Annual Review of New Criminal Justice Legislation
This article contains the annual review of new legislation amending the Penal Law (PL), Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) and related statutes. The discussion that follows will highlight key provisions of the new laws, and, as such, the reader should review the legislation for specific details. In some instances, where indicated, legislation enacted by both houses is awaiting the governor’s signature, and, of course, the reader should check to determine whether the governor has signed or vetoed the bill.
Among the many new laws enacted by the Legislature in the last session, there were three important areas in which substantive legislation was passed: bail reform, discovery reform and new weapon-related laws in response to the Supreme Court’s decision in New York State Rifle and Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen.
In the area of bail reform, the Legislature expanded the number of bail-eligible offenses, added new factors that judges must consider when setting bail, added a mental health assessment as a non-monetary condition of release, and added three circumstances in which a desk appearance ticket can be denied to a defendant.
In expanding the number of bail-eligible offenses, legislators were responding to a concern that some individuals who are arrested on larceny or criminal mischief charges are then rearrested on the same type of charges and released again.
To address the above concern, legislators amended CPL § 530.40(4)(t), which permits a judge to set bail when a defendant is arrested for a crime involving “harm to an identifiable person or property” after the defendant has been released on an earlier crime involving “harm to an identifiable person or property.” The amendment defines “harm” as “including, but not limited to theft or damage to property.”
Second, a judge can now set bail when an individual is issued a desk appearance ticket (DAT) for a “harm” crime and then rearrested on a second “harm” crime before being arraigned on the DAT. A judge can now set bail on the later crime.
In addition, the crime of possession of a firearm (PL § 265.01-b, a class E felony) is now treated as a “harm” crime for purposes of setting bail. Accordingly, if an individual is given a DAT for PL § 265.01-b and then rearrested for a larceny before being arraigned on the DAT, a judge can set bail on the larceny charge. Similarly, if a person is given a DAT for a “harm” crime and then rearrested for PL § 265.01-b before being arraigned on the DAT, a judge can set bail on the weapons charge.
When a defendant is being arraigned on a second “harm” crime, a judge can still release a defendant without bail depending on the presence or absence of additional factors. A judge may set bail if either a theft is not negligible or it was in furtherance of other criminal activity. If neither factor is present, however, the judge must release the defendant without bail. Finally, if a court has the discretion to set bail, it still must first determine whether there was reasonable cause to believe that the defendant committed the crime. The statute is silent on whether the prosecutor can satisfy that burden when a complaint has not yet been converted into an information.
The Legislature also added two nonviolent crimes to the current list of bail-eligible crimes: criminal sale of a firearm to a minor (PL § 265.16, a class C felony), and criminal possession of a defaced weapon (PL § 265.02(3), a class D felony).
Under the prior bail reform statute, the Legislature expanded the issuance of desk appearance tickets but also created a number of exceptions under which a police officer could still make a custodial arrest. In the latest version, the Legislature added three new circumstances in which a police officer is not required to issue a DAT: (1) where an individual, who is 18 years or older, is charged with criminal possession of a weapon on school grounds (PL § 265.01-a, a class E felony); (2) where an individual, who is 18 years or older, is charged with a hate crime pursuant to PL § 485.05; and (3) where an individual is charged with a qualifying offense involving harm to an identifiable person or property under CPL § 510.40(4)(t), as amended above.
In the prior reform legislation, the Legislature amended the factors that a court must consider when determining whether monetary or non-monetary bail conditions should be set. In this year’s legislation, three additional factors were added. Two of these factors were previously considered only when a charge involved a member or members of the same family or household: violation of an order of protection and a defendant’s history of use or possession of a firearm. Those two factors must now be considered when an individual is arrested for any qualifying offense. And judges must now also consider whether the charge is alleged to have caused serious harm to an individual or group of individuals.
The final part of the new bail reform package adds two non-monetary conditions of release, which address concerns a court may have about the mental health of a defendant. Last year, the Legislature added a condition by which a court may, where applicable, direct a defendant to be removed to a hospital pursuant to Mental Hygiene Law § 9.43 that provides for at least a 72-hour period of emergency hospitalization for immediate observation, care and treatment.
This year two additional conditions were added that expand upon the current section and provide more explicit directions to judges who wish to address any concerns about a defendant’s mental health. The conditions provide for both a voluntary and involuntary psychiatric assessment of a defendant (CPL § 500.10 (3-c)).
If a judge were to find by clear and convincing evidence that a defendant is mentally ill such that, if left unattended, his or her conduct may result in harm to himself, herself or others, a court may order, as a condition of release, that the defendant seek a voluntary psychiatric assessment under § 9.13 of the Mental Hygiene Law. This condition can only be imposed if the defendant consents and he or she has a recently documented history of mental illness or psychiatric hospitalization.
A court can also now order an involuntary psychiatric assessment at a local hospital pursuant to Mental Hygiene Law § 9.43. This can be done if the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that a person is mentally ill such that, if left unattended, his or her conduct may result in immediate serious harm to himself, herself or others, and if the defendant is acting in such a manner which, in a person who is not mentally ill, would be deemed disorderly conduct that is likely to result in immediate serious harm to himself, herself or others.
If an involuntary assessment is ordered, to ensure that the defendant arrives at the hospital, the court may order that a police officer, sheriff or peace officer transport the defendant, and an ambulance service may be utilized.
Once the defendant is at the hospital, a defendant must be examined within 48 hours and may not be held more than 15 days unless a determination is made that the defendant should be admitted. Once the defendant is admitted, a process is commenced by which a defendant is entitled to a hearing to determine whether he or she should be retained for further treatment. The statute places a greater responsibility on pre-trial service agencies to provide the court with the status of a defendant’s psychiatric assessment and an update on his or her placement, treatment or discharge.
The Legislature also enacted a number of minor changes in the area of discovery in an effort to improve the efficiency of discovery practice. One amendment clarifies the standard to evaluate supplemental certificates of compliance. When the discovery statute was revised in 2019, it provided for a supplemental certificate, but did not provide much guidance on its usage. Since that time, prosecutors have filed them infrequently.
The amendment clarifies that when a supplemental certificate is filed, the prosecutor is required to explain the reason for the delayed disclosure of materials so that the court may determine whether the delayed disclosure affects the propriety of the original certificate (CPL § 245.50 (1-a)). Thus, a prosecutor must demonstrate either that the belatedly disclosed material did not exist at the time of the filing of the original certificate, or it existed but was not in the possession, custody or control of the prosecutor despite diligent efforts to learn of and obtain the items.
The filing of a supplemental certificate will not negate the validity of the original certificate if it was filed by the prosecutor in good faith, and after exercising due diligence, or if the additional discovery did not exist at the time the original certificate was filed. Thus, if belatedly disclosed material was gathered by the police, it would be difficult to argue that the prosecutor exercised due diligence in filing the original certificate, as items in the possession of the police are deemed in possession of the prosecutor. Thus courts will now have a factual record upon which to assess the reasons for the belated disclosure of material, which will enable them to rule on the propriety of the initial certificate of compliance.
A second change in the discovery process addresses the procedure by which a party can challenge or question a certificate of compliance or a supplemental certificate of compliance. Last year the Legislature enacted CPL § 245.50(4), which was ambiguous in that it permitted “questions” related to a certificate to be raised in a motion. The amendment adds clarifying language, although it inadvertently did not delete the above existing language.
Under the amendment, either party (although it will more frequently be defense counsel) has an obligation to raise known potential defects in a certificate “as soon as practicable” (CPL § 245.50(b)). The defect that will normally be raised is that one or more items of discovery had not been disclosed. This section was added to address concerns by prosecutors that some defense counsel had engaged in gamesmanship, intentionally waited too long to notify them about material that was missing, and then challenged the certificate for the first time in a speedy trial motion. The requirement that counsel act quickly will actually be to their advantage; should a prosecutor ignore such timely notice it could support a later argument that the prosecutor was not “diligent” in obtaining the missing item(s). There is no time limit, however, by which defense counsel must notify a prosecutor under this section.
It is expected that, by imposing this obligation on defense counsel, any disputes over purportedly missing information can be resolved through discussions with the prosecutor. In the event the notification process does not resolve a dispute, defense counsel can make a motion to challenge the sufficiency of a certificate or supplemental certificate and must do so “as soon as practicable.”
While courts have always had the authority to dismiss a charge as a sanction for a discovery violation, the people have never had the right to appeal that order. An amendment now provides prosecutors with a right to appeal. In addition, where a judge dismisses only some of the charges against a defendant based upon a discovery violation, the prosecutor will now have a right to an interlocutory appeal since the remaining charges cannot be tried until the appeal is decided. A defendant is also now permitted to apply for bail pending this new interlocutory appeal.
Lastly, the amendment clarifies that this type of dismissal is a discretionary and drastic remedy and must be “proportionate to the prejudice suffered by the party entitled to disclosure.” This codifies case law (see People v. Kelly). One must distinguish this discretionary type of dismissal, however, from a dismissal under CPL § 30.30, which is mandatory when based on a failure of the prosecutor to file a valid certificate of compliance.
Finally, a new amendment relieves prosecutors of automatic discovery obligations in three types of matters: (1) a simplified information charging only traffic infractions under the Vehicle and Traffic Law; (2) an information that charges only petty offenses, as defined by the municipal code of a village, town, city or county, that do not authorize a jail sentence; and (3) any matter where a defendant stands charged under a local ordinance that carries no jail penalty nor any fine. In these matters the court must advise the defendant, at the first appearance, that he or she can file a motion for discovery.
Possession of Weapons
The Legislature enacted substantive legislation in a third area, i.e., possession of weapons. It enacted a legislative package of 10 weapon-related laws in reaction to the Supreme Court’s decision in New York State Rifle and Pistol Ass’n Inc. v. Bruen. In Bruen, the court held that there is a constitutional right for “law-abiding” citizens to carry a firearm outside the home for purposes of self-defense. In addition, the court held that the New York statute (Penal Law § 400.00(2)(f)) impermissibly infringed upon that right because “it required a showing of particularized need in order to obtain such license, rendering the exercise of the right by ordinary citizens a near-impossibility.” As a result, the statute’s requirement that compelled an applicant to demonstrate a special need for self-defense purposes, distinguishable from that of the general community, was held to be unconstitutional.
The centerpiece of the weapon-related legislative package is the Concealed Carry Improvement Act, which creates a new licensing procedure designed to comport with Bruen. Among the 15 eligibility criteria for a gun permit that an applicant must now meet is a requirement that an applicant be at least 21 years old with “good moral character”; that term is defined as having the temperament and judgment necessary to be entrusted with a weapon and to use it only in a manner that does not endanger oneself or others. In order to establish the applicant’s good character, he or she must provide a list of former and current social media accounts for the prior three years.
Among other criteria, an applicant cannot have a prior conviction for a felony or “serious offense” as that is defined in Penal Law § 265.00(17); must not be an “addict” as defined under 21 U.S.C. § 802 (habitually uses a narcotic drug); and must not have been previously committed to a facility for being a danger to oneself or others or “ever suffered from a mental illness” (Penal Law § 400.00, L. 2022, Ch. 371, eff. September 1, 2022). In addition, a license will be denied to an applicant who has been convicted within the prior five years of assault in the third degree; misdemeanor driving while intoxicated or menacing as defined in Penal Law § 120.15. Finally, an applicant must not be convicted of any misdemeanor that has to do with domestic violence.
Prior to the issuance of a license, an applicant must complete an in-person firearms safety course. This must include a minimum of 16 hours of curriculum and a minimum of two hours of a live-fire range training course. The license must be renewed after three years. The law also creates an appeal process for applicants who are denied a license, but that system will not be effective until April 1, 2023.
The bill also requires, for the first time, that anyone seeking to purchase a semiautomatic rifle must be at least 21 years of age and must first obtain a license.
Even if an individual has a license to carry a weapon, the bill creates a comprehensive list of 20 “sensitive locations” in which the possession of a firearm, rifle or shotgun constitutes an E felony. These locations include schools, hospitals, places of worship, parks, mass transit systems, bars, theaters, stadiums and “the area commonly known as Times Square.” While the statute does not define “Times Square” with any specificity, the city council subsequently passed a measure that designated the boundaries of “Times Square” for purposes of the statute. The boundaries are West 40th Street (south border); West 53rd Street (north border); 9th Avenue (west border); and 6th Avenue (east border).
It should be noted that on the day before the statute was to take effect, a federal court dismissed a challenge to the new law seeking to prevent its enforcement. In Antonyuk v. Bruen, the court dismissed the action, citing a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court did, however, identify two areas in the statute that were problematic.
First, the court found that, in requiring an applicant to disclose social media content in order to obtain a license, an applicant is being required to surrender his or her Fifth Amendment right in order to exercise a Second Amendment right. Second, the statute’s list of “sensitive locations” impermissibly includes locations that went beyond the type of locations approved by the United States Supreme Court in Bruen.
The bill also provides that, with respect to private businesses, unless a property owner displays a sign conspicuously stating that a gun is permitted on the property, or gives express consent, possession of a weapon will constitute a class E felony despite the fact that a person has a license to carry a weapon. This section will not apply to certain individuals including law enforcement officers, peace officers and security guards.
Finally, the bill replaces the term “body vests” with “body armor,” which is defined as a personal protective body covering intended to protect against gunfire and includes hard body armor. This definition will apply to a broader array of protective equipment that is bullet resistant. Another bill creates two new related crimes: the unlawful purchase of body armor and the unlawful sale of body armor.
Another bill in the legislative package expands the availability and use of an extreme risk protection order (ERPO), the result of the institution of the “red flag” law. This law authorizes a court to issue an order, allowing the police to temporarily confiscate firearms from people who are found by a judge to be a danger to themselves or others. After a deadly mass shooting in Buffalo this past spring, there has been a 93% increase in the number of applications by state police.
The new bill requires police and prosecutors to apply for an ERPO if credible information is received that an individual is likely to engage in conduct that would result in serious harm to others. In addition, the category of those eligible to apply for an ERPO has been expanded to include health care professionals. It should be noted that on May 18, 2022, Governor Hochul issued Executive Order 19, which requires the New York State Police to train its members on filing an ERPO and requires a police officer to file an ERPO when he or she has the requisite information to do so.
Another bill in this package opens the door for microstamping technology to be applied to firearms. This technology utilizes lasers to make precise engravings on the internal portion of a gun. These engravings can be used like a serial number to identify the make and model of the gun. The technology imprints the identifying characteristics of a firearm onto every cartridge ejected from the gun; as a result, investigators need only recover the cartridges at the scene of a crime to be able to identify the gun used in the commission of the crime. The bill requires the Division of Criminal Justice Services to certify, or decline to certify, that microstamping-enabled pistols are technologically viable and, if certified, to establish processes for the implementation of such technology.
Three other bills in this legislative package have closed certain loopholes relating to the use of weapons. First, the Legislature has enacted two new crimes: making a threat of mass harm (a class B misdemeanor) and aggravated threat of mass harm (a class A misdemeanor). These crimes supplement the current crime of making a terrorist threat (a class D felony) that can only be committed when there is a reasonable expectation of the imminent commission of such offense. The new crimes do not contain that element.
Second, another bill expands the definition of a “firearm” to include any weapon not defined in the Penal Law that is designed or may readily be converted to expel a projectile by action of an explosive. This is intended to capture firearms that may have been modified to be shot from an arm brace which, up to now, have not been included in the current definition of firearms and rifle. Finally, another bill eliminates the grandfathering of large capacity ammunition feeding devices that were, in the past, lawfully possessed.
The Legislature enacted several weapon-related laws that were not in the legislative package mentioned above. First, a new law strengthens the current state law defining “toy guns” or “imitation weapons,” by making it consistent with the more expansive definition in the New York City Administrative Code. Two other bills give courts more authority, after issuing an order of protection, to determine whether the defendant possesses a weapon and to ensure the seizure of that weapon when it is determined that continued possession poses a danger.
Finally, the Legislature lowered the threshold for charging two violent firearm offenses involving the sale of weapons. Criminal sale of a firearm in the first degree is now committed when an individual illegally sells three guns in a period of one year; previously, the threshold was 10 weapons (PL § 265.13, a class B felony). Criminal sale of a firearm in the second degree is now committed when an individual sells two firearms in a period of one year; previously the threshold was five weapons.
Several new weapon-related crimes that were enacted last year became effective this year. First, it is now a class A misdemeanor to possess a “major component of a firearm, rifle or shotgun.” This includes the barrel, slide, cylinder, finished frame or receiver. This bill was designed to close a loophole that permits untraceable parts of weapons to be converted into a fully functional weapon.
Second, it is a misdemeanor to possess an “unfinished frame or receiver” – commonly referred to as an 80% lower receiver – that is a component critical to completing the manufacture of a ghost gun. Third, the term “ghost gun” has been added to the Penal Law, and its possession constitutes a class A misdemeanor.
Each year the Legislature enacts new crimes and expands the definition of others; this year was no exception. This year the Legislature responded to an unfortunate consequence of modern technology: the dissemination of crime images for improper purposes. For example, in 2009, an EMT worker took a photograph of a young woman who had been murdered and posted it on his Facebook page.
In response to that and other inappropriate conduct, the Legislature has enacted two new crimes: unlawful dissemination of a personal image in the first and second degree; an A and B misdemeanor, respectively. A person commits those crimes when he or she disseminates an image that depicts a person who is the victim of an assault, homicide, sex offense or kidnapping without the victim’s consent. The person disseminating the image must intend to degrade or abuse the victim or otherwise cause harm to the emotional, financial or physical welfare of the victim or must do so for the actor’s amusement, entertainment or profit. The law does not apply to the reporting of unlawful conduct; sharing of images by law enforcement; or sharing of images made for a legitimate public purpose, e.g., news reporting.
The Legislature has now aligned “boating while intoxicated” offenses with New York’s current Leandra’s Law, which provides increased penalties for persons who operate motor vehicles while intoxicated, when a child 15 years of age or under is a passenger in a . As a result, it is a Class E felony to operate a vessel on the water while intoxicated and while a child who is 15 years of age or under is a passenger in the vessel.
A number of bills have expanded the definition of existing crimes. The crime of aggravated sexual abuse in the third degree (a class D felony) has been amended to include two new elements. First, it can be committed by the insertion of a finger in addition to a foreign object. Second, it can be committed when the victim is younger than 11 years old and the defendant is 18 years of age or older.
The crime of assault in the second degree (a class D felony) has been expanded to include, among the class of victims, employees of transit agencies who work at transportation terminals.
The Legislature has addressed fraudulent criminal activity related to COVID-19 vaccination cards. First, for purposes of forgery-related crimes, a vaccination card is now considered a “written instrument.” In addition, computer tampering in the third degree (a class E felony) can now be committed by entering false information in a computer related to a vaccination card.
Corporations and their agents who fail to follow safety protocols in the workplace are now subject to increased monetary penalties. If a corporation is found guilty of an offense involving the death or injury of a worker, a maximum fine for a felony can be $1 million dollars.
As a result of an increase in hit and run accidents in New York City, the Legislature has increased the fines for leaving the scene of an accident for a first violation to a range of $750–$1,000 and for a repeat violation to $1,000– $3,000.
A number of procedural changes were enacted in the last legislative session. One bill requires judges to read one sentence prior to the entry of a guilty plea: “If you are not a citizen of the United States you may become deportable, ineligible for naturalization or inadmissible to the United States based on a conviction by plea or verdict” (emphasis added). It should be noted that, while certain convictions mandate the deportation of an individual under federal immigration law, the seemingly questionable advice to be given by the court would only require a judge to tell the defendant that he or she may be subject to deportation. The legislation does provide, however, that if a court fails to give the above warning to a defendant, any plea will be rendered involuntary, requiring vacatur of the conviction. In addition, if a defendant requests time to consider the plea in view of possible immigration consequences, a court must grant that request.
The Legislature has provided protection for health care practitioners against attempts by other states to impose restrictions on legal abortions performed within New York State. In one amendment, new legislation creates a statutory exception for the extradition of abortion providers. In addition, a police officer may not arrest any person for performing an abortion in accordance with Public Health Law Article § 25A.
The Legislature has also expanded the use of electronic appearances in criminal cases. Courts in 27 counties have the authority to conduct electronic appearances in a criminal action, separate from a hearing or trial. New legislation permits an additional eight counties to do so (Sullivan, Steuben, Rockland, Saratoga, Seneca, Chemung, Schuyler and Yates).
Finally, in an effort to remove the stigmatization of incarceration, the Legislature enacted legislation that replaces the word “inmate” in various statutes and replaces it with the term “incarcerated individual.”
Barry Kamins is a partner in the law firm of Aidala, Bertuna & Kamins, where his practice focuses primarily on appellate matters and professional discipline. Prior to joining the firm, he was the administrative judge of the New York City Criminal Court and chief of policy and planning for the New York court system. Judge Kamins is an adjunct professor at Brooklyn Law School, where he teaches New York criminal practice. He is the author of New York Search and Seizure and writes the Criminal Law and Practice column for the New York Law Journal.
 New York State Rifle and Pistol Assn. v. Bruen, 142 S. Ct. 211 (2022).
 2011 N.Y. Laws, Ch. 56 (amending CPL § 530.40 and § 510.10, eff. May 9, 2022).
 2022 N.Y. Laws, Ch. 56 (amending CPL § 150.20(1)(b), eff. May 9, 2022).
 2022 N.Y. Laws, Ch. 56 (amending CPL § 510 and § 530, eff. May 9, 2022).
 2022 N.Y. Laws, Ch. 56 (amending CPL § 500.10, eff. May 9, 2022).
 2022 N.Y. Laws, Ch. 56 (amending CPL § 245.50, eff. May 9, 2022).
 2022 N.Y. Laws, Ch. 56 (amending CPL § 245.50, eff. May 9, 2022).
 2022 N.Y. Laws, Ch. 56 (amending CPL § 450.20(12), eff. May 9, 2022).
 2022 N.Y. Laws, Ch. 56 (amending CPL § 530.50, eff. May 9, 2022).
 2022 N.Y. Laws, Ch. 56 (amending CPL § 245.80, eff. May 9, 2022).
 People v. Kelly, 62 NY.2d 515 (1984)).
 2022 N.Y. Laws, Ch. 56 (amending CPL § 245.10, eff. May 9, 2022).
 142 S. Ct. 211 (2022).
 People v. Rodriquez, 2022 N.Y. Slip Op. 22217, at 2 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co. 2022).
 2022 N.Y. Laws, Ch. 371, eff. Sept. 1, 2022.
 2022 N.Y. Laws, Ch. 371 and 212 (amending CPL 400, eff. Sept. 1, 2022).
 2022 N.Y. Laws, Ch. 371 (amending PL § 265.01-e, eff. Sept. 1, 2022).
 Antonyuk v. Bruen, 1:22 CV-0734 (N.D.N.Y. 2022).
 2022 N.Y. Laws, Ch. 371 (adding PL § 265 01-d, eff. Sept. 1, 2022).
 2022 N.Y. Laws, Ch 210 (adding PL § 270.21, § 270.22, eff. July 6, 2022).
 2022 N.Y. Laws, Ch. 208 (amending CPLR 6340, eff. July 6, 2022).
 2022 N.Y. Laws, Ch. 205 (adding PL § 265.00(33) (34) and (35) and other sections, eff. four years after certification by DCJS or one year after an entity can ensure compliance, whichever is earlier).
 See People v. Hulsen, 150 A.D.3d 1261 (2d Dep’t 2017).
 2022 N.Y. Laws, Ch. 206 (adding PL § 240.78 and § 240.79, eff. June 6, 2022).
 2022 N.Y. Laws, Ch. 211 (amending PL § 265.00(3), eff. July 6, 2022).
 2022 N.Y. Laws, Ch. 209 (amending PL § 265.00, eff. July 6, 2022).
 2022 N.Y. Laws, Ch. 501 (amending General Business Law § 871, eff. Nov. 14, 2022).
 S. 6363, S. 6443, awaiting signature of the governor.
 2022 N.Y. Laws, Ch. 56 (amending PL § 265.12, § 265.13, eff. May 9, 2022).
 2021 N.Y. Laws, Ch. 519 (adding PL § 265.00), eff. Apr. 29, 2022).
 2021 N.Y. Laws, Ch. 519 (adding PL § 265.00(32), eff. Apr. 29, 2022).
 2021 N.Y. Laws, Ch. 520 (adding PL § 265.00(32), eff. Apr. 26, 2022).
 S. 7211, awaiting signature of the governor.
 A. 911, awaiting the signature of the governor.
 A. 7079, awaiting the signature of the governor.
 2022 N.Y. Laws, Ch. 233 (amending PL § 120.05(11), eff. Sept. 25, 2022).
 2021 N.Y. Laws, Ch. 784 (amending PL § 156.25, eff. Dec. 22, 2021).
 2022 N.Y. Laws, Ch. 24 (amending PL § 156.25, eff. Dec. 22, 2021).
 A. 4947, awaiting the signature of the governor.
 2022 N.Y. Laws, Ch. 497 (amending Vehicle and Traffic Law § 600(2), eff. Nov. 11, 2022).
 A. 9877, awaiting the signature of the governor.
 2022 N.Y. Laws, Ch. 219 (adding CPL § 570.17, eff. June 13, 2022).
 2022 N.Y. Laws, Chs. 246, 351, 252, 254, 321 and 242 (amending CPL § 182.20, eff. June 30, 2022).
 2022 N.Y. Laws, Ch. 486 (amending numerous statutes, eff. Aug. 8, 2022).