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Recent Decisions and Legislation in Environmental Law

By Priscila Galambos

Recent Decisions and Legislation in Environmental Law

Rancho Vista Del Mar v. United States, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 206277 (D.D.C. Nov. 14, 2022)

Facts

In 2019, former President Donald Trump declared a national emergency that allowed the United States to construct a wall along the southern border of the United States. This emergency centered on the “influx” of “illegal immigrants” coming into the United States. Statutory authority was given to the armed forces to “undertake military construction projects” to address the emergency.1

While retaining almost 500 acres of land, Rancho Vista deeded about 17 acres to the United States government so that a continuous border fence could be constructed adjacent to the remainder of their property.2 The construction upon Rancho Vista’s property was part of San Diego Project 4 (the Project).3 The DHS secretary approved construction on the sites as part of the project.4 The secretary did not account for NEPA or ESA procedures.5 President Biden then terminated the national emergency at the southern border once he took office.6 DOD and DHS were ordered to halt construction projects along the border, and Rancho Vista’s property was next to the unfinished construction project.7 The site was left “uncleaned, partially excavated, and with both installed and uninstalled materials left behind.”8 Rancho Vista claimed that those actions (or inaction) caused it injury by causing erosion and desedimentation, destroying the habitat, and threatening the endangered species connected to Rancho Vista’s property.9 Rancho Vista also claimed that the 700-foot gap left by the construction “channel[ed] illegal immigrants crossing the border. . .” onto its property, further contributing to impairment of enjoyment and environmental destruction.10

Procedural History

This case arose when the corporation of Rancho Vista del Mar (Rancho Vista) brought suit against the United States, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and its secretary, and the Chief Patrol Agent for the San Diego Sector of Customs and Border Protection (CBP). Rancho Vista alleged that the government’s decision to halt unfinished construction of a border wall on Rancho Vista’s property violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), and the Endangered Species Act (ESA).11 The defendants then filed a motion to dismiss.12

Issue

Can government agencies be held responsible under the ESA, NEPA, and/or the APA for injurious, but nondiscretionary, agency action?

Rationale

Article III Standing

In order to establish Article III Standing, the plaintiff in any case must have suffered a (1) “concrete and particularized,” actual or imminent (not hypothetical or conjectural) injury-in-fact (2) with a “causal connection” between the injury and the conduct in question; and (3) it must be “likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.”13 The plaintiff also has the burden of alleging facts to fit the elements.14

A. Injury-In-Fact

Here, the court found that Rancho Vista had established a cognizable injury-in-fact, because the injuries in the complaint were concrete and imminent or actual. The injuries in question were the desedimentation, destruction of habitat, and continued threat to the endangered species on Rancho Vista’s property.15 This left Rancho Vista’s property and the surrounding area “open to environmental destruction.” Rancho Vista also alleged that the unfinished gap on the wall left the property open to “undocumented immigrants” passing through and destroying the environment.16 These injuries were concrete and particular to Rancho Vista, so the first requirement was met. The court also denied the government’s assertion that the environment being injured was not enough to show standing because plaintiffs must show injury.17 This was unpersuasive because Rancho Vista had shown that there was an injury to itself since Rancho Vista owns the critical habitat in question.18 Rancho Vista also stated that the government’s actions “impaired its enjoyment” of the property and “harmed [plaintiff’s] ranch and the surrounding environment.”19

B. Causal Connection

The causal connection here was not in dispute, because the injuries complained of were immediately traceable to the actions of the DOD.20 If the DOD did not abandon the project, then Rancho Vista would not have construction materials littering the property, there would not be a gap in the wall, and the resulting destruction of the environment would not exist. The injury also continued because the construction was not cleaned up and the environment continued to suffer.21

C. Redressability

Redressability was challenged here. To meet this third requirement for standing, the injury-in-fact must be able to be redressed if the court was to grant relief. Rancho Vista must be able to have its particularized injury corrected if it were to prevail.22

Rancho Vista sought two forms of relief: “(1) ‘an order holding unlawful and setting aside [the government’s] decision to cease all work on the border fence segment adjacent to Rancho Vista’s property,’ and (2) ‘an order requiring [the government] to secure and finish the site in a workmanlike manner.’”23 The court found that these requests for relief would have been able to adequately address Rancho Vista’s injuries if they were to be granted.24 The government attempted to argue that redressability was not met, but only because the defendants do not have the authority to grant these two forms of relief. However, the court found that this argument assumed a decision on the merits of the case, whereas redressability is not decided on an analysis of the merits.25 Initially, there must always be an assumption that the plaintiff would win on the merits of the case.26

Administrative Procedure Act Claim

After the analysis on constitutional standing, the court turned to the merits of the claims. The APA requires that agencies decide actions based on a “consideration of relevant factors” and without a “clear error of judgement.”27 Rancho Vista alleged that the government action was “arbitrary and capricious.” Agency actions are arbitrary and capricious when it has relied on “factors which Congress has not intended it to consider” and has “entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem,” explained its decision “that runs counter to the evidence” or the explanation “is so implausible” that a difference in opinion or agency expertise could not be responsible.28

The agency responsible for the pause in construction could not be blamed here, because it could not be held responsible for merely obeying an “unambiguous statutory and executive command.”29 Thus, the actions were not arbitrary or capricious. The order to end construction was given by executive command via President Biden, and that did not leave any room for agency discretion.30 The DOD did not have the authority to continue the project, and the secretary did not need to consider any factors when ending construction on the border wall.31

Rancho Vista proposed that the DOD or DHS should have raised a different statutory authority to finish the project, but the court did not find this persuasive because the APA only requires agency action that is “legally required.”32 The court found for the government on the APA claim because the DOD was legally required to stop construction and Rancho Vista’s cited statutory authority did not have a basis for the court to order the government to act in Rancho Vista’s interests.33

National Environmental Policy Act and Endangered Species Act Claims

The court found the NEPA and ESA claims unavailing because the procedural requirements within both acts do not apply to “nondiscretionary” agency decisions.34 The command to halt construction was not an option for the DOD or DHS because it came from President Biden’s order to end the national emergency that was originally declared by the Trump administration.35 NEPA only applies to “actions” where there is discretionary federal authority.36 ESA does not apply to “mandatory duties imposed on agencies by statute.”37 Thus, Rancho Vista failed to state a claim under these acts.38

Conclusion

The court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss with prejudice because Rancho Vista failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. While Rancho Vista has constitutional standing to bring the claims, they could not prevail on the merits because they did not have colorable claims under the APA, NEPA, or the ESA.

Priscila Galambos
Albany Law School, Class of 2024

Endnotes

1 Rancho Vista Del Mar v. United States, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 206277, at *3-*4, (D.D.C. Nov. 14, 2022).

2 Id. at *4.

3 Id.

4 Id. at *5.

5 Id.

6 Id.

7 Id. at *6.

8 Id.

9 Id. at *7.

10 Id.

11 Id. at *2.

12 Id. at *1.

13 Id. at *9-*10 (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 119 L. Ed. 2d 351 (1992)).

14 Id. at *10.

15 Id.

16 Id.

17 Id. at *11 (citing Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 169, 120 S. Ct. 693, 145 L. Ed. 2d 610 (2000)).

18 Id. at *11.

19 Id.

20 Id.

21 Id. at *12.

22 Id.

23 Id.

24 Id.

25 Id. at *13-*14.

26 Id. at *14 (citing City of Waukesha v. EPA, 320 F.3d 228, 235, 355 U.S. App. D.C. 100 (D.C. Cir. 2003)).

27 Id. at *15.

28 Id.

29 Id. at *15-*16.

30 Id. at *16.

31 Id. at *17.

32 Id. at *19.

33 Id. at *20-*21.

34 Id., at *21.

35 Id.

36 Id. (See Citizens Against Rails-to-Trails v. Surface Transp. Bd., 267 F.3d 1144, 1151, 347 U.S. App. D.C. 382 (D.C. Cir. 2001)).

37 Id. (citing Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defs. of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 644, 127 S. Ct. 2518, 168 L. Ed. 2d 467 (2007)).

38 Id. at *22.