpatient treatment later fails or refuses to comply with treatment as ordered by the court, if efforts to solicit voluntary compliance are made without success, and if in the clinical judgment of a physician, the respondent may be in need of either involuntary admission to a hospital or immediate observation, care and treatment pursuant to standards set forth in the Mental Hygiene Law, then the physician can seek the respondent’s temporary removal to a hospital for examination to determine whether hospitalization is required.

Kendra’s Law is not permanent and next expires in 2027. The 2005 reauthorization of the AOT statute required an independent evaluation of the implementation and effectiveness of the AOT program in New York State. Upon issuing the report in 2009, researchers stated that as designed, AOT can be used to prevent relapse or deterioration before hospitalization is needed. However, in nearly three-quarters of all cases, it was used as a discharge planning tool for hospitalized patients. Thus, AOT was largely used as a transition plan to improve the effectiveness of treatment following a hospitalization and as a method to reduce hospital recidivism. Further, most of New York State’s experience with AOT originates in the New York City region where approximately, at the time the report was generated, 70% of all AOT cases were found. AOT was systematically

318 See, MHL § 9.60 (n).
319 Expires and deemed repealed June 30, 2027, pursuant to L.1999, c. 408, § 18.
320 Following a competitive request for proposal, the contract was awarded to the Services Effectiveness Research Program in the Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences at Duke University Medical Center with a subcontract to Policy Research Associates, Inc. of Delmar, New York. The evaluation team was led by Principal Investigators Marvin Swartz, M.D., and Jeffrey Swanson, Ph.D., of Duke and Henry Steadman, Ph.D., and Pamela Clark Robbins of PRA. The final report was issued on June 30, 2009.
implemented citywide in New York City with well-delineated city-wide policies and procedures. In the remainder of the state, AOT was implemented and utilized at the discretion of each county. The researchers noted that in some counties, AOT had been rarely used; in several it had not been used at all. Based on key stakeholder and recipient interviews and on AOT program data, the researchers found considerable variability in how AOT is implemented across the state, but strong uniformity in how it is implemented in New York City.

The Task Force members recognize that any conversation about reform of the mental health system in New York State must include the assisted outpatient treatment statute. The AOT remedy continues to be employed primarily in the New York City area. Data gathered by the Mental Hygiene Legal Service reflects that 4,138 AOT applications were filed in 2019, with the vast majority of cases arising in the First and Second Judicial Departments.321 Racial disparities persist in the utilization of the statute with 44% of AOT recipients being Black and 32% Latino in New York City.322 Duke University concluded in 2009, with similar data, that the racial disparities were a function of poverty, lack of insurance, access to private mental health treatment, and history of psychiatric hospitalizations and not racial discrimination.323 The substantial racial disparities are nonetheless disturbing indicators of continued disparities in resources and disengagement with health care systems. While the legislative response to the mental health crisis has been to seek to expand eligibility criteria as reflected in the 2022 chapter amendment, our observation is that the law, as written, is not an impediment to accessing treatment, but rather, the lack of community resources remains a persistent problem. Indeed, counties in their self-assessments consistently noted that AOT petitions were the priority for scarce resources.324 Finally, the Task Force heard from advocates who continue to insist that voluntary treatment options, including those with peer bridging, should be funded and enhanced to reduce reliance on more coercive interventions such as AOT. The perception of coercion, also clearly expressed in comments to OMH town

321 Based upon statistics maintained by the Mental Hygiene Legal Service which is served with every Kendra’s Law application and appears as counsel for the respondent unless private counsel is retained.


323 Marvin S. Swartz, et.al., New York State Assisted Outpatient Treatment Evaluation, Duke University School of Medicine (June 30, 2009).

324 https://www.clmhd.org/contact_local_mental_hygiene_departments/
halls was also evident in the Duke University surveys. We agree with this observation and certainly find it consistent with the statutory requirement that least restrictive treatment options appropriate to the needs of the individual must be exhausted before AOT is imposed by court order.

*Provide a Right to Counsel for Respondents in CPLR Article 63-a Proceedings*

In 2019, New York State enacted its Extreme Risk Protection Order (“ERPO”) statute, CPLR Article 63-a, also known as the Red Flag Law. The law allows the court to issue an ERPO where the petitioner establishes, “by clear and convincing evidence, that respondent is likely to engage in conduct that would result in serious harm to himself, herself or others, as defined in paragraph one or two of subdivision (a) of section 9.39 of the mental hygiene law.” If granted, an ERPO requires the respondent to surrender any firearm, rifle, or shotgun in their possession, directs the temporary suspension of the respondent’s existing firearm license and ineligibility for such a license, and prohibits the respondent from purchasing or possessing such weapons.

The connection between mental illness and the enactment of New York’s ERPO law is clear, including the Legislature’s decision to incorporate the definition in MHL § 9.39 into Article 63-a. As noted by the NYSBA Task Force on Mass Shootings and Assault weapons:

“There are various steps that can be taken to prevent individuals suffering from serious mental illness from having access to firearms thereby minimizing the incidence of mass shootings and the devastating injuries and loss of life that occur, as well as the self-inflicted harm that is often a more probable outcome. … [T]he Task Force examines and makes recommendations concerning three issues of fundamental importance to the proper balance of public safety and individual rights in this area. The first is the subject of so-called “red flag” laws or Extreme Risk Protective Order Laws.”

NYSBA’s Criminal Justice Section, the Committee on Disability Rights, and the Committee on Mandated Representation have raised several due process concerns regarding the ERPO law, including the failure to provide a right to

325 OMH, Local Services Plan and Statewide Town Hall Analysis, September 2022. https://my.vimeo.co/v/1j6edpo3-9zg8pj
326 CPLR 6343
counsel to respondents who are financially eligible for counsel. On December 22, 2022, the Monroe County Supreme Court ruled in *G.W. v. C.S.*, that CPLR Article 63-a is unconstitutional, in part due to the failure to provide a right to counsel, noting that similarly situated respondents in MHL § 9.39 and Article 10 proceedings are entitled to counsel. The Task Force supports amendment of CPLR Article 63-a to provide a right to counsel. This would ensure that those who are alleged to meet the standard in MHL 9.39 have legal representation and are able to raise other due process issues.

Repeal and Replace Mental “Hygiene”

This report led with a note about language, and we reiterate here that language matters. Negative attitudes and beliefs toward people who have a mental health condition are pervasive. The Task Force urges that non-stigmatizing and respectful language be incorporated into our public discourse, written work and in judicial proceedings. Throughout this report we have endeavored to adhere to these principles. All stakeholders in the delivery of essential services and justice would benefit from training on the tenants of procedural justice and the use of person-first language so we can emphasize the person rather than the condition or an illness. Having said that, we are burdened in New York with the Mental “Hygiene” Law. As Task Force Member Chris Liberati-Conant so cogently explained in his 2023 Journal article the mental hygiene movement that gave its name to our law was closely associated with eugenics. The term “mental hygiene” is confusing and potentially offensive to anyone who does not know its history, and to who anyone who does, it is an unpleasant reminder of the early 20th century psychiatric establishment that sought to eradicate the individuals to whom it applies. To what might replace the term, if repealed, those who are subject to the law should be heard. To encompass the three autonomous offices and populations served by them, a name change could be as simple as the Department of Mental Hygiene becoming the Department of Mental Health,

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330 *Id.*
331 Mental health: Overcoming the stigma of mental illness - Mayo Clinic
Developmental Disabilities and Addiction Services and Support. The “Mental Hygiene Law” could become the “Mental Disability Law” because of the definition of “mental disability” would encompass all populations served by the “O” agencies. 333

**Recommendations**

- Promote autonomy of individuals with mental disabilities through supported decision-making principles.

- Develop legislation that require recognition of Psychiatric Advance Directives (“PAD”s) even without proxies in all settings, to fund peer and provider trainings to facilitate their use, and to establish means of transmission, such as registries and web-based access.

- Amending MHL Article 81 to explicitly include supporters for decision-making as “available resources” as defined under MHL § 81.03(e), when considering the need for and/or scope of guardianship

- Recommend that OMH convene a working group to review supported decision-making processes in New York State, to promote peer supports and social environments that are conducive to supported decision-making (SDM), and to explore the possibility of a pilot project relating SDM and psychiatric advance directives.

- Recommend collaboration between OMH and OPWDD to further the use of SDM for individuals with dual diagnoses, including any necessary reasonable accommodations, and to address the needs of people who are dually diagnosed when developing the upcoming OPWDD regulations implementing MHL Article 82.

- Promote reform of guardianship statutes in New York State and provide procedural pathways for individuals subject to guardianship under both Article 81 of the MHL and Article 17-A of the SCPA to seek modification of existing orders and restoration of rights.

- Promote Single Transaction Orders as a less restrictive intervention than a plenary guardianship.

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333 See, MHL § 1.03 (3).
• OCA should include information and forms on its website regarding the process to remove a guardian and the newly enacted SDM statute (MHL Article 82) as a guardianship alternative. 334

• OCA should update its guidelines for attorneys accepting guardian ad litem appointments. The guidelines were last revised twenty years ago, in 2003.335

• Support amendment of the Extreme Risk Protection Order statute, CPLR Article 63-a, to add a right to counsel for respondents.

• Support amendment of the New York State Constitution and related statutes to remove references to “mental hygiene” and adopting a modern nomenclature that does not stigmatize people with mental health conditions and is more reflective of the values of the community.

F. Accommodations

On January 25, 2023, the Office of Court Administration Pandemic Practices Working Group issued its final report entitled New York Courts’ Response to the Pandemic: Observations, Perspectives, and Recommendations.336 The working group is an initiative of the Commission to Reimagine the future of New York State’s Courts. The Task Force takes this opportunity to comment on court accommodations because the people who are the subject of our inquiry are court users and among the most vulnerable people appearing in civil and criminal proceedings. Lawyers with disabilities are also among our Associations' members and sit on the Task Force.

As noted in the introduction to the Pandemic Practices Working Group Report, “the COVID -19 pandemic was arguably the most disruptive event in the history of New York Courts, and it brought significant hardship to many individuals who depend on the court system.” 337 The New York Lawyers’

334 https://ww2.nycourts.gov/forms/surrogates/guardianship.shtml
335 Publications Home Page | NYCOURTS.GOV - Guidelines for Guardian Ad Litem, with Sample Reports and Forms.
337 Id.
Assistance Group ("NYLAG") studied pandemic practices extensively and observed that COVID is receding, the changes it wrought on our justice system “are not disappearing overnight, or possibly ever. The present juncture offers a valuable opportunity to step back, regroup, and learn from the courts' pandemic-era experience thus far.”\(^{338}\) That particular framing of the issue causes the Task Force to consider virtual hearings and the impact upon people with mental disabilities.

The Task Force agrees with the Pandemic Practices Working Group which found: 1) that virtual proceedings can benefit people with disabilities and other people requiring accommodations and 2) that virtual proceedings may require accommodations in the same manner that in person proceedings can.\(^{339}\) The Task Force endorses and agrees with the recommendations found at page 49 of the report of the Pandemic Practices Working Group. In particular, the accommodation of establishing a private means, such as a secure web form, for people to request accommodation, has long been advocated by the NYSBA Disability Rights Committee has benefitting not only litigants but attorneys with disabilities.\(^{340}\)

OCA issued Guidelines for Handling Requests for Disability Accommodations in 2020.\(^{341}\) These Guidelines made strides to simplify the Court’s reasonable accommodation request process, including eliminating unnecessary jargon, designating a central point of contact for all requests, requiring higher-level review before requests can be denied, tracking denials through a written Denial Accommodation Form, and directing the Statewide ADA Coordinator to review all denials within 10 days. However, these changes only apply to accommodation requests that are classified as “administrative requests”

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\(^{339}\) [Reports of the Commission to Reimagine the Future of New York's Courts | NY COURTS.GOV](https://nycourts.gov/) p 42.

\(^{340}\) The court system is currently piloting the online accommodation form in the NYC courts. [https://portal.nycourts.gov/ada-wizard/](https://portal.nycourts.gov/ada-wizard/).

\(^{341}\) Appendix Document 13
Court users, lawyers, and pro-se litigants with disabilities continue to face barriers obtaining reasonable accommodations when the request is classified as a judicial accommodation. Under the Guidelines, judicial accommodations are handled by the individual judge without the involvement of the Statewide ADA Coordinator, a written Denial Accommodation Form, or an ability to seek a timely review of the denial. As highlighted by the Pandemic Practices Working Group Report, many court users, lawyers and pro-se litigants needed the reasonable accommodation of appearing in court remotely. Yet, the accommodation process was not equally applied to each request because each judge was given the discretion to approve or deny the request. Others faced barriers to participation in remote proceedings and required accommodations in order to do so. There was no consistent response to these requests, even when made by the same party for the same accommodation before the same judge.

The Task Force recommends that the court system adopt the following recommendations with respect to disability accommodations:

Requests that do not have to be decided by a judge or judicial officer will be decided by the Chief Clerk or District Executive, sometimes in consultation with the Statewide ADA Coordinator. These include most requests for what the ADA calls “auxiliary aids and services,” such as sign language interpreters, assistive listening devices, or CART (also known as “real-time”) reporting for a person who is Deaf or hard of hearing, or copies of documents in large print, Braille, screen readable, or audio formats for a person who is blind or has low vision. The Chief Clerk or District Executive will also decide requests to modify an administrative practice or procedure, such as relocating a proceeding to a physically accessible courtroom or allowing papers to be filed in a physically accessible location for a person with a mobility impairment, or to provide assistance in filling out a form to a person with a manual impairment. A Chief Clerk or District Executive, however, cannot grant any request that involves a judicial balancing of the rights of the parties or the Judge’s or judicial officer’s inherent power to manage the courtroom and the proceeding. Examples of such requests may include, but are not limited to, requests for: extensions of time or adjournments; changes in the time of day a case will be heard; permission to participate by phone or video; the presence or absence of other persons in the courtroom; and, modifications in the way testimony is to be given. Those types of accommodation requests must be decided by the judge or judicial officer presiding over the case. If all or some part of the request that is made to a Chief Clerk or District Executive involves an accommodation that only a judge or judicial officer has the authority to provide, the Chief Clerk or District Executive will refer the request (or that part of it) to the judge or judicial officer presiding over the case.
• Ensure centralized decision-making to reduce inconsistency throughout the court system.
• Establish an administrative review process for all judicial accommodation denials.  
• Documentation for judicial accommodation requests should be the same as required for administrative accommodations.
• Place guidelines for reviewing accommodation requests into the Judge’s Desk Book.

The Task Force also endorses a recommendation made by NYLAG in its report which is that “whenever litigants with disabilities struggle with either in-person or virtual proceedings, the court must consider whether a switch to the other format would serve as an appropriate accommodation.”  

The flexibility engendered by the NYLAG suggestion seems quite important as it may not be apparent that a person with a disability is unable to participate fully in a proceeding (whether in-person or hybrid) until the proceeding is commenced and one form or the other is attempted.

IV. CONCLUSION

“We need to recognize that we are deep in a crisis of care, made worse by pandemic loss and by the social inequities that have increased during the pandemic. We need to reframe this crisis as more than a medical challenge. It is a social justice issue.”  

There is considerable work to be done to ensure equity and fairness in the justice system and the service delivery system for people with mental disabilities. Task Force endeavored to provide meaningful recommendations for reform as explained in this report drawing from diverse perspectives. We focused on civil and criminal justice issues during our inquiry. Our observations and recommendations were placed in the context of a vast service delivery system that many characterize as “broken” while being mindful that solutions must be trauma informed and further justice. During our investigation, we were guided by the fact

343 Under the current Guidelines, a person seeking judicial review of a denial must file an appeal with the Appellate Division.
345 Insel, supra, note 6 p. 241.
that too often the voices of family members and individuals with lived experience are left out of conversations about reform. Public responses can suffer as a result. Task Force members are also mindful that ample evidence exists regarding inequities in both the behavioral health system and the courts. There is, for example, over-representation of minority communities in the justice system and a lack of behavioral health providers of color. NYSBA must lead and join with others calling for evidence-based practices that ensure diversity and equity across all programs designed to improve outcomes for people with mental disabilities involved in the civil and criminal justice systems.

April 10, 2023
Testimony to the Joint Legislative Budget Hearing
Proposed 2023-24 NYS Budget
Hearing on Mental Hygiene
February 16, 2023

Presented by:
Joseph A. Glazer, Esq.
Deputy Commissioner
Department of Community Mental Health
And;
Co-Chair
NYS Bar Association Task Force on Mental Health and Trauma Informed Practice
Good afternoon, and thank you for the opportunity to testify to this Joint Legislative Hearing on Governor Hochul’s proposed Budget for NYS Fiscal Year 2023-24. My name is Joseph Glazer, the Deputy Commissioner of the Westchester County Department of Community Mental Health. I am also Co-chair of the NYS Bar Association Task Force on Mental Health and Trauma Informed Representation.

I today look back on my more than 25 years’ experience working in the behavioral health field, in roles as various as statewide nonprofit President and CEO, private practice attorney, government official, and even state senate staffer. I cherish that I have had the pleasure of working with some of the assembled legislators here over the years.

I look at my current role, working with Westchester County government and our partner nonprofits where together we are the primary provider of services at the local level. In the last five years, under the leadership of County Executive George Latimer, Westchester has made substantial strides in working toward a seamless system of care. We strive for an integrated system to ensure people with co-occurring mental health and substance misuse needs have access to the treatment services and modalities they need. And we are, every day, working towards it.

We are “Reimagining Policing”, instituting a tremendous model that includes 911 Diversion and Mobile Crisis Response Teams across the county working with all 42 law enforcement agencies, as well as providing copious mental health and crisis training for not just police but all first responders. This will ultimately give us an interconnected and seamless system of behavioral health crisis diversion in Westchester.

We are working with our District Attorney, Mimi Rocah, as well as with the NYS Office of Court Administration, to build new models of criminal justice diversion, expanding our ability to redirect people from the criminal justice system to the appropriate level of care. This work improves outcomes and reduces recidivism in our communities.

We are building out substance misuse and opioid treatment and prevention programs, and working with schools to expand services in educational settings.

And, up until now, we have done all this with very little, if any, additional state funding. Rather, we have mostly managed with local funds, federal funds, Medicaid expansion, and increased efficiency in utilizing our resources. And
frankly, that has been the rule of thumb for county governments in our state in addressing the behavioral health needs of communities for many, many years.

As I look forward, I can say that this year’s governor’s proposed budget offers an amazing opportunity for progress. In its overarching themes and goals, it does more to address the needs of people living with behavioral health and co-occurring disorders than any single undertaking since the 1993 Community Mental Health Reinvestment Act.

As per the analysis of our statewide organization, the Conference of Local Mental Hygiene Providers, Governor Hochul’s proposed budget includes broad expansion and development of services:

- Expand Residential Programs. Investing $890 million in capital to build 2,150 new residential beds for people with mental illness who need varying levels of supports. This includes 500 new Community Residence – Single Room Occupancy (CR-SRO) beds, 900 Transitional Step-Down Beds, and 750 permanent Supportive Housing beds.
- 600 licensed Apartment Treatment beds and 750 scattered site Supportive Housing beds, for a total of 3,500 new units throughout the State.
- Budget also provides $25 million in capital resources to develop 60 community step-down units designed to serve formerly unhoused individuals who are transitioning from inpatient care.
- Expand Outpatient Services - funding 12 new Comprehensive Psychiatric Emergency Programs, including $60 million in capital; 42 new Assertive Community Treatment teams; eight new Safe Options Support teams, to expand the Critical Time Intervention (CTI) initiative started in 2022; 42 new Health Home Plus Care Managers; and start-up funding and operating costs for expanded clinic capacity at 20 sites.
- Expand Inpatient Bed Capacity - includes funding for the opening of 1,000 inpatient psychiatric beds which is part of a multi-year plan to increase operational capacity at mental health facilities. Added beds include 850 currently offline, inpatient psychiatric beds at public hospitals licensed under Article 28; and 150 new State-operated inpatient psychiatric beds.
- Support the Development of the 988 Crisis Hotline - the Executive Budget provides $60 million in FY 2024, to fund the expanded crisis center network to support people contacting the 988 Crisis Hotline in New York State through call, chat, and text.
- Suicide Prevention Programs - invests $10 million in grants to suicide prevention programs targeting high-risk youth and $400,000 to fund
FarmNet, which works with Cornell University to support farmers and their family members.

- Increase Support for Existing Residential Programs - $39 million in FY 2024 – for existing community-based residential programs and included legislation to extend property pass-through provisions to include OMH’s supported housing.
- Enhance Children’s Mental Health Programs – invests an additional $12 million in the HealthySteps program and HomeBased Crisis Intervention (HBCI) teams, $5 million for High Fidelity wrap around supports, and $10 million to develop school-based clinics.
- Expand INSET Program - includes $2.8 million to expand the Intensive and Sustained Engagement Treatment (INSET) program. Funding supports the creation of three new teams which will offer peer-based outreach and engagement for adults with serious mental illness. INSET helps to support recovery, reduce emergency room visits and hospitalizations, and ensures the appropriate utilization of Assisted Outpatient Treatment (AOT) orders, where possible.
- Cost Of Living Adjustment (COLA) - The Executive Budget includes a 2.5% COLA to human services providers in FY 2024. The COLA applies to voluntary operated providers of services for OPWDD, OMH, OASAS, Office of Children and Family Services (OCFS), Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance (OTDA), and the State Office for the Aging (SOFA).
  - For the Mental Hygiene agencies, this amounts to $188.6 million ($314.1 million including federal matching funds) for OPWDD, OMH, and OASAS voluntary operated programs, and will provide fiscal relief to providers, enabling them to offer more competitive wages to their staff to address workforce recruitment and retention issues and better support the individuals they serve. Minimum Wage.
- The Executive Budget leverages an additional $38 million in State funds to support minimum wage increases, including indexing minimum wage to inflation, for staff at programs licensed, certified, or otherwise authorized by OPWDD, OMH, and OASAS.

And while I stress that this is the greatest single proposed undertaking to address this state’s broken mental health system since Reinvestment, it comes with a caveat…
Our service providers are in a staffing crisis, and our housing providers are in a staffing and rent crisis.

Should these concomitant crises be left unaddressed, the Governor’s proposed budget will effectively bring little change in our system. We will have a huge, robust system on paper, and the static inability to fill new apartments and hire employees, unless the legislature addresses the on-going woeful inadequacy of funding for our workforce and our rental allowances. These two financial deficit areas tag team to reduce the available number of residential beds and available services for people with mental health and co-occurring needs in many communities, and Westchester is among those.

Specific to my county of Westchester, the failure of state funding to grow with the needs and demands has created a substantial gap in the provision of housing and services.

Currently the Supported Housing allocation and guidelines for Westchester County provide $1669 for a one bedroom. The median rental rate in Westchester County, is $1796 a month for a one bedroom apartment. That means that well over 50% of available apartments are not available to our population in need. The minimal increases in rental allowance included in the last two years have proven to be insufficient to keep up with skyrocketing rental rates.

Our mental health housing programs currently have a waitlist of 750 people on the Supported Housing referral list. There are people on our waitlist for housing who have been on the list for up to five years. The average wait time for each program is:

Community Residence - 2 years
Treatment Apartment - 9 months
Supported Housing - 5 years

Beyond the overall insufficiency of the number of allocated beds, there are currently 60 vacant openings in Supported Housing because we cannot find rental apartments willing to accept the amount provided in the rental guidelines. Simply put, this means we have “residential beds” that exist on paper in our housing system, but they do not actually exist because we cannot find landlords willing to accept the rental rate. We fear that without more state funding the Governor’s robust proposal will perpetuate and exacerbate this problem.
But beyond rent allocations and subsidies, staff for these programs is a huge issue. We have vacancies in all three levels of housing programming because of staffing. Workforce is now the number 1 issue for all of the Human Service nonprofits in our county. Since the beginning of COVID, our estimate is that the workforce employment vacancy rate has doubled.

Staffing levels in some of our housing programs hover below 50%, which means half the staff required to meet requisite service levels and operational needs per house or per bed simply are not there. Without sufficient staffing, beds that could help vulnerable people with the greatest needs remain empty in Westchester.

Further, we generally, across the human service system, struggle to accommodate Spanish speaking clients because our nonprofit housing partners are not sufficiently funded to be able to hire Spanish speaking staff, a skill that is currently in great demand. This applies as well to the many other primary languages in our communities.

Because of the low staff reimbursements rates, people can make more working in retail or food service, while many of our nonprofits are struggling to pay more than a fraction above the minimum wage to direct care workers.

For example, there are job titles attached to the treatment housing service continuum that require years of experience, and do not pay commensurate with those requirements.

Because of these staffing deficiencies, we have agency management staff covering overnight shifts so more people can be housed, including 2 Nonprofit Executive Directors that we know have done shift work.

Quite frankly, the Governor’s proposed 2.5% COLA is insufficient to remedy this situation.

Having outlined this, there are others areas worthy of review as well. We are extremely deficient in meeting the needs of children and adolescents. Westchester, a county of a million people has a handful of youth population community residences, which providing care to children with lower level residential needs. And while we have residential treatment facilities operated by OCFS (forensic) for high needs children, there are none that are OMH licensed. Thus we lack voluntary residential services for very high needs children and adolescents anywhere in Westchester, including substance misuse.
As state government looks to increase treatment beds, we must ensure we address the needs in all populations.

One further issue that clearly needs to be reviewed is the statutory framework for those deemed to be incapacitated in assist in their own defense under Criminal Procedure Law Section 730. CPL 730 creates a statutory process by which the criminal justice system determines whether or not a defendant is competent, and if not, they are placed in a state operated forensic psychiatric hospital -- often for months. And the bill for it, up to $1000 a day or more, is sent to the counties. It is estimated that our bill for the current year for restoration will exceed $2 million.

But the cost is not the sole problem with CPL 730. The statute requires restoration, which is a very different function than broad-based treatment. Formerly in my private practice, I have had individuals removed from their coordinated treatment because of pending charges and their situational decompensation, and placed in state psychiatric hospitals where much of their core treatment was either discontinued or changed.

The much needed reform of CPL 730 requires a review of funding and payment, complete care, and recognizing that the roots of CPL 730 reach back to the 19th century, CPL 730 must evolve to keep up with and incorporate our modern behavioral health care system. We should be considering alternatives to the triggering of CPL 730, and allowing crisis, respite and enhanced and intensive community-based services to be utilized before a person is deemed CPL 730 incapacitated, which results in their hospitalization and long delays in the justice system. We should limit the time a person can remain in “restoration”, and more quickly determine when a person will likely never be able to participate in their own defense. And we should make it a requirement that all individuals placed in the custody of any of the “O” agency Commissioners must receive full and co-occurring competent care.

That said, I go back to a point I made earlier: In Governor Hochul’s proposed state budget, New York has been presented the best opportunity in 30 years to fix our long broken behavioral health system. We hope that this is an opportunity that is fully grasped.

Thank you, for your time and the opportunity to be heard.
Report to the Executive Committee of the New York State Bar Association on the Use and Efficacy of Penal Law § 40.15 and Criminal Procedure Law § 330.20 and Recommendation to Establish a Mental Health Task Force or Committee

Committee on Mandated Representation
Robert Dean, Chair

Mental Health Subcommittee
Chris Liberati-Conant, Chair
Mardi Crawford
Majer Gold
Justine Luongo
Lisa Schreibersdorf
Sheila Shea
Sherry Levin Wallach

November 2018
Overview and Recommendation

This report will first undertake a brief historical overview of the “insanity defense” in New York, highlighting how much it remains a child of *M’Naghten’s Case*. It will then explore how the insanity defense is used and the effects of its invocation, including the ever-more-restrictive post-acquittal confinement apparatus. Lastly, it will discuss the need for deeper inquiry into this and other questions related to mental health that affect society in general and the bar in particular. Such inquiry requires resources beyond the scope of the Committee on Mandated Representation and, to the knowledge of the authors of this report, any existing committee or section. Thus, this report ultimately recommends that the Executive Committee establish a permanent committee or task force to examine and recommend necessary action on the insanity defense and other issues related to mental health and the law.

*M’Naghten’s Legacy in New York*

New York’s “insanity defense” has its roots in ancient common law. As in nearly every state, New York’s statutory provisions applicable to criminal defendants who lack criminal culpability due to a mental illness stem directly from the English common law *M’Naghten’s Case*. In that case, a woodturner who suffered from delusions of political persecution was acquitted of the murder of a civil servant and committed to a mental
In 1843, following public outcry at the acquittal and inquiry from the House of Lords, the Court of Common Pleas announced the rule that criminal liability could be excused only if the accused “clearly proved that, at the time of committing the act, the accused was labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or, if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong.”

When the rule was imported to New York, the courts placed on the prosecution the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was not insane. The difficulty of carrying this burden was eased by a presumption of sanity that required the defendant to introduce substantial evidence of his insanity. Burden aside, in 1915, 70 years after M’Naghten, the rule remained essentially unchanged in form: “a person is not excused from criminal liability as an idiot, imbecile, lunatic or insane person, except upon proof that, at the time of committing the alleged criminal act, he was laboring under such a defect of reason as: (1) not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or (2) not to know that the act was wrong.” Judge Cardozo expanded the breadth of the defense when he interpreted not knowing the act was wrong as referring to knowledge of both the act’s illegality and immorality.

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3 8 Eng. Rep 718 (1843).
4 People v. Schmidt, 216 N.Y. 324, 332-33 (1913).
5 Kohl, 72 N.Y.2d at 202-03 (“Our earliest statute on the subject declared that ‘[n]o act done by a person in a state of insanity can be punished as an offence’ (Rev Stat of 1828, part IV, ch 1, tit 7, § 2).” The dissenting opinion provides a further history of the prosecution’s burden in these matters.
6 People v. Silver, 33 N.Y.2d 475, 482, 354 N.Y.S.2d 915 (1974), defined substantial evidence as “the degree of proof required to rebut ‘most, but not all’ presumptions recognized in this State (Richardson, Evidence [10th ed.], § 58, p. 37).”
8 Id. at 333-34. Cases that followed Schmidt further specified that an appreciation of moral wrongfulness refers to the standards of the community, as opposed to one’s own moral structure. See People v. Wood, 12 N.Y.2d 69, 236 N.Y.S.2d 44 (1962).
By 1964, the harshness of New York’s strict adherence to *M’Naghten* led to legislative reform.⁹ The Legislature enacted Penal Law § 30.05,¹⁰ which provided: “A person is not criminally responsible for his conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity to know or appreciate either: (a) The nature and consequences of such conduct; or (b) That such conduct was wrong.” The revision ameliorated the strict *M’Naghten* rule in that a defendant’s lack of capacity to know or appreciate was not required to be total, but substantial.¹¹ It also changed “nature and quality” to “nature and consequences.” The Legislature declined, however, to accept in full the recommendation of the Temporary Commission on Revision of the Penal Law and Criminal Code, which followed the Model Penal Code in providing that the defense applies to one who, due to a mental disease or defect, lacked substantial capacity “to conform his conduct to the requirements of law.”¹²

By 1970, the Court of Appeals had restricted the defense by approving of a jury instruction that explained that to be held criminally responsible, “the defendant must have realized that the act was against the law and against the commonly accepted standards of morality.”¹³ Thus, regardless of how pervasive a delusion, so long as a defendant

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¹⁰ L. 1965, ch. 593, § 1.
understood that conduct was illegal and generally considered immoral, the insanity defense would fail as a matter of law.\textsuperscript{14}

In 1984, following the attempted assassination of Ronald Reagan and the public furor at his would-be assassin John Hinckley’s insanity acquittal,\textsuperscript{15} the federal government and multiple states, including New York, tightened insanity statutes.\textsuperscript{16} The New York Legislature did so by repealing Penal Law § 30.05 and replacing it with Penal Law § 40.15, thereby shifting the burden to the defendant, making insanity an affirmative defense to be proved by a preponderance of the evidence. The statements of agencies and stakeholders contained within the bill jacket for Penal Law § 40.15 overwhelmingly

\begin{footnotesize}
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  \item \textsuperscript{14} The Pattern Jury Instructions describe lack of substantial capacity to know or appreciate that conduct is wrong as “either that the conduct was against the law or that it was against commonly held moral principles, or both.” CJI2d[NY] Defenses: Insanity. Lack of substantial capacity to know or appreciate the wrongfulness of an act need not be so restricted. Arguably, a defendant acting on beliefs caused by mental illness may lack substantial capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of an act despite being able to articulate that it is both illegal and against commonly accepted moral principles. For instance, a person who believes that he is being persecuted by the government and that nearly everyone he meets is either a dupe or conspirator may be able to articulate that an act he believes will stop the persecution is both illegal and contradictory to commonly accepted moral values. Yet, that person may nevertheless lack substantial capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct because his delusions make commonly accepted moral values appear to him to be the products of wickedness, corruption, and conspiracy. A restrictive definition of substantial capacity to appreciate that an act is wrong also ignores the magical thinking attendant to some delusions, i.e., that everything will be fixed after the fact.
  \item \textsuperscript{15} According to an ABC news poll taken the day after the verdict, 83% of Americans believed “justice was not done.” Douglas O. Linder, \textit{The Trial of John W. Hinckley, Jr.}, http://www.famous-trials.com/johnhinckley/537-home (last visited July 6, 2018).
  \item \textsuperscript{16} \textit{Id.} (The House and Senate began hearings regarding shifting the burden of the insanity defense within one month of the Hinckley verdict. Within three years, two-thirds of the states shifted the burden to the defense to prove insanity, eight states adopted the verdict of “guilty but mentally ill,” and Utah abolished the insanity defense). \textit{See also} Joe Palazzolo, \textit{John Hinckley Case Led to Vast Narrowing of Insanity Defense}, \textit{WALL ST. J.}, July 27, 2016, https://www.wsj.com/articles/john-hinckley-case-led-to-vast-narrowing-of-insanity-defense-1469663770. (Following the Hinckley verdict, Kansas, Idaho, and Nevada also abolished the insanity defense, although Nevada later reinstated it.)
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supported the change.  

Most echoed the arguments offered by the Governor’s statement in support: that insanity acquittals had risen in the decade prior and that placement of the burden of disproving insanity on the prosecution favored the defendant too heavily, thus creating a risk that defendants would “get away with murder.” Governor Mario Cuomo’s Criminal Justice Coordinator argued: “It makes the law fairer. You’ll no longer be able to hide behind this defense.”

Whether the new law was fairer was a matter of debate at the State’s highest court. In People v. Kohl, the Court of Appeals upheld Penal Law § 40.15’s shifting to the defendant of the burden of proving insanity. Judge Stewart F. Hancock, Jr. dissented, arguing that the Court had abandoned fundamental and ancient principles of criminal responsibility: “the majority holds that legal sanity is not an essential element of the crime of murder, that sanity and murder may be defined as the Legislature chooses, and that mere ‘conscious objective’—without regard to the capacity to appreciate that one’s conduct is wrong—is all the mental culpability necessary to constitute the crime of murder.”

The statute has not been amended since 1984 and Kohl remains good law. Two cases, one from 1994 and one from 2018, illustrate the insanity defense’s continued narrowness in practice.

17 See, e.g., Memorandum from Linda J. Valenti, NYS Division of Probation General Counsel, to Gerald C. Crotty, Counsel to the Governor, et al. (June 25, 1984); Letter from Paul Litwak, N.Y.S. Office of Mental Health, to Gerald C. Crotty, Counsel to the Governor (June 21, 1984); Memorandum from Jay M. Cohen, N.Y.S. Division of Criminal Justice Services to Matthew T. Crosson (June 19, 1984) (included in N.Y. Laws 1984, ch. 668 legislative bill jacket).
20 Id. at 200-01.
In 1994, brandishing a rifle, Ralph Tortorici took a classroom full of University of Albany students hostage. “He claimed that he was the victim of an experiment in which a microchip was implanted in his brain, and [he] wanted to expose the people responsible for victimizing him.”\(^{21}\) One of the student hostages, Jason McEnaney, charged Tortorici and managed to wrestle the rifle away from him, allowing other students to pin him to the ground. During the struggle, Tortorici shot and wounded McEnaney.\(^{22}\) Tortorici was indicted on 15 counts, including attempted murder, kidnapping, and first degree assault.

Once the trial began, Tortorici declined to attend, instead remaining in his holding cell.\(^{23}\) The People did not present any psychiatric evidence, while the defense presented four psychiatric experts, all of whom agreed that Tortorici did not understand the nature and consequences of his conduct.\(^{24}\) The jury, deliberating for an hour, convicted Tortorici of multiple felonies, including kidnapping and assault, but acquitted him of attempted murder. The court sentenced Tortorici to an aggregate term of 15½ to 40 years’ imprisonment.\(^{25}\) The Appellate Division and Court of Appeals affirmed the verdict.\(^{26}\)


\(^{23}\) *Tortorici*, 92 N.Y.2d at 762.


\(^{26}\) Id.
Despite receiving Office of Mental Health services while in custody, Tortorici hanged himself in his cell in 1999.27

A juror explained why they had rejected Tortorici’s insanity defense: “if he had just grabbed a gun and run into a McDonald’s, it would have been a different situation. We would have looked at it differently. The fact that [there] was so much planning weighed heavily on us.”28 The juror’s interpretation of the insanity defense is consonant with the Pattern Jury Instructions for Penal Law § 40.15, which describe a lack of substantial capacity to know the nature and consequences of an act or that it was wrong in terms of children who “sometimes recite things that they cannot understand.”29 Although people with mental illnesses were once thought of as insensible wild animals or infants,30 we have long known that even where a mental illness Impairs reasoning in some areas

29 “Children can sometimes recite things that they cannot understand. In those circumstances, the children may be said to have surface knowledge of what they recited, but no true understanding. Thus, a lack of substantial capacity to know or appreciate either the nature and consequences of the prohibited conduct, or that such conduct was wrong, means a lack of substantial capacity to have some true understanding beyond surface knowledge…” CJ2d[NY] Defenses: Insanity.
30 For a discussion of the origins of the idea of people with mental illness as wild animals or children, see Anthony M. Platt, The Origins and Development of the “Wild Beast” Concept of Mental Illness and Its Relation to Theories of Criminal Responsibility, Vol. 1, ISSUES IN CRIMINOLOGY, No.1, Criminal Responsibility (Fall 1965) at 1.
(i.e., so that a person believes that taking a college class hostage will stop the government from experimenting on him), it does not often destroy all rational thought.\(^\text{31}\)

In 2013, Lakime Spratley, seemingly at random and without planning or provocation, shot a woman in a grocery store, killing her.\(^\text{32}\) The evidence at trial indicated that he suffered from schizoaffective disorder, heard voices, and suffered from delusions of persecution. In a police interview he offered as a partial explanation that he believed the victim had stolen his clothes and was wearing his shorts, and that she had made trigger gestures at him.\(^\text{33}\) A jury convicted him of murder in the second degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree. The Appellate Division, Second Department, reversed the verdict, explaining that “the rational inferences which can be drawn from the evidence presented at trial do not support the conviction,” finding as a matter of law that the defendant had established that he lacked substantial capacity to know or appreciate that his conduct was wrong.\(^\text{34}\) One justice dissented.

More than 80 years before Tortorici’s conviction, and 100 years before Spratley’s, Judge Cardozo posited that a mother who, at what she believes to be God’s command, murders her child, is not guilty by reason of insanity.\(^\text{35}\) To Cardozo, it would be a

\[\text{31} \quad \text{See People v. Jackson, 60 A.D.3d 599, 877 N.Y.S.2d 244 (1st Dep’t 2009) (“Although two psychiatric examiners opined that defendant was not competent because he insisted on pursuing a defense of posthypnotic suggestion derived from his delusions, the ultimate determination of whether a defendant is an incapacitated person is a judicial, not a medical, one… Defendant expressed a rational understanding of the judicial proceedings, the charges against him, the choices available to him, and the consequences of his decision to pursue a hypnosis defense rather than an insanity defense.”) (citations omitted). For an examination of the decision making abilities of those diagnosed with mental illness as compared to those without, see Paul Appelbaum & Thomas Grisso, The MacArthur Treatment Competence Study, MACARTHUR RESEARCH NETWORK ON MENTAL HEALTH AND THE LAW (May 2004), http://www.macarthur.virginia.edu/treatment.html (last visited July 9, 2018).}\]

\[\text{32} \quad \text{People v. Spratley, 159 A.D.3d 725, 71 N.Y.S.3d 582 (2d Dep’t 2018).}\]

\[\text{33} \quad \text{Id.}\]

\[\text{34} \quad \text{Id. at 731.}\]

\[\text{35} \quad \text{People v. Schmidt, 216 N.Y. 324 (1915).}\]
“mockery” and “abhorent” to hold that she knew what she did was wrong, even if she did understand it to be illegal, because she could not comprehend its moral repugnance. Tortorici, like Judge Cardozo’s hypothetical mother and even M’Naghten himself, committed his crimes while under the influence of delusions that appear to have compromised his moral judgment.\(^36\) He believed that government agents were following him by means of a microchip implanted in his body\(^37\) and that holding the class hostage would alleviate the persecution.\(^38\) It strains credulity to argue that he possessed substantial capacity to understand the nature and consequences of his conduct or that his conduct was wrong.\(^39\) His reasoning and apparent motivations were so irrational as to appear comparable to a child’s magical thinking. For his part, Spratley appears to have not even possessed the understanding of a child at the time he committed the crime—he did not know what he was doing. Yet, both were convicted, and the Appellate Division’s reversal of Spratley’s conviction was not unanimous.

These cases highlight the narrowness of New York’s ostensibly evolved M’Naghten rule. Cardozo’s distinction between knowledge of legal right and wrong and moral right and wrong is illusory. For the defense to succeed, the defendant must have been insensible to the point that the line between lack of mens rea and the insanity defense disappears. But mental illness is not all or nothing; one need not conform to the


\(^{37}\) Tortorici, 92 N.Y.2d at 771.

\(^{38}\) Id. at 759.

\(^{39}\) Id. at 771; Vincent Bonventre, Editor’s Foreword, State Constitutional Commentary, 68 Alb. L. Rev. 2 (2005) (referring to Tortorici’s conviction as “highly questionable”).
medieval notion of lunacy by howling at the moon to lack—or have diminished—criminal culpability.\textsuperscript{40}

In response to an inquiry sent by the Committee on Mandated Representation’s Mental Health Subcommittee to chief defenders, 18 of 19 respondents endorsed the belief that Penal Law § 40.15 is insufficient to ensure justice for criminal defendants who lack criminal culpability due to mental disease or defect. In addition, multiple respondents questioned the all-or-nothing nature of the defense, noting that culpability, ability to appreciate the nature of one’s conduct, and the ability to tell right from wrong are more appropriately viewed as matters of degree. Unfortunately, while societal and medical understanding of mental illness has evolved, the insanity defense has stood still.

The Insanity Defense in Practice

The comments in support of the enactment of Penal Law § 40.15 in 1984 would suggest that the insanity defense was being routinely abused.\textsuperscript{41} In the eyes of the public and legislators, it presented an unacceptable opportunity for murderers to walk free by faking a mental illness. Attorneys and the public alike “believe that the defense is invoked frequently and principally in cases involving murder.”\textsuperscript{42} Yet social science research suggests that the insanity defense may only be invoked in one percent of felony cases.

\textsuperscript{40} \textit{Rivers v. Katz}, 67 N.Y.2d 485, 494, 504 N.Y.S.2d 74 (1986) (regarding mentally ill patients’ ability to make decisions regarding their own care, “neither the fact that appellants are mentally ill nor that they have been involuntarily committed, without more, constitutes a sufficient basis to conclude that they lack the mental capacity to comprehend the consequences of their decision to refuse medication that poses a significant risk to their physical well-being”).

\textsuperscript{41} E.g., Letter from Paul Litwak, N.Y.S. Office of Mental Health, to Gerald Crotty, Counsel to the Governor (June 21, 2018); Memorandum from Jay M. Cohen, N.Y.S. Division of Criminal Justice Services, to Matthew T. Crosson (June 19, 1984); Memorandum in Support, From Robert B. Tierney, City of New York Office of the Mayor (included in N.Y. Laws 1984, ch. 668 legislative bill jacket).

cases, and that, when invoked, it is rarely successful. While research varies widely, some studies conclude that the defense succeeds in only one out of four cases, while others have found a success rate as low as one in 1,000. New York State does not track how often the defense is invoked, but the Department of Criminal Justice Statistics reports that over the five-year period from 2013-2017, only 11 defendants, out of 19,041 felony and misdemeanor trials statewide, were found not responsible by reason of mental disease or defect after a trial. During the same five-year period, 241 defendants entered a plea of not responsible, compared to 1,375,096 convictions for felonies and misdemeanors. According to the Office of Mental Health, as of June 30, 2018, 260 insanity acquittees were in secure confinement and 452 were in the community subject to orders of conditions. Meanwhile, as of 2016, approximately 20 percent of sentence-serving inmates in New York State correctional facilities carried mental health diagnoses that required Office of Mental Health services. In other words, based on a reported total

45 Division of Criminal Justice Services, emails dated April 9, 2018 (on file with authors).
prison population of 51,000, over 10,000 inmates receive services from Office of Mental Health.47

The insanity defense’s low usage rates paired with the high incidence of mental illness in prisons raises a question: why are more defendants not invoking a defense that would send them to treatment instead of prison? First, the overall low success rate may deter defendants from interposing the defense. Second, defendants pay a penalty for arguing insanity and losing.48 Defendants whose insanity defenses are unsuccessful—which, as noted above, represents the vast majority of those who raise it at trial—receive significantly longer sentences than those who are convicted without having argued insanity.49 Third, defendants may be unwilling to assert the defense because they decline to accept a mental illness diagnosis. Fourth, as discussed in the next section, New York’s civil commitment system may itself deter defendants with viable insanity defenses from raising them. For example, defendants acquitted based on insanity may remain confined for longer than the maximum term of the prison sentence they would have served if

48 Fatma Marouf, Assumed Sane, 101 Cornell L. Rev. 25, 30 (2016).
convicted. In the words of Charles P. Ewing, forensic psychologist, lawyer and professor at Buffalo Law School, “You have to be crazy to plead insanity . . . and I say that because the consequences are so grave.”

Get Out of Jail Free? Criminal Procedure Law § 330.20

Whether the insanity defense should be reformed cannot be considered absent an examination of what happens to an individual after an insanity acquittal. The retention, care, treatment, and release of persons found not responsible of crimes after successfully invoking the insanity defense is a complex process involving the balancing of individual liberties and the protection of society. In New York, the current procedures that follow a verdict or plea of not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect were enacted in 1980 following a study by the New York State Law Revision Committee and to comply with the constitutional mandates of Matter of Torsney.

In Matter of Torsney, the Court of Appeals held that, because insanity acquittees lack criminal culpability, “[b]eyond automatic commitment . . . for a reasonable period to

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50 Mac McClelland, When Not Guilty Is a Life Sentence, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 27, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/27/magazine/when-not-guilty-is-a-life-sentence.html; People v. D.D.G., 27 Misc. 3d 1224(A), 911 N.Y.S.2d 694 (Sup. Ct., Queens Co., 2010). In determining whether to release a defendant from custody following an adjudication of not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect, “a court may consider … the length of confinement and treatment [and] the lapse of time since the underlying criminal acts” (internal citations omitted). In this case, defendant was released after more than 20 years of confinement, but the length of confinement was not the only factor the court considered, and standing alone would have been insufficient to secure his release.


determine [acquittees’] present sanity, justification for distinctions in treatment between persons involuntarily committed under the Mental Hygiene Law and persons committed under CPL § 330.20 draws impermissibly thin.”

Nevertheless, due to a judicially imposed presumption that the defendant acquitted by reason of mental disease or defect is perpetually dangerous, in practice the CPL § 330.20 commitment scheme has become “increasingly onerous, bearing little resemblance to [Mental Hygiene Law] article 9 (civil) commitments.”

Stages of the Proceeding

“Track status, as determined by the initial commitment order, governs the acquittee’s level of supervision in future proceedings and may be overturned only on appeal from that order, not by means of a rehearing and review.”

Following an insanity verdict or plea, the trial judge must immediately order a psychiatric examination of the defendant, to be followed by an initial hearing to determine the acquittee’s mental condition. This hearing, in which the district attorney continues to participate, determines the level of judicial and prosecutorial involvement in future decisions concerning the acquittee’s confinement, transfer and release.

55 Id. at 674-75.
57 In re Norman D., 3 N.Y.3d 150, 152, 785 N.Y.S.2d 1 (2004). As observed by the Court of Appeals in In re Norman D., “track one status is significantly more restrictive than track two status.” Id. at 155.
58 CPL § 330.20(2)-(6).
initial hearing the court then assigns the acquittee to one of the three “tracks.”\(^{60}\) Track-one acquittees are those found by the trial judge to suffer from a dangerous mental disorder that makes them “a physical danger to [themselves] or others.”\(^{61}\) Track-two acquittees are mentally ill, but not dangerous,\(^ {62}\) while track-three acquittees are neither dangerous nor mentally ill.\(^ {63}\)

The trial judge must issue a commitment order consigning track-one defendants to the custody of the Commissioner for confinement in a secure facility for care and treatment for six months.\(^ {64}\) A court order is thereafter required for any transfer to a non-secure facility, off-ground furlough, release or discharge. The district attorney's office continues to be notified of, and may participate in, further court proceedings involving the defendant’s retention, care and treatment.\(^ {65}\)

Track-two defendants are ordered into the Commissioner’s custody for detention in a non-secure (civil) facility, subject to an order of conditions.\(^ {66}\) The order committing a track-two defendant is deemed made pursuant to the Mental Hygiene Law rather than section 330.20; concomitantly, subsequent proceedings regarding retention, conditional release or discharge of a track-two defendant are generally governed by articles 9

\(^{60}\) *In re Norman D*, 3 N.Y.3d at 154. The “track” nomenclature does not appear in CPL § 330.20 but is derived from the Law Revision Commission report that accompanied the proposed legislation, which states that “[t]he post-verdict scheme of proposed CPL § 330.20 provides for three alternative ‘tracks’ based upon the court’s determination of the defendant’s mental condition at the time of [the initial] hearing.” (1980 Report at 2265).

\(^{61}\) CPL § 330.20(1)(c), (6).

\(^{62}\) CPL § 330.20(1)(d), (6), (7).

\(^{63}\) CPL § 330.20(7); *People v. Stone*, 73 N.Y.2d 296, 539 N.Y.S.2d 718 (1989).

\(^{64}\) CPL § 330.20(1)(f), (6). The “Commissioner” taking custody of the acquittee may be the Commissioner of the Office of Mental Health or the Commissioner of the Office for People with Developmental Disabilities (OPWDD).

\(^{65}\) *Id.*

\(^{66}\) CPL § 330.20(1)(o), (7).
(mentally ill) or 15 (developmentally disabled) of the Mental Hygiene Law.67 Track-three defendants are discharged either unconditionally or, in the judge's discretion, with an order of conditions.68

Although the statute is silent as to the quantum of proof needed to satisfy the court in a post-insanity-acquittal commitment proceeding, in People v. Escobar the Court of Appeals declined to apply the clear and convincing evidentiary standard that governs other civil commitment proceedings, instead applying the preponderance of the evidence standard.69

The most onerous aspect of the statutory scheme is the “recommitment” process, which is used to return outpatient acquittees to inpatient status in the event of psychiatric decompensation. As interpreted by the Court of Appeals, an acquittee on conditional release can be committed to secure confinement under the Criminal Procedure Law without the enhanced procedural due process protections afforded to people subject to civil hospitalization under section 9 of the Mental Hygiene Law even if at the initial hearing the defendant was found not dangerous and placed in track two or three.70 In other words, a defendant who was not committed to begin with can nevertheless be

67 CPL § 330.20(7); People v. Flockhart, 96 A.D.2d 843, 465 N.Y.S.2d 601 (2d Dep’t 1983); In re Jill ZZ, 83 N.Y.2d 133, 608 N.Y.S.2d 161 (1994). Notwithstanding the statutory requirement that the “conditional release or discharge” of the track two defendant shall be in accordance with the provisions of the Mental Hygiene Law, the Court of Appeals held in In re Jill ZZ that the conditional release of the track two defendant shall be subject to a CPL order of conditions.

68 CPL § 330.20(1)(n). A discharge order is defined as an order terminating an order of conditions or unconditionally discharging a defendant from supervision under the provisions of section 330.20. An order of conditions is “an order directing a defendant to comply with [the] prescribed treatment plan, or any other condition which the court determines to be reasonably necessary or appropriate, and, in addition, where a defendant is in custody of the commissioner, not to leave the facility without authorization.” CPL § 330.20(1)(o). See also CPL § 330.20(12). Orders of conditions are valid for five years and may be extended for additional five-year periods indefinitely upon a mere finding of “good cause shown.” CPL § 330.20(1)(o); In re Oswald N., 87 N.Y.2d 98, 637 N.Y.S.2d 949 (1995).


“recommitted” under CPL § 330.20. Appellate courts in New York have been completely unpersuaded that the initial findings of a criminal court placing defendants in one of the three available “tracks” have any constitutional significance.\(^71\) “All such persons have committed criminal acts, and this underlies the permissible distinction between them and all others.”\(^72\) Federal constitutional challenges to the New York statutory scheme have to date failed, albeit narrowly.\(^73\)

In 1995, in *In re George L.*,\(^74\) the Court of Appeals determined that section 330.20 does not constrain a court to determining dangerousness as of the time when the hearing is conducted.\(^75\) Instead, the Court held that the State was permitted to engage in a presumption that the causative mental illness continues beyond the date of the criminal conduct.\(^76\) Stated another way, *George L.* adopted a presumption that the mental illness that led to the criminal act continues after the plea or verdict of not responsible and that assessments of dangerousness should not be limited to a point in time, but rather should be contextual and prospective in nature.\(^77\) Further, the presumption of dangerousness continues, in fact, and is not extinguished by a subsequent finding that the defendant no longer suffers from a dangerous mental disorder.\(^78\) Thus, despite the Court’s admonition in *In re Torsney* that the Constitution requires insanity acquittees to be treated like people involuntarily confined in

\(^{71}\) *In re Zamichow*, 176 A.D.2d 807, 575 N.Y.S.2d 327 (2d Dep’t 1991).
\(^{73}\) *See Francis S. v. Stone*, 221 F.3d 100, 112 (2d Cir. 2000).
\(^{75}\) *Id.*
\(^{76}\) *Id.*
\(^{77}\) *Id.*
\(^{78}\) *Francis S. v. Stone*, 221 F. 3d 100, 112 (2000). The Second Circuit observed that a track two defendant’s equal protection argument that following his release he could not be recommitted to a secure hospital under the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Law had “considerable force,” but denied habeas relief because of the restricted scope of review imposed on federal courts. His claim was premised upon two prior explicit state court findings in his case that he did not suffer from a dangerous mental disorder.
the civil context, the Court has since that time consistently advanced restrictive interpretations of section 330.20 that lead to longer stays and a low burden of proof on the state and district attorneys to keep insanity acquittees confined.

**Length of Stay**

In addition to the judicial interpretations of CPL § 330.20 discussed above, Office of Mental Health policy has led to an increase in length of stay for confined acquittees. Over time, OMH has become “increasingly risk averse.”79 Lengths of stay have become longer for people committed under the CPL despite the fact that the length of hospitalization has little or no effect on re-arrest.80 In fact, research indicates that insanity acquittees re-offend at a lower rate than prisoners.81 Further, statistical trends demonstrate that the while the number of not responsible admissions to hospitals in New York State declined over the past three decades from a high of 77 in 1982 to a low of 22 in 2008, the length of hospitalization of these individuals has increased significantly.82 More than 40 percent of those admitted in the 1980s were released into the community within seven years of admission.83 In the 1990s, only 21 percent of the admissions were released into the community within seven years.84 By the year 2000, only eight percent of admissions were released within a seven-year period.85 As of June 30, 2018, 452 insanity acquittees were

80 Id.
81 See Debbie Green et al., Factors Associated with Recommitment of NGRI Acquittees to a Forensic Hospital, 32 Behav. Sci. & L. 608, 608 (2014).
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Id. at 524-25.
subject to orders of conditions. From 2015-2017, approximately 20 insanity acquittees per year were released from orders of conditions. And from 2015 to 2017, approximately 30 acquittees per year were released from secure confinement to an order of conditions.

Unlike in other states, the maximum term to which an acquittee could have been sentenced does not limit the time that an acquittee may be confined at a secure forensic facility or subject to an order of conditions. In other words, a defendant whose maximum sentence would have been five years can be confined and/or subject to an order of conditions for the rest of his life. As aptly noted by one commentator, if one asks the question what happens after a defendant successfully invokes the insanity defense, “often the answer is involuntary confinement in a state psychiatric hospital—with no end in sight.”

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In sum, once a defendant has been acquitted based on insanity and thereby adjudged to lack criminal culpability, she faces indefinite detention that can exceed the maximum time for which she could have been imprisoned. She enters an increasingly risk averse milieu that has enforced an increasing length of confinement despite falling admissions. 87 Even if she is initially determined not to be dangerous and assigned to tracks two or three, she remains subject to re-classification and re-commitment. Once she is placed in secure confinement, even if her Office of Mental Health treatment team at the forensic psychiatric facility recommends her transfer to a civil hospital on an order of

87 Id. “The question … ‘becomes one of risk tolerance. America has become—to an extreme level that’s almost impossible to exaggerate—a risk-intolerant society.’ Fears of people with mental illness persist, even though, according to the best estimates, only 4 percent of violent acts in the United States are uniquely attributable to serious mental illness.” Id.; Richard Miraglia & Donna Hall, The Effect of Length of Hospitalization on Re-arrest Among Insanity Plea Acquittees, 39 J. Am. Acad. Psychiatry & L. 526 (2011).
conditions, the district attorney can object and, if the trial or appellate court agrees with the district attorney, override the judgment of the treatment team.

Conclusion

Penal Law § 40.15 and the post-acquittal commitment scheme under Criminal Procedure Law § 330.20 deserve close examination with an eye toward reform. The insanity defense remains essentially unchanged since the reign of King George III and appears insufficient to address the prevalence of mental illness in the prison population or take account of the fact that mental illness is not an all-or-nothing condition. Meanwhile, the commitment scheme that follows an insanity acquittal appears to have compensated for a drop in the number of insanity acquittal admissions by moving consistently toward longer periods of confinement, in the face of evidence that longer confinement is not correlated with reduced risk of violent recidivism. A defendant who is acquitted based on insanity faces indefinite detention that may continue past the maximum criminal sentence, regardless of the opinions of his treatment team. It is little wonder the defense is so rarely invoked.

Given that approximately 10,000 state prisoners receive services from the Office of Mental Health, the question whether the insanity defense and attendant civil commitment scheme can be revised to better serve the goals of public safety, effective treatment of the mentally ill, efficient expenditure of public funds, and punishment of only morally culpable behavior is of paramount importance. Though New York’s system is entrenched, some legislative action may be straightforward. For example, fairness and reason suggest that the length of time for which an acquittee can be confined or subject to an order of conditions should be limited to the maximum sentence that person could have served had he or she
been convicted. After the expiration of the maximum sentence, the patient would be transferred to a civil hospital subject to the civil confinement regime of Mental Hygiene Law Article 9 that governs individuals said to present a risk of serious physical harm to themselves or others.

Nor is New York’s restrictive approach to post-acquittal confinement the only model for insanity acquittees. In Tennessee, for example, 45 percent of insanity acquittees are never civilly committed; instead they are treated on an outpatient basis, and the average length of confinement is two years. Its recidivism rates have not changed since it changed its approach to insanity acquittees.

On the other hand, it is also possible that the large-scale incarceration of mentally ill individuals may be most effectively addressed through alternative means. In response to an inquiry from the authors of this report, multiple chief defenders stated that they often prefer to find alternative resolutions to the insanity plea for defendants with mental health issues, such as adjournments in contemplation of dismissal with mental health treatment requirements. And mental health courts have shown promise in diverting defendants with mental health issues to treatment. But only 27 such problem-solving courts operate in New York, and they are inconsistent in their diagnostic techniques and in matching the

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89 Cf. C.P.L. § 730.70 (upon expiration of incapacitated defendant’s legal status under CPLR Article 730, MHL Article 9 may be invoked if the patient is alleged to require continued inpatient care and treatment).
91 Id.
92 See generally Carol Fisler, Toward a New Understanding of Mental Health Courts, Judges J. 54:2, 8-13 (Spring 2015).
intensity of the intervention to the intensity of the risk. Alternatives to the insanity defense should therefore also be reviewed to identify successful models to serve as bases for statewide training efforts or legislative action.

It is, however, beyond the scope of this report or the resources of this subcommittee to undertake the inquiries or action outlined above. Such inquiries and action should include a diversity of views, including not only indigent defense counsel, but also prosecutors and advocates for persons with mental illnesses, among others.

This report addresses only one of the myriad issues at the intersection of law and mental health. For example, the root problems of pervasive stigmatizing language and bias suggest the necessity of efforts to examine the Mental Hygiene Law, as well as other bodies of law, to replace such terms as “mental hygiene” with less stigmatizing language, and to educate the courts and the bar on person-centered language. Furthermore, issues like the funding of community-based treatment, the way mental health issues are addressed in schools and other social institutions, and the limitation of the constitutional rights of people with mental illnesses go to the very heart of our societal structure and deserve sustained focus.

Recommendation


The Committee on Mandated Representation therefore recommends that the New York State Bar Association form a standing Mental Health Committee or Task Force to address large-scale issues that do not fit within a single Section or Committee’s purview. While it is true that other Sections and Committees, including the Committee on Disability Rights, the Mental Health Subcommittee of the Elder Law and Special Needs Section, and the Lawyer Assistance Committee focus on mental health issues as they relate to that Section or Committee’s mandate, none of them is poised to address the broad range of issues raised here. So long as effective communication is established among the existing mental health Sections and Subcommittees and the proposed mental health Committee or task force, there is little risk of inefficiency. In the words of Professor Perlin:

Mental Disability is no longer—if it ever was—an obscure subspecialty of legal practice study. Each of its multiple strands forces us to make hard social policy choices about troubling social issues—psychiatry and social control, the use of institutions, informed consent, personal autonomy, the relationship between public perception and social reality, the many levels of “competency,” the role of free will in the criminal law system, the limits of confidentiality, the protection duty of mental health professionals, the role of power in forensic evaluations. These are all difficult and complex questions that are not susceptible to easy, formulistic answers.95

Mental illness is often raised in the public consciousness only in association with tragedy, whether it be a person who takes their own life, a person who is killed by others due to illness-driven behavior, or a person whose illness-driven behavior leads to the death

or injury of others. At the same time, the stigma that has long attached to mental illness is now breaking. High-profile athletes, celebrities, and attorneys have publicly acknowledged their struggles with mental illness, shining a welcome light on the issue. That light has begun to eradicate the notion that mental illness is somehow “unclean” -- an archaic attitude enshrined in the name of the Mental Hygiene Law itself. New York has long been a leader in the care of its most vulnerable citizens. A Mental Health Committee or Task Force can help ensure that the law does not further stagnate and that the promise of the New York State Constitution to care for and support those in need is fulfilled.


97 This report was aided greatly by information and assistance from Mardi Crawford and the New York State Defenders Association, Professor Michael Perlin, the Office of Mental Health, the Division of Criminal Justice Statistics, and the staff of the New York State Bar Association.
Mental Health in New York State, 1945-1998
An Historical Overview

Introduction

New York State has for more than one hundred years been a pioneer in the development of mental health treatment and research. Although it was not the first state to construct state-supported institutions specifically for the mentally ill, it was the first completely to relieve county and city governments of the burden of caring for their mentally ill inhabitants; the 1890 State Care Act, which placed all responsibility for the care and treatment of those suffering from mental disorders in the hands of state government, was emulated by a number of other states in subsequent years. The landmark 1954 Community Mental Health Services Act (CMHSA), which was born of the state's desire to divest itself of some of this responsibility, and policymakers' subsequent efforts to compel localities to improve care and to insure that the needs of the seriously mentally ill were being met also anticipated developments in other states and at the federal level.

The reasons for the state's consistent willingness to embrace innovation are obscure, but they may stem in part from the state's large size and, in the New York City metropolitan area, population density. Gerald Grob, the leading historian of mental health policy in the United States, asserts that the development of state mental institutions was but one of many responses to industrialization, urbanization, and immigration, which rendered ineffective the personal relationships and local social institutions that had during the nation's agrarian past cared for the needy.1 New York State was among the first states to experience these sweeping changes, and as a result the need to devise effective responses to them arose sooner than it did elsewhere. In addition, New York State's demographic characteristics may have exacerbated the problems arising from past policy decisions; for example, policymakers' support for community-based mental health programs was in large part rooted in their awareness that New York State had the largest number of institutionalized people in the nation and fear that state hospital populations and costs would continue swelling.

New York State has also been unusually rich in the cultural resources and political will needed to develop and implement bold reforms. Grob notes that most nineteenth-century efforts to alter American mental health policy originated in the populous Northeast, which dominated the nation's cultural and intellectual life.2 Although New York State does not seem to have had a nineteenth-century agitator as prominent as Dorothea Dix, the Massachusetts activist who fought to compel state governments to assume responsibility for the care of the mentally ill, it has had more than its share of individuals and organizations dedicated to improving the care of the mentally ill. A number of important national advocacy organizations such as the National Committee for Mental Hygiene (a forerunner of the National Association for Mental Health) were headquartered in New York City and were thus well placed to influence state policy decisions. In addition, New York State has long been known as a laboratory of political reform. Mental-health advocacy groups working in the state have consistently found governors and state legislators to be far more receptive to change than their counterparts in many other parts of the

2Grob, The Mad Among Us, 43.
United States. However, the state's politicians, like their counterparts elsewhere, have seldom been motivated solely by the desire to do good. Advocates of change have consistently been most successful when they have been able simultaneously to appeal to lawmakers' altruism, fiscal conservatism, and yearning for efficient solutions to bedeviling social problems; for example, the postwar push for community-based treatment and preventative care won adherents because it held out the promise of simultaneously slashing expenditures and reducing human suffering.

The report that follows presents an overview of the complex and often tense relationships that existed between and within the mental health professions, voluntary agencies and political activists, and state and federal politicians. It does not pretend to be definitive, and it deliberately avoids two powerful historiographical traditions that guide many studies of mental health treatment and policy. The first of these traditions, which began taking shape in the late nineteenth century and came of age in the 1940's and 1950's, asserts that state mental institutions are miserable warrens of neglect and suffering. The second, which emerged in the 1960's and continues to inform the arguments of many historians and sociologists, views mental institutions and the very concept of mental illness as means of controlling those who refuse to accept the mental and moral discipline of modern civilization. It seeks primarily to identify the individuals and organizations that shaped mental health policy in New York State, to assess how they interpreted the problems that confronted them, to uncover the mechanisms through which policy was implemented, and, in instances in which policy decisions were particularly ill-informed or inappropriate, to point out these failures. Important as they are, questions of whether state mental hospitals were (or are) inherently bad and whether policymakers were (or are) consciously or unconsciously trying to shore up the social order are in many respects tangential to this endeavor.

The Policy Revolution, 1945-65

Between the enactment of the State Care Act and the passage of the CMHSA, the government of New York State was almost exclusively responsible for the care of the mentally ill. However, a number of important changes took place during this sixty-year period. During the first decades of the twentieth-century, a growing number of Progressive-era psychiatrists were no longer content to see themselves as state hospital-based purveyors of custodial care and began envisioning a broader role for themselves. Rejecting the nineteenth-century belief that mental illness was biologically based and typically incurable and that psychiatrists' chief responsibility was to furnish humane custodial care, they sought to reestablish psychiatry's ties to the medical profession and adopt its therapeutic orientation. They also sought to bring their expertise to bear upon a broad array of social problems such as alcoholism and venereal disease. Seeing these ills as manifestations of mental disorder, they asserted that safeguarding individual and social mental hygiene would ultimately eradicate these vexing problems. The psychiatrists drawn to the mental hygiene movement, which was spearheaded by the Manhattan-based National Committee for Mental Hygiene (NCMH), were convinced that mental illness had a hereditary component and had little faith in their power to cure it once it had developed.3 At the

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3The NCMH was founded in 1909 by psychiatrist Adolf Meyer and Clifford Beers, a Yale University graduate who had been institutionalized for a short period of time. At first, it devoted most of its energies to improving conditions in state hospitals, but within ten years of its foundation focused chiefly upon preventative programs and comprehensive studies of mental illness and treatment; see Gerald N. Grob, Mental Illness and American Society, 1875-1940 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), 147-66. In 1950, the NCMH merged with the Psychiatric Association, the fundraising division of the American Psychiatric
same time, they were confident that those predisposed to develop mental disorders could remain healthy if they learned how to respond appropriately to their environment; as a result, champions of mental hygiene believed that teaching adults and, in particular, children how to negotiate adverse personal and social circumstances could help to prevent many (generally less serious) forms of mental illness. The psychiatrists who gravitated toward the movement were also confident in their ability to work in concert with social workers, psychologists, occupational therapists, and other professionals who could help to improve people's mental adjustment; however, by the 1930's many of them felt that these other professionals were challenging their authority and expertise.

The activities of those drawn to the mental hygiene movement were varied. The leaders of the NCMH and other mental hygiene organizations were like other Progressive-era reformers in that they were convinced that scientific study of social problems would highlight potential remedies and force policymakers and the public to take action. As a result, these groups sponsored a number of local studies of mental illness and treatment options; however, their firm belief that mental illness was preventable often overcame their objectivity. They also undertook an ambitious and remarkably successful effort to convince social workers, parent-education groups, and teachers that children were vulnerable to mental illness and that intellectual accomplishment should not come at the expense of personality development. In addition, mental-hygiene organizations spurred the creation of a number of community-based mental health programs, which were sponsored by Community Chest groups, private foundations such as the Rockefeller Foundation, the Laura Spellman Rockefeller Memorial Fund, the Milbank Memorial Fund and the Commonwealth Fund, the State Charities Aid Association, medical schools, and, in some urban areas, city governments. Information about specific programs is

Association (APA), and the National Mental Health Foundation, an outgrowth of the federal government's wartime Mental Hygiene Program of the Civilian Public Service, and became the National Association for Mental Health. The association was supported largely through grants from the Rockefeller Foundation; see Theresa R. Richardson, The Century of the Child: The Mental Hygiene Movement and Social Policy in the United States and Canada (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 155-57.

Grob, Mental Illness and American Society, 144-45, 166-71. Grob notes that the emphasis that psychiatrists within the mental hygiene movement placed upon the preventability of mental illness kept most of them from embracing the less savory aims of some of the movement's other adherents: compulsory sterilization of the mentally ill and developmentally disabled and harsh immigration restrictions designed to keep southern and eastern Europeans out of the country.

Grob, Mental Illness and American Society, 243-65, details the emergence of psychiatric social work, psychology, and occupational therapy and the increasing tension that characterized their relations with the psychiatric profession.

Grob, The Mad Among Us, 156. For an example of the kind of social research undertaken by those active in the mental hygiene movement, see Elizabeth Greene, George K. Pratt, Stanley P. Davies, and V.C. Branham, Report of a Survey of Mental Hygiene Facilities and Resources in New York City (New York: National Committee for Mental Hygiene and New York City Committee on Mental Hygiene, State Charities Aid Association, 1929).

Sol Cohen, "The Mental Hygiene Movement, the Development of Personality and the School: The Medicalization of American Education," History of Education Quarterly 23 (Summer 1983): 124-25, 128-39. By the 1950’s, pedagogical theorists had embraced mental-hygienist ideas so fervently that the movement itself no longer existed within educational circles; the movement was a victim of its own success.

Community Chest organizations were peacetime outgrowths of the War Chest charity federations that were formed in order to relieve domestic hardship during the First World War. Like their parent bodies, they were federations that solicited corporate as well as individual contributions. After the Second World War, many Community Chest federations joined forces with the Red Cross and other organizations that were not chiefly concerned with assisting the needy and became United Funds. The federations' adoption of their current name, the United Way, came sometime afterward. For a brief history of the origins of Community Chests, see Community Surveys, Inc., of Indianapolis, Community Chest: A Case Study in Philanthropy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1957), 20, 266-67. For information about the philanthropic foundations that supported mental-hygiene programs, see Richardson, The Century of the Child, 40-41. The New York State Charities Aid Association, which had since its formation in 1872 worked to improve state asylum conditions, created a New York City Committee on Mental Hygiene in 1927. The association, now known as the State Communities Association, still exists and still takes an active interest in state mental health policy; see, e.g., New York State Communities Aid Association, Mental Health at the Crossroads: The Case for
scant, but they existed in Albany and the New York City and it is probable that child guidance clinics and other mental hygiene initiatives took shape in other cities.9

Adherents of the mental hygiene movement also sought to alter public policy, and their success in gaining the attention of New York State's legislators is evident in the name given a state agency created in 1926: the Department of Mental Hygiene (DMH). The responsibilities of the DMH as it was first constituted were very modest: the agency was to "visit and inspect all institutions, either public or private, used for the care and treatment of" people who were mentally ill, epileptic, or mentally retarded.10 However, in the following year the state's new Mental Hygiene Law gave the agency the responsibilities and overall structure that it would have for the next fifty years. It made the DMH responsible for the administration of all state-owned institutions caring for those with mental disorders and for insuring that all mentally ill, developmentally disabled, and epileptic New Yorkers received appropriate care. One provision of the Mental Hygiene Law further testified to the influence of the mental hygiene movement upon state policy: it mandated the creation of a DMH Division of Prevention, which was to monitor "psychiatric field work [and] after care and community supervision" of individuals discharged from state hospitals and perform other activities needed to avert the development of mental disorders.11

At the same time as psychiatric champions sought to expand their professional influence beyond the grounds of state mental hospitals, psychiatric activities within these institutions were changing substantially. The years between the First and Second World Wars witnessed the development of new therapies that initially seemed quite promising: fever therapy, which was developed during the 1920's, the surgical procedure known as prefrontal lobotomy, which emerged a decade later and seemed to promise an end to uncontrollable violence and a cure for at least some patients who were not helped by other therapies, insulin and metrazol shock therapies, which also came into use in the 1930's, and electro-convulsive treatment, which was used in the United States from the early 1940's onward and replaced insulin and metrazol as the shock treatment of choice. Psychiatrists were often extremely ambivalent about these therapies, which were drastic and poorly understood. Shock and surgical treatments sometimes produced modest or pronounced improvements, but even their leading proponents did not understand how or why they worked. This uncertainty aside, the aggressive therapeutic stance that underlay these therapies was a manifestation of psychiatrists' desire to prove themselves to be competent physicians.12

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9Between 1945-59, the Community Chest of Albany and city social welfare organizations sponsored a program for children with emotional problems; see Stanley Powell Davies, Toward Community Mental Health: A Review of the First Five Years of Operations under the Community Mental Health Services Act of the State of New York (New York: New York Association for Mental Health, 1960), 63-64. As of 1939, the New York City's school system had a Bureau of Child Guidance that served children living in four of the city's boroughs; see Central Hanover Bank and Trust Company, Department of Philanthropic Information, The Mental Hygiene Movement: From the Philanthropic Standpoint (New York: Central Hartford Bank & Trust Co., 1939), 52.
10The DMH was created as a result of the constitutional reorganization of New York State government approved by the electorate in November 1925; see New York State Constitution (1925), art. 5, § 2, § 11. The DMH's inspection duties had formerly been assigned to the State Mental Hospital Commission and the State Commission for Mental Defectives, which ceased to exist in the wake of the government's reorganization.
12Grob, Mental Illness and American Society, 296-306.
As important as these therapeutic innovations were, they were not the only developments shaping psychiatrists' attitudes about state mental institutions. A number of phenomena taking place outside of the mental health field posed great difficulties for state hospital administrators and grave problems for their patients. The economic hardships of the Great Depression resulted in pervasive overcrowding, staff shortages, and deterioration of facilities' physical plants. These problems worsened throughout the Second World War, which siphoned resources and personnel away from state hospitals and other institutions serving the civilian population. After the war ended, this constellation of problems gave rise to a concerted professional and public campaign for improvement of hospital conditions. Reformers had long been critical of the level of care furnished in most state mental hospitals, but after the end of the Second World War their condemnation of state institutions became increasingly vocal. Albert Deutsch, author of the classic postwar polemic, The Shame of the States, and other reformers who penned exposés of institutional conditions began calling not only for dramatic improvements in hospital conditions but a fundamental reevaluation of the role of state facilities in the care and treatment of the mentally ill. Their writings, which almost uniformly depicted state hospitals as dens of great and pointless suffering, to this day exert lingering influence upon popular and scholarly conceptions of mental institutions.

Postwar lay reformers were not alone in questioning the existence of state mental hospitals. Psychiatrists themselves called for nothing less than a revolutionary change in the treatment of the mentally ill. The profession's prewar efforts to broaden its responsibilities and loosen its ties to state institutions came to full fruition as a growing number of its practitioners began denouncing mental hospitals. Psychiatrists who had treated military personnel suffering from combat-related mental illness found that this patient cohort responded best to immediate, short-term care furnished outside of the asylum environment. In addition, many of them shared the public's shock and revulsion at the dilapidation and overcrowding that existed in many state facilities. The combination of wartime therapeutic successes and disgust at existing institutional conditions led a growing number of psychiatrists to see traditional mental hospitals as inherently detrimental to patients. Convinced that the mental illnesses found in the civilian population were essentially identical to those suffered by military personnel and that state institutions were impeding effective treatment, they began stressing the environmental dimensions of mental disease and the efficacy of outpatient-based therapy and preventative care.

The psychiatric profession’s postwar shift toward environmental models of mental illness should not be exaggerated. Some practitioners remained convinced that mental disorders were biological in origin or that they were largely incurable, and the American Psychiatric Association (APA) and other psychiatric professional organizations endured bitter battles over theories of etiology, personality formation, behavioral motivation, and treatment models during the late 1940's and 1950's. Furthermore, even die-hard environmentalists embraced Thorazine and other new psychiatric drugs that appeared in the mid-1950's and shared the profession's belief that these new medicines would facilitate outpatient treatment. Nonetheless, those dissatisfied with the traditional inpatient hospital and somatic theories about the etiology of mental illness were very much in the ascendant, and their influence is manifest in post-war legislative

14 Albert Deutsch, The Shame of the States (New York: Harcourt, Brace, [1948]).
15Grob, From Asylum to Community, 8-23, 71-77.
16Grob, From Asylum to Community, 146-50.
developments. Even before the end of the Second World War, reform-oriented mental health professionals such as Robert Felix, the head of the Public Health Service's Division of Mental Hygiene, began lobbying for federal funding of treatment of and research concerning mental illness. The efforts of Felix and others gave impetus to the 1946 National Mental Health Act (NMHA), which sanctioned the disbursement of funds to researchers studying the etiology and treatment of mental illness, to institutions educating mental health professionals, and to states desiring to establish or maintain local mental health programs. The NMHA also provided for the establishment of a new division of the National Institute of Health, the National Institute for Mental Health (NIMH), which would be responsible for evaluating grant applications and monitoring funded projects; the NIMH was formally established in 1949, and Robert Felix served as its head from 1949-64. The Hill-Burton Act, also passed in 1946, provided funds for construction of mental hospitals and psychiatric wings in general hospitals and thus further increased federal involvement in mental health care.

Federal developments were paralleled by those taking shape at the state level. Although mental health was rarely their top concern, state politicians shared professional and broader public concerns about institutional conditions, and they were also concerned about the cost of caring for the mentally ill. Those in New York State, which had by far the largest number of institutionalized patients, were particularly eager to alter the manner in which care was provided and funded. Community treatment and prevention programs took shape in almost every state during the 1950's, and state funding for such programs rapidly outstripped federal support. In New York, legislation enacted in 1949 created the New York State Mental Health Commission (SMHC) within the DMH. The SMHC, which was to meet annually between 1949-54 and to submit to the legislature a final report outlining its recommendations in February 1954, was charged with creating a master plan for state mental health programs. Components of this master plan were to include, among other things, facilitating the recruitment and training of needed mental health personnel, planning and developing needed in- and outpatient services for children and adults, sponsoring needed research, and coordinating the activities of public and private agencies working in any given community.

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17 Grob, From Asylum to Community, 24-43, 124-46. As Grob points out, the psychiatric profession was syncretistic, and few of its practitioners denied that both somatic and environmental factors contributed to mental illness; psychiatrists differed as to which set of factors was most important.
18 Grob, From Asylum to Community, 44-53.
19 Grob, From Asylum to Community, 53-56. The status and responsibilities of the NIMH have changed substantially. In 1953, the Public Health Service, of which the NIH and the NIMH were part, was made part of the newly created Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW; renamed the Department of Health and Human Services after the creation of the Department of Education in 1979). The NIMH was severed from the National Institute of Health (NIH) and given bureau status in 1967, but in 1973 it was again made part of the NIH. At the same time, it was made part of HEW's newly-created Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and Mental Health Administration (ADAMHA). Following the ADAMHA Reorganization Act of 1992, which abolished the ADAMHA and replaced it with the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA), the NIMH became part of SAMHSA and its research activities were transferred to the NIH. See National Institute of Mental Health, NIMH Legislative Chronology, available [online]: <http://www.nimh.nih.gov/about/legichro.htm> [23 April 1998].
20 Grob, From Asylum to Community, 166.
21 Grob, From Asylum to Community, 59.
22 Act of April 7, 1949, Laws of New York, ch. 733, § 1-2, § 6. As it existed in the wake of the 1949 legislative changes, the SMHC was chaired by Dr. Newton Bigelow (later director of the Marcy State Hospital) and consisted of the state commissioners of health, education, social welfare, and correction; Dr. Ernest M. Gruenberg served as its executive director. Hyman C. Forstenzer as assistant director, and Luther E. Woodward as coordinator of community mental health services in the New York City metropolitan area; see Davies, Toward Community Mental Health, 2. The SMHC apparently enjoyed a de facto existence before it received its legal recognition and mandate: in 1947, it began receiving federal funds allocated in accordance with the 1946 Mental Health Act; see Davies, Toward Community Mental Health, 2-3.
The SMHC ultimately concluded that public demand for community-based mental health care was increasing, that such care was in egregiously short supply in every part of the state, that the availability of such care varied widely from one locality to the next, that there was no single local government agency accountable for community mental health programs, and that the efforts of various state agencies to establish programs for populations in need led to local-level confusion. These findings and politicians' ever-present concerns about the escalating cost of supporting the state's mental hospitals, which cared for roughly one-fifth of the nation's 559,000 psychiatric inpatients, helped to propel passage of New York State's Community Mental Health Services Act (CMHSA), the first legislation of its kind in the United States. State politicians who feared that funding community-based services would place further pressure on the state budget were ultimately persuaded to support the act by the mounting expense of inpatient treatment and predictions that state hospital admissions would increase and that community-based care would be cheaper than treatment furnished in state institutions, and psychiatrists' assertions that community-based care was more humane and effective.

The CMHSA encouraged but did not compel the governments of counties and of cities of more than 50,000 people to establish community mental health boards (CMHB's); New York City was exempted from these guidelines and instructed to create a single CMHB for all five boroughs. By law, CMHB's were composed of the locality's ranking health and welfare officials and at least two physicians and headed by psychiatrists; other local officials and representatives from community service groups were allowed to sit on them. CMHB's were to assume responsibility for identifying and planning to meet the mental health needs of their communities and administering all locally-based in- and outpatient preventative, treatment, rehabilitation, and educational/consultative programs. In effect, the act gave CMHB's a sweeping mandate but little concrete direction. The CMHSA also sought to induce localities to act by compelling the state to reimburse half of a given CMHB's approved expenditures. The CMHSA capped the reimbursement that a given CMHB could request at $1.00 per capita of the general population it served. Although this figure sounds low, the intent of those who drafted the reimbursement provision was to double the existing level of care in the best-served parts of the state. At the same time, legislators passed a bond act designed to raise $350,000,000 for construction of new state hospital facilities and the planned community mental health centers; the act, which attached mental health construction bonds to an existing bond act designed to provide bonuses to World War II veterans and their families, was subsequently approved by voters.

The move toward community-based and -controlled mental health care was given added momentum by changes in the operations of state mental hospitals. The open hospital movement, which emerged in Great Britain in the late 1940's and early 1950's and, in the wake of British presentations at the 1954 World Association for Mental Health conference in Toronto, began shaping inpatient mental health care in the United States during the mid- to late 1950's. Its

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23Grob, The Mad Among Us, 234; Grob, Mental Illness and American Society, 317.
24Grob, From Asylum to Community, 171-72.
26Community Mental Health Services Act, Laws of New York (1954), ch. 10, § 190-b subd. 1 and subd. 3.
27Community Mental Health Services Act, Laws of New York (1954), ch. 10, § 190-c and § 191-a, subd. 1.
28Community Mental Health Services Act, Laws of New York (1954), ch. 10, § 191-a. On the goal of doubling care levels, see Davies, Toward Community Health, 8.
29Mental Health Construction Bond Act, Laws of New York (1954), ch. 8, § 2. Act of 5 February 1954, Laws of New York, ch. 9, § 1, § 3, created the War Bonus and Mental Health Bond Account, which was financed through a combination of income tax revenue and a one-half cent per pack tax on cigarettes.
adherents believed that state institutions as they then existed infantilized patients and intensified their mental illnesses.\textsuperscript{30} They argued that involuntary commitment and institutional regimentation, no matter how gentle, robbed patients of decision-making abilities and other skills they needed to function in society. They also urged that commitment to mental hospitals be largely voluntary and that hospitals allow patients the greatest possible control over their own movements and behavior; high walls, tight schedules, and security checks were to be replaced by open facilities that allowed patients to choose how and where they would spend their time. Lastly, proponents of the open hospital envisioned a smaller treatment role for the hospital, stressing that institutionalization should be of short duration and that it should become part of an array of in- and outpatient programs designed to allow the mentally ill to return to society as soon as possible.\textsuperscript{31} As Gerald Grob notes, their ultimate goal was "to blur the demarcation between . . . hospital and community."\textsuperscript{32}

New York State mental health officials and professionals found the open hospital concept highly attractive. In 1957, DMH Commissioner Paul H. Hoch sent six state mental hospital administrators to Britain to study open facilities. All six became adherents of the concept, and by late 1959, seventy percent of the patients at the Central Islip State Hospital, eighty percent of those at the Brooklyn State Hospital, and ninety percent of those at the Hudson River and Middletown State Hospitals resided in open wards.\textsuperscript{33} Hoch and other New York State professionals who advocated the creation of open hospitals were aided by the New York City-based Milbank Memorial Fund, which had since 1922 provided money for public health projects and studies in New York State and had become interested in mental health issues during the 1930's. The fund financed the 1957 hospital administrators' tour of British facilities and held annual conferences at which American, Canadian, and British mental health professionals detailed their efforts to create effective prevention, treatment, and rehabilitation projects. In turn, high-ranking New York State mental health officials helped guide the fund's activities: Commissioner Hoch and Hudson River State Hospital head Dr. Robert C. Hunt sat on its Technical Board.\textsuperscript{34}

New York State advocates of the open hospital identified several obstacles that stood in their way. They felt that the courts were overly concerned about the possibility that lowering the number of involuntary commitments might increase the crime rate, and they believed that the

\textsuperscript{30}Grob, From Asylum to Community, 140-41, 144-46.
\textsuperscript{31}See, e.g., Robert G. Hunt, "Ingredients of a Rehabilitation Program," in Milbank Memorial Fund, An Approach to the
Prevention of Disability from Chronic Psychoses: The Open Mental Hospital within the Community (New York: Milbank
Memorial Fund, 1958), 9-27.
\textsuperscript{32}Grob, From Asylum to Community, 145.
\textsuperscript{33}The six administrators sent to Britain were: Dr. Nathan Beckenstein, head of Brooklyn State Hospital; Dr. Robert C. Hunt,
head of Hudson River State Hospital; Dr. Francis J. O'Neill, head of Central Islip State Hospital; Dr. Hyman Pleasure, head of
Middletown Hospital; Dr. Herman B. Snow, head of St. Lawrence State Hospital; Dr. C.F. Terrence, head of Rochester State
Hospital. It is unclear as to just how many patients at the St. Lawrence and Rochester State Hospitals were in open wards;
however, Dr. Pleasure reported that sixty-five percent of those at St. Lawrence were in such wards even before he went to Britain
and that even more patients were placed in open wards after he returned. For the views of the six psychiatrists who went to
Britain and their subsequent efforts to emulate their British counterparts, see "Reports of Group Visits to Great Britain's
Community-Based, Open Mental Hospitals," in Milbank Memorial Fund, Steps in the Development of Integrated Psychiatric
Services: Report of the Third Meeting of the Advisory Council on Mental Health Demonstrations (New York: Milbank
Memorial Fund, 1960), 14-36.
\textsuperscript{34}Information about the Milbank Memorial Fund and its activities can be found in Ernest M. Gruenberg and Frank G. Boudreau,
"Preface," in An Approach to the Prevention of Disability from Chronic Psychoses, 5, and Grob, From Asylum to Community,
89, 169. Grob asserts that the fund began supporting mental health projects in the 1940's, but a 1939 overview of the mental
hygiene movement indicates that the organization's concern with mental health developed at least a decade earlier; see Central
Hartford Bank & Trust Co, The Mental Hygiene Movement, 57.
general public's lack of knowledge about the nature of mental illness was impeding progress. They also perceived another hurdle specific to New York State: the 1890 State Care Act, which made treatment of the mentally ill the exclusive responsibility of the state. In 1957, Robert Hunt charged that:

"The state [had] . . . in effect established a system that allows everyone else to be irresponsible. Local government, general hospitals, practicing physicians, individual citizens, and patients long since abdicated to the state all responsibility for caring for their fellow man when he becomes mentally ill. In New York State local officials can . . . dispose of a problem case with no cost whatever [sic] to any local agency or to the family. They may actually make a profit by removing a name from the welfare rolls."  

Not all advocates of community mental health care believed that local politicians were obsessively stingy. However, Hunt's argument continually resurfaced in subsequent decades. In 1965, the New York State Planning Committee on Mental Disorders, which was composed of state officials, mental health professionals, CMHB members, and representatives from interested private groups, argued that "choice of treatment facility should be based on the needs of the patient" and implied that ending "exclusive State fiscal responsibility for State hospital care" would result in more appropriate treatment. In 1976, the Assembly Joint Committee to Study the Department of Mental Hygiene noted that "the presence of a State facility in a county [could] inhibit the development of local programs because it [was] easier and less costly for the locality to use the State facility."  

Not surprisingly, the enthusiasm of Hoch, Hunt, and other New York State mental health professionals for community health care programs far exceeded the rate of program development. Community-based programs took shape gradually and CMHB personnel benefited from the creation in 1956 of the Association of Community Mental Health Boards (ACMHB), which from 1957 onward sponsored annual conferences intended to allow CMHB members to share their experiences. However, progress did not occur at the speed that reformers wanted. Stanley Davies, who in 1959 conducted a study of CMHB's for the New York Association for Mental Health, underscored the slow rate of change. Davies visited thirty of the thirty-one

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35Hunt, "Ingredients of a Rehabilitation Program," 16.
36In 1959, Dr. William Carson, the chair of the St. Lawrence County CMHB, asserted that he was "constantly amazed" that many of his colleagues seemed to regard "elected officials, particularly boards of supervisors [. . .] as backwoodsmen without any thought except guarding the county treasury" and stressed that officials generally wanted what was best for their communities; see New York State Department of Mental Hygiene, Association of Community Mental Health Boards, Fourth Annual Conference of Community Mental Health Boards ([Albany, NY: Department of Mental Hygiene, 1959]), 69-70.
38New York State Assembly, Assembly Joint Committee to Study the Department of Mental Hygiene, Mental Health in New York: A Report To Speaker Stanley Steingut from the Assembly Joint Committee to Study the Department of Mental Hygiene (Albany: New York State Assembly, 1976). It is important to note that local officials in certain areas may have had another reason for relying upon state facilities: fear that the hospitals would be shut down. Rural state hospitals brought money and jobs into the villages and small towns adjacent to them, and local officials might have feared that community mental health programs would ultimately lead to hospital closure.
39[New York State Department of Mental Hygiene, Association of Community Mental Health Boards], Second Annual Conference of New York State Community Mental Health Boards. [Albany: Department of Mental Hygiene, 1957], 11.
40Davies was Director of Special Studies for the New York State Association for Mental Health at the time he carried out the study. At various times, he had been associate director of the New York State Charities Aid Association, executive secretary of the New York State Committee on Mental Hygiene, general director of the Community Service Society of New York City, president of the New York State Association for Mental Health, a board member of the National Association for Mental Health,
counties that had CMHB’s or community mental health programs in place in late 1959, and found that there were 171 outpatient mental health clinics in operation (seventy-nine of which were in New York City), general psychiatric wards in eighteen hospitals, thirty-six consultative and educational programs, and four rehabilitation programs. The sole responsibility of the CMHB’s in the thirteen rural counties, which he defined as those that had less than 200,000 inhabitants, was the administration of all-purpose part- or full-time clinics; in six of these counties, these clinics did not exist prior to the formation of the county CMHB.

In explaining why the pace of change was so slow, Davies pointed to a number of issues. Funding was a persistent problem, and CMHB's that operated in rural areas often found it particularly difficult to secure adequate funds. Rural CMHB's also found it hard to induce qualified psychiatrists, psychologists, social workers, and other needed personnel to move away from cities. In addition, those that were established in counties without existing social-welfare and child-services agencies were besieged by people with needs and problems that fell outside of the CMHB's legal mandate. Urban-area CMHB's, which typically inherited control of programs that were already in existence and worked with voluntary organizations seeking state reimbursement, encountered a different set of problems. Local governments that had financed community initiatives and voluntary mental-health programs were eager to secure state funds, and urban CMHB's were beset by reimbursement demands as soon as they were formed. These demands and the administrative functions that these CMHB's were forced to perform almost immediately after they came into existence often consumed all of their time and resources, and they were unable to fulfill the planning component of their mission. In addition, CMHB's that assumed control over or, as was more common, established service contracts with existing programs sometimes found that program personnel saw them as usurpers. The CMHB governing community health programs in New York City, which furnished the highest level of local services in New York State, encountered particular difficulties. Demand for reimbursement was such that the city’s CMHB quickly reached the maximum established by the CMHSA and could not establish any other programs.

Davies also discovered that the availability of care continued to vary widely from one part of the state to the next, and he identified another difficulty stemming from the provisions of the CMHSA: localities that did not wish to establish a CMHB were under no obligation to do so, and a number of counties, almost all of which were rural, had witnessed failed attempts at persuading county officials and the broader public that community-based mental health services were needed. Stressing that the solution to this problem lay in the education of citizens and local politicians, Davies did not argue that communities should be compelled to create CMHB's or to allocate funds for community programs. However, in highlighting the role of citizen resistance in retarding the creation community programs he identified a problem that in future decades

president of the Family Service Association of America, and president of the Mental Health Materials Center; see New York State Department of Mental Hygiene, New York State Association of Community Mental Health Boards, Sixth Annual Conference of New York State Community Mental Health Boards ([Albany: Department of Mental Hygiene, 1961]), 53.

Davies, Toward Community Mental Health, 9-10. The Chemung County CMHB refused to allow Davies to assess its activities. CMHB's existed in Albany, Broome, Cayuga, Chemung, Dutchess, Erie, Greene, Jefferson, Monroe, Nassau, Niagara, Oneida, Onondaga, Ontario, Orange, Putnam, Rockland, St. Lawrence, Saratoga, Schenectady, Suffolk, Ulster, Warren, Washington, Wayne and Westchester counties and in the New York City.

Davies, Toward Community Mental Health, 11-13.

Davies, Toward Community Mental Health, 32.

Davies, Towar Community Mental Health, 14-15, 22.

Davies, Towar Community Mental Health, 204-05.

Davies, Toward Community Mental Health, 24.
would continue to bedevil advocates of locally-based prevention, treatment, and rehabilitation: the public's ongoing ignorance about mental illness and persistent preference for segregation of the mentally ill in isolated institutions.

Davies did not explicitly single out one other factor that helped to retard the development of community mental-health programs: the imprecision of the CMHSA as to priorities and target clienteles. Responsibility for making such assessments was placed in the hands of individual CMHB's with the laudable intent of allowing each community to create programs and policies that best met its unique circumstances and needs. However, assigning primary responsibility for effecting radical changes in mental health policy to inexperienced local organizations virtually guaranteed that progress would be slow. State officials became increasingly aware that CMHB's were in need of guidance, and in 1959 the DMH created ten Regional Mental Health Advisory Committees (RMHAC's) that were charged with helping CMHB's plan, implement, and administer programs. In 1962, the DMH created the positions of Associate Commissioner for Community Services and Assistant Commissioner for Community Services in an effort to facilitate the development of local programs. In 1965, it underwent a structural reorganization that made the newly created Division of Local Services one of its three main operating divisions.

The lack of coordination between state and local efforts nonetheless persisted. The obstacles encountered by CMHB's and their champions within the DMH were many and their origins complex. The difficulty of coordinating local and state initiatives and creating a comprehensive array of in- and outpatient services was the subject of the 1961 annual conference of the Milbank Memorial Fund. At the conference, future Commissioner of Mental Hygiene Dr. Lawrence R. Kolb argued that research-oriented and teaching hospitals, long noted for furnishing high levels of care to the mentally ill, could nonetheless act in ways that were counterproductive. Their admissions policies were guided in part by the need for exemplary teaching and research cases, and as a result some patients who were in great need of care were turned away. Such policies often resulted in a poor fit between the hospital and community it served and also served students and researchers poorly: those exposed only to these carefully selected cases failed to grasp the actual distribution of mental illness within communities or to appreciate the role of community-based programs in aiding the mentally ill. Others present at the conference highlighted the persistence of staffing shortages, localities' reluctance to fund...
programs, and the dearth of rehabilitative programs designed to ease the return from the mental hospital to society. 51

Despite these difficulties in implementation, the New York State CMHSA anticipated developments taking place in other states. California, New Jersey, and Minnesota passed similar laws in 1957, and mental health authorities in other states began implementing similar programs without benefit of legislative mandate. 52 New York State’s new mental health policy also set the course changes that took place on the federal level. In the early 1950’s interested members of Congress, federal officials working within the NIMH and the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW), and mental health professionals active in the APA and the American Medical Association (AMA) agreed that the federal government should take a more active role in financing and directing mental health care. In 1955, they established the Joint Commission on Mental Illness and Health (JCMIH), which was sponsored by APA and AMA but supported in part by federal funds. The JCMIH issued its final report, entitled Action for Mental Health, in 1961. Action for Mental Health outlined a comprehensive plan that called for federal support for construction and staffing of community mental health centers. Neither the AMA nor the APA unconditionally accepted the recommendations of the JCMIH, which nonetheless guided the development of federal mental health policy. 53 In 1963, the Community Mental Health Centers Construction Act (CMHCCA), which authorized funds to help defray the costs of constructing (but not staffing) local clinics, was enacted; federal support for staffing, which was administered by HEW, was passed in August 1965. The CMHCCA also established federal funding for the care and training of the mentally retarded and developmentally disabled, whose circumstances were of particular concern to President John F. Kennedy, other members of the Kennedy family, and a growing number of citizen advocates. 54 However, the CMHCCA, which constituted a radical break from previous national mental health policy in both the kind of facilities it supported and the degree of direct federal involvement that it represented, did not clearly define the functions and target clientele of the community centers or their relationship to other local health-care institutions. 55 In its imprecision, it strongly resembled New York State's CMHSA.

The CMHCCA reinforced New York State's move toward community-based provision of mental health care. Under its provisions, funds were made available for every state that devised plans for community mental health programs and facility construction, designated an agency to execute them, and appointed a broadly representative advisory council to guide state policy. In New York State, DMH Commissioner Paul Hoch applied for a planning grant from the NIMH and after approval of his request in May 1963 appointed a Planning Committee on Mental Disorders (PCMD) composed of DMH and other state officials, CMHB members, representatives of professional organizations, and leaders of voluntary advocacy groups. Hoch also ordered all of the RMHAC's to appoint regional planning committees that would report to

51 Dr. Marvin E. Perkins, "Problems of Integration . . . in New York City," in Milbank Memorial Fund, Decentralization of Psychiatric Services, 76-77; Dr. Harold C. Miles, "Problems of Integration . . . in Monroe County," in Milbank Memorial Fund, Decentralization of Psychiatric Services, 81-84; Dr. C.F. Terrence, "Problems of Integration . . . in Monroe County," in Milbank Memorial Fund, Decentralization of Psychiatric Services, 85-88.
52 Grob, From Asylum to Community, 173-75.
53 Grob, From Asylum to Community, 187-214. Grob notes that one of the most vocal critics of the JCMIH's recommendations was New York State DMH official and Psychiatric Quarterly editor Newton Bigelow, who argued that doing as JCMIH advocated and turning large state mental hospitals into chronic care facilities was in effect defining certain patients as hopeless cases and simply warehousing them.
54 Grob, From Asylum to Community, 233-34, 248.
55 Grob, From Asylum to Community, 235-238.
In order to take full advantage of the federal funds that the CMHCCA made available, in summer 1964 Governor Nelson Rockefeller made the DMH solely responsible for meeting the needs of New York State’s mentally retarded and developmentally disabled citizens. As a result, Commissioner Hoch created a Mental Retardation Section within the PCMD and urged all of the RMHAC’s to appoint developmental-disability experts to the regional committees. New York State was one of the first to receive CMHCCA funds, and as of 1966 it had gotten $6,600,000 for construction of community centers and another $1,500,000 for construction of facilities for the mentally disabled.

However, New York State's increasing expenditures upon mental health center construction and staffing were not propelled solely by the availability of federal funds. Elected officials buoyed by the booming economy and promises that community mental health care initiatives would in the long run save money created a number of new funding initiatives. In April 1963, roughly six months before the CMHCCA became law, legislation established the New York State Mental Hygiene Facilities Improvement Corporation (MHFIC), a public-benefit corporation run by the DMH commissioner and two trustees appointed by the governor. The MHFIC, which began its work in January 1964, was empowered to plan, undertake, and direct construction and rehabilitation of facilities for the mentally ill, the mentally retarded, and the developmentally disabled, and it was given control over all local, state, and federal monies intended for these purposes. The MHFIC could also purchase or lease real estate and buildings needed for the creation, expansion, or renovation of mental health facilities. At the same time, the Housing Finance Authority (HFA), which had been established to promote the construction of affordable housing, was given the power to furnish loans for the construction of schools and hospitals; as of 1966, the HFA had loaned $600,000,000 for mental health facility construction. The same piece of legislation also created the Mental Health Services Fund, which was financed out of the surplus monies that the MHFIC returned to the state comptroller at the end of the year and helped to support personnel training and research activities.

In the wake of the CMHCCA's passage, New York State devoted even more funds to facility construction. In early 1965, Governor Nelson Rockefeller announced plans for a mammoth construction initiative. Five hospitals designed to replace outdated facilities, twelve hospitals exclusively for children, and eight state schools for the developmentally disabled were planned; in the following year, work began upon four of the hospitals and nine new rehabilitation facilities.
wings at existing facilities. In 1965, new state legislation enabled local governments to seek state reimbursement of up to one-third of the capital costs and one-half of the operating costs incurred by community mental health centers and psychiatric wings within public hospitals; this legislation also raised the expenditure ceiling for community mental health programs, which had been raised to $1.20 per capita in 1960, to $1.40 per capita and waived this limit for communities that met certain qualifications. However, the legislative developments of 1963 and 1965 should not be seen as signs that state government was consciously seeking to micro-manage community-based mental health care. State expenditures for construction, equipment, and training certainly increased, but policymakers were convinced that the programs housed within state-financed buildings should be controlled largely by local authorities. A pamphlet sent to local officials during the latter half of the 1960's stressed that even though the MHFIC would design, construct, and equip facilities and the HFA would finance construction, municipalities would be responsible for their maintenance and operation; after the bonds that had financed construction were retired, localities would also assume ownership of the facilities that the HFA and the MHFIC had built.

The Department of Mental Hygiene also moved to take advantage of various sources of federal funds that became available as a result of programs created or expanded during the administration of Lyndon Johnson. In 1966, it published a handbook detailing the monies available to state and local mental-health programs through the NIMH and other divisions of HEW, the Department of Labor, and the Office of Economic Opportunity; the guide also outlined federal funding sources for programs serving the developmentally disabled. However, the most significant new federal programs were Medicare, a federally-funded health insurance program for senior citizens, and Medicaid, a health insurance program for the needy jointly financed by the federal, state, and local governments. Both of these programs, which were enacted in 1965, covered some forms of mental health treatment and greatly altered the care given mentally ill persons. The framers of these laws sharply limited Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement for care furnished in state mental hospitals; in keeping with prevailing opinion, they believed that state facilities placed far less emphasis upon treatment than psychiatric wings situated in general hospitals. They also made impoverished mentally ill persons under the age of sixty-five ineligible for Medicaid coverage. These stipulations had unanticipated and dramatic consequences. Mental hospital administrators across the nation began moving the aged mentally ill, who had long constituted a substantial proportion of the institutionalized population, out of state hospitals. Some mentally ill senior citizens were sent to psychiatric facilities attached to general hospitals, but the great majority ended up in nursing homes. New York State was not an exception to this trend, which was often detrimental to those moved out of state facilities and yet beneficial to those who remained within. In subsequent years, the DMH realized that its rush

63New York State Department of Mental Hygiene, Control of Mental Disorders in New York State, 4, 12.
65New York State Health and Mental Health Facilities Improvement Corporation, Improved Health Facilities for Your Community: How the State Can Assist in Construction (Albany, New York State Health and Mental Health Facilities Improvement Corporation, n.d).
66New York State Department of Mental Hygiene, Catalog of Selected Federal Programs for Financial Assistance and Grants, (Albany, New York State Department of Mental Hygiene, 1966).
67On the provisions of Medicare and Medicaid and their effects on treatment of the mentally ill elderly, see Grob, From Asylum to Community, 267-70. Grob notes that the transfer of the aged mentally ill to nursing homes freed up resources that were then used to improve care for the patients who remained. However, those sent to nursing homes encountered widely varying levels of care and a dearth of psychiatric services. The mortality rate of mentally ill senior citizens increased among those transferred, suggesting that nursing home care was often inadequate; see Grob, The Mad Among Us, 266, 289-90.
to move mental patients into nursing homes was in some respects ill-considered: by the mid-
1970's, nursing home operators who had in the past had negative experiences with former state hospital patients and local social welfare agencies that had no desire to fund any of the costs associated with nursing home care heartily resisted the DMH's efforts to place discharged patients in such facilities.68

The unexpected consequences of Medicare and Medicaid regulations were not offset by dramatic successes in the creation of community-based mental health facilities. As of early 1967, one hundred centers across the nation had received CMHCCA funds, forty-seven centers had been granted monies for staffing, and twenty-six centers were receiving federal support for both construction and staffing. The pace of center development fell far short of the projections of CMHCCA proponents, who envisioned the relatively rapid creation of some 2,000 centers nationwide. Gerald Grob argues that the slow growth of community centers at the federal level was in part the result of increased competition for funds within HEW and persistent shortages of qualified mental-health personnel. He also underscores the impact of the escalating conflict in Vietnam, which increasingly occupied the attention of President Johnson and the public at large and drained money from social welfare programs, upon federal mental health expenditures.69

Grob also highlights the shortcomings inherent in the centers themselves. Beliefs about etiology and treatment held by the staffers of many centers remained nebulous, ensuring wide variation in the scope and kinds of therapies that the centers offered.70 Furthermore, centers focused increasing attention and resources upon those who had less serious forms of mental illness. In part, this shift was due to the increasing role that psychologists played in furnishing treatment. Psychologists tended to reject somatic explanations of the etiology of mental illness, and they were relatively uninterested in furnishing care to the most seriously mentally ill, were employed in ever-greater numbers in community centers. Relations between psychiatrists and psychologists had been tense since the 1930's, but in the 1960's psychologists’ challenges to psychiatry's pre-eminence in the field of mental health at last came to fruition.71 However, psychologists were not alone in their dislike of treating the acutely mentally ill. Psychiatrists who worked in the centers often saw themselves chiefly as providers of psychotherapy, a therapeutic tool that was resource-intensive and most efficacious when used with educated patients who had relatively minor mental disorders.72

Other factors hampered the effectiveness of the centers. Programs designed to help to smooth the transition from institutionalization to life in the larger community often fit poorly with the community center model and were not always eligible for government funding.73 As a result, these essential components of the new mental health system envisioned by champions of community programs were few and far between. In addition, the CMHCCA's insistence that centers be controlled locally rendered them vulnerable to increasing community demands for services such as substance abuse treatment and counseling designed to help people resolve personal problems.74 From 1968 onward, federal laws mandating that centers treat substance abuse, a growing public concern, compelled the centers to provide such care. Local control of

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68New York State Department of Hygiene, Task Force Report: The Department of Mental Hygiene's Inability to Access Community Skilled Nursing and Health Related Facilities (Albany: New York State Department of Hygiene, 1974), [1]-[2], [4]-[5].
69Grob, From Asylum to Community, 249-50.
70Grob, From Asylum to Community, 251-52.
71Grob, From Asylum to Community, 285-86; Grob, The Mad Among Us, 264.
72Grob, From Asylum to Community, 252-53.
73Grob, From Asylum to Community, 262-63.
74Grob, The Mad Among Us, 264.
centers also gave rise to the same problem that New York State experienced in the wake of the CMHSA: lack of coordination between different treatment programs. Lastly, it set the stage for bitter internal struggles that beset many centers as a result of the social, cultural and political upheavals of the late 1960's and early 1970's.  

_Mental Health Besieged, 1965-77_

From the mid-1960's onward, the problems associated with the slow development of community mental health centers, the inherent shortcomings of the centers themselves, and excessively optimistic discharge policies became increasingly apparent. Politicians and the general public were increasingly critical of the poorly planned revolution in mental health treatment and policy. However, this criticism had little immediate effect: even as the flaws inherent in the nation’s developing mental health policy became too great to ignore, the commitment of state and federal policymakers to community mental health and dramatic reduction in state inpatient censuses intensified. At the same time, society’s opinions about mental health and psychiatry changed dramatically as a result of the intense cultural, political, and social ferment that characterized the latter half of the 1960’s and early 1970’s. People on opposite ends of the political spectrum denounced the very concept of mental health. Psychiatrists, who had formerly been seen as compassionate experts, were instead frequently denounced as ruthless oppressors bent on singling out and crushing the individuality of those who rejected the dominant values of society.

The mental health professions were both instigators and victims of these upheavals. Some psychologists, social workers, and environmentally-oriented psychiatrists were sympathetic to Lyndon Johnson’s social welfare initiatives and made commitment to social activism a key component of their professional identities: if mental illness were caused by poor social conditions, then combating racism, poverty, and other social ills was a logical and necessary part of mental health work. Members of the Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry, a liberal professional organization formed in the late 1940’s by William Menninger and other sociodynamic psychiatrists, had since the early 1950’s advocated psychiatric involvement in social reform causes. During the late 1960’s, a growing number of those working in the field embraced the reform-oriented ethos of what Gerald Grob terms “community psychiatry.” A smaller number went even further and pronounced themselves champions of the overthrow of capitalism and technocracy.  

The pronouncements of the Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry and proponents of community psychiatry focused unwelcome attention upon the profession as a whole. Extremist right-wing organizations had long denounced mental health programs as covert attempts to facilitate the spread of Soviet communism, and their attacks increased as psychiatrists and others voiced their support for the civil rights and anti-war movements, anti-poverty programs, and other causes. By the late 1960’s and early 1970’s, mainstream conservatives, who were increasingly convinced that the mental health field was composed almost exclusively of their political enemies, were also suspicious of psychiatry. President Richard Nixon sought to eviscerate the CMHCCA and other federal supports for mental health care on the grounds that

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75 Grob, _From Asylum to Community_, 254-55.  
76 Grob, _The Mad Among Us_, 197-98; Grob, _From Asylum to Community_, 241-44, 281.  
77 Grob, _From Asylum to Community_, 280.
they had been intended only as pilot measures; however, his efforts to dismantle federal mental health policy were foiled by the courts.78

Contrary to the accusations made by reactionaries and conservatives, the majority of psychiatrists refused to embrace social activism. A growing number of those within the profession remained convinced that mental illness was a neurobiological disorder; from the late 1960's onward, psychiatrists have abandoned sociodynamic theories and placed increasing emphasis the somatic dimensions of mental disorder. Others were supporters of the civil rights movement and other liberal goals but were firmly convinced that citing their credentials when supporting political causes was unprofessional. The activists within the profession were a small group.79 Outside of the profession, however, the influence of this group far exceeded their numbers. This phenomenon is perhaps most evident in the popularity of one of its subgroups: leftist and libertarian practitioners who sought to strip their own profession of its legitimacy. R.D. Laing, a left-wing Scottish practitioner who was an active member of Britain's Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, asserted that schizophrenia and other serious mental illnesses were in fact logical responses to a society that had become delusional and self-destructive and that defining a person as mentally ill was a means of maintaining the hegemony of the existing order. Laing's ideas were in many respects an outgrowth of the environmental theories of mental illness that had emerged in the immediate postwar period; he simply carried the belief that mental illness was influenced by social conditions to an unprecedented extreme.80 The work of Thomas Szasz, a Hungarian-born professor at the SUNY Upstate Medical Center at Syracuse University, also won widespread acceptance. A libertarian who believed that psychiatry was nothing more than a covert means of extending the power of the state over its citizens, Szasz argued that mental illness did not exist; those suffering from “mental illness” were in fact abdicating their responsibility to make moral choices.81

The writings of scholars outside of the psychiatric profession gave added force to the assault on psychiatric legitimacy, and their influence is to this day evident within a number of academic disciplines. In 1965, the English translation of French philosopher Michel Foucault's Madness and Civilization first appeared.82 Foucault argued that the altruism that had been associated with psychiatry since the eighteenth century was a facade: psychiatrists were not humane helpers of the mentally ill but coercive figures seeking to force asylum inmates to internalize the moral discipline of bourgeois society. In later writings, Foucault elaborated upon these ideas. Taken together, his writings constitute a history of Western civilization that stresses the shift away from external feudal constrictions on behavior toward modern efforts to induce individuals to internalize the values of the modern state and police their own thoughts and actions. He asserted that the function of insane asylums and prisons is to compel the compliance

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78 Grob, The Mad Among Us, 281-83.
79 Grob, From Asylum to Community, 281.
80 Rael Jean Issac and Virginia C. Armat, Madness in the Streets: How Psychiatry and the Law Abandoned the Mentally Ill (New York: Macmillan, Free Press, 1990), 27-32, furnish a summary of Laing's ideas. However, their work must be read with a certain degree of caution. They make no pretense of hiding their intense anger at deinstitutionalization, which they see as the end product of a determined legal and psychiatric assault upon social order, family rights, and human decency. Their sympathies clearly rest with the families of the seriously mentally ill, whom they see as burdened and abused by unresponsive courts and mental health professionals.
of those who resist integration into the state's moral and behavioral regime.\textsuperscript{83} Foucault's assessment of the inner meaning of madness and other forms of social deviance to this day carries immense weight in the social science and humanities; although Foucault's popularity has waned in Europe and North America, scholars remain divided as to the accuracy and value of his work, his ideas continue to guide many sociologists, historians, and policy analysts.

A number of sociologists working independently of Foucault also stressed the coercive dimensions of mental health diagnosis and treatment. Earving Goffman's \textit{Asylums}, which was published in 1961, extended Bruno Bettelheim's arguments about the devastating impact of Nazi concentration camps upon the human psyche to mental hospitals. Goffman asserts that the two were alike in that they were "total institutions" that isolated inmates from society, strictly regulated their behavior, and stripped them of all sense of individuality and dignity. In this respect his arguments differ little from those advanced by Paul Hoch, Robert Hunt, and other psychiatric champions of the open hospital movement and community-based mental health care. However, Goffman also had a jaundiced view of psychiatry and its undergirding assumptions. He concluded that the real function of mental hospitals was to sustain the psychiatric profession and its belief in the medical model of diagnosis and treatment: "to get out of the hospital, or to ease their life within it, they [patients] must show acceptance of the place accorded them, and the place accorded to them is to support the occupational role of those who appear to force this bargain."\textsuperscript{84}

Other sociologists argued that psychiatry was concerned less about insuring the continued existence of their own profession than about enforcing social order. Sociologists had long been sensitive to the ways in which societies defined and stigmatized aberrant behavior, but in the turbulent political and social climate of the 1960's the study of deviancy became explicitly political. A growing number of them turned their attention to the study of social deviance and found signs of authoritarian social control everywhere they looked. Thomas Scheff and other scholars asserted that psychiatric diagnoses such as schizophrenia were little more than labels attached to those who refused to conform to dominant societal values; in turn, those labeled as deviant came to see themselves as such and became even more insistent upon acting abnormally.\textsuperscript{85}

The arguments of Laing, Szasz, Goffman, Scheff, and others critical of psychiatry and mental institutions gained wide currency from the mid-1960's onward, and their impact upon popular culture is readily evident. During the 1950's, books and films had generally depicted psychiatrists as humane and competent professionals, but from the early 1960's onward writers and filmmakers took a much harsher view of them. Acclaimed novels such as \textit{One Flew Over the Cuckoo's Nest} (1962) and \textit{A Fine Madness} (1964), documentaries such as \textit{The Titicut Follies} (1967) and fictional films such as \textit{Diary of a Mad Housewife} (1970) and the highly-regarded motion-picture version of \textit{One Flew Over the Cuckoo's Nest} (1975) framed them as malevolent and dictatorial. The press, which had long played an important role in creating public concern about conditions within mental institutions, also became increasingly assertive in challenging the


\textsuperscript{84}Earvin Goffman, \textit{Asylums: Essays on the Social Situation of Mental Patients and Other Inmates} (Garden City, NY: , 1961), 364, quoted in Grob, \textit{From Asylum to Community}, 284.

\textsuperscript{85}Thomas J. Scheff, "Schizophrenia as Ideology," \textit{Schizophrenia Bulletin} no. 2 (Fall 1970): 15-20. Interestingly, the \textit{Schizophrenia Bulletin} was published by the NIMH.
authority and expertise of state hospital administrators and other members of the psychiatric profession.  

However, the effects of the assault upon psychiatry and mental health were most evident within the reform and radical movements that flourished during the latter half of the 1960's. Many of those drawn into these movements readily embraced Laing and Scheff, who were openly sympathetic to leftist causes; the work of Szasz, who never hid his contempt for the New Left, also captivated them. To many drawn into the nascent youth subculture, psychiatry and mental hospitals were little more than an effort to force teenagers and young adults to accept the achievement- and acquisition-oriented ethos of consumer capitalism. However, not all of these activist young people were willing to discard the concept of mental health entirely. In cities across the United States, they established alternative services that sought to cast aside the traditional hierarchical relationship between caregiver and client and treat young people's drug use, sexual behavior and emotional distress with sympathetic concern. Some of these programs were started by altruistic laypeople, others by young psychologists and social workers dissatisfied with existing institutions and programs, and still others through the cooperative efforts of lay and professional people. These activists often contended not only with the hostility of established mental health providers but with the distrust of young people and political radicals, who often suspected them of being police informants or covert supporters of "the Establishment." In addition, they often experienced considerable internal conflict: the pressures associated with commitment to a precarious venture, their ambivalent relationships with both the larger society and the youth subculture, and their attempts to improvise more egalitarian and emotionally honest ways of living sometimes led them to turn upon one another. Many of these programs, which almost always placed far greater emphasis upon resolution of emotional difficulties than upon treatment of serious mental illness, perished shortly after they were started, but others were eventually incorporated into existing networks of community mental health and welfare services.

The hostile attitude of leftist radicals toward the profession of psychiatry and institutionalization was echoed by adherents of the other social movements that emerged during the late 1960's and early 1970's. The resurgent feminist movement was sharply critical of the ways in which mental health providers treated women. In the highly influential The Feminine Mystique, Betty Friedan sharply criticized psychiatrists who tried to treat what she called "the problem with no name" with tranquilizers and psychotherapy; Friedan, whose arguments centered upon educated middle-class homemakers, argued that the "problem" was little more than a frustrated yearning for challenging work. Friedan believed that psychiatrists were acting out of ignorance, but other feminists asserted that mental health professionals were knowingly coercive. Writers such as Phyllis Chesler and psychologist Naomi Weisstein asserted that

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86Grob, From Asylum to Community, 292; Grob, The Mad Among Us, 275.
87 One person who was not captivated by Szasz’s work was DMH Commissioner Paul Hoch, who tried to have fired Szasz from the Upstate Medical Center and apparently succeeded in insuring that he had no allies on the faculty; see Issac and Armat, Madness in the Streets, 40.
89The extent to which the alternative mental health service movement existed in New York State is unclear. The movement was by its very nature community-based and separate from existing channels of care and funding, and may be hard to document. However, examination of community mental-health and social-service organizations may provide clues to their existence; for example, the Equinox program located in the city of Albany is apparently an outgrowth of efforts to provide alternative counseling and welfare services to troubled young people.
psychiatrists had long sought to force women to accept their subordination and punished women who were aggressive, uncooperative, or sexually unorthodox. At roughly the same time, those involved in the nascent gay rights movement launched stinging assaults on the abuses that the profession, which until 1973 defined homosexuality as a form of mental illness, had inflicted upon gay men and lesbians. Attitudes toward mental health within these movements varied in ways similar to that seen within the youth subculture as a whole: some feminists and gay activists denounced the very concept of mental health as a political weapon, while others sought to create mental health programs that would support women and gay people as they struggled to overcome their internal and external oppression.

Former mental patients also began denouncing psychiatrists and mental institutions. Former patients had in previous decades organized on their own behalf: Clifford Beers, who had been institutionalized in private and state facilities for a short period of time, was the driving force behind the creation of the NCMH, and groups of former patients started self-help programs such as the Manhattan-based Fountain House program. However, the ex-patient movement of the 1960's was notable for its sweeping attacks upon the legitimacy of psychiatry and the very concept of mental illness. Groups such as New York City's Mental Patients Liberation Project and publications such as the Madness Network News declared that psychiatry was a bulwark of the established social order and mental institutions were inhumane. Those active in the movement sponsored numerous demonstrations, boycotts, and sit-ins (including a month-long occupation of the offices of California governor Jerry Brown) in an effort to draw attention to their cause. Politically active former patients were aided by mental health professionals sympathetic to their cause. In 1973, radical therapists and former patients held the first annual North American Conference on Human Rights and Psychiatric Oppression, and the group sponsored annual meetings well into the 1980's. However, tensions between the therapists and former patients eventually became too great to surmount and many patient liberation groups ultimately broke with their supporters in the mental health professions.

Civil libertarians were also influenced by the popularity of Laing, Szasz, and Scheff, and as a result began paying closer attention to the practices of mental health professionals.

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92 Not all segments of the psychiatric profession supported efforts to have homosexuality removed from its comprehensive listing of mental illnesses, the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Psychiatric Disorders; to this day, some members of the profession regard homosexuality as a mental disorder. However, the APA asserted after a 1973 referendum vote that homosexuality was not a mental illness and that it would no longer be classed as such. For an analysis of the bitter conflict that the issue, which gay and feminist activists forced the APA to address, produced, see Ronald Bayer, Homosexuality and American Psychiatry: The Politics of Diagnosis, 2d. ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), 101-55.

93 The Fountain House program was started in the 1940's by a group of former patients of the Rockland State Hospital who felt that they had been cut adrift after discharge. The program was initially an informal support group, but in 1948 it purchased a Midtown brownstone and created a halfway house. In 1955, it hired professional staffers to oversee the program. Fountain House has always emphasized the importance of work in restoring clients' self-confidence. Staffers and clients work side by side at the same tasks, and in 1960 Fountain House started a job-placement program notable for its policy of insuring that mental illness-related absenteeism will not affect employers: if a Fountain House resident cannot go to work on any given day, one of the program's staffers will substitute for him or her. Fountain House also has a striking open-door policy: any person who has been part of the program is welcome to return at any time if he or she feels the need to do so. See Issac and Armat, Madness in the Streets, 289-90.

Organizations such as the American Civil Liberties Union and the American Bar Association had in past years devoted increasing attention to the legal issues raised by commitment procedures, but their efforts were limited largely to outlining the law as it then existed and recommending limited changes. As Gerald Grob asserts, these efforts nonetheless had the effect of drawing attention to patient rights and implying that these rights were being violated. This perception was heightened by the proceedings of the Senate Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights, which in 1961 began investigating commitment procedures in the District of Columbia even though there was little evidence that abuses existed; the subcommittee was chaired by Sam Earvin, a Southerner who may have wanted to look tough on civil rights without having to contend with racial issues. 

New York State and a number of other states responded to initiative such as these by reforming their commitment laws. New York State's new commitment law, which passed in April 1964 and went into effect the following September, greatly reduced the state's reliance upon courtroom commitment hearings, which were widely regarded as humiliating public ordeals. The law also mandated that every involuntary commitment decisions be subject to periodic review and created the Mental Health Information Service, an advocacy and legal advisory service for patients and their families. In 1967, California went even further, enacting legislation that prohibited those who were neither dangerous nor gravely ill from being involuntarily committed for more than seventeen days.

These changes were not sufficient to prevent judicial scrutiny of institutionalization. By the late 1960's and early 1970's, lower federal and state courts, which had traditionally been content to leave mental health policy to psychiatrists, became increasingly willing to intervene when it seemed that patients' civil liberties were being violated. In 1966, Judge David Bazelon of the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals issued a ruling, Rouse v. Cameron, that set the law on a collision course with state commitment procedures. Bazelon asserted that individuals sent to mental hospitals by criminal courts had a right to therapeutic treatment and that denial of such treatment constituted cruel and unusual punishment, denial of due process, and violation of equal protection of the law. Later that year, Bazelon issued another ruling that established patients' right to treatment in the least restrictive setting suited to their condition. Two years later, the Massachusetts Supreme Court followed Bazelon's line of argument and ruled that patients who had been sent to mental hospitals after being deemed incompetent to stand trial for criminal offenses had a right to expect treatment. In New York State, the Court of Claims ruled in 1968 that a man who had been held in Matteawan State Hospital for more than fourteen years because he had allegedly violated his parole had been treated unjustly and awarded him some $300,000 in damages. In the years that followed, many other state and federal courts ruled that some commitment practices violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. This trend culminated in the U.S. Supreme Court's 1975 decision in O'Connor v.
Donaldson. The court did not find that mental patients had a right to treatment, but it unequivocally stated that people who were not dangerous to themselves or others and who were capable of living independently or with assistance from willing family and friends could not be institutionalized against their will. In addition, a number of lower court rulings, including New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation v. Stein, afforded mental patients the right to refuse treatment if they so chose.

In the wake of these decisions, public-interest lawyers, who had during the 1960's begun working with African-Americans, Latinos, women, and other groups traditionally ill-served by the law, started to defend the rights of the mentally ill and the developmentally disabled. In New York State, the New York Civil Liberties Union (NYCLU) initiated a new campaign upon behalf of mental patients. Led by David Ennis, who had little prior knowledge about the inner workings of the mental health system apart from reading of the works of Thomas Szasz, the campaign was also supported by Brooklyn lawyer Morton Birnbaum, the author of a 1960 American Bar Association Journal article that had heavily influenced David Bazelon. The NYCLU initiated New York State Association for Retarded Children v. Rockefeller, the landmark case more popularly known as Willowbrook. Although the court's 1973 ruling stopped short of asserting that people in New York State facilities for the mentally ill, the mentally retarded, and the developmentally disabled had a right to treatment, it found that overcrowding at the Willowbrook State Hospital, a facility for the mentally retarded and the developmentally disabled, violated patients' right to protection from harm and ultimately handed down a consent decree that mandated that all Willowbrook patients were to be placed in community residences.

The Willowbrook case gave added impetus to the discharge of patients from state facilities: at least some DMH and other state health officials were afraid that state hospital administrators might eventually have to contend with a Willowbrook-type ruling. In response to this fear, the department may have assigned discharge quotas to administrators of state mental hospitals in an effort to reduce the inpatient census and avert unfavorable legal rulings.

Other factors hastened the decline in hospital populations in New York State and other states. New federal programs made it possible for increasing numbers of mentally ill people who were incapable of supporting themselves to live independently or to be housed in other institutions. Medicaid and Medicare, which resulted in the transfer of large numbers of the aged mentally ill to nursing homes from the mid-1960's onward, were expanded in 1966 to subsidize alternative forms of care for the mentally ill. At the same time, other new Social Security

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101 Johnson, "Unravelling of a Social Policy," 285. The other cases establishing this right were Wyatt v. Stickney, a landmark 1972 federal case that also affirmed the right to treatment, and Winters v. Miller, which afforded institutionalized Christian Scientists the right to refuse psychotropic drugs.
103 Johnson, "Unravelling of a Social Policy," 274, 284. Other legal cases also affected the operation of state hospitals. Public interest lawyers filed a number of federal suits that succeeded in barring the use of patient labor that was not compensated at prevailing wage levels. These suits were laudable in that they sought to force hospitals to honor labor laws and to prevent them from retaining patients who were well enough to be discharged but capable of performing important tasks. However, these suits also increased the patient inactivity that hospital critics deplored. For a discussion of these suits, see Issac and Armat, Madness in the Streets, 137-39.
104 See, e.g., New York State Department of Mental Hygiene, Task Force Report: The Department of Mental Hygiene's Inability to Access Community Skilled Nursing and Health Related Facilities (Albany: New York State Department of Mental Hygiene, 1974), 46.
105 New York State Assembly Legislative Committee, Mental Health Subcommittee on Community Aftercare, From the Back Wards to the Back Alleys (Albany: New York State Assembly, Mental Health Subcommittee on Aftercare, 1978), 5. It is unclear as to whether the existence of these quotas, which were alleged to have been in force from 1968 onward, can be documented: the subcommittee's report claims only that it received "many reports" about their existence.
programs were created: Old Age Assistance, Aid to the Permanently and Totally Disabled (APTD), and Old Age and Survivor Insurance. The states took advantage of these programs, which made matching funds available to them, and discharged increasing numbers of patients from state facilities. Deinstitutionalization accelerated even further in the wake of the 1972 legislation that created two new Social Security programs, Supplemental Security Income (SSI) and Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI). SSI and SSDI were designed to guarantee the mentally and physically disabled a minimum income and to remove the stigma long associated with relief payments; by placing them under the umbrella of Social Security, policymakers hoped that these programs would be regarded as entitlements and thus preserve the dignity of recipients. States, which were concerned less with safeguarding the self-worth of the indigent disabled than with shifting the cost of caring for the disabled to the federal government, rushed to secure SSI and SSDI dollars. All of those receiving APTD benefits before 31 December 1973 were guaranteed SSI benefits, and the states responded by enrolling as many of the seriously mentally ill as they could. In addition, SSI's status as an entitlement meant that the application process could begin before a patient was discharged from a state institution, and hospital personnel often took an active part in helping patients secure SSI benefits.¹⁰⁶

However, SSI, which gradually superseded APTD and was funded wholly by the federal government, had unanticipated and profound effects upon the treatment of the mentally ill. Ann Braden Johnson notes that the SSI program's emphasis upon the rights and dignity of recipients prevented it from mandating that they seek treatment. In addition, those living in publicly-owned halfway houses designed to ease the transition from the institution to society were not eligible for SSI. Patients who had no desire to continue treatment were not forced to do so, and those who did want to do so at times found it difficult to obtain care. As a result of this combination of program requirements and treatment scarcity, many former state mental patients who received SSI ended up living in nursing homes, single-room occupancy hotels (SRO's), or in the nursing homes and private proprietary homes for adults (PPHA's) that sprang up like mushrooms in the wake of the program's creation.¹⁰⁷ This phenomenon may best be described as reinstitutionalization: life in many PPHA's and nursing homes is every bit as regimented and stultifying as life in the state hospital back wards. Television and print journalists who no longer find the state hospitals rich sources of scandal have not been disappointed by these institutions, some (but not all) of which are characterized by listless and overmedicated residents deprived of all recreation other than television, overworked and sometimes abusive staffers, and administrative corruption.¹⁰⁸

Mental health care in New York State was also affected by a number of less predictable national developments. The economic stagnation and inflation of the 1970's affected almost every aspect of New York State government, and the DMH encountered its share of cost-cutting initiatives and efforts to ensure its fiscal responsibility. Policymakers' concerns about squandering of resources were almost invariably wedded to criticism of the failures of community mental health programs, which politicians and advocacy organizations saw as inadequate, lacking oversight, and resistant to citizen involvement. The DMH, which remained generally optimistic about the possibility of treating most mental illnesses in community-based outpatient settings, tried to respond to these concerns. In 1973, it created the Office of Citizen Participation in an effort to facilitate public involvement in the creation of community mental

health programs, and in 1974 established a citizen advisory council charged with drafting recommendations for mental health, mental retardation, and substance abuse treatment. During its 1975 reorganization, it created a new office dedicated to oversight of expenditures and gave greater power to its Office of Evaluation and Inspection.

State policymakers sought to resolve other problems that beset the agency. In 1973, the state sought to improve community services and ensure adequate care for the severely mentally ill who had been discharged from state institutions by passing the Unified Services Act in 1973. The Unified Services Act, which had the backing of the DMH, strongly encouraged CMHB's to devise plans for the treatment of the mentally ill living that tied local services to those provided by the state. Unified services plans had to coordinate state and local programs and to ensure that "all population groups [were] covered, that there [was] coordination and cooperation among local providers of services, . . . and that there [was] continuity of care among all providers of services." Localities were not compelled to devise unified services plans, but those that chose not to still had to create comprehensive local plans; communities that failed to draft approved unified or local service plans that were acceptable to the DMH would not receive state support. In an effort to induce local governments to create unified services plans, state funding to localities that had such plans approved increased according to a complicated population-based formula. In order to make it easier for CMHB's to devise unified services plans, the DMH created eight regional offices designed to support and guide them. In the following year, the DMH gave the directors of these regional offices sole responsibility for oversight of all local and state mental health programs in their jurisdictions in an effort to improve the fit between state and local programs.

However, local governments were hesitant to devise unified services plans. In the three years following the passage of the Unified Services Act, only the counties of Rensselaer, Rockland, Westchester, and Warren and Washington (which put forth one plan for both counties) put forth plans that the state approved. Niagara County also drew up a plan, but the DMH refused to accept it on the grounds that county officials could not secure the cooperation of one of its largest providers. In February 1976, Governor Hugh Carey placed an eighteen-month moratorium on acceptance of unified services plans and charged the DMH with determining why localities were so slow to respond to the Unified Services Act. DMH Commissioner Lawrence Kolb allotted this investigation to a task force charged with improving mental health services.

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109 New York State Department of Mental Hygiene, 1974 Annual Report (Albany: New York State Department of Mental Hygiene, 1974), 5.
110 New York State Department of Mental Hygiene, 1975 Annual Report (Albany: New York State Department of Mental Hygiene, 1975), 5.
111 Unified Services Act (1973), § 11.12, § 11.13; § 11.13, subd. 4 quoted.
112 Unified Services Act (1973), § 11.17.
113 Unified Services Act (1973), § 11.17.
114 Unified Services Act (1973), § 11.23.
115 Department of Mental Hygiene, 1974 Annual Report, 4. The eight regions were: Western New York (Chautauqua, Cattaraugus, Allegany, Erie, and Niagara counties); Finger Lakes (Steuben, Chemung, Schuyler, Seneca, Yates, Livingston, Wyoming, Genesee, Orleans, Monroe, Ontario, and Wayne counties); Central New York (Tioga, Broome, Delaware, Otsego, Chenango, Cortland, Cayuga, Onondaga, and Madison counties), North Country (Lewis, Hamilton, Warren, Jefferson, St. Lawrence, Franklin, Clinton, and Essex counties); Northeast New York (Greene, Columbia, Schoharie, Albany, Rensselaer, Washington, Saratoga, Schenectady, Montgomery, Herkimer, and Oneida counties); Mid Hudson (Rockland, Westchester, Putnam, Orange, Sullivan, Ulster, and Duchess counties); Nassau-Suffolk, and New York City.
116 New York State Department of Mental Hygiene, 1975 Annual Report, 5.
117 New York State Department of Mental Hygiene, Task Force on Mental Hygiene Service Delivery, Toward a New System of Service Delivery of Mental Hygiene Services for the State of New York (Albany: New York State Department of Mental Hygiene, Task Force on Mental Hygiene Service Delivery, [1976]), 25.
118 Department of Mental Hygiene, 1975 Annual Report, 16, 22.
The task force found that localities were confused by the complex and multi-tiered funding provisions built into the act and intimidated by the prospect of having to coordinate the activities of many different (and sometimes uncooperative) agencies and programs. The permanency of unified services plans, which local authorities regarded as experimental and unprecedented, also gave them; once a locality had put forth an acceptable unified services plan, it did not have the choice of retreating and creating a local services plan if the unified plan proved unsuccessful. Most importantly, local governments were daunted by the prospect of having to increase expenditures for mental health care. Local officials who successfully waded through the Unified Services Act's complex funding formula often realized that a unified services plan would force them to spend more money than they would under a local services plan. As it was, the New York City and Erie and Onondaga counties and other local authorities were reducing mental health expenditures as a result of the economy's downturn. As a result of these problems, the Unified Services Act never produced the results desired by policymakers or the DMH.

Lawmakers, not satisfied with the DMH's efforts to remedy the problems associated with community-based mental health services and state hospital discharge policies, also enacted several pieces of legislation intended to remedy the DMH's shortcomings. From 1975 onward, the department was compelled to take into account the extent to which "consumers, consumer groups, voluntary agencies, and other providers of services" had participated in the development of a given unified services plan when judging whether to approve it. In the following year, the state ordered the DMH to devise a comprehensive plan for the "consolidation [and] realignment of patient care functions" that would simultaneously ensure that patients were receiving adequate care and that resources were not being used inappropriately; the possibility of closing some state hospital facilities was specifically mentioned. At the same time, New York State assumed greater responsibility for the care of the severely mentally ill. In 1974, it passed legislation mandating that all of the costs associated with furnishing aftercare to people who had been patients in state hospitals between 1 January 1969 and 31 December 1973 were to be paid by the state. Another new law made New York State temporarily responsible for paying all public and medical assistance costs incurred by discharged patients who had been institutionalized for at least five years; however, the state's responsibility for costs incurred by a given patient ended after he or she had lived outside of state institutions for five years.

The state's targeting of funds for community care, which was reinforced by the DMH's conscious decision to steer funds away from state hospitals and toward local programs in an effort to discourage use of state facilities, may have resulted in a decline in the quality of care found in state institutions. In 1975, the DMH endured the very public humiliation of having the Creedmoor and Pilgrim Psychiatric Centers stripped of their accreditation. The department was acutely aware that loss of accreditation meant that patients in these facilities were no longer eligible for Medicare and Medicaid reimbursements and publicly proclaimed the need for state facilities to meet accepted standards, but continued to divert funds toward outpatient care, which

118 Task Force on Mental Hygiene Service Delivery, Toward a New System of Service Delivery, 26-27.
119 Task Force on Mental Hygiene Service Delivery, Toward a New System of Service Delivery, 42.
123 Act of 30 May 1974, Laws of New York, ch. 621, §1, § 3. Laws making the state responsible for one hundred percent of the costs associated with the outpatient care of the most acutely mentally ill further retarded the development of unified services plans. They led localities to believe that a dual system of care would continue to exist and tempted them to inflate the number of cases eligible for one hundred percent reimbursement; see Task Force on Mental Hygiene Services Delivery, Toward a New System of Service Delivery, 26-27.
was still widely regarded as less expensive and more humane than care furnished in state hospitals; the inpatient facilities that were best funded were recently constructed ones that were explicitly designed to fit into the community-centered treatment model. In 1977, the DMH further proved that it was committed to moving patients out of state facilities: in response to the planning mandate of the previous year, it proposed closing the Marcy and Northeast Nassau Psychiatric Centers and merging the three facilities situated on New York City's Ward's Island. It also held out the possibility of closing other facilities, arguing that some should be closed because they were no longer housing significant numbers of patients and others because localities were overutilizing them.

The DMH's efforts to direct more funds away from inpatient care and toward community-based outpatient programs sparked outright opposition from a number of quarters. The public and private organizations that furnished most community-based mental health care in many instances resisted accepting former state hospital patients, who were typically impoverished and unresponsive to psychotherapy. In addition, many providers of community-based care and treatment felt that the state had not adequately informed them of the impending return of large numbers of acutely ill people to society. In the New York City area, local mental health providers who felt that they had been taken by surprise formed the Coalition of Voluntary Mental Health, Mental Retardation, and Alcoholism Agencies in 1972 and lobbied city and state officials in an effort to avoid being saddled with what they saw as unanticipated and unwelcome responsibilities. It is likely that providers of outpatient care working in other parts of New York State publicly resisted the state's efforts to force them to care for the seriously mentally ill or simply furnished just the bare minimum of care needed to remain eligible for state reimbursement. However, their ability to resist was soon reduced by the 1975 federal Mental Health Act, which sought to force community mental health centers receiving federal funds to screen and treat discharged state mental hospital patients.

The DMH and state policymakers encountered even more resistance from the Civil Service Employees' Association (CSEA) and one of its offshoots, the Public Employees' Federation (PEF). The PEF, which represented most of those employed in state hospital facilities, and the CSEA reacted violently to the news that the DMH was contemplating the closure of hospital facilities and loudly protested the privatization of mental health jobs. The CSEA created a highly publicized task force that concluded that the state was "dumping" the acutely ill onto the streets and into substandard PPHA's and that community mental health care providers would never willingly care for the most seriously ill. During the 1978 gubernatorial election, the union ran a brief but devastatingly effective radio and print advertising campaign that accused the state of sacrificing patient welfare in the name of cost-cutting. This campaign,

124Department of Mental Hygiene, 1975 Annual Report, 10-11.
125New York State Department of Mental Hygiene, Proposals for Consolidation—Realignment of DMH Facilities (Albany: New York State Department of Mental Hygiene, 1977), 4.
126Johnson, "Unravelling of a Social Policy," 352, 549; The Coalition of Voluntary Mental Health Agencies, Inc., The Coalition of Voluntary Mental Health Agencies at 25: A Casual History of the First Quarter Century, available [online]: <www.cvmha.org/histoire.pdf> [29 May 1998]. The coalition is somewhat vague about the circumstances that led to its creation, asserting that it took shape because the New York City Department of Mental Health did not appreciate member agencies' commitment to "caring and nurturing of clients" and tried to limit their ability to determine how their clients' needs would be met. The issue of being forced to care for an undesirable client population is never explicitly mentioned, but it is quite possible that the agencies that formed the coalition objected to being forced to assume responsibility for care of the seriously mentally ill.
127Grob, The Mad Among Us, 283.
which did little to endear state hospital employees and community-based mental health workers to one another, apparently helped to produce a gubernatorial policy decision that thwarted state and DMH efforts to reduce the role of state facilities in mental health treatment. Shortly after the election, Governor Hugh Carey's chief policy advisor, Robert Morgado, drafted a memorandum that strongly recommended that the staff-patient ratio at state hospitals be increased to roughly 1.0, that hospital officials strive to ensure that all discharges were appropriate, and that employee retraining and transfer programs be implemented. In the wake of Morgado's memorandum, staffing levels apparently increased: an Accountants for the Public Interest study found that in 1981 the staff-patient ratio in state psychiatric facilities, which had been .25 in 1955, had increased to 1.38.129

Efforts to reduce the hospital population and create outpatient programs for the seriously mentally ill also provoked increasing opposition from private citizens. Advocates of community-based mental health care had since the 1950's been aware that the public could resist their initiatives, but citizen resistance to the depopulation of state mental hospitals became an increasing concern of policymakers during the 1970's.130 In part, public resistance may have stemmed from economic conditions: voters who had readily approved local mental health levies in more affluent times were in all likelihood less willing to increase their tax burdens when inflation unemployment were on the rise. The discharge of large numbers of acutely mentally ill persons also aroused considerable fear about increases in crime and public disorder. Proposals for the creation of community-based residential programs for the mentally ill aroused increasing opposition from homeowners concerned about their physical safety and their property values. In 1976, the Assembly Joint Committee to Study the Department of Mental Hygiene faulted the past practices of the DMH for aggravating public resistance: in previous years, large numbers of poorly trained and inadequately socialized patients had been released into communities that were wholly unprepared for their return to society.131 The combination of fear, anger, and ignorance that greeted community-based efforts to care for the seriously mentally ill remains a serious problem for the state, local and voluntary agencies that support community-based mental health care and treatment.

Mental Health in the Present Era, 1977-98

Frustrated by the slow development of community-based mental health programs, the high cost of furnishing inpatient care, and what it saw as the DMH's inefficiency and lack of clearly defined priorities, the state legislature took action in 1977. It completely recodified the Mental Hygiene Law and reorganized the DMH. In the process, New York State's mental health agency acquired the structure that it has to this day; some of its components have of course been

129Accountants for the Public Interest, The Transfer of People Versus Dollars: Intergovernmental Financing for Mental Health Services in the State of New York (New York: Accountants for the Public Interest, 1983), 38-41. Part of the apparent rise in patient-staff ratio was due to the increase in outpatient and alcoholism services. Although those who conducted the study excluded hospital staffers who furnished outpatient care, they made no effort to disaggregate administrative and support staffers employed at state hospitals; some of these workers were responsible solely for outpatient programs. In addition, staffers responsible for inpatient treatment of alcoholism, a problem that was of increasing concern to policymakers, were included in calculation of staff-patient ratios. The figures put forth by Accountants for the Public Interest differ from those put forth by the Office of Mental Health, which stated in 1982 that its staff-patient ratio was .72; see New York State Department of Mental Hygiene, Office of Mental Health, Annual Report 1982 (Albany: New York State Department of Mental Hygiene, Office of Mental Health, 1982), 2.

130See, e.g., Task Force on Service Delivery, Toward a New System of Service Delivery, 5, and New York State Assembly, Assembly Joint Committee to Study the Department of Mental Hygiene, Mental Health in New York State (Albany, New York State Assembly, Assembly Joint Committee to Study the Department of Mental Hygiene, 1976), 191-204.

131Joint Committee to Study the Department of Mental Hygiene, Mental Health in New York, 195-96.
created, merged, phased out, or renamed in subsequent years, but its administrative hierarchies generally resemble those established in 1977. The DMH's obligation to care for and treat the mentally ill, the developmentally disabled, and substance abusers was partitioned and invested in three autonomous offices: the Office of Mental Health (OMH), headed by the Commissioner of Mental Health, the Office of Mental Retardation and Developmental Disability (OMRDD), headed by the Commissioner of Mental Retardation and Developmental Disability, and the Office of Alcoholism and Substance Abuse (OASA), headed by the Director of the Division of Alcoholism and Alcohol Abuse and the Director of the Division of Substance Abuse. The three offices were to consult one another on a regular basis and to work together to care for people who had multiple mental disabilities, but the framers of the law clearly hoped that disaggregating the DMH's responsibilities would streamline the department's administration and reduce waste and inefficiency.132

In an effort to insure that the New Yorkers who needed the services provided by the OASA, the OMRDD, and the OMH were given appropriate care and treatment, legislators mandated that "each local government [had to] submit a five-year plan and annual implementation plans and budgets which . . . reflect[ed] local needs and resources" in order to remain eligible for state reimbursement.133 These local or unified services plans had to conform to the state's long-term plans and had to win the approval of all three offices.134 In order to facilitate these complex and long-range planning activities, the new Mental Hygiene Law established or reformed a host of councils and committees designed to assist the DMH's three offices. The OMH was aided by the Advisory Council on Mental Health, which consisted of the Commissioner of Mental Health and fourteen other members appointed by the governor; at least seven members had to be former patients or outpatient clients, relatives of current or former patients or clients, or other "consumer representatives." The Advisory Committee on Youth, which was similar in composition to the Advisory Council on Mental Health, aided the OMH in identifying the special mental health needs of children and adolescents.135 The heads of the state's CMHB's (now called community services boards, or CSB's) were incorporated into the State Conference of Local Mental Hygiene Directors, which was to review proposals for changes in local and state provision of care.136 These advisory groups and similar bodies established within the OMRDD and the OASA reported to the Council for Mental Hygiene Planning, which consisted of the heads of the OMRDD, the OASA, and the OMH, and fifteen mental health, mental retardation, and alcohol substance abuse experts and advocacy group representatives appointed by the governor. The council was to supervise planning, devise effective evaluation mechanisms, and ensure that local and state programs were working toward common goals. Its ultimate task was to produce a comprehensive and detailed five-year plan and budget that drew upon local government plans and the work of the various councils and committees that reported to it.137 In addition, these groups were to help the OMH devise new standards for admission to and discharge from all in- and outpatient mental health facilities, provisions for local review of admission and discharge

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132 Mental Hygiene Law, Laws of New York (1977), Ch. 978, § 1. Records pertaining to the reorganization of the DMH are held by the New York State Archives.
133 Mental Hygiene Law, Laws of New York (1977), Ch. 978, § 41.15, subd. b.
134 Mental Hygiene Law, Laws of New York (1977), Ch. 978, § 41.16.
135 Mental Hygiene Law, Laws of New York (1977), Ch. 978, § 7.05. In 1982, these two advisory bodies and the OMH's Advisory Committee on Minority Affairs were merged into the Mental Health Services Council, which was given greater influence in shaping OMH policy; see Act of 27 July 1982, Laws of New York (1982), Ch. 724, § 1.
136 Mental Hygiene Law, Laws of New York (1977), Ch. 978, § 41.10.
137 Mental Hygiene Law, Laws of New York (1977), Ch. 978, § 5.07.
decisions, a state-wide "assessment, evaluation, and reporting system," standard per-patient payment rates for facilities upkeep and programming, and new labor and employment policies governing mental health facilities.\textsuperscript{138}

In keeping with its legislative mandate, the OMH devoted increasing attention to planning for future needs. It put forth its first five-year plan in 1978, issued updates in subsequent years, and to this day continues to devise plans in accordance with the 1977 Mental Hygiene Law. It also took other steps designed to increase its accountability to politicians and the public and its ability to perform its mandated tasks. In 1979, it standardized the planning forms and terminology used by localities in order to speed processing and increase the accountability of local officials. A year later, many state and local mental health personnel were using identical service categories in their reports and all local providers were required to employ standard planning, budgeting, and service reporting formats when working with the state.\textsuperscript{139} It also sought to standardize patient case records.\textsuperscript{140} In addition to reducing the potential for fraud and inefficiency, these changes made it possible for the OMH to compile more detailed statistics about the people it treated.\textsuperscript{141}

The OMH also sought to mitigate some of the problems associated with the ad hoc policy of deinstitutionalization. Some of its efforts to do so were mandated by new legislation. Politicians and other policymakers were still convinced that community-based outpatient treatment was far more humane and far less expensive than state hospital care, and they had few alternative options; had they questioned the wisdom of depopulating state facilities, economic circumstances and the newly-established right to refuse treatment would almost certainly have led them to reject the possibility of dramatically expanding state-furnished inpatient care. However, they were displeased by the unplanned and often ill-considered manner in which state facilities had discharged patients. Dismayed that that the overwhelming majority of discharged state hospital patients had no further contact with state or voluntary mental health personnel, in 1977 the state legislature compelled the OMH to locate and contact former patients and to formulate individualized treatment programs for those who needed and desired outpatient care. By December 1979, the OMH had identified 11,000 former patients in need of follow-up care and had contacted ninety-eight percent of them.\textsuperscript{142} This effort to insure that the seriously mentally ill were not left to fend for themselves developed into an ongoing intensive case management program that exists to this day.

Other OMH initiatives, most notably the Community Support System (CSS) took shape within the agency itself. The CSS, which was implemented in 1978 and which was in all likelihood propelled in part by the desire to make the state eligible for funds from the NIMH's new Community Support Program for the seriously mentally ill, was funded entirely by the state, supervised by the OMH's five regional offices, and maintained largely by local and private

\textsuperscript{138}Mental Hygiene Law, Laws of New York (1977), Ch. 978, § 41.17. The OMRDD and the OASA were to perform the same tasks.
\textsuperscript{139}New York State Office of Mental Health, Annual Report 1979, 8, 20; New York State Department of Mental Hygiene, Office of Mental Health, Annual Report 1980 (Albany: New York State Department of Mental Hygiene, Office of Mental Health, 1980), 4.
\textsuperscript{140}New York State Department of Mental Hygiene, Office of Mental Health, Annual Report 1981 (Albany: New York State Department of Mental Hygiene, Office of Mental Health, 1981), 3.
\textsuperscript{141}New York State Department of Mental Hygiene, Office of Mental Health, Annual Report 1982 (Albany: New York State Department of Mental Hygiene, Office of Mental Health, 1982), 3.
\textsuperscript{142}New York State Department of Mental Hygiene, Office of Mental Health, Annual Report 1979 (Albany: New York State Department of Mental Hygiene, Office of Mental Health, 1979), 4. In all likelihood, OMH staff shortages and time constraints made it impossible for staffers to perform the lengthy follow-up visits and devise the highly individualized treatment plans that policymakers desired.
agencies working under contract.\textsuperscript{143} It was designed to furnish community-based outpatient
treatment and other services needed by seriously ill people who had been patients in state, local,
or private inpatient facilities. Almost eighty percent of the initial allocation of $15.1 million was
targeted at the communities most profoundly affected by hospital discharges of the acutely
mentally ill: Erie, Chemung, Niagara, Broome, Oneida, St. Lawrence, Dutchess, Rockland,
Westchester, Sullivan, Nassau, and Suffolk counties, and nine areas within the New York
City.\textsuperscript{144} By 1984, the CSS, which received almost $50 million in funds, was treating some
20,000 former hospital patients on a regular basis and furnishing sporadic care to another
10,000.\textsuperscript{145}

Aware of former patients' difficulties in finding suitable living arrangements, the OMH
did as many other state mental health authorities were doing and began financing the
establishment and operation of community-based residential facilities. Like its counterparts in
other parts of the United States, the office did not become directly involved in the provision of
such services; instead, it contracted out to voluntary and for-profit agencies.\textsuperscript{146} It began working
with a voluntary organization, the Association for Community Living Administrators in Mental
Health, to build or subsidize appropriate facilities.\textsuperscript{147} The number of beds supported by the
OMH grew relatively rapidly but consistently lagged behind need: in 1987, there were only
roughly 5,500 such beds in existence.\textsuperscript{148} Not surprisingly, the quality of these residences also
varied considerably: a 1988 Commission on Quality of Care for the Mentally Disabled study of
thirty-two OMH-sponsored residential facilities found that only one-third were completely "safe,
nurturing, and rehabilitative," while half fell somewhat short of OMH goals and fifteen percent
fell far short of meeting one or more of the OMH's standards concerning the safety, hygiene,
health, recreational, and rehabilitative needs of residents. The commission also found that the
OMH had failed to create programs for people who were ready to move out of these residences
but were not yet capable of leading completely independent lives; as a result, residence
administrators had to choose whether to continue housing people who were ready to assume

\textsuperscript{143}On the NIMH Community Support Program, which was intended to improve coordination of services for the mentally ill, see
Grob, \textit{The Mad Among Us}, 305. In 1982, the OMH received NIMH funding for ongoing analysis of the effectiveness of CSS
programs, and it is likely that these funds were made available under the auspices of the Community Support Program; see Office
of Mental Health, \textit{Annual Report} (1982), 15. The 1977 reorganization created five new regional administrative units: Western
New York (Chautauqua, Cattaraugus, Allegany, Erie, Niagara, Steuben, Chemeung, Schuyler, Seneca, Yates, Livingston,
Wyoming, Genesee, Orleans, Monroe, Ontario, and Wayne counties); Central New York (Tioga, Broome, Delaware, Otsego,
Chenango, Cortland, Cayuga, Onondaga, Madison, Lewis, Hamilton, Warren, Jefferson, St. Lawrence, Franklin, Clinton, and
Essex counties); Hudson River (Greene, Columbia, Schoharie, Albany, Rensselaer, Washington, Saratoga, Schenectady,
Montgomery, Herkimer, Oneida, Rockland, Westchester, Putnam, Orange, Sullivan, Ulster, and Duchess counties); Nassau-
Suffolk; and New York City. It is probable that this change was an effort to improve services in the rural parts of the state. The
annual reports that the DMH published during the 1970's suggest that rural areas were persistently underserved; in fact, the old
North Country region, which contained the Adirondack State Park, was barely mentioned in the DMH's reports even though it
contained the St. Lawrence Psychiatric Center.

\textsuperscript{144}New York State Department of Mental Hygiene, Office of Mental Health, \textit{Annual Report} 1978 (Albany: New York State
Department of Mental Hygiene, Office of Mental Health, 1978), 14.

\textsuperscript{145}New York State Department of Mental Hygiene, Office of Mental Health, \textit{Annual Report} 1984 (Albany: New York State
Department of Mental Hygiene, Office of Mental Health, 1984), 9.

\textsuperscript{146}A 1986-87 NIMH study of state-supported residential programs found that the overwhelming majority of them began in
the second half of the 1970's, when federal legislation compelled CMHC's receiving federal funds to furnish appropriate outpatient
care for the seriously mentally ill, and mushroomed during the 1980's. The study also found that relatively few agencies were
involved in creating and running such programs and that slightly more than half were not-for-profit organizations; see Frances L.
Rudolph, Priscilla Ridgway, and Paul J. Carling, "Residential Programs for Persons with Severe Mental Illness: A Nationwide

\textsuperscript{147}Office of Mental Health, \textit{Annual Report} 1979, 9.

\textsuperscript{148}New York State Department of Mental Hygiene, Office of Mental Health, \textit{Annual Report} 1987 (Albany: New York State
Department of Mental Hygiene, Office of Mental Health, 1987), 4.
greater responsibility for their own well-being or to cast them adrift and hope that they would be able to fend for themselves.\textsuperscript{149}

The OMH also sought to improve standards of care in state inpatient facilities. Since the passage of the 1890 State Care Act, the DMH sought to insure that state facilities served clearly defined regional catchment areas, but the OMH increasingly felt that simply directing all patients from a given region to a single psychiatric center was wasteful and detrimental to patient well-being. From 1980 onward, it began grouping patients according to degree of treatment needed and level of functioning instead of geographic origin; in doing so, it was emulating the organization of other residential facilities that cared for the mentally ill.\textsuperscript{150} The public embarrassment of having two state psychiatric centers denied reaccreditation was also a concern: in 1978 it created a Bureau of Accreditation that conducted preparatory reviews of all facilities awaiting accreditation inspections and in 1981 entered into an agreement with the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals that allowed it to direct most capital funds away from facilities that were being phased out of existence.\textsuperscript{151} Efforts to insure that state psychiatric centers remained accredited also led the OMH to increase staffing levels; of course, continuing political pressure from the CSEA and other unions and the Morgado memorandum also guided its actions.\textsuperscript{152} Increasing public concern about the abuse of patients, which culminated in a legislative inquiry into the problem, also goaded it into action. It began implementing reporting and investigative programs designed to uncover such problems, and sent employee representatives from state psychiatric centers to classes at Cornell University's School of Industrial and Labor Relations that detailed how to detect and respond to instances of abusive behavior.\textsuperscript{153}

However, the OMH's efforts to improve inpatient care standards in large part grew out of its increasing awareness that serious mental illnesses such as schizophrenia could not be cured and that some patients simply could not function in community settings. During the late 1970's and the 1980's, the population of adult patients in state psychiatric centers declined only one to three percent each year, and the OMH acknowledged that the reduction in the inpatient census was due solely to the deaths of elderly patients; had it not been for these deaths, state hospital populations would have increased slightly during these years.\textsuperscript{154} The OMH was also faced with the rapid growth of a new type of patient: the chronically ill young male adult. Men between the ages of eighteen and thirty-four made up an increasing percentage of the inpatient census, and the emergence of this patient cohort baffled OMH officials and other mental health professionals.\textsuperscript{155} It is not at all surprising that the number of mentally ill young adults increased

\textsuperscript{149}New York State Commission on Quality of Care for the Mentally Disabled, A Review of 32 Office of Mental Health Supervised Community Residences (Albany: New York State Commission on Quality of Care for the Mentally Disabled, 1988), iii, 3-17. New York State was not atypical in this respect. The 1986-87 NIMH study found that only one-third of the agencies that furnished residential care "offered more than one type of program" and that the "continuum of residential services" needed to furnish effective care apparently did not exist; Randolph, Ridgway, and Carling, "Residential Programs for Persons with Severe Mental Illness," 1114.
\textsuperscript{150}Office of Mental Health, Annual Report 1980, 6.
\textsuperscript{152}Office of Mental Health, Annual Report 1982, 2.
\textsuperscript{153}Office of Mental Health, Annual Report 1978, 7.
\textsuperscript{154}Office of Mental Health, Annual Report 1984, 17.
\textsuperscript{155}New York State Department of Mental Hygiene, Office of Mental Health, Annual Report 1983 (Albany: New York State Department of Mental Hygiene, Office of Mental Health, 1983), 18. The number of men who were between the ages of eighteen and thirty-four who were in state inpatient facilities increased by eighteen percent in 1983; in contrast, the percentage of those between the ages of thirty-five and forty-four declined by seven percent and those over by twenty-seven percent. Seriously ill young adults also constituted an increasing percentage of those treated at community mental health centers.
at this time: the number of adults between the ages of eighteen and thirty-four swelled as the baby-boom generation came of age. This increase in the absolute number of young adults, not a dramatic rise in the percentage of young adults afflicted by serious mental illness, was most likely responsible for the emergence of this patient cohort. However, the characteristics of this group were in some respects unique: like others their age, acutely ill young adults were suspicious of authority, highly mobile, and unprecedentedly tolerant of illicit drug use. Many refused treatment, tried to run away from their problems (and sometimes ended up on the streets), and descended into alcohol or drug addiction. Legal restrictions, funding shortages, and prevailing treatment philosophies militated against long-term institutionalization of this cohort of patients, but the OMH, other mental health agencies, and policymakers were increasingly forced to acknowledge that some forms of mental illness were hard to treat in outpatient settings and that some people who were capable of living outside of state facilities would never be capable of living independently of some sort of intensive support network.

The OMH also had to contend with a growing number of mentally ill people who were not eligible for any form of outpatient treatment: those who committed serious crimes. The state's prison population increased dramatically during the late 1970's and the 1980's, bringing increasing numbers of mentally ill people into contact with the criminal justice system. The office's increasing responsibility for caring for mentally ill criminals is evident in the rapid expansion of facilities designed specifically for them. In the mid-1970's, the DMH had taken over a reformatory established by the New York City and created the Mid-Hudson Psychiatric Center, which treated those who were deemed incompetent to stand trial or judged not guilty by reason of insanity. In 1977, the OMH established the Central New York Psychiatric Center, which was intended specifically for treatment of mentally ill prison inmates, and started outpatient programs in seven prisons around the state. Between 1977 and 1985, the office also established regional forensic units at the Hutchings, Gowanda, Manhattan, Rochester, and Sullivan Psychiatric Centers. From 1980 onward, the Insanity Defense Reform Act required that the criminally insane be institutionalized for lengthier periods of time and evaluated regularly, thus further increasing the demand for forensic services. As a result, the OMH opened the Metropolitan New York Forensic Center in 1984 and the Kirby Forensic Psychiatric Center in 1985; both of these facilities were intended to relieve persistent overcrowding at the Mid-Hudson Psychiatric Center, which underwent expansion at roughly the same time. Relying in part upon NIMH funding, the OMH also worked with local corrections officers, creating a demonstration program intended to identify and treat suicidal and potentially suicidal

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156It is difficult to tell from readily accessible OMH statistics whether the percentage of men being treated in inpatient facilities increased or remained constant; the question certainly bears investigation. The emergence of this patient cohort reflects a decline in the age of first hospitalization or onset of mental illness. In 1981, the OMH anticipated that the inpatient census might increase as the baby boom generation reached its thirties and forties, the age range that had historically produced high rates of hospital admission for schizophrenia and other serious mental disorders; see Office of Mental Health, Annual Report 1981, 21. In 1998, the National Alliance for the Mentally Ill noted that most people who have serious mental illnesses are diagnosed when in late adolescence or early adulthood; see National Alliance for the Mentally Ill, Things You Should Know: NAMI Facts, available [online]: <http://www.nami.org/about/thing.htm> [29 May 1998].

157Grob, The Mad Among Us, 296-300.


159Office of Mental Health, Annual Report 1983, 12; New York State Department of Mental Hygiene, Office of Mental Health, Annual Report 1985, 11.


county and city jail inmates. This program soon became a full-fledged component of the OMH's forensic responsibilities and helped to spawn a joint OMH-Department of Correctional Services program that trains police officers how to recognize signs of mental illness and how to respond to mentally ill people they encounter while working.

The OMH also implemented a number of new outpatient treatment initiatives that targeted specific groups of New Yorkers. Aware that African-Americans and Latinos were slightly overrepresented in the state's patient population, the OMH sponsored a number of research projects intended to identify the particular needs of mentally ill African-Americans and Latinos and demonstration programs that sought to provide culturally sensitive treatment; the need to furnish such treatment is to this day one of the office's hey concerns. The OMH also devoted increasing attention to treating mentally ill senior citizens. Even though the state had since the mid-1960's sought to place patients over the age of sixty-five in nursing homes and other facilities, the elderly remained a substantial part of the inpatient population in state facilities and the OMH continued to find it difficult to find appropriate placements for patients who no longer needed intensive inpatient care. Increasing knowledge about some forms of mental illness that afflict older people and the concomitant formation of new advocacy groups also prodded the OMH into action. In the early 1980's, the degenerative phenomena that had formerly been attributed to arteriosclerosis or to the process of aging itself were increasingly recognized as symptoms of a distinct and progressive disorder known as Alzheimer's disease. The office sought to provide guidance to families caring for those who suffered the disease and to create day and respite care programs for elderly New Yorkers suffering from Alzheimer's disease and other forms of mental illness. From the mid-1980's onward, it also paid increasing attention to the mental health needs of the growing number of people suffering from the newly-defined physical illness known as Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome, or AIDS.

With the probable exception of its new forensic programs, the OMH's efforts were guided not only by legislative mandates, public-relations considerations, and internal concerns about patient welfare but by pressure from a growing number of citizen advocacy groups. In 1979, the National Alliance for the Mentally Ill (NAMI), which is a support group for people with serious mental illness, became a full-fledged component of the OMH's forensic responsibilities and helped to spawn a joint OMH-Department of Correctional Services program that trains police officers how to recognize signs of mental illness and how to respond to mentally ill people they encounter while working.
mental illness and their families, a lobbying organization that sought to increase funding for and levels of care, and a sponsor of research concerning the etiology of mental illness, was founded in Madison, Wisconsin. The NAMI grew rapidly, its membership swelling in large part due to the deep frustration felt by many people who had acutely ill relatives: the absence of appropriate treatment programs for relatives who had been discharged from state facilities or who had repeatedly been hospitalized for long periods of time led many family members to make great personal sacrifices and made many of them feel bewildered and isolated. In the early 1980's twelve New York State NAMI chapters formed the Alliance for the Mentally Ill in New York State, which currently has over seventy chapters and remains dedicated to helping mentally ill people and their families.168

Relations between these groups and the OMH and other mental health care providers have not always been ideal: like others who care for chronically ill relatives and lack adequate resources or support, many of those drawn to them were (and are) profoundly dissatisfied with the status quo. Searching for effective alternatives to institutionalization and in many instances convinced that outpatient care was simply not suitable for their relatives, they have often been convinced that state mental health agencies, the state and federal courts, and mental health professionals had failed them; some have openly yearned for a return to long-term institutionalization.169 As a result, these organizations were at times impatient with and publicly critical of the OMH. However, these groups also sought to work with the OMH and other state agencies, which in the long term probably benefited from their involvement. The OMH's programs for people suffering from Alzheimer's disease were developed in tandem with a new voluntary organization, the Alzheimer Disease and Related Disease Foundation, and in subsequent years the office worked with other citizen advocacy groups when developing new mental health programs.170 Cooperative efforts such as these may have initially magnified frustrations, but they may also have served to create lasting working relationships between the OMH and the new advocacy groups. In addition, these organizations performed much-needed educational and support functions at little cost to the OMH or other state agencies and pressed legislators to increase funding for mental health treatment and research. The emergence of this growing citizen constituency was in part propelled by the mounting fiscal difficulties faced by the OMH and social welfare and mental health agencies across the nation. From the late 1970's onward, the OMH shouldered an increasing share of the cost for the care of the mentally ill. The goal of making county and city governments assume a greater share of the burden was increasingly recognized as unworkable, and federal monies earmarked for mental health research and treatment declined substantially. The federal government's intent to decrease funding for mental health care first became evident during the administration of Jimmy Carter. State policymakers, mental health professionals, and advocacy groups had hoped that the Carter administration would produce significant advances in federal support for mental health: First Lady Rosalyn Carter was a prominent advocate of better care for

169Families' anger at not being able to have mentally ill relatives placed in state facilities for lengthy periods of time stemmed from a number of sources. A few probably wanted to be rid of troublesome kin. However, others caring for deinstitutionalized family members had good reason to fear violence from their mentally ill loved ones or watched helplessly as family members repeatedly improved as a result of drug therapy administered in inpatient programs and then declined after they were discharged and refused to take their medicines. See Issac and Armat, Madness in the Streets, 272-76, and Johnson, "Unravelling of a Social Policy," 373-75, 433-34, 486.
the mentally ill, and the creation in 1977 of the highly publicized President's Commission on Mental Health seemed to portend an expansion of federal support for mental health initiatives. However, the federal government's ability to do so was limited by spiraling inflation, the escalating cost of Medicare, Medicaid and other federal entitlement programs, the absence of vocal champions at the NIMH and other government agencies, and the lack of consensus about priorities; the community mental health centers' many responsibilities and the increasing prominence of psychologists and social workers in the mental health field virtually guaranteed that there would be no agreement as to which forms of mental illness or treatment were to be emphasized. These contradictions were reflected in the 1980 National Mental Health Systems Act, which stressed the need for improving linkages between mental health and other forms of health care, increasing provider accountability, improving care for the acutely ill, and safeguarding patients' civil rights but did not detail how these aims were to be accomplished. In addition, the act stressed that the federal government would continue to help shape mental health policy even as federal funding for community mental health centers would eventually cease.171

From 1981 onward, the federal government's reluctant disengagement from mental health policy quickly gave way to a determined retreat. Seeking to cut federal taxes and expenditures, President Ronald Reagan sought to dismantle or shrink many social welfare programs. One of the aims of his first administration was to take apart federal mental health and substance abuse programs, cut federal support for them by twenty-five percent, and forward federal monies to the states in the form of block grants that would allow each state to devise its own mental health and substance abuse treatment policies. With the passage of the 1981 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, which revoked the Mental Health Systems Act, this goal was made into policy.172 Gerald Grob argues that the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act constituted a dramatic rejection of the federal mental health policy that had taken shape during the 1960's. In its wake, American mental health policy was once again the responsibility of the states and of localities. However, the federal government's abdication of responsibility occurred "at precisely the same time that states [and local governments] were confronted with monumental social and economic problems that increased their fiscal burdens" and was as a result particularly disastrous for the mentally ill.173

Part of the states' fiscal difficulties stemmed from other federal policy changes. During the Reagan years, the executive and legislative branches of the federal government sought to curb Social Security expenditures. Rejecting the call of the President's Commission on Mental Health, which issued its final report in December 1980, to integrate federal entitlement programs and mental health treatment, both the president and Congress sought to shrink the SSI and SSDI rolls and curb abuse of these programs. Under the provisions of the 1980 Disability Amendments Act, each SSI and SSDI recipient was to undergo a benefits review every three years. Under pressure from the Reagan administration, the Social Security Administration used these reviews to cut large numbers of mentally ill and other disabled recipients from these programs. It created definitions of mental disability that differed considerably from those it had employed in the past and from prevailing professional definitions of acute mental disorder, and its actions resulted in a dramatic decline in the number of mentally ill people receiving SSI and SSDI. Mentally ill people, who constituted roughly eleven percent of recipients, made up some

171Grob, The Mad Among Us, 284-86.
173Grob, The Mad Among Us, 286-87.
thirty percent of those dropped from the SSI and SSDI rolls. The vast cuts in SSI and SSDI expenditures, which produced savings far greater than that anticipated by the Reagan administration, ultimately produced a public uproar that compelled the Reagan administration to reverse course.174 However, the hardships and dislocations that grew out of this policy were no doubt substantial; at least some of those who were denied benefits became homeless and severed all contact with mental health and social service agencies.175 Decreases in federal support for low-income housing and other social-welfare programs made it even more difficult for mentally ill people to adjust to being removed from the SSI and SSDI rolls.176

Federal funding cuts and the state cuts that followed them clearly affected mental health care in New York State. The OMH noted in 1982 that fourteen of the twenty-six community mental health centers that had constructed and staffed under the provisions of the CMHCCA and other federal laws had "graduated from federal funding" and were being supported largely by the state.177 The state's fiscal difficulties were also noted by the Governor's Select Commission on the Future of the State-Local Mental Health System, which predicted that New York State would eventually face a fiscal nightmare if it did not integrate state and community-based programs more effectively and that it could no longer expect substantial assistance from the federal government.178 By 1983, funding for a number of OMH programs had been slashed, and the office laid off some personnel and transferred responsibility for the office's Long Island Research Institute to another state agency in hopes of saving money.179 The office, goaded perhaps by a report from the New York State Division of Audits and Accounts that charged that slipshod OMH managerial practices denied the state some $4.5 million in Medicaid and Medicare reimbursements every year, also automated its billing procedures and took over responsibility for setting Medicaid reimbursement rates in order to insure that it got as much money as possible from remaining federal sources.180

In the wake of federal cutbacks, policymakers in New York State and other states were more firmly committed than ever to community-based provision of mental health. Some still hoped that community programs would be much cheaper than inpatient care at state psychiatric centers, but most were guided by the realization that the current fiscal and legal climate militated against any dramatic expansion of inpatient care and remained convinced that inappropriate institutionalization remained a problem. As a result, the OMH sought improve community-based care for the acutely ill. The office created a program designed to support voluntary agencies' efforts to acquire real property and create residences for mentally ill people and sought to boost funding of community-based service programs.181 In addition, the OMH used the federal block

174Grob, The Mad Among Us, 300-02. The administration had hoped for a savings of $218 million by 1985, but the Social Security Administration projected that some $3.5 billion would be saved by that time.
176Frank and MacGuire, "Health Care Financing and State Mental Health Systems," 129.
180Office of Mental Health, Annual Report 1987, 7. The OMH's share of block-grant monies was relatively small: the House Committee on Energy and Commerce concluded that by the early 1990's New York State was directing only ten percent of its block-grant funds to mental health programs. See U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Energy and Commerce, Community
grant funds it received to expand the CSS, and in 1987 streamlined funding for the program by
inducing the legislature to merge monies allocated for the CSS with those earmarked to fulfill the
state's legal obligation to pay for the aftercare of former state psychiatric center patients. 182

The OMH also undertook a number highly-publicized efforts to address the problem of
homelessness, which grew in part as a result of federal and state cuts in social welfare spending
and was particularly pronounced in New York City. The office's drive to furnish care to the
homeless was in large part the result of mounting public criticism of past mental health policy:
many citizens and politicians had become convinced that almost all former state hospital patients
ended up on the streets, that all but a few of them were belligerent, socially disruptive, and
potentially dangerous, and that deinstitutionalization was solely to blame for the phenomenon of
homelessness and the urban decay associated with it. In reality, only a highly visible subgroup
of mentally ill people became homeless and the problem had multiple roots: the shortage of
aftercare, the inability of the OMH and other agencies to compel the acutely ill to undergo
treatment, the reductions in the SSI and SSDI rolls, alcohol and drug addiction, and New York
City real-estate tax and abatement codes that encouraged ruthless (and often illegal) evictions
from and demolition of SRO's and other residences inhabited by low-income people. 183

Aware of the complexity of the problem, the OMH sought to defuse public criticism by
addressing the existence of mental illness among the homeless population of the New York City.
It cooperated with the Governor's Task Force on the Homeless and, in conjunction with the State
Department of Social Services and the New York City Human Resources Administration,
created short- and long-term programs for the homeless at the Creedmoor Psychiatric Center. 184
In addition, the OMH, acting in tandem with the Human Resources Administration, placed
mental health screening teams in a number of municipal shelters for the homeless; after the
Creedmoor facility for the homeless opened in 1985, the OMH screening teams directed those in
need of immediate and intensive inpatient care to the city-operated Bellevue Hospital and those
requiring less intensive care to Creedmoor. 185 The OMH's efforts did not hold back the swelling
tide of public criticism; however, given the multiple causes of homelessness and the simple fact
that not all homeless people are mentally ill, no amount of action taken by the OMH would have
completely resolved public concern about (and fear of) homeless people. 186

The financial hardships that the OMH and other mental health authorities endured during
the early 1980's became less acute during the second Reagan administration and the
administration of George Bush. Advocacy groups and mental health professionals supportive of
the reforms outlined by the President's Commission on Mental Health were galvanized into
action by dramatic federal funding cuts, and they increasingly made common cause with
advocacy groups representing people with other forms of disability. The resulting alliances
made it easier for supporters of mental health care expansion and reform to influence the

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182Office of Mental Health, Annual Report 1984, 4-5; New York State Office of Mental Health, Annual Report 1987, 4;
183On the roots of the problem of homelessness in New York City, see Johnson, "Unravelling of a Social Policy," 399-410, and
Governor's Select Commission on the Future of the State-Local Mental Health System, Final Report, 6.
184Office of Mental Health, Annual Report 1983, 4-5.
186The prevalence of mental illness among homeless people has been the subject of protracted debate. Estimates have ranged
from twenty to more than fifty percent, and funding considerations may have colored efforts to equate homelessness and mental
illness. One New York City mental health worker subsequently recalled that the state labeled homeless people mentally ill
because it could use the existing CSS program to finance their care and thus avoided having to pass legislation that would furnish
funds through the Department of Social Services; see Johnson, "Unravelling of a Social Policy, 407-09.
formation of policy. In addition, the Social Security Administration implemented a number of
desirable changes after it was forced to stop purging mentally ill persons from program rolls. It
altered the requirements of SSI (but not SSDI) to allow mentally ill people to remain eligible for
partial benefits after they found paid work and expanded Medicaid support for mental health
care. These reforms may have stemmed partly from the involvement of the agency's fiscal
experts in the work of the President's Commission: as a result, key Social Security personnel
became aware that some SSI provisions did not meet the needs of mentally ill recipients.187

These changes were accompanied by modest increases in federal spending for mental
health research and treatment. These increases were typically implemented with little fanfare:
high-profile initiatives such as the 1992 Community Mental Health and Substance Abuse
Services Improvement Bill, which sought to make federal funding more equitable and expand
community programs, did not become law.188 Mental health advocacy groups and their friends
in the Democratic-controlled Congress soon learned that the most effective way to increase
federal mental health expenditures was to bury funding mandates in mammoth budget
reconciliation bills that retarded close scrutiny.189 However, some federal measures explicitly
dedicated to improving mental health care did become law. In 1984, Congress succeeded in
overcoming the objections of the Reagan administration and bestowed full legal status upon the
NIMH's Community Support Program, which for the next five years continued to induce the
states to improve services for people with serious and chronic mental illness.190 In 1986, the
State Comprehensive Mental Health Services Plan Act (SCMHSPA), which compelled the states
to devise detailed service plans that emphasized improving outpatient-based care for the
chronically mentally ill in order to receive federal mental health monies, became law.191 The
planning provisions of the SCMHSPA, which mark a low-profile return to direct federal
involvement in the shaping of mental health policy, bear more than a passing resemblance to
those contained within the 1977 recodification of the New York State Mental Hygiene Law.

During the presidency of Bill Clinton, the executive and the legislative branches of the
federal government have cooperated in increasing both the amount of and the strings attached to
the block-grant funds disbursed by the Center for Mental Health Services (CMHS), which is a
component of the Department of Health and Human Services' Substance Abuse and Mental
Health Services Administration (SAMHSA).192 In addition to controlling block-grant monies,
the CMHS also administers grant funds targeted for demonstration projects involving mentally ill
children, programs for the homeless and people with HIV disease, legal advocacy and
information groups serving the mentally ill, and training of mental health personnel. The center
is also responsible for compiling statistics concerning mental illness, treatment, and research, and
furnishing assistance to those devising programs for select populations (e.g., women, African-
Americans, Asian-Americans, Latinos, prison inmates, those living in rural areas) or working
with disaster survivors. Most recently, the CMHS has begun the National Mental Health

187Chris Koyanagi and Howard H. Goldman, "The Quiet Success of the National Plan for the Chronically Mentally Ill," Hospital
and Community Psychiatry 42 (September 1991), 903.
188U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Energy and Commerce, Community Mental Health and Substance Abuse Services
189Koyanagi and Goldman, "The Quiet Success of the National Plan for the Chronically Mentally Ill," 903.
190Grob, The Mad Among Us, 305. In 1989, the NIMH dedicated the Community Support Program solely to measuring the
effectiveness of state programs.
191State Comprehensive Mental Health Services Plan Act of 1986, Statutes at Large 100, sec. 501-03, 3794-97.
192See note 19 for discussion of the creation of the SAMHSA.
Services Knowledge Exchange Network, an information clearinghouse for mentally ill people, their family members, and others interested in mental-health issues. Apart from these incremental increases in federal responsibility and funding for treatment, research, and public education, federal mental health policy has undergone little change during the Clinton years. The first Clinton administration's highly publicized national health insurance plan was notable for its relatively generous provisions for mental health treatment. However, in the wake of the plan's rejection by Republicans and many Democrats in Congress and the 1994 elections that gave control of both houses of Congress to the Republican Party, the Clinton administration has been loath to press for dramatic expansions of social welfare programs. Instead, the administration and Congress have sought modest improvements in third-party insurance coverage of mental health treatment. The Mental Health Parity Act (MHPA) of 1996, which went into effect upon 1 January 1998, compelled corporations that offered mental health benefits to their employees to increase annual and lifetime caps to match more closely those set for physical disorders. These changes have at best meant a modest improvement in the insurance benefits of some seriously or moderately mentally ill people, but mental-health professionals and advocacy groups heralded the MHPA as a first step toward equal coverage of mental and physical disorders. The MHPA did not prohibit the states from enacting more stringent parity legislation, and in its wake a number of states did so. However, New York State was among neither the pioneers that had acted in advance of federal legislation nor among those propelled into action by it. At the present time, state lawmakers apparently believe that the MHPA's provisions are sufficient; apart from a bill improving insurance coverage of treatment for serious mental illness, which is at the time of this writing being studied by the New York State Insurance Department, politicians have been loath to press private insurance companies to offer more comprehensive mental health benefits.

New York State legislators have been much more eager to adopt some of the cost-containment strategies devised by commercial and not-for-profit health insurers. In 1991, they compelled counties to devise managed care programs for Medicaid recipients, including those who are mentally ill, and in 1996 subsequent legislation mandated the creation of Special Needs Plans (SNPs) for mentally ill adults and children who receive Medicaid benefits; pending federal approval, the 1996 legislation also gives the state the power to force the mentally ill into these managed care programs. As of late 1997, the OMH, which has played a substantial role in

193 Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, Center for Mental Health Services, The Center for Mental Health Services Information Page, available [online]: <http://www.samhsa.gov/cmhs/cmhs/cmhs.htm> [29 May 1998].
194 Mental Health Parity Act of 1996, Statutes at Large 110, sec. 701-03, 2944-50. The MHPA, which expires on 30 September 2001, does not compel companies to offer mental-health coverage, apply to those that have fewer than fifty employees, or extend to treatment for substance abuse and chemical dependency. In addition, corporations that could prove that parity implementation would raise their insurance costs by at least one percent could apply for exemptions. The passage of the MHPA also brings to the fore a subject of particular interest to those seeking to document the development of mental health policy and programs: the history of private insurance coverage of mental illness. Information on this aspect of mental health policy is hard to come by, but it seems that mental health benefits began to develop in the 1960's and became more common in subsequent decades.
197 At present, the only bill that would mandate improved coverage of mental illness is Assembly Bill 1379, which would compel insurers to cover serious mental illness. The bill was sent to the Insurance Department for study in January 1998; see New York State Legislature, Legislative Bill Drafting Commission, Legislative Digest 1998: January 7 to May 22, vol. 2, Assembly Introduction Record, 81.
determining the provisions of the SNP's, anticipated that the plans designed for adults would be implemented in the summer of fall of 1998 and that those for children and adolescents six months to a year later. The drive to cut costs also spurred the OMH to close a number of its psychiatric centers. However, declining inpatient populations also drove the closures: the inpatient census declined from 22,724 in 1980-81 to 10,500 in late 1993 and that admissions rates, which had remained constant throughout the 1980's, dropped substantially in 1991-92. In response to this rapid drop in population, the Harlem Valley, Gowanda, Central Islip, Willard, and King's Park Psychiatric Centers all ceased operations during the mid- to late 1990's. The closure of these facilities, coupled with sustained efforts by Mario Cuomo and George Pataki to reduce the number of state employees, produced a dramatic decrease in the number of people employed by the OMH: between 1988 and 1997, transfer programs, retirement incentives, and attrition contributed to a forty-seven percent drop in the agency's workforce. As of late, the OMH anticipates that community-based outpatient programs and the growing number of inpatient psychiatric beds in general hospitals (which are eligible for Medicaid reimbursement) will in the future produce a further decline in the state's inpatient population.

The OMH's closure of facilities and declining workforce gave rise to concern that the welfare of the seriously mentally ill would be sacrificed in the name of cost-effectiveness. In an effort to insure that psychiatric-center closures do not produce the problems associated with deinstitutionalization in the 1970's and that efforts to pare the OMH workforce and close facilities that it operates are not propelled solely by the desire to reduce mental-health spending, the Community Mental Health Reinvestment Act (CMHRA) of 1993 mandates that the savings realized from the closure of Harlem Valley, Gowanda, Central Islip, Willard, King's Park, and any other state psychiatric centers be directed to community-based treatment, residential, and support programs for people with severe mental illnesses. Although Governor Mario Cuomo initially objected to the CMHRA on the grounds that it would tie the hands of his successors and the CSEA was opposed to any facility closures, the Mental Health Action Network, an informal coalition of politicians, mental health professionals and advocacy groups that pressed for the law's passage and shaped its provisions, successfully overcame this opposition and secured its passage. Despite Governor Pataki's efforts to undercut it, the CMHRA remains in effect.

**Conclusion**

In some respects, the course of mental health treatment and policy in New York State and in the United States from the late nineteenth to the late twentieth century has been circular. Psychiatrists and advocacy groups representing families of the mentally ill now concur that serious mental illnesses are biologically rooted. In the future, the mountain of studies into the neurochemical dimensions of mental illness may alter the very manner in which it is conceptualized: the New York City chapter of the NAMI asserts that "mental illness" is a

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203For the circumstances leading to the creation and passage of the CMHRA, see Robert N. Swidler and John V. Tauriello, "New York State's Community Mental Health Reinvestment Act," *Psychiatric Services* 46 (May 1995): 496-500.
misnomer and that "neurobiological disorder" is a more appropriate and precise way of classifying disorders such as schizophrenia, and the term seems to be gaining favor. ²⁰⁴ Although the OMH continues to assert that its actions should be guided by "the expectation that each person can recover from mental illness," advocacy groups such as the NAMI and most members of the psychiatric profession have become markedly pessimistic about curing serious mental disorders. ²⁰⁵ The federal government's retreat from extensive involvement in the shaping of mental health policy and the increasing latitude given the state also calls to mind the decades before the Second World War.

However, these apparent similarities obscure as much as they reveal about the trajectory of mental health policy. The federal government has since the mid-1980's resumed some responsibility for mental health policy and compels states seeking federal funds to adhere to certain requirements concerning care of the seriously mentally ill and development of community-based programs. The OMH and its counterparts in many other states preside over a decentralized system of care and treatment that consists of both local and state agencies and which is supported by a combination of state, local and federal monies. The office also strives to meet the needs of a much broader client population: the expansion of mental health treatment to cover those suffering less serious forms of mental illness or having difficulty coping with difficult life circumstances that began during the Progressive era and blossomed from the 1960's onward has compelled it to develop its programs accordingly. In devising these programs, the OMH continues to rely upon psychiatrists, the traditional providers of care and treatment of the mentally ill, but it also works with psychologists, social workers, and other mental health professionals who no longer defer to psychiatric expertise. State inpatient institutions, which once housed most of the mentally ill, have become but one of several kinds of facilities providing care and treatment, and it is highly unlikely that they will once again predominate: even if the state had the money needed to reconstruct the extensive network of hospitals that once existed, the numerous court cases that established patients' right to refuse treatment would militate against the recreation of the old mental health system.

Changing attitudes toward treatment also work against the reestablishment of the old state hospital-centered system. The hope of finding easy and permanent cures for serious mental illness has been discarded, but few mental health professionals and advocacy groups believe that simple custodial care such as that formerly furnished on the back wards of state hospitals is desirable. Recognizing that serious mental illness is chronic and that those who suffer from it are likely to suffer relapses from time to time, they have instead focused upon trying to ensure that mentally ill people can function to their fullest potential and to reduce the dislocations that the illness produces. Of course, these hopes do not always coincide with reality: in many instances, the quality of life in PPHA's and other institutions that developed as state hospital systems were being dismantled is little better than that found in the back wards of the old state facilities, and community-based programs in many areas remain fragmented and ill-equipped to prevent those with serious mental illness from falling through the gaps in the safety net.

The mental health system of New York State resembles the integrated network envisioned by the drafters of the 1954 Community Mental Health Services Act much more closely than it does the centralized hospital system created by the 1890 State Care Act. However, it continues to exhibit many of the problems highlighted by its critics from the mid-

²⁰⁴ National Alliance for the Mentally Ill/ New York City, NAMI/NYC, available [online]: <http://www.schizophrenia.com/ami/> [1 June 1998].
²⁰⁵ Office of Mental Health, OMH Strategic Framework.
1950's onward: lack of cooperation between state and local providers, gaps in provision stemming from the state's efforts to tailor policy to maximize reimbursements from the federal government, and an unfortunate tendency to lose track of the most acutely ill. Recent policy initiatives spearheaded by the OMH, state lawmakers, and federal authorities have sought, with varying degrees of success, to address these problems, and it seems that this relatively modest goal will in the immediate future continue to animate state and federal policy reforms: given the immense difficulty of radically restructuring such a complex system and the seeming absence of the political will needed to do so, it seems likely that most efforts at changing the mental health system will focus upon correcting its more readily identifiable and (apparently) remediable flaws.

1998 by Bonita L. Weddle
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Timeline

Mental Health Policy in New York State, 1900-1998

1890's-1930's: Psychiatrists, who over the course of the nineteenth century become distant from the medical profession, seek to reestablish their medical credentials. No longer content to see themselves as providers of humane custodial care, they adopt an aggressive therapeutic stance.

1909: The National Committee for Mental Hygiene (NMCH) is founded and headquarters in Manhattan. The NCMH spearheaded the mental hygiene movement, which was pessimistic about curing mental illness but convinced that it could be prevented. The aims of the movement fit well with psychiatrists' efforts to broaden their influence, but by the 1930's the movement's efforts to involve psychologists and social workers in mental health treatment make many psychiatrists feel that their status and authority is under attack. Psychiatrists attracted to the mental hygiene movement refrained from embracing the demands for compulsory sterilization of the mentally ill and developmentally disabled and harsh immigration restrictions put forth by some active in the movement.

1920's: Fever therapy is introduced in mental hospitals. Many psychiatrists are ambivalent about its use.

1920's-1940's: The mental hygiene movement's preventative activities focus upon schools. After the Second World War, concepts of personality development and child guidance become so deeply ingrained in American pedagogical theory that the movement as a result of own success.

1926: The New York State Department of Mental Hygiene (DMH) is created in wake of 1925 constitutional reorganization of state government. The DMH's sole responsibility is to inspect state and private institutions caring for the mentally ill, the developmentally disabled, and epileptics.

1927: The New York State Mental Hygiene Law is enacted. The DMH is given almost all responsibility for the care and treatment of the mentally ill, the developmentally disabled, and epileptics. The Mental Hygiene Law also underscores the influence of the mental hygiene movement upon state policymakers: it mandates the creation of a DMH Division of Prevention.

1930's: Insulin shock and metrazol shock therapies and surgical technique of prefrontal lobotomy are developed. As was the case with fever therapy, many psychiatrists are hesitant to embrace them.
1930's-1945: Conditions in state mental institutions deteriorate as a result of Depression-era financial hardships and the resource and personnel demands of the war. Physical plants deteriorate and overcrowding is common.

Late 1930's-Early 1940's: Electroconvulsive therapy, which replaces insulin and metrazol shock therapies, is introduced into the United States. Psychologists are of two minds about its value.

1941-1945: The experience of treating military personnel suffering from combat-related mental illness leads many psychiatrists to emphasize the social dimensions of mental disorder. The recognition that patients suffering from war-related disorders respond best when given immediate care in outpatient-based settings leads the profession to hypothesize that mentally ill civilians might best be treated outside of traditional mental institutions.

Late 1940's--Early 1950's: Exposés of hospital conditions produce a widespread public and professional demand first for reform and then for dismantling of state hospitals.

Mid-1940's: Fountain House, a Manhattan-based support group, is started by a group of former patients of the Rockland State Hospital. In 1948, the organization purchases a Midtown brownstone that serves as a residence for program members.

1946: The federal Hill-Burton Act, which allocates monies for state hospital renovation and construction, is enacted.

1949: The National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH), a new component of the Public Health Service's National Institute of Health, comes into existence.

1949: The New York State Mental Health Commission is formed. The commission is charged with meeting annually to determine the outlines of a new state mental health policy designed to reduce the state's inpatient census, which is the largest in the nation.

1954: The New York State Community Mental Health Services Act is passed. The act encourages localities to establish community-based mental health programs and to apply for state reimbursement of up to fifty percent of the cost of these programs.

Mid-1950's: The development of psychiatric drugs such as Thorazine and new tranquilizers reinforce psychiatric confidence in the effectiveness of outpatient treatment and their ability to cure mental illness. Even die-hard champions of environmental models of mental illness are enthusiastic.

Mid-1950's: The open-hospital movement, which developed in Great Britain and emphasizes patients' need to govern their own movements, comes to the United States. In 1957, DMH commissioner Paul Hoch becomes interested and sends seven state hospital
administrators to Britain to study the movement. All seven return adherents of the principle of allowing patients the greatest freedom of movement.

1955: The Federal Mental Health Study Act funds the activities of the Joint Commission on Mental Illness and Health, a study group established by the American Medical Association and the American Psychiatric Association.

1956: The DMH creates the Association of Community Mental Health Boards in order to foster communication between and innovation among community mental health boards (CMHB's), the local authorities responsible for creation and administration of community-based mental health programs.

1959: The DMH creates ten Regional Mental Health Advisory Committees in an effort to assist CMHB efforts to devise suitable programs.

1961: The Joint Commission on Mental Illness and Health issues its final report, Action for Mental Health. The lack of consensus and focus within the commission, which is dominated by social and behavioral psychiatrists, is evident, and APA is divided about its recommendations.

1963: The Federal Community Mental Health Centers Construction Act makes available federal funds for construction of community centers; between one- and two-thirds of the cost of each center is paid for by the federal government. States have to submit plans, designate an agency responsible for executing them, appoint a broad advisory council and develop a construction program. In subsequent years, the federal government allocates some funds for staffing centers and training necessary personnel.

1963: The New York State Mental Hygiene Facilities Improvement Corporation is established and given control of disbursing all local, state, and federal funds targeted for facility construction. The state's Housing Finance Authority, the agency responsible for issuing loans for health facility, public housing, and state university construction projects, is empowered to issue loans for construction of mental health facilities.

1965: Medicare, a federally-supported health insurance program for senior citizens, and Medicaid, a health insurance program for the needy funded jointly by local and federal government, are established. Both contain provisions for mental health treatment, but care furnished in state hospitals is explicitly not covered and mentally ill people under the age of sixty-five are ineligible for Medicaid benefits. These provisions result in the transfer of large numbers of the elderly mentally ill from state hospitals to nursing homes, a shift that increases mortality rates among mentally ill senior citizens.

1967: The NIMH is given full bureau status.

Late 1960's-1970's: Academic attacks on mental health and psychiatry, including some launched from within, proliferate:
-- R.D. Laing, a left-wing Scottish psychiatrist and Thomas Szasz, a libertarian professor of psychiatry at the SUNY Upstate Medical Center at Syracuse University, launch concerted and highly influential assaults upon psychiatry.

-- French philosopher Michel Foucault's studies of insane asylums, penal institutions, and other modern Western phenomena stress that psychiatry and other developments commonly seen as "enlightened" are in fact tools of the modern Western state, which induces people to internalize its codes of thought and behavior.

-- Sociologists such as Earving Goffman assert that psychiatrists are concerned above all else with preserving their own professional identity.

Late 1960's-1970's: The mass political movements of the era are often hostile to the concept of mental health.

-- The New Left sees it as a tool of "the Establishment" and embraces the arguments of Laing, Szasz, and Goffman; however, a few drawn to the New Left attempt to create more responsive alternatives to traditional mental health treatment.

-- Feminists assert that psychiatrists wittingly or unwittingly seek to compel women to accept their subordination.

-- Gay-rights activists, who in 1973 successfully force the American Psychiatric Association to assert that homosexuality is not a mental disorder, denounce the suffering that psychiatrists have caused lesbians and gay men.

-- A nascent patient-liberation movement denounces psychiatry and mental institutions as instruments of oppression.

-- Conservatives angered by the pronouncements of the minority of psychiatrists who are active in the civil rights and anti-war movements denounce mental health as a covert means of advancing a liberal or radical political agenda.

Late 1960's-1970's: The definition of mental illness, which has gradually broadened as a result of the mental hygiene movement and psychiatric efforts to expand the scope of their influence, expands to include minor mental disorders and difficulty in coping with life crises. This expansion is in part propelled and reinforced by the increasing involvement of psychologists, social workers and other non-psychiatric personnel in treating mental illness. During the 1960's, these professionals successfully challenge the hegemonic position of the psychiatric profession.

Late 1960's-1970's: The problems associated with the policy of mass discharges from state hospitals, which is increasingly referred to as deinstitutionalization, become increasingly evident: lack of continuity of care and failure to meet the needs of the seriously mentally ill.

Late 1960's-1970's: State and federal courts rule that the mentally ill have the legal right to refuse treatment and cannot be involuntarily committed to mental institutions unless they
pose a clear and present danger to themselves or others. Other court rulings force New York State and other states to improve the quality of care in the institutions they operate.

1970's: Economic difficulties affect the DMH and hamper its ability to maintain and expand programs.

1972: Two new federal Social Security programs, Supplemental Security Income (SSI) and Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI), dramatically alter care for the mentally ill. Designed to preserve recipients' dignity, they do not mandate that mentally ill recipients seek treatment. These benefits enable those who might otherwise have no place to go other than a state hospital to live independently, sometimes at the cost of ensuring that they are housed, fed, and clad decently.

1973: New York State Unified Services Act seeks to improve coordination between state and local agencies by encouraging localities to devise service plans that harmonize state and local efforts. Owing to the complexity of its funding provisions, local lawmakers' reluctance to embrace untried reform measures or increase spending on mental health programs, the act does not produce desired results: only five counties put forth acceptable unified services plans.

1973: The NIMH is made part of the Department of Health and Human Services' newly created Alcohol, Drug Abuse and Mental Health Administration (ADAMHA). Its research functions are transferred to the National Institute of Health.

1974: The New York State Legislature enacts laws mandating that the state furnish appropriate care for those discharged from state hospitals.

1975: The Creedmoor and Pilgrim Psychiatric Centers are stripped of their accreditation. Although deeply embarrassed, the DMH continues to channel resources away from the state's psychiatric centers.

1975: The Federal Mental Health Act, which Congress passes over the veto of President Gerald Ford, compels federally funded community mental health centers to care for the seriously mentally ill.

1977: The New York State Mental Hygiene Law is recodified and the DMH's responsibilities broken down and assigned to three autonomous offices: the Office of Alcohol and Substance Abuse, the Office of Mental Retardation and Developmental Disability, and the Office of Mental Health (OMH). The recodification also compels local mental health authorities and the three successor offices of the DMH to draw up five-year service plans and to issue annual progress reports.

1977: Jimmy Carter forms the President's Commission on Mental Health.
1978: The OMH creates the Community Support System, a program designed to furnish treatment and support services to the seriously mentally ill. This program may be an effort to secure funds from the NIMH's newly-created Community Support Program for the seriously ill.

1978: The Civil Service Employees Association, the labor union representing many state hospital employees, sponsors a radio and print advertising campaign that accuses the state of "dumping" the mentally ill onto the streets or into substandard custodial facilities. The highly effective campaign, which runs during the gubernatorial election, results in an executive-office policy directive that instructs the OMH to increase staffing levels in state psychiatric centers.

1979: The National Alliance for the Mentally Ill (NAMI), a new advocacy group for people with serious mental illness and their families, is formed in Madison, WI. Branches quickly take shape in New York State. The NAMI is but one of several new advocacy groups that shape the direction of mental health policy.

1980's: The OMH creates new initiatives designed to meet the specific needs of mentally ill African-Americans and Latinos. In response to the emergence of Alzheimer's disease as a distinct mental illness, it increases outpatient programs for the elderly. Escalating prison populations lead it to create new facilities for the treatment of mentally ill criminals, outpatient programs in several state correctional facilities, and training programs for state and local law enforcement officers. From the mid-1980's onward, it also devotes increasing attention to the mental health needs of people with AIDS.

1980: The New York State Insanity Defense Reform Act increases the OMH's responsibility for caring for and evaluating criminals deemed not responsible by reason of insanity.

1980: The National Mental Health Systems Act, which asserts that the federal government will continue to shape mental health policy but will assume less of the burden of paying for treatment, is passed during the last months of Jimmy Carter's presidency.

1981: The President's Commission on Mental Health issues its final report, albeit without fanfare.

1981: The administration of Ronald Reagan abdicates responsibility for setting federal mental health policy. The 1981 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act repeals the provisions of the National Mental Health Systems Act, cuts federal mental health and substance abuse allocations by twenty-five percent, and converts them to block grants disbursed with few strings attached. New York State, which uses block-grant monies to fund community-based programs, and other states have to cut mental health programs.

Early 1980's: Seeking to cut federal expenditures, the Reagan administration directs the Social Security Administration to pare the SSI and SSDI rolls. Social Security administrators respond by developing definitions of mental illness that diverge from
those used in the past and those employed by mental health professionals. They also project a savings of $3.5 billion dollars, a figure far larger than that predicted by the administration's budget personnel, who had anticipated a $218 million savings. The mentally ill were disproportionately affected by program cuts: they constituted eleven percent of SSI and SSDI recipients and roughly thirty percent of those purged from the rolls. The resulting dislocations ultimately produce a public outcry that compels the administration and Social Security to back down.

**Mid-1980's:** Federal support for mental health treatment increases as advocacy groups protest against funding cuts and Democrats in Congress bury funding allocations in omnibus budget bills.

**1986:** The federal State Comprehensive Mental Health Plan Act compels states to devise detailed service plans that emphasize the needs of the seriously mentally ill in order to remain eligible for federal block grant funds. In its emphasis upon planning, it closely resembles New York State's efforts to insure that seriously ill people receive adequate care.
1992: The federal Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and Mental Health Administration Reorganization Act abolishes the ADAMHA and replaces it with the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA). During the Bush and Clinton administrations, the SAMHSA emphasizes information provision and administration of block grants, which have more restrictions than they had in the past.

1993: The New York State Community Mental Health Reinvestment Act mandates that all savings realized from the closure of unneeded state psychiatric centers be funneled to community mental health programs. The act is propelled in part by the OMH's intention to close several facilities.

1993: The Clinton administration's efforts to create a national health insurance program are notable for their relatively generous provisions for mental health care. However, the plan is rejected by Republicans and many Democrats in Congress and the administration shies away from advancing any other bold policy initiatives.

1996: The federal Mental Health Parity Act compels companies that offer mental health insurance benefits to their employees to insure that coverage of mental and physical illness is reasonably equitable.
New York State's Community Mental Health Reinvestment Act

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In an era of scarce resources, public mental health systems have been struggling to develop comprehensive community-based treatment and rehabilitation systems for persons with mental illnesses. In New York State the Community Mental Health Reinvestment Act, signed into law in December 1993, establishes the state government's commitment over a five-year period to provide substantial new resources to fund the development of community services. The basic principle behind the legislation, the most significant reform in the state's mental health care financing in decades, is that funds saved from downsizing the state hospital system through closures and census reductions must be "reinvested" to create more community-based services.

The authors describe the political processes leading to the act's passage, the obstacles overcome by legislative negotiators, the act's provisions, and some implementation issues. Although the act has received some criticism, it appears to be favorably regarded by mental health advocates, recipients, providers, and administrators. (Psychiatric Services 46:496-500, 1995)

On December 20, 1993, New York State Governor Mario M. Cuomo signed into law the Community Mental Health Reinvestment Act (1). In several ways, the act dramatically reformed the state's funding of community-based mental health services.

At its core is a basic principle: funds saved from downsizing of the state-operated psychiatric hospital system must be "reinvested" to create more community-based services for persons with severe mental illnesses. The act implements the demand of mental health advocates and the longstanding promise of public officials: dollars should follow persons discharged into the community.

Background

The political impetus for the reinvestment legislation arose from persistent factors that were ignited by recent developments. Mental health activists and others have long advocated a shift in the locus of mental health services from large institutions to smaller, community-based settings.

When this shift began to occur in the 1960s, it reflected changes in treatment philosophy, the advent of new medications, and a preference, from a civil liberties and quality-of-life standpoint, for treatment in less restrictive settings. The shift also coincided with the state's interest in reducing the financial burden of serving an enormous inpatient population, which had reached a peak of 93,000 patients in 1959. As a result of the shift, the census of state-operated psychiatric hospitals in New York fell rapidly and steeply. Between 1983 and 1993 the adult inpatient census declined from 21,800 to about 10,000 patients.

At the same time, mental health advocates contended that the state had failed to match its reduction in inpatient services with the development of community-based services. From a balance-sheet perspective, the contention is debatable. New York State's spending for community-based mental health services has risen significantly over the past decade, from $273 million in 1983-1984 to $560 million in 1993-1994. However, advocates have pointed out that community-based services have received a disproportionately low share of state mental health funding: although 90 percent of persons receiving mental health care are served in community-based programs, such programs have received only about 40 percent of the public mental health system's dollars.

Statistics aside, the most forceful argument that the state was not meeting its responsibility to fund community-based services was the evidence on the streets of New York's major cities: the high visibility of persons with severe mental illness, who were struggling not only with their mental disorders but with homelessness, unemployment, drug and alcohol problems, and poor general health.

The immediate factor that ignited the demand for the reinvestment legislation was the state's budget crisis of 1990-1992. In the mental health arena, the budget crisis increased the pressure on the state both to acceler-
are downsizing of state psychiatric hospitals and to contain new local mental health spending. Specifically, in conjunction with the 1992 executive budget, the state proposed both the closure of five psychiatric hospitals and an 8 percent cut in community-based mental health spending.

At this juncture, mental health advocates faced not only a steep reduction in community-based funding but a loss of the resource base—funding for psychiatric hospitals, which was the potential source for further community-based funding. The advocates' political goal became clear: further hospital downsizing must be matched by increased community spending.

A coalition of interested organizations began to meet on this issue, calling itself the Mental Health Action Network. Membership in the network was broad and included groups representing patients, families, providers, local governments, and others. Although these organizations clearly shared a broad objective—to push for more spending on community-based mental health services—forging a consensus was no easy matter. They differed in matters ranging from their vision of a community-based system to questions of tactics and how much to compromise.

Despite these differences, by the spring of 1992 the network succeeded in developing a consensus proposal and securing its introduction in the state legislature. The Mental Health Resources Bill (as it was called at that time) attracted some attention but was not acted on during that session. In the spring of 1993 a revised bill was introduced, and the Mental Health Action Network began promoting the bill in earnest through a combination of personal lobbying, demonstrations, media coverage, and other activities.

The politics surrounding the bill at this stage were complex. The state's fiscal crisis still cast a shadow over all proposals for new spending. Nonetheless, legislators shared a growing sense that the mental health system had borne more than its share of the brunt of budget cuts in recent years. The bill was also boosted by the rhetoric that it did not seek new spending, only the reallocation of current spending for inpatient services.

Governor Cuomo, however, found the bill highly problematic. Above all, he opposed, as a matter of principle, legislation that would bind him and possibly a future governor to fund a particular budget category according to a formula. He forcefully argued that he had a constitutional responsibility to evaluate the state's projected revenues and projected needs each year and develop a budget accordingly.

The governor also lodged other criticisms against the bill. He noted that real savings in inpatient costs came not simply from census decreases but from the closure of facilities, and he criticized the bill for doing nothing to help secure the closure of underutilized state-operated psychiatric hospitals. He also maintained that the bill did not guarantee that funds would go where the need was greatest, such as for care of homeless mentally ill persons, and that the bill did not adequately ensure the cost-effective use of funds.

However, Governor Cuomo increasingly appreciated the principle of reinvestment, as well as the growing political support for the principle. Accordingly, his staff and staff of the State Office of Mental Health began to explore ways to address his specific concerns.

In developing the legislation, efforts were made to direct funds toward New York State's most severely mentally ill adults and children and to ensure that funds would be used to purchase an effective array of services.

Meanwhile, the bill was promoted by sponsors, advocates, and newspaper editorial boards throughout the state and gathered considerable political momentum. On July 5, 1993, the state senate passed the bill, and at 7 a.m. on July 7, after an all-night session, the state assembly passed it—the last bill passed on the last day of the session.

The governor's signature was required before the bill would become law, and he reiterated his concerns about the bill in its current form. However, he authorized his executive staff, along with OMH staff, to meet with senate and assembly staff to try to work out a compromise bill. Meetings occurred throughout the summer and fall.

In general, the governor's staff pushed for a reinvestment formula linked to actual state savings, an agreement to close five facilities, the targeting of funds for homeless or chemically dependent mentally ill persons, and provisions to make it easier to provide capital financing for community-based services. The legislature generally sought to keep the formula as generous as possible, to restrict the conditions under which closures could occur, and to maintain a politically acceptable geographic distribution of reinvestment funds.

Agreements were reached in the fall of 1993. At a special December legislative session called to address a variety of unfinished business, the legislature passed the revised bill. The governor signed the Community Mental Health Reinvestment Act into law on December 20, 1993.

Provisions of the act
Amount of funds made available. The new legislation establishes a five-year commitment by the legislature and the governor of New York State to shift resources from a shrinking state hospital system into an expanded community-based mental health service system. The act reallocates an estimated $210 million over five state fiscal years, 1994–1995 through 1998–1999.

The funds are derived from three sources. The largest source, amounting to $143 million, is savings asso-
associated with anticipated declines in the census of patients who are the financial responsibility of the state (that is, adults between the ages of 22 and 64). The second largest source of funds, about $47 million, is savings associated with the closure of at least five state-operated psychiatric hospitals identified in the law. Third, a separate five-year appropriation of $30 million is provided for services to mentally ill persons who are also homeless or substance dependent.

The act requires up to $27 million to be set aside to enhance the number of staff on inpatient wards of state psychiatric hospitals to ensure the health and safety of patients and staff. Therefore, the amount actually "reinvested" into community-based mental health services over the five-year period is expected to total $183 million, or an average annual allocation of $36.6 million. This represents an annual growth rate of approximately 6 percent, a significant improvement over rates in recent, recession-year years.

The funding made available under the Reinvestment Act is largely contingent on the decline in the psychiatric hospital census. For example, in the first year the act provides for reinvestment of no less than $57,500 per bed closed. Thus the actual amount of reinvestment funding in any fiscal year may vary from the estimates because of the uncertainty of census projections. If census declines exceed projections, more funds will be available for community-based services; if projected declines do not materialize, funding for new services will be less than anticipated.

If the statutory formula described above appears inadequate or excessive in any year, the legislature and the governor retain the authority to modify the funding through the budget process. Indeed, each year's allocations are subject to appropriations.

Geographic allocation of funds. The distribution of funds throughout the state will be accomplished primarily through state grants of aid to each of the state's 58 local governmental units. New York State is diverse in terms of demography, wealth, and needs for services. For political purposes and reasons of fairness, the negotiators of this new law had to ensure that each locality would receive an equitable share of reinvestment funding. However, it was also necessary to make certain that some portion of the funds would be used to redress historic inequities in the distribution of funds and services to meet unmet needs, particularly in inner-city and rural areas. In addition, it was recognized that the promise of additional funding could be used to encourage the development of new services, such as innovative service models, recipient-run programs, and more cost-effective multicounty programs, that would further reduce the need for state-operated inpatient services.

To accomplish these goals, the bill established a four-part allocation formula. First, 50 percent of the funds are distributed on a pro rata basis according to the number of county residents who have serious mental illness. (The City of New York, with roughly half of the state's population, can receive no more than half of this portion of the funding.) Second, 25 percent of the funds are distributed based on each county's relative need for new community mental health services.

Third, 5 percent of funds in any fiscal year are granted to counties served by each state psychiatric hospital that is scheduled to close during that year. Finally, the remainder of such funds—up to 25 percent, depending on the number of hospital closures that year—is distributed at the discretion of the state commissioner of mental health.

Statutory priorities for the discretionary monies (the last category described above) are county proposals designed to deliver needed community-based services to persons who are discharged from state hospitals. The remainder of these discretionary funds is allocated based on the commissioner's determination of priority needs.

The legislation establishes a minimum amount of funding that each county must receive each year, $75,000. This provision ensures that even the most sparsely populated counties will receive funds to provide a meaningful level of services.

Targeted population and services. In the development of the Reinvestment Act, efforts were made to direct funds toward New York State's most severely mentally ill adults and children and to ensure that the funds would be used to purchase an effective array of services. Recipients of the new mental health services are required to have a designated diagnosis of mental illness, with a severity and duration of illness resulting in "substantial functional disability" (2). Particular emphasis is placed on the need to serve "special populations," including mentally ill homeless persons, persons with both mental illness and substance abuse problems, and other "hard-to-serve populations" (3). Hard-to-serve populations are defined to include persons with frequent hospitalizations and persons who have a history of being noncompliant with necessary mental health treatment (4).

Services to be developed are those needed by persons with the most severe mental illnesses. They include emergency and crisis services, intensive case management services, residential services, outpatient services that provide "an adequate level of treatment and rehabilitation," and other support services such as psychiatric rehabilitation, supported work programs, consumer self-help programs, and vocational training (5).

The state mental health commissioner is given statutory powers to ensure that reinvestment funds are used to serve persons with severe mental illness and other hard-to-serve populations in a cost-efficient and effective manner.

Counties will use a revised version of the state's existing planning process for community mental health services to determine which services are to be funded and which providers are to receive reinvestment funds. The revised planning process is a locally conducted evaluation, which provides authority to counties to
Governments in this effort, the legislation amends the local planning process to require significant involvement by recipients of mental health services and their families.

Mental health subcommittees, which are appointed by counties to assist in the development and evaluation of local plans for the new services, must include among their membership at least two current or former recipients of services and at least two family members (effective December 20, 1994). These subcommittees are given enhanced authority to review the use of reinvestment funds and report on the consistency of local plans with the needs of residents with serious mental illnesses.

Despite the revitalized role of government, recipients, and families in the planning process, the statemental health commissioner retains authority to "modify" any local plan (6).

Funds annually set aside for reinvestment in community mental health services "are intended to pay for the development, expansion, and operation" of new community-based services (7). These funds cannot be used to "supplant or replace" funding of identical community mental health services that had previously been paid for through other sources.

Because community-based mental health services in New York are a shared state and local responsibility, the state commissioner of mental health is also authorized to reduce state assistance in future fiscal years to any county that fails to maintain at least the same annual level of financial contributions for local community mental health services.

Recognizing that a handful of newly constructed buildings could devour the bulk of the available funds, the legislation provides that traditional "capital costs" cannot be paid with reinvestment funds. However, counties may use reinvestment funds to pay for initial "program development costs" of community programs and operating costs of these programs, including debt service incurred as a result of building construction or renovation.

Hospital closures and alternate uses of hospital campuses. A significant portion of the money to be reinvested in community services will come from closure over the next five years of five state psychiatric hospitals that the State Office of Mental Health had previously proposed to close. Each of these hospitals is a significant employer and economic resource in its area, and powerful coalitions of local business leaders, labor unions, and state and locally elected officials had presented formidable obstacles to previous attempts to close these facilities. In addition, relatives and friends of patients, and patients themselves, had asserted that closures would impair access to and quality of mental health services.

The negotiators of the Reinvestment Act were able to forge a political consensus to overcome these obstacles and authorize the closure of five facilities. Several factors accounted for their success. First and foremost, the legislation explicitly links closures to funding and authorization to develop additional community-based services. The act provides that all savings resulting from hospital closures will be reinvested in new or expanded services in areas of the state where persons with serious mental illnesses reside and where the relative need for services is greatest. Furthermore, the new law specifically dedicates a significant infusion of funding for new services—5 percent of that year's new funding—to localities in which a hospital is closed.

Second, by establishing state and local task forces with specific planning responsibilities, the law ensures the involvement of state and local government representatives in developing alternate uses for closed state hospital campuses. In addition, involvement of local community business leaders and the public is ensured through the requirement that at least one public hearing be held before plans are developed for reuse of any closing hospital. To assist in the implementation of plans for alternative uses, the act also expands the authority of the state to convey, lease, or sublease these properties for new public or private uses (8).

Finally, the law includes specific provisions to address several issues unique to a particular hospital or issues considered to be particularly vital by those who negotiated the Reinvestment Act. For example, one hospital, which serves a largely geriatric population, is prohibited from closing until a "co-located, gero-psychiatric" facility is established at a nearby state psychiatric hospital (9). Another hospital, which is located in a rural area of the state that has been particularly hard hit by a federal military base closing and other adverse economic conditions, is prohibited from closing until the aforementioned state task force certifies "that a significant alternative use... has been established" (9).

State workforce issues. State labor representatives were concerned that any law encouraging state hospital closures and the reduction of state inpatient resources was certain to have a significant adverse impact on the state workforce, including layoffs. Concern was also expressed that as the hospital census declined, remaining patients were likely to be younger and more seriously mentally ill and would thus require more staff-intensive services to ensure health and safety within the hospital.

Drafters of the Reinvestment Act...
attempted to address these workforce issues in several ways. First, labor received statutory assurances that a significant amount of reinvestment dollars (up to 15 percent of each year's funding) would be made available to improve staff-to-patient ratios on state hospital inpatient wards (10). The act also provides that at least 7 percent of all newly developed community services will be state operated and, therefore, will be staffed by state employees. Plans for reuse and development of state hospital campuses vacated by hospital closures must consider alternative uses that will minimize displacement of the hospital workforce. In addition, the state commissioner of mental health, in consultation with commissioners of other relevant state agencies, is required to develop specific proposals to provide continuity of employment, to ease the transition of state employees to other jobs, and to provide alternatives to layoffs.

Implementation issues
As of late 1994, implementation of the Reinvestment Act was well under way—some $38.6 million in first-year projected savings from downsizing and closures was being distributed to counties for new community-based services developed pursuant to local plans. By most accounts, the act is highly regarded, both for the new resources it has made available and for the process by which the funds are allocated. Nonetheless, criticisms have emerged from various quarters.

For example, local reinvestment plans have tended to apply reinvestment dollars toward non-Medicaid programs, such as consumer-run initiatives and nonresidential community support programs. This tendency is partly due to local ideas about desirable programs and partly due to the fact that in New York State, local governments are required to match the state share of most Medicaid expenditures. (The Reinvestment Act provides only the state, not the local, share of Medicaid expenditures.) Consequently, providers and others who had hoped for expansion of Medicaid-funded programs such as outpatient clinics have been disappointed.

Moreover, by promoting the development of community-based services, the Reinvestment Act has become the focus of complaints from some local activists who oppose siting residential programs and other services for persons with mental illness in their neighborhoods. Actually, the Reinvestment Act does not change siting practices in New York State; negotiators on all sides avoided this highly volatile issue. However, the act has been characterized by some as a scheme to expedite deinstitutionalization to the detriment of communities. The fallacy of that critique is that rapid downsizing of state psychiatric hospitals had been occurring for some time; the Reinvestment Act finally attaches funding to that process and thus actually relieves the burden on communities.

Further, many mental health advocates have argued that distribution of new funds for residential services has been far less than need would dictate. In fact, local plans for reinvestment services have devoted only 10 percent of funds to new residential services. Critics argue that this level of funding is inadequate and has resulted from local siting concerns and neighborhood opposition to residential development.

Other concerns have been expressed about such matters as the overall level of funding, whether provisions for including families and recipients in the planning process have "enough teeth to ensure their meaningful participation, the process for distributing funds for homeless and substance-abusing persons with mental illness, and the dearth of new funding for services for persons not seriously and persistently mentally ill. Such tensions are inevitable in response to a new and complex bill that strives to balance different interests and to set new priorities in an era of scarce resources.

Conclusions
The principle behind the Reinvestment Act is simple and compelling: as state psychiatric hospitals become smaller or close, dollars should flow the patients into the community. Efforts to embody that principle into statute encountered a thicket of legal, political, and fiscal issues, from the governor's institutional concerns about the intrusion on the budget-making authority of the executive to the fear of unions that the bill would expedite layoffs in hospitals and the suspicion of some legislators that it would excessively shift mental health funds from upstate New York to New York City.

Nonetheless, empowered and propelled by pressure from advocates and other lobbying groups, negotiators were able in a relatively short period of time to find viable compromises or other solutions to the myriad problems presented. The result is a bill that if it lives up to its stated goals, will bring about a significant increase in community-based services for persons with mental illness in New York State.

Shortly before publication of this article, newly elected New York Governor George E. Pataki proposed a state budget containing a broad range of spending cuts, including a reduction in funding under the Community Mental Health Reinvestment Act. At this time, it cannot be determined whether the state legislature will adopt those proposals.

References
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November 7, 2022

The President
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
Washington, D.C. 20500

Mr. President:

There is no question that Americans have suffered great loss of life and endured financial hardships, across all sectors, over the past 32 months due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Frontline healthcare workers risked their lives, provided care during physically and emotionally demanding situations, and bore witness to their patients’ goodbyes to loved ones from afar.

Yet, in recent months, hospital emergency departments (EDs) have been brought to a breaking point. Not from a novel problem – rather, from a decades-long, unresolved problem known as patient “boarding,” where admitted patients are held in the ED when there are no inpatient beds available. While the causes of ED boarding are multifactorial, unprecedented and rising staffing shortages throughout the health care system have recently brought this issue to a crisis point, further spiraling the stress and burnout driving the current exodus of excellent physicians, nurses and other health care professionals.

**Boarding has become its own public health emergency.** Our nation’s safety net is on the verge of breaking beyond repair; EDs are gridlocked and overwhelmed with patients waiting – waiting to be seen; waiting for admission to an inpatient bed in the hospital; waiting to be transferred to psychiatric, skilled nursing, or other specialized facilities; or, waiting simply to return to their nursing home. And this breaking point is entirely outside the control of the highly skilled emergency physicians, nurses, and other ED staff doing their best to keep everyone attended to and alive.

Any emergency patient can find themselves boarded, regardless of their condition, age, insurance coverage, income, or geographic area. Patients in need of intensive care may board for hours in ED beds not set up for the extra monitoring they need. Those in mental health crises, often children or adolescents, board for months in chaotic EDs while waiting for a psychiatric inpatient bed to open anywhere. Boarding doesn’t just impact those waiting to receive care elsewhere. When ED beds are already filled with boarded patients, other patients are decompensating and, in some cases, dying while in ED waiting rooms during their tenth, eleventh, or even twelfth hour of waiting to be seen by a physician. The story recently reported about a nurse in Washington who called 911 as her ED became completely overwhelmed with waiting patients and boarders is not unique – it is happening right now in EDs across the country, every day.

“At peak times which occur up to 5 days per week we have more patients boarding than we have staffed beds. High numbers have included last week when our 22 bed emergency department had 35 boarders and an additional 20 patients in the waiting room…In addition, we have patients who unfortunately have died in our waiting room while awaiting treatment. These deaths were entirely due to boarding. Our boarding numbers have unfortunately skyrocketed in the wake of covid as a consequence of increasing surgical volumes and decreasing inpatient nurse staffing.” – anonymous emergency physician

To illustrate the stark reality of this crisis, the American College of Emergency Physicians (ACEP) recently asked its members to share examples of the life-threatening impact the recent uptick in boarding has brought to their emergency departments. Excerpts of the responses received, as well as key findings from a qualitative analysis of the submissions, are included in this letter to summarize aspects of the problem. The full compilation of anonymized stories, attached as an appendix, paints a picture of an emergency care system already near collapse. As we face this winter’s “triple threat” of flu, COVID-19 surges, and pediatric respiratory illnesses that are on a sudden rise, **ACEP and the undersigned organizations hereby urge the Administration to convene a summit of stakeholders from across the health care system to identify immediate and long-term solutions to this urgent problem.** If the system is already this strained during our “new normal,” how will emergency departments be able to cope with a sudden surge of patients from a natural disaster, school shooting, mass casualty traffic event, or disease outbreak?

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2 “Silverdale hospital short on staff calls 911 for help after being overwhelmed with patients”
Background

Imagine a short-staffed restaurant with seating for 40, with a long line of starving customers that cannot be turned away. The chef and line cooks are desperately trying to keep up to provide safely prepared and high-quality meals. They create space for an extra 15 diners in a back hallway and assign one server to attend to them all. But there are 50 more customers waiting to come into the dining room to eat. They serve as many as possible in chairs in the lobby with a much more limited menu. Now imagine that those who are fed never leave and stay there until they need food again. Meanwhile, Uber Eats and other delivery service orders are also coming in, and the delivery drivers crowd the room further, waiting to pick up orders.

In this simplified analogy, the restaurant is the emergency department; the chef, line cooks, hosts, and waitstaff all comprise the emergency care team; the meals are the emergency care itself; and the Uber Eats drivers are emergency medical service (EMS) crews bringing in more patients. Customarily, patients who arrive to the ED via walk-in are checked in and either directed to a treatment area or the waiting room to wait until space is available, depending on the severity of illness. Once space becomes available, they are taken back into the treatment area for a completion of the clinical assessment and any needed treatment. A decision is then made that the patient is either well enough to go home or requires admission to the hospital for continued treatment. Inpatient beds traditionally require both a physical bed space (patient room) and nurses to care for that patient. Unlike in the ED, most hospitals have ratios of nurses to patients for inpatient beds to promote quality of care and patient safety that are set by state laws, regulatory agencies, and accrediting bodies. If there are no available (staffed) beds within the specific unit to which the patient needs transferring, the patient must wait, or be “boarded” in the ED, often for hours, sometimes days or even weeks. The same issue of required staffing ratios holds true for transfer outside the facility, such as to an inpatient psychiatric facility or a skilled nursing facility. As well, patients that arrive in an ambulance via EMS must be appropriately screened by ED staff before the EMS crew can release the patient and return their ambulance to service. So once the hospital’s available inpatient beds are full, more ED patients are boarded and must be accommodated in the ED, filling up valuable ED beds and even hallways. Unless the ED can go on diversion status (which is becoming increasingly difficult), more patients continue to show up via EMS. Needed ambulances must be taken out of service as the EMS crews must often wait hours with their patient in the ED before they can safely hand them over to ED staff. And through this all, walk-in patients continue to arrive to the ED and cannot be turned away under the federal Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act, or EMTALA, requirements.

Boarding and ED crowding are not caused by ED operational issues or inefficiency; rather, they stem from misaligned economic drivers and broader health system dysfunction. Boarding and ED crowding lead to increased cases of mortality related to downstream delays of treatment for both high and low acuity patients. Boarding can also lead to ambulance diversion, increased adverse events, preventable medical errors, lower patient satisfaction, violent episodes in the ED, and higher overall health care costs. Much has been written on causes of and potential solutions to boarding, but the issue persists, due in part to its many derivative factors, the disparate stakeholders involved, and misaligned economic incentives.

Preventable Patient Harm

There is ample evidence that boarding harms patients and leads to worse outcomes, compromises to patient privacy, increases in medical errors, detrimental delays in care, and increased mortality. The Joint Commission identifies boarding as a patient safety risk that should not exceed 4 hours, yet many of the responses to the ACEP’s call for stories cite boarding times much longer than that as an almost routine occurrence; 97 percent of stories with times provided cited boarding times of more than 24 hours, 33 percent per week, and 28 percent over 2 weeks.

References:
Descriptions of the negative impact on patient outcomes, including potentially avoidable deaths, follow:

“We are a very rural hospital with only family practice and emergency physicians - there are no specialists within 90 miles...Recently I had a woman with abdominal pain in the ER. When she arrived she had normal vital signs and was not really very sick. Testing showed that she had an infected gallbladder - a simple problem for any surgeon to treat. We called 27 hospitals before one in a different state called us back when a bed finally opened up. She spent thirty six hours in our ER, and was in shock being treated with maximum doses of drugs to keep her alive when she was transferred. She didn't survive.”

“...The physician finally was able to see her in a side waiting room, he stepped out of the room for several minutes and on return she was face down and blue. They immediately began trying to resuscitate her, brought her back to our trauma bay in which they were unable to intubate her and then performed an emergent cricothyrotomy on her. She had anoxic brain injury and died. While this sounds like a random occurrence, I am frequently asked to come to the waiting rooms to help carry people out of their cars or off the floor because they have passed out or gone into cardiac arrest in the waiting rooms on multiple occasions. I have since reached out to nearly all my close friends and family and have begged them under no circumstances to go to the ED without reaching out to me first. I have begun doing house calls in my neighborhood as well as Zoom calls with family to keep them out of the ED’s because they are so dangerous. In fact, I’ve gone as far as begun sending people home from the ED whom I would normally admit because the hospitals have become that dangerous. It’s safer for many of these people to be discharged home and taken care of by family than run the risk of the multitude of mistakes that are taking place in the hospitals because there is no staff.”

“In the past six months, 3 people have died in our er waiting room. One only noticed when he had been sitting for > 6 hours and slumped to the floor. When he was found had been dead “awhile”. The patient had been triaged by a nurse, but in a very busy urban where the waiting room is always packed and people regularly wait > 8 hours to be seen regularly the er physicians were never aware of this patient. We can only see new patients all day rotating through 3 chairs as all other beds are full. We physicians want desperately to see patients but there is a huge stop gap as we cannot pull back patients efficiently because there are no nurses for new patients. All ER nurses are now functioning floor nurses for all the boarding patients.”

**Waiting Room Care**

Many emergency physicians who submitted stories reported daily numbers of boarders close to or even exceeding 100 percent of the total number of beds in their EDs, while the number of patients in the waiting room comprised up to 20 times the number of free treatment beds in which they could even be seen. In the past, that often left only hallway stretchers within the ED to care for incoming patients. But now, those too are increasingly over capacity, and so the emergency department waiting room has become the latest ad-hoc location for receiving patient care.

“We’ve had lobby nurses responsible for 15-20 patients each. We’ve pushed diltiazem, hung amiodarone, cared for septic shock, and are now admitting patients regularly directly from the lobby. Care is being provided in chairs with little privacy and the hope of a portable monitor. Meanwhile 40 boarders are being cared for in an ED with overhead pages, lights on all the time and a total of 5 bathrooms and no showers. One night we had a septic patient waiting two hours for triage code and die in our triage room.”

“My shop is 34 bed rural tertiary care center that serves an area greater than 20,000 square miles. Month after month our boarding issues continue to exacerbate and have surpassed critical levels many months ago. We are frequently the largest in-patient ward in the hospital. Currently we average 28 boarding patients in our department and this has been as high as 41 boarded patients and 31 patients in the waiting room less than a week ago...Due to these challenges we have fully implemented “waiting room medicine”, closed down our Provider in Triage, instead all providers pick up patients in the waiting room. Nearly 50% of our patient encounters now result in discharge from the waiting room. Finally, it is not at all uncommon to have patients in
the waiting room with SarsCoV-2, pending orders for heparin, diltazem, or other vasoactive medications. In the past month we have had SAH [subarachnoid hemorrhage, or brain bleed], Fournier gangrene, hip fractures, Septic shock all being treated in the waiting room with no available beds to move them into.”

"...our 40 bed ED was boarding a large number of patients up to several days awaiting an inpatient hospital bed with a waiting room of >30 people. We had someone in the lobby who was not being appropriately monitored and began having large bloody vomiting. Vitals were only available from when he initially presented to triage almost 8 hrs ago. He lost pulses in the waiting room in front of others including children. As the resuscitation began in the lobby, this posted high risk for other patients in the lobby as we began CPR while blood ejected from his mouth with every compression. It wasn’t until he was in a proper room that we were able to obtain IV access and suction the blood. This was not only scaring for the others and hospital workers, but may have been avoided if our emergency department was decompressed and an appropriate history/exam/workup had been done by me or another physician much earlier in order to initiate treatments that have been shown to improve outcomes related to his presenting complaint and known risk factors.”

Patients don’t just arrive in the ED through the waiting room—they are also brought in by EMS via ambulance. Many hospitals are unable to go on diversion status, even when the emergency department is completely backed up with patients, which means EMS crews must wait with the patient until they can be seen. This means the ambulances are stuck at hospitals and unable to respond to new emergencies:

“We have 26 beds in the emergency department but often over 50 total patients. We are not allowed to go on divert as [County] does not allow us to. It is often very unsafe in the emergency department when there are too many patients without any physical space or enough nurses to care for them. It puts physicians in a bad place as we have to continue to accept ambulance traffic without being able to care for them or the 20+ patients in the lobby.”

“Our County’s Emergency Medical Services reduced our ability to go on diversion down to 200 hours max for the month of October. Diversion is when paramedics bypass our hospital to take patients with heart attacks and strokes to other hospitals and is the only mechanism we have to offset ED overcrowding due to inpatient boarding. Removing this ability means patients will continue to arrive despite all beds being occupied with admitted patients thereby forcing us to care for these patients in areas such as ambulance ramps and public hallway spaces. Therefore we are essentially disrobing patients in public spaces in order to care for them. All this because of inpatients boarding in the ED. Basically the ED is the largest inpatient unit in the hospital. Patients are receiving bills for 2 or 3 days of inpatient care but never actually arrive upstairs to an inpatient space.”

**Pediatric Care**

Unfortunately, the pediatric population is not immune to the serious ED boarding issue we are facing—particularly those with mental health conditions. During the last decade, pediatric ED visits for mental health conditions have risen dramatically. The COVID-19 pandemic led to a greater acceleration of these visits, causing several pediatric health organizations to issue a national emergency for children’s mental health in 2021 and the U.S. Surgeon General to release an advisory on mental health among youth. According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), during March–October 2020, among all ED visits, the proportion of mental health-related visits increased by 24 percent among U.S. children aged 5–11 years and 31 percent among adolescents aged 12–17 years, compared with 2019. Further, a metanalysis conducted in 2020 illustrates the detrimental effects of boarding among the pediatric population. Multiple studies show that pediatric patients with mental health conditions who are boarded are more likely to leave without being treated, and less likely to receive counseling or psychiatric medications. Beyond mental health, children with other health care conditions are experiencing similar ED wait

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times as adults; even children’s hospitals that only serve the pediatric population are already over capacity as cold and flu season is only getting started. The stories below illustrate how boarding is particularly impacting those children in the greatest need of immediate medical attention:

“We are a 28 bed pediatric ED, with a catchment area of 2.5 million children. I came onto shift yesterday morning. We had 15 children on psych holds, many of them waiting in the lobby for their 24-72 hours stays so we could use our beds to see medical patients. One of those patients had been in the ED for >150 hours, as their parents had relinquished their rights and DFS was refusing to take the patient back, even though our psychiatry team had cleared them as no longer a danger to self or others. We had 10 admissions boarding, 7 on high-flow oxygen, 4 of which were Peds ICU level. There are no open Peds ICU beds in our 4 closest counties, including our own. We had 35 patients in the waiting room in addition to the 20 medical patients being managed by the ED. We had 7 transfers pending from outside facilities to the ED, plus more awaiting direct admissions from an outside ED to an inpatient bed whenever a bed became available. One that left another hospital’s ED against medical advice and came to our ED had been waiting 3 days for transfer. They had an AVM in their brain that needed urgent surgery.”

“We had a 12 month old patient who presented in respiratory distress and low oxygenation who was found to have pneumonia and required a high amount of oxygen (Opitflo) to maintain his oxygen saturations. After stabilizing him for the interim, we attempted to transfer to a Pediatric ICU (PICU). We were met with not a single open PICU bed in the state, as well as no hospitals with capability to accept transfer in every major city in the surrounding states. The critically ill child stayed in our emergency department for over 24 hours awaiting acceptance at one of our state’s Children’s Hospitals and still had an over 8 hour wait for EMS once a bed was available. Luckily, this child started to improve with antibiotics and treatment over those 24 hours though if they had progressed, we may have had to be boarding a child on life support (ventilator) without access to a Pediatric ICU.”

“My wife is a Pediatric Emergency Physician. She works at the [redacted] Children’s Hospital in the world, with all available services at the hospital and patients from all over the world who come for care. She walked into her shift the other day with over 50 patients in the waiting room of a 60+ bed ER, with all hospital and ER beds already full with sick patients and others holding to be admitted. 27 ER beds were being held up with actively psychotic or suicidal children with nowhere else to go. A young child had to sit in the waiting room for 8+ hours with their lower lip lacerated and nearly completely hanging off of their face, because there weren’t any beds available to properly evaluate and treat the patient.”

**Psychiatric**

Boarding of psychiatric patients in EDs is particularly prevalent, disproportionately affecting patients with behavioral health needs who wait on average three times longer than medical patients because of significant gaps in our health care system. While the ED is the critical frontline safety net, it is not ideal for long-term treatment of mental and behavioral health needs. Research has shown that 75 percent of psychiatric emergency patients, if promptly evaluated and treated in an appropriate location – away from the active and disruptive ED setting – have their symptoms resolve to the point they can be discharged in less than 24 hours. However, far too many Americans have limited options for accessing outpatient mental health care. This can exacerbate ED boarding from two directions: on one end, as patients who can’t access outpatient treatment may then enter into a crisis that requires an ED visit, and from the other end, a lack of available outpatient follow-up care prevents patients from being discharged from inpatient psychiatric care and freeing up a bed for the next admission waiting in the ED.

“We have ~ 70 beds, this AM we had 42 admitted patients (admitted up to 38 hours earlier), 10 boarding Behavioral Health Patients, and 5 social boarders/group home patients. Our group home patients all have

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chronic, lifelong behavioral issues, and were inappropriately 'dumped' in ED by the group home and guardian (whether LME or DSS, after not following state guidelines related to appropriate group home discharge). Our group home patients have been here from 1200 - 3520 hours. Considering average ED visit being 3-4 hours, those 6 group home patients boarding hours = loss of ability to see upwards of 2500 other ED patients.”

“Our system has failed our most vulnerable patients. We held a 14 yr old girl in a tiny ED room for 42 days (!!!!) awaiting transfer/ placement for inpatient psychiatric care. In our ED we routinely board patients due to the hospital at capacity, but it’s particularly bad with mental health patients who need inpatient psychiatric treatment. Our hospital is not a licensed psychiatric facility, and by law we may only hold for 72 hours under a 5150 application. That said, just because there are no facilities able and/or willing to take the patients doesn’t mean their psychiatric emergencies have resolved. Can you imagine being confined to a small room, without actually getting psychiatric care, for 42 days??? This could have been the subject of a Stephen King novel. Horrific.”

“I’m working in a 9-bed ED with an additional 3-beds dedicated to psychiatric patients. We now have a patient who has been boarding with us for over 5 MONTHS with no end in sight. She is unfortunately a disruptive person as well, interrupting patient care elsewhere in the ED as she wanders the hallways (we do have to allow her out of her 10x10 room on occasion and tying up our security resources. She has injured herself on occasion, and has refused medications until she is so psychotic that she can’t refuse them any longer.”

**Burnout**

Overcrowding and boarding in the emergency department is a significant and ever-growing contributor to physician and nurse burnout, as they must watch patients unnecessarily decompensate or die despite their best efforts to keep up with the growing flood of sicker and sicker patients coming in. Health care professionals experiencing burnout have a much higher tendency to retire early or stop practicing all together. This increases the loss of skilled health care professionals in the workforce and adds more strain to those still practicing, which continues the cycle of burnout within the profession.

Though stress is a given in emergency medicine, the rate of burnout is of tremendous concern and causing additional strain to an already crippled healthcare system. Shift work, scheduling, risk of exposure to infectious disease, and violence in the emergency department can all affect the mental health and wellbeing of the physicians and nurses. Coupled with overcrowding and boarding in the ED, health care professionals are now facing stresses and moral injury that go well beyond everyday practice. The danger of the cycle of burnout is further demonstrated with the American Medical Association (AMA)’s recently released study that shows that **62.8 percent of physicians felt burned out in 2021**. Additionally, according to another recent study in Mayo Clinic Proceedings, the burnout rate among physicians in the United States spiked dramatically during the first two years of the COVID-19 pandemic. As the winter’s “triple threat” of flu, COVID-19 surges, and pediatric respiratory illnesses approaches, it is critical that we end the burnout cycle in EDs to ensure our nation’s health care workforce can meet the needs of its patient population.

“We are a large-volume ED, seeing 350-400 patients per day. When we have over 50% of our ED beds full of admitted patients (which happens frequently) we have a plan in place to move our physicians out to see patients in the waiting room. We also, at the same time, fill the hallways with stretchers, where patients are interviewed, examined and often given discharge instructions after their workup is complete. As you can imagine, this is not ideal as it is hard to ensure privacy, and patient comfort in either of these settings. Patient experience is impossible to improve for these patients (would you be happy if this was you or your family member??). Physicians are unhappy as it feels like we can’t provide the care we want to, the care we went into medicine for...

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we are drowning, stressed and we need help - desperately.”

“Evening shift with 55 boarding admitted patients, waiting room backs up to 45-50 patients. A 70 year old woman presents with abdominal and back pain but relatively normal vital signs. She is in a chair in the waiting room. Due to the # of people in the waiting room her husband is sent up to another waiting area. She waits for over 3 hours. Her husband tries communicating with his wife via text messages, but no response. He comes down to ED to find his wife slumped over in the chair and yells to the triage nurses. The patient is in cardiac arrest. She is brought back to the resuscitation bay but is not able to be resuscitated and dies. The ED team, attending physicians, residents, nurses, techs, when finding out that she had been in the waiting room that long, are devastated, many in tears, highly frustrated by the failure of our institution and US healthcare in general to be able to provide adequate access for patients, adequate staffing for our hospitals and ED’s, enough options for longer term care, and a safe environment for patients and providers. Our level of burnout in physicians and nurses is at an all time high. A tragic case like this, a consequence of boarding, is another wound in this long battle which shows no signs of letting up. It even seems to be worsening.”

“By the time I saw her she had been there for 6 hours, stuck on a stretcher inches from an intoxicated man who was vomiting on himself and another patient screaming obscenities. She had not gotten any pain medication and was having severe right hip pain. She also had to urinate badly but had been unable to get anyone to help her. There are 2 triage nurses who are there to watch the 15+ people who were in ambulance triage that night while also receiving the new EMS patients. Orthopedic surgery saw my patient and admitted her from ambulance triage. For the rest of my 8 hour shift she remained in ambulance triage waiting for a bed upstairs or to go to the or, whichever happened first. She is only 1 of many patients with broken bones that I have seen wait for hours before being seen because of how boarded our ED is…It is demoralizing to start every patient encounter with profuse apologies for the wait and difficulty they have had to endure just being in our emergency department. It is heartbreaking to find someone who could be my grandmother languishing in pain for hours before we are finally able to see and evaluate her. We are in a crisis and although we do everything we can to MacGyver solutions to the problem while we are on shift, there is only so much we can do from the ground. We cannot fix this problem in the ED, we need help.”

**Staffing Shortages**

Nursing shortages have exacerbated the deficiency of the health care workforce and stretched care teams to take on extra hours, care for more patients, and shoulder additional clinical and nonclinical duties. Adding to this challenge is the fact that EDs are also not subject to the same staffing ratio requirements as other parts of the hospital often are, and as a result, the ED too often becomes the only place in which to keep many patients. Prior to the pandemic, the American Association of Colleges of Nursing already projected a nursing shortage. That trend has accelerated due to COVID-19, confirmed by a recent American Nurses Foundation survey⁹ which found that 21 percent of nurses surveyed intended to leave their position, with another 29 percent considering leaving. Almost half of all respondents cited insufficient staffing as a factor in their resignation, and their departures will only increase the insufficiency, forcing their fellow nurses to an even more severe condition and impeding the ability to provide high-quality patient care.

“I work in a 34 bed ED in [redacted]. At night we normally staff enough nurses a PA or NP and myself for 20 patients. We calculate one RN to 4 patients. Unfortunately over the past year or more we have nights we hold 20 or more patients in the ED waiting for beds. Some are ICU patients. In the unit they would have one nurse to 1-2 patients. Ours nurses will have one or more sick patient that takes lots of work and at least 3 other patients. Some nights 7 patients to one nurse. This is not safe. We cannot turn people away when over whelmed. That means many people sit in the waiting room uncared for 8-9 or up to 12 hours waiting to be seen.”

“While previously we were able to adapt, utilizing float pool to care for these patients and creating “care spaces” in every nook and cranny, the current boarding and staffing crisis leaves us at the breaking point. ED nurses, with less than 50% staffing sometimes at night, are left to care for boarders in the ED as well as acute patients. Inpatients rooms are closed due to staffing with ratios upstairs barely budging from 1:4.”

“We are a 70 bed tertiary emergency department as part of a health system and we continually have holding of 10-30 patients in our emergency department for 7-72 hours. This holding may be a result due to volume, a lack of movement upstairs on the inpatient floors (having ‘clean’ beds available so the nurse doesn’t get another patient), holding ‘dead beds’ for theoretical postoperative patients and trauma victims, nursing ratios of how many patients an inpatient nurse can see (1:4,6 vs and emergency nurse 1:6,8,10,12,18). I’ve seen elderly patients that cannot fend for themselves in the hallway under cared for and dwindling for hours. I’ve seen pediatric psychiatric patients held with no free bed to transfer to for two to three days. I’ve see adult psychiatric patients locked away on a constant observation order in a 4x6’ room for 48-80 hours with only the freedom to walk to the bathroom and back (no sunlight, no exercise).”

**Misaligned Incentives**

Despite years of advocacy and research to draw attention to the harmful impacts of boarding, it continues, largely due to misaligned incentives in how health care is financed. As hospitals continue to bring in and dedicate beds to elective admissions while boarding the backlog of non-elective patients in the ED, the financial benefits of ED boarding exceed the cost.¹⁰ This was reflected in numerous anecdotes collected in the ACEP poll:

“We are a top nationally ranked hospital that, due to budget issues, has now prioritized transfers and surgery admissions over ED admissions. We typically board 120-200 hrs/day and LBTC rates have climbed from 3-4% to 15-20%.”

“Since July boarding has become the new norm. In our 15 bed ER we are utilizing space in an adjacent unit to house holds. We have had a steady uptick from 5 in July to 5-10 in august, to now consistently 8-15 boarders/holds per day. Last week the AM doc came in to 15 holds and 2 spaces available to see patients. A nursing leader came down and he told them he was tired of this and admin answer was "we will get through it like we have the last few weeks". We didn’t get through it, our patients suffered extensive delays and suboptimal care boarding. Admin doesn’t want to pay agency rates, so the ER is bearing the brunt of shortages…We are treating things like acute appendicitis out of the waiting room with IV fluids and antibiotics, fluids while awaiting OR. We have not cancelled any elective surgeries and until last week they were getting inpatient beds before people holding in ED >24 hours right after PACU.”

“We are a 38 bed ED, usually with 30-40 pts in the waiting room and many EMS patients waiting for rooms in the hallway. Patients come in agitated, acutely psychotic occasionally violent. We cannot provide these patients with high-quality medical care when they are waiting for a bed for hours/sometimes days. We also have critically ill patients requiring higher level of care who have to wait in hallways. It’s not unheard of for these patients to decompensate before we are able to get them into a ED room. This is not sustainable. Saving beds for elective surgical patients while truly ill, critically ill patients waiting hallways in the emergency department is disheartening. It’s unsustainable, morally, wrong, and dangerous for staff and for patients. How did we go from being healthcare heroes to an afterthought of the medical system?”

All of these stories paint a stark picture of boarding’s impacts on every aspect of the health care system. Yet it is clear a disproportionate share of that burden is being carried by two key stakeholders – the emergency care team and their patients. At any time, any of our loved ones are just a moment away from becoming one of these

patients, and their health and safety will depend on your immediate action to address a system that is heading towards collapse.

We greatly appreciate the commitment and attention your Administration has given to the health and safety of those in our nation over the last two years, and we implore you to now make the growing crisis of boarding a major priority. We stand ready to collaborate with you and other impacted stakeholders to identify near- and long-term solutions. If you have any questions, please contact Laura Wooster, MPH, ACEP’s Senior Vice President of Advocacy & Practice Affairs, at lwooster@acep.org.

Sincerely,

American College of Emergency Physicians
Academy of General Dentistry
Allergy & Asthma Network
American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry
American Academy of Emergency Medicine (AAEM)
American Academy of Family Physicians
American Academy of Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation
American Academy of Physician Associates
American Association of Oral and Maxillofacial Surgeons
American College of Allergy, Asthma & Immunology (ACAAI)
American College of Osteopathic Emergency Physicians (ACOEP)
American College of Radiology
American Foundation for Suicide Prevention
       American Medical Association
       American Nurses Association
       American Osteopathic Association
       American Psychiatric Association
       American Society of Anesthesiologists
Association of Academic Chairs of Emergency Medicine
Association of State and Territorial Health Officials (ASTHO)
       Brain Injury Association of America
       Council of Medical Specialty Societies
Council of Residency Directors in Emergency Medicine (CORD)
       Emergency Medicine Residents' Association
       Emergency Nurses Association
       Family Voices
       Infectious Diseases Society of America
       International Association of Fire Chiefs
       National Alliance on Mental Illness
       National Association of EMS Physicians
National Health Care for the Homeless Council
       National Partnership for Women & Families
       Society for Academic Emergency Medicine
Society of Emergency Medicine Physician Assistants (SEMPA)
       The National Alliance to Advance Adolescent Health

cc: The Honorable Xavier Becerra, Secretary, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
       The Honorable Alejandro Mayorkas, Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security
February 7, 2023

The Civil Rights Community Urges Prioritization of Alternative Response in EO Implementation

Dear Deputy Assistant Attorney General Mathis, Deputy Associate Attorney General Mody, and Senior Advisor Fisher,

Thank you for meeting with our groups on January 11, 2023, regarding implementation of Section 14 of Executive Order 14074, Executive Order on Advancing Effective, Accountable Policing and Criminal Justice Practices to Enhance Public Trust and Public Safety (hereafter “EO”). It was an informative and productive meeting, and we look forward to continuing to work together on this important issue.

We would like to emphasize again our commitment to alternative unarmed responders for calls involving people with mental health conditions or other disabilities or who are experiencing a crisis episode — and our continuing serious concerns about co-responder models. Such models lead to continued uses of force and criminalization of people with disabilities, especially when they are Black. We urge you to support alternative responders rather than co-responders in your implementation of the EO, including in any studies, funding, or investments associated with the EO or other activities or programs. Alternative response is an important step towards reducing the harm faced by those experiencing problems with mental health and represents our best chance to respect the civil and human rights of people with disabilities in a safe and just manner.

As you know, encounters with law enforcement can create lasting harm. Black people experience heightened surveillance; higher rates of stops, searches, and arrests by law enforcement; and are grossly overrepresented among those incarcerated in the United States.1 Police encounters also have a deleterious effect on the mental health of Black people.2 Vulnerable populations — including people with mental health conditions, deaf people, autistic people, and people with intellectual and developmental disabilities

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— are at heightened risk for harm from police encounters, which can often turn deadly, especially when the person involved is Black.³

People with mental health conditions and cognitive disabilities are grossly overrepresented among those in jail and prison: Although people with serious mental health conditions comprise only 4 to 5 percent of the U.S. population, they make up about 15 and 20 percent of the prison and jail populations, respectively.⁴ The Bureau of Justice Statistics identifies cognitive disability as the number one reported disability in state and federal populations.⁵ Law enforcement encounters especially threaten the health of Black people with mental health conditions: A recent study shows that Black men with mental health conditions are shot and killed by law enforcement officers at significantly higher rates than White men who exhibit similar behaviors.⁶

There is a heightened risk that police will harm or kill those with mental health conditions or other disabilities, particularly if the individual at risk is Black, and yet law enforcement is generally the default and sometimes only response to calls from or involving those with mental health conditions. This risk would be mitigated if trained mental health workers, including people with lived experience, responded to these calls instead.⁷ Since the risk of harm to the individual is so great, and the actual threat to public safety is usually small, mental health advocates stress that law enforcement response to people with mental health conditions should be avoided whenever possible. Contact between law enforcement and people experiencing mental health crises should be limited to only the rarest exceptions because of the potentially dire consequences. While some advocate for co-responder models, in which law enforcement respond to situations alongside mental health workers, there is not enough evidence to suggest that these models have a positive impact. In fact, law enforcement officer involvement can increase trauma to individuals in crisis, and a co-responder model falsly assumes that most mental health-related 911 calls pose a high safety risk that requires police involvement.⁸ Police responses present an inherent threat of involvement in the criminal-legal system, including incarceration, and that threat cannot be mitigated by better training or the accompanying presence of a mental health professional. The risk posed by law enforcement involvement to those with mental health conditions is simply too great.

Just as the health care system responds to physical health emergencies, be it with an ambulance, a medic, or other services, so too should the mental health system and peer support lead on responding to mental health crises. Instead of relying on law enforcement, the federal government should help cities, states, and other localities invest in community-based alternative response models and mental health services.

³ See LDF-Bazelon, supra note 1, at 3-6.
⁴ Ibid at 3.
Providers of all these services must take steps to ensure that staff understand the cultural norms and socio-economic challenges of the communities they serve and the traumas experienced by members of those communities. These steps should include training received from and the involvement of community members themselves, especially those with lived experience. Peers with lived experience and from communities that have borne the brunt of harmful police involvement are key to any response and should be actively involved in developing alternative response models.

Communities across America, in both urban and rural settings, are investing in mental health care crisis teams or other alternative response models with positive results. For example, since 2015, as required by its settlement agreement with the department, Georgia has provided mobile crisis services within all 159 of the state’s counties, with an average annual response time of one hour or less. The state has a central call center, the Georgia Crisis and Access Line (GCAL), which deploys community-based crisis response teams (historically, on a disbursed staffing model, with clinicians dispatching from their own homes) to individuals in active crisis. Critically, an increasing number of jurisdictions — including St. Petersburg, Florida; Durham, North Carolina; and Albany County, New York, among many others — have specifically designed their programs so that unarmed teams are answering 911 calls that would otherwise receive a police response by default. Other jurisdictions have trained community members, including but not limited to individuals with background in providing medical care, to work as mobile responders.

10 The federal Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA) has said that to be aligned with best practice guidelines, behavioral health mobile crisis teams should include people with lived experience working as peers. SAMHSA. “National Guidelines for Behavioral Health Crisis Care: Best Practice Toolkit.” Pg. 18. 2020. https://www.samhsa.gov/sites/default/files/national-guidelines-for-behavioral-health-crisis-care-02242020.pdf. San Francisco has launched a Street Crisis Response Team (SCRT) program that dispatches teams including a clinician, a community paramedic, and a peer worker to calls for help involving people experiencing mental health crises. City & County of San Francisco. “Street Crisis Response Team.” https://sf.gov/street-crisis-response-team (last visited Jan. 23, 2023). As part of its response to a Consent Decree with the Department of Justice, the city of Baltimore is implementing two-person teams including a clinician and a peer worker across the city and three neighboring counties. Behavioral Health System Baltimore. “GBRICs Partnership.” https://www.bhsbaltimore.org/learn/gbrics-partnership/#1009274555958-4a845e25-3003 (last visited Jan. 23, 2023).
15 See, e.g., National Ass’n of State Mental Health Program Directors. “Strategies for the Delivery of Behavioral Health Crisis Servs. In Rural and Frontier Areas of the U.S.” Pgs. 5-6. Aug. 2020. (describing Alaska’s community-based Behavioral Health Aide program, established in 2008 and following a similar program providing medical services in rural communities: BHAs are often the first to identify when someone is experiencing a crisis, and are the first to respond to traumatic events in the communities they serve. Alaska has found the BHA program to be
Some programs pair workers like these with emergency medical technicians as part of an alternative response. Following the embrace of telehealth services during the COVID-19 pandemic, and with increased federal support available through the American Rescue Plan, other models pair onsite in-person crisis response with virtual support from clinicians and/or prescribers.

A significant benefit from the use of alternative response is the increased likelihood that individuals with mental health conditions will be effectively linked to voluntary, longer-term community-based services that have been shown to help them live successfully in their own homes and communities. Voluntary engagement in assertive community treatment (ACT), housing support programs, supported employment, peer support services, and outpatient medication assisted treatment (MAT) have been shown to help people with mental health conditions avoid involvement with law enforcement and subsequent incarceration. In particular, ACT and other multidisciplinary team approaches are functioning in both urban and rural areas and should be the first responders for individuals enrolled in such programs.

We ask that, as you implement the executive order, you and your colleagues at the Department of Justice and at the Department of Health and Human Services keep these considerations in mind and work to prioritize alternative response as much as possible over law enforcement involvement in incidents involving those with mental health conditions. If you have any questions, please feel free to contact Chloé White, senior policy counsel for justice at The Leadership Conference, at white@civilrights.org.

effective at utilizing available human resources in communities that may otherwise not have an adequate supply, or any supply, of licensed behavioral health providers.” [hereinafter Strategies for Rural Areas], https://nri-inc.org/media/1679/2020paper10.pdf. Colorado’s efforts to implement a similar program in its rural areas have been delayed by the COVID-19 pandemic. Id. at 7.


See, e.g., Strategies for Rural Areas, supra note 15, at 10 (describing Charleston County, South Carolina, program under which ambulance workers use tablet to connect individual in crisis with mobile crisis team for triage: “Service is immediate and allows for more appropriate use of EMS time and resources, and reduces the number of referrals to emergency departments in the county. It reduces the need for mobile crisis teams to travel long distances to reach a crisis, and allows individuals in crisis to receive services quickly.”).

See, e.g., Watson, Amy C., et al., “Crisis Response Services for People with Mental Illness or Intellectual or Developmental Disabilities: A Review of the Literature on Police-Based and Other First Response Models.” The Vera Institute. Pg. 44. 2019. (following literature review, concluding that mobile crisis services “have high rates of consumer and provider satisfaction and can effectively increase community-based service use, reduce reliance on psychiatric ED [emergency departments], and link people to community-based care once discharged from an ED”), https://www.vera.org/downloads/publications/crisis-response-services-for-people-with-mental-illnesses-or-intellectual-and-developmental-disabilities.pdf.


Sincerely,

The Arc of the United States
Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law
Human Rights Watch
The Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights
NAACP
NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. (LDF)
National Urban League
Vera Institute

Cc: Tiffany Russell, SAMHSA
Advancing An Alternative to Police: Community-Based Services for Black People with Mental Illness

July 2022
I. Background

Natasha McKenna was a 37-year-old Black mother of a seven-year-old daughter in Alexandria, Virginia. On February 3, 2015, law enforcement officers began to transfer Natasha from her cell in Fairfax County Jail, where Natasha was being detained on suspicion of attacking a police officer, to a facility in Alexandria, where Natasha would have access to the mental health services that she needed. Natasha was diagnosed with schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, and depression at a young age and clearly displayed signs of her mental illness leading up to and during the week she was detained in Fairfax County jail before her death. In fact, officers at the jail initiated Natasha’s transfer because of rising concerns over the rapid deterioration of her mental health while she was detained. After officers handcuffed Natasha in preparation for her transfer, Natasha grew increasingly anxious. Although she was only 5’3” and weighed about 130 pounds, the Fairfax County Sheriff’s Office deployed its emergency response team of five officers dressed in biohazard suits and gas masks to restrain her. Video footage shows officers forcibly removing Natasha, seemingly nude, out of her cell, wrestling her to the ground, and using a taser on her four times as she sat in a restraint chair. After withstanding over 100,000 volts of electricity, Natasha’s heart stopped beating. A nearby hospital put Natasha on life support for five days, until hospital staff removed the support and pronounced her dead on February 8, 2015. Among Natasha’s last words to the law enforcement officials who tackled, restrained, and ultimately killed her were, “You promised you wouldn’t kill me. I didn’t do anything.”

On April 4, 2018, Saheed Vassell, a 34-year-old Black man, was walking up and down the block, as he always did, in his neighborhood of Crown Heights in Brooklyn, New York. Saheed had developed and was diagnosed with bipolar disorder following the tragic killing of his best friend at the hands of the NYPD. Before his mental illness worsened, Saheed worked as a welder. His bipolar diagnosis inhibited him from maintaining work, but Saheed nonetheless continued to find fascination in collecting and carrying around metal objects reminiscent of his welding days. On the day of his murder, Saheed was carrying part of a welding torch in the shape of a curved silver pipe. Three 911 calls, however, described a black man pointing something that “looked like a gun.” The calls reporting Saheed’s “erratic behavior” were likely made by new arrivals in the neighborhood, unfamiliar with Saheed’s “frequent, harmless presence on the streets.” Three plainclothes officers saw an alert about these calls in their unmarked car and, even though they were not explicitly assigned to the incident, decided to respond. They reached Saheed within two minutes of seeing the alert, followed closely by a marked police car. Although all the local police officers knew of Saheed, his idiosyncrasies, and his history of mental illness, the officers who responded to the scene were part of a specialty anti-crime unit detached from the community. The responding officers claimed they saw Saheed assume a “shooting stance” and rapidly shot him ten times within less than ten seconds of their arrival. Saheed was pronounced dead after arriving at a nearby medical center. Several witnesses recount that the officers did not say anything before opening fire.

In the early hours of March 23, 2020, Daniel Prude, a 41-year-old Black man, experienced a mental health crisis during his visit to his brother in Rochester, New York. During this episode, Daniel ran out of his brother’s home shirtless and shoeless. Daniel had experienced a crisis episode the night before, in response to which he was taken to a nearby hospital for evaluation and released a few hours later. This time, several law enforcement officers arrived on the scene to find Daniel completely nude and wandering the streets as snow began to fall. The first officer who approached Daniel pointed a taser directly towards him, demanding Daniel lie face first on
the street with his hands behind his back. Daniel immediately complied. After several minutes of sitting handcuffed on the cold, wet street with four officers standing at varying distances, Daniel began to verbally express his increasing agitation. Video footage shows Daniel spitting something out of his mouth, in the opposite direction from where the officers stood around him. From behind Daniel’s back and without any advance warning, the officers placed a “spit sock” over Daniel’s face, purportedly to decrease the potential spread of the ongoing Coronavirus, which Daniel had earlier said he had. The mesh hood visibly exacerbated Daniel’s distress and he started to move around on the pavement and speak up even more. When Daniel attempted to stand up, three officers pinned him to the ground, with one pressing his knee on Daniel’s back and another pushing his face into the pavement using the weight of his body. After two minutes, Daniel stopped breathing. He was pronounced brain dead upon arrival to the hospital shortly after. Daniel’s last words in between gasps of air and prayers were “You’re trying to kill me.”

The killings of Natasha McKenna, Saheed Vassell, and Daniel Prude illustrate the all-too-common experiences of Black people with mental illness who encounter law enforcement officers. To protect Black people with mental illness and help them thrive, states and local governments must invest in comprehensive mental health systems to prevent emergencies from occurring, and to respond when emergencies occur.

II. Black People are More Likely to Encounter Law Enforcement and Be Harmed During the Encounter

Black people experience heightened surveillance, higher rates of stops, searches, and arrests by law enforcement, and are grossly overrepresented amongst those incarcerated in the U.S. Additionally, Black people are over three times as likely as white Americans to be killed by law enforcement. In fact, use of force by law enforcement is among the leading causes of death for Black men and boys, making them 2.5 times more likely to be killed by law enforcement officers than white men and boys. “Over the life course, about 1 in every 1,000 black men can expect to be killed by police;” a “nontrivial lifetime risk of being killed by police.” Similarly, Black women are 1.4 times more likely to be killed by law enforcement than white women.

Anti-Black racial bias—whether unconscious, conscious, or structural—from law enforcement officers and agencies contributes to increased stops and violence for Black people when they encounter law enforcement. A false association of Blackness with criminality has historically been used to control Black bodies and movement. This dangerous association persists even today, often influencing perceptions by people regardless of race, gender, class, or occupation, including law enforcement. Research has demonstrated that Black people are also perceived to be more “hostile” than white people with the same facial expressions. These misperceptions likely contribute to aggressive responses from law enforcement officers during encounters with Black people.

Despite decades-long patterns of racial discrimination and law enforcement violence against Black communities, efforts to promote public safety in these communities often rely upon continuing or expanding the use of law enforcement without accounting for the threats and harm law enforcement themselves pose to the communities. Increased law enforcement presence within Black communities leads to increased exposure and contact with officers. This increased contact with law enforcement can harm Black people not only physically, but also psychologically, through lasting trauma and anxiety even in those they do not arrest. Studies show that beginning from a young age, men who reported more frequent contact with law enforcement also reported
more symptoms of psychological distress, the severity of which positively correlated with the intrusiveness of the encounter and the perceived unfairness of law enforcement in general. Even those who experience less intrusive kinds of encounters—e.g., being stopped but not physically searched—are at heightened risk of psychological distress.

Inundating predominantly Black communities with law enforcement officers creates a dangerous self-fulfilling prophecy. High concentrations of law enforcement officers result in overexposure for Black residents to encounters with law enforcement, during which officers may be primed to see suspicious activity or criminal conduct where there is none. Even without a subsequent arrest, law enforcement stops of Black youth have led to a greater likelihood that they engage in criminal activity in the future. Rather than promoting public safety, an increased law enforcement presence is often counterproductive.

III. People with Mental Illness Are Harmed by Law Enforcement

People with mental illness are also at risk from encounters with law enforcement. The results of such encounters are often deadly, especially when the person with mental illness is Black, as discussed in Section IV. Nationwide, law enforcement officers are generally the first and only responders to be dispatched when people with mental illness experience a crisis or otherwise need help—or are reported for disturbing or annoying others. The same is true for autistic people, individuals with substance use issues, and individuals with intellectual or developmental disabilities. And far too often, as in the cases of Natasha McKenna, Saheed Vassell, and Daniel Prude, tragic consequences follow.

People with mental illness are grossly overrepresented among those in jail and prison. Their interactions with law enforcement officers often end in arrest and incarceration, even when they do not engage in actual criminal behavior. Although people with a serious mental illness comprise only 4-5% of the U.S. population, they make up about 15 and 20% of the prison and jail population, respectively. Contrary to a misguided and unfortunate public perception, people with mental illness, or serious mental illness, are not more violent than the population at large. Moreover, people with mental illness do not engage in criminal behavior more than people without mental illness. Nonetheless, two million people with a serious mental illness are booked into jails each year, and the risk of confinement is particularly high for Black people with mental illness. Indeed, one study found that Black people with mental illness were more likely to be incarcerated than any other racial group.

As the stories of Natasha McKenna, Saheed Vassell, and Daniel Prude illustrate, there is a real risk that police will use deadly force when they interact with individuals with mental illness. Of the over 7,500 people shot and killed by law enforcement officers since 2015, one in five fatalities were of people who were experiencing a mental health crisis. The risk of death at the hands of law enforcement is even higher when the individual is Black. Black people account for less than 13 percent of the population, yet police officers fatally shoot Black people at more than twice the rate as they do White Americans. A recent study shows that Black men with mental illness are shot and killed by law enforcement officers at significantly higher rates than white men who exhibit similar behaviors.

Despite this risk, law enforcement is generally the default and only response to calls from or involving people with mental illness. The vast majority of these calls, however, would be much safer and more effectively handled if trained mental health workers—including people with lived experience with mental illness working as “peers”—responded to the crisis instead of law
enforcement or, only in the rarest exceptions, with law enforcement as a backup. About ten percent of calls to 911 involve people with mental illness, yet few of these situations actually threaten public safety. Such calls may involve situations where families are concerned for a loved one experiencing a mental health crisis, but who is not posing any kind of threat. Other calls may involve situations when individuals with mental illness display behavior considered “erratic” in public, or when a person’s unusual but nonthreatening behavior is induced by alcohol or drug use. Law enforcement officials also respond to situations when individuals with a mental illness are suicidal or otherwise experiencing a crisis, when unhoused individuals with mental illness linger in public spaces, and when individuals with mental illness fail to obey staff in facilities or schools. Law enforcement officers are also used to transport people to hospitals, typically in handcuffs, when a doctor or judge directs that they be institutionalized.

Since the risk of harm to the individual is so great, and the actual threat to public safety is usually small, mental health advocates stress that law enforcement response to people with mental illness should be avoided whenever possible. Contact between law enforcement and people experiencing mental health crises—even when officers respond alongside mental health workers in the “co-responder” model—should be limited to only the rarest exceptions because of the potentially dire consequences. Even when co-responder models dispatch officers who have undergone crisis intervention training (CIT), completing such training should not exempt officers from this limitation. Studies have shown that equipping officers with CIT has produced no net effect on outcomes of arrest or officer use of force. One study of the Chicago Police Department, however, showed a marginal increase in use of force by CIT-trained officers over their non-CIT counterparts. While co-responder models have had some success in increasing access to behavioral health services more than traditional police responses, there is not enough evidence to conclude that overall, co-responder programs positively impact encounters for people experiencing mental health crises. One factor, studies have suggested, is that officer involvement may retraumatize individuals due to their previous traumatic interactions with law enforcement.

The overall failure of our public mental health systems largely explains why law enforcement continues to be the first responder to people experiencing mental health crises, and often the only responder. Publicly funded mental health service agencies have limited funding, and what services exist are inequitably distributed across communities. The services that work best for people with serious conditions are in very short supply. Programs created or funded through federal and state legislation, intended to provide community-based services and avoid the harmful and unnecessary placement of people with mental illness in institutions to receive care, have never been sufficiently funded to meet the needs of people with mental illness, especially those with the most serious conditions. The dearth of appropriate care, combined with the rise of mass incarceration and the lack of adequate federal support for affordable housing (and the concurrent increase in homelessness), has exposed people with mental illness to disproportionately high rates of arrest and incarceration. The lack of community services also results in many people with mental illness being unnecessarily institutionalized, in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act and the U.S. Supreme Court’s Olmstead decision.

When law enforcement officers respond, this not only fails to protect people with mental illness, but also exacerbates the crisis they are experiencing. Law enforcement officers are not adequately equipped to respond to people going through mental health crises. Experiencing a mental health crisis can significantly compromise a person’s ability to think and behave rationally, making it much more difficult for even close family and friends, let alone law enforcement officers,
to calm the person down. The threat of force inherent in police encounters, especially when weapons are drawn, aggravates an already-sensitive situation and distresses the person in crisis even further. This unhealthy dynamic contributes to the disproportionate incarceration, institutionalization, and trauma experienced by people with mental illness at the hands of law enforcement, and is counterproductive to promoting the wellness and safety of people with mental illness.96

IV. Black People with Mental Illness Face Discrimination in the Mental Health System

Black people with mental illness are not only at great risk of arrest, incarceration, and fatal harm by law enforcement,97 but also of racially biased and discriminatory treatment by mental health professionals.98 This process begins for Black people in their youth and continues through adulthood. For example, when Black youth show indications of attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), medical professionals, perhaps due to unconscious biases, are more likely to misdiagnose them with disruptive behavior disorders (e.g., oppositional defiant disorder (ODD) or conduct disorder (CD)) rather than with ADHD.99 The over-diagnosis of disruptive behavior disorders deprives Black youth of the proper behavioral interventions, educational accommodations, and medication provided to children with an ADHD diagnosis. Moreover, medical professionals are less supportive of children with ODD or CD, who are seen as less treatable or even untreatable.100 The bias in diagnosis may perpetuate other biases by, for example, influencing how educators and school administrators perceive Black children and contributing to disparities in disciplinary practices and involvement in the juvenile corrections system.101

Beyond the education system, Black people face the challenges of cross-cultural communication and language differences in the healthcare system,102 which leads to fear and mistrust of the system itself.103 One study found that physicians were more verbally dominant and less patient-centered when communicating with Black patients than with white patients, two factors that contribute to poorer health outcomes.104 Nurses, too, have demonstrated implicit biases against Black people by recommending significantly less pain medication for Black patients than white patients, upon viewing pictures of both patients exhibiting genuine expressions of pain.105 Only 3% of American Psychological Association members are Black,106 leading some mental health advocates to worry that the majority of mental health care practitioners lack the cultural competency to adequately treat Black patients.107 When Black patients do receive care, they often receive inadequate services and experience worse outcomes.108 For example, Black people are less likely to receive appropriate care for depression, leading to longer and more severe episodes.109 They may also be more likely to experience coerced treatment, in the form of involuntary commitment.110 In Alameda County, California, where Black people make up 11 percent of the population,111 a lawsuit alleged that “[d]uring a recent two-year period, over 2,300 people were detained at the County’s psychiatric facilities more than three times, the majority of whom were Black” and “some individuals were detained more than 100 times”,112 36% of people detained at one facility—“more than three times their overall representation in Alameda County”—were Black;113 and “[f]rom January 2018 to June 2020, more than 45% of individuals institutionalized in County psychiatric facilities three or more times were Black.”114 And yet, two-thirds of Black people in need of mental health services do not receive any care at all.115

The existence of bias in the responses of both the police and medical professionals to Black people with mental illness is supported by research regarding how Black people are perceived in general.116 Decades of research demonstrate that most people have implicit biases against Black people.117 People have a tendency to unconsciously associate Black people with criminality,118 and
often perceive identical ambiguous behaviors as more “aggressive” when committed by Black people as compared to white people.\textsuperscript{119} Further, law enforcement officers have a view of acceptable behavior—of what is obedient or compliant—that often leads them to react harshly to people they think are not according them the level of deference they believe they deserve.\textsuperscript{120} Black men and people with mental illness are at greater risk of being perceived as noncompliant, and thus, disrespectful, to officers.\textsuperscript{121} Taken together, these two biases help explain how contact with the police for minor behavior can become fatal for so many Black people with a mental illness.\textsuperscript{122}

Walter Wallace Jr.’s experience with Philadelphia police officers illustrates the risk that Black people with mental illness face when encountering law enforcement. In the midst of a mental health crisis on October 26, 2020, Walter Wallace Jr., a 27-year-old Black man, walked outside of his parents’ front door in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania holding a kitchen knife by his side.\textsuperscript{123} Walter did not make any threatening motions or actions towards anyone,\textsuperscript{124} even when two police officers pointed their guns at Walter and yelled for him to drop the kitchen knife.\textsuperscript{125} A number of factors signaled that Walter was experiencing a mental health episode: several calls to 911 from Walter’s family earlier that day seeking emergency medical assistance for Walter’s condition;\textsuperscript{126} shouts from bystanders familiar with Walter’s history with bipolar disorder, warning officers that Walter was “mental;”\textsuperscript{127} and Walter’s almost trance-like state as he casually walked away from and around the officers, ignoring their repeated commands.\textsuperscript{128} But Walter’s seeming indifference towards the two white police officers and nonthreatening grasp of a kitchen knife resulted in both officers quickly shooting Walter seven times each,\textsuperscript{129} hitting him in the shoulder and chest.\textsuperscript{130} Walter’s mother, who just seconds before was pleading for the officers not to shoot her son,\textsuperscript{131} ran towards his bleeding body, screaming, “You killed my son.”\textsuperscript{132} Walter was pronounced dead shortly after arriving at a nearby hospital.\textsuperscript{133} It was only three weeks after his wedding day.\textsuperscript{134}

Walter Wallace Jr. did not attack, threaten, nor engage with the police officers who shot and killed him. The officers were not even the emergency responders Walter’s family requested in their calls to 911—Walter’s brother, who made the last of several calls that day, specifically requested medical assistance and an ambulance for Walter because of his history of mental illness.\textsuperscript{135} Tragically, police arrived at the Wallace family home before the ambulance.\textsuperscript{136} The Wallaces knew that Walter needed help from medical professionals who would be better equipped to de-escalate their loved one. Had medical assistance intervened instead of law enforcement, Walter could still be alive today.

V.\hspace{1em} New Solutions are Needed to Better Support Black People with Mental Illness, and All People with Mental Illness

As demonstrated above, the practice of law enforcement responding to calls involving people with mental illness does not provide people with mental illness the needed support and often results in physical harm, sometimes fatal. We must therefore develop better solutions to serve those with mental illness, and protect their rights.\textsuperscript{137} To do so, we must expand the capacity of states, counties, and cities to deliver culturally competent community-based mental health services, including Assertive Community Treatment (ACT), housing, assistance securing and maintaining employment, and substance use treatment.\textsuperscript{138} Schools must take a similar approach, ending their reliance on law enforcement and school resource officers, and increasing their investment in professional staff and improved services.\textsuperscript{139} Providers of all these services must take steps to ensure that staff understand the cultural norms and socio-economic challenges of the communities they serve, and the traumas experienced by members of those communities. These steps should include training received from community members themselves.
When there is a physical health emergency, typically the health care system responds, with a medic, ambulance, or both. When people experience a mental health crisis, there should also be a healthcare-centered response, with the mental health system taking the lead.

As we develop alternatives to a police response, we must look at the historic and current harmful impact of police involvement, and heed the voices of those communities that have borne the brunt of such harms—Black people, people with mental illness, and those at the intersection. Far too often, their voices have been excluded or ignored. Peers with lived experience, including those with lived experience with mental illness, should play a major role in planning and implementing the alternatives developed. Peers with lived experience are a valuable resource. They have a keen understanding of the needs and concerns of people receiving services, and they are able to develop relationships of trust, help individuals see the benefits of treatment, and help prevent and respond to crises.

Some communities have already taken steps to reduce the role of the police in responding to people with mental illness. In the Eugene, Oregon CAHOOTS program, a medic and social worker, both unarmed, are dispatched to most situations involving people with mental illness, instead of the police. Police join them in rare situations, including if someone is in immediate danger or presents a clear threat to others. The program reports that each year it saves the city $8.5 million in public safety costs and $14 million in ambulance and emergency room costs. Other communities are implementing similar programs. For example, San Francisco has adapted the CAHOOTS model so that it includes a peer responder on the team. An even greater number of communities are investing in mental health crisis teams. New federal funding is available for such teams, which can be dispatched by 911 or law enforcement as well as by the mental health system. Mental health crisis teams include a clinician and often a peer.

The alternative programs that communities have implemented to better support people with mental illness and to address the disproportionate harm people with mental illness experience at the hands of law enforcement have common elements: they are implemented by skilled unarmed personnel from a variety of backgrounds able to address the needs of people with mental illness, including – clinical training in mental health or social work, nursing, peers with lived experience with mental illness, and specially-trained emergency medical technicians (EMTs). Psychiatrists are available “on call” through telehealth as virtual back-up to responders. Mobile crisis teams are trained to successfully de-escalate situations, diverting people from arrest and incarceration, or hospitalization. When the crisis is resolved, they strive to connect people with the services they need for long term stability.

These types of alternative responses should be supplemented by a sufficient array of facilities that are available for crisis care, including short-stay apartments staffed by mental health professionals and peers, walk-in urgent care centers and “drop-off” centers (in urban areas, scattered so that they are readily accessible to people in all neighborhoods), and hospital beds for those who need inpatient care. Short-term detox facilities should be available as well, with offers of treatment for substance use disorders upon and following discharge. Some proponents of changing responses to people with mental illness have focused on improving law enforcement encounters through training or pairing police with mental health professionals (frequently called "co-responder models"). These are not solutions to the problems caused by unnecessary police contact with people with mental illness. Meta-analyses of currently
implemented training programs and co-responder models across the country have not found either reform to have significant positive impacts on police encounters with people with mental illness. These programs will not remedy the trauma and safety issues experienced during even the best-intentioned law enforcement interactions. Better police training will not provide the expert medical and peer support that people with mental illness or in crisis need. Police responses by their very nature present a threat of violence or incarceration. And a police response is unnecessary in the vast majority of calls involving people with mental illness. Moreover, as noted in Section III above, research on the effects of CIT programs across the country demonstrates no significant effect on officer use of force in encounters of people with mental illness. Mental health systems should provide services to prevent people from experiencing crises, and when crises occur, they should provide the services needed to stabilize the situation, and connect people to long-term services. Not only is this safer and more effective, but it also advances civil rights and avoids incarceration, institutionalization, and coercion.

A. Specific Steps to Implement Alternatives to Harmful Police Response

Developing alternatives to a law enforcement response requires action in three areas.

1. Re-direct requests for police intervention.

Calls to 911 and the police should be screened to determine whether the person about whom the call is made is known to or appears to have a mental illness or is experiencing a mental health crisis. Such calls should be redirected to experts and peers in the mental health system and handled by a unit within the mental health system that operates much like 911, making urgent responses when required.

The mental health system should have policies identifying the small number of cases where it may be appropriate for the mental health system to respond jointly with the police or have the police on the scene as backup. Communities should collect and analyze data and provide training to call-takers and police staff, identifying those situations that can and should be handled entirely by the mental health system. The police should not respond, jointly or as backup, when the call involves an individual who is suicidal and presents no risk to others.

2. Develop the services needed for a non-police response.

Each community should have the services needed to respond to calls involving an individual with mental illness or experiencing a mental health crisis. Such calls, including calls to 911, should be routed to the mental health system, where trained call-takers can resolve many calls by providing advice, making referrals, and/or providing transportation to a community-based provider. Other calls will require dispatching a mobile support team that can quickly respond and resolve the situation—like the CAHOOTS team (discussed above) or a mental health crisis team. There should also be an array of walk-in, drop-off, and other facilities for crisis resolution and stabilization, scattered throughout the community. Many of these activities, including mobile crisis teams, can be funded through Medicaid, with the federal government picking up a sizeable share of the cost.

3. On-going community-based services.

After the immediate issue is resolved, the mental health system should follow up to ensure the individuals gain access to voluntary community-based services on an on-going basis. Many people with serious mental illness will need access to long-term housing, intensive case
management, peer support services, ACT, and supported employment. People with lived experience working as peers can be involved in—and lead—the delivery of all of these services.

If the person was regularly receiving services before the episode, the mental health system should review and improve the services it is providing, in order to help the person avoid similar issues in the future.

B. Advocating for Solutions

To protect Black people and others with mental illness, it is critical that we expand culturally competent community-based mental health services. The services needed include clinical services, such as ACT and mental health crisis services, but also non-clinical services, such as supportive housing, peer support, and supported employment.

Below is a list of actions that government authorities should take to better support Black people and others with mental illness.

Actions that Congress, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, and State and Local Governments Should Take

Congress should:

- Enact legislation to fund community-based mental health services including supportive housing. Congress should pass, and the President should sign, legislation that provides states and localities with the resources they need to provide these critical services and supports and require that they be culturally competent.

- Permanently authorize flexibilities in Medicaid funding for tele-mental health services as permitted related to COVID-19, while also requiring that in-person services and hybrid in-person and virtual services are available for people who want them. This will ensure that services are accessible by whatever means people with mental illness find most effective.

- Fund call centers within the mental health system to which calls for help involving people with mental illness can be routed.

- Provide strong financial incentives, including through federal grant programs, for communities to use the mental health system, rather than law enforcement, to respond to calls involving people with mental illness.

- Invest in programs that help expand the behavioral health workforce, including peer support/services, and provide incentives to individuals from Black and Brown communities to join the behavioral health workforce.

The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) should:

- Robustly promote and fund services that prevent encounters with law enforcement, including ACT, mobile crisis services, peer services, supported housing, and supported employment.

- Support programs that address underlying problems—sometimes called “social determinants of health”—that may prompt mental health crises for people with mental illness, such as supportive housing and supported employment programs.
• Provide significant funding to efforts that ensure mental health services are culturally competent, including the efforts of the National Network to Eliminate Disparities In Behavioral Health (NNED).  

• Allow federal Medicaid dollars to be used to support housing for people with mental illness.  

• Improve Medicaid rules regarding reimbursement for peer services, including removing the requirement that peer services be delivered under the supervision of a clinician.  

• Clarify Medicaid rules regarding reimbursement for mental health services provided to students at school, which could help build significant additional service capacity in school districts that enroll large numbers of Medicaid and Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP) beneficiaries.  

**States and local governments should:**  

• Ensure that there is a robust array of voluntary, community-based services that reduce the occurrence of mental health crises, provide an effective response when they occur, and provide on-going treatment and support after the crisis is resolved. The services should be culturally competent and acknowledge the trauma Black people have experienced, and incorporate a trauma-informed approach.  

• Ensure that every community has each of the necessary components of a community-based behavioral health crisis response system, and that this system is a meaningful alternative to a law enforcement response. This includes call centers (reachable through 911, 988, or other hotline or warmline numbers) that can resolve most calls for help, mobile crisis teams to respond quickly when needed, de-escalate situations, and connect people to services, and an array of facilities when people need somewhere to go for crisis resolution and stabilization.  

• Create a continuum of alternative responders to calls for help, from street outreach teams, to CAHOOTS-type teams, to mental health crisis teams to handle the wide variety of calls involving people with mental illness.  

• Conduct public education campaigns to inform people about the availability of alternatives to calling 911 and law enforcement, and of community-based mental health services. Such campaigns should effectively reach Black communities—including by acknowledging trauma, featuring Black service providers, and reducing stigma about mental health services.  

• Collect and analyze data, adopt policies, and provide training to 911, 988, and police staff about situations involving people with mental illness that can and should be handled entirely by the behavioral health system, and situations to which the police should also respond.  

• Ensure that law enforcement officers refer people with mental illness whom they encounter while on duty to appropriate community-based resources, and arrange for safe transportation if needed.  

• Ensure that affected communities are involved in the design, implementation, and evaluation of all alternatives to a law enforcement response to people with mental illness, such as advisory councils and working groups.
• Expand the mental health workforce, including peer services, by among other things, taking advantage of federal Community Mental Health Services and Substance Abuse Prevention and Treatment block grants and Certified Community Behavioral Health Center (CCBHC) funds, investing in professional development, and identifying and removing barriers to entry for Black people and others.

• Invest in peer-led services such as peer crisis respite centers, peer “bridger” services that help people transition from hospitals, jails, and prisons to the community, and peer-run hotlines and warmlines for people who need help.

• Expand supported employment services using the Individual Placement and Support (IPS) model. Peer specialists should be part of the IPS teams.

• Take steps to diversify the mental health workforce to reflect the racial, ethnic, cultural, sexual orientation, and gender identity diversity of the communities served. Peer workers should reflect the lived experiences of people in the communities they serve, including Black communities.

• Take advantage of COVID-19-related flexibilities in Medicaid to suspend premiums, copays, and other cost sharing; suspend the need for prior authorizations or re-authorizations for mental health services; make advanced and/or incentive payments to community mental health providers; and increase payment rates for services.

• Address the social determinants of health, which helps prevent mental health crises. States and local governments should invest in programs that, among other things, help people secure and maintain housing and find and maintain employment.

• Use federal COVID-19 relief funds to support mental health services in schools. Schools can use these funds to recruit, retain, and train more school-based mental health professionals, such as social workers and counselors; provide more individualized and small group instruction and tutoring; provide high-quality afterschool and summer programs; and invest in other strategies for supporting student mental health.

VI. Conclusion

It is past time that we address the incarceration, institutionalization, and police violence that Black people with mental illness, and all people with mental illness, face in law enforcement encounters when community-based mental health services are not available to respond to their needs. It is too late to avoid the tragic deaths of Natasha McKenna, Saheed Vassell, Daniel Prude, Walter Wallace, Jr., and the other Black people with mental illness who have lost their lives during encounters with law enforcement. But it is not too late for stakeholders to demand action and for our policymakers to respond with effective solutions.

We urgently call upon national and local stakeholders to center community-based, trauma informed approaches that integrate peers, language diversity, cultural competency, and cross disability accessibility. Effective alternative responses to crises are needed. Robust longer-term services, including peer services, Assertive Community Treatment (ACT), supported employment, and supported housing, delivered equitably and without bias, are also critical. Black communities must be centered and participate in decision-making about the systems that will serve them. These systems must be a meaningful alternative to a police response.
Implementing a comprehensive community-based mental health system can and will stop violence against Black people with mental illness. We urgently call on our cities, states, and the federal government to implement these systems now.


4 Id.


15 Locals Knew, supra note 10.

16 Id.


18 Id.

19 Id.

20 Mueller, supra note 14.

21 Locals Knew, supra note 10.

22 Id.

23 Mueller, supra note 14.
possession of contraband 26% less often than white drivers.”

46 Adults are about five times as likely as whites to say they’ve been unfairly stopped by police because of thei

39 https://www.reddit.com/r/SampleSize/comments/q8ouhg/academic_queer_mmind_mad_mentally_ill/

38 Disabilities Act (ADA); for that reason, this paper sometimes uses the term “mental health disabilities.”

37 and/or problems functioning in social, work or family activities.”

36 https://www.n

34 death

31 This paper uses the term “mental illness” to describe people who have “health conditions involving changes in
emotion, thinking or behavior (or a combination of these).” What is Mental Illness?, AM. PSYCH. ASS’N (Aug.
2018), https://psychiatry.org/patients-families/what-is-mental-illness. “Mental illnesses are associated with distress
and/or problems functioning in social, work or family activities.” Id. There are other terms that people use to
describe these conditions. For example, most people with mental illness are protected by the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA); for that reason, this paper sometimes uses the term “mental health disabilities.” See infra
notes 95, 110. However, many people with mental illness do not use either of these labels to describe themselves.
Some people refer to having “lived experience” with mental health conditions. Others use different terms to describe
themselves and others with such issues. See, e.g., u/MadQueerResearcher, Queer MMIND (Mad, Mentally Ill,
Neurodivergent, and Disabled) College Student Experiences, REDDIT (Oct. 15, 2021), https://www.reddit.com/r/SampleSize/comments/q8ouhg/academic_queer_mmind_mad_mentally_ill/.

43 This paper uses the terms “law enforcement” and “police” interchangeably to represent the array of law
enforcement officers and agencies that disproportionately harm black people and people with mental illness, and
especially those at the intersection of both identities.

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34 Gold & Closson, supra note 26.

33 Michael V. Pettigano, Daniel Prude video: Rochester police body cam footage (10-min. version), DEMOCRAT &

32 Id.

31 Id.

30 Id.


28 Michael Gold & Troy Closson, What We Know About Daniel Prude’s Case and Death, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 16,

27 Id.

26 Sarah Maslin Nir, Rochester Officers Will Not Be Charged in Killing of Daniel Prude, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 6, 2021),

25 Locals Knew, supra note 10.

24 Mueller & Schieber, supra note 12.


21 Michael Gold & Troy Closson, supra note 26.


19 Police Department presence…are conce
See Emma Pierson et al., A Large-Scale Analysis of Racial Disparities in Police Stops Across the United States, 4 NATURE HUM. BEHAV. 736, 737 (2020), https://www.nature.com/articles/s41562-020-0858-1.pdf ("...[A]mong state patrol stops, the annual per-capita stop rate for black drivers was 0.10 compared to 0.07 for white drivers; and among municipal police stops, the annual per-capita stop rate for black drivers was 0.20 compared to 0.14 for white drivers."); see also Table of Arrest rates by offense and race in 2019 (all ages), U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., OFF. OF JUV. JUST. & DELINQ. PREVENTION, https://www.ojpdp.gov/ojstatbb/crime/ucr.asp?table_in=2&selYrs=2019&rdoGroups=1&rdoData=r (last visited June 21, 2022) (reporting that the arrest rate for Black people and white people is 5,723.3 and 2,750.4 per 100,000, respectively); U.S. Incarceration Rates by Race and Ethnicity, 2010, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE, https://www.prisonpolicy.org/research/race_and_ethnicity/ (last visited June 21, 2022) (noting that the incarceration rate for Black people and white people is 2,306 and 450 per 100,000, respectively).


Morgan Sherburne, Police: Sixth-leading cause of death for young black men, UNIV. OF MICH. INST. FOR SOC. RSVL. (June 1, 2020), https://isr.umich.edu/news-events/news-releases/police-sixth-leading-cause-of-death-for-young-black-men-2/ (noting that police killings are the sixth leading cause of death in Black men; 100 Black men and boys and 39 white men and boys per 100,000 are killed by police, respectively).

Mary Giliberti, It’s Outrageous: Jails and Prisons Are No Place to Treat Mental Illness; Just Ask Paton Blough, HUFF. POST BLOG (May 21, 2016) https://www.huffpost.com/entry/its-outrageous-jails-and-prisons-are-no-place-to-treat-mental-illness_b_7334026. The people with mental illness who are being arrested and jailed are also cycling in and out of emergency rooms and psychiatric hospital units. In many communities, there is a discrete and identifiable group of poor and poorly served people with mental illness, often homeless, who cycle in and out of jail, emergency
rooms, and hospital beds, at great cost to the taxpayers. Studies show that for less than what is now being spent on these individuals, they could be provided housing and effective community-based mental health services. See Alexi Jones & Wendy Sawyer, Arrest, Release, and Repeat: How Police and Jails are Misused to Respond to Social Problems, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Aug. 2019), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/repeatarrests.html (finding that investment in community-based mental health and substance use treatment “is estimated to yield a $12 return for every $1 spent, as it reduces future crime, costly incarceration, and lowers health care expenses”). See also CORP. FOR SUPPORTIVE HOUS., FREQUENT USERS OF PUBLIC SERVICES: ENDING THE INSTITUTIONAL CIRCUIT 6 (2009), https://www.csh.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/Report_FUFBooklet.pdf (calculating that investment in supportive housing saves between $2,953 and $7,231 in incarceration costs per person placed in that housing).


William B. Hawthorne et al., Incarceration Among Adults Who Are in the Public Mental Health System: Rates, Risk Factors, and Short-Term Outcomes, 63 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 26, 29 (2012).

76 See THE WASHINGTON POST POLICE SHOOTINGS DATABASE, WASH. POST [hereinafter DATABASE], https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/investigations/police-shootings-database/ (last visited June 27, 2022). See also Wesley Lowery et al., Distracted People, Deadly Results, WASH. POST (June 30, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/s/investigative/2015/06/30/distracted-people-deadly-results/ (finding that 27% of people killed by police in the first half of 2015 were in crisis); Amam Z. Saleh et al., Deaths of People with Mental Illness During Interactions with Law Enforcement, 58 INT’L J. OF L. AND PSYCHIATRY 110, 112-14 (2018) (estimating that 23% of people killed by police have a psychiatric disability); DORIS A. FULLER ET AL., TREATMENT ADVOC. CTR., OVERLOOKED IN THE UNDERCOUNTED: THE ROLE OF MENTAL ILLNESS IN FATAL LAW ENFORCEMENT ENCOUNTERS (Dec. 2015), https://www.treatmentadvocacycenter.org/storage/documents/overlooked-in-the-undercounted.pdf (estimating the risk of death as sixteen times greater than for people without mental illness); Shaun King, If You Are Black and in a Mental Health Crisis, 911 Can Be a Death Sentence, INTERCEPT (Sept. 29, 2019, 7:00 AM), https://theintercept.com/2019/09/29/police-shootings-mental-health/ (“Studies show that as many as 50 percent of people killed by American police had registered disabilities and that a huge percentage of those were people with mental illnesses”); Robert Salonga, Report: Mentally ill are in nearly 40 percent of South Bay police shootings, MERCURY NEWS (May 14, 2018, 9:03 AM), https://www.mercurynews.com/2018/05/11/report-mentally-ill-are-in-nearly-40-percent-of-south-bay-police-shootings/ (“[A] new civil grand jury report reveals that nearly 40 percent of officer shootings in Santa Clara County involve someone who is mentally ill.”).

77 Two circumstances contribute to this result. First, the disproportionate policing of Black people and communities, and second, the high percentage of people killed by police shootings who have a mental illness. See Camille A. Nelson, Frontlines: Policing at the Nexus of Race and Mental Health, 43 FORDHAM URBAN L. REV. 615, 621 (2016) (finding that Black people report higher rates of serious psychological stress than White people, and “people who exhibit mental health challenges are more likely to attract heightened police scrutiny and reasonable suspicion; they are less likely to respond to police in ways that comport with police behavioral expectations and may, thereby, prompt unfortunate police escalation.”); King, supra note 76 (“[Y]oung black men with mental illnesses are in the single most at-risk category in the nation for fatal police violence”).

78 See DATABASE, supra note 76.


80 Rogers et al., supra note 67.

81 See Martha Williams Deane et al., Emerging Partnerships Between Mental Health and Law Enforcement, 50 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 99, 100 (1999) (estimating that 7% of all police contacts involve someone with a psychiatric disability); LODESTAR, L.A. POLICE DEP’T CONSENT DEGREE MENTAL ILLNESS PROJECT, FINAL REPORT 24 (May 28, 2002), https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/media/publications/lapd_executive_summary_consent_degree_mental_illness_project_2002.pdf (estimating that 2-3% of calls to the Los Angeles Police Department involve mental health); Jennifer L.S. Teller et al., Crisis Intervention Team Training for Police Officers Responding to Mental Disturbance Calls, 57 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 232, 234 (2006) (finding that 6.55% of calls to the Akron, Ohio Police Department involve mental health). But see Alexander Black et al., The Treatment of People with Mental Illness in the Criminal Justice System: The Example of Oneida County, New York, LEVITT CTR. FOR PUB. AFFS. AT HAMILTON COLL. 9 (June 2019), https://digitalcommons.hamilton.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1005&amp;context=student_scholarship

82 See Brett Sholtis, During a Mental Health Crisis, A Family’s Call to 911 Turns Tragic, NPR (Oct. 29, 2020, 5:00 AM ET), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2020/10/29/92839761/during-a-mental-health-crisis-a-families-call-to-911-turns-tragic (discussing the fatal shooting of Ricardo Muñoz, where his mother called emergency services for assistance with Ricardo’s mental health episode, but maintained that “Ricardo was never a threat to them”); see also supra Part I (discussing the fatal shooting of Daniel Prude, where his brother called for emergency assistance although Daniel was wandering an empty street); see also infra note 124 and accompanying text (stating that Walter Wallace Jr. did not show active signs of threat during his mental health crisis, even in the presence of the officers who responded to the scene).

83 See Bellafante, supra note 17 and accompanying text.

84 Position Statement 59: Responding To Behavioral Health Crises, Mental Health Am., https://www.mhanational.org/issues/position


86 Lauren Young, Decriminalizing Disability, 52 Md. B.J. 62, 62 (2019).

87 El-Sabawi & Carroll, supra note 85, at 17.


89 El-Sabawi & Carroll, supra note 85, at 16.

90 Id.

91 Id. at 17.

92 Margarita Alegria, PhD. et al., A New Agenda for Optimizing Investments in Community Mental Health and Reducing Disparities, 179 Am. J. Psychiatry 6, 402 (2022) (citing inadequate funding as one of the underlying reasons of the racial disparity in effective and accessible public mental health care).

93 See Martone et al., supra note 68, at 5 (“Throughout the country, communities lack the capacity to provide intensive community-based mental health services, including Assertive Community Treatment, mobile crisis services, intensive case management, peer outreach and support, and supported housing, all of which have been proven successful in reducing arrest and incarceration as well as other forms of institutionalization. For people with mental illness and co-occurring substance use disorders, there is not enough medication-assisted treatment, detoxification services, or peer outreach and support, among other treatment options.”); id. (“Consequently, too many people with mental illness end up in crisis, landing them in … emergency rooms, hospitals, and jails.”); id. at 3 (“a disproportionate number of people with mental illness are incarcerated in jails and prisons, segregated from society for offenses that could well have been prevented had they had access to appropriate community-based services and supports.”); id. at 5 (“Psychiatric crisis services are often nonexistent or insufficient to respond to, divert, or refer individuals back into the mental health system, leaving law enforcement professionals with the dilemma of having to arrest a person because no treatment diversion option exists.”); Robert Bernstein, Ira Burnim, & Mark J. Murphy, Judge David L. Bazelon CTR. For Mental Health L., Diversion, Not Discrimination: How Implementing the Americans with Disabilities Act Can Help Reduce the Number of People With Mental Illness in Jails 24 (July 2017), http://www.bazelon.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/MacArthur-White-Paper-re-Diversion-and-ADA.pdf (“Public mental health systems are underfunded. While most overwhelmingly embrace the core principles of deinstitutionalization and community mental health … services such as Assertive Community Treatment and supported housing are in short supply and are reserved for frequent users of psychiatric hospitals…. Often, this tendency results in mental health systems placing too little priority on people with mental illness who are–or who are at high risk of becoming–justice-involved”); Judge David L. Bazelon CTR. For Mental Health L., Diversion to What? Evidence-Based Mental Health Services That Prevent Needless Incarceration 2 (Sept. 2019) [hereinafter Diversion to What], http://www.bazelon.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/Bazelon-Diversion-to-What-Essential-Services-Publication_September-2019.pdf (“Investing in community-based mental health services. provides numerous benefits, including a reduction in law enforcement intervention and incarceration.”).

94 Among others, the Community Mental Health Services Act of 1963, Pub. L. 88-164, intended to provide federal support for community-based services that would help people with mental illness avoid the “cold mercy of custodial
Testing for Statistical Discrimination in Health Care

Health Disparities
ethnic disparities in health care. . . . indirect evidence from several lines of research suggesting that implicit biases may shape physician behavior and result in discriminatory treatment;

Perpetuate Health Care Disparities
note 75. (“The combination of disability and skin color amounts to a double bind”); with discrimination against individuals with disabilities. (Mar. 18, 2021), https://www.samhsa.gov/homelessness-programs-resources/hpr-resources/jeks-legacy-community-based-care (“[California’s 2004 Mental Health Services Act] has provided billions in funding for mental-health programs, but has also been criticized for its complex regulatory structure and lack of state oversight. Counties have also been accused of ‘hoarding’ MHSA funds that should be going to mental-health programs, or using it for other purposes.”).)

95 Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581 (1999) (holding that unnecessary segregation is discrimination actionable under Americans with Disabilities Act). In Olmstead, the Supreme Court noted Congress’s finding that “society has tended to isolate and segregate individuals with disabilities, and, despite some improvements, such forms of discrimination continue to be a serious and pervasive social problem.” Id. at 588. The Court also noted Congress’s intent that the ADA “provide a clear and national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities. Id. at 589.

96 Kristen M. Folkerts, Isra Merchant, & Chenxi Yang, A Tri-Country Analysis of the Effects of White Supremacy in Mental Health Practice and Proposed Policy Alternatives, 19 COLUM. SOCIAL WORK REV. 86, 97 (2022) (citing a study revealing that 25-40% of Americans with mental health illnesses face incarceration in their lifetimes).

97 See Abigail Adams, Black, Disabled and at Risk: The Overlooked Problem of Police Violence Against Americans with Disabilities, Time (June 25, 2020, 8:56 AM), https://time.com/5857438/police-violence-black-disabled/ (“The combination of disability and skin color amounts to a double bind”); Jeffrey Swanson et al., Racial Disparities in Involuntary Outpatient Commitment: Are They Real?, 28 HEALTH AFFS. 816, 821 (2009) (“Rates of outpatient commitment per 10,000 were higher for blacks than for whites at every level”); supra text accompanying note 75.


100 Id.

101 Id.

102 See Jude Mary Cénat, How to provide anti-racist mental health care, 7 LANCET PSYCHIATRY 929, 929 (2020), https://www.thelancet.com/action/showPdf?pii=S2215-0366%2820%2930309-6 (“[R]acial discrimination, racial
profiling, microaggressions, and racism exist within physical and mental health-care institutions and services in western countries. These widespread and chronic factors are associated with lack of training of mental health professionals on racial issues and disparities.”); Vickie Mays et al., *Perceived Discrimination in Health Care and Mental Health/Substance Abuse Treatment Among Blacks, Latinos, and Whites*, 55 MED. CARE 173, 180 (2017), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5233585/pdf/nihms807350.pdf (finding that experiences of discrimination in mental health or substance abuse visits contributes to early treatment discontinuation for Black people, which could be a factor in poorer mental health outcomes).


105 Chapman et al., *supra* note 98.


107 *Black Communities, supra* note 74.

108 Mays et al., *supra* note 102.

109 See generally Mary S. Garner & Dorcas E. Kunkel, *Quality Improvement of Pastoral Care For Major Depression in the Community of an African American Religious Organization*, 41 ISSUES MENTAL HEALTH NURSING 568 (2020) (explaining that, because Black Americans are less likely to receive appropriate diagnosis and culturally competent care for depression, their depression tends to become chronic and more severe).

110 See, e.g., First Amended Complaint at ¶ 2, Disability Rights California v. County of Alameda, 2021 WL 212900 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2021) (No. 5:20-cv-05256-CRB) (“During a recent two-year period, over 2,300 people were detained at the County’s psychiatric facilities more than three times, the majority of whom were Black.”); Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Finds that Alameda County, California, Violates the Americans with Disabilities Act and the U.S. Constitution (Apr. 22, 2021), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-finds-alameda-county-california-violates-americans-disabilities-act-and-us (finding that Alameda County failed to provide services to its constituents with mental health disabilities and unnecessarily institutionalized them at various psychiatric facilities instead of providing appropriate community-based services).

111 First Amended Complaint, *supra* note 110, at ¶ 57.

112 Id. at ¶ 2.

113 Id. at ¶ 74.

114 Id. at ¶ 84.


116 Richardson & Goff, *supra* note 56, at 121.

117 Richardson, *supra* note 57.

118 Id.

119 Richardson & Goff, *supra* note 56.

120 Robert E. Worden et al., *On the Meaning and Measurement of Suspects’ Demeanor Toward the Police: A Comment on “Demeanor and Arrest,”* 33 J. RSCH. CRIME & DELINQ. 324, 325 (1996) (noting that the proposition that police officers respond punitive to those they believe are not accorded them deference “emerged from some of the earliest systematic inquiry into police behavior”). Research also shows significantly high levels of stigma against mental illness among law enforcement officers. See El-Sabawi & Carroll, *supra* note 85, at 11. One study reported that a majority of surveyed police officers viewed being treated for a mental illness as a “sign of personal...

121 Richardson & Goff, supra note 56, at 137.

122 Inappropriate and unnecessary contact between Black people with mental illness and law enforcement officers also violates our nation’s Constitution and its civil rights laws. See, e.g., C.R. DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., INVESTIGATION OF THE BALTIMORE CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT 3, 8 (Aug. 10, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/crt/file/883296/download. Following the killing of Freddie Gray in 2014, the Department of Justice conducted a comprehensive investigation of the Baltimore Police Department’s (BPD’s) policies and practices. Id. at 10. Among other things, the Department found that the BPD engaged in a pattern or practice of use of excessive force against Baltimore’s residents, including Black residents with mental health disabilities. Id. at 74-85. The BPD also failed to make reasonable modifications to its policies for interactions with people with mental health disabilities, in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Id. at 80-85. At the same time, the BPD also engaged in racially discriminatory stops, searches, arrest, and use of force, in violation of the Constitution and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act. Id. at 47-72. The Department, the BPD, and the City of Baltimore resolved the Department’s findings through a Consent Decree, which is still being implemented by the parties under court supervision. Consent Decree, United States v. Police Dep’t of Baltimore City, 282 F. Supp. 3d 897 (2017) (No. 17-cv-00099-JKB), 2017 WL 4481156, https://www.j ustice.gov/opa/file/925056/download; CONSENT DECREASE MONITORING TEAM, SEVENTH SEMIANNUAL REPORT (Feb. 15, 2022), https://static1.squarespace.com/static/59db8644e45a7c08738ca2ff1/t/620c205fdfa1535274047ae2/1644961899345/7th+semiannual+report.pdf. The Department continues to investigate police departments across the country for potential violations of the Constitution, Title VI, and the ADA. See, e.g., Attorney General Merrick B. Garland Delivers Remarks Announcing a Pattern or Practice Investigation into the City of Phoenix and the Phoenix Police Department, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., (Aug. 5, 2021), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-merrick-b-garland-delivers-remarks-announcing-pattern-or-practice (announcing the Justice Department’s investigation into whether the Phoenix Police Department uses unconstitutional excessive force, engages in discriminatory policing practices, and “respond[s] to people with disabilities in a manner that violates the Americans with Disabilities Act”).


124 Id.


128 NBC Video, supra note 125.


131 Madani, supra note 127.

132 Id.

133 Id.

134 Calvert, supra note 126.

135 Id.

136 Id.

137 See supra note 122.

138 The community mental health services in which substantial investment is needed is described in DIVERSION TO WHAT, supra note 93, at 2. See also MARTONE ET AL., supra note 68, at 3 (noting that “many states have implemented policies, programs, and new housing options” that effectively serve people with mental illness in the community and “[w]hile progress has been slow, …many more people with mental illness [are] living in integrated,
community-based settings”). Among these, Assertive Community Treatment (ACT) is “an individualized package of services and supports effective in meeting the needs of people with serious mental illness living in the community,” delivered by a multi-disciplinary team that provides case management, assessments, psychiatric services, substance use disorder services, housing assistance, and supported employment. DIVERSION TO WHAT, supra note 93, at 3. “The team is on call 24 hours a day to address the individual’s needs and any crises that may occur.” Id.


143 Scottie Andrew, This Town of 170,000 Replaced Some Cops with Medics and Mental Health Workers. It’s Worked for Over 30 Years, CNN (July 5, 2020, 10:10 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/07/05/us/cahoots-replace-police-mental-mental-trnd/index.html.


145 See What is the Street Crisis Response Team?, CITY & CNTY. S.F., https://sf.gov/street-crisis-response-team (last visited July 1, 2022). “San Francisco’s new, unarmed, non-police teams are scheduled, at first, to take over the police calls for code 800 – a broad, catch-all category the police describe as ‘a report of a mentally disturbed person.’ The police here got nearly 17,000 of those code 800s last year, according to SFPD data, and nearly 22,000 overall from persons in mental or behavioral crisis. The vast majority of them were non-violent. Of those code 800 calls, the police data show, only 132 of them reported ‘a potential for violence or a weapon.’ S.F. DEP’T PUB. HEALTH, STREET CRISIS RESPONSE TEAM ISSUE BRIEF (Feb. 2021), https://www.sfdph.org/dph/files/IWG/SCRT_IWG_Issue_Brief_FINAL.pdf. There are several different mental health crisis response models with varying degrees of law enforcement involvement, including none at all. A few community-based mental health programs in California importantly conduct all of their services without any law enforcement involvement. For a more in-depth description of the various mental health crisis response teams, see MIMI E. KIM ET AL., INTERRUPTING CRIMINALIZATION, DEFINE THE POLICE - INVEST IN COMMUNITY CARE: A GUIDE TO ALTERNATIVE MENTAL HEALTH RESPONSES (May 2021), https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5ee39ec764dbd7179ef1243c6/t/60ca7e7399f1b5306c8226c3/1623883385572/Crisis+Response+Guide.pdf.

146 See GBRICS Partnership (Greater Baltimore Regional Integrated Crisis System): Transforming Behavioral Health Crisis Services, BEHAV. HEALTH SYS. BALT. [hereinafter GBRICS Partnership], https://www.bhsbaltimore.org/learn/gbrics-partnership/ (last visited July 1, 2022) (describing Baltimore region’s plans to “[e]xpand capacity of mobile crisis teams (non-law enforcement) so that they are available 24/7 across the region,” with the goal of “[r]educ[ing] unnecessary emergency department use and police interaction for people in behavioral health crisis”).


148 DIVERSION TO WHAT, supra note 93, at 7-8. The federal government has endorsed the clinician-peer worker model as a “best practice.” See SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., NAT’L GUIDELINES FOR
effective at reducing incidents of police use of force (or even simply reducing incidents of policing) in the thirty years following CIT’s conception, little evidence exists to show that the CIT approach is transformative. El-Darby & colleagues, supra note 85, at 13 (“Despite the enormous number of programs in operation in the thirty years following CIT’s conception, little evidence exists to show that the CIT approach is effective at reducing incidents of police use of force (or even simply reducing incidents of excessive police use of force) during behavioral-health-related calls.”).

**Note:**

149 See supra note 85.

150 See supra note 88.

151 See supra note 88.

152 See supra note 88.

153 See supra note 88.

154 See supra note 88.

155 See supra note 88.
by Congresswoman Katie Porter, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) would provide grants to
enacted legislation permitting states to place fees on mobile phone networks to pay for staffing and training for 988,
content/upload [hereinafter M
expected legislation]
116 crises including but not limited to threats of self
167 lawm
166 s, as well as to private insurance regulators.
https://www.cchpca.org/2021/11/Spring2021_COVIDPolicies
165 a
164 needs#:~:text=The%20House%2Dpassed%20Build%20Back%20Better%20bill%20would%20provide%20more,exp
10, 2022), Investments in Build Back Better Would Address Pressing Unmet Needs
163 in federal financial resources for Medicaid
154 increases jurisdictions’ compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act); Bernstein, Burnim, & Murphy, supra note 93,
at 7-8 (describing these services and the evidence of their success in preventing incarceration).
165 In November 2021, the House of Representatives passed the Build Back Better Act, which included $150 billion in federal financial resources for Medicaid reimbursement for services like ACT, crisis services, supported employment, and peer support services. Emily Cochrane & Jonathan Weisman, House Narrowly Passes Biden’s Social Safety Net and Climate Bill, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 21, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/19/us/politics/house-passes-reconciliation-bill.html; Elise Aguilar, The Build Back Better Act: $150 Billion for Medicaid HCBS Funding and Other Important Programs, AM. NETWORK CMTY. OPTIONS & RES. (Nov. 2, 2021), https://www.ancor.org/newsroom/news/build-back-better-act-150-billion-medicaid-hcbs-funding-and-other-important-programs. The Build Back Better Act also allocated another $150 billion in federal housing resources, including Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) housing vouchers that can be used by people with mental illness so that they can afford safe and stable housing. Will Fischer, Housing Investments in Build Back Better Would Address Pressing Unmet Needs, CTR. BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (Feb. 10, 2022), https://www.cbpp.org/research/housing/housing-investments-in-build-back-better-would-address-pressing-unmet-needs#:~:text=The%20House%2Dpassed%20Build%20Back%20Better%20bill%20would%20provide%20more,exp
163 This recommendation also applies to state lawmakers, as well as to private insurance regulators.
162 This recommendation also applies to state lawmakers, as well as to private insurance regulators.
161 This summer will see the roll-out of 988, the new three-digit number for calls to the national network of call centers affiliated with the National Suicide Prevention Lifeline. Designating 988 for the National Suicide Prevention Lifeline, 47 CFR § 52.200 (2020). 988 is intended to be a new “mental health 911” for calls involving mental health crises including but not limited to threats of self-harm. National Suicide Hotline Designation Act of 2020, Pub. L. 116-172 (2020). As currently constituted, the 988 network is inadequate to meet the needs of all those who are expected to call 988, or to serve as an effective resource to the 911 system. JUDGE DAVID L. BAZELON CTR. FOR MENTAL HEALTH L., A NEW DAY OR MORE OF THE SAME? OUR HOPES AND FEARS FOR 988 (AND 911) (June 2022) [hereinafter HOPES AND FEARS FOR 988], https://secureservercdn.net/198.71.233.111/d25.2ac.myftpupload.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/A-New-Day-or-More-of-the-Same-Our-Hopes-Fears-for-988-and-911.pdf. Congress has enacted legislation permitting states to place fees on mobile phone networks to pay for staffing and training for 988, see id., but more federal support has been proposed and is needed.
160 For example, under the Mental Health Justice and Parity Act of 2022, introduced in the House of Representatives by Congresswoman Katie Porter, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) would provide grants to

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158 Taheri, supra note 88, at 90.
159 There are different ways to implement a joint response. A pre-existing team of police and mental health personnel can be dispatched, or the police and mental health system can separately deploy personnel who coordinate and converge on the scene. Communities have implemented a variety of co-responder models. ASHLEY KRIDER ET AL., POL’Y RSCH., INC. & NAT’L LEAGUE OF CITIES, RESPONDING TO INDIVIDUALS IN BEHAVIORAL HEALTH CRISIS VIA CO-RESPONDER MODELS: THE ROLES OF CITIES, COUNTIES, LAW ENFORCEMENT, PROVIDERS (Jan. 2020), https://www.theiACP.org/sites/default/files/SJCResponding%20to%20Individuals.pdf.
161 DIVERSION TO WHAT, supra note 93, at 7-8.
163 See MARTONE ET AL., supra note 68, at 5 (noting these services “have been proven successful in reducing arrest and incarceration as well as other forms of institutionalization”); Bernstein, Burnim, & Murphy, supra note 93, at 18 (noting these services’ success in preventing needless institutionalization and pointing out that their availability increases jurisdictions’ compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act); DIVERSION TO WHAT, supra note 93, at 7-8 (describing these services and the evidence of their success in preventing incarceration).
164 In November 2021, the House of Representatives passed the Build Back Better Act, which included $150 billion in federal financial resources for Medicaid reimbursement for services like ACT, crisis services, supported employment, and peer support services. Emily Cochrane & Jonathan Weisman, House Narrowly Passes Biden’s Social Safety Net and Climate Bill, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 21, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/19/us/politics/house-passes-reconciliation-bill.html; Elise Aguilar, The Build Back Better Act: $150 Billion for Medicaid HCBS Funding and Other Important Programs, AM. NETWORK CMTY. OPTIONS & RES. (Nov. 2, 2021), https://www.ancor.org/newsroom/news/build-back-better-act-150-billion-medicaid-hcbs-funding-and-other-important-programs. The Build Back Better Act also allocated another $150 billion in federal housing resources, including Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) housing vouchers that can be used by people with mental illness so that they can afford safe and stable housing. Will Fischer, Housing Investments in Build Back Better Would Address Pressing Unmet Needs, CTR. BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (Feb. 10, 2022), https://www.cbpp.org/research/housing/housing-investments-in-build-back-better-would-address-pressing-unmet-needs#:~:text=The%20House%2Dpassed%20Build%20Back%20Better%20bill%20would%20provide%20more,exp
166 This recommendation also applies to state lawmakers, as well as to private insurance regulators.
communities for programs in which clinicians and/or peers respond to service calls instead of the police. Mental Health Justice and Parity Act of 2022, H.R. 7254, 117th Cong. (introduced Mar. 28, 2022). These alternative responders would be trained in the principles of de-escalation and antiracism, and grantees could receive additional funds if they demonstrate a notable reduction in incarceration or death of people with mental illness, or a notable increase in referrals of people with mental illness to voluntary community-based services. Id. Federal funding for other initiatives, such as the 988 network, see HOPES AND FEARS FOR 988, supra note 167, was included in the Bipartisan Safer Communities Act of 2022, enacted by Congress and signed by President Biden in June 2022. See President Joseph R. Biden, Remarks at the Signing of S.2938, the Bipartisan Safer Communities Act (June 25, 2022), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2022/06/25/remarks-by-president-biden-at-signing-of-s-2938-the-bipartisan-safer-communities-act/.

See, e.g., Fact Sheet: President Biden to Announce Strategy to Address Our National Mental Health Crisis, As Part of Unity Agenda in his First State of the Union, WHITE HOUSE (Mar. 1, 2022) (announcing President’s FY2023 budget request for mental health workforce capacity-building programs), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/03/01/fact-sheet-president-biden-to-announce-strategy-to-address-our-national-mental-health-crisis-as-part-of-unity-agenda-in-his-first-state-of-the-union/. Existing programs such as the National Health Service Corps, Nurse Corps, Behavioral Health Workforce Education and Training Program, Substance Use Disorder Treatment and Recovery Loan Repayment Program, and the Minority Fellowship Program, provide training, access to scholarships and loan repayment to mental health clinicians committed to practicing in underserved communities.


171 See, e.g., DIVERSION TO WHAT, supra note 93 (calling on communities to implement supported housing and supported employment programs).

172 See About, NAT’L NETWORK TO ELIMINATE DISPARITIES IN BEHAV. HEALTH (NNED), https://nned.net/about/ (last visited July 1, 2022) (stating that NNED supports community-based organizations in learning about and implementing training and other efforts to increase behavioral health equity).

173 See, e.g., Lucy Tompkins, If Housing Is a Health Care Issue, Should Medicaid Pay the Rent?, N.Y. Times (June 14, 2022), https://www.nytimes.com/2022/06/14/headway/medicaid-housing-rent-health.html; Jennifer Mathis, Housing is Mental Health Care: A Call for Medicaid Demonstration Waivers Covering Housing, PSYCHIATRY ONLINE (Dec. 18, 2020), https://ps.psychiatryonline.org/doi/10.1176/appi.ps.202000252 (stating that Medicaid should “approve demonstrations covering housing for people with serious mental illnesses. If these demonstrations show that providing Medicaid financing for housing improves mental health outcomes and reduces use of more costly services, those results should spur a conversation about modifying Medicaid to allow reimbursement for housing in appropriate circumstances”). Studies show that providing permanent, scattered-site supported housing to people with mental illness fosters better outcomes, in terms of reduced emergency room and hospital utilization, reduced engagement with law enforcement, and increased measures of social interaction and community engagement. See, e.g., JUDGE DAVID L. BAZELON CTR. FOR MENTAL HEALTH L., SUPPORTIVE HOUSING: THE MOST EFFECTIVE AND INTEGRATED HOUSING FOR PEOPLE WITH MENTAL DISABILITIES (Apr. 2017), http://www.advancingstates.org/sites/nasauad/files/hcb/files/155/7711/Supportive_Housing.pdf; Position Statement 38: Supportive Housing and Housing First, MENTAL HEALTH AM. (Sep. 18, 2018), https://www.mhnational.org/issues/position-statement-38-supportive-housing-and-housing-first#_ednref13; Tim Aubry et al., A randomized controlled trial of the effectiveness of Housing First in a small Canadian City, 19 BMC PUB. HEALTH 1154 (2019), https://bmcpublichealth.biomedcentral.com/track/pdf/10.1186/s12889-019-7492-8.pdf. Providers of mental health services report that it is easier to engage people with mental illness in considering other services, and in active participation in service planning and recovery. See, e.g., What We Do: Housing First Teams, PATHWAYS TO HOUSING DC [hereinafter PATHWAYS], https://pathwayslohousingdc.org/what-we-do/housing-first/ (“After receiving housing first, every client is matched with a support team[,] . . . which works together to provide a client-centered, comprehensive community-based treatment and support services around the clock. . . . Using this model, we have been able to maintain a housing retention rate of at least 91% with clients who have traditionally been viewed as ‘treatment resistant,’ and ‘not ready for housing’”) (last visited July 1, 2022).

174 See Letter from Dennis G. Smith, Dir., Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., to U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs. (Aug. 15, 2007), https://downloads.cms.gov/cmsgov/archived-downloads/smdl/downloads/smdl081507a.pdf (stating that supervision of peer support workers is a “core component” of peer services, and must be provided by a “competent mental health professional”). Although consulting with clinicians such as psychologists or social workers may be beneficial to people working as peers, it should not be a requirement for reimbursement of all peer support services. The lived experience of peers, and their ability to share these experiences with other people with
mental illness, are intrinsically valuable, and there are other approaches to ensuring that peer services are effective, including those in which networks of peers share their experiences among themselves, that should be considered. See, e.g., “People USA’s Rose Houses,” PEOPLE USA, https://people-usa.org/program/rose-houses/ (last visited July 1, 2022) (“Rose Houses are short-term crisis respite that are home-like alternatives to hospital psychiatric ERs and inpatient units. They are 100% operated by peers who have their own lived experiences with behavioral health challenges, crisis, and moving toward wellness.”); Online and Phone Supports, WILDFLOWER ALL. [hereinafter Wildflower Phone Supports], https://wildfloweralliance.org/online-support-groups/ (last visited July 1, 2022) (hosting peer-led suicide-related support groups both online and by phone); The Living Room: Forever Hope, THRESHOLDS, https://www.thresholds.org/programs-services/peer-services/the-living-room (last visited July 1, 2022) (“The Living Room is an entirely peer-led crisis respite center, an alternative to psychiatric hospitalization. . . . [The] Living Room is a calm, peaceful, and inviting space with plenty of natural light. . . . Staff at The Living Room help guests through a screening and assessment process in a natural, comfortable setting.”); What is the Evidence for Peer Recovery Support Services?, RECOVERY RSCH. INST., https://www.recoveryanswers.org/research-post/what-is-the-evidence-for-peer-recovery-support-services/ (last visited July 1, 2022) (citing Reif et al., Peer recovery support for individuals with substance use disorders: assessing the evidence, 65 PSYCHIATRIC SERV. 853 (2014)); DIVERSION TO WHAT, supra note 93, at 11.


177 DIVERSION TO WHAT, supra note 93, passim. These services include intensive case management, peer support services, Assertive Community Treatment (ACT, which should serve as a crisis response resource for its clients), supported employment, and supported housing. Id. For children and youth, available services should be wrapped around the child and family, through a plan developed by a multi-disciplinary team partnering with the child and family. See, e.g., Letter from Vanita Gupta, Principal Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., C.R. Div., U.S. Dep’t of Just., to Honorable Earl Ray Tomblin, Governor, W. Va. 9 (June 1, 2015), https://www.ada.gov/olmstead/documents/west_va_findings_ltr.pdf.; CINDY MANN & PAMELA S. HYDE, CTR. FOR MEDICAID & CHIP SERVS. & SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., JOINT CMCS & SAMHSA INFORMATIONAL BULLETIN: COVERAGE OF BEHAVIORAL HEALTH SERVICES FOR CHILDREN, YOUTH, AND YOUNG ADULTS WITH SIGNIFICANT MENTAL HEALTH CONDITIONS 3-6 (2013), https://www.medicaid.gov/federal-policy-guidance/downloads/cib-05-07-2013.pdf. Services should be adapted to make them effective for all communities, including Black communities. RAHN K. BAILEY, M.D., AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, BEST PRACTICE HIGHLIGHTS: AFRICAN AMERICANS/BLACKS, https://www.psychiatry.org/File%20Library/Psychiatrists/Cultural-Competency/Treating-Diverse-Populations/Best-Practices-AfricanAmerican-Patients.pdf (last visited June 14, 2022).


179 See, e.g., HOPES AND FEARS FOR 988, supra note 167, at 10-11. Effective call centers resolve requests for help by providing advice, making referrals, and/or providing transportation to a community-based service provider. Id.

180 DIVERSION TO WHAT, supra note 93, at 7.

181 HOPES AND FEARS FOR 988, supra note 167, at 11. These include respite apartments or “living room” model care centers. Id. All of the components of the behavioral health crisis response system should be coordinated so that provider capacity and an individual’s progress through the system are tracked and outcomes monitored. See, e.g., TOOLKIT, supra note 148.

182 See, e.g., PATHWAYS, supra note 173.

183 See, e.g., WHITE BIRD CLINIC, supra note 141 (describing implementation of the CAHOOTS program in the Eugene-Springfield metro area of Oregon); STAR PROGRAM, supra note 144.

See, e.g., HOPES AND FEARS FOR 988, supra note 167, at 12; NAT’L SUICIDE PREVENTION LIFELINE, POLICY FOR HELPING CALLERS AT IMMINENT RISK OF SUICIDE 1 (Dec. 2010), https://www.madinamerica.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/SAMHSA-Lifeline-Policy-for-Helping-Callers-at-Imminent-Risk-of-Suicide.pdf (finding that in a 2007 study of four Lifeline centers, deployment of emergency rescue services varied from 0.5% of calls at one center to 8.5% of calls at another center), 988 and 911 service providers, and law enforcement agencies, should audit those instances when police are dispatched to better understand whether involving the police was appropriate. See, e.g., Neusteter Presentation, supra note 160.


See, e.g., GBRICS Partnership, supra note 146 (describing 21-member stakeholder group providing guidance to behavioral health crisis reform effort; members are required to participate in committees including to promote community engagement). This may mean providing stipends or childcare to community members so that they can participate in meetings.


See, e.g., Expanding the Peer Bridge Program, WASH. MENTAL HEALTH SUMMIT, https://www.wamhsummit.org/peer-bridge-program (last visited July 1, 2022).


See, e.g., SUPPORT, TECH. ASSISTANCE & RES. CTR., CULTURAL COMPETENCY IN MENTAL HEALTH PEER-RUN PROGRAMS AND SELF-HELP GROUPS: A TOOL TO ASSESS AND ENHANCE YOUR SERVICES 8 (2010), https://power2u.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/CulturalCompetencyInMentalHealthPeer-runProgramsSelf-helpGroups.pdf (advising providers of peer support services to look at “cultural composition of your peer staff, volunteers or leadership”).


Memorandum in Support

March 16, 2023

S. 4007-B, Part DD
A. 3007-B, Part DD

By: BUDGET
By: BUDGET
Senate Committee: Finance
Assembly Committee: Ways and Means
Effective Date: 90th day after it shall have become law

THE TASK FORCE ON MENTAL HEALTH AND TRAUMA INFORMED REPRESENTATION SUPPORTS THIS LEGISLATION

New York State Bar Association’s Task Force on Mental Health and Trauma Informed Representation supports an 8.5% Cost of Living Increases for Human Service Programs.

The New York State Bar Association’s Task Force on Mental Health and Trauma Informed Representation (“Task Force”) is tasked with evaluating all areas of the law where clients living with mental illness and trauma need representation, and what lawyers need to provide the best possible representation. As part of this evaluation, the Task Force has reviewed the underlying funding for staffing provided annually for those who serve in housing, clinical and treatment roles in community-based services and finds significant additional funding is needed.

Part CC of the Executive’s Mental Health and Hygiene Budget Bill (S.4007-A/A.3007-A) establishes a “2.5% COLA” (Cost of Living Adjustment) for designated Human Service Programs. This COLA increase would be added to the state funding in support of the services of numerous community-based health care provider organizations. Among those providers are the hundreds of nonprofits providers of “behavioral health services”: those which help to meet the needs of individuals living with mental health, addiction, and developmental/intellectual disabilities, as well as co-occurring disorders.

New York, like most of the states, is facing a healthcare worker shortage. Following COVID-19, when combined with the already challenging work and often irregular hours, low wages become one of the core contributors to this staffing shortage. “COVID-19 certainly played a major role, said Bryan O’Malley, CDPAANYS executive director, with people quitting because they didn’t want to take the risk, or because they needed to care for their own children or a sick person in their household. Despite that, almost 50 percent of the clients responding to the association’s survey said a home health aide had quit because of low pay or having found a better job. “COVID definitely made the situation worse, but it was already a crisis," O’Malley said.”
In 2006, the State Legislature enacted a COLA for the benefit of mental hygiene and human services providers. The statutory COLA authority has been extended every year since then, however the language included “notwithstanding” language, which has allowed the COLA to be ignored in subsequent years. A COLA was provided in 2006 but was “notwithstanding” in all except three years since then creating a lack of necessary funding to provide proper services to those in need.

In those three years in which a COLA was provided, there was a 0.2%, 1.0% and a 5.4% COLA totaling 6.6%, while the consumer price index increased during that period a total of 35.31%. (In two other years, there were modest salary increases for mental hygiene programs but no across-the-board increases.) The cumulative, compounded impact of deferred COLA increases is approximately a 30% loss in reimbursement, which directly translates to wage increases for front-line and support workers, when compared to the increase in inflation, over those 16 years.

As a result, most mental health, addiction and ID/DD community-based have seen little increase in wages, resulting in extreme difficulty hiring and retaining staff positions. Thus, many currently have double digit vacancy rates.

NYSBA applauds Governor’s Hochul’s historic proposed expansion of mental health services in her 2023-24 Executive Budget, however, it is clear that it will have limited impact without increasing funding to existing providers to pay competitive salaries to recruit and retain competent staff. The Assembly and Senate proposed budgets include the 8.5% COLA that is necessary for these services to expand.

As Task Force Co-Chair Joseph A. Glazer, who serves as Deputy Commissioner of the Department of Community Mental Health in Westchester County wrote in his budget testimony to the Joint Hearing on the Health and Mental Hygiene Article VII budget proposal, “Our service providers are in a staffing crisis... Should these ... crises be left unaddressed, the Governor’s proposed budget will effectively bring little change in our system. We will have a huge, robust system on paper, and the static inability to fill new apartments and hire employees, unless the legislature addresses the on-going woeful inadequacy of funding for our workforce...”

Based on the foregoing, the Task Force supports efforts proposed by the Assembly and Senate budgets increasing the 8.5% COLA for Human Services Programs.

Interim Report: Respite Care Services Workgroup  
Submitted April 2011

Introduction, Background and Charge
In February, 2010, The Commissioners’ Committee on Cross-Systems Youth asked its Senior Staff and Family & Youth Partners to form a study and work group to identify issues related to Respite Care with a cross-system focus. Through multiple vehicles and venues, including personally attended regional hearings across the state, the cross-systems Commissioners heard about a range of issues associated with the supply, demand, access to, understanding, availability, accessibility, affordability, and effectiveness of local respite care services. Respite care issues to be studied included access, planned and emergency respite services. The group was also asked to recommend remedial strategies and outline a plan moving forward. By way of this interim report, the Respite Care Services Workgroup conveys its findings to date and suggests strategic directions for the Senior Staff and Family & Youth Partners and Commissioners’ Committee’s consideration.

Group Membership Representatives of the Following State Agencies, Organizations and Systems
- Council on Children and Families (CCF)
- Commission on Quality of Care and Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities (CQC )
- Families Together in NYS (FTNYS)
- Office of Children and Family Services (OCFS)
- Department of Health (DOH)
- Office of Mental Health (OMH)
- Office for People With Developmental Disabilities (OPWDD)

Findings
- Planned respite care is lacking in NYS, especially for cross-systems youth.
- No cross-systems serving programs that came to our attention have adequate emergency and crisis respite capabilities.
- There is no consistent definition of respite care, policy, procedure, or practices across state agencies. While common themes for defining and providing respite care services exist, there are some regulatory differences among the state agencies.
- Regulations do not adequately differentiate between types of respite services, (i.e. planned, emergency, crisis, etc.) across the child serving systems.
- Cross-system coordination is inconsistent on the county level; each child-serving system has its own referral pathways, triage efforts, and contracting patterns.
• For youth enrolled in NYS sponsored programs (OMH, OPWDD, OCFS), planned respite frequently takes several months to establish as part of a treatment plan and is barely adequate.

• Emergency respite availability is virtually non-existent for youth not currently enrolled in OMH, OPWDD, OCFS, or DOH programs, in some cases; eligibility is limited to waiver-enrollment.

• Local respite planning and response varies widely for cross-system youth. These variances have had none to relatively little state inquiry or intervention and are driven by local conditions including but not limited to geography, the political and economic landscape, creativity of key community staff, issues of supply and demand, cultural traditions, etc.

• The lack of crisis respite results in children being picked up by law enforcement or presenting in emergency rooms. Reliable data is not available to measure the impact on our Juvenile Justice, Child Welfare, and Mental Health service systems.

• Local service systems need to maximize available funding streams through more creative approaches. This currently results in children being inappropriately placed in higher levels of care. (I.e. psychiatric care, PINS petitions, diagnostic units, detention).

• There is insufficient data and even less cross-system data available to track the number of units of service being provided, the number of children being served, or the number of homes and slots available at any point in time. With the expansion of community prevention programs such as the OMH waiver and B2H Waiver, the demand for planned and emergency respite will likely increase in the coming years. Some residential care agencies, TBH’s, have apparent capacity to serve, but regulatory, supervision strategies and financing model(s) do not exist for cross-systems populations.

Research Activities

• Review of available literature (limited availability).

• Review of applicable laws and regulations of involved state agencies (OMH, OPWDD, DOH, OCFS, DPCA).

• Review of respite care services under HCBS Waivers in OPWDD, OMH, OCFS (B2H).

• Review of available hard data and information including sampling of local service delivery Plans across systems, select County social services information, indications of local utilization of respite services delivered in accordance with B2H service menus.

• Interviews from a sample of county and regional parent partners, Department of Social Services (DSS) officials, mental health (MH) officials, Youth Advocates, Single Point of Access (SPOA) coordinators, OPWDD officials and Developmental Disabilities Services Office (DDSO) representatives, Regional Technical Assistance Team (RTAT) leaders and members, OCFS youth, Coordinated Children’s Services Initiative (CCSI) coordinators, planners, voluntary child welfare services providers, and others.

• Interviews with National Technical Assistance Center for Children’s Mental Health at Georgetown University Center for Child and Human Development.

• Identification of local, state and national best practices.
• Presentation by Parsons Child and Adolescent Crisis Mobile Team.
• Interview with Ellis Hospital Emergency Room Administrator.
• Review of a sample of approximately 15 Local Service Plans across systems.
• Review of sample contacts with planned and emergency respite services providers.
• Participation in national webinar on respite care.

Systemic Recommendations and Strategic Directions (in Priority Order)

• If tasks related to strengthening respite care services are to remain a cross-systems priority, a clear and stronger commitment by the involved agencies will need to be made to develop consistent definitions, practice and financing models. As one example, each agency should be asked to conduct a thorough review of its respite services with a goal of identifying areas for shared training, collaboration, and resource utilization. Efforts to identify policy and practice differences among the state agencies must be rectified if a common respite practice is to emerge across children serving agencies.

• In the same vein, agencies will need to provide their expertise to develop the practice, business, and fiscal models for each of the respite services. Key program and fiscal staff will need to lend their expertise across systems to develop viable respite care alternatives.

• Ideally, respite care is one preventive strategy within a system of care that employs multiple prevention strategies to meet the needs of high-risk youth. CCF, through the implementation of the Children’s Plan and long-term commitment to cross-systems leadership efforts, is available to assist localities in developing local and regional systems of care and respite care services programs. Consultation with RTAT’s and appropriate state agencies will enhance efforts to improve local systems of care and building respite care capacity.

• As a component of model building, more accurate data is needed to identify the need for emergency and planned respite. This data needs to be broken down by county and by system. RTAT’s are an implementation partner resource. The Council on Children and Families is a resource identified in the Children’s Plan.

Short-Term Actions

• Respite Care is one strategic intervention in a cross-agency child serving system that requires increased coordination, collaboration, and access. The Council of Children and Families in implementing the Children’s Plan and building local systems of care can provide technical assistance in this effort with the assistance of state agencies.

• Treatment plans need to anticipate crisis situations and team members need to be well versed in addressing these needs. As a quality assurance measure, state agencies should review whether/how prevention and waiver programs are developing appropriate crisis diversion responses.

• Programs need to ensure the availability of culturally and linguistically competent respite programs that encourage familial informal and natural support networks to be available after services end.
• The original request to state agency and family representatives on the Workgroup for feedback on barriers in their respective agencies/systems by June 30, 2011 has been deferred until further notice.

• The provision of respite services must include children with a wide range of supervision needs. A demonstration allowing a downsizing of RTC’s may provide valuable data on the cost effectiveness of respite, and assist in longer term financing preparation.

• A range of respite options from familial to group care options should be part of a flexible continuum of services. Some localities have paid an “on-call” per diem for approved Therapeutic Foster Care families that have provided some relief for emergency respite situations. This is the most cost-effective option next to a robust emergency response to crisis situations.

• Revisit and prepare regulatory amendment recommendations in order to better serve children with cross-system needs. (i.e., by enabling more flexibility with respect to mixing of ages and populations in planned and crisis respite programs and multiple state agency approval processes). As one example, if a respite provider is approved by one state system, that approval process should suffice for other state systems wishing to approve the same provider. Communities should develop protocols to anticipate the needs of children with complex needs (OPWDD & OMH eligible) and make a rapid response to these youth. (Ex. Oneida County agencies cooperatively planned for cross-system children’s respite needs.)

• Adjoining counties need to work together to identify and respond to respite needs. The Workgroup recommends the continued strengthening of RTAT’s, agency regional offices, and other regional groups be trained to help organize these responses.

Long-Term Actions

• Agencies should continue to conduct comprehensive, intra-agency reviews of their working definitions and implementation of respite care services with a report back to the Workgroup on efforts to standardize working definitions where feasible by June 30, 2011.

• The state’s regulatory framework is not conducive to build a true cross-systems respite care services system without regulatory, financing, and practice models that are cross-systems orientated.

• Cross-systems crisis management training and mentoring opportunities must be developed, implemented, and administered for each child and family entering each agency’s service system. The lack of agreed upon and consistent practice, business, and fiscal models is prohibitive in advancing respite care services conversations. Planned respite care and emergency/crisis respite care would each benefit from this tripartite paradigm.

• As a long-range strategy, a children’s cross-systems reinvestment plan should be considered as one cornerstone for identified financial models. The possibility of a cross-systems sourced, dedicated funding stream for respite services and related supports has been discussed. In the immediate term, gathering useful data and information on ways select counties are ensuring that funding is flexible enough to follow the youth who needs temporary emergency respite placements.
• Additionally, another financial and funding cornerstone relates to ensuring the availability of and payment for respite care services through the present waiver services menus and derivatives as well as in any future waiver services enhancements, developments, and allowances by the Federal government.

• Any proposed financial-funding models should be tied to outcome metrics which in turn should be linked to performance outcome measures to promote a pay for performance financing framework based on quality.

• Explore and be prepared to address the development/replication of service-effective and cost-conscious mobile crisis teams for children and youth (e.g. Parsons Team) as an innovative service delivery direction and remain aware of the need for both urban/suburban and rural crisis team service approaches. Demonstration of the cost-benefit and value of such a proposition should be identified as a discrete task. An assessment/evaluation through the University at Albany, for example, may be proposed to further develop and advance this concept.

*Interim Report: Submitted April, 2011*
Memorandum in Support

May 13, 2022

S. 2881-B By: Senator Ramos
A. 8524-A By: M. of A. Forrest
Senate Committee: Alcoholism and Substance Abuse
Assembly Committee: Codes
Effective Date: 180 days after it shall have become a law

AN ACT An act to amend the criminal procedure law and the judiciary law, in relation to judicial diversion programs; and to repeal certain provisions of the criminal procedure law relating thereto.

THE NEW YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION SUPPORTS THIS LEGISLATION

The New York State Bar Association (NYSBA) strongly supports the Treatment Not Jails (TNJ) legislation (S.2881B & A.8524A). This proposed legislation amends Judicial Diversion as codified in Criminal Procedure Law Article 216, to go beyond the eligible substance use disorders and limited specified crimes. If the TNJ amendment is passed, CPL 216 would also be available to people accused of any charge under the penal law and to those who have mental health diagnoses or other “functional impairments.” The TNJ bill would also expand judicial powers to grant diversion, offer pre-plea participation in treatment, ensure clinical and scientific individual-oriented and harm-reduction based models of treatment rather than punitive ones, embrace “procedural justice,” and create diversion parts in every county in New York State.

Poverty frequently exacerbates mental health and developmental problems which in turn prevent individuals and families from leaving poverty, creating an intergenerational cycle of poverty and poor health. Poverty in childhood is associated with lower school achievement; worse cognitive, behavioral, and attention-related outcomes; higher rates of depressive and anxiety disorders; and higher rates of almost every psychiatric disorder in adulthood. Poverty in adulthood is linked to depressive disorders, anxiety disorders, psychological distress, and suicide. Approximately 1 in 4 individuals with serious mental illness also have a substance use disorder.

People living in poverty with mental illness and substance use challenges are less likely to be able to access therapeutic services. The criminalization of mental illness and substance use is evidenced by the fact that jails and prisons have become larger mental health providers than psychiatric hospitals. Notably, more than half (52%) of the people in NYC DOC custody have received mental health services, up from 44% in 2016.

1 Functional impairments include mental health, intellectual, neurocognitive and physical disabilities as defined by the DSM-5.
3 https://www.psychiatrictimes.com/view/addressing-poverty-and-mental-illness
5 For example, among children experiencing poverty who need mental health care, less than 15% receive services, and even fewer complete treatment.
6 https://www.treatmentadvocacycenter.org/key-issues/criminalization-of-mental-illness
In 2020, an average of 17% were diagnosed with a “serious mental illness,” up from 10% four years earlier.\textsuperscript{7} Statistics for counties outside of New York City reveal similar patterns. “Nearly 1 in 5 women and 1 in 10 men entering New York jails has a serious mental illness. The Cost of Incarceration in New York State shows that 1 in 9 women and 1 in 10 men entering New York jails has a serious mental illness.”\textsuperscript{8}

Per a January 2021 report by the Vera Institute:\textsuperscript{9}

“Much of the problem lies at the feet of State government. Although most spending on social services, mental health, and public health flows through - and is reflected in - county budgets, the bulk of the money in those categories comes from state aid, not money the county itself raises or controls. From 2011 to 2019, New York State: cut aid to counties for behavioral health and social services by 8 percent — from $12.3 billion to $11.3 billion; and reduced state spending (that does not flow through county budgets) on human services by 21 percent from 2011 to 2017 and by 26 percent from 2017 to 2018.”

Vera’s report states further: “These deep cuts in funding for social services, mental health, and public health have left counties without sufficient resources to provide treatment, care, and supports that help people get and stay healthy. Even before the coronavirus hit...75 percent of counties reported that they needed more heroin- and opioid-related programs and services; 68 percent of counties said they did not have enough drug crisis services; 74 percent of counties — particularly those in rural areas where there is little to no public transportation — reported that they needed more resources to help people travel to drug treatment; and 84 percent of counties reported that they did not have enough housing for people with behavioral health issues, leaving many to live on the street or in substandard rentals, including places without heat or utilities. The State requires counties to fund public health, mental health, and emergency assistance for families in addition to county jails. But last year, counties collectively spent approximately 11 times as much on jails as they spent on community mental health.”

There is no statute affording Judicial Diversion in New York State for persons with mental health disorders or cognitive or intellectual disabilities charged with crimes despite the fact that public safety is notably increased by expanded opportunities as reflected by lower rates of recidivism for graduates.

Criminal Procedure Law 216 was enacted in 2009. This statute allows Judicial Diversion for persons with alcohol or substance use disorders who are charged with a select number of drug and property-related non-violent class B, C, D or E felonies and who have no violent felony convictions within the last ten years.\textsuperscript{10}

Even when they otherwise meet the criteria for admission under Criminal Law Procedure 216, people with psychiatric disorders are generally excluded from such treatment courts, based on the recommended practices of the Office of Court Drug Treatment Programs.\textsuperscript{11} Even with the recommended addition of new “mental health tracks” in Manhattan Drug Court, as an example, this does not change the fact that a limited number of charges are eligible for statutory judicial diversion. All other applicants for court mandated mental health treatment must rely on the complete discretion of prosecutors.

However, there is presently no statute delineating Judicial Diversion for persons with mental health disorders or cognitive or intellectual disabilities. As such, mental health treatment courts are not available in every county in New York: only 26 criminal courts statewide have ad hoc mental health treatment courts which

\textsuperscript{7} New York City Comptroller. (March 2021). FY 2022 Agency Watch List: Department of Correction.
\textsuperscript{8} New York State Office of Mental Health, “Mental Health Resource Handbook Chapter 2: Providing Mental Health Services in Local Detention/Correctional Facilities”
\textsuperscript{9} The Cost of Incarceration in New York State (vera.org)
\textsuperscript{10} Criminal Procedure Law 216, Judicial Diversion Program for Certain Felony Offenders.
solely rely on prosecutorial gatekeeping.12

Yet in New York State, one in 5 people have a mental health diagnosis.13 Moreover, more than 50% of individuals experiencing mental health challenges will also experience a substance use disorder, and vice versa.14

New York State’s jails and prisons have replaced hospitals and community treatment providers as the primary facility for people with mental illness. New York State incarcerates more people with serious mental illnesses in its jails and prisons than it treats in hospitals15, and there are more people with serious mental illness living in Rikers Island than in any psychiatric hospital in the United States.16

Additionally, the rate in jails and prison of people with mental health or other disabilities is higher than that in communities.17 For example, the number of people incarcerated in NYC jails receiving ongoing mental health care in jail (designated “Brad H” because of the court settlement of the same name) outnumber incarcerated people without mental health issues. At the end of July 2021, 49.6% of incarcerated people were designated with Brad H status by the City Department of Correction.18 Barry Virts, Wayne County sheriff and president of the New York State Sheriffs’ Association has reported that “Sheriffs have increasingly found that individuals are coming to their jail facilities with serious medical, mental health, and substance use issues.”19

The numbers of people with mental health challenges and other disabilities are expected to rise as we see the impact of the collective trauma of the COVID-19 pandemic. This has exacerbated existing mental health challenges as well as created its own challenges via post-pandemic-stress-syndrome and cognitive issues related to long-haul- COVID.20

Additionally, many jails are at an extraordinary level of chaos and disorder – for example the situation at Riker’s Island has been aptly described as a humanitarian crisis. In addition to the high rates of force and violence, there is an alarming level of staff absenteeism that is causing demonstrably dangerous disruptions to both security and basic services to people in custody from the moment they arrive at a reception facility. 21

Critics of treatment courts may claim that they do not protect public safety or reduce crime. However, mental health courts throughout New York have reportedly been proven successful in lowering recidivism for its graduates.22

As the trends of the past three decades also indicate, more jail does not equal more safety. To the contrary, an emerging body of research indicates that the overuse of jail, while temporarily incapacitating people, can actually lead to more criminal activity and risks undermining the health of individuals, families, and entire neighborhoods. Those who go into jail or prison with challenges— substance use, mental health concerns, joblessness, unstable housing, etc.—tend to come out with those challenges worsened. Jail also comes at

15 Treatment Advocacy Center, “New York”.
16 Serious Mental Illness Prevalence in Jails and Prisons - Treatment Advocacy Center
17 https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5008459
18 Source: Vera Institute of Justice.
19 ID. (The Cost of Incarceration)
21 On August 24, 2021, the court-appointed federal Monitor in Nuñez filed a special report advising the court of “grave concerns about the conditions and pervasive high level of disorder and chaos in the New York City jails.” Available here.
22 https://ps.psychiatryonline.org/doi/10.1176/appi.ps.201700107
tremendous financial cost: incarcerating one person on Rikers for a year costs a staggering $556,000. In June 2020 there were more than 10,000 fewer people in jail in counties outside New York City than on any given day in 2012. If counties build on their commitment to decrease jail populations and take steps to turn those transformations into savings, New York State could free up valuable dollars during this fiscal crisis - dollars that could be key to addressing behavioral health crises, mitigating the surge in unemployment and housing instability that is already underway, and investing in building healthy, safe communities.

Thus, TNJ promotes public safety, relying on a robust body of research that consistently shows that jailing those entangled in the criminal legal system leads to more - not less - criminal involvement. As the research and our collective experience demonstrates, incarceration is a profoundly destabilizing and traumatizing experience. That is especially true for those with mental health and substance use challenges, who are often brought into the criminal legal system precisely because of a fundamental lack of basic services, like stable housing, treatment and community supports. In our current carceral system, these individuals lose whatever semblance of stability they previously possessed when they become confined, and emerge from jail even more unmoored and unsupported, and by extension, more likely to be rearrested.

Mental illness, substance use disorders and other disabilities have disparate impacts along race, income, gender/gender identity, geographic and ethnic lines including disproportionate involvement by these groups in the criminal legal system; this can be addressed by expanding the reach and revising the structure of problem-solving courts.

While codification of Judicial Diversion under CPL 216 in 2009 was intended to address systemic inequities, over a full decade later, it is apparent it did not go far enough. The 2021 TNJ bill aims to make those corrections to protect and improve the lives of vulnerable people who intersect with the criminal legal system in NYS often a result of their behavioral health challenges.

This legislation would amend the current codification of judicial diversion to include individuals who have mental health diagnoses or other disabilities regardless of criminal history or offense charged.

Much of the prevailing “wisdom” driving treatment court exclusion of people with mental illness or people previously convicted of or charged with violent crimes has been proven false. People with mental health challenges are no more violent than the general population and in fact more likely to be the victims of violent crime rather than the perpetrators. Studies show that people accused of violent charges are as likely to succeed in community-based treatment as those charged with non-violent charges.

TNJ would also expand the authority of judges to accept people into Judicial Diversion when there are clinical and scientific bases for doing so, and implement due process safeguards against arbitrary rejection, punishment and expulsion. This would help ensure that people who are most in need receive treatment, streamlining the process. CPL 216 currently permits eligibility when there is a showing that “the defendant has a history of substance abuse or dependence,” “such alcohol or substance abuse or dependence is a contributing factor to the defendant’s criminal behavior,” “the defendant’s participation in judicial diversion could effectively address such abuse or dependence” and “institutional confinement of the defendant may or may not be necessary for the protection of the public.” TNJ would effectively replace this outdated and exclusive language by requiring a showing that “the defendant’s functional impairment (e.g., mental illness, disability and/or substance use disorder) is likely a contributing factor to their current or future involvement in the criminal legal system”; “the defendant’s participation in judicial diversion could effectively address such functional impairment; and, “the defendant’s access to treatment through this

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24 [The Hidden Cost of Incarceration | The Marshall Project](https://www.thecaseforchange.org/human-cost-of-incarceration)
25 [https://www.mentalhealth.gov/basics/mental-health-myths-facts](https://www.mentalhealth.gov/basics/mental-health-myths-facts)
The bill allows for participation in treatment without requiring a guilty plea to avoid dire collateral consequences of such a conviction. Criminal convictions may compromise a person’s lawful immigration status and otherwise prevent educational, housing and employment opportunities. People who sustain criminal convictions can lose access to public benefits, parenting rights, licensure, freedom of movement, and suffer financial instability. These consequences affect a person’s family relationships, self-worth, stability, motivation to succeed and can have the adverse effect of bringing about more criminal legal involvement, and by extension, jeopardize public safety.

The impact of collateral consequences to communities of color was also previously noted by this committee when debating automatic sealing and expungement of criminal convictions. Pre- and post-plea outcomes also disproportionately fail to protect majority BIPOC communities. For example, Syracuse County Treatment Court, a court that serves a majority white population, allows some individuals to participate pre-plea. Since participants must live in Onondaga County, the population of which is 80% white (as compared to the population of NYC, which is 42.7% white) we see a more open and accepting model benefitting the majority white residents in Onondaga County, whereas a similar model has been rejected in other courts serving Black and Brown populations.

A pre-plea model also reduces the coercive aspects of our legal system and addresses the reality that poor people, particularly those who are Black and Brown, too often plead guilty to crimes they did not commit every single day in order to get out of jail, access treatment, protect their jobs, keep their housing, maintain their schooling, return to their loved ones, and avoid the hassle of having to return to court over and over again. A pre-plea resolution acknowledges criminal legal involvement as a public health issue, making inroads towards viewing behavioral health as a health and not criminal issue. The majority of people who enter into the criminal legal system struggle with a diagnosable condition under the DSM-5: a mental health condition, a substance use disorder, a neurocognitive disability, or other disorders and disabilities. If a person’s mental illness or addiction played a role in their criminal legal system involvement, the resulting legal experience and treatment must also be treated as a matter of public health equity. The TNJ amendment to CPL 216 would also presume treatment rather than incarceration, which would in effect mitigate racial and gendered disparities in carceral policies’ impact. It would also ensure that mental health and substance use practitioners collaborate with participants in treatment based on scientific and clinical models of treatment rather than outdated punitive models which are proven to have disparate impacts on and exacerbate harm to people with mental health and substance use issues. Treatment courts have an ethical obligation - and a practical imperative - to evolve their practices in the face of a changing public health and legal landscape. To that end, the bill would base treatment on evidence-based practices, including “harm reduction,” which is now recognized around the world as a safe, smart, effective and humane way to view “treatment,” deferring to the expertise and clinical opinions of

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27 See National Inventory of Collateral Consequences; for example, a conviction can affect employment requiring licensure in New York. As outlined here, the Department of State reviews criminal convictions and open cases when an individual applies for licensure.

28 Syracuse Community Treatment Court Policy; Census Facts Onondaga County; Census Facts New York City

29 Prison Policy Review, New York State. In New York, per 100,000 people incarcerated:1,655 are Black,709 are American Indian/Alaska Native, 607 are Hispanic, 219 are white. Prison Policy Review, LGBTQ. In both prisons and jails, lesbian or bisexual women are sentenced to longer periods of incarceration than straight women. Gay and bisexual men are more likely than straight men to have sentences longer than 10 years in prison.

30 Once incarcerated, people with mental illness often spend longer in prison than their counterparts without mental illness. Paula M. Ditton, Special Report: Mental Health and Treatment of Inmates and Probationers, Bureau of Justice Statistics 8 (1999),(people with mental illness are incarcerated on average 15 months longer than those without disabilities with similar convictions); Prevalence And Severity Of Mental Illness Among California Prisoners On The Rise, Stanford Justice Advocacy Project 1, 2 (2017), (on average, California incarcerated people with mental illness receive sentences 12% longer than those without diagnosis for same crimes).

mental health and substance use practitioners and ensuring the focus remains on the individual’s success in treatment.\textsuperscript{32} The bill thus encourages judges to use incarceration as a last option for positive drug screenings and mental health crises. TNJ will, further, reduce dangerous overdose and death related to substance use, adopting a much needed and widely recommended “harm reduction” model which recognizes that “cold turkey” approaches to treating substance use is dangerous and counterproductive to meaningful, autonomous, and safe recovery.

Over the last decade, there has been even greater acknowledgement of the harm inflicted upon BIPOC\textsuperscript{33} communities marginalized by barriers to accessing wealth and services.\textsuperscript{34} TNJ Bill, which will ensure that problem-solving court models reduce rather than reproduce disparities along race, income, gender/gender identity and ethnic lines in the health and criminal legal systems. TNJ will effectively “legislate” mental health courts in recognition of the nexus between a person’s mental health condition or other disability with criminal legal involvement and the shared goal of protecting public safety and reducing recidivism.

Based on the foregoing, the State Bar Association \textbf{SUPPORTS} the enactment of this legislation.


\textsuperscript{33} “BIPOC” stands for Black, Indigenous, and People of Color.

\textsuperscript{34} See, \textit{e.g.}, the resources cited under ”Racism and Health (Physical & Mental)” at https://www.nysda.org/page/RacialJusticeandEquity
Guardianship for People with Developmental Disabilities: Examination and Reform of Surrogate's Court Procedure Act Article 17-A is a Constitutional Imperative.

Preamble: The Free Britney controversy has illuminated the dangers of the guardianship process, and its potential for abuse. A person's right to determine the course of his or her life is a fundamental value in American law and firmly embodied in New York State jurisprudence. Guardianship is the legal means by which a court appoints a third party, either an individual, a not-for-profit corporation or government official, to make some or all decisions on behalf of a person determined unable to manage his or her own affairs. The civil liberties of the person subjected to guardianship yield to that decision. Because the decision exacts such a pervasive personal cost, procedural and substantive due process requirements must be observed by the court. A failure to afford due process to a respondent in a guardianship proceeding imposes burdens on the individual, but also upon societal values. This report examines article 17-A of the Surrogate's Court Procedure Act (SCPA), a discrete guardianship statute for people with developmental disabilities. In the opinion of the Committee, article 17-A requires immediate reform by the Legislature because the statute violates procedural and substantive due process, the Americans With Disabilities Act, and other well established principles addressing the rights of people with developmental disabilities and their need for empowerment, advocacy and quality decision-making. Reform of article 17-A must also recognize various forms of decision-making alternatives to guardianship for people with disabilities that are described within this report.


2 This report does not address reform of SCPA 1750-b, the health care decision making statute for people with developmental disabilities. The Legislature tapped the New York State Task Force on Life and the Law with the responsibility to reconcile the Family Health Care Decisions Act (FHCDA), SCPA 1750-b and other statutes and regulations governing surrogate health care decision making for people with mental disabilities (see L. 2010, c 8, section 28 – "[T]he task force shall consider whether the FHCDA should be amended to incorporate procedures, standards and practices for decisions about the withdrawal or withholding of life-sustaining treatment from patients with mental illness or mental retardation or developmental disabilities, and from patients residing in mental health facilities..."). The Task Force issued its report entitled Recommendations for Amending the Family Health Care Decisions Act for Persons with Developmental Disabilities and Patients In or
I. Guardianship and Civil Rights - Historical Perspectives and Modern Context

Guardianship has been employed since Ancient Rome to protect people who are unable to manage their personal and financial affairs because of incapacity by removing their right to make decisions and transferring legal power to another person, the guardian. Guardianship is a matter of state law. Before a guardian may be appointed, an individual must be determined to be an incapacitated person, defined in various ways, but codified in uniform acts as:

an individual who, for reasons other than being a minor, is unable to receive and evaluate information or make or communicate decisions to such an extent that the individual lacks the ability to meet essential requirements for physical health, safety, or self-care, even with appropriate technological assistance.

In most states, a single guardianship statute applies to all populations, regardless of the alleged cause of the person’s incapacity. New York is one of six states, the others being California, Connecticut, Idaho, Kentucky and Michigan, that have a separate statute that may be invoked for people with developmental disabilities. Guardianships may be plenary in nature, divesting all autonomy from the person subject to the regimen, or tailored to the individual needs of the person found to lack capacity.

Given its ancient origins, guardianship laws predate not only modern civil rights laws, such as the Americans with Disabilities Act, but also precede the United States Constitution and the Magna Carta. Although often examined through the lens of benevolence, the appointment of a guardian divests autonomy from another person and has severe civil rights implications. As stated in 1987 by the House of Representatives Special Committee on Aging:

Transferred from Mental Health Facilities in 2016 (see https://www.health.ny.gov/regulations/task_force/). Legislation has not yet been introduced to implement the Task Force's recommendations.

3 The term “incapacity” is not a term of art as used in this section of the report. As described later in this report, “incapacity” is defined at Mental Hygiene Law § 81.02 (b). Article 17-A does not employ the term “incapacity,” but by its own definitional terms allows for plenary adjudications upon a finding that the respondent in the proceeding is incapable of managing his/her affairs. SCPA 1750 provides: “For the purposes of this article, a person who is intellectually disabled is a person who has been certified by one licensed physician and one licensed psychologist, or by two licensed physicians ... as being incapable to manage him or herself and/or his affairs by reason of intellectual disability and that such condition is permanent in nature and likely to continue indefinitely” (see also, SCPA 1750-a for the definition of “developmental disability”).


By appointing a guardian, the court entrusts to someone else the power to choose where [he/she] will live, what medical treatment [he/she] will get and, in rare cases, when [he/she] will die. It is in one short sentence, the most punitive civil penalty that can be levied against an American citizen ...  

The “civil death” characterization of guardianship arises because a person subjected to it loses autonomy over matters related to his or her person and property. Indeed, in many jurisdictions a person with a legal guardian will be deprived of fundamental rights, such as the right to vote, marry and freely associate with others.

Since the enactment of article 17-A in 1969, there have been several national and international calls for the fundamental guardianship reform, but not of them have touched article 17-A. It should not be lost on our society that over two generations have passed following the 1975 passage of the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act when the American Bar Association (“ABA”) undertook a broad study of major areas of law affecting developmentally disabled children and adults. This study, known as the Developmental Disabilities State Legislative Project, included guardianship. The goal was to encourage “well-conceived” legislation that drew on “the best thinking, most advanced concepts, and outstanding work products from other states.” After a review of state guardianship statutes, the Project concluded that the standards for appointing guardians for individuals with disabilities were frequently “broad and vague” and, most importantly, “failed to recognize that individuals with disabilities are often capable of doing many things for themselves.” The Project proposed a Model Guardianship and Conservatorship Act, the purpose of which was to establish:

a system which permits partially disabled and disabled persons and minors to participate as fully as possible in all decisions which affect them, which assists such persons in meeting the essential requirements for their physical health and safety, protecting their rights, managing their financial resources, and developing or regaining their abilities to the maximum extent possible, and which accomplishes these objectives through the use of the least restrictive alternatives.

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8 Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-103, 89 Stat. 486 (1975). Over the years, the Act has been reorganized and amended extensively (see Rose Mary Bailly, Charis B. Nick-Tovok, Should We Be Talking?--Beginning a Dialogue on Guardianship in New York, 75 Alb. L. Rev. 807, 813, n. 36).

9 See Bailly & Nick-Tovok, supra note 6, Should We Be Talking, pp. 813-14 and the authorities cited therein.

10 Id.

11 Id. at 814, citing, ABA Commission on the Mentally Disabled, Guardianship & Conservatorship 1-2 (1979); Model Guardianship and Conservatorship Act.
Furthermore, a powerful counter voice to guardianship as civil death is the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) and its Optional Protocol.\(^{12}\) Adopted in 2006, the CRPD is the first international human rights treaty drafted specifically to protect the rights of people with disabilities.\(^{13}\) Even though the United States Senate has not ratified the treaty, legal scholars argue that the CRPD will provide the impetus for reshaping guardianship laws in the United States as “CRPD dictates supported—as opposed to substituted - decision making.”\(^{14}\)

Despite all of these efforts at reform and the passage of time, article 17-A remains stuck in time and a counterweight to progressive principles that typically emerge in New York State. The NYSBA Disability Rights Committee argues that there is an urgent need to reform article 17-A, particularly as the Office for People with Developmental Disabilities (OPWDD) is advancing a program bill codifying supported decision making in New York State. As a Committee, we set forth the following general principles which a guardianship statute for adults with intellectual and developmental disabilities should contain and explain in this report the underpinnings of the principles we articulate.

**Principles of Guardianship**

1. Neither the alleged developmental disability nor the age of the individual alleged to have a developmental disability should be the sole basis for the appointment of a guardian. Rather, the individual’s ability to function in society with available supports should be the focus of the Court’s inquiry into the need for a guardian.

2. The appointment of a guardian must be designed to encourage the development of maximum self-reliance and independence in the individual. The standard for appointment should be that the person is unable to provide for personal needs and/or property management with available supports; and the person cannot adequately understand and appreciate the nature and consequences of such inability.

3. The appointment of a guardian must be necessary and the least restrictive form of intervention available to meet the personal and/or property needs of the individual as determined by a court.


4. A guardianship petition must allege the other available resources for decision-making, if any, that have been considered by the petitioner and the petitioner's opinion as to their sufficiency and appropriateness, or lack thereof. Other resources include, but are not limited to, powers of attorney, health care proxies, trusts, representative and protective payees, and supported decision making.

5. All persons alleged to be in need of the appointment of a guardian are entitled to due process protections including, but not limited to, notice of the proceeding in plain language and right to counsel of their own choosing or the appointment of counsel guaranteed at public expense.

6. A guardian should not be appointed absent a hearing where the person alleged to be in need of a guardian is present. The person's appearance at the hearing may be dispensed with in exceptional circumstances at the court's discretion and in accordance with statutory standards. The person has the right to a jury trial.

7. The need for the guardianship must be established by clear and convincing evidence of the person's functional limitations which impair the person's ability to provide for personal needs, the person's lack of understanding and appreciation of the nature and consequences of his or her functional limitations; the likelihood that the person will suffer harm because of the person's functional limitations and inability to adequately understand and appreciate the nature and consequences of such functional limitations; and necessity of the appointment of a guardian to prevent such harm.

8. The powers of the guardian should be identified in the order/decree issued by the court and tailored to meet the needs of the individual in the least restrictive manner possible. The person subject to guardianship retains any powers not expressly conveyed to the guardian.

9. The individual must be included in all decisions to the maximum extent possible and practicable, in order to encourage autonomy. The Guardian should be encouraging the development of maximum self-reliance and independence in the individual.

10. The duties of the guardian should be specified in the order/decree. Among other things, the guardian's duty is to make decisions that give maximum consideration to the individual's preferences, wishes, desires, and functioning level. A guardian

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15 See MHL § 81.20. Among the duties of an article 81 guardian are that the guardian shall exercise only those powers that the guardian is authorized to exercise by court order, the guardian shall exercise the utmost care and diligence when acting on behalf of the incapacitated person, and that the guardian shall exhibit the utmost degree of trust, loyalty and fidelity in relation to the incapacitated person (MHL § 81.20 [a][1-3]). A guardian of personal needs should also promote the individual's independence and self-determination (see MHL § 81.20 [7]) and comment annually on whether facts indicate the need to terminate the guardianship or alter the powers of the guardian (see MHL §81.31 [b][10]).
should protect the individual from unreasonable risks of harm, while supporting and encouraging the individual to achieve maximum autonomy.

11. The duration of a guardianship should be determined by the court and conform to the proof adduced at the hearing. For instance, time limited guardianships may be appropriate including where a guardianship is sought for a young adult between the ages of 18-25. Where a guardianship of limited duration has been ordered by the court, any application to extend the guardianship should require proof by clear and convincing evidence by the petitioner that it is necessary to continue the guardianship.

12. A person under guardianship has a right to seek review of the guardianship and restoration of rights. There must be a clear process to initiate restoration that permits the person under guardianship to initiate and obtain access to counsel at public expense.

13. The court should retain jurisdiction over the guardianship and entertain modification and termination proceedings where the burden of proof shall be on the person objecting to discharge or seeking increased powers for the guardian rather than on the respondent.

14. The person or entity appointed guardian must be subject to monitoring and oversight by the court. For instance, Guardians should periodically file reports as to their activities.

II. Guardianship in New York

The general adult guardianship statute in New York is codified at article 81 of the Mental Hygiene Law (MHL). The purpose of article 81 is to: satisfy either personal or property management needs of an incapacitated person in a manner tailored to the individual needs of that person, which takes in account the personal wishes, preferences and desires of the person, and which affords the person the greatest amount of independence and self-determination and participation in all the decisions affecting such person’s life. A discrete statute exists, however, that may be invoked for people alleged to be in need of a guardian by reason of an intellectual or other developmental disability. In contrast, that statute, codified at article 17-A of the SCPA is a plenary statute the purpose of which at its inception in 1969 was largely to permit parents to exercise continued control over the affairs of their adult children with disabilities. In essence, the statute rested upon a widely

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16 MHL § 81.01.

17 SCPA 1750, 1750-a. An Article 17-A proceeding may also be commenced for a person alleged to have a traumatic brain injury (see SCPA 1750-a [i]).
embraced assumption that “mentally retarded” people were perpetual children.\textsuperscript{18} Under New York law, a person with developmental disabilities can be subject to either guardianship statute, despite the considerable substantive and procedural variations between article 81 and article 17-A. An injustice arises, as a result, because a petitioner for guardianship can choose between two statutes and petitioner’s choice will determine the due process protections to be afforded to a respondent with developmental disabilities.\textsuperscript{19}

\textsl{Article 81 of the Mental Hygiene Law}\textsuperscript{20}

Article 81 of the MHL, proceedings for appointment of a guardian for personal needs or property management, became effective on April 1, 1993.\textsuperscript{21} Article 81 replaced the former dual structure conservatorship and committee statutes that operated in New York.\textsuperscript{22} By way of history, the appointment of a committee, pursuant to former Article 78 of the MHL, was the only available legal remedy to address the affairs of a person alleged to be incompetent.\textsuperscript{23} However, the committee statute required a plenary adjudication of incompetence. Because of the stigma and loss of civil rights accompanying such a finding, the judiciary became reluctant to adjudicate a person in need of a committee.\textsuperscript{24} In 1972, the conservatorship statute (former article 77 of the MHL) was enacted into law as a less restrictive alternative to the committee procedure.\textsuperscript{25} Unlike the committee statute, the appointment of a conservator did not require a finding of incompetence. Rather, the former law authorized the appointment of a conservator of the property for a person who had not been:

\textsuperscript{18} To elaborate, there is an undue emphasis under article 17-A that people with developmental disabilities are children forever. First, is the ambiguous nature of article 17A. It appears to apply to adults, yet its main provisions mirror those applicable to minors in article 17. Article 17-A also incorporates article 17 by reference (see SCPA 1761 - “To the extent that the context thereof shall admit, the provisions of article seventeen of this act shall apply to all proceedings under this article with the same force and effect”). In addition, while article 17-A does not specifically state that the statute is applicable to minors as well as adults, the statute appears to contemplate such. For example, a guardian appointed pursuant to article 17-A does not terminate “at the age of majority” (see SCPA 1759). Further, article 17-A, provides that the standard for appointment of a guardian is “best interests,” the same standard applicable to minors in article 17 (see SCPA 1701 - “the court may appoint a permanent guardian of a child if the court finds that such appointment is in the best interests of the child.” (emphasis added); SCPA 1707 -“If the court be satisfied that the interests of the infant will be promoted by the appointment of a guardian or by the issuance of temporary letters of guardianship of his or her person or of his or her property, or of both, it must make a decree accordingly. If the court determines that appointment of a permanent guardian is in the best interests of the infant or child, the court shall issue a decree appointing such guardian.”) (emphasis added). Finally, there is no required hearing under article 17 or 17-A of the SCPA (see SCPA 1706, 1754).

\textsuperscript{19} See Shea and Pressman, supra note 2, Guardianship a Civil Rights Perspective, at 21.

\textsuperscript{20} The following discussion of article 81 of the Mental Hygiene Law and article 17-A of the SCPA is largely borrowed from Shea and Pressman, supra note 2, Guardianship a Civil Rights Perspective, pp 21-23.

\textsuperscript{21} 1992 N.Y. Laws c. 698.

\textsuperscript{22} Id.

\textsuperscript{23} Id.

\textsuperscript{24} In re Fisher, 147 Misc. 2d 329, 332 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1989).

\textsuperscript{25} 1972 N.Y. Laws, c. 251
Judicially declared incompetent and who by reason of advanced age, illness, infirmity, mental weakness, alcohol abuse, addiction to drugs or other cause suffered substantial impairment of his ability to care for his property or has become unable to provide for himself or others dependent upon him for support.\(^{26}\)

However, by design, the statute limited the power of the conservator to property and financial matters.\(^{27}\) Chapter amendments to the MHL were enacted in 1974 attempting to expand the role of conservators. The first established a statutory preference for the appointment of a conservator.\(^{28}\) A second chapter amendment authorized conservators to assume a limited role over the personal needs of the person who was the subject of the proceeding.\(^{29}\) Cast as reform measures, the amendments actually contributed to the “legal blurring” between articles 77 and 78.\(^{30}\) In 1991, the Court of Appeals was confronted with a case requiring a construction of the statutory framework to determine the parameters of the authority of a conservator. The question presented to the tribunal was whether a conservator could authorize the placement of his ward in a nursing home. In the case of \textit{In re Grinker},\(^{31}\) the Court of Appeals determined that such power could be granted only pursuant to the committee statute. The \textit{Grinker} decision “settled the debate” surrounding the authority of a conservator to make personal needs decisions.\(^{32}\) However, the \textit{Grinker} holding also “dramatized the very difficulty the courts were trying to resolve, namely, choosing between a remedy which governs property and finances or a remedy which judges a person completely incompetent.”\(^{33}\)

To resolve the difficulties inherent in the conservator-committee dichotomy, the New York State Law Revision Commission proposed the enactment of Article 81 as a single remedial statute with a standard for appointment dependent upon necessity and the identification of functional limitations.\(^{34}\) The new statute rejected plenary adjudications of incompetence in favor of a procedure for the appointment of a guardian whose powers are specifically tailored to the needs of the individual. Going forward, the right to counsel would be guaranteed and monitoring of guardianships would be required. The objective of the proceeding as declared by the legislature was to arrive at the “least restrictive form of intervention” to meet the needs of the person while, at the same time, permitting the person to exercise the independence and self-determination of which he or she is capable.\(^{35}\)

\(^{26}\) MHL § 77.01 (repealed 1992 N. Y. Laws c. 698).
\(^{27}\) \textit{Id.}
\(^{28}\) MHL 77.04 & 70.02 (repealed 1992 N. Y. Laws c. 698).
\(^{29}\) 1974 N. Y. Laws c. 623 § 3.
\(^{32}\) Solinski, \textit{supra} note 27 at 450.
\(^{33}\) \textit{Id.}
\(^{35}\) MHL § 81.01.
Article 17-A of the SCPA

Under article 17-A, the basis for appointing a guardian is whether the person has a qualifying diagnosis of an intellectual or other developmental disability. Current law permits the appointment of a guardian upon proof establishing to the “satisfaction of the court” that a person is intellectually or developmentally disabled and that his or her best interests would be promoted by the appointment. As a jurisdictional prerequisite, a 17-A petition must be accompanied by certifications of two physicians or a physician or a psychologist that the respondent meets the diagnostic criteria of an intellectual or other developmental disability. On its face, article 17-A provides only for the appointment of a plenary guardian and does not expressly authorize or require the surrogate to dispose of the proceeding in a manner that is least restrictive of the individual’s rights. Indeed, article 17-A does not even require the court to find that the appointment of a guardian is necessary, does not guarantee the right to counsel and permits the proceeding to be disposed without a hearing at the discretion of the court. That said, article 17-A has been revered by families because of its relative ease in commencing the proceeding, often without the assistance of counsel. In contrast, article 81 proceedings can be very complex and expensive to prosecute. The convenience of article 17-A proceedings as compared to article 81 proceedings causes tension in New York. As aptly stated by one commentator:

If guardianship is made too expensive, incapacitated people who need the protection and assistance of a guardianship may not have those needs met. However, if guardianship fails to protect the rights of respondents, then respondents can be unjustly deprived of their right to autonomy.

Given the many substantive and procedural variations between article 17-A and article 81, the Governor’s Olmstead Cabinet and commentators have called for reform or

36 See SCPA 1750, 1750-a. An article 17 proceeding may also be commenced for a person alleged to have a traumatic brain injury (SCPA 1750-a[1]).
37 Id.
38 See Bailly & Nick-Tovok, supra note 6, Should We Be Talking, 821-825.
39 See Karen Andreasian, Natalie Chin, Kristin Booth Glen, Beth Haroules, Katherine I. Hermann, Maria Kuns, Aditi Shah, Naomi Weinstein, A Report Of The Mental Health Law Committee And The Disability Law Committee Of The New York City Bar Association, Revisiting S.C.P.A. 17-A: Guardianship for People with Developmental Disabilities, 18 CUNY L. Rev. 287, n. 23 at 300, where the authors not that 17-A procedure is relatively simple and can be typically managed by pro se petitioners.
40 The cost of an article 81 proceeding will often encompass the fees of petitioner’s counsel, counsel for respondent and the Court Evaluator. The person alleged to be incapacitated is generally liable for fees when a petition is granted (see MHL§§ 81.09[f], 81/10[f], 81/16[f]). Efforts have been made to reduce the expenses associated with article 81 proceedings. For example, article 81 forms are now uploaded to the New York State Office of Court Administration website for the 6th Judicial District: http://ww2.nycourts.gov/article-81-forms-31251
42 The Olmstead Cabinet derives its name from the United States Supreme Court decision in Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581 (1999). The Cabinet’s mandate is to recommend law and policy changes to ensure that people with disabilities receive services and supports in settings that do not segregate them from the community. https://www.ny.gov/programs/olmstead-communityintegration-every-new-yorker-last.
“modernization” of article 17-A. In some cases, Surrogates are bringing enhanced scrutiny to article 17-A adjudications and dismissing petitions where guardianship is not the least restrictive form of intervention. Further, a lawsuit was commenced on September 26, 2016 in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York by Disability Rights New York seeking to enjoin the appointment of guardians pursuant to article 17-A. While the lawsuit was subsequently dismissed on Younger abstention grounds, the complaint alleged that Article 17-A violates the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, the ADA and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. The federal court’s decision to abstain does not prejudice the right of the plaintiffs to challenge the statute in state court.

III. Article 17-A is indefensible under the lens of constitutional analysis

The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that the federal government shall not deprive any person “of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” The Fourteenth Amendment makes this requirement applicable to the states, and together, the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments forbid the government from infringing on a fundamental liberty interest where the matter is not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest. Guardianship impacts both the fundamental liberties and property interests of individuals. An individual may be subject to guardianship indefinitely, interfering with the individual’s ability to maintain personal relationships, seek and obtain employment, marry, or vote. While the Supreme Court has not specifically defined “liberty,” the term is broadly interpreted and “extends to the full range of conduct which the individual is free to pursue,” and must not be restricted without proper governmental objective.

These fundamental liberty and property rights are at stake in a guardianship proceeding. Guardianship can infringe on a person’s fundamental right to privacy to engage in personal conduct; fundamental right to refuse unwanted medical treatment; a fundamental right to make personal decisions regarding marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education; and a fundamental right to vote. New York

43 See Bailly & Nick-Tovok, supra note 6; Andreasian et al., supra note 36.
44 See In re D.D., 50 Misc. 3d 666 (Sur Ct., Kings Co. 2015).
47 916 F. 3d at 137. Our Committee also notes that an action in state court may implicate New York State constitutional guarantees. New York courts “have not hesitated[,] when [they] concluded that the Federal Constitution as interpreted by the Supreme Court fell short of adequate protection for our citizens[,] to rely upon the principle that that document defines the minimum level of individual rights and leaves the States free to provide greater rights for its citizens through its Constitution, statutes or rule-making authority (Cooper v. Morin, 49 N.Y.2d 69, 79 [1979]).
48 U.S. Const. amend V.
49 See U. S. Const. amend. XIV § 1; Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301-02 (1993).
50 See Monthie, supra note 42 at 961 and the authorities cited therein.
51 Id., at 961-962 and the authorities cited therein. The right to vote in New York State should not be impacted by the appointment of a guardian under either article 17-A or article 81 due to administrative pronouncement that the exclusions found in the New York State Election Law are obsolete and unenforceable.
courts have described guardianship as “calculated to deprive a citizen not only of the possession of his property, but also of his personal liberty.”\textsuperscript{52} Two New York Surrogate’s Courts (New York County and Kings County) have consistently invoked the liberty and property interests of individuals subjected to Article 17-A guardianship. The New York County Surrogate’s Court found:

The appointment of a plenary guardian of the person under article 17-A gives that guardian virtually total power over her ward’s life ... including virtually all medical decisions, where the ward shall live, with whom she may associate, when and if she may travel, whether she may work or be enrolled in habilitation programs, etc. This imposition of virtually complete power over the ward clearly and dramatically infringes on a ward’s liberty interests.\textsuperscript{53}

\textit{Procedural Due Process}

There are three factors to determine whether a taking of liberty or property violates a person’s rights to procedural due process. First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.\textsuperscript{54} A brief review of pleading requirements of article 17-A and the procedures employed to dispose of guardianship applications reveals their patent insufficiency given the liberty interests at stake in the proceeding.

- The statute is entirely diagnosis driven and will turn upon certificates filed in conjunction with the petition alleging that the respondent has an intellectual disability or other developmental disability; \textsuperscript{55}

\textit{(see Sadie Ishee and Sheila Shea, Make Every Vote Count: Reform of New York’s Election Law to Protect the Franchise for People with Disabilities, 14 Alb. Gov’t. Law Review, 1, 15-16, 17-18 [2021]). Nonetheless, persistent ambiguity about the reach of New York’s Election Law § 5-106(6) and its exclusion from voter rolls for people “adjudged incompetent” call for its repeal, \textsuperscript{52} \textit{Id., citing, In re Burke}, 125 A.D. 889, 891 (N.Y. App. Div. 1908); \textit{In re Ginnel}, 44 N. Y. S. 2d 232, 235 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1943). \textsuperscript{53} \textit{In re Mark C.H.}, 28 Misc. 3d 765, 776 (Sur. Ct. New York Co., Glen, J.). \textsuperscript{54} \textit{See Matthews v. Eldridge}, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976); In a guardianship proceeding, the State is exercising its \\textit{pares patriae power (see Rivers v. Katz}, 67 N.Y.2d 485 [1986] - “the \\textit{sine qua non for the state's use of its \\textit{pares patriae power as justification for the forceful administration of mind-affecting drugs is a determination that the individual to whom the drugs are to be administered lacks the capacity to decide for himself whether he should take the drugs ... We hold, therefore, that in situations where the State's police power is not implicated, and the patient refuses to consent to the administration of antipsychotic drugs, there must be a judicial determination of whether the patient has the capacity to make a reasoned decision..."

\textsuperscript{55} The certifications are often entirely conclusory, hearsay and/or are not subject to cross-examination.
• There is no requirement that the 17-A petitioner even allege that the appointment of a guardian is necessary or that there are less restrictive alternatives to guardianship;

• There is no right to counsel for the respondent in the proceeding;

• In most cases there is no hearing and the determination of what is in the respondent’s best interests is left to the discretion of the court.

• The guardianship is plenary; that is, the person under guardianship loses to right to make any and all decisions;

• The appointment of a guardian has no time limit and continues indefinitely; indeed, guardianship does not terminate at the age of majority of upon the marriage of the person who is developmentally disabled, but shall continue during the life of such person, or until terminated by the court.

• There is no requirement that a guardian of the person ever report on the respondent’s personal circumstances and there is no review of the necessity for continuation of guardianship by the court; and

• In a guardianship modification or termination proceeding, the statute does not identify the party with the burden of proof and case law leans toward requiring the respondent to demonstrate a change in circumstances before a guardianship decree may be modified or terminated.

As this brief description of the statute demonstrates, it is entirely out of date with regard to procedural protections that are now both statutorily and constitutionally required when compared with article 81 of the MHL.56

Substantive Due Process

Under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, a state government may not deprive an individual “of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”57 The Supreme Court has interpreted the guarantee of “due process of law” in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to include “a substantive component that bars certain

56 In 2010, then Judge Glen wrote that “in 1990 the legislature mandated review of SCPA Article 17-A, first enacted in 1969, in light of both the changing views of, and more sophisticated knowledge about, the populations covered by the statute, and changes in law and constitutional requirements over the intervening 20 year period. Although the Law Revision Commission was then in the midst of proposing massive changes to the state’s conservator and committee laws for adult guardianship, resulting in Mental Hygiene Law Article 81, there was no report, no proposal, and no change to 17-A. Twenty years later there still has been no action, but the need for reconsideration of our scheme for guardianship of persons with mental retardation and developmental disabilities is greater than ever” (In re Mark C. H., 28 Misc. 3d at 769-771) (internal citations omitted).

57 See U. S. Const. amend. XIV.
arbitrary, wrongful government actions regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them.” 58 As discussed above, article 17-A has numerous procedural flaws that may lead to erroneous determinations. In addition, the statute also violates the substantive due process rights of respondents for lack of any clear criteria for the court to adjudicate when presented with a guardianship application and by not requiring that there be any inquiry into whether guardianship is the least restrictive alternative.59

For example, article 81 requires clear and convincing evidence of the necessity of guardianship before a guardian will be appointed and functional limitations must be proven before a guardianship is imposed.60 By contrast, the decision to appoint a guardian of the person or property, or both, under article 17-A is based upon the less-stringent best interest standard.61 The best interest standard has been described as “amorphous”62 and the “criteria necessary to support a finding that appointment of a guardian is appropriate in a particular case are rarely articulated but frequently assumed.”63 Given the gravity of the liberty and property interests at stake in an article 17-A guardianship proceeding, the best interest standard must be substituted with a functional test requiring the court to scrutinize a respondent’s abilities, rather than permitting the court to rest on a diagnosis when disposing of the application. Indeed, the subjective best interest standard, makes a guardianship order difficult to appeal and poses obstacles to restoration of the respondent's rights in the future.

Equal Protection of the Law

Under the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, individuals subjected to Article 17-A guardianship proceedings are also denied the equal protection of the laws. "While the end to be achieved by article 17-A and article 81 is the same, the means is not, and the inequality of treatment is not justifiable." 64

The Fourteenth Amendment requires that where a person’s fundamental rights and liberties are implicated, “classifications which might invade or restrain them must be closely

59 In the case of In re Guardianship of Dameris L., Surrogate’s Court New York County (Glen, J.) wrote that "in order to withstand constitutional challenge, including, particularly, challenge under our own state Constitution’s due process guarantees, SCPA article 17-A must be read to include the requirement that guardianship is the least restrictive alternative to achieve the state's goal of protecting a person with intellectual disabilities from harm connected to those disabilities. Further, the court must consider the availability of "other resources," like those in Mental Hygiene Law § 81.03(e), including the support network of family, friends and professionals before the drastic judicial intervention of guardianship can be imposed (38 Misc. 3d 570, 578-579 [2012]).
60 See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979) -- , adopting a "standard of proof is more than an empty semantic exercise." In cases involving individual rights, whether criminal or civil, "[t]he standard of proof [at a minimum] reflects the value society places on individual liberty."
61 SCPA 1754
64 See, Monthie, supra note 42 at 988.
The guaranty of “equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws.” When the law lays an unequal hand on those who have committed intrinsically the same quality of offense and sterilizes one and not the other, it has made as invidious a discrimination as if it had selected a particular race or nationality for oppressive treatment.66

As demonstrated above, the due process protections afforded to individuals subjected to these guardianship proceedings depends on whether guardianship is being considered pursuant to article 17-A or article 81. Specifically, article 81 directs the court to limit the appointment of a guardianship even if the person is found to be incapacitated, while an article 17-A proceeding relies exclusively on the best interest standard for appointment of guardianship. There are also stark differences with the level of notice that each of the statutes requires: article 81 directs that the notice inform the alleged incapacitated person of the nature and potential consequences of the proceeding and the right to a hearing and counsel, whereas article 17-A is silent as to notice beyond providing a copy of the petition to the individual with a disability. Once the petition proceeds to a hearing, the right to counsel, the right to a mandatory evidentiary hearing, and the standard of proof applied at the hearing all differ dramatically.67

Also, when the court appoints a guardian, the article 81 process directs that the guardianship be tailored and that the person’s right to participate in decision-making not be encumbered to the greatest extent possible. Article 81 specifically directs that guardianship must be administered in the least restrictive manner after consideration of all other alternatives. Article 17-A directs the appointment of only a plenary guardianship. Furthermore, article 17-A uses a lower standard of proof as compared to article 81. Article 81 expressly requires courts to apply a clear and convincing evidence standard of proof, whereas article 17-A uses a best interest standard.68

Restoration of Rights

A person subjected to an article 17-A guardianship faces greater difficulty when attempting to terminate or modify the guardianship. Article 17-A is silent on the burden of proof in a termination proceeding, but the majority of written decisions place the burden on the person seeking to terminate the guardianship—the person with a disability. 69 On the

67 See Monthie, supra note 42, 968-970.
68 See Monthie, supra note 42, 980-983.
other hand, article 81 specifically prescribes a mechanism for termination of the guardianship and places the burden on the party seeking to continue the guardianship.\textsuperscript{70}

\textit{Closing Thoughts on Constitutional Analysis}

"The line drawn between individuals subjected to article 17-A and article 81 is an artificial one, and one that should be (and is) prohibited by the due process clause."\textsuperscript{71} In fact, the New York judges have struggled with these divergent processes and have recognized that people with developmental disabilities can be subject to either article 17-A or article 81 guardianships and should treated equally.\textsuperscript{72} In \textit{Matter of Derek},\textsuperscript{73} Judge Eugene Peckham, then the Broome County Surrogate's Court held: "There [was] no rational reason why the respondent in a contested article 81 guardianship proceeding should be [able] to assert [a] ... privilege while the respondent in a contested article [17-A] guardianship ... cannot."\textsuperscript{74} Judge Peckham’s pronouncement captures the disparities in the statutory schemes governing guardianship in New York State.

IV. Article 17-A is indefensible under the Americans with Disabilities Act

Article 17-A provides inferior due process protections to people with developmental disabilities and traumatic brain injuries compared to all other New Yorkers who are afforded the superior protections of article 81 of the Mental Hygiene Law. This is clearly discriminatory on the basis of type of disability, and, as such, violates Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act. Additionally, in November 2012, New York State created the Olmstead Development and Implementation Cabinet ("Olmstead Cabinet"), “charged with developing a plan consistent with New York’s obligations under the ... \textit{Olmstead v. L.C}.” decision.\textsuperscript{75}

By way of background, on June 22, 1999, the U.S. Supreme Court held in \textit{Olmstead v. L.C}, that unjustified segregation of individuals with disabilities constituted discrimination in violation of Title II of the ADA. The Court held that public entities must provide community-based services to persons with disabilities when (1) such services are appropriate; (2) the affected persons do not oppose community-based treatment; and (3) community-based services can be reasonably accommodated, taking into account the resources available to the public entity and the needs of others who are receiving disability services from the entity. This decision placed an affirmative duty on states to ensure that the state’s services, programs, and activities for people with disabilities are administered in the most integrated setting appropriate to the person’s needs.

\textsuperscript{70} See Monthie, \textit{supra} note 42, 987-988.

\textsuperscript{71} See Monthie, \textit{supra} note 42, at 990.

\textsuperscript{72} See, \textit{In re Guardianship of B.}, 190 Misc. 3d 581, 585 (Co. Ct. Tompkins County. Peckham, J.) - "The equal protection provisions of the federal and state Constitutions would require that mentally retarded person in a similar situation be treated the same whether they have a guardian appointed under [A]rticle 17-A or [A]rticle 81."

\textsuperscript{73} 12 Misc. 3d 1132 (Sur. Ct., Broome County 2006).

\textsuperscript{74} \textit{Id.}, at 1134-1135

\textsuperscript{75} 527 U.S. 581 (1999).
The Olmstead Cabinet examined New York’s compliance with Olmstead, and issued a thirty-one-page report with recommendations in October 2013. This report concluded that Article 17-A discriminated against people with intellectual and developmental disabilities under the ADA, because:

(i) Under Article 17-A, the basis for appointing a guardian is diagnosis driven and is not based upon the functional capacity of the person with disability. A hearing is not required, but if a hearing is held, Article 17-A does not require the presence of the person for whom the guardianship is sought.

(ii) Additionally, Article 17-A does not limit guardianship rights to the individual’s specific incapacities, which is inconsistent with the least-restrictive philosophy of Olmstead.

(iii) Once guardianship is granted, Article 17-A instructs the guardian to make decisions based upon the “best interests” of the person with a disability and does not require the guardian to examine the choice and preference of the person with a disability.

The Olmstead Cabinet recommended that article 17-A be modernized in light of the Olmstead mandate to mirror the more recent article 81 with respect to appointment, hearings, functional capacity, and consideration of choice and preference in decision-making.” In 2015, the Office for People With Developmental Disabilities proposed a (OPWDD) departmental bill to the legislature, which sought to redress the discrimination criticized in the Olmstead report. The bill was not enacted. In 2016, two new bills were introduced: Senate bill 5840 and Assembly bill 8171. Neither of these bills were enacted and legislative reform efforts since 2017 have remained elusive as priorities changed with the advent of the COVID public health crisis in 2019.

Reform of Article 17-A must also recognize that there are less restrictive decision-making alternatives to guardianship that are described below. These alternatives are identified as a continuum of options available to potentially meet the needs of individuals with developmental disabilities.

V. **Alternatives to Plenary Guardianship**

*Health Care Proxies and other Health Care Advance Directives;*

Article 29-C of the Public Health Law establishes a decision-making process that allows a competent adult (the principal) to appoint an agent to decide about health care in the event the principal becomes unable to decide for him or herself. The proxy law covers decisions to consent to or refuse any treatment, service or procedure to diagnose or treatment an individual’s physical or mental condition. Adults are presumed competent to

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76 The Cabinet’s mandate is to recommend law and policy changes to ensure that people with disabilities receive services and supports in settings that do not segregate them from the community. [https://www.ny.gov/programs/olmstead-communityintegration-every-new-yorker-last](https://www.ny.gov/programs/olmstead-communityintegration-every-new-yorker-last).
designate a health care agent unless they have a guardian appointed for them. OPWDD regulations encourage the execution of health care proxies for people with developmental disabilities. Pursuant to OPWDD regulations, in order for a person (the "principal") to execute a health care proxy, the person must have the requisite capacity to understand that he or she is delegating to another person the authority to make medical decisions in the event of incapacity.

A 2008 chapter amendment to article 33 of the MHL authorized the creation of a simplified advance directive for persons with developmental disabilities. The form shall specify, at the option of the principal, what end-of-life treatment the person wishes to receive; may designate a health care agent consistent with the provisions of this article; and may, at the option of the principal, authorize the health care agent to commence making decisions immediately upon the execution of the proxy, provided that all such decisions made prior to a determination of incapacity pursuant to section twenty-nine hundred eighty-three of the public health law shall be made in direct consultation with the principal and the attending physician; and provided, further, that if, after such consultation, the principal disagrees with the agent's proposed decision, the principal's wishes shall prevail; and provided, further, that, in the case of any decision to withhold or withdraw artificial nutrition or hydration, the principal's wishes must have been recorded in the health care directive or stated in the presence of the agent and the attending physician; and further, provided, that the consultation among principal, agent and attending physician must be summarized and recorded in the principal's medical record.

The feature of the law permitting the proxy to be effective immediately upon execution, have led to the phrase "Act Now" health care proxy being ascribed to this initiative. The 2008 chapter amendment also requires that the form for the simplified advance health care directive be developed by the commissioner of OPWDD in consultation with the commissioner of health, providers of service authorized to provide services pursuant to article sixteen of this chapter, advocates, including self-advocates, and parents and family members of persons receiving services from such providers. A workgroup was formed to implement the chapter amendment shortly after its enactment. Regrettably, a form has yet

77 Public Health Law (PHL) § 2981[1][b]); but see, Matter of John T. (Hanson), 119 A.D. 3d 948 (2d Dept. 2014) where the Court reversed the presumption of competency based upon a diagnosis of moderate to severe mental retardation.
78 See 14 N.Y.C.R.R. 633.20
79 14 N.Y.C.R.R. 633.20 (a)(1)(ii). There are also special witnessing requirements when a health care proxy is executed by a person with developmental disabilities. Specifically, for persons who reside in OPWDD facilities, at least one witness shall be an individual who is not affiliated with the facility and at least one witness shall be a physician, nurse practitioner, physician assistant or clinical psychologist who either is employed by a developmental disabilities services office named in section 13.17 of the MHL or who has been employed for a minimum of two years to render care and service in a facility operated or licensed by the office for people with developmental disabilities, or has been approved by the commissioner of developmental disabilities in accordance with regulations approved by the commissioner. Such regulations shall require that a physician, nurse practitioner, physician assistant, or clinical psychologist possess specialized training or three years experience in treating developmental disabilities (see PHL § 2981[1][c]).
80 L. 2008, c. 210; MHL 33.03[e]).
81 Id.
to be approved by OPWDD so this statutory innovation, while potentially beneficial to people with developmental disabilities, remains dormant.

Powers of Attorney

A Power of Attorney is a legal instrument that is used to delegate legal authority to another. The person who signs (executes) a Power of Attorney is called the Principal. The Power of Attorney gives legal authority to another person (called an Agent) to make property, financial and other legal decisions for the Principal. There is no health care decision making authority attached to a Power of Attorney.

A Principal can give an Agent broad legal authority, or very limited authority. The Power of Attorney is frequently used to help in the event of a Principal’s illness or disability, or in legal transactions where the principal cannot be present to sign necessary legal documents. A person with a developmental disability who has capacity to execute a power of attorney may do so if the person resides in an OPWDD operated or licensed facility.

Representative payment, supplemental needs trusts, ABLE accounts

A person with a disability who is receiving public benefits but who may be unable to manage his or her funds, may have a representative payee appointed which can negate the need for a property guardian. For example, the Social Security Administration (SSA) has a regulatory scheme implementing representative payment. As a matter of policy, SSA states that every beneficiary has the right to manage his or her own benefits. However, some beneficiaries due to a mental or physical condition or due to their youth may be unable to do so. Under these circumstances, SSA may determine that the interests of the beneficiary would be better served if SSA certified benefit payments to another person as a representative payee.

A Supplemental Needs Trust (also called a Special Needs Trust) is a trust which, under federal and State law, allows a trustee (either a corporation authorized by law or an individual) to manage funds for the benefit of a person with a disability (the “beneficiary”), while preserving that person's eligibility for government benefits such as Supplemental Security Income or Medicaid. Such means-tested public benefits can make a significant

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82 The New York State Power of Attorney statute was recently amended, effective June 13, 2021. See, L. 2020, c. 323.
83 See, definitions at General Obligations Law (GOL) § 1501.
84 However, an agent may make financial decisions relative to health care (see GOL § 1502k).
85 14 N.Y.C.R.R. 22.3 - when a patient may sign a legal instrument.
86 20 C.F.R. Part 404, subpart U;  Part 416 (Supplemental Security Income). SSA’s policy is that every beneficiary has the right to manage his or her benefits. However, some beneficiaries due to a mental or physical condition or due to their youth may be unable to do so (see 20 C.F.R. 416.601).
87 20 C.F.R. 2010; to the extent the SSA regulations afford due process rights to beneficiaries alleged to need a representative payee those remedies are found cross-referenced to sub-part J of the regulations (20 C.F.R. 2030[b]).
positive impact on the quality of life available to the person with disabilities, permitting them to live successfully in their home communities, while the trust funds can pay for supplemental needs and wants of the beneficiary which the public funds do not provide.\textsuperscript{89}

In contrast, an ABLE account (Achieving a Better Life Experience [ABLE] Act)\textsuperscript{90} is a tax-advantaged savings program for individuals with disabilities enabled by federal law and modeled after the federal college savings plans. ABLE accounts enjoy tax-free growth on the income within the account. Future distributions are allowed on a tax-free basis so long as they are for "qualified expenses." In addition, these distributions generally will not count as income to the beneficiary for the purposes of means tested government programs such as SSI and Medicaid. States implement the federal law and in New York, the ABLE program administered by the New York State Comptroller under authority granted in the State Finance Law and MHL. \textsuperscript{91}

\textit{Single Transaction Orders}

An underutilized provision of New York’s adult guardianship law, MHL § 81.16(b), permits a judge to “authorize a [necessary] transaction or transactions” that can solve a single problem or a series of interrelated problems that stem from a health concern. Informally known as a “one-shot” provision, section 81.16(b) can meet a health care provider’s need for informed consent to a medical procedure, or for authorization for a hospital discharge without the requirement of first establishing guardianship. Using section 81.16(b) thus avoids the imposition of guardianship, permits a person to retain all their rights, personhood, and dignity, while offering a solution to the vulnerable person’s immediate health concerns and, importantly, takes into consideration that individual’s specific, related challenges. In addition to decisions that are directly related to a person’s health and medical treatment, a “one-shot” solution can also encompass related issues that impact on a person’s health, such as preserving that person’s home from foreclosure, securing an inheritance that makes it possible to pay for necessities. For clients served in the OPWDD system, single transaction guardianships have been used very effectively to establish SNTs in those instances where the person may have received an inheritance of a retroactive SSA benefit.

\textit{Supported Decision Making}

Whereas guardianships involve a third party making decisions for the individual subject to the regimen, supported decision-making focuses on supporting the individuals' own decisions. As stated by the American Bar Association:

\textsuperscript{90} 26 U.S.C. 529A
\textsuperscript{91} \textit{See} MHL art. 84; State Finance Law 99-x.
Supported decision-making constitutes an important new resource or tool to promote and ensure the constitutional requirement of the least restrictive alternative. As a practical matter, supported decision-making builds on the understanding that no one, however abled, makes decisions in a vacuum or without the input of other persons whether the issue is what kind of car to buy, which medical treatment to select, or who to marry, a person inevitably consults friends, family, coworkers, experts, or others before making a decision. Supported decision making recognizes that older persons, persons with cognitive limitations and persons with intellectual disability will also make decisions with the assistance of others although the kinds of assistance necessary may vary or be greater than those used by persons without disabilities.\(^\text{92}\)

Supported Decision-Making New York (SDMNY) is a consortium of Hunter/CUNY, The New York Alliance for Innovation and Inclusion, and Arc of Westchester with Disability Rights New York (DRNY) as its legal partner which recently concluded a five year pilot funded by the Developmental Disabilities Planning Council.\(^\text{93}\) Drawing on the expertise of its members, and on the work of advocates and pilots in other countries, SDMNY has developed a three-phase model, utilizing trained facilitators who, in turn, are supported by experienced mentors. The facilitators work with people with intellectual and developmental disabilities (who are referred to as “Decision Makers,” to emphasize their centrality to the process) and the trusted persons in their lives who they have chosen as their supporters. They assist the Decision Makers in identifying the areas in which they want support, the kinds of support they want, and the ways in which that support should be given. The “product” of the facilitation, which typically involves monthly meetings over a period of nine to twelve months, is a contract negotiated by the Decision Maker and her/his supporters, the Supported Decision-Making Agreement (the SDMA) that reflects their agreement. The SDMA is not just a piece of paper, but describes and memorializes a flexible process, which the Decision Maker can use for the rest of her/his life to make her/his own decisions, with the support s/he needs and desires.\(^\text{94}\)

Presently in New York, the SDMA has no binding legal effect, and third parties--health care professionals, financial institutions, landlords, for example-- are under no legal obligation to honor it. An SDM program bill was introduced during the 2020 session, however, and if enacted, the bill would, as other states have done, require acceptance by third parties of SDMA agreements and relieve those third parties from liability for good faith reliance.\(^\text{95}\)


\(^{93}\) https://sdmny.hunter.cuny.edu/

\(^{94}\) See Kristin Booth Glen, Supported-Decision Making From Theory to Practice: Further Reflections on an Intentional Pilot Project, 13 Alb. Gov’t L. Rev. 94 (2019-2020).

\(^{95}\) S. 7107 (2020). If enacted, OPWDD will be charged with developing regulations to implement the statute. The regulations, among other things, will further define the rights of decision makers and the training required for supporters to ensure the law meets its intended objectives.
VI. **Recommendations and Conclusions**

The NYSBA Disability Rights Committee urges the reform of Article 17-A of the SCPA and recognition that people with developmental disabilities should not be deprived of their agency, autonomy, and civil rights based upon misassumptions about their abilities or the quality of their lives. The Committee offers an Appendix with legislative proposals that can be advanced and supported in the upcoming 2022 legislative session.

VII. **Proposed Statutory Reform - APPENDIX**
   a. Law Revision Commission - proposal to reform article 17-A
   b. Office of Court Administration - program bill #30
   c. Document comparing the two legislative proposals
   d. Supported Decision Making- 2020 OPWDD program bill (S. 7107)
   e. Stakeholder Comments on OPWDD program bill

Dated:  November 15, 2021

Joseph Ranni  
Alison Morris  
Co-Chairs  
New York State Bar Association Committee on Disability Rights
January 4, 2022

Re: January 2022 Report and Recommendations of Disability Rights Reform Article 17-A

Dear President Brown and Delegates:

On behalf of the committee members of the NYSBA’s Committee on Civil Rights (“CCR”), we strongly support the Report and Recommendations from the Disability Rights Committee reforming Article 17-A of the Surrogates Court Procedure Act.

Respectfully submitted,

Co-Chairpersons: Hanna F. Madbak & Matthew W. Alpern
Hi Sheila,

As promised, we surveyed the Executive Committee of the Health Law Section and met this morning. The Health Law Section supports the DRC Report and agrees that Article 17-A does not sufficiently protect the rights of persons with intellectual disabilities and that Article 81 of the Mental Hygiene Law offers a preferable and constitutionally defensible model. We would further suggest that for the same or similar reasons, consideration should be given to eliminating SCPA 1750-b and applying the Family Health Care Decisions Act in its place as the guiding statute for purposes of making end of life decisions for persons with intellectual disabilities.

Thank you for your continuing work in this space. Please let me know if you have questions or wish to discuss.

Kind regards,

Anoush

Anoush Koroghlian-Scott
Partner
IN SENATE

S. Senate

--read twice and ordered printed, and when printed to be committed to the Committee on

A. Assembly

IN ASSEMBLY--Introduced by M. of A.

with M. of A. as co-sponsors

--read once and referred to the Committee on

SURCPRAC* *Office of Court Administration 30*

(Relates to guardians of persons who are intellectually and developmentally disabled; and repeals certain provisions of the surrogate’s court procedure act relating thereto)

SCPA. guardianship, disability

AN ACT

to amend the surrogate’s court procedure act, in relation to guardians of persons who are intellectually and developmentally disabled; and to repeal certain provisions of such law relating thereto
The People of the State of New York, represented in Senate and Assembly, do enact as follows:
Section 1. Section 1750 of the surrogate's court procedure act is
REPEALED and a new section 1750 is added to read as follows:

§ 1750. Definitions

When used in this article:

1. "Developmental disability" shall mean a developmental disability
within the meaning of subdivision twenty-two of section 1.03 of the
mental hygiene law.

2. "Traumatic brain injury" shall mean an injury, as defined in
section twenty-seven hundred forty-one of the public health law, which
originated before the age of twenty-two.

3. "Respondent" shall mean an individual listed in the petition as
alleged to have a developmental disability or traumatic brain injury,
which disability originates before such person attains age twenty-two.

§ 2. Section 1750-a of the surrogate's court procedure act, as amended
by chapter 198 of the laws of 2016, is amended to read as follows:

§ 1750-a. Guardianship of persons [who are developmentally disabled]
with a developmental disability or traumatic brain injury

1. When it shall appear to the satisfaction of the court [that a
person is a person who is developmentally disabled, the court is author-
ized to appoint a guardian of the person or of the property or of both
if such appointment of a guardian or guardians is in the best interest
of the person who is developmentally disabled. Such appointments shall
be made pursuant to the provisions of this article, provided however
that the provisions of section seventeen hundred fifty of this article
shall not apply to the appointment of a guardian or guardians of a
person who is developmentally disabled. For the purposes of this arti-
cle, a person who is developmentally disabled is a person who has been
certified by one licensed physician and one licensed psychologist, or by
two licensed physicians at least one of whom is familiar with or has
professional knowledge in the care and treatment of persons with develop-
mental disabilities, having qualifications to make such certification,
as having an impaired ability to understand and appreciate the nature
and consequences of decisions which result in such person being incapable
of managing himself or herself and/or his or her affairs by reason
of developmental disability and that such condition is permanent in
nature or likely to continue indefinitely, and whose disability:
(a) is attributable to cerebral palsy, epilepsy, neurological impair-
ment, autism or traumatic head injury;
(b) is attributable to any other condition of a person found to be
closely related to intellectual disability because such condition
results in similar impairment of general intellectual functioning or
adaptive behavior to that of persons with intellectual disabilities; or
(c) is attributable to dyslexia resulting from a disability described
in subdivision one or two of this section or from intellectual disabili-
ty; and
(d) originates before such person attains age twenty-two, provided,
however, that no such age of origination shall apply for the purposes of
this article to a person with traumatic head injury.

2. Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, for the
purposes of subdivision two of section seventeen hundred fifty and
section seventeen hundred fifty-b of this article, "a person who is
intellectually disabled and his or her guardian" shall also mean a
person and his or her guardian appointed pursuant to this section;
provided that such person has been certified by the physicians and/or
psychologists, specified in subdivision one of this section, as (i)
having an intellectual disability, or (ii) having a developmental disa-
bility, as defined in section 1.03 of the mental hygiene law, which (A) includes intellectual disability, or (B) results in a similar impairment of general intellectual functioning or adaptive behavior so that such person is incapable of managing himself or herself, and/or his or her affairs by reason of such developmental disability] based on clear and convincing evidence that the respondent is a person with a developmental disability or traumatic brain injury, the court may appoint pursuant to the provisions of this article a guardian of the person or of the property or both provided that guardianship shall be imposed only if necessary and in the least restrictive manner, specifically considering the respondent’s functional abilities.

2. Every decree issued pursuant to this article shall include a finding as to whether the respondent has the capacity to make health care decisions, as defined by subdivision three of section twenty-nine hundred eighty of the public health law. A determination that the respondent has the capacity to make health care decisions shall not preclude the appointment of a guardian to make other decisions on behalf of the respondent.

§ 3. Section 1750-b of the surrogate’s court procedure act, as amended by chapter 198 of the laws of 2016, is amended to read as follows:

§ 1750-b. Health care decisions for persons [who are intellectually disabled] with a developmental disability or traumatic brain injury

1. Scope of authority. Unless specifically prohibited by the court after consideration of the determination, if any, regarding a person [who is intellectually disabled’s capacity] with a developmental disability or traumatic brain injury to make health care decisions, which is required by section seventeen hundred fifty of this article, the guardi-
an of such person appointed pursuant to section seventeen hundred fifty
of this article shall have the authority to make any and all health care
decisions, as defined by subdivision six of section twenty-nine hundred
eighty of the public health law, on behalf of the person [who is intel-
lectually disabled] with a developmental disability or traumatic brain
injury that such person could make if such person had capacity. Such
decisions may include decisions to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining
treatment. For purposes of this section, "life-sustaining treatment"
means medical treatment, including cardiopulmonary resuscitation and
nutrition and hydration provided by means of medical treatment, which is
sustaining life functions and without which, according to reasonable
medical judgment, the patient will die within a relatively short time
period. Cardiopulmonary resuscitation is presumed to be life-sustaining
treatment without the necessity of a medical judgment by an attending
physician. The provisions of this article are not intended to permit or
promote suicide, assisted suicide or euthanasia; accordingly, nothing in
this section shall be construed to permit a guardian to consent to any
act or omission to which the person [who is intellectually disabled]
with a developmental disability or traumatic brain injury could not
consent if such person had capacity.

(a) For the purposes of making a decision to withhold or withdraw
life-sustaining treatment pursuant to this section, in the case of a
person for whom no guardian has been appointed pursuant to section
[seventeen hundred fifty or] seventeen hundred fifty-a of this article,
a "guardian" shall also mean a family member of a person who (i) has
[intellectual disability] a traumatic brain injury, or (ii) has a devel-
opmental disability[, as defined in section 1.03 of the mental hygiene
law, which (A) includes intellectual disability, or (B) results in a
similar impairment of general intellectual functioning or adaptive
behavior so that such person is incapable of managing himself or
herself, and/or his or her affairs by reason of such developmental disa-
bility). Qualified family members shall be included in a prioritized
list of said family members pursuant to regulations established by the
commissioner of the office for people with developmental disabilities.
Such family members must have a significant and ongoing involvement in a
person's life so as to have sufficient knowledge of their needs and,
when reasonably known or ascertainable, the person's wishes, including
moral and religious beliefs. In the case of a person who was a resident
of the former Willowbrook state school on March seventeenth, nineteen
hundred seventy-two and those individuals who were in community care
status on that date and subsequently returned to Willowbrook or a
related facility, who are fully represented by the consumer advisory
board and who have no guardians appointed pursuant to this article or
have no qualified family members to make such a decision, then a "guard-
ian" shall also mean the Willowbrook consumer advisory board. A decision
of such family member or the Willowbrook consumer advisory board to
withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment shall be subject to all
of the protections, procedures and safeguards which apply to the deci-
sion of a guardian to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment
pursuant to this section.

In the case of a person for whom no guardian has been appointed pursu-
ant to this article or for whom there is no qualified family member or
the Willowbrook consumer advisory board available to make such a deci-
sion, a "guardian" shall also mean, notwithstanding the definitions in
section 80.03 of the mental hygiene law, a surrogate decision-making
committee, as defined in article eighty of the mental hygiene law. All
declarations and procedures, including expedited procedures, to comply
with this section shall be established by regulations promulgated by the
commission on quality of care and advocacy for persons with disabili-
ties.

(b) Regulations establishing the prioritized list of qualified family
members required by paragraph (a) of this subdivision shall be developed
by the commissioner of the office for people with developmental disabil-
ities in conjunction with parents, advocates and family members of
persons who are intellectually disabled. Regulations to implement the
authority of the Willowbrook consumer advisory board pursuant to para-
graph (a) of this subdivision may be promulgated by the commissioner of
the office for people with developmental disabilities with advice from
the Willowbrook consumer advisory board.

[(c) Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the formal
determinations required pursuant to section seventeen hundred fifty of
this article shall only apply to guardians appointed pursuant to section
seventeen hundred fifty or seventeen hundred fifty-a of this article.]

2. Decision-making standard. (a) The guardian shall base all advocacy
and health care decision-making solely and exclusively on the best
interests of the person [who is intellectually disabled] with a develop-
mental disability or traumatic brain injury and, when reasonably known
or ascertainable with reasonable diligence, on [the person who is intel-
lectually disabled's] such person's wishes, including moral and reli-
gious beliefs.

(b) An assessment of [the person who is intellectually disabled's]
such person's best interests shall include consideration of:

(i) the dignity and uniqueness of every person;
(ii) the preservation, improvement or restoration of [the person who is intellectually disabled's] such person's health;

(iii) the relief of [the person who is intellectually disabled's] such person's suffering by means of palliative care and pain management;

(iv) the unique nature of artificially provided nutrition or hydration, and the effect it may have on [the] such person [who is intellectually disabled]; and

(v) the entire medical condition of the person.

(c) No health care decision shall be influenced in any way by:

(i) a presumption that persons [who are intellectually disabled] with a developmental disability or traumatic brain injury are not entitled to the full and equal rights, equal protection, respect, medical care and dignity afforded to persons without [an intellectual disability or] a developmental disability or traumatic brain injury; or

(ii) financial considerations of the guardian, as such considerations affect the guardian, a health care provider or any other party.

3. Right to receive information. Subject to the provisions of sections 33.13 and 33.16 of the mental hygiene law, the guardian shall have the right to receive all medical information and medical and clinical records necessary to make informed decisions regarding the [person who is intellectually disabled's] health care of the person with a developmental disability or traumatic brain injury.

4. Life-sustaining treatment. The guardian shall have the affirmative obligation to advocate for the full and efficacious provision of health care, including life-sustaining treatment. In the event that a guardian makes a decision to withdraw or withhold life-sustaining treatment from a person [who is intellectually disabled] with a developmental disable-
(a) The attending physician, as defined in subdivision two of section twenty-nine hundred eighty of the public health law, must confirm to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that the person [who is intellectually disabled] with a developmental disability or traumatic brain injury lacks capacity to make health care decisions. The determination thereof shall be included in [the person who is intellectually disabled's] such person's medical record, and shall contain such attending physician's opinion regarding the cause and nature of [the person who is intellectually disabled's] such person's incapacity as well as its extent and probable duration. The attending physician who makes the confirmation shall consult with another physician, or a licensed psychologist, to further confirm [the person who is intellectually disabled's] such person's lack of capacity. The attending physician who makes the confirmation, or the physician or licensed psychologist with whom the attending physician consults, must (i) be employed by a developmental disabilities services office named in section 13.17 of the mental hygiene law or employed by the office for people with developmental disabilities to provide treatment and care to people with developmental disabilities, or (ii) have been employed for a minimum of two years to render care and service in a facility or program operated, licensed or authorized by the office for people with developmental disabilities, or (iii) have been approved by the commissioner of the office for people with developmental disabilities in accordance with regulations promulgated by such commissioner. Such regulations shall require that a physician or licensed psychologist possess specialized training or three years experience in treating intellectual disability. A record of such consultation shall be included in the [person who is intellectu-
ally disabled's] medical record of the person with a developmental disab-
ility or traumatic brain injury.

(b) The attending physician, as defined in subdivision two of section
twenty-nine hundred eighty of the public health law, with the concur-
rence of another physician with whom such attending physician shall
consult, must determine to a reasonable degree of medical certainty and
note on the [person who is intellectually disabled's] chart of the
person with a developmental disability or traumatic brain injury that:

(i) [the] such person [who is intellectually disabled] has a medical
condition as follows:

A. a terminal condition, as defined in subdivision twenty-three of
section twenty-nine hundred sixty-one of the public health law; or
B. permanent unconsciousness; or
C. a medical condition other than such person's [intellectual] devel-
opmental disability or traumatic brain injury which requires life-sus-
taining treatment, is irreversible and which will continue indefinitely;
and
(ii) the life-sustaining treatment would impose an extraordinary
burden on such person, in light of:

A. such person's medical condition, other than such person's [intel-
lectual] developmental disability or traumatic brain injury; and
B. the expected outcome of the life-sustaining treatment, notwith-
standing such person's [intellectual] developmental disability or trau-
matic brain injury; and
(iii) in the case of a decision to withdraw or withhold artificially
provided nutrition or hydration:

A. there is no reasonable hope of maintaining life; or
B. the artificially provided nutrition or hydration poses an extraordinary burden.

(c) The guardian shall express a decision to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment either:

(i) in writing, dated and signed in the presence of one witness eighteen years of age or older who shall sign the decision, and presented to the attending physician, as defined in subdivision two of section twenty-nine hundred eighty of the public health law; or

(ii) orally, to two persons eighteen years of age or older, at least one of whom is the person who is [intellectually disabled's] the attending physician to the person with a developmental disability or traumatic brain injury, as defined in subdivision two of section twenty-nine hundred eighty of the public health law.

(d) The attending physician, as defined in subdivision two of section twenty-nine hundred eighty of the public health law, who is provided with the decision of a guardian shall include the decision in the [person who is intellectually disabled's] medical chart of the person with a developmental disability or traumatic brain injury, and shall either:

(i) promptly issue an order to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment from [the] such person [who is intellectually disabled], and inform the staff responsible for such person's care, if any, of the order; or

(ii) promptly object to such decision, in accordance with subdivision five of this section.

(e) At least forty-eight hours prior to the implementation of a decision to withdraw life-sustaining treatment, or at the earliest possible
time prior to the implementation of a decision to withhold life-sustain-
ing treatment, the attending physician shall notify:

(i) the person [who is intellectually disabled] with a developmental
disability or traumatic brain injury, except if the attending physician
determines, in writing and in consultation with another physician or a
licensed psychologist, that, to a reasonable degree of medical certain-
ty, the person would suffer immediate and severe injury from such
notification. The attending physician who makes the confirmation, or the
physician or licensed psychologist with whom the attending physician
consults, shall:

A. be employed by a developmental disabilities services office named
in section 13.17 of the mental hygiene law or employed by the office for
people with developmental disabilities to provide treatment and care to
people with developmental disabilities, or

B. have been employed for a minimum of two years to render care and
service in a facility operated, licensed or authorized by the office for
people with developmental disabilities, or

C. have been approved by the commissioner of the office for people
with developmental disabilities in accordance with regulations promul-
gated by such commissioner. Such regulations shall require that a physi-
cian or licensed psychologist possess specialized training or three
years experience in treating intellectual disability. A record of such
consultation shall be included in the [person who is intellectually
disabled's] medical record of the person with a developmental disability
or traumatic brain injury;

(ii) if the person is in or was transferred from a residential facili-
ty operated, licensed or authorized by the office for people with devel-
 opmental disabilities, the chief executive officer of the agency or
organization operating such facility and the mental hygiene legal
service; and
(iii) if the person is not in and was not transferred from such a
facility or program, the commissioner of the office for people with
developmental disabilities, or his or her designee.
5. Objection to health care decision. (a) Suspension. A health care
decision made pursuant to subdivision four of this section shall be
suspended, pending judicial review, except if the suspension would in
reasonable medical judgment be likely to result in the death of the
person [who is intellectually disabled] with a developmental disability
or traumatic brain injury, in the event of an objection to that decision
at any time by:
(i) the person [who is intellectually disabled] with a developmental
disability or traumatic brain injury on whose behalf such decision was
made; or
(ii) a parent or adult sibling who either resides with or has main-
tained substantial and continuous contact with the person [who is intel-
lectually disabled] with a developmental disability or traumatic brain
injury; or
(iii) the attending physician, as defined in subdivision two of
section twenty-nine hundred eighty of the public health law; or
(iv) any other health care practitioner providing services to the
person [who is intellectually disabled] with a developmental disability
or traumatic brain injury, who is licensed pursuant to article one
hundred thirty-one, one hundred thirty-one-B, one hundred thirty-two,
one hundred thirty-three, one hundred thirty-six, one hundred thirty-
nine, one hundred forty-one, one hundred forty-three, one hundred
forty-four, one hundred fifty-three, one hundred fifty-four, one hundred
52\(5\) fifty-six, one hundred fifty-nine or one hundred sixty-four of the education law; or
53\(v\) the chief executive officer identified in subparagraph \((i)\) of paragraph \((e)\) of subdivision four of this section; or
54\(vi\) if the person is in or was transferred from a residential facility or program operated, approved or licensed by the office for people with developmental disabilities, the mental hygiene legal service; or
55\(vii\) if the person is not in and was not transferred from such a facility or program, the commissioner of the office for people with developmental disabilities, or his or her designee.
56\(b\) Form of objection. Such objection shall occur orally or in writing.
57\(c\) Notification. In the event of the suspension of a health care decision pursuant to this subdivision, the objecting party shall promptly notify the guardian and the other parties identified in paragraph \((a)\) of this subdivision, and the attending physician shall record such suspension in the [person who is intellectually disabled's] medical chart of the person with a developmental disability or traumatic brain injury.
58\(d\) Dispute mediation. In the event of an objection pursuant to this subdivision, at the request of the objecting party or person or entity authorized to act as a guardian under this section, except a surrogate decision making committee established pursuant to article eighty of the mental hygiene law, such objection shall be referred to a dispute mediation system, established pursuant to section two thousand nine hundred seventy-two of the public health law or similar entity for mediating disputes in a hospice, such as a patient's advocate's office, hospital chaplain's office or ethics committee, or as described in writing and
1 adopted by the governing authority of such hospice, for non-binding
2 mediation. In the event that such dispute cannot be resolved within
3 seventy-two hours or no such mediation entity exists or is reasonably
4 available for mediation of a dispute, the objection shall proceed to
5 judicial review pursuant to this subdivision. The party requesting medi-
6 ation shall provide notification to those parties entitled to notice
7 pursuant to paragraph (a) of this subdivision.
8 6. Special proceeding authorized. The guardian, the attending physi-
9 cian, as defined in subdivision two of section twenty-nine hundred
10 eighty of the public health law, the chief executive officer identified
11 in subparagraph (ii) of paragraph (c) of subdivision four of this
12 section, the mental hygiene legal service (if the person is in or was
13 transferred from a residential facility or program operated, approved or
14 licensed by the office for people with developmental disabilities) or
15 the commissioner of the office for people with developmental disabili-
16 ties or his or her designee (if the person is not in and was not trans-
17 ferred from such a facility or program) may commence a special proceed-
18 ing in a court of competent jurisdiction with respect to any dispute
19 arising under this section, including objecting to the withdrawal or
20 withholding of life-sustaining treatment because such withdrawal or
21 withholding is not in accord with the criteria set forth in this
22 section.
23 7. Provider's obligations. (a) A health care provider shall comply
24 with the health care decisions made by a guardian in good faith pursuant
25 to this section, to the same extent as if such decisions had been made
26 by the person [who is intellectually disabled] with a developmental
27 disability or traumatic brain injury, if such person had capacity.
(b) Notwithstanding paragraph (a) of this subdivision, nothing in this section shall be construed to require a private hospital to honor a guardian's health care decision that the hospital would not honor if the decision had been made by the person [who is intellectually disabled] with a developmental disability or traumatic brain injury, if such person had capacity, because the decision is contrary to a formally adopted written policy of the hospital expressly based on religious beliefs or sincerely held moral convictions central to the hospital's operating principles, and the hospital would be permitted by law to refuse to honor the decision if made by such person, provided:

(i) the hospital has informed the guardian of such policy prior to or upon admission, if reasonably possible; and

(ii) the person [who is intellectually disabled] with a developmental disability or traumatic brain injury is transferred promptly to another hospital that is reasonably accessible under the circumstances and is willing to honor the guardian's decision. If the guardian is unable or unwilling to arrange such a transfer, the hospital's refusal to honor the decision of the guardian shall constitute an objection pursuant to subdivision five of this section.

(c) Notwithstanding paragraph (a) of this subdivision, nothing in this section shall be construed to require an individual health care provider to honor a guardian's health care decision that the individual would not honor if the decision had been made by the person [who is intellectually disabled] with a developmental disability or traumatic brain injury, if such person had capacity, because the decision is contrary to the individual's religious beliefs or sincerely held moral convictions, provided the individual health care provider promptly informs the guardian and the facility, if any, of his or her refusal to honor the guardian's
decision. In such event, the facility shall promptly transfer responsi-

bility for the person [who is intellectually disabled] with a develop-
mental disability or traumatic brain injury to another individual health
care provider willing to honor the guardian's decision. The individual
health care provider shall cooperate in facilitating such transfer of
the patient.

(d) Notwithstanding the provisions of any other paragraph of this
subdivision, if a guardian directs the provision of life-sustaining
treatment, the denial of which in reasonable medical judgment would be
likely to result in the death of the person [who is intellectually disa-
bled] with a developmental disability or traumatic brain injury, a
hospital or individual health care provider that does not wish to
provide such treatment shall nonetheless comply with the guardian's
decision pending either transfer of the person [who is intellectually
disabled] with a developmental disability or traumatic brain injury to a
willing hospital or individual health care provider, or judicial review.

(e) Nothing in this section shall affect or diminish the authority of
a surrogate decision-making panel to render decisions regarding major
medical treatment pursuant to article eighty of the mental hygiene law.

8. Immunity. (a) Provider immunity. No health care provider or employ-
ee thereof shall be subjected to criminal or civil liability, or be
deemed to have engaged in unprofessional conduct, for honoring reason-
ably and in good faith a health care decision by a guardian, or for
other actions taken reasonably and in good faith pursuant to this
section.

(b) Guardian immunity. No guardian shall be subjected to criminal or
civil liability for making a health care decision reasonably and in good
faith pursuant to this section.
§ 4. Section 1751 of the surrogate's court procedure act, as amended by chapter 198 of the laws of 2016, is amended to read as follows:

§ 1751. Petition for appointment; by whom [made] and where made

1. A petition for the appointment of a guardian of the person or property, or both, [of a person who is intellectually disabled or a person who is developmentally disabled] may be made by a parent of a person asserted to have a developmental disability or traumatic brain injury, any [interested] person eighteen years of age or older on behalf of the [person who is intellectually disabled or a person who is developmentally disabled] respondent, including a corporation authorized to serve as a guardian as provided for by this article, or by the person who is [intellectually disabled or a person who is developmentally disabled] asserted to have a developmental disability or traumatic brain injury when such person is eighteen years of age or older.

2. A proceeding under this article shall be brought in the surrogate's court within the county in which the respondent resides. If the respondent is a resident in a residential facility, the residence of the respondent shall be deemed to be in the county where that facility is located.

§ 5. Section 1752 of the surrogate's court procedure act, as amended by chapter 198 of the laws of 2016, is amended to read as follows:

§ 1752. Petition for appointment; contents

The petition for the appointment of a guardian shall be filed with the court on forms to be prescribed by the [state] chief administrator of the courts. Such petition for a guardian of a [person who is intellectually disabled or a person who is developmentally disabled] respondent shall include, but not be limited to, the following information:
1. the full name, date of birth and residence of the [person who is intellectually disabled or a person who is developmentally disabled] respondent;

2. the name, age, address and relationship or interest of the petitioner to the [person who is intellectually disabled or a person who is developmentally disabled] respondent;

3. the names of the [father, the mother] parents, children, adult siblings [if eighteen years of age or older], the spouse [and primary care physician if other than a physician having submitted a certification with the petition, if any, of the person who is intellectually disabled or a person who is developmentally disabled], if any, of the respondent, and whether or not they are living, and if living, their addresses and the names and addresses of the nearest [distributees] family members of full age who are domiciliaries, if both parents are [dead] deceased;

4. the name and address of the person with whom the [person who is intellectually disabled or a person who is developmentally disabled] respondent resides if other than the parents or spouse. If the respondent resides in a facility, the name and address of the facility;

5. the name, age, address, education and other qualifications, and consent of the proposed guardian, standby and alternate guardian[, if];

If petitioner is someone other than the parent, spouse, adult child [if eighteen years of age or older] or adult sibling [if eighteen years of age or older], and if such parent, spouse [or] adult child or adult sibling be living, why any of them should not be appointed guardian;

6. the estimated value of real and personal property and the annual income therefrom and any other income including governmental entitle-
ments to which the [person who is intellectually disabled or person who is developmentally disabled] respondent is entitled; [and]

7. any circumstances which the court should consider in determining whether [it is in the best interests of the person who is intellectually disabled or person who is developmentally disabled to] the respondent should not be present at the hearing [if conducted];

8. a statement that the respondent has a developmental disability or traumatic brain injury, including the basis for same, and the nature and extent of the respondent's functional abilities; and

9. a statement of the alternatives to guardianship considered, including but not limited to the execution of a health care proxy, power of attorney, representative payee, care coordination and/or other social support services, or other supported or shared decision-making, and reasons for the declination of such alternatives.

§ 6. Section 1753 of the surrogate's court procedure act, as amended by chapter 198 of the laws of 2016, is amended to read as follows:

§ 1753. Persons to be served

1. Upon presentation of the petition, process shall issue to:

(a) the spouse, the parent or parents, and adult children and adult siblings, if the petitioner is other than a parent[, adult siblings, if the petitioner is other than a parent, and if the person who is intellectually disabled or person who is developmentally disabled is married, to the spouse, if their residences are known];

(b) the person [having] providing care [and custody of] to the [person who is intellectually disabled or person who is developmentally disabled] respondent, or with whom such person resides if other than the parents or spouse; and
(c) the [person who is intellectually disabled or person who is developmentally disabled if fourteen years of age or older for whom an application has been made in such person's behalf] respondent.

2. Upon presentation of the petition, notice of such petition shall be served by certified mail to:

(a) the adult siblings if the petitioner is a parent, and adult children if the petitioner is a parent;

(b) [the mental hygiene legal service in the judicial department where the facility, as defined in subdivision (a) of section 47.01 of the mental hygiene law, is located if the person who is intellectually disabled or person who is developmentally disabled resides in such a facility;

(c)] in all cases, to the director in charge of a facility licensed or operated by an agency of the state of New York, if the [person who is intellectually disabled or person who is developmentally disabled] respondent resides in such facility;

[(d) one] [e] any other person or persons if designated in writing by the [person who is intellectually disabled or person who is developmentally disabled] respondent; and

[(e)] [(d) such other persons as the court may deem proper.

3. [No process or notice shall be necessary to a parent, adult child, adult sibling, or spouse of the person who is intellectually disabled or person who is developmentally disabled who has been declared by a court as being incompetent. In addition, no process or notice shall be necessary to a spouse who is divorced from the person who is intellectually disabled or person who is developmentally disabled, and to a parent, adult child, adult sibling when it shall appear to the satisfaction of the court that such person or persons have abandoned the person who is
intellectually disabled or person who is developmentally disabled] The court shall upon the issuance of a citation assign counsel for the respondent and shall provide said counsel with a copy of the petition and any supporting papers filed therein. Process or notice may be dispensed with in the court's discretion.

§ 7. Section 1754 of the surrogate's court procedure act, as amended by chapter 198 of the laws of 2016, is amended to read as follows:

§ 1754. Hearing and trial

1. Upon a petition for the appointment of a guardian of a [person who is intellectually disabled or person who is developmentally disabled eighteen years of age or older] respondent, the court shall conduct a hearing at which [such person] the respondent shall have the right to jury trial. The right to a jury trial shall be deemed waived by failure to make a demand therefor. [The court may in its discretion dispense with a hearing for the appointment of a guardian, and may in its discretion appoint a guardian ad litem, or the mental hygiene legal service if such person is a resident of a mental hygiene facility as defined in subdivision (a) of section 47.01 of the mental hygiene law, to recommend whether the appointment of a guardian as proposed in the application is in the best interest of the person who is intellectually disabled or person who is developmentally disabled, provided however, that such application has been made by:

(a) both parents or the survivor; or
(b) one parent and the consent of the other parent; or
(c) any interested party and the consent of each parent.

2. When it shall appear to the satisfaction of the court that a parent or parents not joining in or consenting to the application have aban-
opmentally disabled or are not otherwise required to receive notice, the
court may dispense with such parent's consent in determining the need to
cconduct a hearing for a person under the age of eighteen. However, if
the consent of both parents or the surviving parent is dispensed with by
the court, a hearing shall be held on the application.

3. If a hearing is conducted, the person who is intellectually disa-
bled or person who is developmentally disabled]

2. (a) The court shall appoint mental hygiene legal services as coun-
sel for the respondent unless it appoints other counsel. The court may
also appoint a guardian ad litem for the respondent. Such assignments of
counsel or guardian ad litem shall be implemented as provided in section
four hundred seven of this act.

(b) If the respondent objects to having counsel, the respondent may
proceed self-represented only with leave of the court. The court may
appoint counsel or guardian ad litem at its discretion, over the
respondent's objection.

3. Counsel for the respondent or the guardian ad litem may:

(a) apply to the court for an order to inspect the clinical records
pertaining to the respondent in accordance with state and federal laws;

(b) be allowed access to the respondent's clinical records without a
court order as otherwise limited by law; and

(c) request that the court issue such orders to permit access.

4. At the scheduled hearing, the respondent shall be present unless it
shall appear to the satisfaction of the court [on the certification of
the certifying physician that the person who is intellectually disabled
or person who is developmentally disabled is medically incapable of
being present to the extent that attendance is likely to result in phys-
ical harm to such person who is intellectually disabled or person who is
developmentally disabled, or under such other circumstances which the

court finds would not be in the best interest of the person who is

intellectually disabled or person who is developmentally disabled.

4. If either a hearing is dispensed with pursuant to subdivisions one

and two of this section or the person who is intellectually disabled or

person who is developmentally disabled is not present at the hearing

pursuant to subdivision three of this section, the court may appoint a

guardian ad litem if no mental hygiene legal service attorney is author-

ized to act on behalf of the person who is intellectually disabled or

person who is developmentally disabled. The guardian ad litem or mental

hygiene legal service attorney, if appointed, shall personally interview

the person who is intellectually disabled or person who is develop-

mentally disabled and shall submit a written report to the court] that

the respondent's presence would result in harm to such person.

5. If, upon conclusion of [such hearing or jury trial or if none be

held upon the application] the proceeding, the court is satisfied [that

the best interests of the person who is intellectually disabled or

person who is developmentally disabled will be promoted by the appoint-

ment of a guardian of the person or property, or both, it shall make a

decree naming such person or persons to serve as such guardians] based

on clear and convincing evidence that the respondent is incapable of

managing her or his affairs, it shall make a decree appointing a guardi-

an provided that guardianship shall be imposed only if necessary and in

the least restrictive manner specifically considering the respondent's

functional abilities.

6. Where the court has determined that the respondent has certain
decision-making capacity, the court shall appropriately limit the scope

or duration of the guardianship it decrees.
§ 8. The surrogate's court procedure act is amended by adding a new section 1754-a to read as follows:

§ 1754-a. Decision-making standard

Decisions made by a guardian appointed hereunder shall be made in accordance with the following standards:

1. A guardian shall exercise authority only as necessary and shall encourage the person with a developmental disability or traumatic brain injury to participate in making decisions and to act on his or her own behalf.

2. A guardian shall consider the expressed desires and personal values of the person with a developmental disability or traumatic brain injury to the extent known when making decisions and shall consult such person.

3. If the person's wishes are unknown and remain unknown after reasonable efforts are made to discern them, the decision shall be made on the basis of the best interests of such person as determined by the guardian. In determining the best interests of such person, the guardian shall weigh the reason for and nature of the proposed action; the benefit or necessity of the action; the possible risks and other consequences of the proposed action; and any available alternatives and their risks, consequences and benefits. The guardian shall take into account any other information, including the views of family and friends that the guardian believes said person would have considered if able to act for herself or himself.

§ 9. Section 1755 of the surrogate's court procedure act is REPEALED and a new section 1755 is added to read as follows:

§ 1755. Duration, modification and revocation

1. Such guardianship shall remain in effect until modified or revoked by the court.
2. Any person for whom a guardian has been appointed pursuant to this article, or anyone, including the guardian, on behalf of such person may petition to the court to discharge the guardian and appoint a successor, to designate the guardian of the property as a limited guardian of the property, to appoint a spouse as stand-by guardian, or to otherwise modify or revoke the guardianship order. Upon such a petition, the court shall conduct a hearing and such review pursuant to section seventeen hundred fifty-four of this article. The court may modify or revoke an order if it deems that the circumstances or needs of the person with a developmental disability or traumatic brain injury have changed and the provisions of the order are no longer appropriate or necessary.

3. Any proceeding to modify or revoke a prior guardianship order may be brought in the surrogate's court which granted the prior order, unless at the time of the application to modify or revoke the order the person with a developmental disability or traumatic brain injury resides elsewhere, in which case the proceeding may be brought in the county where the person with a developmental disability or traumatic brain injury resides.

§ 10. Section 1756 of the surrogate's court procedure act, as amended by chapter 198 of the laws of 2016, is amended to read as follows:

§ 1756. Limited guardian of the property

When it shall appear to the satisfaction of the court that [such person who is intellectually disabled or person who is developmentally disabled for whom an application for guardianship is made is eighteen years of age or older and] the respondent is wholly or substantially self-supporting by means of [his or her] wages or earnings from employment, the court is authorized and empowered to appoint a limited guardian of the property of [such person who is intellectually disabled or
person who is developmentally disabled] the respondent who shall receive, manage, disburse and account for only such property of said person [who is intellectually disabled or person who is developmentally disabled] as shall be received from other than the wages or earnings of said person.

[The] Said person [who is intellectually disabled or person who is developmentally disabled] for whom a limited guardian of the property has been appointed shall have the right to receive and expend any and all wages or other earnings of [his or her] employment and shall have the power to contract or legally bind himself or herself for such sum of money not exceeding one month's wages or earnings from such employment or three hundred dollars, whichever is greater, or as otherwise authorized by the court.

§ 11. Section 1757 of the surrogate's court procedure act, as amended by chapter 198 of the laws of 2016, is amended to read as follows:

§ 1757. Standby guardian of a person [who is intellectually disabled or person who is developmentally disabled] with a developmental disability or traumatic brain injury

1. Upon application, a standby guardian of the person or property or both of a person [who is intellectually disabled or person who is developmentally disabled] with a developmental disability or traumatic brain injury may be appointed by the court. The court may also, upon application, appoint an alternate and/or successive alternates to such standby guardian, to act if such standby guardian shall die, or become incapacitated, or shall renounce. Such appointments by the court shall be made in accordance with the provisions of this article.

2. Such standby guardian, or alternate in the event of such standby guardian's death, incapacity or renunciation, shall without further
proceedings be empowered to assume the duties of [his or her] office immediately upon death, renunciation or adjudication of incompetency of the guardian or standby guardian appointed pursuant to this article, subject only to confirmation of [his or her] the appointment by the court within one hundred eighty days following assumption of [his or her] the standby or alternate guardian's duties of such office. Before confirming the appointment of the standby guardian or alternate guardian, the court may conduct a hearing pursuant to section seventeen hundred fifty-four of this article upon petition by anyone on behalf of the person [who is intellectually disabled or person who is developmentally disabled] with a developmental disability or traumatic brain injury or the person [who is intellectually disabled or person who is developmentally disabled if such person is eighteen years of age or older] with a developmental disability or traumatic brain injury, or upon its discretion.

3. Failure of a standby or alternate standby guardian to assume the duties of guardian, seek court confirmation or to renounce the guardianship within sixty days of written notice by certified mail or personal delivery given by or on behalf of the person [who is intellectually disabled or person who is developmentally disabled] with a developmental disability or traumatic brain injury of a prior guardian's inability to serve and the standby or alternate standby guardian's duty to serve, seek court confirmation or renounce such role shall allow the court to:

(a) deem the failure an implied renunciation of guardianship, and

(b) authorize, notwithstanding the time period provided for in subdivision two of this section to seek court confirmation, any remaining standby or alternate standby guardian to serve in such capacity provided

(i) an application for confirmation and appropriate notices pursuant to
subdivision one of section seventeen hundred fifty-three of this article
are filed, or (ii) an application for modification of the guardianship
order pursuant to section seventeen hundred fifty-five of this article
is filed.

§ 12. Subdivision 2 of section 1758 of the surrogate's court procedure
act, as amended by chapter 198 of the laws of 2016, is amended to read
as follows:

2. After the appointment of a guardian, standby guardian or alternate
guardians, the court shall have and retain general jurisdiction over the
person [who is intellectually disabled or person who is developmentally
disabled] with a developmental disability or traumatic brain injury for
whom such guardian shall have been appointed, to take of its own motion
or to entertain and adjudicate such steps and proceedings relating to
such guardian, standby, or alternate guardianship as may be deemed
necessary or proper for the welfare of such person [who is intellectual-
ly disabled or person who is developmentally disabled].

§ 13. Section 1759 of the surrogate's court procedure act is REPEALED.

§ 14. Section 1760 of the surrogate's court procedure act, as amended
by chapter 198 of the laws of 2016, is amended to read as follows:

§ 1760. Corporate guardianship

No corporation may be appointed guardian of the person under the
provisions of this article, except that a non-profit corporation organ-
ized and existing under the laws of the state of New York and having the
corporate power to so act [as guardian of a person who is intellectually
disabled or person who is developmentally disabled may be appointed as
the guardian of the person only of such person who is intellectually
disabled or person who is developmentally disabled] may be appointed.
§ 15. Section 1761 of the surrogate's court procedure act, as amended by chapter 198 of the laws of 2016, is amended to read as follows:

§ 1761. Application of other provisions

To the extent that the context thereof shall admit, the provisions of article seventeen of this act shall apply to all proceedings under this article [with the same force and effect as if an "infant", as therein referred to, were a "person who is intellectually disabled" or "person who is developmentally disabled" as herein defined, and a "guardian" as therein referred to were a "guardian of the person who is intellectually disabled" or a "guardian of a person who is developmentally disabled" as herein provided for].

§ 16. This act shall take effect on the first of January next succeeding the date on which it shall have become a law.
IN SUPPORT OF

S.

A.

AN ACT to amend the surrogate’s court procedure act, in relation to guardians of persons who are intellectually and developmentally disabled

This is one in a series of measures being introduced at the request of the Chief Administrative Judge upon the recommendation of his Surrogate’s Court Committee.

This measure would amend Article 17-A of the Surrogate’s Court Procedure Act to better reflect the rights of individuals with developmental disabilities and traumatic brain injuries by removing obsolete language and addressing current legal standards of due process.

Article 17-A serves the vital purpose of ensuring that family members, or other individuals, interested in the welfare of persons who were born with intellectual disabilities or who suffered traumatic brain injuries at a young age, can be appointed guardians of the person and/or property in an inexpensive and generally more efficient manner than if they had to obtain such relief by proceeding under Article 81 of the Mental Hygiene Law.

Given the statute’s significance, it is imperative that it be amended not only to modernize its clinical terminology to conform with current usage, but also to reflect today’s medical knowledge regarding the capabilities of persons with intellectual disabilities. Additionally, it is critical that the statute be amended to more clearly define existing procedural requirements, while establishing new provisions that eliminate any perceived violations of due process alleged to exist under the current Federal or State statutory framework.

This measure ensures that a respondent will be represented by counsel with the right to a hearing or jury trial prior to the issuance of a guardianship order; imposes a “clear and convincing” standard as the burden of proof; and provides that a guardianship of the person will be imposed in the least restrictive means possible. In the same vein, the measure clarifies any ambiguity existing in the current statute regarding a court’s authority to tailor a guardianship to specific areas of responsibility, as the evidence presented focuses on the respondent’s functional abilities or limitations instead of on a simple diagnosis of a medical condition. In so doing, the amendment relieves petitioners of the burden of acquiring formulistic medical affidavits from health care providers.

Importantly, the new statutory scheme ensures that persons with intellectual disabilities may exercise the independence and self-determination of which they are capable by establishing
a new standard of guardianship decision making, which promotes self-reliance to the fullest extent possible.

Finally, this measure does not place any additional administrative burdens on Surrogate’s Court personnel, while providing for the uniform application of Article 17-A throughout the State by clearly defining the proper procedural framework within which these proceedings must operate.

The following will summarize key provisions of this measure:

* Section 1750 is repealed, and a new section 1750 is added to set forth new definitions of developmental disability and traumatic brain injury.

* Section 1750-a is amended to establish that the court may grant guardianship of individuals with developmental disabilities and traumatic brain injuries pursuant to Article 17-A. This section also establishes a clear and convincing standard as the proof required and provides that a guardianship shall be imposed in the least restrictive manner considering the individual’s functional abilities.

* Section 1750-b is amended to add new language setting forth its applicability to health care decisions for individuals with developmental disabilities or traumatic brain injuries.

* Section 1751 is amended to add new language and to add a new section pertaining to venue.

* Section 1752 is amended to add new language and sets forth additional requirements for the contents of the petition seeking guardianship. It adds new provisions requiring the petition to contain a statement regarding the nature and extent of the individual’s functional abilities, and a statement of the alternatives to guardianship considered.

* Section 1753 is amended to add new requirements regarding service of process and notice. It requires the court to assign counsel for the respondent upon the issuance of a citation.

* Section 1754 is amended to reflect new language and provides that the court shall appoint the Mental Hygiene Legal Service or other counsel to represent the respondent. It would also provide the court with discretion to appoint a guardian ad litem for the respondent; and that counsel assignments shall be implemented for indigent persons as provided in section 407 of the SCPA.

* Section 1754-a is added to set forth a decision-making standard for guardians. It requires that a guardian shall encourage self-determination and follow the expressed desires and personal values of the individual and requires the guardian to consult with the individual. If the individual’s wishes are unknown, the amended statute would require the guardian to make decisions based on the best interests of the individual.
• Section 1755 is repealed, and a new section 1755 is added to set forth guidelines for the duration, modification and revocation of guardianship, and to set forth provisions for venue of proceedings to modify or revoke a guardianship.

• Sections 1756, 1757, 1758, 1760 and 1761 are amended to add new language; and section 1759 is repealed.

This measure, which would have no fiscal impact, would take effect January first after becoming law.

Legislative History: None. New proposal.
An act to amend the surrogate’s court procedure act in relation to guardianship for individuals with developmental disabilities.

The People of the State of New York, represented in the Senate and Assembly, do enact as follows:

Section 1. Section 1750 of the surrogate’s court procedure act, as amended by chapter 198 of the laws of 2016, is amended to read as follows:

§ 1750. POWER Guardianship of persons who are intellectually disabled. When it shall appear to the satisfaction of the court that a person AN INDIVIDUAL WITH A DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITY is a person who is IN NEED OF A GUARDIAN AS DETERMINED BY THE COURT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE STANDARD SET FORTH IN SECTION 1756 intellectually disabled, the court is authorized to appoint a guardian of the person or of the property or of both, if such appointment of a guardian or guardian is in the best interest of the mentally retarded person. NEITHER THE ALLEGED DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITY NOR THE AGE OF THE INDIVIDUAL ALLEGED TO HAVE A DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITY CAN BE THE SOLE BASIS FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF A GUARDIAN. THE APPOINTMENT OF A GUARDIAN SHALL BE DESIGNED TO ENCOURAGE THE DEVELOPMENT OF MAXIMUM SELF-RELIANCE AND INDEPENDENCE IN THE INDIVIDUAL. THE APPOINTMENT SHALL BE ORDERED ONLY AS A LAST RESORT AND ONLY TO THE EXTENT A GUARDIAN IS NEEDED BECAUSE OF THE ACTUAL IMPAIRMENT OF AN INDIVIDUAL’S GENERAL OR SPECIFIC AREAS OF INTELLECTUAL FUNCTIONING AND/OR ADAPTIVE BEHAVIORS WHEN EITHER 1) THE INDIVIDUAL CONSENTS TO THE APPOINTMENT OF THE GUARDIAN, OR 2) THERE IS CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT THE INDIVIDUAL IS LIKELY TO SUFFER HARM BECAUSE THEY ARE UNABLE TO PROVIDE FOR PERSONAL NEEDS AND/OR PROPERTY MANAGEMENT, AND CANNOT ADEQUATELY UNDERSTAND AND APPRECIATE THE NATURE AND CONSEQUENCES OF SUCH INABILITY EVEN WITH APPROPRIATE SUPPORTIVE SERVICES, TECHNOLOGICAL ASSISTANCE, OR SUPPORTED DECISION MAKING THAT ALLOWS THEM TO EXERCISE THEIR LEGAL CAPACITY. Such appointment shall be made pursuant to the provisions of this article, provided however that the provisions of section seventeen hundred fifty-a of this article shall not apply to the appointment of a guardian or guardians of a mentally retarded person. 1. For the purposes of this article, a mentally retarded person is a person who has been certified by one licensed physician and one licensed psychologist, or by two licensed physicians at least one of whom is familiar with or has professional knowledge in the care and treatment of persons with mental retardation, having qualifications to make such certification, as being incapable to manage him or herself and/or his or her affairs by reason of mental retardation and that such condition is permanent in nature or likely to continue indefinitely. 2. Every such certification pursuant to subdivision one of this section, made on or after the effective date of this subdivision, shall include a specific determination by such physician and psychologist, or by such physicians, as to whether the mentally retarded person has the capacity to make health care
decisions, as defined by subdivision three of section twenty-nine hundred eighty of the public health law, for himself or herself. A determination that the mentally retarded person has the capacity to make health care decisions shall not preclude the appointment of a guardian pursuant to this section to make other decisions on behalf of the mentally retarded person. The absence of this determination in the case of guardians appointed prior to the effective date of this subdivision shall not preclude such guardians from making health care decisions.

§ 2. Section 1750-a of the surrogate's court procedure act is REPEALED.

§ 3. Section 1750-b of the surrogate's court procedure act, as amended by chapter 198 of the laws of 2016, is amended to read as follows:

§ 1750-b. Health care decisions for persons who are intellectually disabled with a developmental disability

1. Scope of authority. Unless specifically prohibited by the court after consideration of the determination, if any, regarding a person who is intellectually disabled's capacity of a person alleged to have a developmental disability to make health care decisions, which is required by section seventeen hundred fifty of this article, the guardian of such person appointed pursuant to section seventeen hundred fifty of this article shall have the authority to make any and all health care decisions, as defined by subdivision six of section twenty-nine hundred eighty of the public health law, on behalf of the such person who is intellectually disabled that such person could make if such person had capacity. Such decisions may include decisions to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment. For purposes of this section, “life-sustaining treatment” means medical treatment, including cardiopulmonary resuscitation and nutrition and hydration provided by means of medical treatment, which is sustaining life functions and without which, according to reasonable medical judgment, the patient will die within a relatively short time period. Cardiopulmonary resuscitation is presumed to be life-sustaining treatment without the necessity of a medical judgment by an attending physician. The provisions of this article are not intended to permit or promote suicide, assisted suicide or euthanasia; accordingly, nothing in this section shall be construed to permit a guardian to consent to any act or omission to which the such person who is intellectually disabled could not consent if such person had capacity.

(a) For the purposes of making a decision to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment pursuant to this section, in the case of a person for whom no guardian has been appointed pursuant to section seventeen hundred fifty or seventeen hundred fifty-a of this article, a “guardian” shall also mean a family member of a person who (i) has intellectual disability, or (ii) has a developmental disability, as defined in section 1.03 of the mental hygiene law, which (A) includes intellectual disability, or (B) results in a similar impairment of general intellectual functioning or adaptive behavior so that such person is incapable of managing himself or herself, and/or his or her affairs by reason of such developmental disability. Qualified family members shall be included in a prioritized list of said family members pursuant to regulations established by the commissioner of the office for people with developmental disabilities. Such family members must have a significant and ongoing involvement in a person's life so as to have sufficient knowledge of their needs and, when reasonably known or ascertainable, the person's wishes, including moral and religious beliefs. In the case of a person who was a resident of the former Willowbrook state school on March seventeenth, nineteen hundred seventy-two and those
individuals who were in community care status on that date and subsequently returned to Willowbrook or a related facility, who are fully represented by the consumer advisory board and who have no guardians appointed pursuant to this article or have no qualified family members to make such a decision, then a “guardian” shall also mean the Willowbrook consumer advisory board. A decision of such family member or the Willowbrook consumer advisory board to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment shall be subject to all of the protections, procedures and safeguards which apply to the decision of a guardian to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment pursuant to this section.

In the case of a person for whom no guardian has been appointed pursuant to this article or for whom there is no qualified family member or the Willowbrook consumer advisory board available to make such a decision, a “guardian” shall also mean, notwithstanding the definitions in section 80.03 of the mental hygiene law, a surrogate decision-making committee, as defined in article eighty of the mental hygiene law. All declarations and procedures, including expedited procedures, to comply with this section shall be established by regulations promulgated by the commission on quality of care and advocacy for persons with disabilities JUSTICE CENTER FOR THE PROTECTION OF PEOPLE WITH SPECIAL NEEDS, AS ESTABLISHED BY ARTICLE TWENTY OF THE EXECUTIVE LAW.

(b) Regulations establishing the prioritized list of qualified family members required by paragraph (a) of this subdivision shall be developed by the commissioner of the office for people with developmental disabilities in conjunction with parents, advocates and family members of persons who are intellectually disabled WITH A DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITY. Regulations to implement the authority of the Willowbrook consumer advisory board pursuant to paragraph (a) of this subdivision may be promulgated by the commissioner of the office for people with developmental disabilities with advice from the Willowbrook consumer advisory board.

(c) Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the formal determinations required pursuant to section seventeen hundred fifty-six of this article shall only apply to guardians appointed pursuant to section seventeen hundred fifty or seventeen hundred fifty-a of this article.

2. Decision-making standard. (a) The guardian shall base all advocacy and health care decision-making solely and exclusively on the best interests of the person who is intellectually disabled WITH A DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITY and, when reasonably known or ascertainable with reasonable diligence, on the WISHES OF THE person who is intellectually disabled’s wishes WITH A DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITY, including moral and religious beliefs.

(b) An assessment of the BEST INTERESTS OF THE person WITH A DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITY who is intellectually disabled’s best interests shall include consideration of:

(i) the dignity and uniqueness of every person;
(ii) the preservation, improvement or restoration of the HEALTH OF THE person who is intellectually disabled’s health WITH A DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITY;
(iii) the relief of the SUFFERING OF THE person who is intellectually disabled’s suffering WITH A DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITY by means of palliative care and pain management;
(iv) the unique nature of artificially provided nutrition or hydration, and the effect it may have on the person who is intellectually disabled WITH A DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITY; and
(v) the entire medical condition of the person.

(c) No health care decision shall be influenced in any way by:
(i) a presumption that persons who are intellectually disabled with a developmental disability are not entitled to the full and equal rights, equal protection, respect, medical care and dignity afforded to persons without an intellectual disability or a developmental disability; or (ii) financial considerations of the guardian, as such considerations affect the guardian, a health care provider or any other party.

3. Right to receive information. Subject to the provisions of sections 33.13 and 33.16 of the mental hygiene law, the guardian shall have the right to receive all medical information and medical and clinical records necessary to make informed decisions regarding the health care of a person who is intellectually disabled's health care with a developmental disability.

4. Life-sustaining treatment. The guardian shall have the affirmative obligation to advocate for the full and efficacious provision of health care, including life-sustaining treatment. In the event that a guardian makes a decision to withdraw or withhold life-sustaining treatment from a person who is intellectually disabled with a developmental disability:

(a) The attending physician, as defined in subdivision two of section twenty-nine hundred eighty of the public health law, must confirm to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that the person who is intellectually disabled with a developmental disability lacks capacity to make health care decisions. The determination thereof shall be included in the medical record of the person who is intellectually disabled's medical record with a developmental disability, and shall contain such attending physician's opinion regarding the cause and nature of the lack of capacity of a person who is intellectually disabled's incapacity with a developmental disability as well as its extent and probable duration. The attending physician who makes the confirmation shall consult with another physician, or a licensed psychologist, to further confirm the lack of capacity of the person who is intellectually disabled's lack of capacity with a developmental disability. The attending physician who makes the confirmation, or the physician or licensed psychologist with whom the attending physician consults, must (i) be employed by a developmental disabilities services office named in section 13.17 of the mental hygiene law or employed by the office for people with developmental disabilities to provide treatment and care to people with developmental disabilities, or (ii) have been employed for a minimum of two years to render care and service in a facility or program operated, licensed or authorized by the commissioner of the office for people with developmental disabilities in accordance with regulations promulgated by such commissioner. Such regulations shall require that a physician or licensed psychologist possess specialized training or three-years experience in treating intellectual disability. A record of such consultation shall be included in the medical record of the person with a developmental disability who is intellectually disabled's medical record.

(b) The attending physician, as defined in subdivision two of section twenty-nine hundred eighty of the public health law, with the concurrence of another physician with whom such attending physician shall consult, must determine to a reasonable degree of medical certainty and note on the chart of the person who is intellectually disabled's chart with a developmental disability that:

(i) the person who is intellectually disabled with a developmental disability has a medical condition as follows:
A. a terminal condition, as defined in subdivision twenty-three of section twenty-nine hundred sixty-one of the public health law; or
B. permanent unconsciousness; or
C. a medical condition other than THE DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITY OF such person's intellectual disability, which requires life-sustaining treatment, is irreversible and which will continue indefinitely; and
(ii) the life-sustaining treatment would impose an extraordinary burden on such person, in light of:
A. such person's medical condition, other than THE DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITY OF such person's intellectual disability; and
B. the expected outcome of the life-sustaining treatment, notwithstanding THE DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITY OF such person's intellectual disability; and
(iii) in the case of a decision to withdraw or withhold artificially provided nutrition or hydration:
A. there is no reasonable hope of maintaining life; or
B. the artificially provided nutrition or hydration poses an extraordinary burden.
(c) The guardian shall express a decision to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment either:
(i) in writing, dated and signed in the presence of one witness eighteen years of age or older who shall sign the decision, and presented to the attending physician, as defined in subdivision two of section twenty-nine hundred eighty of the public health law; or
(ii) orally, to two persons eighteen years of age or older, at least one of whom is the ATTENDING PHYSICIAN OF THE person who is intellectually disabled's attending physician WITH A DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITY, as defined in subdivision two of section twenty-nine hundred eighty of the public health law.
(d) The attending physician, as defined in subdivision two of section twenty-nine hundred eighty of the public health law, who is provided with the decision of a guardian shall include the decision in the MEDICAL CHART OF THE person who is intellectually disabled's medical chart WITH A DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITY, and shall either:
(i) promptly issue an order to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment from the person who is intellectually disabled WITH A DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITY, and inform the staff responsible for such person's care, if any, of the order; or
(ii) promptly object to such decision, in accordance with subdivision five of this section.
(e) At least forty-eight hours prior to the implementation of a decision to withdraw life-sustaining treatment, or at the earliest possible time prior to the implementation of a decision to withhold life-sustaining treatment, the attending physician shall notify:
(i) the person who is intellectually disabled WITH A DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITY, except if the attending physician determines, in writing and in consultation with another physician or a licensed psychologist, that, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, the person would suffer immediate and severe injury from such notification. The attending physician who makes the confirmation, or the physician or licensed psychologist with whom the attending physician consults, shall:
A. be employed by a developmental disabilities services office named in section 13.17 of the mental hygiene law or employed by the office for people with developmental disabilities to provide treatment and care to people with developmental disabilities, or
B. have been employed for a minimum of two years to render care and service in a facility operated, licensed or authorized by the office for people with developmental disabilities, or
C. have been approved by the commissioner of the office for people with developmental disabilities in accordance with regulations promulgated by such commissioner. Such regulations shall require that a physician or licensed psychologist possess specialized training or three years experience in treating intellectual disability. A record of such consultation shall be included in the person who is intellectually disabled's medical record;

(ii) if the person is in or was transferred from a residential facility operated, licensed or authorized by the office for people with developmental disabilities, the chief executive officer of the agency or organization operating such facility and the mental hygiene legal service; and

(iii) if the person is not in and was not transferred from such a facility or program, the commissioner of the office for people with developmental disabilities, or his or her designee.

5. Objection to health care decision. (a) Suspension. A health care decision made pursuant to subdivision four of this section shall be suspended, pending judicial review, except if the suspension would in reasonable medical judgment be likely to result in the death of the person who is intellectually disabled with a developmental disability, in the event of an objection to that decision at any time by:

(i) the person who is intellectually disabled with a developmental disability on whose behalf such decision was made; or

(ii) a parent or adult sibling who either resides with or has maintained substantial and continuous contact with the person who is intellectually disabled with a developmental disability; or

(iii) the attending physician, as defined in subdivision two of section twenty-nine hundred eighty of the public health law; or

(iv) any other health care practitioner providing services to the person who is intellectually disabled with a developmental disability, who is licensed pursuant to article one hundred thirty-one, one hundred thirty-one-B, one hundred thirty-two, one hundred thirty-three, one hundred thirty-six, one hundred thirty-nine, one hundred forty-one, one hundred forty-three, one hundred forty-four, one hundred fifty-three, one hundred fifty-four, one hundred fifty-six, one hundred fifty-nine or one hundred sixty-four of the education law; or

(v) the chief executive officer identified in subparagraph (ii) of paragraph (e) of subdivision four of this section; or

(vi) if the person is in or was transferred from a residential facility or program operated, approved or licensed by the office for people with developmental disabilities, the mental hygiene legal service; or

(vii) if the person is not in and was not transferred from such a facility or program, the commissioner of the office for people with developmental disabilities, or his or her designee.

(b) Form of objection. Such objection shall occur orally or in writing.

(c) Notification. In the event of the suspension of a health care decision pursuant to this subdivision, the objecting party shall promptly notify the guardian and the other parties identified in paragraph (a) of this subdivision, and the attending physician shall record such suspension in the MEDICAL CHART OF THE person with the developmental disability who is intellectually disabled's medical chart.

(d) Dispute mediation. In the event of an objection pursuant to this subdivision, at the request of the objecting party or person or entity authorized to act as a guardian under this section, except a surrogate decision making committee established pursuant to article eighty of the mental hygiene law, such objection shall be referred to a dispute mediation system, established pursuant to section two thousand nine hundred seventy-two of the public health law or similar entity for
mediating disputes in a hospice, such as a patient's advocate's office, hospital chaplain's office or ethics committee, as described in writing and adopted by the governing authority of such hospice, for non-binding mediation. In the event that such dispute cannot be resolved within seventy-two hours or no such mediation entity exists or is reasonably available for mediation of a dispute, the objection shall proceed to judicial review pursuant to this subdivision. The party requesting mediation shall provide notification to those parties entitled to notice pursuant to paragraph (a) of this subdivision.

6. Special proceeding authorized. The guardian, the attending physician, as defined in subdivision two of section twenty-nine hundred eighty of the public health law, the chief executive officer identified in subparagraph (ii) of paragraph (e) of subdivision four of this section, the mental hygiene legal service (if the person is in or was transferred from a residential facility or program operated, approved or licensed by the office for people with developmental disabilities) or the commissioner of the office for people with developmental disabilities or his or her designee (if the person is not in and was not transferred from such a facility or program) may commence a special proceeding in a court of competent jurisdiction with respect to any dispute arising under this section, including objecting to the withdrawal or withholding of life-sustaining treatment because such withdrawal or withholding is not in accord with the criteria set forth in this section.

7. Provider's obligations. (a) A health care provider shall comply with the health care decisions made by a guardian in good faith pursuant to this section, to the same extent as if such decisions had been made by the person who is intellectually disabled WITH A DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITY, if such person had capacity.

(b) Notwithstanding paragraph (a) of this subdivision, nothing in this section shall be construed to require a private hospital to honor a guardian's health care decision that the hospital would not honor if the decision had been made by the person who is intellectually disabled WITH A DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITY, if such person had capacity, because the decision is contrary to a formally adopted written policy of the hospital expressly based on religious beliefs or sincerely held moral convictions central to the hospital's operating principles, and the hospital would be permitted by law to refuse to honor the decision if made by such person, provided:

(i) the hospital has informed the guardian of such policy prior to or upon admission, if reasonably possible; and

(ii) the person who is intellectually disabled WITH A DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITY is transferred promptly to another hospital that is reasonably accessible under the circumstances and is willing to honor the guardian's decision. If the guardian is unable or unwilling to arrange such a transfer, the hospital's refusal to honor the decision of the guardian shall constitute an objection pursuant to subdivision five of this section.

(c) Notwithstanding paragraph (a) of this subdivision, nothing in this section shall be construed to require an individual health care provider to honor a guardian's health care decision that the individual would not honor if the decision had been made by the person who is intellectually disabled WITH A DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITY, if such person had capacity, because the decision is contrary to the individual's religious beliefs or sincerely held moral convictions, provided the individual health care provider promptly informs the guardian and the facility, if any, of his or her refusal to honor the guardian's decision. In such event, the facility shall promptly transfer responsibility for the person who is intellectually disabled WITH A DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITY to another individual health care provider willing to honor
the guardian's decision. The individual health care provider shall cooperate in facilitating such transfer of the patient.

(d) Notwithstanding the provisions of any other paragraph of this subdivision, if a guardian directs the provision of life-sustaining treatment, the denial of which in reasonable medical judgment would be likely to result in the death of the person who is intellectually disabled WITH A DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITY, a hospital or individual health care provider that does not wish to provide such treatment shall nonetheless comply with the guardian's decision pending either transfer of the person who is intellectually disabled WITH A DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITY to a willing hospital or individual health care provider, or judicial review.

(e) Nothing in this section shall affect or diminish the authority of a surrogate decision-making panel to render decisions regarding major medical treatment pursuant to article eighty of the mental hygiene law.

8. Immunity. (a) Provider immunity. No health care provider or employee thereof shall be subjected to criminal or civil liability, or be deemed to have engaged in unprofessional conduct, for honoring reasonably and in good faith a health care decision by a guardian, or for other actions taken reasonably and in good faith pursuant to this section.

(b) Guardian immunity. No guardian shall be subjected to criminal or civil liability for making a health care decision reasonably and in good faith pursuant to this section.

§ 4. Article 17A of the surrogate's court procedure act is amended by adding a new section 1751 to read as follows:

§ 1751. DEFINITIONS

WHEN USED IN THIS ARTICLE,

(1) "ADAPTIVE BEHAVIOR" SHALL MEAN THE COLLECTION OF CONCEPTUAL, SOCIAL AND PRACTICAL SKILLS LEARNED BY INDIVIDUALS TO ENABLE THEM TO FUNCTION IN THEIR EVERYDAY LIVES.

(2) "AVAILABLE RESOURCES AND ALTERNATIVES TO GUARDIANSHIP" SHALL MEAN EXISTING HEALTH CARE AND OTHER SURROGATE DECISIONMAKING STATUTES AND REGULATIONS, AND RESOURCES, SUPPORTS, AND ALTERNATIVES, SUCH AS, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, HEALTH CARE PROXY, JOINT BANK ACCOUNT, POWER OF ATTORNEY, REPRESENTATIVE PAYEE, SPECIAL NEEDS TRUSTS, HEALTH CARE SURROGATE DECISIONMAKING COMMITTEE, CASE MANAGEMENT SERVICES, DAY SERVICES, IN-HOME CARE SERVICES, MONEY MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS, CARE COORDINATION, SOCIAL SUPPORTS, SERVICES AND NETWORKS, SUPPORTED DECISION MAKING, AND AVAILABLE SHARED DECISION MAKING.

(3) "DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITY" SHALL MEAN A DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITY WITHIN THE MEANING OF SUBDIVISION TWENTY-TWO OF SECTION 1.03 OF THE MENTAL HYGIENE LAW.
(4) “FUNCTIONAL LEVEL” SHALL MEAN THE MEASUREMENT OF THE ABILITY TO LIVE INDEPENDENTLY, PROVIDE FOR PERSONAL NEEDS, FUNCTION SAFELY, AND/OR THE ABILITY TO MANAGE PROPERTY, WITH APPROPRIATE SUPPORTIVE SERVICES, TECHNOLOGICAL ASSISTANCE, OR SUPPORTED DECISIONMAKING.

(5) “FUNCTIONAL LIMITATIONS” SHALL MEAN BEHAVIOR OR CONDITIONS OF A PERSON WHICH IMPAIR THE ABILITY TO LIVE INDEPENDENTLY, PROVIDE FOR PERSONAL NEEDS, FUNCTION SAFELY, AND/OR THE ABILITY TO MANAGE PROPERTY, EVEN WITH APPROPRIATE SUPPORTIVE SERVICES, TECHNOLOGICAL ASSISTANCE, OR SUPPORTED DECISIONMAKING.

(6) “DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITY INDIVIDUAL SUPPORT AND CARE COORDINATION ORGANIZATION” SHALL MEAN AN ENTITY THAT HAS RECEIVED A CERTIFICATE OF AUTHORITY PURSUANT TO THE PUBLIC HEALTH LAW TO PROVIDE, OR ARRANGE FOR, HEALTH AND LONG TERM CARE SERVICES, AS DETERMINED BY THE COMMISSIONER AND THE COMMISSIONER OF THE OFFICE FOR PEOPLE WITH DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES.

(7) "PERSONAL NEEDS" SHALL MEAN NEEDS SUCH AS, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, FOOD, CLOTHING, SHELTER, HEALTH CARE, AND SAFETY.

(8) "PROPERTY MANAGEMENT" SHALL MEAN TAKING ACTIONS TO OBTAIN, ADMINISTER, PROTECT, AND DISPOSE OF REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTY, INTANGIBLE PROPERTY, BUSINESS PROPERTY, BENEFITS, AND INCOME, AND TO DEAL WITH FINANCIAL AFFAIRS.

(9) “RESPONDENT” SHALL MEAN THE INDIVIDUAL WHO IS ALLEGED TO HAVE A DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITY.

(10) “SUPPORTED DECISION MAKING” SHALL MEAN ASSISTANCE FROM ONE OR MORE PERSONS OF AN INDIVIDUAL’S CHOOSING IN UNDERSTANDING THE NATURE AND CONSEQUENCES OF POTENTIAL PERSONAL AND FINANCIAL DECISIONS, WHICH ENABLE THE INDIVIDUAL TO MAKE DECISIONS, AND IN COMMUNICATING A DECISION ONCE MADE IF CONSISTENT WITH AN INDIVIDUAL’S WISHES.

§ 5. Section 1751 of the surrogate's court procedure act, as amended by chapter 198 of the laws of 2016, is renumbered section 1752 and amended to read as follows:

§ 1752. Petition for appointment; by whom made. A petition for the appointment of a guardian of the person or property, or both, of a person who is intellectually disabled or a person who is developmentally disabled THE RESPONDENT may be made by (1) a parent, any interested person eighteen years of age or older on behalf of the person who is intellectually disabled or a person who is developmentally disabled RESPONDENT including a corporation authorized to serve as a guardian as provided for by this article, or by,
(2) the person who is intellectually disabled or a person who is developmentally disabled RESPONDENT when such person is eighteen years of age or older.

§ 6. Section 1752 of the surrogate's court procedure act, as amended by chapter 198 of the laws of 2016, is renumbered section 1753 and amended to read as follows:

§ 1753. Petition for appointment; contents.
The petition for the appointment of a guardian shall be filed with the court on forms to be prescribed by the state chief administrator of the courts. Such petition for a guardian of a person who is intellectually disabled or a person who is developmentally disabledmentally ALLEGED TO HAVE A DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITY shall include, but not be limited to, the following information:

1. the full name, date of birth and residence of the person who is intellectually disabled or a person who is developmentally disabled RESPONDENT;


3. the name, age, address, and relationship or interest of the petitioner to the person who is intellectually disabled or a person who is developmentally disabled RESPONDENT;

4. the names of the father, the mother, children, adult siblings if eighteen years of age or older, the spouse and primary care physician if other than a physician having submitted a certification with the petition, if any, of the person who is intellectually disabled or a person who is developmentally disabled RESPONDENT and, whether or not they are living, and if living, their addresses and, IF BOTH PARENTS ARE DEAD, the names and addresses of the nearest distributees of full age who are domiciliaries if both parents are dead;

5. the name and address of the person with whom the person who is intellectually disabled or a person who is developmentally disabled RESPONDENT resides if other than the parents or spouse;

6. THE NAME AND ADDRESS OF THE DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITY INDIVIDUAL SUPPORT AND CARE COORDINATION ORGANIZATION AND ANY OTHER PERSONS PROVIDING SERVICES RELATED TO THE ALLEGED DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITY OF THE RESPONDENT, OR ARRANGING FOR THE PROVISION OF SUCH SERVICES TO THE RESPONDENT, IF SUCH PERSONS ARE KNOWN TO THE PETITIONER;

7. the name, age, address, education and other qualifications, and consent of the proposed guardian, standby and alternate guardian, if other than the parent, spouse, adult child if eighteen years of age or older or adult sibling if eighteen years of age or older, and if such parent, spouse, or adult child, OR ADULT SIBLING be living, why any of them should not be appointed guardian;
6. the estimated value of real and personal property and the annual income therefrom and any
other income including governmental entitlements to which the person who is intellectually
disabled or a person who is developmentally disabled RESPONDENT is entitled; and

7. any circumstances which the court should consider in determining whether it is in the best
interests of the mentally retarded or developmentally disabled person not be be present at the
hearing if conducted;

9. A DESCRIPTION OF THE RESPONDENT’S FUNCTIONAL LEVEL, ADAPTIVE
BEHAVIORS, AND FUNCTIONAL LIMITATIONS INCLUDING THE RESPONDENT’S
ABILITY TO MANAGE THE ACTIVITIES OF DAILY LIVING, AND ANY SUPPORTIVE
SERVICES, TECHNOLOGICAL ASSISTANCE OR SUPPORTED DECISION MAKING
THE INDIVIDUAL USES;

10. A STATEMENT OF THE AVAILABLE RESOURCES AND ALTERNATIVES TO
GUARDIANSHIP WHICH HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED OR IMPLEMENTED BY THE
PETITIONER, AND IF THEY HAVE NOT BEEN CONSIDERED OR IMPLEMENTED, THE
REASON THEY HAVE NOT BEEN CONSIDERED OR IMPLEMENTED;

11. THE PARTICULAR POWERS BEING SOUGHT, THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO THE
FUNCTIONAL LEVEL, ADAPTIVE BEHAVIORS, AND FUNCTIONAL LIMITATIONS
DESCRIBED IN PARAGRAPH NINE, AND DURATION OF THE POWERS BEING
SOUGHT;

12. THE APPROXIMATE VALUE AND DESCRIPTION OF THE PROPERTY AND
FINANCIAL RESOURCES OF THE RESPONDENT, TO THE BEST OF THE
PETITIONER’S KNOWLEDGE;

13. THE NATURE AND AMOUNT OF ANY CLAIM, DEBT, OR OBLIGATIONS OF THE
RESPONDENT, TO THE BEST OF THE PETITIONER’S KNOWLEDGE;

14. AN EXPLANATION OF THE REASONS WHY THE FORM OF GUARDIANSHIP
SOUGHT IS THE LEAST RESTRICTIVE RELIEF WHICH WILL MEET THE NEEDS OF
THE RESPONDENT;

15. ANY OTHER INFORMATION WHICH THE PETITIONER ALLEGES WILL ASSIST
THE COURT.

§ 7. Section 1753 of the surrogate’s court procedure act, as amended by chapter 198 of the laws
of 2016, is renumbered section 1754 and amended to read as follows:

§ 1753-1754. Persons to be served AND NOTICE
1. Upon presentation of the petition, process shall issue to:
(a) the parent or parents, adult children, if the petitioner is other than a parent, adult siblings, if
the petitioner is other than a parent, and if the person who is intellectually disabled or a
person who is developmentally disabled RESPONDENT is married, to the spouse, if their residences are known; 
(b) the person having care and custody of the person who is intellectually disabled or person who is developmentally disabled with whom such person RESPONDENT resides if other than the parents or spouse; and 
(c) the person who is intellectually disabled or person who is developmentally disabled RESPONDENT if fourteen years of age or older for whom an application has been made in such person’s behalf.


2. Upon FILING presentation of the petition, notice of such petition shall be served by certified mail to: 
(a) the adult siblings if the petitioner is a parent, and adult children if the petitioner is a parent; 
(b) the mental hygiene legal service in the judicial department where the facility, as defined in subdivision (a) of section 47.01 of the mental hygiene law, is located if the person who is intellectually disabled or person who is developmentally disabled RESPONDENT resides in such a facility. 
(c) in all cases, to the director in charge of a facility AS DEFINED IN SECTION 47.01 OF THE MENTAL HYGIENE LAW, if the person who is intellectually disabled or a person who is developmentally disabled RESPONDENT resides in such facility; 
(d) THE DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITY INDIVIDUAL SUPPORT AND CARE COORDINATION ORGANIZATION AND ANY OTHER PERSONS PROVIDING SERVICES TO THE RESPONDENT; 
(e) one other person if designated in writing by the person who is intellectually disabled or person who is developmentally disabled RESPONDENT; and 
(e) such other persons as the court may deem proper.

3. No process or notice shall be necessary to a parent, adult child, adult sibling, or spouse of the person who is intellectually disabled or person who is developmentally disabled RESPONDENT who has been declared by a court as being incompetent; In addition, no process or notice shall be necessary to a spouse who is divorced from the person who is intellectually disabled or person who is developmentally disabled RESPONDENT; and to a parent, adult child, adult sibling when it shall appear to the satisfaction of the court that such person or persons have abandoned the person who is intellectually disabled or person who is developmentally disabled RESPONDENT.
§ 8. Article 17A of the surrogate’s court procedure act is amended by adding a new section 1755 to read as follows:

§ 1755. COUNSEL; GUARDIAN AD LITEM

1. THE RESPONDENT SHALL BE ENTITLED TO BE REPRESENTED BY LEGAL COUNSEL. THE COURT SHALL APPOINT AS COUNSEL THE MENTAL HYGIENE LEGAL SERVICE. IF THE COURT DETERMINES THAT MENTAL HYGIENE LEGAL SERVICE CANNOT ACCEPT AN APPOINTMENT BECAUSE OF A CONFLICT OF INTEREST, THE COURT SHALL APPOINT AN ATTORNEY WITH APPROPRIATE EXPERTISE ELIGIBLE FOR APPOINTMENT PURSUANT TO SECTION THIRTY-FIVE OF THE JUDICIARY LAW. IN THE EVENT THAT THE COURT DETERMINES THAT THE RESPONDENT HAS RETAINED COUNSEL, THE COURT SHALL SUBSTITUTE RETAINED COUNSEL FOR APPOINTED COUNSEL UPON THE COURT’S DETERMINATION THAT RETAINED COUNSEL HAS BEEN CHOSEN FREELY AND INDEPENDENTLY BY THE RESPONDENT. THE COURT APPOINTED COUNSEL SHALL BE AT NO COST TO THE PETITIONER OR RESPONDENT. COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENT SHALL BE PROVIDED WITH COPIES OF THE PETITION AND THE SERVICE OF PROCESS AND NOTICE COMPLETED PURSUANT TO SECTION SEVENTEEN FIFTY-FOUR. COUNSEL SHALL BE AFFORDED ACCESS TO THE RESPONDENT’S CLINICAL RECORDS WITHOUT A COURT ORDER TO THE EXTENT ACCESS IS OTHERWISE AUTHORIZED BY STATE AND FEDERAL LAWS, AND MAY APPLY TO THE COURT FOR PERMISSION TO INSPECT THE CLINICAL RECORDS PERTAINING TO THE RESPONDENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH STATE AND FEDERAL LAWS. COUNSEL SHALL ADVOCATE FOR THE RESPONDENT’S EXPRESSED WISHES, IF KNOWN. IF THE RESPONDENT’S WISHES ARE NOT KNOWN AND CANNOT BE ASCERTAINED AFTER INVESTIGATION, COUNSEL SHALL SAFEGUARD THE RESPONDENT’S PROCEDURAL RIGHTS THROUGHOUT THE PROCEEDING TOWARD ACHIEVING THE LEAST RESTRICTIVE DISPOSITION CONSISTENT WITH THE RESPONDENT’S NEEDS.

2. THE COURT IN ITS DISCRETION MAY APPOINT A GUARDIAN AD LITEM AS PROVIDED IN ARTICLE FOUR OF THIS ACT.

§ 9. Section 1754 of the surrogate’s court procedure act, as amended by chapter 198 of the laws of 2016, is renumbered section 1756 and amended to read as follows:

§ 1754. 1756. Hearing and trial; STANDARD OF APPOINTMENT OF A GUARDIAN; DISPOSITIONAL ALTERNATIVES.

1. Upon a petition for the appointment of a guardian of a person who is intellectually disabled or person who is developmentally disabled FOR A RESPONDENT eighteen years of age or older, the court shall conduct a hearing ON ANY CONTESTED ISSUE OF FACT at which such person shall have the right to jury trial AND THE RIGHT TO PRESENT EVIDENCE AND CONFRONT AND CROSS-EXAMINE WITNESSES. The right to a jury trial shall be deemed waived by failure to make a demand therefor. EXCEPT AS OTHERWISE PRESCRIBED BY LAW, ALLEGATIONS CONTAINED IN A PETITION, UNLESS DENIED BY ANSWER, OBJECTION OR OTHER PROOF, ARE DUE PROOF OF THE FACTS STATED THEREIN.
The court may in its discretion dispense with a hearing for the appointment of a guardian, and may in its discretion appoint a guardian ad litem, or the mental hygiene legal service if such person is a resident of a mental hygiene facility as defined in subdivision (a) of section 47.01 of the mental hygiene law, to recommend whether the appointment of a guardian as proposed in the application is in the best interest of the person who is intellectually disabled or a person who is developmentally disabled, provided however, that such application has been made by: (a) both parents or the survivor; or (b) one parent and the consent of the other parent; or (c) any interested party and the consent of each parent.

2. When it shall appear to the satisfaction of the court that a parent or parents not joining in or consenting to the application have abandoned the person who is intellectually disabled or person who is developmentally disabled or are not otherwise required to receive notice, the court may dispense with such parent's consent in determining the need to conduct a hearing for a person under the age of eighteen. However, if the consent of both parents or the surviving parent is dispensed with by the court, a hearing shall be held on the application.

3. If a hearing is conducted, the person who is intellectually disabled or a person who is developmentally disabled shall be present unless it shall appear to the satisfaction of the court on the certification of the certifying physician that the person who is intellectually disabled or person who is developmentally disabled is medically incapable of being present to the extent that attendance is likely to result in physical harm to such person who is intellectually disabled or person who is developmentally disabled, or under such other circumstances which the court finds would not be in the best interest of the person who is intellectually disabled or person who is developmentally disabled THE RESPONDENT SHALL BE PRESENT AT THE HEARING UNLESS SUCH PRESENCE IS EXCUSED BY THE COURT, TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION THE RECOMMENDATION OF RESPONDENT'S COUNSEL.

4. If either a hearing is dispensed with pursuant to subdivisions one and two of this section or the person who is intellectually disabled or person who is developmentally disabled is not present at the hearing pursuant to subdivision three of this section, the court may appoint a guardian ad litem if no mental hygiene legal service attorney is authorized to act on behalf of the person who is intellectually disabled or person who is developmentally disabled. The guardian ad litem or mental hygiene legal service attorney, if appointed, shall personally interview the person who is intellectually disabled or person who is developmentally disabled and shall submit a written report to the court.

5. THE COURT, UPON THE PLEADINGS, OR AFTER A HEARING ON ANY CONTESTED ISSUES OF FACT, SHALL MAKE FINDINGS REGARDING:

(a) WHETHER THE RESPONDENT HAS A DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITY;

(b) THE EXTENT OF THE FUNCTIONAL LEVEL, THE FUNCTIONAL LIMITATIONS AND THE LEVEL OF THE IMPAIRMENT IN THE RESPONDENT'S INTELLECTUAL FUNCTIONING AND/OR ADAPTIVE BEHAVIORS;

(c) THE RESPONDENT'S LACK OF UNDERSTANDING AND APPRECIATION OF THE NATURE AND CONSEQUENCES OF THEIR FUNCTIONAL LIMITATIONS AND IMPAIRMENT IN INTELLECTUAL FUNCTIONING AND/OR ADAPTIVE BEHAVIORS;

(d) THE SUFFICIENCY AND RELIABILITY OF AVAILABLE RESOURCES AND ALTERNATIVES TO GUARDIANSHIP;
(e) The likelihood that the respondent will suffer harm because of
the respondent’s functional limitations and impairment in
intellectual functioning and/or adaptive behaviors and inability
to adequately understand and appreciate the nature and
consequences of such functional limitations and impairment;

(f) The necessity of the appointment of a guardian to prevent such
harm;

(g) The specific powers of the guardian which constitute the least
restrictive form of intervention consistent with the findings of this
subdivision.

4. (a) If it is determined that the respondent does not have a
developmental disability, the court shall dismiss the petition.

(b) If it is determined that the respondent can provide for personal
needs and/or property management, the court shall dismiss the
petition.

(c) If it is found that the respondent is a person with a
developmental disability and it is determined by clear and
convincing evidence that respondent is likely to suffer harm
because of the respondent’s functional limitations and impairment
in intellectual functioning and/or adaptive behaviors and inability
to adequately understand and appreciate the nature and
consequences of such functional limitations and impairments, even
with the supports they may require, the court without appointing a
guardian, may authorize, direct, or ratify any transaction or series
of transactions necessary to achieve any security, service, or care
arrangement meeting the foreseeable needs of the respondent, or
may authorize, direct, or ratify any contract, trust, or other
transaction relating to the respondent's property and financial
affairs if the court determines that the transaction is necessary as
a means of providing for personal needs and/or property
management for the respondent. Before approving a protective
arrangement or other transaction under this subdivision, the
court shall consider the interests of dependents and creditors of
the respondent, and in view of the respondent’s functional level,
whether the respondent needs the continuing protection of a
guardian. The court may appoint a special guardian to assist in the
accomplishment of any protective arrangement or other
transaction authorized under this subdivision. The special guardian
shall have the authority conferred by the order of appointment,
shall report to the court on all matters done pursuant to the
ORDER OF APPOINTMENT, AND SHALL SERVE UNTIL DISCHARGED BY ORDER OF THE COURT.

(d) IF IT IS FOUND THAT RESPONDENT IS A PERSON WITH A DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITY AND IT IS DETERMINED BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT THE RESPONDENT IS LIKELY TO SUFFER HARM BECAUSE THEY ARE UNABLE TO PROVIDE FOR SOME BUT NOT ALL OF THEIR PERSONAL NEEDS AND/OR PROPERTY MANAGEMENT AND CANNOT ADEQUATELY UNDERSTAND AND APPRECIATE THE NATURE AND CONSEQUENCES OF SUCH INABILITY, EVEN WITH THE SUPPORTS THEY MAY REQUIRE, THE COURT SHALL APPOINT A LIMITED GUARDIAN WITH AUTHORITY TAILORED TO ACT ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT WITH RESPECT TO SPECIFIC FUNCTIONAL LIMITATIONS OF THE RESPONDENT, SHALL ESTABLISH THE DURATION OF THE GUARDIANSHIP, AND SHALL DISPOSE OF ANY REMAINING ISSUES IN THE PROCEEDING.

(e) IF IT IS FOUND THAT THE RESPONDENT IS A PERSON WITH A DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITY AND IT IS DETERMINED BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT THE RESPONDENT IS LIKELY TO SUFFER HARM BECAUSE THEY ARE TOTALLY UNABLE TO PROVIDE FOR THEIR PERSONAL NEEDS AND/OR PROPERTY MANAGEMENT AND CANNOT ADEQUATELY UNDERSTAND AND APPRECIATE THE NATURE AND CONSEQUENCES OF SUCH INABILITY, EVEN WITH THE SUPPORTS THEY MAY REQUIRE, THE COURT SHALL APPOINT A PLENARY GUARDIAN OF THE PERSON OR OF THE ESTATE OR BOTH FOR THE RESPONDENT, SHALL ESTABLISH THE DURATION OF THE GUARDIANSHIP, AND SHALL DISPOSE OF ANY REMAINING ISSUES IN THE PROCEEDING.

(f) THE ORDER APPOINTING A GUARDIAN SHALL PROVIDE THAT THE MENTAL HYGIENE LEGAL SERVICE IN THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT WHERE THE RESPONDENT RESIDES, AND ALL PERSONS IDENTIFIED IN THE ORDER SHALL BE ENTITLED TO NOTICE OF ALL FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.

§ 10. Section 1755 of the surrogate's court procedure act, as amended by chapter 198 of the laws of 2016, is renumbered section 1757 and amended to read as follows:

§ 1755-1757. REMOVAL, DISCHARGE OR Modification order.

(a) Any person who is intellectually disabled or person who is developmentally disabled, eighteen years of age or older WITH A DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITY FOR WHOM A GUARDIAN HAS BEEN APPOINTED BY THIS COURT, or any person on behalf of any person who is intellectually disabled or person who is developmentally disabled WITH A DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITY for whom a guardian has been appointed BY THIS COURT, may apply to the court having jurisdiction over the guardianship ORDER requesting REMOVAL OR DISCHARGE OF THE GUARDIAN OR modification of THE GUARDIANSHIP ORDER such order in order to protect the person who is intellectually disabled's, or person who is developmentally disabled's financial situation and/or his or her
personal interests. A REQUEST FOR REMOVAL, DISCHARGE OR MODIFICATION
UNDER THIS SECTION, IF MADE BY THE INDIVIDUAL FOR WHOM A GUARDIAN
HAS BEEN APPOINTED, MAY BE COMMUNICATED TO THE COURT BY ANY
MEANS, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, ORAL COMMUNICATION OR LETTER.
(b) The court may, upon receipt of any such request, REMOVE OR DISCHARGE
THE GUARDIAN, OR modify the guardianship order, appoint MENTAL HYGIENE LEGAL
SERVICE AS COUNSEL FOR THE PERSON WITH A DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITY
UNLESS IT APPEARS TO THE COURT THAT THE PERSON WITH A
DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITY HAS RETAINED COUNSEL, AND IF THE REQUEST
HAS BEEN MADE BY MEANS OTHER THAN A MOTION, REQUIRE COUNSEL TO
PREPARE A WRITTEN MOTION FOR REMOVAL, DISCHARGE OR MODIFICATION TO
BE SUBMITTED TO THE COURT. A guardian ad litem. The court shall modify the
guardianship order if in its judgment the interests of the guardian are adverse to those of the
person who is intellectually disabled or person who is developmentally disabled or if the interests
of justice will be best served including, but not limited to, facts showing the necessity for
protecting the personal and/or financial interests of the person who is intellectually disabled or
person who is developmentally disabled
(c) THE COURT WHICH APPOINTED THE GUARDIAN SHALL REMOVE THE
GUARDIAN WHEN THE GUARDIAN FAILS TO COMPLY WITH AN ORDER, IS GUILTY
OF MISCONDUCT, OR FOR ANY OTHER CAUSE WHICH TO THE COURT SHALL
APPEAR JUST.
(d) THE COURT WHICH APPOINTED THE GUARDIAN SHALL DISCHARGE THE
GUARDIAN OR MODIFY THE POWERS OF THE GUARDIAN WHERE APPROPRIATE,
IF IT APPEARS TO THE SATISFACTION OF THE COURT THAT:
(1) PERSON HAS BECOME ABLE TO EXERCISE SOME OR ALL OF THE POWERS
NECESSARY TO PROVIDE FOR PERSONAL NEEDS OR PROPERTY MANAGEMENT
WHICH THE GUARDIAN IS AUTHORIZED TO EXERCISE;
(2) THE PERSON HAS BECOME UNABLE TO EXERCISE POWERS NECESSARY TO
PROVIDE FOR PERSONAL NEEDS OR PROPERTY MANAGEMENT WHICH THE
GUARDIAN IS NOT AUTHORIZED TO EXERCISE;
(3) THE PERSON HAS DIED; OR
(4) FOR SOME OTHER REASON, THE APPOINTMENT OF THE GUARDIAN IS NO
LONGER NECESSARY FOR THE PERSON WITH A DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITY,
OR THE POWERS OF THE GUARDIAN SHOULD BE MODIFIED BASED UPON
CHANGES IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE PERSON.
(e) THE COURT SHALL CONDUCT A HEARING ON THE APPLICATION UPON NOTICE
TO THE PERSONS ENTITLED TO NOTICE UNDER SUBDIVISION (f) OF SECTION 1756.
THE COURT MAY FOR GOOD CAUSE SHOWN DISPENSE WITH THE HEARING
PROVIDED THAT AN ORDER OF MODIFICATION INCREASING THE POWERS OF THE
GUARDIAN SHALL SET FORTH THE FACTUAL BASIS FOR DISPENSING WITH THE
HEARING. IF THE PERSON OR THEIR COUNSEL RAISES AN ISSUE OF FACT AS TO
THE ABILITY OF THE PERSON TO PROVIDE FOR THEIR PERSONAL NEEDS OR
PROPERTY MANAGEMENT AND DEMANDS A JURY TRIAL OF SUCH ISSUE, THE
COURT SHALL ORDER A TRIAL BY JURY THEREOF.
(f) TO THE EXTENT THAT RELIEF SOUGHT UNDER THIS SECTION WOULD
TERMINATE THE GUARDIANSHIP OR RESTORE CERTAIN POWERS TO THE PERSON
WITH A DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITY THE BURDEN OF PROOF SHALL BE ON THE
PERSON OBJECTING TO SUCH RELIEF. TO THE EXTENT THAT RELIEF SOUGHT
UNDER THIS SECTION WOULD FURTHER LIMIT THE POWERS OF THE PERSON
WITH A DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITY, THE BURDEN OF PROOF SHALL BE ON
THE PERSON SEEKING SUCH RELIEF.

(g). IF THE GUARDIAN IS DISCHARGED BECAUSE THE PERSON WITH A
DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITY BECOMES FULLY ABLE TO CARE FOR THEIR
PROPERTY, THE COURT SHALL ORDER THAT THE PROPERTY REMAINING IN THE
HANDS OF THE GUARDIAN BE RESTORED TO SUCH PERSON. IF THE PERSON WITH
A DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITY HAS DIED, THE GUARDIAN SHALL PROVIDE FOR
SUCH PERSON'S BURIAL OR OTHER DISPOSITION THE COST OF WHICH SHALL BE
BORNE BY THE ESTATE OF THE PERSON WITH A DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITY.

§ 11. Section 1756 of the surrogate's court procedure act, as amended by chapter 198 of the laws
of 2016, is REPEALED.

§12. Section 1757 of the surrogate's court procedure act, as amended by chapter 198 of the laws
of 2016, is renumbered section 1758 and amended to read as follows:

§ 1757. Standby guardian of a mentally retarded or developmentally disabled person WITH
A DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITY

1. Upon application, a standby guardian of the person or property or both MAY BE
APPOINTED BY THE COURT FOR a mentally retarded or developmentally disabled person
WITH A DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITY FOR WHOM A GUARDIAN HAS BEEN
APPOINTED may be appointed by the court. The court may also, upon application, appoint an
alternate and/or successive alternates to such standby guardian, to act if such standby guardian
shall die, or become incapacitated, or shall renounce. Such appointments by the court shall be
made in accordance with the provisions of this article.

2. Such standby guardian, or alternate in the event of such standby guardian's death, incapacity
or renunciation, shall without further proceedings be empowered to assume the duties of his or
her office immediately upon death, renunciation or adjudication of incompetence or incapacity
of the guardian or standby guardian appointed pursuant to this article, subject only to
confirmation of his or her appointment by the court within one hundred eighty days following
assumption of his or her duties of such office. Before confirming the appointment of the standby
guardian or alternate guardian, the court may conduct a hearing pursuant to section seventeen
hundred fifty-four of this article upon petition by anyone on behalf of the mentally retarded
or developmentally disabled person WITH A DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITY or the
mentally retarded or developmentally disabled person WITH A DEVELOPMENTAL
DISABILITY if such person is eighteen years of age or older, or upon its discretion.

§ 13. Section 1758 of the surrogate's court procedure act, as amended by chapter 198 of the laws
of 2016, is renumbered section 1759 and amended to read as follows:

§ 1759. Court jurisdiction, VENUE, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW OF GUARDIANSHIP
APPOINTMENTS
1. A PROCEEDING UNDER THIS ARTICLE SHALL BE BROUGHT IN THE SURROGATE'S COURT IN THE COUNTY IN WHICH THE RESPONDENT RESIDES, OR IS PHYSICALLY PRESENT AT THE TIME THE PROCEEDING IS COMMENCED, SUBJECT TO AN APPLICATION TO CHANGE VENUE PURSUANT TO THIS SUBDIVISION.

2. After the appointment of a guardian, standby guardian or alternate guardians, the court shall have and retain general jurisdiction over the GUARDIAN AND THE mentally retarded or developmentally disabled person WITH A DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITY for whom such guardian shall have been appointed, to take of its own motion or to entertain and adjudicate such steps and proceedings relating to such guardian, standby, or alternate guardianship as may be deemed necessary or proper for the welfare of such mentally retarded or developmentally disabled person. ANY PROCEEDING TO REMOVE OR DISCHARGE A GUARDIAN, OR TO MODIFY A PRIOR ORDER SHALL BE BROUGHT IN THE SURROGATE'S COURT WHICH APPOINTED THE GUARDIAN OR GRANTED THE PRIOR ORDER, UNLESS AT THE TIME OF THE APPLICATION, THE RESPONDENT RESIDES ELSEWHERE IN WHICH CASE THE PROCEEDING SHALL BE BROUGHT IN THE COUNTY WHERE THE RESPONDENT IS LOCATED, SUBJECT TO AN APPLICATION BY AN INTERESTED PARTY FOR A CHANGE IN VENUE TO THE COURT WHICH APPOINTED THE GUARDIAN OR GRANTED THE PRIOR ORDER BECAUSE OF THE INCONVENIENCE OF THE PARTIES OR WITNESSES OR THE CONDITION OF THE PERSON.

3. THE GUARDIANSHIP SHALL BE SUBJECT OF REVIEW BY MENTAL HYGIENE LEGAL SERVICE EVERY THREE YEARS AFTER THE APPOINTMENT OF THE GUARDIAN. THE COURT MAY, AT ANY TIME, ON ITS OWN MOTION OR UPON REQUEST BY MENTAL HYGIENE LEGAL SERVICE, OR ANY INTERESTED PERSON, TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTION REGARDING THE GUARDIANSHIP, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, ORDERING A REVIEW OF THE GUARDIANSHIP.

§ 14. Article 17A of the surrogate's court procedure act is amended by adding a new section 1760 to read as follows:

§ 1760. DECISION MAKING STANDARD

DECISIONS MADE BY A GUARDIAN APPOINTED PURSUANT TO THIS ARTICLE SHALL BE MADE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FOLLOWING STANDARDS:

1. A GUARDIAN SHALL EXERCISE AUTHORITY ONLY AS NEEDED BECAUSE OF THE LIMITATIONS OF THE PERSON WITH A DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITY, AND, TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE, SHALL ENCOURAGE THE PERSON WITH A DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITY TO PARTICIPATE IN DECISIONS AND TO ACT ON HIS OR HER OWN BEHALF.

2. A GUARDIAN SHALL ENCOURAGE THE PERSON WITH A DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITY TO DEVELOP OR REGAIN TO THE MAXIMUM EXTENT POSSIBLE THE CAPACITY TO MEET HIS OR HER NEEDS.

3. A GUARDIAN SHALL CONSIDER THE EXPRESSED DESIRES AND PERSONAL VALUES OF THE PERSON WITH A DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITY TO THE EXTENT KNOWN WHEN MAKING DECISIONS AND SHALL CONSULT WITH THE PERSON WITH A DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITY WHenever MEANINGFUL COMMUNICATION IS POSSIBLE.

§ 15. Section 1759 of the surrogate's court procedure act is REPEALED.

§ 16. Section 1760 of the surrogate's court procedure act, as amended by chapter 198 of the laws of 2016, is renumbered section 1761 and amended to read as follows:

§ 1761. Corporate guardianship
No corporation may be appointed guardian of the person under the provisions of this article, except that a non-profit corporation organized and existing under the laws of the state of New York and having the corporate power to act as guardian of THE PERSON OF A PERSON WITH A DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITY, GUARDIAN OF THE PROPERTY OF mentally retarded or developmentally disabled persons WITH A DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITY, OR BOTH, may be appointed as the guardian of the person OR THE PROPERTY OR BOTH only of such mentally retarded or developmentally disabled person.

§ 17. Section 1761 of the surrogate's court procedure act, as amended by chapter 198 of the laws of 2016, is renumbered section 1764 and amended to read as follows:

§ 1764. Application of other provisions.
To the extent that the context thereof shall admit, the provisions of article seventeen of this act shall apply to all proceedings under this article with the same force and affect as if an "infant", as therein referred to, were a "mentally retarded" or "developmentally disabled person" as herein defined, and a "guardian" as therein referred to were a "guardian of the mentally retarded person" or a "guardian of a developmentally disabled person" as herein provided for.

§ 18. THE MENTAL HYGIENE LEGAL SERVICE SHALL MAKE A REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE AND THE GOVERNOR OF ITS FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND ANY RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS LEGISLATION NOT LATER THAN DECEMBER THIRTY-FIRST, TWO THOUSAND TWENTY-FOUR.
§ 19. (a) CONTINUATION OF GUARDIANS APPOINTED PRIOR TO THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THIS ACT. ANY ORDERS, DETERMINATIONS OR DECISIONS OF THE APPOINTING OR SUBSEQUENT COURT SHALL CONTINUE IN FORCE AND EFFECT UNTIL DULY MODIFIED OR ABROGATED BY A JUDGE PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 17A AS AMENDED BY THIS ACT. ANY GUARDIAN APPOINTED PRIOR TO THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THIS ACT SHALL BE GOVERNED BY THE REPORTING REQUIREMENTS OF SECTION 1762, AS OF APRIL 1, 2020.

(b) PRIOR PROCEEDINGS. IN ALL PROCEEDINGS COMMENCED UNDER ARTICLE 17A PRIOR TO APRIL 1, 2020 BUT UNDER WHICH NO DETERMINATION FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF A GUARDIAN HAS BEEN MADE, THE COURT SHALL MAKE THE FINDINGS REQUIRED BY SECTION 1756 OF THE SURROGATE’S COURT PROCEDURE ACT 17A AS AMENDED BY THIS ACT. UNLESS THE COURT DEEMS IT IMPRACTICABLE, SUCH PROCEEDINGS SHALL OTHERWISE BE GOVERNED BY ALL OTHER PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 17A AS AMENDED BY THIS ACT.

§ 10. THIS ACT SHALL TAKE EFFECT ON THE FIRST OF APRIL NEXT SUCCEEDING THE DATE ON WHICH IT SHALL HAVE BECOME A LAW.
Introduced by Sen. MANNION -- (at request of the Office for People with Developmental Disabilities) -- read twice and ordered printed, and when printed to be committed to the Committee on Disabilities

AN ACT to amend the mental hygiene law, in relation to supported decision-making by people with intellectual, developmental, cognitive and psychosocial disabilities

The People of the State of New York, represented in Senate and Assembly, do enact as follows:

1 Section 1. The mental hygiene law is amended by adding a new article 82 to read as follows:

ARTICLE 82
SUPPORTED DECISION-MAKING

Section 82.01 Legislative findings and purpose.

82.02 Definitions.

82.03 Presumption of capacity.

82.04 Scope.

82.05 Duties, responsibilities, and authority of supporters.

82.06 Formation and term of agreement.

82.07 Revocation and amendment of agreement.

82.08 Eligibility and resignation of supporters.

82.09 Facilitation of agreement.

82.10 Form of agreement.

82.11 Legal effect of decisions made with support and third-party obligations.

82.12 Limitations on liability.

82.13 Supporter notice.

82.14 Reporting abuse, coercion, undue influence, or financial exploitation.

82.15 Rules and regulations.

§ 82.01 Legislative findings and purpose.

EXPLANATION--Matter in italics (underscored) is new; matter in brackets [ ] is old law to be omitted.
(a) The legislature finds that a person's right to make their own
decisions is critical to their autonomy and self-determination. People
with intellectual, developmental, cognitive and psychosocial disabili-
ties are often denied that right because of stigma and outdated beliefs
about their capability. This right is denied, despite the reality that
very few people make decisions entirely on their own. Everyone uses
supports, as do people with disabilities; who may just need more or
different kinds of supports.

(b) The legislature further finds that the, now well recognized, prac-
tice of supported decision-making is a way in which people with disabil-
ities can make their own decisions with the support they need from
trusted persons in their lives, and that supported decision-making can
be a less restrictive alternative to guardianship. Recognizing that
supported decision-making can take a variety of forms, the legislature
finds that a more formal process, resulting in a supported decision-mak-
ing agreement between the person with a disability (the decision-maker)
and their supporter or supporters, can provide the basis for requiring
third parties, who might otherwise question a person's legal capacity
because of their disability, to recognize their decisions on the same
basis as others, and to grant corresponding immunity to such parties
when they do so in good faith. When this more formal process is
followed, people with disabilities can make choices confident that they
will be respected by others and knowing they will be solely responsible
for their own decisions.

(c) The legislature further finds that supported decision-making and
supported decision-making agreements should be encouraged for most
persons with disabilities, and that the execution of a supported deci-
sion-making agreement should not detrimentally impact the eligibility of
a person for other services, including adult protective services. At
present, the legislature finds there is sufficient evidence of the means
of providing support to persons with intellectual and developmental
disabilities, as demonstrated, for example, through the recently
completed five-year pilot project funded by the New York State Develop-
mental Disability Planning Council, to require third-party recognition
of decisions made pursuant to supported decision-making agreements made
through a process of facilitation for the decision-maker and their
supporters. Where persons with intellectual or developmental disabili-
ties and their supporters receive facilitation and/or education, in
accordance with regulations to be drafted by the office for people with
developmental disabilities, the legislature will deem them to have legal
capacity on a basis equal with all others.

(d) The legislature also strongly urges relevant state agencies and
civil society to research and develop appropriate and effective means of
support for older persons with cognitive decline, persons with traumatic
brain injuries, and persons with psychosocial disabilities, so that full
legislative recognition can also be accorded to the decisions made with
supported decision-making agreements by persons with such conditions,
based on a consensus about what kinds of support are most effective and
how they can best be delivered.

§ 82.02 Definitions.

When used in this article, the following terms shall have the follow-
ing meaning, unless the context or subject matter requires a different
interpretation:

(a) "abuse" encompasses physical abuse, sexual abuse, and emotional
abuse, as defined in section four hundred seventy-three of the social
services law.
(b) "adult" means an individual eighteen years of age or older.
(c) "advance directive" means a legally recognized written or oral instruction by an adult relating to the provision of health care to the adult if and when they become incapacitated, including but not limited to a health care proxy, a consent to the issuance of an order not to resuscitate or other orders for life-sustaining treatment recorded in a patient's medical record, or other legally-recognized statements of wishes or beliefs.
(d) "decision-maker" means an adult who has executed, or seeks to execute, a supported decision-making agreement.
(e) "financial exploitation" has the meaning given in section four hundred seventy-three of the social services law.
(f) "good faith" means honest in fact and in the observance of reasonable standards of fair dealing.
(g) "neglect" has the meaning defined in paragraph (d) of subdivision one of section four hundred seventy-three of the social services law.
(h) "physical coercion" means to place under duress, menace, or threaten physical violence or imprisonment.
(i) "supported decision-making" means a way by which a decision-maker utilizes support from trusted persons in their life, in order to make their own decisions about their life, including, but not limited to, decisions related to where and with whom the decision-maker wants to live; decisions about finances; the services, supports, and health care the decision-maker wants to receive; and where the decision-maker wants to work.
(j) "supported decision-making agreement" is an agreement a decision-maker enters into with one or more supporters under this section that describes how the decision-maker uses supported decision-making to make their own decisions.
(k) "supporter" means an adult who has voluntarily entered into a supported decision-making agreement with a decision-maker, agreeing to assist the decision-maker in making their own decisions as prescribed by the supported decision-making agreement, and who is not ineligible under section 82.08 of this article.
(l) "undue influence" means moral or mental coercion that leads someone to carry out the wishes of another instead of their own because they are unable to refuse or resist.
§ 82.03 Presumption of capacity.
(a) For the purposes of this article, every adult shall be presumed to have the capacity to enter into a supported decision-making agreement, unless that adult has a legal guardian, appointed by a court of competent jurisdiction, whose granted authority is in conflict with the proposed supported decision-making agreement. This presumption may be rebutted only by clear and convincing evidence.
(b) Capacity shall include capacity with decision-making support and/or accommodations.
(c) A diagnosis of intellectual, developmental, or other disability or condition shall not constitute evidence of incapacity.
(d) The manner in which an adult communicates with others shall not constitute evidence of incapacity.
(e) No person or court may use or consider a decision-maker's execution of, or wish to execute, a supported decision-making agreement as evidence that the decision-maker lacks capacity, or to deny the decision-maker benefits to which they are otherwise entitled.
(f) A decision-maker may make, change, or revoke a supported decision-making agreement, if the decision-maker understands that they are
making, changing, or revoking an agreement with their chosen supporters and that they are doing so voluntarily.

§ 82.04 Scope.

(a) If a decision-maker voluntarily enters into a supported decision-making agreement with one or more supporters, the decision-maker may, in the agreement, authorize the supporter to provide support to them in making their own decisions in areas they choose, including, but not limited to: gathering information, understanding and interpreting information, weighing options and alternatives to a decision, considering the consequences of making a decision or not making it, participating in conversations with third parties if the decision-maker is present and requests their participation, communicating the decision-maker’s decision to third parties, and providing the decision-maker support in implementing the decision-maker’s decision.

(b) Nothing in this article, nor the existence of an executed supported decision-making agreement, shall preclude the decision-maker from acting independently of the supported decision-making agreement or executing, with or without the assistance of supporters under a supported decision-making agreement, a power of attorney under title fifteen of article five of the general obligations law, health care proxy under article twenty-nine-c of the public health law, or other advance directive.

(c) Notwithstanding the existence of a supported decision-making agreement, a decision-maker shall continue to have unrestricted access to their personal information without the assistance of a supporter.

(d) Notwithstanding the existence of a supported decision-making agreement, a decision-maker may request and receive assistance in making any decision that is not covered under the supported decision-making agreement at any time and from any person, regardless of whether that person is designated as a supporter in the supported decision-making agreement.

(e) A supported decision-making agreement made pursuant to this article may be evidence that the decision-maker has a less restrictive alternative to guardianship in place.

(f) The availability of supported decision-making agreements is, in no way, intended to limit the informal use of supported decision-making, or to preclude judicial consideration of such informal arrangements as less restrictive alternatives to guardianship.

(g) Execution of a supported decision-making agreement may not be a condition of participation in any activity, service, or program.

(h) If a decision-maker seeks from any person professional advice that would be otherwise covered by evidentiary privilege in accordance with sections forty-five hundred three, forty-five hundred four, forty-five hundred seven, forty-five hundred eight and forty-five hundred ten of the civil practice law and rules, the inclusion in the conversation of a supporter authorized by the supported decision-making agreement to provide support in the area in which the decision-maker seeks the professional advice shall not constitute a waiver of that privilege.

(i) Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, nothing within this article shall be construed to prohibit eligibility of a decision-maker for receipt of services or supports that they would have otherwise been entitled absent entering into a supported decision-making agreement under the provisions of this article.

§ 82.05 Duties, responsibilities, and authority of supporters.

(a) A supporter must:
1. respect the decision-maker's right to make a decision, even when
the supporter disagrees with the decision or believes it is not in the
decision-maker's best interests;
2. act honestly, diligently, and in good faith;
3. act within the scope set forth in the executed supported decision-
making agreement;
4. avoid conflicts of interest; and
5. notify the decision-maker in writing, and in a manner the deci-
sion-maker can understand, of the supporter's intent to resign as a
supporter.

(b) A supporter is prohibited from:
1. making decisions for the decision-maker, except to the extent
otherwise granted in an advance directive;
2. exerting undue influence upon the decision-maker;
3. physically coercing the decision-maker;
4. obtaining, without the consent of the decision-maker, information
acquired for a purpose other than assisting the decision-maker in making
a decision authorized by the supported decision-making agreement; and
5. obtaining, without the consent of the decision-maker, or as
expressly granted by the supported decision-making agreement, and accom-
panied by an appropriate release, nonpublic personal information as
defined in 15 U.S.C. § 6809(4)(A), or clinical records or information
under subdivision (c) of section 33.13 of this chapter.

(c) The relationship between a decision-maker and a supporter is one
of trust and confidence and serves to preserve the decision-making
authority of the decision-maker.

(d) A supporter shall not be considered a surrogate or substitute
decision maker for the decision-maker and shall not have the authority
to sign legal documents on behalf of the decision-maker or bind the
decision-maker to a legal agreement, but may, if such authority is
expressly granted in the supported decision-making agreement, provide
co-signature together with the decision-maker acknowledging the receipt
of statements of rights and responsibilities in order to permit partic-
ipation in such programs or activities that the decision-maker has
communicated a choice to participate in.

(e) If expressly granted by the supported decision-making agreement,
and the decision-maker has signed an appropriate release, the supporter
may assist the decision-maker in obtaining educational records under the
protected health information under the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act of 1996 (45 CFR §§ 164.502, 164.508), or clinical
records and information under subdivision (c) of section 33.13 of this
chapter.

(f) A supporter shall ensure the information under this section is
kept privileged and confidential, as applicable, and is not subject to
unauthorized access, use, or disclosure.

§ 82.06 Formation and term of agreement.

(a) An adult may enter into a supported decision-making agreement at
any time if the adult enters into the agreement voluntarily.

(b) A decision-maker may sign a supported decision-making agreement in
any manner, including electronic signatures permitted under article
three of the state technology law.

(c) A supported decision-making agreement formed under the provisions
of this article shall remain in effect unless and until revoked by the
decision-maker.

§ 82.07 Revocation and amendment of agreement.
(a) The decision-maker may revoke all or part of a supported decision-making agreement by notifying the supporters orally or in writing, or by any other act evincing a specific intent to revoke the agreement. The failure of the decision-maker to notify supporters shall not invalidate the revocation of all or part of the supported decision-making agreement.

(b) A decision-maker may amend a supported decision-making agreement at any time for any reason, subject to the requirements of this section. The decision-maker shall notify all supporters of any amendment made to the supported decision-making agreement, but the failure to do so shall not invalidate the amendment.

§ 82.08 Eligibility and resignation of supporters.

(a) A supporter shall be any adult chosen by the decision-maker.

(b) An individual who has been chosen by the decision-maker to be a supporter, or who has entered into a supported decision-making agreement as a supporter shall be deemed ineligible to act, continue to serve as supporter upon the occurrence of any of the following:
1. a court authorizes a protective order or restraining order against the supporter on request of or on behalf of the decision-maker; or
2. the local department of social services has found that the supporter has committed abuse, neglect, financial exploitation, or physical coercion against the decision-maker as such terms are defined in section 82.02 of this article.

(c) A supporter may resign as supporter by written or oral notice to the decision-maker and the remaining supporters. If the supported decision-making agreement includes more than one supporter or is amended to replace the supporter who has resigned, the supported decision-making agreement shall survive for supporters who have not resigned as supporters, unless it is otherwise revoked under this section.

(d) If a supporter with whom a decision-maker entered into a supported decision-making agreement becomes ineligible to serve as supporter under subdivision (b) of this section, or resigns as supporter under subdivision (c) of this section, and the decision-maker does not amend the supported decision-making agreement to designate a replacement, the supported decision-making agreement shall be considered terminated as to the role of the ineligible or resigned supporter, but shall continue to have effect as to any other designated supporters.

§ 82.09 Facilitation of agreement.

The provisions of section 82.11 and subdivisions (b) through (d) of section 82.12 of this article shall only apply in circumstances where a decision is made by a decision-maker who receives or is eligible to receive services that are operated, certified, funded or approved by the office for people with developmental disabilities, pursuant to a supported decision-making agreement made in accordance with this article and following a recognized supported decision-making facilitation or education process as defined and prescribed by regulations promulgated by the office for people with developmental disabilities.

§ 82.10 Form of agreement.

(a) A supported decision-making agreement may be in any form consistent with the requirements set forth in this article.

(b) A supported decision-making agreement must:
1. be in writing;
2. be dated;
3. designate the decision-maker, and at least one supporter;
4. list the categories of decisions with which a supporter is authorized to assist the decision-maker.
5. list the kinds of support that each supporter may give for each area in which they are designated as a supporter;
6. contain an attestation that the supporters agree to honor the right of the decision-maker to make their own decisions in the ways and areas specified in the agreement, respect the decision-maker's decisions, and, further, that they will not make decisions for the decision-maker;
7. state that the decision-maker may change, amend, or revoke the supported decision-making agreement at any time for any reason, subject to the requirements of section 82.06 of this article;
8. be signed by all designated supporters; and
9. be executed or endorsed by the decision-maker in the presence of at least two adult witnesses who are not also designated as supporters, or with the attestation of a notary public.

(c) A supported decision-making agreement may:
1. appoint more than one supporter;
2. authorize a supporter to obtain personal information as described in subdivision (e) of section 82.05 of this article;
3. authorize a supporter to share information with any other supporter or others named in the agreement; or
4. detail any other limitations on the scope of a supporter's role that the decision-maker deems important.

(d) In order to be subject to the provisions of section 82.11 and subdivisions (b) through (d) of section 82.12 of this article, a supported decision-making agreement must also:
1. be signed by a facilitator or educator;
2. include a statement that the supported decision-making agreement was made in accordance with a recognized facilitation and/or education process; and
3. include an attached attestation by the decision-maker that a particular decision has been made in accordance with the support described in the supported decision-making agreement.

§ 82.11 Legal effect of decisions made with support and third-party obligations.

(a) This section shall apply only to decisions made by adults who receive or are eligible to receive services that are operated, certified, funded or approved by the office for people with developmental disabilities, and pursuant to supported decision-making agreements made in accordance with this article and following a recognized supported decision-making facilitation or education process, as prescribed by regulations governing the facilitation and education processes promulgated by the office for people with developmental disabilities.

(b) A decision or request made or communicated by a decision-maker with the assistance of a supporter in accordance with the provisions of a supported decision-making agreement must, notwithstanding any other provision of law, be recognized as the decision or request of the decision-maker and may be enforced by the decision-maker in law or equity on the same basis as all others.

(c) A person, entity, or agency required to recognize and honor a decision made pursuant to a supported decision-making agreement authorized by this section may require the decision-maker to execute or endorse an attestation, as provided in paragraph three of subdivision (d) of section 82.10 of this article, as a condition of recognizing and honoring the decision.

(d) A person, entity, or agency that receives a supported decision-making agreement must honor a decision made in accordance with the agreement, unless the person, entity, or agency has substantial cause to
believe the supported decision-making agreement has been revoked, or the
decision-maker is being abused, coerced, unduly influenced, or finan-
cially exploited by the supporter, or that the decision will cause the
decision-maker substantial and imminent physical or financial harm.
§ 82.12 Limitations on liability.
(a) Subdivisions (b), (c) and (d) of this section shall apply only to
decisions made by adults who receive or are eligible to receive services
that are operated, certified, funded or approved by the office for
people with developmental disabilities, and pursuant to supported deci-
sion-making agreements made in accordance with this article and follow-
ingen a recognized supported decision-making facilitation or education
process, as prescribed by regulations governing the facilitation and
education processes promulgated by the office for people with develop-
mental disabilities.
(b) A person shall not be subject to criminal or civil liability and
shall not be determined to have engaged in professional misconduct for
an act or omission if the act or omission is done in good faith and in
reliance on a decision made by an decision-maker pursuant to a duly
executed supported decision-making agreement made in accordance with
this article.
(c) Any health care provider that provides health care based on the
consent of a decision-maker, given with support or assistance provided
through a duly executed supported decision-making agreement, made in
accordance with this article, shall be immune from any action alleging
that the decision-maker lacked capacity to provide informed consent
unless the entity, custodian, or organization had actual knowledge or
notice that the decision-maker had revoked the supported decision-making
agreement, or that the supporter had committed abuse, physical coercion,
undue influence, or financial exploitation with respect to the decision
to grant consent.
(d) Any public or private entity, custodian, or organization that
discloses personal information about a decision-maker in reliance on the
terms of a duly executed supported decision-making agreement made in
accordance with this article, to a supporter authorized by the terms of
the supported decision-making agreement to assist the decision-maker in
accessing, collecting, or obtaining that information under subdivision
(e) of section 82.05 of this article shall be immune from any action
alleging that it improperly or unlawfully disclosed such information to
the supporter unless the entity, custodian, or organization had actual
knowledge that decision-maker had revoked such authorization.
(e) This section may not be construed to provide immunity from actions
alleging that a health care provider has done any of the following:
1. caused personal injury as a result of a negligent, reckless, or
intentional act;
2. acted inconsistently with the expressed wishes of a decision-maker;
3. failed to provide information to either decision-maker or their
supporter that would be necessary for informed consent; or
4. otherwise acted inconsistently with applicable law.
(f) The existence or availability of a supported decision-making
agreement does not relieve a health care provider of any legal obli-
gation to provide services to individuals with disabilities, including
the obligation to provide reasonable accommodations or auxiliary aids
and services, including, but not limited to, interpretation services and
communication supports to individuals with disabilities under the feder-
§ 82.13 Supporter notice.
(a) If any state or municipal law requires that an agency, entity, or person provide a prescribed notice to a decision-maker, and the agency, entity, or person required to provide such notice has received a supported decision-making agreement from a decision-maker that specifies that a supporter is also to receive a copy of any such notice, then the agency, entity, or person in possession of the supported decision-making agreement shall also provide the specified supporter with a copy of such notice.

(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of this subsection, if any state or municipal law requires that an agency, entity, or person provide a prescribed notice to a decision-maker and such notice includes protected information, including private health information or educational records protected by state or federal law, such notice shall not be provided to the specified supporter unless the supported decision-making agreement is accompanied by a release authorizing the specified supporter to obtain the protected information.

§ 82.14 Reporting abuse, coercion, undue influence, or financial exploitation.

(a) Any person who receives a copy of or an original supported decision-making agreement and has cause to believe the decision-maker is being abused, physically coerced, or financially exploited by a supporter, may report the alleged abuse, physical coercion, or financial exploitation to adult protective services pursuant to section four hundred seventy-three of the social services law.

(b) Nothing in this section may be construed as eliminating or limiting a person's duty or requirement to report under any other statute or regulation.

§ 82.15 Rules and regulations.

(a) The commissioner of the office for people with developmental disabilities shall promulgate within one year of the passage of this act the rules and regulations necessary to implement this article for adults who receive or are eligible to receive services that are operated, certified, funded or approved by the office for people with developmental disabilities.

(b) Further regulations related to this article may be promulgated by state agencies whose service populations may benefit from the implementation of supported decision-making.

§ 2. This act shall take effect ninety days from the date that the regulations issued in accordance with section one of this act appear in the New York State Register, or the date such regulations are adopted, whichever is later; and provided that the commissioner of mental hygiene shall notify the legislative bill drafting commission upon the occurrence of the appearance of the regulations in the New York State Register or the date such regulations are adopted, whichever is later, in order that the commission may maintain an accurate and timely effective data base of the official text of laws of the state of New York in furtherance of effecting the provisions of section 44 of the legislative law and section 70-b of the public officers law.
REPORT ON LEGISLATION BY THE
MENTAL HEALTH LAW COMMITTEE

A.XXXX-X

An act to amend the mental hygiene law, in relation to supported decision-making by people with intellectual, developmental, cognitive and psycho-social disabilities.

THIS BILL IS APPROVED WITH MODIFICATION

Supported decision-making (SDM) is an emerging practice by which persons with intellectual, developmental, cognitive and psychosocial disabilities can make their own decisions with the support of trusted persons in their lives. SDM can take many forms, from entirely informal to a more formal process resulting in a signed supported decision-making agreement (SDMA) between the person with a disability, often referred to as the “Decision-Maker” and their supporters. SDM is now widely recognized as a constitutionally required “less restrictive alternative to guardianship;” the Uniform Law Commission has explicitly included SDM as such in its recently revised Uniform Guardianship, Conservatorship and Other Protective Proceedings Act, and several states have followed suit.

At the same time, a growing number of U.S. states—ten as of this writing—and the District of Columbia, have adopted legislation to legally recognize decisions made pursuant to supported decision-making agreements (SDMAs). SDMA statutes have a number of purposes, including encouraging and incentivizing the use of SDM and SDMAs, empowering people with disabilities to become more self-determined and autonomous, and ending unwarranted

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1 Supported decision-making has been recognized as a “less restrictive alternative” to guardianship by, e.g., the American Bar Association, the National Guardianship Association, ARC of the U.S., the National Council on Disability, and, most recently, the Fourth National Guardianship Summit. The constitutional imperative of least restrictive alternative derives from O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975) and has been embraced by New York courts. See, e.g., Kesselbrenner v. Anonymous 33 N.Y. 2d 161,165 (1973); Manhattan Psychiatric Center v. Anonymous, 285 A.D. 2d 189, 197-98 (1st Dept. 2001).


3 See, e.g., Maine Revised Probate Code, 18-C M.R.S. Sec. 5-401.

discrimination against persons with disabilities whose decisions are often questioned or disregarded because third parties believe that they “lack capacity.” SDMA statutes, like the instant bill, draw on the non-discrimination principles of the Americans with Disabilities Act to require equal treatment of persons with disabilities who make decisions pursuant to a legislatively recognized SDMA by requiring third parties to accept those decisions and, in return, conferring immunity for their good faith acceptance. As the Legal Director for the Autism Self-Advocacy Network has written, “It is critical that states adopt legislation through which people with significant decision-making support needs can make legally enforceable decisions with the assistance of a chosen support network.”

The New York City Bar Association (“City Bar”) was founded in 1870 and is a private, non-profit organization of more than 23,000 attorneys, judges and law professors. With over 23,000 members, the City Bar has long supported the vigorous and fair enforcement of civil rights law. In January 2016, the City Bar’s Mental Health Law Committee in conjunction with the Disability Law Committee issued a report, Revisiting S.C.P.A. 17-A: Guardianship for People with Intellectual Disabilities which addressed how, if at all, the state should provide substituted decision-making for this vulnerable population and specifically noted the emergence of SDM as “a new model of autonomy and self-determination.” The Mental Health Law Committee respectfully urges the Legislature to consider the adoption of the A.XXXX-X (“the bill”) with the modification proposed, in order to ensure that the rights of people with intellectual, developmental, cognitive and psychosocial disabilities are properly protected.

1. The Bill is the Consequence of Significant Involvement and Investment by the State.

New York has played a significant and thoughtful role in the formulation and development of SDM and SMDAs in theory and in practice. In 2012, the American Bar Association Commissions on Law and Aging, and Disability Rights, convened the first national, interdisciplinary Roundtable to explore SDM in New York City. The convening received funding from the New York Community Trust and support from the federal government’s Administration for Community Living. Three years later, as efforts to enact SDMA legislation grew around the country, the New York State Developmental Disability Planning Council (DDPC), awarded a $1.5 million, five-year grant to Supported Decision-Making New York (SDMNY) to educate stakeholders about SDM, to develop and pilot a model utilizing SDM to

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5 Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 12101 et seq. As one commentator has written, “Just as we recognize that the law—and common principles of human decency—generally require that we build a ramp so that an individual with a physical impairment can enter a building without being carried up the steps, we should also recognize a legal obligation to provide decision-making support to an individual with limitations in mental capabilities rather than assign a guardian to make decisions for that person.” Rachel Mattingly Phillips, Note: Model Language for Supported Decision-Making Statutes, 98 Wash. U. L. Rev 615, 624 (2020).


7 18 CUNY L. Rev. 287 (2015); also available at http://www2.nycbar.org/.


divert persons at risk of guardianship or restore rights to persons currently under guardianship, and to develop an evidentiary base for prospective SDMA legislation in New York. Over the last five years, SDMNY has enrolled more than 140 Decision-Makers, developed a three-phase model that facilitates Decision-Makers and their supporters in making an agreement reflecting the process by which the Decision-Maker will make decisions and the supporters will provide support going forward. Unlike the other jurisdictions that have enacted SDMA statutes with no empirical, “on the ground” evidence, New York’s prescient decision to first thoroughly explore how SDM actually works for people with intellectual and developmental disability (I/DD) positions it as a leader in fostering the rights of people with intellectual, cognitive and psychosocial disabilities through an authentic practice of SDM.

2. By Recognizing SDM as an Alternative to Guardianship the Bill Will Clarify Existing Law and Provide Guidance to Courts, Litigants and Counsel.

Although New York has recognized the constitutional imperative of “least restrictive alternative” in case law, and provided that other decisional supports must be considered before guardianship is imposed pursuant to Article 81 of the Mental Health Law (MHL), SDM is nowhere specifically named. Article 17-A of the Surrogate’s Court Procedure Act (SCPA) lacks any reference to consideration of alternatives whatsoever. By naming the process of SDM as “a way by which a decision-maker utilizes support from trusted persons in their life, in order to make their own decisions about their life,” stating explicitly that SDM can be “a less restrictive alternative to guardianship,” and recognizing that SDM may take a variety of forms, all of which, including informal arrangements may be considered by courts as “less restrictive alternatives,” the bill fills the existing lacuna, providing clear guidance to courts and litigants.

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10 SDMNY is a consortium of Hunter/CUNY, the NY Alliance for Inclusion and Innovation, a statewide association of provider agencies (formerly NYSACRA) and the Arc of Westchester, a large, parent-led provider agency, with New York’s federally funded Protection & Advocacy Agency, Disability Rights New York (DRNY) as its legal partner.

11 The SDMNY model, including the 3-phase facilitation process, facilitator training and oversight by trained mentors, and the U.S. and the international pilots from which it was derived is described in detail in Glen, supra n. 9, and on the SDMNY website, www.sdmny.org.

12 Supra. n.1.

13 MHL Sec. 81.01; see, e.g. In re Isadora R., 5 A.D.3d 494 (2d Dept. 2004); In re Janczak, 167 Misc. 2d 766 (S. Ct. Ontario Co. 1995).

14 This is not deliberate; the concept of SDM did not yet exist when Article 81 was enacted.

15 The bill defines “decision-maker” is defined as “an adult who has executed or seeks to execute a supported decision-making agreement.” Sec. 82.02(i).

16 Id.

17 Sec. 82.01(b).

18 Sec.82.04(f).
3. By recognizing SDM, and Prescribing a More Formalized Process for Making SDMAs, the Bill Will Provide Families an Alternative to Guardianship While Leaving Existing Guardianship Statutes in Place and Available When Appropriate.

The bill does nothing to change existing guardianship law which has, in any event, proven relatively impervious to alteration.19 No one is, or can be required to use SDM or enter into an SDMA.20 Nor does the use of SDM or the existence of an SDMA necessarily result in denial of a proposed guardianship, or termination of an existing guardianship; a factual inquiry into the need for the guardianship, and whether SDM or the SDMA actually constitutes a less restrictive alternative is always required. SDM or an SDMA does not preclude parents or other potential petitioners from seeking—and obtaining—guardianship if the process is not effectively meeting the needs that guardianship is statutorily prescribed to fill. Studies consistently demonstrate that many parents who want to continue promoting the autonomy and self-determination of their adult children with I/DD believe they have no alternative other than to seek guardianship and are unaware of alternatives.21 The bill provides an alternative that families are free to try and which may prove a beneficial and less restrictive alternative, preserving the civil and legal rights of persons with I/DD.

At the same time, the bill will incentivize the use of SDM by families seeking to promote self-determination of their adult children with I/DD. One learning from the DDPC-supported pilot project is particularly salient. Many parents and their adult children with I/DD are anxious to try SDM, but fear that, in the absence of legal recognition, they will inevitably find themselves in a situation where a third party (generally perceived to be a health-care provider) refuses to provide services to the Decision-Maker because of her/his perceived lack of capacity, insisting instead on a guardianship order. Many other families face pressure—whether intentional or through the well-intentioned recommendations of professionals—to seek guardianship.22

Those parents, facing what they understand to be the likely “inevitability” of guardianship, may say that the time and work that goes into creating an SDMA is simply not worth it—unless and until there is legal recognition of decisions made pursuant to the SDMA. Parents who have been surveyed are virtually unanimous in supporting legislation that “solves” this problem by providing for legislative recognition, and report that it would positively impact their decision to try SDM.23 That is precisely what the bill will provide.

19 This is particularly true of SCPA Article 17-A, which was recognized as needing significant reform as early as 1990, as reflected in the Committees’ earlier Report, supra n. 7. Despite a federal civil rights law suit challenging the law, Disability Rights N.Y. v. New York, 916 F.3d 129, 133–37 (2d Cir. 2019); Glen, supra n. 9 at 100-101, and numerous other calls for change, remains unchanged to this day.
20 A specific provision of the bill prohibits conditioning of services on the execution of an SDMA, Sec. 82.04(g).
21 See, e.g., NATIONAL COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, BEYOND GUARDIANSHIP: TOWARD ALTERNATIVES THAT PROMOTE GREATER SELF-DETERMINATION, at 92 (2018).

For many reasons, third parties, both private and public, question the ability of persons with disabilities to make decisions and often refuse to accept their decisions.24 In practice, this means individuals with disabilities are frequently deprived of the right to legal capacity.25 Although existing law presumes that all adults have legal capacity,26 a diagnosis of intellectual, developmental, cognitive or psychosocial disability, or belief that a person has such disability often results in discriminatory treatment, including refusal to recognize their decisions.27 The bill, similar to existing SDMA legislation in other jurisdictions, avoids such discrimination by removing the ability of third parties to make their own “determinations” of a person’s legal capacity based on their disability. Instead, the bill provides that a decision made pursuant to a recognized SDMA is presumptively made with legal capacity.28 In this respect, the bill reflects the principles and requirements of the Americans with Disabilities Act by recognizing SDM, through a prescribed process reflected in an SDMA, as an accommodation that enables people with disabilities equal access to contractual relationships.29

24 These include stigma and prejudice against people with intellectual, developmental, cognitive and psychosocial disabilities, but also fear of liability if a transaction to which a person with such disability was a party is ultimately voided for “lack of capacity.” As to the latter, the bill, and other SDMA statutes, avoid the problem by conferring immunity for the acceptance of a decision made pursuant to an authorized SDMA “in good faith.” Sec. 82.12(b)

25 The “right of legal capacity” is derived from the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities which requires recognition of the right to make one’s own decisions, and to have those decisions legally recognized, without regard to disability. Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, General Comment No. 1, Article 12: Equal Recognition Before the Law, ¶ 12, U.N. Doc. CRPD/C/GC/1 (May 19, 2014).


27 See, e.g., Crane, supra n. 6, noting that “individuals and businesses [may be] unwilling to enter into major contracts—such as lease agreements or automobile loans—with individuals with disabilities who do not have guardians, as a court may at some later point determine that the individual lacked capacity to enter into such contracts and therefore declare them invalid. Similarly, health care providers may be unwilling to provide treatment requested by a disabled individual, for fear that a court will later determine that the individual lacked capacity to consent to treatment.”

28 See, e.g., Rachel Mattingly Phillips, Note: Model Language for Supported Decision-Making Statutes, 98 Wash. U. L. Rev. 615, 637 (2020) (proposing that a “statute should make it clear that any decision made or action taken by the principal with the aid of a supporter is legally valid and binding (absent the sort of extenuating circumstances that could void any decision). To this end, the statute should acknowledge that an individual using a supporter is considered to be competent to the same degree as if they had the same capability acting alone.”).

29 Considering the ADA, one commentator has noted that “[t]he statute itself specifies that entering into contracts is a strategy that can be used to ensure the full participation and inclusion of those with disabilities. The ADA provides that the refusal of covered entities, including a broad swath of private actors, to enter into contracts with the disabled is an act of discrimination.” Sean M. Scott, Contractual Incapacity and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 124 Dick. L. Rev. 253, 288 (2020). The National Guardianship Summit, a convocation of experts and stakeholders, convened approximately every decade, that makes influential recommendations in the field. The Fourth National Guardianship Summit, which met from May 12-16, 2021, just adopted a resolution calling on the Department of Justice to explicitly recognize SDM as an accommodation under the ADA. Fourth National Guardianship Summit, Recommendation VII (on file with Committee).
5. The Bill Provides Protection Against Possible Abuse or Exploitation of Decision-Makers.

Families are often concerned about possible exploitation of their vulnerable adult children with I/DD, and seek guardianship as “protection,” relying on supposed court oversight. In fact, Article 17-A of the SCPA has no provision for reporting once a guardian has been appointed, or for any periodic review. In contrast, the bill provides significant protection by essentially creating “on-the-spot,” “point-of-transaction” monitoring, by permitting a third party to refuse to accept a decision if there is substantial cause to believe it is the product of abuse, coercion, undue influence or financial exploitation by a supporter, and to report the alleged abuse, coercion, undue influence or exploitation to the appropriate protective agency, in real time, without fear of any penalty.

In addition, existing SDMA statutes have been subject to criticism that by creating a “legal status” for supporters, unrelated to any court proceeding or oversight, people with disabilities entering into SDMAs could be easily exploited through a kind of “guardianship on the cheap.” If a supporter had the right to “communicate” and/or enforce (or “implement”) the alleged decision of a person with a disability, they would essentially have all the powers of a guardian, but with none of the protections of court-imposed guardianship. The bill protect against this in several ways. First, it explicitly states that a supporter may not make decisions for the Decision-Maker, be considered a substitute decision-maker, or legally bind the Decision-Maker to any legal agreement. Second, where other SMDA laws have accorded legislative recognition to decisions made pursuant to SDMAs that are simply signed forms, with no requirement of any education or facilitation process to ensure that both the Decision-Maker and supporters understand and have committed to a process of trust and respectful support, the Bill draws on the experience of the DDPC-funded project and requires completion of a meaningful facilitation process for Decision-Makers and their supporters for SDMAs in order to require recognition. Finally, as noted below, the bill also draws on empirical evidence—and the lack thereof—to initially limit recognition to SDMAs made by people with I/DD for whom there is consensus on what constitutes appropriate decision-making support.

30 See the Mental Health Law Committee’s prior Report, supra n. 7 at 313-31. One court has required periodic reporting and review as constitutionally compelled. In re Mark C. H., 28 Misc. 3d 765 (Surr. Ct. N.Y. Co. 2010).
31 Sec. 82.11 (d).
32 Sec. 82.14 (a).
34 Sec. 82.05 (b)(1).
35 Sec. 82.05 (d).
36 Sec. 82.09. Family members surveyed in focus groups about SDMA legislation believe this to be an important protection against others “taking advantage of” their adult children with I/DD. See Parent-to-Parent Report, supra at n. 23. Commentators have called for a training or education requirement. See, E.g., Megan S. Wright, Dementia, Autonomy and Supported Healthcare Decisionmaking, 79 Md. L. Rev. 257, 289 (2020).
6. The Bill Encourages SDM and the Use of SDMAs for Everyone While Initially Limiting Legislative Recognition to People with I/DD for Whom Effective and Appropriate Supports Have Been Empirically Demonstrated.

The bill provides that an SDMA can be made by any adult, thus “normalizing” the process, and recognizing that, in making decisions, “everyone uses supports, as do people with disabilities, who may just need more or different kinds of supports.” How an SDMA is made, what it may and may not contain, and provisions ensuring that the making of an SDMA can neither be used against the person, or required of them, apply to everyone. To confer legislative recognition, however, there should be some significant level of confidence that the person who has executed the SDMA has appropriate and adequate supports to make decisions. To date, virtually all of the pilot projects and evaluations around the world have involved people with I/DD and have resulted in a general consensus on the use of a process of facilitation for Decision-Makers and their supporters; the DDPC-funded pilot in New York has confirmed that facilitated SDM provides the necessary and appropriate support for legislative recognition of decisions made by persons with I/DD pursuant to an SDMA. There is no corresponding evidentiary base, or the existence of any pilot projects for persons with other disabilities, and no clear understanding of what kinds of support would be necessary for them to achieve or be afforded legal capacity. The bill acknowledges this lacuna while calling on government and civil society “to develop appropriate and effective means of support for older persons with

38 Sec. 82.01(a); see also Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, General Comment No. 1, Article 12: Equal Recognition Before the Law, ¶ 12, U.N. Doc. CRPD/C/GC/1 (May 19, 2014) [hereinafter CRPD Committee].
39 Under the bill, making an SDMA is not evidence of lack of capacity, nor can it be used to deprive a person of benefits to which they are otherwise entitled. Sec. 82.03(e). Conversely, making an SDMA “may not be a condition of participation in any activity, service or program.” Sec.82.04(g).

41 For discussion of why there has been so little attention to older persons, and how SDM could be important to that population, see Rebekah Diller, Legal Capacity for All: Including Older Persons in the Shift from Guardianship to Supported Decision-Making, 43 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 495, 498 (2016). For discussion of legal capacity and persons with psychosocial disabilities, see generally PIERS GOODING, A NEW ERA FOR MENTAL HEALTH LAW AND POLICY: SUPPORTED DECISION-MAKING AND THE UN CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES (2017).
cognitive decline, persons with traumatic brain injury, and persons with psychosocial disabilities, so that full legislative recognition can also be accorded to the decisions made with supported decision-making agreements by persons with such conditions.”

7. The Bill Should Include a Requirement that Relevant State Entities Provide Accessible Information on SDM and SDMAs as an Alternative to Guardianship.

Few if any of the many benefits of this bill will actually occur unless stakeholders know about SDM and SDMAs. Research consistently shows that parents of transition-age adults with I/DD are routinely and repeatedly informed about, and encouraged to pursue guardianship when their children turn 18. This leads to what the National Council on Disability calls the “school to guardianship pipeline.” Similarly, many parents report that they had no idea of available alternatives, and had never heard of SDM. Parents and self-advocates believe that information about SDM should be more readily available, and national organizations have likewise called for information on SDM to be made available in the educational and court systems as well as for professionals and others. This is also a “learning” and recommendation of the DDPC-funded project. To ensure that persons with developmental, intellectual, cognitive and psychosocial disabilities, those who might seek guardianship, and current guardians have access to information about SDM, potentially preventing unnecessary guardianships and protecting the civil and legal rights of persons with disabilities, the bill should include a provision directing the Department of Education to require that schools provide information on SDM and SDMAs as an alternative to guardianship to students and parents during transition planning. Additionally, the bill should require the Office of Court Administration to provide similar information in the appropriate clerks’ offices in Surrogates Courts and Supreme Court, Civil Term, and that all such information should be made available in accessible form.

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42 Sec. 82.01(d).
43 See, e.g., Rood, supra note 23; Crane, supra n. 6 at 193, 203.
46 Some New York Surrogates Courts are already including information in their clerks’ offices, and the Office of Court Administration website has a video on alternatives that mentions SDM. See, e.g., Guardianship Information Session 17A Alternatives to Guardianship, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O6Fea1w-LQo.
47 See, e.g., NCD Report, supra n. 23 at 18-19, Fourth National Guardianship Summit, supra n. 30, Recommendations.
49 A similar provision can be found in the Wisconsin SDMA Statute, supra n. 4 at Sec. 115.807 and the bill currently pending in Massachusetts, S. 124 Section 4, available at https://malegislature.gov/Bills/192/S.124 (requiring the Massachusetts Department of Education to provide information on SDM to parents and students in the transition planning process).
New York City Council Public Hearing
Committee on Public Safety
Mental Health Involuntary Removals and Mayor Adams’ Recently Announced Plan

Written Testimony of the New York City Bar Association
February 6, 2023

The New York City Bar Association (City Bar),¹ through its Civil Rights Committee, Disability Law Committee, Mental Health Law Committee, New York City Affairs Committee and Social Welfare Law Committee, urges Mayor Adams to pause implementation of the new directive on “mental health involuntary removals” (the “NYC Removal Directive”).²

The NYC Removal Directive purports to clarify that the NYPD and other agencies are empowered to forcibly remove from public spaces people who appear to have a mental illness and to be unable to meet their basic needs to an extent that causes them harm. This vague and broad initiative raises significant legal issues that demand careful review to ensure the City’s compliance with City, State, and Federal anti-discrimination laws, as well as State laws governing mental health treatment and the U.S. Constitution. Furthermore, as is evidenced by the numerous concerns raised by directly impacted individuals and groups advocating for people with mental illness, the NYC Removal Directive also presents serious policy concerns that deserve thoughtful consideration and would benefit from additional stakeholder input. We call on the City to pause its rushed implementation of the NYC Removal Directive and engage in a transparent and good faith dialogue with service providers, advocates, and directly impacted individuals to design interventions that are evidence-based, consistent with individuals’ rights and autonomy, and do

¹ The mission of the New York City Bar Association, which was founded in 1870 and has over 23,000 members, is to equip and mobilize a diverse legal profession to practice with excellence, promote reform of the law, and uphold the rule of law and access to justice in support of a fair society and the public interest in our community, our nation, and throughout the world.

² On November 29, 2022, Mayor Adams delivered an “Address on the Mental Health Crisis in New York City” transcript available at: https://www.nyc.gov/office-of-the-mayor/news/871-22/transcript-mayor-eric-adams-delivers-address-mental-health-crisis-new-york-city-holds (all websites last visited February 2, 2023). The 5 page directive that was released with the announcement is captioned Mental Health Involuntary Removals, as of 11/28/2022, and is available at: https://www.nyc.gov/assets/home/downloads/pdf/press-releases/2022/Mental-Health-Involuntary-Removals.pdf. Following the announcement, the City has communicated the new policy to its police officers through a FINEST message dated December 6, 2022 (FINEST message). The FINEST message was posted on the docket in the Baerga et al. v. NYC et al., 21-cv-05762 (SDNY) (PAC) litigation, ECF/Docket # 123-1.

About the Association

The mission of the New York City Bar Association, which was founded in 1870 and has over 23,000 members, is to equip and mobilize a diverse legal profession to practice with excellence, promote reform of the law, and uphold the rule of law and access to justice in support of a fair society and the public interest in our community, our nation, and throughout the world.
not violate (on their face or in their implementation) our anti-discrimination laws or the U.S. Constitution.

Below, we highlight our primary legal and policy concerns and reiterate fundamental principles—such as autonomy in decision-making and the “least restrictive alternative”—that we believe should undergird any future City initiative affecting people with mental health conditions.

First, the City’s broad language in the NYC Removal Directive would allow removals that are not justified under the U.S. Constitution or State mental health law;

Second, the City’s language announcing this initiative both reflects and will exacerbate bias against unhoused people and people with serious mental illness, in violation of anti-discrimination principles, and the NYC Removal Directives will disproportionately burden people of color; and

Third, this initiative directs resources into a failed strategy, at a time when the City has reduced investments in effective strategies that connect people to long term treatment and care.

I. The City’s broad language would allow removals that are not justified under the U.S. Constitution or State law.

Summary

Under Mental Hygiene Law (MHL) sections 9.41 and 9.58, the City has the prerogative to remove individuals to a hospital involuntarily under certain circumstances. Indeed, public reporting indicates NYPD effectuated more than 1,000 such removals in 2022 before the issuance of the NYC Removal Directive. This authority which, under section 9.41 is vested in peace officers and law enforcement officers, and under section 9.58 is additionally vested in physicians and certain mental health professionals, is constrained by the Constitution. The New York State Office of Mental Health (“OMH”) guidance largely aligns with the caselaw around mental hygiene arrests under MHL § 9.41 with respect to both the probable cause standard and the requirement of an inability to meet basic needs such that a person presents a present risk of harm to self. The mayor’s announcement and the accompanying NYC Removal Directive, however, do not.

Background Law and Policy

The Mental Hygiene Law (“MHL”) provides authority for peace officers and law enforcement officers to take into custody for the purpose of a psychiatric evaluation those individuals who appear to be mentally ill and are conducting themselves in a manner which is

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likely to result in serious harm to self or others. MHL § 9.41. Additionally, MHL § 9.58 provides that “a physician or qualified mental health professional who is a member of an approved mobile crisis outreach team shall have the power to remove” someone under the same circumstances.

OMH Commissioner Ann Marie T. Sullivan and Chief Medical Officer Thomas Smith issued interpretive guidance in February 2022 (the “OMH Involuntary Removal Guidance”) setting forth the circumstances under which courts have determined that the MHL permits “persons who appear to be mentally ill and who display an inability to meet basic living needs” to be mandated into emergency psychiatric assessments and emergency and involuntary inpatient psychiatric admissions.

Constitutional Considerations

In discussing involuntary confinement, the United States Supreme Court has stated that “a State cannot constitutionally confine, without more, a nondangerous individual who is capable of surviving safely in freedom by himself or with the help of willing and responsible family members or friends.” O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 576 (1975). The Court added that “[m]ere

4 Like most of the provisions of Article 9 of the MHL relating to involuntary admission and treatment, MHL § 9.41 rests on the definitional construct of “danger” to self or others, permitting what is commonly referred to as a Mental Hygiene “arrest.” Section 9.41 provides as follows:

Any peace officer, when acting pursuant to his special duties, or police officer who is a member of the state police or of an authorized police department or force or of a sheriff's department may take into custody any person who appears to be mentally ill and is conducting himself in a manner which is likely to result in serious harm to himself or others. “Likelihood to result in serious harm” shall mean (1) substantial risk of physical harm to himself as manifested by threats of or attempts at suicide or serious bodily harm or other conduct demonstrating that he is dangerous to himself, or (2) a substantial risk of physical harm to other persons as manifested by homicidal or other violent behavior by which others are placed in reasonable fear of serious physical harm. Such officer may direct the removal of such person or remove him to any hospital specified in subdivision (a) of section 9.39 or, pending his examination or admission to any such hospital, temporarily detain any such person in another safe and comfortable place, in which event, such officer shall immediately notify the director of community services or, if there be none, the health officer of the city or county of such action.

5 N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law § 9.41 (emphasis added).

5 N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law § 9.58 uses identical language (“any person who appears to be mentally ill and is conducting himself in a manner which is likely to result in serious harm to himself or others”) and does not elaborate on the standard for likelihood for serious harm articulated in § 9.41. Though the NYC Removal Directive purports to authorize numerous agencies, including many that employ individuals covered by § 9.58, the City Bar is not aware of any specified guidance that has been provided by any of these agencies. The legal issues presented by the overbroad language of the NYC Removal Directive are not ameliorated depending on whether a peace officer or mental health professional makes the determination. That said, arrests pursuant to § 9.41 present a special risk, since peace officers are not trained mental health professionals, are armed, and are authorized to use force in certain instances.

public intolerance or animosity cannot constitutionally justify the deprivation of a person’s physical liberty.” *Id.* At 575. In a Second Circuit case dealing with the seizure of a woman for a psychiatric evaluation, the Court held that evidence that the woman appeared irrational, annoyed, and very uncooperative was not sufficient to imply that she appeared dangerous and to establish probable cause for arrest. *Myers v. Patterson*, 819 F.3d 625, 632 (2d Cir. 2016).

Federal courts have long read constitutional guarantees of due process into the various provisions of MHL’s Article 9 as they relate to involuntary retention and treatment. See e.g. *Project Release v. Prevost*, 722 F.2d 960 (2d Cir. 1983). It is well settled that for involuntary removals under § 9.41 of the MHL, “courts apply the same concepts of probable cause and objective reasonableness as in criminal cases to determine whether the confinement is privileged because the plaintiff’s behavior was likely to result in serious harm.” *Greenaway v. County of Nassau*, 97 F. Supp. 3d 225, 233 (E.D.N.Y. 2015). In doing so, courts treat involuntary removals as “the functional equivalent of [arrest[s],]” *Disability Advocates., Inc. v. McMahon*, 279 F. Supp. 2d 158, 168-69 (N.D.N.Y. 2003), *aff’d*, 124 F. App’x 674 (2d Cir. 2005). It should be noted that no caselaw specifically assesses whether inability to meet basic needs rises to the level of probable cause to justify a mental hygiene arrest under MHL § 9.41.

Probable cause for an involuntary hospitalization under the mental hygiene laws—a so-called “mental health arrest”—only “exists if there are reasonable grounds for believing that the person seized is dangerous to herself or to others.” *Guan v. City of New York*, 2020 WL 6365201, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 29, 2020), *aff’d on other grounds*, 37 F.4th 797 (2d Cir. 2022) (internal citation and quotation omitted); *Anthony v. City of New York*, 339 F.3d 129, 142 (2d Cir. 2003) (citation omitted); see *Guan*, 37 F.4th at 805 (addressing probable cause standard for involuntary hospitalization under mental health laws and describing an involuntary hospitalization under said laws as a “mental health arrest”).

**OMH Involuntary Removal Guidance**

Although the OMH Involuntary Removal Guidance does not reference the standards requiring probable cause and danger to self or others that underpin a mental hygiene arrest under MHL § 9.41, the OMH Involuntary Removal Guidance specifies that for purposes of a § 9.41 mental hygiene arrest, “[l]ikelihood of serious harm includes: attempts/threats of suicide or self-injury; threats of physical harm to others; or other conduct demonstrating that the person is dangerous to him or herself, including a person’s refusal or inability to meet his or her essential need for food, shelter, clothing or health care, provided that such refusal or inability is likely to result in serious harm if there is no immediate hospitalization” (emphasis added).\(^7\)

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\(^7\) OMH Involuntary Removals Guidance at 3 (quoting *Matter of Scopes v. Shah*, 59 A.D.2d 203, 398 N.Y.S.2d 911 (3d Dep’t 1977)). In *Matter of Scopes*, the Appellate Division’s Third Department ruled that in order to satisfy substantive due process requirements, “the continued confinement of an individual must be based upon a finding that the person to be committed poses a real and present threat of substantial harm to himself or others.” See also *Matter of Carl C.*, 126 A.D.2d 640 (2d Dept 1987) (“State must prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that the person is mentally ill and that he poses a substantial threat of physical harm to himself (resulting) from a refusal or inability to meet his essential needs for food, clothing or shelter”); *Boggs v. Health Hosps. Corp.*, 132 A.D.2d 340, 523 N.Y.S.2d 71 (1st Dept. 1987) (noting that the sole issue before the court is whether, upon clear and convincing evidence, “Ms. Boggs is so severely mentally ill that, unless she continues to receive hospital treatment,
The OMH Involuntary Removal Guidance relies on caselaw describing an individual’s inability to meet their essential needs in the context of continued retention or involuntary admission of the person for psychiatric treatment. It notes that in order to satisfy substantive due process requirements, “the continued confinement of an individual must be based upon a finding that the person to be committed poses a real and present threat of substantial harm to himself or others, but that such a finding does not require proof of a recent overtly dangerous act.”

The NYC Removal Directive

As demonstrated above, the standard of proof set forth in caselaw and the OMH Involuntary Removal Guidance for what sort of risks rise to the level of “likely to result in serious harm” contemplate imminence (“immediate”), likelihood (“real and present”), and seriousness (“substantial harm” or “dangerousness”), rather than a long-running, speculative risk, or less significant harm. OMH largely aligns with the caselaw when it articulates circumstances in which an “inability to meet essential needs” (also referred to as the “basic needs standard”) could rise to that threshold. The NYC Removal Directive deviates significantly, sweeping in circumstances that are not as imminent, risky, or as substantial as those contemplated by caselaw or OMH, and therefore purports to authorize removals that will be legally indefensible.

The NYC Removal Directive notes that “case law does not provide extensive guidance regarding removals for mental health evaluations based on short interactions in the field” and then directs that the following circumstances “could be reasonable indicia”: “serious untreated physical injury, unawareness or delusional misapprehension of surroundings, or unawareness or delusional misapprehension of physical condition or health.” These are vague, broad, and undefined standards untethered to caselaw or any OMH interpretative guidance, and in particular, they do not incorporate the temporal urgency standard found in the latter source.

The City’s December 6, 2022 FINEST message explaining the NYC Removal Directive to its police officers offers slightly more specificity. It bears noting that, while this specificity is an

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8 OMH Involuntary Removals Guidance at 2 (internal citation and quotation omitted).
9 See the discussion of Matter of Scopes in note 7, supra, and the quoted language from O’Connor in the preceding section entitled “Constitutional Considerations” and the OMH Involuntary Removal Guidance in the section bearing that title.
10 FINEST messages are read to police officers at roll call and are used to announce NYPD policy changes. Unlike the NYC Removal Directive, the instructions provided to officers in the FINEST message reference OMH’s standard of temporal urgency (in one of the two relevant passages) and O’Connor’s language with respect to survival. The FINEST message allows involuntary removal: “when the person appears mentally ill and incapable of meeting basic human needs to such an extent that the person is likely to suffer physical injury or serious harm without immediate attention” (emphasis added). The FINEST message provides as examples (without language of imminence of danger): “an incoherent person may be unable to assess and safely navigate their surroundings (e.g.
improvement on the NYC Removal Directive, it is only being distributed to one agency (NYPD), and the NYC Removal Directive purports to empower many city agencies (not just NYPD). Given the broader language found in the NYC Removal Directive and the Mayor’s statements (discussed below), we remain concerned about the initiative’s implementation across all agencies and future training at NYPD specifically.

These concerns are heightened because of the constitutional right (due process for deprivation of liberty) at stake. In contrast to the standards articulated in caselaw and the OMH Involuntary Removal Guidance, the NYC Removal Directive’s basic needs standard is, in and of itself, insufficient to demonstrate immediate dangerousness to self or an incapability of surviving safely in the community. Given O’Connor and progeny, application of the basic needs standard absent sufficient indicia of dangerousness raises constitutional concerns. See also Myers, 819 F.3d at 632 (holding that a display of irrationality, annoyance, and a lack of cooperation was insufficient to imply dangerousness and to establish that the police acted with probable cause). The NYC Removal Directive’s attempt to establish a link between basic needs and conduct likely to result in serious harm is analogous to the police’s unsuccessful attempt to establish a link between dangerousness and behaviors unrelated to harm in Myers.11

II. The City’s language announcing this initiative both reflects and will exacerbate bias against unhoused people and people with serious mental illness, in violation of anti-discrimination principles, and the NYC Removal Directive will disproportionately burden people of color.

City, State, and Federal law all prohibit discrimination on the basis of disability. The City Bar is concerned that the statements by key policymakers both accompanying the announcement of the NYC Removal Directive and subsequently explaining it will have a harmful effect in perpetuating negative public attitudes towards people with mental illness. The City Bar is further concerned that the NYC Removal Directive will disproportionately burden people of color who are unhoused or experiencing mental illness.

Anti-Discrimination Laws

City, State, and Federal law prohibit discrimination on the basis of disability, including mental illness, and require the City and other actors to provide reasonable accommodations to

avoiding oncoming traffic or subway tracks), may suffer from a serious untreated injury, or unable to seek out food, shelter or other things needed for survival” (emphasis added). A copy of the FINEST message, labeled SER#: 42286935, was posted on the docket in the Baerga et al. v. NYC et al., 21-cv-05762 (SDNY) (PAC) litigation, ECF/Docket # 123-1.

11 There are, no doubt, legal risks that will be created by implementation of the NYC Removal Directive. Most directly, the NYC Removal Directive allows for seizures that will expose the City to liability for wrongful arrests. See, e.g. Myers, 819 F.3d at 633 (denying qualified immunity to a police officer where the record was insufficient to demonstrate arguable probable cause for the seizure and transfer to a psychiatric hospital). Additionally, prior experience has unfortunately but consistently shown that involuntary traumatizing interactions with law enforcement and other first responders have, in numerous instances, resulted in serious harm to both City employees and members of the public. This initiative will prompt incidents that are likely to result in additional City liability to its residents, through worker’s compensation and tort litigation.
people with disabilities. The NYC Removal Directive is at odds with the City’s obligations under these laws in at least two distinct ways.

First, involuntary removals under the NYC Removal Directive could deny people access to public spaces such as the subway and the streets, based on their mental illness or the perception of it, in a much broader set of circumstances than is allowable under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and without the provision of reasonable accommodations. The ADA explicitly does not require an entity to include an individual who presents a “direct threat” meaning “a significant risk to the health or safety of others that cannot be eliminated by a modification of policies, practices, or procedures or by the provision of auxiliary aids or services.” 42 U.S.C. § 12182(3). But the NYC Removal Directive covers a significant range of situations that cannot be categorized as falling within this narrow exception to the ADA’s general requirement of inclusion.

Second, this initiative’s focus on hospitalization in the absence of adequate and appropriate community-based services is inconsistent with both federal law and aligned state commitments to ensure the availability of community-based treatment options. The Supreme Court ruled in *Olmstead v. L.C.*, 527 U.S. 581 (1999)\(^{13}\) that unnecessary institutionalization of people with disabilities is discrimination under the ADA. Simply stated, the ADA’s “integration mandate” “requires that individuals with disabilities receive services in the most integrated setting appropriate to their needs.”\(^{14}\) OMH has acknowledged that this mandate necessitates a shift in New York’s state mental health services towards greater community-based services.\(^{15}\)

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\(^{12}\) Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12132, provides: “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” The City’s Human Rights Law further provides: “it is an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person prohibited by the provisions of this section from discriminating on the basis of disability not to provide a reasonable accommodation to enable a person with a disability to . . . enjoy the right or rights in question provided that the disability is known or should have been known by the covered entity.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(15)(a).

\(^{13}\) The Court in *Olmstead* was encountering a remarkably similar circumstance to the issue at hand, where the plaintiffs, including Lois Curtis, a passionate self-advocate who recently passed away, cycled in and out of psychiatric hospitalization. “Lois and Elaine found themselves going in and out of the state’s mental health hospitals dozens of times. After each stay in the hospital, they would go back home; but then, because they did not have help at home, they would start to struggle again and would have to go back to the hospital to get help again. Lois and Elaine asked the state of Georgia to help them get treatment in the community so that they would not have to go live at the state mental hospital off and on.” Disability Integration Project of Atlanta Legal Aid Society, Brief History of *Olmstead*, https://www.olmsteadrights.org/about-olmstead/.

The Supreme Court stated in *Olmstead* that “unjustified institutional isolation of persons with disabilities is a form of discrimination” in part because “[i]n order to receive needed medical services, persons with mental disabilities must, because of those disabilities, relinquish participation in community life they could enjoy given reasonable accommodations, while persons without mental disabilities can receive the medical services they need without similar sacrifice.” *Olmstead v. L.C.*, 527 U.S. at 600, 601.


\(^{15}\) New York State HCBS [Home and Community-Based Services] Settings Transition Plan (2018) at pg. 195. “The legal system’s expansion of civil rights to include people with mental illness, as part of Olmstead Legislation and Americans with Disabilities Act, has begun to move policy from the concept of least restrictive setting to full community inclusion. However, New York currently exceeds both the national average inpatient
Even assuming a person requires and would benefit from acute inpatient psychiatric services, there is a shortage of inpatient psychiatric beds in New York City, meaning that many people simply languish in psychiatric emergency rooms for longer. Some inpatient psychiatric wards take few Medicaid patients, which can make it harder to find beds for homeless people. The fundamental systemic issue, however, is that there are inadequate services and support for patients following their discharge from a hospital. To that end, the City Bar welcomes Governor Hochul’s recent announcement that hospitals and other inpatient providers will be required to develop a discharge plan that involves immediate wraparound services.

**Disproportionate Effects on Communities of Color**

The NYC Removal Directive may also implicate the City’s obligations to refrain from engaging in practices that have a disparate effect on people of color. Data suggests policies like the NYC Removal Directive are likely to disproportionately impact Black and brown people.

People of color with disabilities are overrepresented in the population of individuals experiencing homelessness. Black New Yorkers already make up 44% of the people currently receiving court-mandated treatment under one state law, though they’re less than a quarter of the city’s population. In New York City, “44% of current assisted outpatient treatment (AOT) recipients are Black and 32% are Latinx, according to state data.” This data suggest that Black and brown New Yorkers are much more likely to be subjected to forced removals from public spaces than white New Yorkers.

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utilization rate at state-operated Psychiatric Centers (PCs), and per capita inpatient census levels at state-operated PCs in other urban states and all Mid-Atlantic States. The OMH is in the process of creating the mental health system that New York needs in the 21st Century—a system focused on prevention, early identification and intervention, and evidence-based clinical services and recovery supports. OMH is rebalancing the agency’s institutional resources to further develop and enhance community-based mental health services which are also consistent with the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The US Supreme Court’s 1999 Olmstead decision held that the ADA mandates that the State’s services, programs, and activities for people with disabilities must be administered in the most integrated setting appropriate to a person’s needs.” Available at: https://www.health.ny.gov/health_care/medicaid/redesign/hcbs/docs/2018-05-18_hcbs_final_rule.pdf.


Bias and Stereotyping

In their public explanations of this initiative, the mayor and public entities have focused on two primary justifications. The first is, according to the mayor, the “moral obligation” to connect severely mentally ill New Yorkers to appropriate care and housing. We support the removal of barriers to accessing care and stable housing for those who need them. The second justification, however, has included the repeated use of stigmatizing language that relies upon stereotypes and exacerbates bias. These statements, quoted below, reflect a shared and fundamentally flawed premise, which is an erroneous belief that those experiencing mental illness definitionally constitute a threat to the personal safety of others.

Inability to meet one’s own basic needs is not indicative of dangerousness to others. As noted above, both the MHL and caselaw provide for distinct lanes of analysis for whether someone constitutes a threat to themselves and whether someone constitutes a threat to others, and do not countenance unjustified slippage between these concepts.19 The OMH Involuntary Removal Guidance explicitly identifies inability to meet one’s needs as potential evidence of a risk of danger to oneself, rather than as evidence of a danger to others: “conduct demonstrating that the person is dangerous to him or herself, including a person’s refusal or inability to meet his or her essential need for food, shelter, clothing or health care, . . .”20 Despite popular perceptions and fears, empirical data connecting even severe mental illness with an increased risk of perpetrating interpersonal violence is inconclusive, and an appropriate assessment of dangerousness is necessarily highly individualized.21

The mayor’s statements at the press conference announcing this new initiative present a fundamental misconception and improperly conflate mental illness and interpersonal violence: “There’s nothing dignified about using a corner of a tent as a restroom or having month-old food sitting there or talking to yourself, being delusional, or waiting until you carry out a dangerous act before we respond. That is just so irresponsible that we know that this person is about to probably go off the edge and harm someone but we’re going to wait until it happened.”22

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19 See supra note 4 quoting MHL § 9.41: “‘Likelihood to result in serious harm’ shall mean (1) substantial risk of physical harm to himself as manifested by threats of or attempts at suicide or serious bodily harm or other conduct demonstrating that he is dangerous to himself, or (2) a substantial risk of physical harm to other persons as manifested by homicidal or other violent behavior by which others are placed in reasonable fear of serious physical harm” (emphasis added).

20 OMH Involuntary Removals Guidance at 3.


Governor Hochul, in announcing funding for mental health services, similarly conflated general public discomfort with individualized assessments of danger, describing “a public safety crisis” stemming from underfunding of mental health services, and pointing to the public feeling “anxious” about encountering people with mental health conditions while on the subway as evidence thereof.23

Unfortunately, these descriptions of the initiative by elected officials -- as well as others that have appeared in both City and State published documents24 -- have the effect of perpetuating bias. The Mayor, the Governor, and the Making New York Work for Everyone report, which was the culmination of months of collaboration among a panel “of civic leaders and industry experts”25 (although the list of panel contributors does not include experts in mental health treatment or leaders of disability advocacy organizations) have repeated harmful stereotypes about people with mental illness. As the New York City Bar Association has stated in other contexts, “Words matter because they reflect thought and drive action.”26 The disability rights community has a motto: “nothing about us without us,” which calls for the meaningful involvement of people with disabilities in the development of policy that impacts them. We call on City leaders to repudiate bias and commit to inclusive decision-making in its future efforts relating to mental illness.

As discussed further below, this new initiative arrives in the context of the City’s inadequate provision of voluntary, community-based mental health treatment options, which has resulted in the inaccessibility of low-cost care and long waiting lists. Governor Hochul’s State of


24 Similarly, the City’s Subway Safety Plan notes as an impetus for this initiative the perceptions of the public: “Second, our subways must be safe and feel safe for every person who enters them . . . . Our city’s prosperity depends on everyone feeling confident and secure when they enter a station.” Subway Safety Plan at 4, https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/home/downloads/pdf/press-releases/2022/the-subway-safety-plan.pdf (cited supra, n. 6).

A joint City and State report Making New York Work for Everyone released this month similarly states: “Concerns about safety and quality of life can stymie economic prosperity in terms of investment, revenue, and overall economic activity. We must acknowledge that many residents, commuters, and business owners have been increasingly concerned for their safety and that of their employees as they move around the city.” Making New York Work for Everyone, December 2022, at pg. 42, https://edc.nyc/sites/default/files/2022-12/New-NY-Action-Plan-Making_New_York_Work_for_Everyone.pdf. Conflating again the concepts of risk of harm to self and harm to others, the report states: “As part of the [NYC Removal Directive] plan, the Mayor issued a directive to outreach workers, City-operated hospitals, and first responders clarifying that they have the legal authority to provide care to New Yorkers when severe mental illness prevents them from meeting their own basic human needs to the extent that they are a danger to themselves or others” (emphasis added). Id. at 44.


26 President’s Column (Winter 2021) by former City Bar President Sheila Boston, https://digital.nycbar.org/44thstreetnotes/winter-2021/launch-of-the-six-priorities/. See also Statement of New York City Bar Association on Reckless Statements and Their Impact in the Charged Environment Surrounding the Mar-A-Lago Search (August 24, 2022) (“words matter and have consequences”) and Statement of New York City Bar Association on The Disturbing Trend of Threats and Violence Against Judges and the Vital Importance of Judicial Security (June 24, 2022) (“today we urge all Americans, particularly public officials and members of the legal profession, to remember that in public discourse our words matter.”).
the State included an announcement of new funding for inpatient and outpatient mental health services, as well as funding for affordable housing. These investments are welcome and will, in time, reduce barriers to treatment and stable housing; at the same time, the effects of decades of underfunding for these services will require time and sustained investment to reverse.

III. This initiative directs resources into a failed strategy, at a time when the City has reduced investments in effective strategies that connect people to long term treatment and care.

Numerous groups and individuals with lived experience, both people with mental illness or those with experience providing treatment, have cautioned that increasing involuntary commitments will hinder, rather than improve, our ability to successfully connect people with care.

Fortunately, there are alternative approaches that will remove barriers to accessing care and stable housing for people experiencing mental illness. As the Bazelon Center has noted, research indicates that high-quality engagement of homeless people with mental health conditions, such as that provided through New York’s Street Homeless Advocacy Project, which sends people with lived experience with homelessness back to the streets to help others, helps individuals see the value of and agree to participate in supportive services. Safe, stable, and affordable housing, provided with voluntary supports, has been shown to help homeless New Yorkers and

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28 See, e.g. Fountain House Calls for Comprehensive Mental Health Care in Response to Mayor Adams’ Directive on Involuntary Removals, December 1, 2022. “[T]he approaches announced this week will not address the revolving doors to hospitals and jails, and can further stigmatize and isolate people living with serious mental illness.” Available at https://www.fountainhouse.org/news/fountain-house-statement-on-mayor-adams-directive-to-expand-involuntary-removals; Anthony Almojera, I’m an N.Y.C. Paramedic. I’ve Never Witnessed a Mental Health Crisis Like This One, The New York Times (guest essay), December 7, 2022. “I’m not opposed to taking mentally ill people in distress to the hospital; our ambulances do this all the time. But I know it’s unlikely to solve their problems . . . . While I don’t know how forcing people into care will help, I do see how it will hurt. Trust between a medical responder and the patient is crucial. Without it, we wouldn’t be able to get patients to talk to us, to let us touch them or stick needles filled with medications into their arms. But if we bundle people into our ambulances against their will, that trust will break.” Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2022/12/07/opinion/nyc-paramedic-mental-health-crisis.html?smid=nytcore-ios-share&referringSource=articleShare.


31 See, e.g., Center for Court Innovation, The Myth of Legal Leverage? (“Studies of therapeutic intervention strongly suggest that the quality of the human interaction outweighs the importance of any particular protocol or approach….” “Factors like goal consensus, empathy, alliance, and positive regard are significantly greater than, say, model fidelity,” and “a robust therapeutic relationship is less a matter of dosage and more a matter of engagement.”), https://www.courtinnovation.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/2020-04/report_the_myth_of_legal_leverage_04232020.pdf.
others stabilize and avoid hospitalization and incarceration.32 And longer-term services, such as assertive community treatment (ACT), supported employment, and peer support services—delivered not in the hospital, but in the person’s own home and community—have been shown to break the cycle of institutionalization.33

Yet a report issued by New York City’s Public Advocate in November 2022 indicated that the city has reduced the scope of effective evidence-based strategies that would better address mental health crises. There are now only four community- and peer-led Respite Care Centers in the five boroughs of the city, down from eight such centers in 2019.34 There are only 19 behavioral health mobile crisis teams (MCTs) that can respond to calls for help instead of the police, serving the entire city in 2022, down from 24 teams in 2019.35

While the City has a pilot program to send teams of alternative first responders to 911 calls related to mental health crises, these “B-HEARD” teams have a limited scope and capacity. They only responded to 16 percent of 911 calls related to mental health crises in the few Manhattan neighborhoods where they are being piloted, and they have a response time that is not comparable with that of the police.36

The Public Advocate’s report found that the city is “lagging behind in providing supportive housing, with an often-delayed application process,”37 and “lagging in the inclusion of peers with lived-in experiences into the city’s mental health programs.”38 The Correct Crisis Intervention Today - New York City (CCIT-NYC) coalition, which is made up of civil rights and human service organizations, people with lived experience with mental health crises, family members, and other advocates, has advocated for a decade to increase the availability of evidence-based, peer-led responses to mental health crises.39 “The City has the power to provide onsite treatment, as well as treatment in homeless shelters or supported housing, but has chosen not to.”40

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35 *Id.* at 5.

36 *Id.* at 7-8.

37 *Id.* at 5.

38 *Id.* at 10.

39 [https://www.ccitnyc.org/](https://www.ccitnyc.org/).

40 National Alliance on Mental Illness – NYC, NAMI-NYC Calls for Comprehensive, Person-Centered Behavioral Health Care for People Living with Serious Mental Illness, November 29, 2022, [https://naminycmetro.org/involuntaryremoval/](https://naminycmetro.org/involuntaryremoval/).
these shortcomings may be addressed by Governor Hochul’s recent announcement of significant funding for community-based mental health services and supportive housing.

Just last month, the United States Interagency Council on Homelessness released a comprehensive report entitled *All In: The Federal Strategic Plan to Prevent and End Homelessness* (the *All In* report). It notes that local officials have responded to a rise in the number of people living in unsheltered locations “not always in the most effective ways” through “out of sight, out of mind” policies that displace people without successfully connecting them to evidence-based services. The mayor’s initiative fits broadly within the parameters of effectively criminalizing homelessness, which the *All In* report identifies as counterproductive. Such policies take away resources from constructive solutions to homelessness, create trauma, can erect financial and criminal legal barriers for people seeking pathways out of housing insecurity and homelessness, and disproportionately burden already-marginalized communities including people of color, LGBTQI+ people and people with disabilities.

*     *    *

In conclusion, we ask for a commitment from the City to pause its rushed implementation of this initiative, and take seriously the concerns raised by individuals with lived experience of mental illness and/or homelessness following the announcement. In the coming months, our committees, like many interested New Yorkers, will carefully evaluate the City’s proposed legislative and operational changes, and would welcome the opportunity to meet with city attorneys to discuss these legal issues. There are evidence-based solutions available to the City to better support people accessing care and housing. We call on the City to halt this removal initiative and instead pursue effective strategies within its legal authority.

Civil Rights Committee
Kevin Eli Jason and Kathleen Rubenstein, Co-Chairs

Disability Law Committee
Katherine Rose Carroll, Chair

Mental Health Law Committee
Mikila J. Thompson, Chair

New York City Affairs Committee
Erik Rubinstein, Secretary

Social Welfare Committee
Lindsay Funk and Sandra Gresl, Co-Chairs

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42 Id. at 20.

43 The Chair and a number of members of the New York City Affairs Committee recused themselves from discussion and voting on this letter.
MEMORANDUM

June 17, 2020

To: Hon. George J. Silver  
Hon. Vito C. Caruso

From: John W. McConnell  
Nancy Barry

Subject: New Procedures for ADA Accommodation Requests

Chief Administrative Judge Lawrence K. Marks recently approved for distribution a set of revised procedures for handling requests for accommodations of disabilities made by parties, attorneys, witnesses, and other court visitors in the trial courts of the Unified Court System (Exh. A). Developed under the supervision of the Chief Judge’s Advisory Committee on Access for People with Disabilities, these procedures are intended to simplify the application process and facilitate swifter provision of appropriate accommodations to court users. In short, the revised guidelines provide that

- Accommodation requests, whether made in advance of, or on the day of a court appearance, and whether in-person, oral or written, should be forwarded to the Chief Clerk (in New York City) or the District Executive (outside New York City) for handling.

(An optional, online accommodation request form will be available for use by requestors later this year to facilitate advance notice requests.)

- Following receipt of an accommodation request, the Chief Clerk/District Executive will assess whether it addresses a judicial issue (e.g., an adjournment, additional time to submit papers, appearance by phone, trial breaks, etc.) or administrative accommodation (e.g., provision of assistive listening devices, use of Sign language interpreter, or relocation to a physically accessible courtroom, etc.). Judicial accommodations will be forwarded to the appropriate judge for resolution; administrative accommodations will be handled by the Chief Clerk/District Executive or their designee.
If a judge receives an accommodation request by a court user appearing before her, and the request addresses a purely judicial accommodation, the judge should determine the request without referring it to the Chief Clerk or District Executive. Any aspect of a request made directly to the judge that involves an administrative accommodation should be referred to the Chief Clerk/District Executive for consideration and appropriate action.

Chief Clerks and District Executives must consult with the Statewide ADA Coordinator before denying an accommodation request. When denying a request, a written Denial of Accommodation Form (web link) must be issued, with a copy sent to the Statewide ADA Coordinator. An administrative denial is subject to review within 10 days by the Statewide ADA Coordinator.

Further information on this procedure, as well as substantial additional information about the court system’s commitment to assuring access to all, may be found at http://ww2.nycourts.gov/Accessibility/index.shtml.

Please note that each courthouse should have informational ADA posters, prominently displayed near courthouse entrances and on each floor, directing court users seeking accommodations to the Chief Clerk’s office for assistance. If a courthouse within your jurisdiction does not have such signage, please notify the ADA Office.

Please distribute this memorandum and attachment to all persons who interact with the public and may be called upon to assist or provide information about accommodation procedures. Questions about the new procedure may be addressed to John Sullivan, Statewide ADA Coordinator (jjsulliv@nycourts.gov). And as always, thank you for your kind assistance in implementing this important court policy.

Attachment

c: Administrative Judges
Hon. Rosalyn Richter
Scott Murphy
Linda Dunlap-Miller
District Executives
NYC Chief Clerks
Chief Michael Magliano
Carolyn Grimaldi
Lucian Chalfen
John Sullivan
Barbara Zahler-Gringer
I. Categories of Disability Accommodation Requests

Requests for disability accommodations fall into three categories: judicial, administrative, or a combination of judicial and administrative. Identifying the type of request is important in order to determine how the request should be handled.

A. **Judicial requests** are for accommodations that only a judge – not a court manager – can grant or deny. Judicial requests typically seek an accommodation that involves the judge exercising authority over:

- the parties (e.g., to adjourn a case, or to appear by phone or video, or for more time to submit motion papers), or
- courtroom practices (e.g., to have someone other than an attorney sit beside a party; to take frequent breaks during the proceeding; to schedule the matter in the afternoon, rather than the morning), or
- the substance of the proceedings (e.g., a motion to be permitted to forego cross-examination, or to re-write a jury instruction).

B. **Administrative requests** are for accommodations that don’t involve the judge’s authority over the case and the parties. These types of requests usually involve:

- providing auxiliary equipment or services (e.g., sign language interpreters; assistive listening devices; CART reporting; or large print or Braille format documents), or
- asking court managers to vary usual court procedures (e.g., relocate a proceeding from an inaccessible courtroom to an accessible courtroom; permit the entry of a service animal into the courthouse; or assist with filling out forms).

C. In some cases, a person may be asking for a combination of judicial and administrative accommodations. In those instances, the judge (and only the judge) can determine whether to grant or deny the judicial accommodation requests, but the judge should not be asked to address the administrative accommodation request portion. In other words, responsibility for addressing these types of hybrid requests will be divided between the judge and non-judicial personnel.

II. Receipt of Disability Accommodation Requests

An accommodation request can be made orally or in writing. It can be communicated via e-mail, fax, phone, or in person. Although we ask people to bring their requests to our attention in advance of their court dates, sometimes the request isn’t received until the person appears in court. Sometimes, non-judicial personnel are the first to receive the request, and sometimes the request isn’t made until the court user is in front of the judge.
III. Process for Handling Disability Accommodation Requests

With one exception – see III (C), below – Chief Clerks (in New York City) and District Executives (outside New York City) are responsible for managing the court system’s response to disability accommodation requests. The Chief Clerk or District Executive determines whether the request requires a judicial or administrative response (or both), and addresses the request accordingly, as set forth in III (A) and (B), below.

A. Requests Made in Advance of a Court Appearance

All advance notice accommodation requests are made:

- In courts within New York City, to the Chief Clerk of the Court;
- In courts outside New York City, to the District Executive.

Upon receipt, the Chief Clerk or District Executive determines whether the disability request is administrative, judicial, or both. The Statewide ADA Office is available for consultation if the answer isn’t clear. If it appears that any delay will be involved, the requestor should be so notified – it is important that court users be kept informed of the status of their requests.

*If the request solely concerns a judicial accommodation:*

1. The request is forwarded immediately to the chambers of the judge presiding over the proceeding, indicating to chambers staff that the type of accommodation sought can only be granted or denied by the judge, not administrative personnel.

2. The requestor is informed that the request must be addressed by the judge, and that it has been forwarded to the judge for determination.

*If a request is for both administrative and judicial accommodations,* that portion that seeks judicial accommodations is referred to the judge, and the requestor so informed. The remaining administrative portion of the request is handled by the court manager, as described below.

*If the request is solely administrative in nature,* the court manager ensures that it is addressed promptly. The District Executive or Chief Clerk:

1. Handles it on their own, or
2. Designates someone else in their office, or the court involved, to be the point person for ADA requests.

B. Requests Made Without Advance Notice

In some cases, individuals may not request an accommodation until they appear in court. Such no-advance notice, in-person accommodation requests might be directed, in the first instance, to front-facing non-judicial personnel (i.e., the clerk of the court, court officers, counter clerks, part clerks, etc). *Those requests also need to be determined by Chief Clerks and District Executives, as follows.*

All non-judicial court personnel should direct “in-person, day-of” requestors to the court’s Chief Clerk’s Office.

*In NYC Supreme and Surrogate’s Courts,* the Chief Clerk determines if a judicial response is required and, if so, forwards it to the appropriate judge and informs the requestor that the judge will determine it. If an administrative response is called for, the Chief Clerk (or a designee) provides the appropriate accommodation, if any.

*In NYC Civil, Criminal, and Family Courts,* the court’s Borough Chief Clerk or Clerk of Court immediately advises the court’s Chief Clerk (citywide) of the accommodation request; the Chief Clerk (citywide) responds as above.

*In courts outside NYC,* the court’s Chief Clerk immediately advises the District Executive of the accommodation request, and the District Executive determines if a judicial response is required and, if so, forwards it to the appropriate judge and informs the requestor that the judge will determine it. If an administrative response is called for, the District Executive (or a designee) provides the appropriate accommodation, if any.

In all cases, it is important for Chief Clerks and District Executives to follow up to ensure that an accommodation has been provided (if it is appropriate to do so), and that the accommodation is proving effective.

*To ensure that requests are addressed in a timely and efficient manner, it is essential that all court personnel who interact with the public know that people with day-of, in-person ADA accommodation requests are to be immediately directed, or escorted, to the Clerk’s Office. (However, in those rare courts that do not have a Clerk’s Office on the premises, the Clerk’s Office should be contacted by phone – the requestor should not be directed to report to another location).*

C. Requests Made to Judges

Judges who are asked for purely judicial accommodations determine the request, without referring it to the District Executive (outside NYC) or Chief Clerk (inside NYC). Judges who are asked for administrative accommodations should refer the request to the District
Executive or Chief Clerk, who will consider the request and make any necessary arrangements, directly or via a designee.

IV. Resolving Accommodation Requests

Granting accommodation Requests: Many requests can be resolved quickly. In some instances, the District Executive or Chief Clerk may need further conversation with the requestor if:

1. It is not clear that the individual qualifies for an ADA accommodation, or

2. A better understanding of the individual's limitations and how they might affect participation in court proceedings is needed, or

3. There is uncertainty about the best and most reasonable means of accommodating the individual's disability. Consult with the ADA Office if assistance is needed.

It is important to remember that court managers and staff should never make overly intrusive inquiries or request medical information that is not relevant to the need for an accommodation. Dialogue about a person's disabilities should always be handled in a sensitive and confidential manner that protects individual privacy as much as possible.

When the District Executive or the Chief Clerk, is granting an accommodation request, it does not have to be done in writing. However, it might be a best practice to keep a record of the types of accommodations being requested, as that may help ensure an adequate distribution of resources.

Ongoing Accommodation Requests: Where an administrative accommodation is needed on an ongoing basis (e.g. a sign language interpreter, or the relocation of a proceeding to an accessible courtroom), a separate request is not necessary for each court appearance. Court personnel should ensure that the accommodation is in place and ready to go at each anticipated future appearance. Judicial accommodation requests must be renewed whenever the requestor appears before a different judge.

Denial of Accommodation Requests: Chief Clerks and District Executives must consult with the Statewide ADA Coordinator before denying an accommodation request. If a request is denied, the Chief Clerk or District Executive must issue a written Denial of Accommodation Form and give it to the requestor, with a copy to the Statewide ADA Coordinator. An administrative denial is subject to review, within 10 days, by the Statewide ADA Coordinator.