Challenging Void Judgments After Coney Island: The Supreme Court Reshapes Rule 60(b)(4) Practice
4.28.2026
The U.S. Supreme Court’s January decision in Coney Island Auto Parts Unlimited, Inc. v. Burton[1] resolved a split in the federal circuit courts of appeals about whether a judgment that might be void is exempt from the “reasonable time” limitations of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(c), finding that even motions to vacate void judgments must be made within a “reasonable time.”For years, many lawyers treated “void” as tantamount to an escape hatch from timing limits, often advising clients to address default judgments only when collection efforts made inroads rather than when the client first learned of the judgment.
After Coney Island, that is no longer a tenable reading of the rule. Rule 60(c)(1)’s “within a reasonable time” requirement applies to all Rule 60(b) motions, including those alleging that a judgment is void. The only remaining questions in any given case are (1) when the clock started and (2) whether the movant acted with sufficient diligence. Federal litigators (and potentially those who practice in states modeling their civil rules after the federal rules) must recalibrate how they think about Rule 60(b)(4).
For lawyers practicing in the 2nd Circuit, this development is evolutionary rather than revolutionary. Existing circuit law had already recognized that Rule 60(b)(4) motions are subject to a reasonable time constraint and that delay can defeat even a colorable voidness challenge. Coney Island confirms that approach and removes any lingering ambiguity in the text.
The Coney Island Holding
In Coney Island, a Chapter 7 trustee obtained a default judgment against Coney Island in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Tennessee in 2015. In April 2016, the trustee sent a demand letter to Coney Island’s CEO advising of the judgment and forthcoming collection efforts. The trustee later retained New York counsel to register the judgment in the Southern District of New York, transcribe it to Kings County, and execute against Coney Island’s bank account. Only after that levy – approximately six years after entry of judgment and about five years after notice – did Coney Island move in the Tennessee Bankruptcy Court to vacate the judgment as void under Rule 60(b)(4).
The Tennessee Bankruptcy Court denied the motion as untimely, and the district court and 6th Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether Rule 60(b)(4) motions are exempt from its “reasonable time” requirement.
The Supreme Court held that they are not. Because Rule 60(c)(1) expressly governs any “motion under Rule 60(b),” it necessarily encompasses motions brought under subsection 4. The Supreme Court rejected the argument that traditional statements describing void judgments as “legal nullities” override the timing language in the rule.
Notably, Coney Island did not dispute that it had actual notice for several years and could not justify the extensive delay in seeking relief from the judgment. Indeed, the Supreme Court observed that Coney Island had not seriously argued that its five‑year delay after actual notice was reasonable, and it allowed the lower courts’ timeliness determination to stand.
The practical implication is clear: Courts may deny motions for relief under Rule 60(b)(4) where they find unreasonable delay by the movant.
The Pre‑Coney Landscape
Majority Approach: ‘At Any Time’ for Void Judgments
Prior to Coney Island, a line of cases and commentary repeated the traditional refrain that a void judgment is a “nullity” that may be attacked “at any time.” That language commonly appeared in default judgment and personal jurisdiction cases and is often cited to support the proposition that Rule 60(b)(4) relief is not constrained by the temporal limits of Rule 60(c)(1).
As observed by the Supreme Court in Coney Island:
“several Courts of Appeals, and a prominent treatise nonetheless maintain that Rule 60(c)(1)’s reasonable-time limit does not apply to motions alleging voidness. See n. 1, supra; 11 C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2862, pp. 431-433 (3d ed. 2012). These authorities acknowledge that their interpretation clashes with Rule 60’s text. See, e.g., Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Ceramica Europa II, Inc., 160 F.3d 849, 852 (CA1 1998). But relying on the generally accepted maxim that a “void judgment is a legal nullity,” United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260, 270 (2010), they argue that the passage of time cannot turn such a nullity into an enforceable judgment. See, e.g., Austin v. Smith, 312 F. 2d 337, 343 (CADC 1962).”[2]
In many instances, however, courts that embraced “at any time” language still denied relief where the movant had clear notice of the judgment and waited years to act or attempted to use Rule 60(b)(4) where it failed to appeal from the judgment.
Minority Rhetoric: Applying Rule(c)(1) Reasonable Time Limitations
Before Coney Island, multiple circuit courts of appeals held that Rule 60(c)(1)’s reasonable time requirement applies to motions under Rule 60(b)(4). While appreciating the unique nature of void judgments usually arising from jurisdictional defects or fundamental due process violations – they strictly construed Rule 60(c)(1)’s timeliness language as a prerequisite to relief.
In practice, those courts asked three questions. First, when was the judgment entered? Second, when did the movant have actual or constructive notice of the judgment and the alleged defect? Third, how long did the movant wait after that point to seek relief?
For example, in the 6th Circuit proceedings that preceded Coney Island,[3] the court held that a Rule 60(b)(4) motion brought more than six years after the movant learned of a default judgment was not filed within a reasonable time.
In a separate case, the 11th Circuit[4] held that a Rule 60(b)(4) motion filed roughly 15 months after judgment – and about six months after actual notice – was untimely, affirming on that basis without reaching the voidness question. Together, these decisions treated timeliness as dispositive even when the challenge targeted the court’s jurisdiction.
2nd Circuit Doctrine
In the 2nd Circuit, courts have often read Rule 60(c)(1)’s “reasonable time” requirement quite generously when a party attacks a judgment as void for lack of jurisdiction or a fundamental due process flaw. In “R” Best Produce, Inc. v. DiSapio,[5] the 2nd Circuit permitted a personal jurisdiction challenge under Rule 60(b)(4) without suggesting any timing problem and reaffirmed that void judgment motions may effectively be brought “at any time.” Similarly, in Grace v. Bank Leumi Trust Co. of N.Y.,[6] the court vacated a judgment as void where a corporation had appeared through a non‑lawyer, treating the due process defect as paramount and giving little weight to the passage of several years.
At the same time, the 2nd Circuit has made clear that even void judgment challenges are not immune from Rule 60(c)(1)’s temporal limits, particularly where the record shows a knowing and prolonged failure to act. In State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Inversiones Errazuriz Limitada,[7] the court found a Rule 60(b)(4) motion untimely when it was filed more than a year after judgment and only after the movant had already litigated an earlier motion to vacate without raising voidness, characterizing this as an exception to the usual leniency in light of the apparent tactical delay. In Lee v. Marvel Enterprises, Inc.,[8] the court held that a five‑year delay in filing motions under Rule 60(b)(4), (5), and (6) was unreasonable despite the defendant’s claims of managerial turmoil, noting that much shorter delays had been found inadequate in other cases. Finally, in Abondolo v. Faraldi,[9] the court concluded that a two‑year delay was unreasonable where the defendant had clear notice of the judgment and collection efforts but waited until enforcement was underway to seek relief, reinforcing that Rule 60(b)(4) is not a safe harbor for parties who sit on their rights.
Coney Island has arguably tempered the 2nd Circuit’s “lenient” approach. The notion that a first Rule 60(b)(4) motion in a default case is literally unconstrained by time is incompatible with Coney Island’s text‑first analysis. After Coney Island, the courts may decide how generously they apply the reasonable time standard in the first motion/default context, but they may no longer ignore that the Rule 60(c) time limits apply.
Practical Benchmarks for ‘Reasonable Time’
Coney Island does not attempt to codify specific time periods that are always reasonable or unreasonable. Nevertheless, when read against pre‑existing case law, several practical benchmarks emerge that can guide federal litigators.
Circumstances in Which Timeliness Is Usually Satisfied
In default‑judgment cases where service and notice are genuinely contested, courts have generally found Rule 60(b)(4) motions timely when:
- The defendant lacked knowledge of the judgment when it was entered; and
- The defendant moved within a relatively short period after first receiving actual notice through enforcement activity or direct communication.
For example, where a bank account restraint, wage garnishment or recorded lien is the first event that alerts a defendant to a default judgment and the defendant files a Rule 60(b)(4) motion within weeks or a few months of that event, courts in New York and elsewhere have typically deemed the motion to be within a reasonable time. In those decisions, the “exceedingly lenient” language has been applied to treat prompt action after actual notice as sufficient under Rule 60(c)(1), even when the underlying judgment is not recent.
Timeliness is also more readily found where the Rule 60(b)(4) motion is the movant’s first post‑judgment attack and there has been no prior Rule 60 motion or appeal.
Circumstances in Which Timeliness Is Frequently Lacking
Other scenarios present substantial timeliness risk, even where the underlying voidness argument is non‑frivolous.
First, repeat motions are particularly vulnerable. In Beller & Keller v. Tyler,[10] the 2nd Circuit signaled that a second post‑judgment motion invoking Rule 60(b)(4) more than a year after judgment – following an earlier 60(b)(1) motion –could appropriately be found untimely. Planet Corp. v. Sullivan,[11] which Beller cited approvingly, had held that a second voidness motion filed approximately one year after judgment was not made within a reasonable time. For litigators, the implication is that the temporal tolerance for a first‑in‑time voidness motion is not available for a second or third attempt to set aside the same judgment.
Second, multi‑year delays after clear notice are increasingly untenable. Coney Island itself is illustrative: the debtor waited roughly five years after actual notice (the 2016 demand letter) and six years after entry of judgment before seeking Rule 60(b)(4) relief. The lower courts held, and the U.S. Supreme Court did not disturb, that such a delay was not within a reasonable time. Eleventh Circuit precedent finding delays of 15 months from judgment and six months from notice as untimely reinforce the trend. Once delay is measured in years after notice, especially against a background of enforcement activity, the odds of surviving a Rule 60(c)(1) challenge diminish substantially.
Third, two‑plus‑year delays in actively litigated matters (beyond pure defaults) present a significant risk. Bankruptcy and district courts within the 2nd Circuit have treated such delays as presumptively problematic, particularly where the party had meaningful opportunities to raise voidness or related issues earlier in the litigation. Coney Island’s emphasis on finality and fidelity to procedural structure is likely to encourage similar outcomes.
Practice Considerations for 2nd Circuit Litigators
Coney Island and existing 2nd Circuit precedent suggest a recalibrated approach to Rule 60(b)(4) timing is appropriate.
Identify the Operative ‘Notice’ Date
In assessing timeliness, it is not sufficient to know only the date of the judgment. Counsel should identify the earliest plausible date on which the client – or a responsible officer or agent – had actual or constructive notice of the judgment or any enforcement action. In Coney Island, that date was April 2016, when the trustee wrote directly to the CEO, not the 2015 entry of judgment or the 2021 levy. In New York practice, comparable notice often arises through restraints, garnishments, recorded liens or formal collection correspondence.
On intake, it is useful to capture three dates immediately: (1) the date of judgment; (2) the earliest notice date; and (3) the date the client first consulted counsel about the matter. Those dates should feature prominently in any motion papers addressing Rule 60(b)(4) timeliness.
Treat ‘Months, not Years’ as a Working Norm
While Rule 60(c)(1) resists bright line rules, existing precedents provide practical guideposts. In most federal civil cases, a delay of several months after notice may be justified, while a delay of several years usually cannot. As the time between notice and motion approaches one year – particularly in the absence of compelling explanations – the risk of an adverse timeliness determination increases.
Frame Arguments With Posture in Mind
For movants, it is important to provide a specific, fact‑based explanation for any delay between notice and filing (e.g., late retention, difficulty obtaining the record, overlapping proceedings), rather than relying on generalized assertions and directly address the narrow definition of “void.” Coney Island did not alter the substantive standard, and errors of law, even serious ones, do not render a judgment void.
For judgment creditors, the converse strategy is appropriate: (a) raise Rule 60(c)(1) timeliness as an independent basis for denial, citing Coney Island for the proposition that all Rule 60(b)(4) motions are subject to a reasonable time limit; (b) develop a detailed chronology of notice and enforcement efforts to demonstrate periods of inaction; and (c) invoke 2nd Circuit precedent long recognizing real constraints on 60(b)(4) timing, particularly where the movant has already engaged in Rule 60 or appellate practice.
In exceptional cases where Rule 60(b)(4) timing is clearly indefensible, but equities are compelling, counsel may consider whether an independent action or other relief under Rule 60(d) is theoretically available. Those avenues remain narrow and fact‑intensive.
Monitor Implications in State Court Practice
Many state systems have adopted procedural rules modeled on Federal Rule 60. Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540(b), for example, closely tracks the structure of Rule 60(b) and includes a similar “reasonable time” requirement. Although state courts are not bound by Coney Island when construing state rules, federal precedent interpreting parallel language is often persuasive. Litigators who practice in both state and federal courts should anticipate that Coney Island’s reasoning may influence how state courts approach void‑judgment timing under analogous provisions.
Coney Island does not diminish the importance of Rule 60(b)(4) as a mechanism for correcting judgments entered without jurisdiction or in violation of basic due process requirements. It does, however, make clear that such motions are not temporally unbounded, leaving to the courts’ discretion what constitutes “reasonable time” measured from when the movant has notice of the order or judgment. Coney Island confirms that interpretation and extends it nationwide.
Going forward, federal litigators should treat timing under Rule 60(c)(1) as a central element of any Rule 60(b)(4) strategy in which delay is measured from the moment of notice. Practitioners should be prepared to either justify months of delay or to defend against years of inaction. The quality of the voidness argument still matters, but after Coney Island, diligence matters just as much.
This article appears in a forthcoming issue of NYLitigator, the publication of the Commercial and Federal Litigation Section. For more information, please visit nysba.org/comfed.
David A. Blansky is counsel in Moritt Hock & Hamroff LLP’s creditors’ rights, restructuring and bankruptcy and litigation practice groups, where he focuses on insolvency, bankruptcy and complex commercial disputes for trustees, fiduciaries, creditors and debtors. A Supreme Court of Florida qualified arbitrator and New York qualified Part 36 receiver, he frequently lectures on judgment enforcement, civil contempt, bankruptcy law and voidable transactions and publishes a weekly legal blog at alawyerinflorida.com. He also registered and executed on the judgment at issue in Coney Island in New York, successfully collecting the judgment.
Endnotes:
[1] 607 U.S. 155 (2026).
[2] Id. at 159.
[3] In re Vista-Pro Automotive, LLC, 109 F.4th 438 (6th Cir. 2024).
[4] Martin v. Florida, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 5002, 2026 WL 482266 (11th Cir. Feb. 20, 2026) (citing Coney Island).
[5] 540 F.3d 115, 124 (2d Cir. 2008).
[6] 443 F.3d 180 (2d Cir. 2006).
[7] 374 F.3d 158, 179 (2d Cir. 2004).
[8] 471 Fed. Appx. 14, 15 (2d Cir. 2012).
[9] 234 F.3d 1261 (Table), 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 29569, 2000 WL 1721132 * 4 (2d Cir. 2000) (unpublished opinion).
[10] 120 F.3d 21 (2d Cir. 1997).
[11] 702 F.2d 123, 125 (7th Cir. 1983) (second motion to vacate filed a year after judgment was entered, and raising, inter alia, voidness argument, was not filed in a “reasonable time”).
